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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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FOIA ID: F00-009, Skinner
Date: 7/30/04

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. report	Re Gorbachev's New Style, 2p <i>R 6/21/06 NLS F00-009/1, #89</i>	ND	B1
2. report	Re Draft Soviet INF Treaty..., 2p <i>R " " " #90</i>	ND	B1
3. report	Page 3 only, re USSR: Arms..., 1p	ND	B1
4. report	Re Arms Control..., 1p <i>R 6/21/06 NLS F00-009/1 #92</i>	1/28/86	B1
5. report	Re Gorbachev's Sweeping..., 2p <i>R " " " #93</i>	1/16/85	B1
6. report	Re New Soviet Arms Offer..., 1p <i>R " " " #94</i>	10/2/85	B1
7. cable	281829Z Dec 84, 1p <i>D " " " #95</i>	12/28/84	B1, 133
8. memo	Henry Cooper to Ambassador Nitze, re pressures on arms control, 3p <i>R " " " #96</i>	1/22/85	B1
9. paper	"Next Four Years", 6p <i>R " " " #97</i>	ND	B1
10. paper	"The Allies and Arms Control...", 13p <i>Part " " " #98</i>	ND	B1
11. paper	"Public Opinion: Post 1984", 12p <i>R " " " #99</i>	ND	B1

RESTRICTIONS

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-- SPECIAL ANALYSIS --

USSR: GORBACHEV'S NEW STYLE ON ARMS CONTROL

After a year of numerous highly propagandistic arms-control initiatives, Gorbachev has now made a series of proposals that he hopes will look more serious to Allied and domestic audiences. The Soviets have clearly not written off negotiation with the Administration in preference for waiting for another. Gorbachev's new emphasis on NST issues and other weapons areas of US-Soviet bilateral arms control such as space suggests he is probing US intentions and trying to gauge what, if anything, might be workable in terms of a summit. After the critical Allied reaction to the SALT II decision, he may hope that the administration is under pressure to be more forthcoming on arms control and hence more receptive to new Soviet proposals.

Gorbachev remains cynical about the administration's desire for a major NST agreement, but he may see a reaffirmation of the ABM treaty, against the background of his recent more forthcoming START position, as providing an adequate framework for a summit accord. In any event, he has not written off doing business with this Administration. Rather, he is redoubling his efforts to bring pressure to bear against Administration policies and will aggressively sell the idea of a trade-off of strategic arms reductions for a non-withdrawal commitment from the ABM treaty. This, as well as the proposal for conventional arms control in Europe, is likely to find receptive audiences in Europe.

* * *

A year of learning. Since coming to power, Gorbachev has put arms control at the top of his foreign policy agenda. Despite a lack of experience in this area, he has become personally involved in forming disarmament initiatives and Soviet activity on this score has become more intense. Gorbachev's first initiatives were highly propagandistic, however, and not intended to advance any ongoing negotiations. In NST, for example, he initially chose a 50 percent cut in strategic forces perhaps because of its public appeal rather than as a real negotiating objective. On INF, he flip-flopped from a limited interim agreement to a European zero-zero approach.

He has also tossed into the hopper a broad spectrum of non-NST proposals, including a test ban, withdrawal of US and Soviet fleets from the Mediterranean, the idea of a comprehensive world security system, and radical reductions of conventional forces in Europe.

Gorbachev seems to have misjudged, however, the likely reception to his initiatives, particularly in Western Europe. The British and French quickly rejected his offer for direct talks, and he was apparently also surprised by the negative

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NLS FOU-009/1 #89

CW NARA, DATE 6/20/06

European reaction to the zero-zero INF missile offer. Although his plea for a nuclear test ban and nuclear disarmament found resonance in leftist organizations, European and US audiences generally reacted with cynicism. Implicitly acknowledging his lack of success over the past year, Gorbachev has openly complained that his peace proposals are not being taken seriously.

Signs of change? The initiatives of the last month suggest he may be trying to develop a new approach. Beginning with his May 14 speech, after Chernobyl, in which he proposed strengthening the IAEA and enhancing international nuclear safety, Gorbachev seems to be striving for a more serious image on arms control and international cooperation. While intended to appeal to governments, Gorbachev apparently also hopes to attract public interest in the proposals.

--The Warsaw Pact elaboration of the "Atlantic to the Urals" proposal appears deliberately crafted to appeal to West European audiences and set up a framework for including arms control in the CSCE process.

--The Soviets have moved off of their 50-percent reduction number (in effect trading propaganda for a more realistic negotiating goal) and modified significantly their forward-based systems and SLCM proposals. While still tied to SDI restrictions, the Soviets can argue that the new proposal meets many US concerns.

--The Soviets have finally dropped their insistence that an SDI ban encompass research. Although this has long been expected and, in practical terms, may not amount to much if the USSR continues to insist on a highly restrictive interpretation of the ABM treaty, it will be attractive to SDI critics and can be touted as proof of Moscow's serious intention to reach an agreement.

--The Soviets have recently expressed interest in bilateral US-Soviet space cooperation without their usual insistence that it be accompanied by an SDI ban. In addition, last week's elaboration of "Star Peace" did not--in contrast to the 1985 version--explicitly state that peaceful cooperation was contingent on a ban on space-strike weapons. The Soviets can argue that this shows their good intentions with regard to resolving the space issue.

--SPECIAL ANALYSIS--

DRAFT SOVIET INF TREATY--NOT SO NEW

The draft INF treaty tabled by the Soviet INF negotiating group yesterday represents no substantive change in phase I of the INF portion of Gorbachev's January 15 proposal. In contrast to the 1983 Soviet draft treaty (which limited but did not eliminate INF), the brevity of this text casts doubt on whether the Soviets see it as a final treaty. SRINF and Asian systems are not mentioned. It relies on NTM for verification, leaving discussion of additional means--such as on-site inspection--to the SCC.

Tabling the new draft treaty is largely a tactical move by the Soviets to capture the initiative once again and cast the negotiations in terms of their proposal. The Soviets probably do not expect us to see the draft as a substantive change in their position.

* * *

Timing. The timing fits the usual Soviet pattern of making a move immediately before or early in the round. This helps the Soviets during the round to play up the "newness" of their moves and their apparent eagerness for an agreement. It also allows them to demand an immediate US response and, given the inevitable delay, to paint the United States as obstructionist.

Simplicity. The draft cuts away much of the detail of the 1983 Soviet draft. This parallels the Soviet characterization of Gorbachev's January proposal as a simplification of arms control. It also reflects the fact that the draft is designed more to frame the debate than to stand as a complete recipe for agreement.

Limited scope/conditions still there. The draft deals only with LRINF missiles: Soviet SS-20s and SS-4s, US Pershing IIs, and GLCMs. It ignores not only US concerns about SRINF and Asian LRINF but also Soviet concerns about INF aircraft. No specific deadline for eliminating European LRINF missiles is given in the draft, unlike the five-to-eight years Gorbachev suggested in January.

The draft omits Soviet conditions not strictly related to US-Soviet LRINF (e.g., prohibiting US transfer of strategic--as opposed to INF--systems like Trident, barring French/UK modernization, or banning long-range SLCMs/ALCMs). However, the Soviets made clear when presenting their proposal that they have not dropped such additional demands.

INF prospects. Although Soviet statements have suggested that INF has the best prospects among the three NST fora, the treaty does not suggest that the Soviets expect an INF breakthrough. Indeed, the Soviet transfer of some of their

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CW NARA, DATE 6/21/06

more experienced INF negotiators to START suggests Moscow could again play down INF in this round, following their roller-coaster pattern of raising and then dashing hopes for progress.

Text highlights.

- The draft provides that the United States and USSR would agree to dismantle or destroy LRINF missiles, launchers, and support equipment and facilities "in the European zone" and not station LRINF there in the future. Unlike the 1983 Soviet draft treaty, there are no references to conversion or replacement of systems.
- "The European zone" remains Europe, Turkey, and the Soviet Transcaucasia, and adjacent waters.
- Provisions apply to missiles for launchers that are operational, stored, or in overhaul or conversion. Unlike the 1983 Soviet draft treaty, they do not specifically apply to missiles under construction (presumably missiles produced in the European USSR for deployment in Asia), but do apply to those at troop-training centers.
- Parties will not circumvent the agreement in any manner-- particularly through transfer of medium-range missiles, launchers, or components to third countries, or through stationing these missiles or launchers in third states outside the European zone but within range of the territory of the other party. Presumably, this last clause is intended to preclude subsequent US deployments in Asia.
- Verification is only by NTM (with a SALT II-type non-interference clause); in the SCC the parties "may" work out additional cooperative measures contributing to NTM, including, "where necessary, on-site inspection, on the understanding that verification measures shall correspond to the scope and nature of the obligations." Thus, any potential verification measures beyond NTM apparently would not be discussed until after the agreement is signed.
- The agreement is of unlimited duration. It may be replaced in the future by a more complete accord on medium-range nuclear systems in Europe.

Bottom line. In line with the Soviet view that our February 1986 proposal was not worth discussing, this draft basically ignores the most recent US proposal. Furthermore, it incorporates a number of Soviet positions that the United States has previously rejected: it bars transferring medium-range missile systems to NATO allies, fails to limit Soviet Asian INF, bans missile conversion, and specifies NTM only as an initially agreed verification method.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 30, 1986

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI *JL*

SUBJECT: Article on Soviet Disarmament Proposal

I believe that the attached article makes some very valid points about the risks of not telling the public the truth about Soviet arms control behavior.

Attachment:

Tab I Newspaper article

Snake Oil From Moscow

By COLIN S. GRAY

Why are some political leaders so reluctant to tell the truth about the Soviet Union and its disarmament proposals? Far from being "very grateful for the offer" to eliminate all nuclear weapons in a three-stage process advanced by Mikhail Gorbachev on Jan. 15, President Reagan could have said that the offer was utterly trivial, indeed, it was even insulting to the intelligence of reasonable people in the West, and that it was the kind of initiative that gives the Geneva process a bad name.

The case for the mendacious triviality of the new Gorbachev offer may be stated succinctly as follows: In the Soviet Union we have a country of known, indeed, incontestable, bad character that would have the motive, the opportunity and the means to cheat. The U.S. and other NATO governments know this, the Soviet leadership knows that they know this, so why must Mr. Reagan play at "let's pretend" to treat the new Soviet offer with respect?

Improbabilities

Two answers suggest themselves. First, there are—inevitably—a few seemingly attractive "nuggets" in the comprehensive Soviet proposal. Absurd though the grand design of the Soviet offer may be, our professional diplomats and amateur Soviet watchers harbor dreams of being able to construct a negotiable deal with only those elements of the Soviet proposal that serve U.S. goals. We know that the opponent offers to begin to eliminate all medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe in stage one (1986 to 1991-94) and to permit on-site inspection. But the U.S. can no more extract an attractive "stand-alone" theater-nuclear agreement from Moscow than it could negotiate, or even less possible, implement, an on-site inspection scheme worth the paper it was written on.

Second, Western leaders believe that their domestic political constituencies would not tolerate being told the truth about Soviet arms-control behavior. Some senior American officials observed that they would have been inclined to take the new Soviet disarmament offer more seriously had it been presented in private first. What those officials should have said is that the proposal is so ridiculous that there would have been no point in the Soviets presenting it in private.

For any proposal on nuclear disarmament to be considered serious, it must recognize that the West cannot disarm if it cannot defend. The U.S. arms control position in Geneva recognizes the necessary

relationship between disarmament and strategic defense; the Soviet position reverses strategic common sense and mandates that there shall be no disarmament if the U.S. deploys new strategic defenses. Yet the official public response from Washington is producing a serious self-inflicted political wound. Mr. Reagan will be placed under pressure to respond in some positive way, show an "enlightened flexibility"—not, as some American media pundits allege, because Mr. Gorbachev has taken the initiative, but rather because the White House did not move swiftly, surely and persuasively to call snake oil snake oil.

The Soviet Union is offering, or pretending to offer (since both sides know that this is strictly political theater), attractive items within the steel band of a rigorous prohibition on SDI development, testing

panding, and strategically an increasingly serious, pattern of Soviet noncompliance with existing treaties and agreements.

2) Cheating on arms-control agreements is always a serious matter. However, the ambiguity over compliance that, in strict security terms, we can tolerate when nuclear arsenals house thousands of weapons is altogether different from a situation where we know we have zero nuclear weapons and the Soviets claim that there are at zero also.

3) The issue is not the desirability of complete nuclear disarmament; rather, it is the impossibility of verifying compliance, or continuing compliance, with such a scheme. The Soviet Union is the largest country on earth, and a police state.

4) On-site inspection can be helpful, as the U.S. has long maintained. But there is

The U.S. can no more extract an attractive "stand-alone" theater-nuclear pact than it can negotiate an on-site inspection plan worth the paper it was printed on.

and deployment. Many people in the U.S. and in Western Europe likely either are convinced or are convincible that the SDI stands in the way of complete nuclear disarmament—which is, of course, Mr. Gorbachev's objective.

To some people it will seem that Mr. Gorbachev has offered a seemingly detailed (phases with dates), superior (all nuclear weapons) and practical scheme for nuclear disarmament, as contrasted with Mr. Reagan's dream of effective defenses one day. Moreover, the Gorbachev scheme, given its hints at collateral designs for other elements of military power, would save money at a great rate, whereas Mr. Reagan's SDI certainly must cost at least several hundred billion dollars and even then its effectiveness likely will be questionable.

The key to effectively explaining the utterly unacceptable character of the Soviet proposal lies in Mr. Reagan's speech writers assembling, and interrelating, three themes that already have appeared many times in presidential rhetoric: commitment to (nuclear) disarmament; the Soviet propensity to lie and cheat; and SDI. The truth wouldn't hurt us. Tersely stated, the major points the administration should register publicly, promptly, in its considered reply to the new Soviet offer are:

1) The U.S.S.R. cheats on arms-control agreements. The U.S. has verified an ex-

no way that a combination of satellite surveillance and reconnaissance and teams of foreign inspectors could verify that the Soviet Union had no nuclear weapons stored in bunkers in its forests, in mine shafts or in innocent-seeming buildings.

5) The Soviet Union has been constructing nuclear weapons since the late 1940s in conditions of the utmost secrecy. The U.S. as an open society, does not give the Soviets anything remotely resembling the verification problem that they pose. The U.S. knows with considerable, though not absolute, assurance how many nuclear weapons the Soviet Union has deployed on its operational delivery vehicles. But we do not know exactly how many nuclear weapons the Soviet Union has produced over the years, nor how many delivery vehicles the Soviet Union has built in secret and "warehoused." The U.S. government has long been concerned about the large difference between the estimated production runs of some strategic weapons and the numbers that it sees deployed or expended in tests.

6) The Soviets cheat today on agreements over items that, in some cases, are of only slight or modest strategic value to them. How could they resist cheating in a situation where cheating would be ludicrously easy, while the reward could be domination of the world?

7) Complete or even very substantial nuclear disarmament will be tolerable for

Western security only if we deploy very effective strategic defenses. The logic is absolutely inexorable. We know that the Soviet Union is not to be trusted; indeed, all shades of opinion on arms control in the U.S. agree that no arms-control agreement of major security significance can rest on trust alone. Only deployed defenses in the West would serve adequately both to deter the Soviet Union from cheating on a comprehensive nuclear-disarmament agreement—that is to say they would need to cheat on a gigantic scale in order to achieve a militarily useful illegal nuclear arsenal—and to enable us to live with the inevitable uncertainties over Soviet compliance.

A nuclear-disarmament regime that, thanks to strategic defenses, was robust against unpleasant nuclear surprises also would need to be proofed against conventional aggression. Strategic defense could protect all NATO countries as they mobilize to resist attack.

Strategic Defenses Needed

Americans and Western Europeans approve of arms-control activity because they seem to believe that in some mysterious way arms control promotes political confidence and peace. However, those same people, time after time when polled, have no difficulty crediting Moscow with a willingness to cheat on treaties. The time is long overdue for the administration to assemble its national security policy story in one package. The public should be told that Mr. Gorbachev has trivialized the Geneva process by introducing a grand design that he knows is fundamentally unacceptable. The goal of eliminating nuclear weapons can be pursued, and would be practical to implement safely, only if the West can develop, test and deploy strategic defenses.

In saying that he is "grateful" for the new Soviet plan, and that "it's just about the first time that anyone has ever proposed actually eliminating nuclear weapons," the president contributes to confusion at home, fuels pressure for an unwise "flexibility" over essentials in his own currently sound policy, and generally gives credit that Mr. Gorbachev in no way deserves.

Mr. Gray is president of the National Institute for Public Policy, a Fairfax, Va., group studying military-strategy issues under foundation and government contract. He is a member of President Reagan's outside advisory panel on arms control.

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BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH - ANALYSIS - JANUARY 28, 1986

1. ARMS CONTROL: SOVIET MOVES ON NON-NUCLEAR NEGOTIATIONS

Gorbachev's surprise arms control initiative included eye-catching moves on CDE, MBFR, and the CW talks in Geneva. He implied that the Soviets may be moving closer to accepting some form of on-site inspection, but in no case does it appear that Moscow is prepared to meet US verification requirements. The Soviets probably hope that positive allied and public reaction to these initiatives will constrain us from pressing for further concessions. Negotiations, which resume this week, will present opportunities to distinguish between propaganda and progress.

* * *

On CDE, Gorbachev made two positive statements. His offer to "carry the question of naval activity" to the next stage of the negotiations removed a roadblock and implied that, like the United States, the Soviets may now wish to limit post-Stockholm work to confidence-building measures. His apparent willingness to lower the notification threshold also suggests room for compromise. We nevertheless expect that major differences will remain over the details of our package, and do not know whether the Soviets will insist that we make concessions on the non-first-use statement they demand. Also, Gorbachev still wants to include independent air activities, a proposal the US considers unacceptable because it would restrict military flexibility and be difficult to verify.

On MBFR the Soviet leader was less forthcoming. He repeated a willingness (expressed in 1983, but dropped in 1985) to accept "reasonable monitoring," including permanently rather than temporarily manned exit and entry points. This may tacitly acknowledge that some additional mechanism is needed to ensure that troops are not surreptitiously reintroduced, but it falls far short of our requirement for inspection throughout the reduction area to resolve the data dispute as well as to guard against cheating. We believe the Soviets will probably continue to claim this would be unnecessarily intrusive, particularly given our small proposed reductions, but they may prepare a counterproposal that may include a token verification regime.

Gorbachev broke new ground by agreeing to declare in the Geneva conference on disarmament the location of CW production sites and discuss procedures for monitoring plant and stockpile destruction, referring specifically to the possibility of on-site verification. Specifying production sites could open the prospect for an agreed data base. He conspicuously avoided reference to on-site inspection by challenge, however, an essential safeguard against subsequent cheating. He may count on allied skepticism about that idea to produce a groundswell for a softer agreement.

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--SPECIAL ANALYSIS--

USSR: GORBACHEV'S SWEEPING ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS

In a major statement on arms control reminiscent of Khrushchev, Gorbachev has publicly proposed that all nuclear weapons be eliminated by the end of the century and suggested a specific timetable for reaching that goal. Although highly propagandistic and aimed at appealing to the imagination of public audiences, the sweeping proposal does not play down the value of interim arms control measures--as Khrushchev's proposals for general and complete disarmament did--but rather calls for progress in each of the arms control fora.

A more detailed presentation of the proposal may be coming, perhaps as a draft treaty at the UN. In the meantime, the proposal--which includes a three-month extension of the nuclear-testing moratorium--gives Gorbachev a peace platform that will be appealing to the party congress next month. It contains a specific plan for action absent from the earlier party program.

The primary target of the new proposal is the United States. Referring to the administration's professed wish to eliminate nuclear weapons, Gorbachev stated that the United States is now being given "a practical opportunity to do just that." Gorbachev hopes to increase pressure on the administration to be more forthcoming on arms control, and he probably sees the new proposal as the basis for a statement of principles at this year's summit.

* * *

Using the new year and the need for new ways of thinking as his general theme, Gorbachev stated that the politburo had adopted a number of foreign policy decisions, the first being a plan for the complete liquidation of nuclear weapons by 1999. Although Gorbachev's predecessors have paid lip service to the idea of general and complete disarmament, it has not been touted as a realistic objective since Khrushchev. Gorbachev has now presented a detailed timetable:

--The first stage, or the next 5-8 years, largely involves proposals already under discussion in Geneva: initiating the Soviet 50 percent reduction proposal, an SDI ban, and the elimination of INF missiles in Europe. In addition, nuclear testing would end.

--The second stage, to begin no later than 1990 (sic), will see the 50-percent reduction completed, other nuclear powers beginning to carry out nuclear disarmament, and the elimination of all tactical nuclear weapons.

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--The third stage, no later than 1995, will see all remaining nuclear arms gone and a "universal accord on ensuring that these weapons are never renewed again." Verification will be by national technical means and on-site inspections.

Relation to NST. Introduced literally on the eve of the fourth round, the disarmament appeal gives the appearance of a dynamic new Soviet initiative without making concrete changes in their existing proposals. Indeed, in his discussion of the talks, Gorbachev emphasized primarily the need to stop SDI before reducing strategic arms, stating that "this must be said bluntly and for all to hear."

Testing moratorium. Stating that the USSR had every right to renew nuclear tests as of January 1, 1986, Gorbachev nevertheless announced an extension of the Soviet moratorium for three months--indefinitely, if the United States also shows restraint. Referring to the 1963 limited test-ban treaty, he said that the USSR was in favor of extending it to underground tests. He repeated his call for a resumption of CTB talks. His position underscores the propaganda importance Gorbachev has attached to nuclear testing--again a la Khrushchev--and his view of the 1963 treaty as ushering in the first wave of detente.

CW, MBFR, and CDE. Gorbachev was upbeat on other topics, implying that in lieu of progress in NST, these peripheral areas could be the basis for a successful 1986 summit.

- While repeating the Soviet position on a chemical weapons ban, he also advocated "interim steps"--for example, agreement on not transferring or deploying chemical weapons to other states. He made clear that any such non-proliferation agreement should be multilateral rather than bilateral.
- On MBFR, he said the outlines are emerging for an agreement and that the USSR and its allies "are filled with the will to achieve success at the Vienna talks." He said that in addition to NTM for monitoring an agreement, it would "be possible to establish permanent monitoring points" to observe the entry of troop contingents. Nonetheless, the Soviets are not likely to accept the rigorous inspection regime contained in the western draft.
- Referring to "possibilities" that have emerged in CDE, Gorbachev said that if there is not time to resolve certain questions, "why not seek to solve them piece by piece?" He suggested specifically that the question of naval activity--one of the sticking points at the conference arising from Soviet positions--be carried over to the next stage of the conference.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

USSR - arms control

October 22, 1985

TO: Linhard
Wright
Kraemer
Mahley
Cobb
Sommer
Lenczowski
Dobriansky
Raymond
Mandel
Small
Djerejian/Guest
Korengold
Sable
Sachs

FROM: Steiner *Stene*

SUBJ: Guidance on Soviet Counterproposal

We finally achieved interagency clearance on the guidance for handling the Soviet arms control counterproposal. It went out in cable form on Saturday to all diplomatic posts and to pertinent military commands.

Attached is a copy for your use. The top sheet, without the word "Summary", can be used as a one-page handout to describe our reaction to the counterproposal.

Attachment:
As stated

October 1985

ASSESSING THE SOVIET ARMS CONTROL COUNTERPROPOSAL

THE US WELCOMES THE FACT THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE FINALLY PUT FORWARD A COUNTERPROPOSAL AT THE GENEVA ARMS CONTROL TALKS THAT SEEMS TO ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE OF DEEP REDUCTIONS. UNFORTUNATELY, THE SOVIET PROPOSAL IS FLAWED AND SELF-SERVING. IT DOES NOT MEET THE KEY CRITERIA THE US USES TO MEASURE ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS, FOR EXAMPLE:

-- THE SOVIET COUNTERPROPOSAL WILL NOT PROMOTE STRATEGIC STABILITY SINCE THERE IS NO ASSURANCE THE SOVIETS WOULD REDUCE THEIR FIRST STRIKE CAPABILITY BY CUTTING THE SS-18'S THAT THREATEN US ICBM'S. INDEED, THIS CAPABILITY COULD INCREASE.

-- PROPOSED US AND SOVIET REDUCTIONS ARE UNBALANCED. THE SOVIETS WOULD RETAIN MAJOR ADVANTAGES IN WEAPONS, THROW-WEIGHT AND DELIVERY VEHICLES.

-- THE SOVIETS INSIST ON LIMITING US SYSTEMS THAT DEFEND OUR ALLIES IN NATO AND ASIA WITHOUT LIMITING THEIR COMPARABLE SYSTEMS THAT THREATEN OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES.

-- THE SOVIETS SEEMINGLY INTEND TO PREVENT US FORCE MODERNIZATION (WHICH IS IMPORTANT TO MAINTAINING THE CREDIBILITY OF OUR DETERRENT POSTURE) WHILE ALLOWING THEIR OWN PROGRAMS TO PROCEED.

-- KEY ELEMENTS OF THE COUNTERPROPOSAL ARE NOT VERIFIABLE -- A MAJOR PROBLEM GIVEN THE HISTORY OF SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE WITH EXISTING AGREEMENTS.

-- THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO DEMAND A HALT TO THE US SDI RESEARCH PROGRAM IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT THEY THEMSELVES HAVE BEEN DEEPLY INVOLVED FOR YEARS IN STRATEGIC DEFENSE PROGRAMS, INCLUDING ADVANCED RESEARCH. THIS IS AN UNACCEPTABLE PRECONDITION THAT REMAINS A SERIOUS OBSTACLE TO PROGRESS IN THE TALKS.

BY CONTRAST, THE US HAS SOUND PROPOSALS ON THE TABLE IN GENEVA THAT WOULD SHARPLY REDUCE OFFENSIVE FORCES IN AN EQUITABLE WAY. US NEGOTATORS HAVE CONSIDERABLE FLEXIBILITY TO SEEK DEEP, STABLE, AND VERIFIABLE REDUCTIONS.

THE US INTENDS TO WORK WITH THE SOVIETS TO SEEK A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT THAT MEETS OUR FUNDAMENTAL CONCERNS. IF THE SOVIETS PROVE AS SERIOUS AND FLEXIBLE AS THE US, MEANINGFUL PROGRESS CAN BE ACHIEVED.

ASSESSING THE SOVIET ARMS CONTROL COUNTERPROPOSAL

SUMMARY

THE US WELCOMES THE FACT THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE FINALLY PUT FORWARD A COUNTERPROPOSAL AT THE GENEVA ARMS CONTROL TALKS THAT SEEMS TO ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE OF DEEP REDUCTIONS. UNFORTUNATELY, THE SOVIET PROPOSAL IS FLAWED AND SELF-SERVING. IT DOES NOT MEET THE KEY CRITERIA THE US USES TO MEASURE ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS, FOR EXAMPLE:

-- THE SOVIET COUNTERPROPOSAL WILL NOT PROMOTE STRATEGIC STABILITY SINCE THERE IS NO ASSURANCE THE SOVIETS WOULD REDUCE THEIR FIRST STRIKE CAPABILITY BY CUTTING THE SS-18'S THAT THREATEN US ICBM'S. INDEED, THIS CAPABILITY COULD INCREASE.

-- PROPOSED US AND SOVIET REDUCTIONS ARE UNBALANCED. THE SOVIETS WOULD RETAIN MAJOR ADVANTAGES IN WEAPONS, THROW-WEIGHT AND DELIVERY VEHICLES.

-- THE SOVIETS INSIST ON LIMITING US SYSTEMS THAT DEFEND OUR ALLIES IN NATO AND ASIA WITHOUT LIMITING THEIR COMPARABLE SYSTEMS THAT THREATEN OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES.

-- THE SOVIETS SEEMINGLY INTEND TO PREVENT US FORCE MODERNIZATION (WHICH IS IMPORTANT TO MAINTAINING THE CREDIBILITY OF OUR DETERRENT POSTURE) WHILE ALLOWING THEIR OWN PROGRAMS TO PROCEED.

-- KEY ELEMENTS OF THE COUNTERPROPOSAL ARE NOT VERIFIABLE -- A MAJOR PROBLEM GIVEN THE HISTORY OF SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE WITH EXISTING AGREEMENTS.

-- THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO DEMAND A HALT TO THE US SDI RESEARCH PROGRAM IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT THEY THEMSELVES HAVE BEEN DEEPLY INVOLVED FOR YEARS IN STRATEGIC DEFENSE PROGRAMS, INCLUDING ADVANCED RESEARCH. THIS IS AN UNACCEPTABLE PRECONDITION THAT REMAINS A SERIOUS OBSTACLE TO PROGRESS IN THE TALKS.

BY CONTRAST, THE US HAS SOUND PROPOSALS ON THE TABLE IN GENEVA THAT WOULD SHARPLY REDUCE OFFENSIVE FORCES IN AN EQUITABLE WAY. US NEGOTATORS HAVE CONSIDERABLE FLEXIBILITY TO SEEK DEEP, STABLE, AND VERIFIABLE REDUCTIONS.

THE US INTENDS TO WORK WITH THE SOVIETS TO SEEK A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT THAT MEETS OUR FUNDAMENTAL CONCERNS. IF THE SOVIETS PROVE AS SERIOUS AND FLEXIBLE AS THE US, MEANINGFUL PROGRESS CAN BE ACHIEVED.

ASSESSING THE SOVIET COUNTERPROPOSAL

THE FACT THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE FINALLY PUT FORWARD A COUNTERPROPOSAL IN GENEVA THAT SEEMS TO ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE OF DEEP REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS A FAVORABLE DEVELOPMENT. IT SHOWS THAT THE WEST'S STRATEGY OF FIRMNESS AND THE ALLIED SOLIDARITY DEMONSTRATED OVER THE LAST FIVE YEARS HAVE PAID OFF. WE ARE PREPARED TO SPEND ALL THE TIME NEEDED AT THE CONFIDENTIAL NEGOTIATING TABLE IN GENEVA TO TRY TO MAKE REAL PROGRESS, THE SOONER THE BETTER AS FAR AS WE ARE CONCERNED.

SEVERAL DETAILS OF THE SOVIET PROPOSAL REMAIN UNCLEAR AND THE US IS SEEKING FURTHER DETAILS FROM THE SOVIETS IN GENEVA. HOWEVER, IT IS ALREADY APPARENT THAT THE NEW SOVIET POSITION IS DEEPLY FLAWED AND SELF-SERVING.

THE GENERAL OUTLINE OF THE SOVIET PROPOSAL INCLUDES:

-- A COMPLETE BAN ON WHAT THE SOVIETS CALL "SPACE STRIKE ARMS", INCLUDING RESEARCH.

-- A 50 PER CENT REDUCTION IN WHAT THE SOVIETS CALL "RELEVANT" NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLES -- SYSTEMS WHICH CAN STRIKE THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER SIDE. THESE INCLUDE INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES (ICBM'S), SUBMARINE LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES (SLBM'S) AND STRATEGIC AIRCRAFT. BUT, ON THE US SIDE, THE SOVIETS WANT TO INCLUDE OVER 1,100 "MEDIUM-RANGE" MISSILES AND AIRCRAFT IN EUROPE AND ASIA, AND CARRIER-BASED AIRCRAFT WHEREVER THEY ARE DEPLOYED. ON THE SOVIET SIDE, HOWEVER, THEY WOULD EXCLUDE APPROXIMATELY 2,000 COMPARABLE SOVIET AIRCRAFT AND MISSILES (INCLUDING ALL SS-20's) PLUS NEARLY 300 BACKFIRE BOMBERS.

-- A LIMIT OF 6,000 ON "NUCLEAR CHARGES" (THAT IS WARHEADS AND BOMBS) ON STRATEGIC FORCES. OF THESE 6000 WEAPONS, NO MORE THAN 60 PERCENT COULD BE ON ANY ONE CATEGORY OF DELIVERY SYSTEMS.

-- A BAN ON ALL LONG-RANGE CRUISE MISSILES.

-- A BAN OR SEVERE LIMITATION ON "NEW" NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS, DEFINING AS "NEW" THOSE SYSTEMS NOT TESTED AS OF AN AGREED DATE.

THE US NEEDS TO MEASURE THE SOVIET COUNTERPROPOSAL AGAINST OUR LONG-STANDING CRITERIA FOR JUDGING SOUND ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS:

-- WILL IT PROMOTE STRATEGIC STABILITY?
SPECIFICALLY, WILL IT STRENGTHEN OR DECREASE THE DESTABILIZING FIRST STRIKE CAPABILITY WHICH THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN BUILDING? WHILE UNDER THE SOVIET PROPOSAL THEIR ICBM WARHEADS WOULD BE LIMITED TO 3600, THERE IS NO ASSURANCE THAT THE NUMBER OF SS-18'S WHICH POSE THE GREATEST THREAT TO US ICBM'S WOULD BE REDUCED. IN FACT, GIVEN A REDUCTION IN US LAND-BASED MISSILES, SOVIET ADVANTAGES WOULD BE FURTHER INCREASED.

-- ARE THE REDUCTIONS EQUITABLE AND STRATEGICALLY SIGNIFICANT? WHILE THE SOVIETS APPEAR TO HAVE PROPOSED MAJOR REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC FORCES, THE STRATEGIC EFFECTS OF THESE REDUCTIONS WOULD BE VERY UNEQUAL SINCE THE SOVIETS WOULD INCLUDE US MEDIUM RANGE SYSTEMS, BUT NOT COMPARABLE SOVIET SYSTEMS. THEY WOULD RETAIN MAJOR QUANTITATIVE ADVANTAGES IN WEAPONS, THROW-WEIGHT AND DELIVERY VEHICLES AND THESE COULD EVEN INCREASE.

-- WHAT WOULD BE THE EFFECT ON THE CAPABILITY OF BOTH SIDES TO MODERNIZE? A BAN ON "NEW" TYPES OF SYSTEMS WOULD PREVENT KEY AREAS OF NEEDED AND PLANNED US MODERNIZATION (IMPORTANT TO MAINTAINING THE WEST'S DETERRENT POSTURE) WHILE ALLOWING MAJOR SOVIET BUILDUP AND MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS, SUCH AS THE SS-24, SS-25 AND BLACKJACK BOMBER, WHICH BEGAN ABOUT 10 YEARS AGO TO BE CARRIED THROUGH TO COMPLETION. IN ADDITION THE PROPOSED BAN ON LONG-RANGE CRUISE MISSILES WOULD SERIOUSLY DEGRADE ONGOING US EFFORTS TO COUNTER SOVIET FORCE DEVELOPMENTS.

-- IS THE AGREEMENT VERIFIABLE? AT SHARPLY REDUCED LEVELS OF ARMS, THERE COULD BE A GREATER INCENTIVE FOR CHEATING AND ITS EFFECT COULD BE GREATER, SO VERIFICATION IS EVEN MORE IMPORTANT. KEY ELEMENTS OF THE SOVIET COUNTERPROPOSAL, SUCH AS A BAN ON SDI RESEARCH, ARE NOT VERIFIABLE -- A MAJOR PROBLEM GIVEN THE HISTORY OF SOVIET NON-COMPLIANCE WITH EXISTING AGREEMENTS.

-- WHAT WOULD BE THE EFFECT ON THE SECURITY OF OUR ALLIES, WHICH WE CONSIDER INDIVISIBLE WITH OUR OWN? WHILE THE SOVIET POSITION MAY CONTAIN AN IMPLICIT ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRESENCE OF SOME US LONG RANGE INF MISSILES IN EUROPE, THE OVERALL THRUST OF THE SOVIET COUNTERPROPOSAL IS TO ADVANCE THE LONG-STANDING SOVIET GOAL OF REMOVING THE US NUCLEAR DETERRENT FROM THE PROTECTION OF OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES IN EUROPE AND ASIA, WHILE LEAVING UNLIMITED SOVIET FORCES WHICH THREATEN THOSE FRIENDS AND ALLIES. IT THEREFORE TRIES TO FORCE US TO CHOOSE BETWEEN DEFENDING OUR ALLIES AND DEFENDING OURSELVES.

-- DOES THE COUNTERPROPOSAL ADDRESS NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL ISSUES WITHOUT UNDERCUTTING US AND ALLIED CAPABILITY TO DETER CONVENTIONAL AGGRESSION? AGAIN, THERE ARE MAJOR CONCERNS ABOUT THE IMPACT OF THE SOVIET PROPOSAL SINCE IT WOULD INCLUDE LIMITS ON US SYSTEMS HAVING IMPORTANT CONVENTIONAL ROLES.

-- FINALLY, DOES THE COUNTERPROPOSAL PROVIDE A FRAMEWORK FOR PROCEEDING TOWARD THE EVENTUAL ELIMINATION OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WHICH IS THE PRESIDENT'S GOAL AND ONE WHICH THE SOVIETS CLAIM TO SHARE? THE SOVIETS HAVE MAINTAINED THEIR PRECONDITION THAT PROGRESS IN REDUCING EXISTING OFFENSIVE ARSENALS MUST BE LINKED TO A HALT IN THE US SDI RESEARCH PROGRAM. THIS PRESENTS A SERIOUS OBSTACLE TO PROGRESS IN THE TALKS. THE NEED FOR OFFENSIVE REDUCTIONS IS SELF-EVIDENT, AND WE BELIEVE THERE ARE AMPLE INCENTIVES ON BOTH SIDES FOR TRADING OFFENSE FOR OFFENSE.

THE US HAS SOUND AND CONCRETE PROPOSALS ON THE TABLE THAT MEET THE ABOVE CRITERIA. FOR EXAMPLE, WE HAVE PROPOSED A REDUCTION OF ABOUT ONE-HALF IN LAND- AND SEA-BASED STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILES AND A CUT OF ABOUT ONE-THIRD IN THE WARHEADS ON THOSE MISSILES TO A LEVEL OF 5000 ON EACH SIDE. WE HAVE ALSO PROPOSED LIMITS ON HEAVY BOMBERS AND THE AIR-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES (ALCM'S) THEY CARRY. WE HAVE PROPOSED THE COMPLETE ELIMINATION OF ALL LONGER RANGE LAND-BASED INF MISSILES, OR AS AN INTERIM STEP, THE REDUCTION ON A GLOBAL BASIS OF THEIR WARHEADS TO THE LOWEST POSSIBLE EQUAL US AND SOVIET LEVEL. FURTHERMORE, OUR NEGOTIATORS HAVE BEEN GIVEN CONSIDERABLE FLEXIBILITY IN THE MEANS TO BE USED TO REACH THE GOAL OF DEEP, STABLE AND VERIFIABLE REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR FORCES.

OUR ANALYSIS OF THE SOVIET COUNTERPROPOSAL THUS FAR SHOWS THAT IT DOES NOT MEET THE BASIC CRITERIA OF STRENGTHENED STABILITY, EQUALITY, STRATEGICALLY SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS, AND EFFECTIVE VERIFIABILITY. IT IS UP TO THE SOVIET NEGOTIATORS TO EXPLAIN THEIR COUNTERPROPOSAL FULLY, INCLUDING HOW IT ADDRESSES OUR CONCERNS AND CRITERIA. IF THE SOVIET UNION SHOWS SERIOUSNESS AND FLEXIBILITY COMPARABLE TO OUR OWN, PROGRESS CAN BE ACHIEVED.

BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH - ANALYSIS - OCTOBER 2, 1985

1. NEW SOVIET ARMS OFFER: LESS THAN MEETS THE EYE

The new Soviet arms package tabled in Geneva Monday represents a return to square one, as it is contingent on an SDI ban (including a ban on research) and limits US "forward based systems" but not Soviet LRINF. It is difficult to see how even the Soviets could live with the number of delivery vehicles (SNDVs) and warheads they have proposed. While it embodies some principles probably designed to appeal to the US--large reductions in delivery vehicles and weapons and a limit on the proportion of weapons carried by ICBMs, SLBMs, or bombers--the offer is clearly a propaganda attempt to put the ball in the US court, and thus creates a tough position for further bargaining.

* * *

In several respects the Soviet offer represents a return to past positions long unacceptable to the United States. Contrary to Gorbachev's Time interview, in which he allowed for at least some types of SDI research, the Soviet offer is premised on a ban on "space strike arms," including "scientific research." The Soviets also reverted to the pre-SALT I days by including US LRINF missiles and nuclear-capable aircraft in Europe, the Far East, and on aircraft carriers in their SNDV limits, while not limiting Soviet INF missiles and aircraft. The proposed 60 percent sublimit for weapons on one SNDV type fails to meet US concerns over heavy MIRVed ICBMs. Other aspects of the offer that are contrary to present US positions include a ban on all long-range cruise missiles and aggregated limits on ballistic-missile warheads and bomber weapons.

The core of the proposal is a reduction of 50 percent in each side's SNDVs (resulting in 1,250 Soviet and 1,680 US) and an equal weapons limit of 6,000 including US FBS (requiring Soviet cuts of 43 percent and a 59 percent US reduction). This is inconsistent with previous Soviet hints at equal SNDV limits as well as weapons totals. Our understanding of Soviet strategic requirements suggests that a level of 6,000 weapons falls well short of actual Soviet needs. A 50 percent cut in US SNDVs would be unlikely to lower Soviet weapons requirements much beyond 7-9,000. Furthermore, the reductions that would be required in Soviet MIRVed ICBMs, single-RV ballistic missiles, and bombers is inconsistent with the size and pace of ongoing Soviet modernization programs.

The Soviet offer is calculated as much for its propaganda effect as for establishing a negotiating position. To the extent the Soviets assume that the US is not ready to make a concession on SDI, they probably see the proposal--especially the dramatic offer of a 50 percent cut--as a means of biding their time while serving to generate more public pressure for a change in the US position.

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Working File's

Arms Control -
Soviet Positions

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I'd welcome your views on this

CW NARA, DATE 6/21/06

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

January 22, 1985

"think piece" from Hank. Steve

MEMORANDUM

TO: Ambassador Nitze

FROM: ACDA/SP - Henry F. Cooper *H.F. Cooper*

SUBJECT: Pressures on Arms Control in the Next Four Years

Attached are the four papers I promised dealing with the influence that the Soviets, our allies, the Congress and the public will likely have on our evolving arms control policy deliberations. These papers, originally distributed in November, have been updated to reflect the outcome of the Geneva talks. Our information and data we believe are current, but we could be a few days behind on some of the Congressional issues. Key bottom lines are as follows.

Major new arms control accomplishments in the next four years will continue to be extraordinarily difficult. Our negotiating leverage is not great and, where it exists, is based largely on potential rather than current strategic systems. Indeed, the areas of most Soviet concern are those where this Administration's commitment to redressing previous adverse imbalances promises in the future to undercut the effectiveness of major past Soviet investment in strategic forces (e.g., ALCMs and Stealth to counter Soviet air defenses and SDI to counter Soviet offensive missiles). They will seek to undermine US progress in these programs by all means available to them -- including propoganda and public diplomacy tactics intended to pressure us through the Allies, our Congress, our free institutions and our publics. And this activity will be conducted in an atmosphere charged with expectations about continued US efforts and initiatives on arms control.

Our past efforts in START and INF suggest that Soviet willingness to accept major negotiated shifts in the nuclear balance, or even seriously to interfere with near-term Soviet procurement programs, is extremely limited. So too is our negotiating leverage which, even viewed optimistically, seems restricted to the deployment of ALCMs and Pershing II, and to the SDI research program. The Soviets do seem willing to negotiate about the removal of some of their older missile systems and perhaps about some R&D programs -- those not yet committed to procurement where the Soviets perceive a US technological advantage. Within these areas, however, the Soviets seem likely to tie progress in the Geneva negotiations to our being forthcoming on limiting SDI research

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and ASAT testing as well as to the state of the broader US-Soviet relationship.

This prospect is not promising. It will be even less so if there is perceived incoherence in US policy about the objectives of arms control (e.g., stability vs. reductions, interim steps vs. major changes), about compliance, about deterrence vs. defense and about our objectives toward the Soviet Union itself. In achieving coherent policy, we face several important consequential near-term decisions, e.g., on our interim constraint policy, on our rationale for SDI in concert with our strategic modernization program, and on our individual and integrated strategy for the three negotiations. These and other related issues will be debated roundly in the next Congress when for the first time in a decade our fundamental deterrent policy will be reexamined as a by-product of the debate on SDI, offense-defense and our other strategic programs.

Even as we attempt to articulate a coherent policy, we will be under a variety of outside pressures. Some pressures are alleviated, somewhat, by the resumption of negotiations -- but most are likely to return in a modified form. The Allies will be urging more arms control activity, better US-Soviet relations, and attention to issues, like INF, of special Allied concern; at the same time, we will be pursuing our own agenda with NATO of conventional force improvements, greater nuclear survivability, and enough burdensharing to assuage Congress. The two agendas will surely interact and may interfere, even if carefully managed. Many in Congress, like the Allies, will press for movement in the negotiations (which will be very counterproductive to our negotiations) and better US-Soviet relations; at the same time, we can expect both continued pressure for unilateral cuts in our research and procurement programs and pressures for clearer Administration choices on compliance, interim constraints, and SDI objectives. Of course, any such clear choices will arouse substantial opposition from one camp or another; but Congressional pressures will more likely be damaging to the Administration if it fails to formulate and enunciate a clear policy line of its own.

Public pressures, here in and in Europe, will both influence and be influenced by actions and initiatives taken by the Soviets, by the Allies, the Administration, and Congress. We can expect substantial support for a coherent Administration "dual" or "two-track" policy, that balances the public's concerns for US and Western security with its desire to seek better East-West relations and that minimizes the risk of war.

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Hopefully these papers will be helpful to you in thinking about how our negotiating strategy, public diplomacy and alliance management can be developed in concert with our national security programs to deal realistically with the pressures from these four groups. We have in some instances taken a "shot" at recommending some efforts and activities, particularly in the area of Congressional and public affairs, meant to reflect what we believe is already going on in these areas and to stimulate additional thought on how to proceed.

In any case, such a discussion of the critical components to be managed should aid in clarifying the critical problems -- the first important step in addressing them.

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As stated

SP:HCooper/ns

NEXT FOUR YEARS
SOVIET APPROACH TO ARMS CONTROL

In order to develop and negotiate a sound arms control agreement with the Soviets, it is important that we have an understanding of their goals and motives. This paper outlines Soviet doctrine, objectives, problems and the key features of the Soviet approach to arms control. This overview should serve as a background for analyzing our own and potential Soviet proposals, while providing a view of the outcomes the Soviets desire.

Soviet Doctrine/Goals

The Soviets view their relationship with the United States as adversarial. Their policies are developed within the context of a persistent, long-term struggle of two world social systems -- socialism and capitalism. They believe that over the long term socialism will triumph. The Soviets measure progress toward achievement of this goal by favorable (to them) shifts in the overall "correlation of forces" -- political, ideological, economic, social and military -- which put them in a position to dictate terms and limit their adversaries' response options.

The Soviets develop their forces based on these broad military and political objectives. Their military doctrine calls for acquiring and maintaining superior warfighting capabilities; a weapons employment policy aimed at achieving military objectives; resolute, centralized command and control; and the economic and social discipline needed to endure the sacrifices required by the state to achieve the objectives. The Soviets believe that success depends on having superior force at the point of attack, being on the offensive, deception of the enemy and maintenance of control throughout an attack, i.e. preemption of a US nuclear strike is clearly one of the tactical objectives, especially in a European conflict. As a result, they probably view their success (defined as destroying the US ability to retaliate effectively) in an initial mass nuclear strike as a decisive factor in the outcome of any future nuclear conflict.

The Soviets fully understand that their military might is their principal foreign policy asset and their efforts over the past 20 years have worked to shift the strategic balance in their favor. They believe that these large investments are paying off both militarily and politically. Militarily they have advanced both their offensive and defensive systems to the point that the key indices of strategic capability now or will shortly favor

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them. This is a key requirement of their concept of stability through denial of enemy capabilities, i.e., the world is stable when the US is self-deterred from opposing Soviet expansion. Politically, they have greatly increased their capability to challenge the West in "Third World" settings, as seen especially in Africa, the Middle East, and the Far East, and to influence our European allies.

The Soviets view their gains as critically related to their strategic capabilities and, as such, will design and negotiate arms control proposals to protect their current advantages and programs while working to achieve an even greater strategic advantage. They view the current US proposals and programs as an attempt to deprive them of the advantages they have achieved.

Problems/Decisions

The Soviets face a number of key uncertainties which could affect their ability to negotiate long-term arms control agreements. They are faced with new US defense programs which could counter the military gains they have made over the past 20 years. SDI, cruise missiles and accurate, survivable ballistic missiles, along with our deployment of stealth technology, will force changes in their planning and acquisition of future forces. They understand the need for survivable forces and are working hard to develop and deploy survivable systems.

They are currently in the process of developing their next five-year plan (the draft plan should be just about complete now), which will address the approach/programs they believe will ensure their current militarily superior strategic position and that favorable trends are maintained. However, the Soviets face some major problems that must be handled in the planning process. They have a stagnating economy which can be expected to get worse because of poor industrial productivity and poor agricultural output. These problems are fueling anti-social attitudes and practices (alcoholism and absenteeism) in the work force. They also face some long-term demographic problems which are reflected in changing birth rates and health conditions. The Soviets are coming to grips with these problems during the five-year planning process, which causes them to focus on domestic matters to a greater degree than usual, as seen by the special party plenum on agriculture. However, their internal problems will have only a marginal (if any) effect on their strategic force planning and policies, including those related to arms control. Soviet

leaders will not be so preoccupied with addressing these domestic problems that they cannot act decisively and resolutely on foreign policy issues, especially those that affect strategic and intermediate forces and space weapons.

The Soviet leadership is currently solidified behind President Chernenko. He was chosen by the "Old Guard" to ensure "business as usual." Consequently, Soviet positions have evolved along more traditional lines and they have returned to arms control negotiations. However, he has serious health problems that limit his ability personally to undertake a high-intensity work program. As a result, current Soviet foreign policies reflect a consensus position that is still greatly influenced by Foreign Minister Gromyko. In fact, with Ustinov's death, Chernenko probably relies even more on Gromyko's advice. This situation and their positions cannot be expected to change in the near future. While they are currently giving "lip service" to deep reductions, once talks actually begin their position will be geared to continuation of the advantage they currently hold.

When Chernenko dies, the Soviets will most likely go through their greatest leadership change in recent times -- the movement to "the next generation." This type of transition, coupled with the fact that, except for Gromyko, the members of the Politburo do not have foreign policy experience, will probably lead them to rely on what they consider to be tried and true measures to maintain or improve their superior military position. Consequently, they should not be expected to propose or agree to major new arms control measures that differ significantly from their existing position until the new leadership is firmly in control. This period of "indecision" could last from a few months or much longer after the leadership change.

Another factor, which should remain constant regardless of other changes and contributes to their inflexibility, is the Soviet arms control decision-making process. While the Ministry of Foreign Affairs provides tactical guidance directly to the Soviet delegations, the basic negotiating positions, and any changes, are coordinated by the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff. Consequently, the Ministry of Defense controls the decision-making process in the name of the Defense Council and Politburo. Even though Gromyko's influence is at its highest, the basic decisions must "go through the system." This results in Soviet proposals that generally reflect programmed force levels and make them fairly rigid and hard to change.

The Soviets also consider targeting requirements as a key factor when developing their proposals. Their warfighting doctrine requires that they have the capability to destroy the nuclear capability, force projection assets, and military/economic resources which support mobilization and the governmental control that would direct mobilization and recovery of all enemies they face. The Soviet damage goals are also high -- 90 percent probability of damage of all nuclear-capability targets, for example. These requirements, along with a reserve force and assessments of potential damage their forces might suffer if attacked before launching, probably translate into a requirement for over 10,000 weapons of which about 8,000 could be ballistic missile RVs. These requirements are a key reason the Soviets have been unwilling to accept the US proposals in the START negotiations.

The Future Soviet Approach

With these factors as a background, what can we expect from the Soviets in the arms control arena? As in the past, the Soviet approach will be extremely conservative with the prime objective of using arms control to aid attempts to gain additional strategic advantage. Their foremost goal will be to place limits on the US SDI research program. At the same time they undoubtedly judge that the negotiations will provide additional opportunities to influence Western perceptions and policies. They will work to divide the Alliance and to delay or stop US programs through public and Congressional pressure. As Gromyko noted in his recent television interview, the Soviets are presenting their positions on SDI, INF and other issues to the US, the Allies, and the whole world.

Over the next few months to a year, the Soviets will undoubtedly continue to proceed with their currently formulated plans, thus portending no major arms control breakthroughs. They can be expected to work through an active disinformation and public diplomacy program at undercutting both our domestic and alliance public support for Administration plans as they move ahead with their own force development and deployment programs, claiming that they are just reacting to US force improvements. Their near-term objective will be to derail key US programs which they undoubtedly believe could be curtailed -- SDI, the MX and INF deployment in Belgium and the Netherlands.

Over the longer term, they will likely continue to make unrealistic demands to gain the tactical advantage in the form of a US concession. We must remember that their overall agenda

should not be expected to change. They will likely remain stubborn and attempt to cajole us into changing our overall policy of deep reductions. They will work to further efforts they believe are achieving success in slowing US and Alliance military programs. The Soviet focus will attempt to place additional limits on US ballistic missile defense developments (by use of limits on the non-militarization of space proposals), the D-5, the MX, cruise missiles and the small missile (in this order) which, if deployed, could undermine their strategic advantage. They will also work to limit P-II and GLCM deployments, with an ultimate goal of their complete removal. In any case they will demand, either directly or indirectly, compensation for British, French and Chinese nuclear systems. At the same time, they will be prepared to pocket any US concession while working hard to develop and deploy systems which can enable them to increase their strategic advantage.

Their first priority will be to protect their silo-based ICBM capabilities. However they recognize the clear possibility of not being successful, so they are proceeding rapidly to improve survivability through mobility. If the US remains firm there is a slight possibility that the Soviets will make some movement toward limited reductions in ICBM force levels in exchange for stringent limits on SDI. However, such movement will be a last-resort Soviet move and should not be expected to significantly redress the current Soviet advantages. They will continue to improve their SLBM force and modernize their bomber force. These actions will reduce the US advantages in both these legs of the triad of strategic forces. They will also continue to place a high priority on defense. Their ABM programs have placed them in a position to "break out" of the ABM Treaty by rapidly deploying conventional ABMs and probably using new air defense missiles in a limited ABM role. They could deploy 500 to 1,000 ABM launchers in the 1986/1987 time frame. If they perceive that the US SDI program will be successful, they likely will counter by first deploying a regional ABM system designed to protect key leadership and military targets while pursuing development of a system similar to ours. They have been working on research programs for years that are needed to produce the capabilities required for a future ballistic missile defense. They probably understand that we do not have an effective penails program and that it would take us some 3-5 years to deploy counters to their ABM-capable systems. The Soviet air defense efforts will also continue apace in order to counter US bomber/cruise missile programs. Their look-down-shoot-down capabilities and improved SAMs will put our surviving airbreathing forces that must penetrate the defenses at greater risk. They will also be working hard on technologies designed to overcome US stealth capabilities.

The Soviets will continue to exploit agreements to gain additional advantages either by exploiting loopholes or through committing violations which they will attempt to cover up or explain away. The pattern of their actions is clearly explained in the Compliance Report to Congress and should be expected to continue. The pattern will not change unless the US takes strong, visible measures to counteract the gains the Soviets perceive were achieved through their actions.

In conclusion, while the Soviets would like to return to the era of the 1970s detente and its attendant benefits for them, they have not, nor will they in the future, rely on arms control to protect the strategic advantages they have gained through increased military capabilities. They will develop and deploy improved systems and cannot be expected to advance bold, new arms control initiatives or to accept major reductions which would, in effect, require them to restructure their strategic forces. The Soviets are "horse traders" and as a result will cheat us if they can. They will pocket any concessions and then ask for more, but not be bound by agreements if they can exploit them to achieve their ultimate goals.

Maintaining the strategic momentum will help the Soviets negotiate "good" agreements in their view -- agreements that ensure their continued strategic superiority. Even with planned US strategic force improvements, the negotiating advantages will be on the Soviet side because of the robustness of their strategic modernization programs. These factors all portend a long, hard set of negotiations in order to achieve agreements we can accept.

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The Allies and Arms Control in the Next Four Years

By OS, NARA, Date 6/21/06
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In the next four years, we can expect difficult bargaining with our NATO Allies on force improvements; in this effort new moves on arms control may play an important role. In the longer run, how NATO deals with these issues could enhance or degrade the credibility of the US extended nuclear deterrent and contribute to or resist political divergence between the US and its Allies.

The Setting

The recent Geneva talks, the resumption of negotiations without significant US concessions and our post-Geneva consultations have enhanced Allied support for the overall US approach to arms control negotiations with the Soviets. Allied interest in arms control has expanded from its near-exclusive focus on INF. Arms control is now seen as a proxy for US-Soviet detente, a state the Allies will wish to see continue -- and which, after a time, they will wish to encourage in their own way. Consultations will be critical to preserving the current Alliance solidarity.

Movement on arms control, the Allies believe, allows them more room to pursue their own agenda of trade and contacts with the Soviets and Eastern Europe, with fewer restrictions from the US (and from the Soviets on the Eastern Europeans, in their view); it reduces the need for hard choices between US policy preferences and domestic peace group pressures, although peace group pressures have been on the wane; and, of course, it reduces pressures for increases in European defense budgets. The substantive effects of arms control are not negligible in European eyes; but to most of the Allies they are distinctly secondary to these political effects. This European view will bear directly on our handling of the upcoming negotiations, particularly regarding the question of the "interrelationship" of the three negotiations.

Thus, the Europeans will continue to urge early US movement on space and strategic arms control issues, while continuing to urge attention to European substantive concerns on INF (and perhaps CDE). They will not make movement on INF a precondition for movement in START or defense/space; but they would probably begin to press us if there were substantial progress on START or space issues while INF subjects remained in contention or in limbo.

Within these broadly held Allied perspectives, there continue to be important differences among Allied governments. Britain, Germany, and especially France, are weighty enough in military terms to help provide for their own security. They will be more cautious on arms control, particularly about proposals that affect their own forces or force options. These states, as

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well as Canada, also take analytical issues seriously (and have access to much US intelligence data making them less dependent on US conclusions). The FRG has its special relationship to the GDR that is quite separate from other NATO policies towards Eastern Europe of a broad, though "differentiated" cultivation of economic/political contacts. Some smaller states--Denmark and, on nuclear issues, Belgium and the Netherlands--know they cannot much affect the substance of their own security, and are more susceptible to purely political or moralistic pressures. Others--the Mediterranean NATO states--are at neither pole, but focus on how security issues can be used for practical political or economic goals (e.g. the Italian goal of recognition as a key ally; Greek-Turkish sparring; Spanish negotiations on EC entry and Gibraltar). These collective and individual perspectives will shape Allied reaction to developments in US-NATO bargaining and in the US-Soviet arms control process.

These Allied governmental positions sometimes reflect--and in any case are constrained by--Allied public views. Recent USIA polling confirms that European publics see arms control as the single most important factor in promoting future Western security. There is widespread support for "blue sky" arms control solutions, such as a non-aggression pact or a European nuclear-free zone. The European public views a continuing dialogue with the Soviet Union as necessary to enhance Western security. On the question of INF, Europeans generally blamed the Soviet Union for the breakdown in negotiations. However, they were deeply divided on whether the US was making a genuine effort to get back to the negotiating table. The initial results of the Geneva talks should substantially alleviate this negative European view.

European opposition to US INF deployment remains high, although it is not nearly as strong in some countries as in others. This is likely to remain so in the foreseeable future. Paradoxically, most of the public believe that the INF missiles promote security rather than increase the chance of a Soviet attack. This probably indicates general European acceptance of the concept of nuclear deterrence rather than support for the INF per se.

Few in NATO countries support increased defense spending. There is a general consensus that spending is high enough and that individual European countries are doing their fair share. In any case, few fear a Soviet attack; most are confident that NATO forces can deter or defend against such an attack. Any push

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for conventional modernization would probably have public support if it did not require large increases in defense spending. However, support for NATO and the US troop presence in Europe remains strong. The most disturbing development is the relatively low confidence the European public, and particularly many Germans, has in the likelihood that the US will honor its commitments in Europe. For instance, West German confidence dropped from 52% in April 1982 to 27% in May/July 1984, according to a USIA survey.

KEY POLICY ISSUES

Important policy issues facing the Alliance over the next several years will have to be viewed in the context of the evolving threat and Allied force modernization activities, economic pressures and the general East-West relationship.

NATO defense: US efforts--directly and through the Secretary-General--to energize and integrate NATO conventional force improvements are likely to raise doctrinal issues of four kinds:

- o Conventional defense vs offense--how deep should "deep strikes" be; are they with aircraft and missiles only, or should we define a ground counter-attack doctrine; The broader issue is how "defensive" must we appear. There is particular doctrinal concern in the FRG; the French criticize deep strikes on practical grounds.
- o Conventional-nuclear threshold-- despite popular pressures against nuclear weapons, a mind-set favoring reliance on nuclear weapons and opposing sustained conventional increases is still entrenched in most Allied bureaucracies and is reinforced by strong resistance to growth in defense spending. (The UK and FRG PermReps take this view). In addition, some Allied officials argue that a relative improvement in the conventional balance only induces an offsetting Soviet response that nullifies our efforts. Finally, possible deployments of dual-capable missiles (e.g. SLCMs), requirements to improve nuclear survivability and examination of the role of nuclear weapons in deterring conventional war have political and arms control implications; these issues have already been raised in the HLG, and they will surface in any case as the NPG tries to agree on general political guidelines for the use of nuclear weapons.

- "Holes"-- to support increases in aggregate NATO capability, Congress will urge us to shift burdens from the US to the Allies. Such shifts will be hard to manage. Ideally, we could negotiate specific US-to-Allied shifts in nuclear or conventional responsibilities, but there will be budgetary and political opposition to this.
- Extended deterrence--the above problems are linked to a broader, longer-term concern about the credibility of the US extended deterrent. On the one hand, some Allied officials oppose change as publicly undercutting what they may privately believe to be an eroding credibility. On the other hand, more public discussion of nuclear issues, in the US and Europe, leads to more public pressure for alternatives.

Conventional defense improvements, and particularly ET, will also involve a host of technical, budgetary, burden-sharing, and bureaucratic issues of less significance for broad NATO policy and arms control.

UK/French strategic modernization: The French strategic modernization program is supported by both Socialists and Gaullists and should stay on track, with the first submarines employing MIRVed ballistic missiles being deployed this year.

The Thatcher government remains committed to the Trident II program

But the peak strain on the UK defense budget will be considerable, and another election will occur well before deployments begin. Labor opposes any UK nuclear deterrent; the SDP/Liberals would probably cancel Trident, but might shift to SLCMs.

British and French forces and their modernization will be raised by the Soviets in any resumed offensive nuclear negotiations. In fact, Gromyko repeated the Soviet position during the Geneva meeting that UK and French systems must be taken into account. Furthermore, the prospect of over 1200 third-country warheads assumes particular importance if we continue to seek to reduce US and Soviet strategic warheads to 5000. A final factor is the ~~impact~~ of strategic defense on

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French and UK decisions to modernize their deterrent forces. No doubt both countries have perceived a need to modernize in the face of growing Soviet offensive capabilities and strategic defensive improvements. The US SDI program is likely to be viewed, however incorrectly, as a catalyst to the development of more elaborate Soviet defenses against ballistic missiles.

Neither France nor the Thatcher government is likely to want to reduce their programs in an arms control context, or to include their forces in an INF context. They (particularly the French) will be unwilling to make any move prior to other key issues being settled. But if the third-country issues became the last key problem blocking an agreement, they might agree either to make a rhetorical gesture (e.g. willingness to enter a follow-on negotiation) or make some form of unilateral "no-undercut" statement (interpreted to allow planned programs). British opposition parties would press to go even further.

ASAT and SDI: While most NATO Allies now generally understand our position on a comprehensive ASAT ban and acknowledge the need for a US capability to counter Soviet targeting satellites, all have in the past urged some movement in the US ASAT position. Prompt acceptance of the Soviets' June 29 offer and subsequent Soviet acceptance of resumed negotiations in START and INF and defense/space negotiations without preconditions has helped to alleviate this Allied pressure. In upcoming US-Soviet negotiations on defense/space all likely would favor our undertaking negotiating initiatives that go beyond confidence-building measures to include concrete limitations on some range of ASAT capabilities. Canada and France are publicly on record as favoring a high-altitude ASAT ban, and other Allies have indicated privately their view that such an approach should be considered.

Beyond the specific ASAT issues, SDI raises Alliance issues of great substance. Allied understanding of our reasons for pursuing SDI seems to have improved. The allies are likely to continue their support for the SDI program as long as it is in the research stage. A problem will arise if the SDI research bears fruit and the US is faced with a deployment decision. Allies are liable to equivocate or even oppose going beyond the reserach phase. The French and UK are concerned that future US SDI deployments might undermine their national nuclear deterrents by leading the Soviets to make an otherwise avoidable SDI/ABM

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breakout. Most Allies are also concerned that such Soviet deployments could undermine the US ability to use its nuclear deterrent in defense of Western Europe (in a period when the credibility of that use is already under challenge). A reasonably effective Soviet SDI/ABM would, in their view, degrade our LNO/SEP capabilities and in effect make Europe "safe for conventional conflict". The notion of a defensive shield over the US, as depicted by many SDI proponents, suggests to many West Europeans the prospect of an isolated, fortress American detached from NATO/Europe.

Most Allied governments therefore would favor avoiding any such US and Soviet deployments; this, they are inclined to believe, can best be achieved either by unilateral US restraint, a reaffirmation of the ABM Treaty, or a negotiated deal. If we decide to deploy ASAT and SDI systems we will have to inform the Allies of our thinking in such a way as to convince them such systems serve their interests as well as our own. Moreover, as negotiations with the Soviets call attention to offense-defense links, we will have to present to the allies a credible and convincing view of SDI and offensive arms control, and of the balance between nuclear deterrence and non-nuclear defense. ATBM capabilities that will be developed as a result of the SDI could provide the key to solving NATO's TNF survivability problem. Secure and survivable NATO TNF would reinforce the linkage between NATO defense and US central strategic systems. They could force the Soviets to commit a major nuclear attack on NATO if they were to have any chance of success. ATBM systems would also be effective against ballistic missiles carrying chemical or improved conventional munitions and could thus strengthen conventional deterrence. These advantages of the SDI program might be useful in demonstrating to the Allies that support for the program is in their interest.

INF deployments: Remaining key events and dates include Belgian deployments beginning in March 1985; FRG GLCM (vs PII) deployments beginning in March 1986; Dutch base construction (which should have begun this fall and may have to wait until the Dutch reconfirm their decision in November 1985) and Dutch deployments beginning in December 1986; and the completion of NATO deployments in late 1988. Apart from technical problems with base construction scheduling, possible obstacles to completion of deployment include:

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-- the Dutch decision could again go awry (e.g. if Soviet SS-20 basing shifts allow Dutch GLCM opponents to argue the number of missiles associated with SS-20 bases has not increased);

-- the Belgian deployment date could be postponed. The Belgian government has made clear that its "internal assessment" of the starting date of any GLCM deployments would still have to be made in the first quarter of this year.

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[REDACTED] we stressed that their best alternative was still the March 1985 date. If the Belgians were to postpone the deployment date it could have two negative effects. First, it would encourage the Soviets to keep up pressure on the Belgians and the Dutch not to deploy and it would give them more time to do so. It would focus more attention, both in Belgium and in the rest of the alliance, on the issue. Second, and depending on the timing of the Belgian deployment date, it could complicate the Dutch decision which is scheduled for November 1985.

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[REDACTED] If the Dutch were to reject deployment this could then have an impact on the actual Belgian deployment. On the other hand, if either the Belgians have not decided or have decided but not yet deployed, they will not be "on board" at the time the Dutch decision is being made. This will eliminate the pressure that would be on the Dutch from being the only remaining alliance member not to have implemented the December 1979 decision. The earlier the Belgian decision is made the better.

-- support for a deployment moratorium could grow if the allies believed it would improve the prospect for agreement in the upcoming negotiations.

SNF/SRINF: The Allies have not exhibited excessive concern about Soviet SRINF countermeasures. However, if the US seeks an Allied welcome for new short-range systems (e.g. new nuclear artillery shells; an improved nuclear Lance missile), some Central European Allies may call in return for parallel NATO efforts in short-range arms control. Such efforts would be more focused than the global freeze on SRINF missiles included in our INF approach. As noted below, they might want to make this the subject for a regional negotiation.

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European arms control: The above factors, plus demographic pressures on manpower levels, may lead some Allies (particularly the FRG) to press for movement on MBFR. MBFR could also seem a candidate if the Allies want to surface new ideas for short-range nuclear arms control. (However, MBFR as a forum may seem too devalued.) Conversely, CDE Phase II continues to be of interest to some as a replacement of MBFR that also covers European Russia. CBMs--in any of several forms--may be of interest to Europeans even if effective reductions cannot be achieved.

Multilateral arms control: The major Allies also participate actively in global multilateral arms control fora--e.g. CD, NPT review, and the various UN bodies. In these fora, the dividing lines are not NATO vs Warsaw Pact, but looser groupings--a "Western" group, including our Pacific allies and some usually friendly neutrals (e.g, Ireland); European neutrals; the third-world non-aligned states, and the East. The positions of the neutral and non-aligned groups range widely in seriousness, technical coherence, and accessibility to US argumentation. Western positions in such fora may be discussed at NATO, such as at the semi-annual NATO Disarmament Experts Meetings, but are not closely coordinated there; and while Western coordination at the negotiating site is often close, it focuses more on immediate tactics than on the substance of policy. It is not common, but is not unknown, for an ally to differ publicly with us on an important issue; the French have done so in the CD on ASAT limits.

The arms control subjects taken up in multilateral fora range widely. Some are generally multilateral--e.g. some aspects of non-proliferation; laws of war; constraints on inhumane weapons. More important for the purpose of the paper, however, is the tendency of multilateral fora to be used to put pressure on the superpowers--and especially the US--to "make progress" on issues that may affect the international community as a whole, but that will be decided mainly by the superpowers. ASAT and nuclear testing are important current examples of such latter issues. Just as most Allies feel more attraction to detente as a political concept than does the US, so do most Allies feel more need to seem responsive to the political dynamic of multilateral fora than does the US (the French and usually the UK are the exceptions). Moreover, given that Allied governments are normally under domestic pressures favoring arms control activity, the renewed US-Soviet arms control negotiations should make it easier for such states to resist multilateral initiatives--e.g. on space. One benefit to the US of active bilateral or regional

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arms control talks is that it helps relieve some of the pressures on us in multilateral fora. The new negotiations should certainly have a positive effect in this regard.

Channels and Procedures

The US has used a variety of procedural channels in NATO on these issues. The formal mechanisms of NAC/DPC policy discussion and IS/IMS force planning reviews; the CNAD structure linking national defense R&D organizations; US-chaired committees (like the SCG and HLG) that are mandated by and report to Ministers, but otherwise work fairly independently; informal coordination between DOD and SACEUR/CINCEUR; bilateral consultations with individual countries in NATO issues and on bilateral issues; and informal consultations with the Secretary-General. These each have their virtues; but there appears to be an inevitable tendency for the proliferation of channels to cause confusion and friction, and for older "high-priority" procedures to become routinized, and for newer "high priority" procedures to be superimposed on (not replace) earlier formats. With respect to the upcoming talks, this normal pressure may be exacerbated by the "interrelationship" between the three negotiations.

We now are helping the Secretary-General prepare for a new high-level committee to monitor his forthcoming package of force improvements. We might also suggest that, as a longer term effort, he examine ways of simplifying the current structure. Specifically, we should seek ways to keep coordination channels to NATO and to the allies individually on the new negotiations in from proliferating or from disturbing our alliance relationships.

Consultations with the allies on the US approach to the upcoming negotiations remain extremely important. The US should, however, be careful that it controls the procedures for consultations and can therefore control the substance of them. The following points ought to comprise our view on this subject.

- o The US considers alliance consultations to be extremely important in order to maintain alliance solidarity and promote an environment in which the new negotiations can be successful.

- o The US considers the SCG to be the appropriate forum for allied discussion of the INF negotiations. INF is unique among

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the three negotiations because it directly involves the entire alliance. Other arms control questions should not be dealt with in the SCG.

o The creation of new alliance consultative bodies, whether formal or informal, does not serve the interest of the US or its allies. The allies have only a marginal interest in START and Defense/Space. Moreover, the US should seek to prevent allied interest in these areas from increasing. Creation of new consultative bodies would stimulate alliance interest and promote among allied officials a sense that we are requesting their approval of our negotiating positions and/or weapons programs. In this regard, a "Quint" for discussion of space, defense, or our SDI program is not in our interest.

o We should however continue to consult with and inform the allies on our negotiating positions as we see fit. The process used during the START negotiations of briefing the NAC before negotiations begin and then again at the end of each round seems to have worked quite well. In the case of space, we could do the same thing. In the event that certain allies have a special interest in a particular negotiation, as in the case of the UK and the French with strategic defense, we should engage in more thorough bilateral discussions.

Implications

The issues above have both short/medium term and longer-term implications.

Given coordination among the Administration, the Secretary-General, major Allies and Congress, we may achieve, in the next year or so, a more coherent and integrated NATO doctrine and force program that addresses some key deficiencies, though it will not transform the balance in Europe. As implemented over the next four years, such a program may at least slow the Allied decline from a 3%-4% real growth goal and may produce a useful gain in the efficient use of Alliance resources. But there will be resistance to a major reallocation of resources to defense. Many Allies will claim economic and political force majeure as they struggle out of recession and face renewed demands for growth in social spending; and they will continue to be resistant to the need for major improvements on any but Congressional grounds.

European anti-nuclear sensitivities will continue, but probably at a reduced pitch. Europeans may seek to avoid the

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consequent requirement for major conventional improvements by semi-public disagreements with us over the severity of the Pact threat and over NATO force effectiveness--they will say the former is smaller, and the latter greater, than we believe (e.g. the new German SPD paper on the European balance). To the extent that nuclear allergies do lead to action, a preferential reduction of European nuclear roles is more likely to be sought by some Allies than any coherent European assumption of conventional missions in replacement of US nuclear missions. We will have to keep pressures on the Europeans for aggregate increases in capability; however, if Carrington in fact takes an active role on this issue it may ease the pressure on us. At the same time, there may be particular cases in which US agreement to selective European nuclear reductions can be part of bargains for more conventional effort--the Dutch may offer such an opportunity.

When LRINF negotiations start up again, there may be Allied interest in a specialized European regional forum for short-range (SNF) and SRINF arms control. MBFR and a CDE Phase II are existing candidates. However, the technical prospects for such negotiations would not be promising, since, at these ranges, most systems on each side are dual-capable, and delivery systems always exceed the numbers of nuclear bombs and warheads. Negotiated reductions in such delivery systems would tend to limit conventional, not nuclear capability, while verifiable reductions in nuclear stockpiles would be hard to devise. The conflict between these problems and public pressures may cause a resurgence in interest in nuclear free zones of more or less limited scope or in CBM-like measures; CDE would be an obvious forum.

In the longer run, NATO will have deeper challenges to face. Up to now, joint efforts of US and Allied governments have prevented surfacing the implications of declining credibility of the US extended deterrent. But anti-nuclear sentiments in the US and in Europe and a lack of success in the renewed negotiations in achieving significant limits on Soviet nuclear capabilities may together force addressal of this issue. There is the additional problem in the apparent contradiction between, on the one hand, the US call for a nuclear-free world and, on the other, our possible short-term objectives (continued INF modernization) and NATO's strategy of flexible response. SDI could push this contradiction to the fore if it is not presented properly.

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NATO's structure has proved hardier than many have thought, and these pressures may not worsen, or may be shrugged off. It is worth remembering that the Soviets have had a first-strike capability against US cities since the mid 1950's and a reasonably survivable second-strike capability since the mid 1960's. But there can be no doubt that the threat posed by modern Soviet TNF to Europe is quantitatively greater and qualitatively different than a decade ago. Gaullist analyses have for 25 years been arguing that the US extended deterrent lacked credibility; yet surprisingly little change in Allied positions or European politics seems to have resulted. But if these pressures worsen and combine, we might finally see a real threat of major change in NATO's basic foundation.

Choices

Even in the short run, there will be some broad policy choices facing the US.

-- With respect to force improvements we might have to choose between a relatively hard push bilaterally on key Allies for more spending and program/doctrinal improvements (with uncertain prospects of success and at the cost of some dissension) versus a consensus-building readiness to accept the best Carrington can produce without a visible US lead. An alternative might be to thread our policy efforts carefully between these two approaches. The Allies will be pushing us one way; Congress another. Congressional pressures--and even threats--will be one element of our limited leverage; trading nuclear reductions for conventional improvements, if we are willing, would be another. We should be certain that any such trades result in a net increase in military capability.

-- We may be also able to improve the climate for more conventional improvements by extra efforts on European arms control. Vigorous efforts on existing proposals, or new proposals in existing or new fora (e.g., a new emphasis on CBMs; CDE constraints; MBFR constraints on SRINF force levels or deployments) might, at the margin, improve Allied willingness to fund NATO improvements. Many of such new arms control efforts would have few attractions to us on substantive grounds; but they might be worth it if they improved the climate for a new program of NATO force improvements. The US, in focusing on arms reductions as the primary objective of arms control, may have underestimated the political benefits of sensible CBMs, although CBMs alone are not likely to improve Allied willingness to fund conventional force improvements.

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-- Our approach to the new negotiations -- START, INF, and defense/space and to issues of offense-defense -- will also affect our relations with the Allies. On all these issues, Allies have concerns about their own security, about the US extended deterrent that undergirds the Alliance and about nuclear arms control as a key element of a tolerable East-West relationship. They fear a combination of events and policies that lead to a worsened political relationship, an "unconstrained" offensive threat, Soviet defense deployments that could block NATO nuclear escalation and their national deterrents and US SDI deployments that encourage the US towards isolation.

Assuring the Allies on these points both through the development of our positions and the closeness of our consultations in the upcoming negotiations will complicate our own policy; but it will be essential for the health of the Alliance. Success would be at least conducive to progress on certain force improvement issues. It is also important to continue to dampen allied expectations for arms control with a more realistic view of what can be achieved and to instill the sense of patience required for achieving even modest goals, particularly in light of the expectations that the success in Geneva has created.

The best--or least unsatisfactory--overall policies will still have to overcome innumerable stumbling blocks; and progress will inevitably be less than we hope. Imagination, creativity and broad perspectives on the part of both the US and the Allies will be necessary to avoid sterile and corrosive confrontations over policy and its implementation. The chronic differences within NATO--burden-sharing, fears of reciprocal attempts to deflect nuclear risks, different assessment of the Soviets and the Soviet threat-- will threaten essential Alliance cohesion. These problems can be particularly onerous during the upcoming US-Soviet negotiations because of Soviet public and private diplomatic efforts at disrupting the alliance via the arms control process. Nevertheless, these problems can be manageable if we can retain controlled and candid channels of consultation and if we maintain a sense of common commitment.

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MAJOR DEFENSE/ARMS CONTROL ISSUES
IN CONGRESS (1985-88)

I. Introduction

The President's robust election victory and the Soviets' return to Geneva will give us a little more maneuvering room on the Hill this year. However, from an arms control and defense budget perspective we expect this session of Congress to be contentious. Changes in the leadership and memberships of key committees add further uncertainties to our predicting the prospects for Administration programs and policies. Increasing interest rates, budget deficits, and the potential for an economic slowdown could all, via Congressional action, impact on Administration defense spending and, in turn, on the interest of the Congress in our approach to the upcoming arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. The naming of 6 Republicans and 6 Democratic observers to the renewed US/Soviet Union negotiations is a clear indication of Senate interest in arms control generally and, specifically, the impending US/Soviet negotiations in Geneva. However long the honeymoon between the White House and Congress lasts this year, we can be sure that 1986, a Congressional election year, will be a more fractious one.

The security and arms control agenda for Congress go well beyond strategic matters, but Hill actions in these areas will have the most significant political interplay from the point of view of our overall national security interest--particularly in conjunction with their review of SDI program. Other relevant high-visibility arms control issues likely to be high on the Congressional docket include theater issues (conventional and nuclear as detailed below), nuclear testing, nuclear non-proliferation, and export controls. We also expect to see attempts to pass arms control resolutions stimulated by concerns for nuclear winter. Debate over developing an effective policy for dealing with Soviet noncompliance is expected to continue, at least among some influential Senators and Congressmen. The progress of this continuing debate could be important to Congressional support for the ongoing negotiations and in ratification hearings for any potential agreement in the foreseeable future.

II. The Stage

A. Impact of the Presidential Margin of Victory

The President's victory margin is sufficient to provide some positive effect during the first year of the second term, but it will require immediate and continual effort to convert the momentum of the re-election victory into political and programmatic gains in Congress this year.

Recall that the euphoria of the 1980 victory (which also included control of the Senate plus gains in the House) lasted about nine months, after which the liberal critics of the Administration in the media and elsewhere began to regain the initiative and put the Administration on the defensive, especially in the defense spending/arms control arena. Indeed, even today after the Administration has been proven right in its approach to East-West diplomacy--culminating in the return of the Soviets to the Geneva negotiations--liberal critics continue to downplay the policies of, and what has been accomplished by, the Administration. The pattern could be expected to continue in 1985.

It is quite possible for the Administration to convert the robust election victory into a political mandate, but we will have to wage a very good political/public diplomacy effort over the next several months in order to sustain the momentum. A basic problem is that much of the media (especially the Washington-based media) is simply opposed to Reagan Administration defense and arms control policies. Over time, this has a powerful effect on Congress and how Congress perceives public opinion on these issues. It will require strong and continual effort on the part of the Administration in the political/public affairs arena to offset this media problem.

The ultimate determining factor as to whether or not the Administration can sustain a post-election initiative in the defense/arms control arena will be the economy. If the economy can maintain slow steady growth over the next few years, we can most likely sustain much of the initiative. If the economy were to slide back into recession next year or in early 1986, it will be very difficult to sustain our defense program at increased levels of spending. The severe economic downturn that began in the later part of 1981 was largely responsible for the dissipation of the defense consensus that existed in Congress and with the public in 1980-81. This actually paved the way for the nuclear freeze movement in 1982 and made its appeal more attractive. When people are feeling economically insecure, they often times project this insecurity in other arenas, e.g., fear of war, etc. Furthermore, the liberals will blame deficits and high interest rates on the defense budget.

Moreover, great concern is the strong support in Congress at the present time for a freeze on the defense budget for FY 86

and substantial reductions in the planned FY 87 and 88 DOD budgets. These proposals would reduce the DOD budget by \$133 to \$163 billion over the FY 86-88 period. Such actions would reduce our leverage and thus undermine the US negotiating posture in arms control talks.

B. Political Trends in Congress (1985-88)

The democratization of Congress, i.e., the breakdown of the strict seniority system and the power of the Committee hierarchy began after the "Watergate" election of 1974. Until now, the Armed Services Committees of both houses have been the last to be affected by this change. Both of these authorizing committees are about to undergo significant change--especially the HASC. The weakening of the leadership of the House Committee was evident during the past authorization cycle; the Committee was beaten on two major issues (MX and ASAT) on the floor.

Leadership changes in both the HASC and SASC over the next four years will result in further dilution of the heretofore conservative, pro-Administration tilt of these two committees and their especially strong support for the Reagan strategic programs. It is also rumored that six professional staff members of the HASC will be leaving over the next nine months.

During the last few years, the HASC and SASC have been similar in that, on the majority side, the Committee membership is composed of senior pro-defense conservatives at the top level; but more independent, less supportive members at the mid-level. Yet, the junior members of the majority side of both Committees are more conservative, pro-defense, in the image of the very senior members. The implication being that at some time later in the decade we will be faced with a HASC and SASC leadership that is less supportive of strategic programs than at any time in the last twenty to thirty years. This change has, of course, already occurred in the HASC with the election of a new Chairman. This may be balanced, however, by the tendencies of the junior members (assuming present trends continue) to be more supportive of strategic modernization, especially strategic defense and counterforce doctrines.

This same pattern is also reflected to varying degrees in the Defense Appropriations Subcommittees and the Intelligence Committees of both the House and Senate--though not as pronounced, perhaps, as with the Armed Services Committees. Obviously, the election results of 1984 and 1986 will weigh heavily on the future politics of Congress and its relationship with the Administration; nevertheless, the above-cited underlying trends are independent of the election outcome.

In summary, it is important to note that the SASC is likely to be a less cohesive committee with fractures occurring within party ranks, rather than solely along party lines, on a number of issues (e.g., programs with strategic policy implications, SDI, etc.). For the next two years, Senator Goldwater will chair the SASC; he is retiring after 1986. If the Republicans were to keep control of the Senate after 1986, Senator John Warner would become chairman. Although Senator Goldwater will be strongly supportive of Administration programs, although his anti-M-X comment came as a surprise to many, he is likely to encounter more friction in the committee than has occurred in the past for reasons cited above. The Republicans will have two vacancies on the committee to fill. The most likely candidates at this time are Senator Denton and the newly elected Phil Gramm of Texas.

The defeat of SFRC Chairman Percy has resulted in Senator Lugar becoming chairman. There will likely be one Republican vacancy to be filled with no known leading contender at this time, although Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah is believed to be seeking the seat. Lugar has implemented a number of staff changes on the majority side. We might also expect the SFRC, as a whole, to play a more important role in future arms control hearings.

It should be kept in mind that committee jockeying can get hard to predict and can be contingent on numerous factors, some of which can be hard to know--these could be surprises. The Dole/Byrd arms control resolution naming six Democrat and six Republican Senators as official Senate observers to future arms control negotiations may be only a harbinger of things to come for Senate "involvement" in US-Soviet negotiations. Depending on how these dozen Senators participate as observers could complicate the development of Administration's positions and strategies in the upcoming negotiations in Geneva.

The election of Les Aspin as Chairman of the HASC could have a profound impact on committee staff in the future and the way in which our program requests are handled. It is, of course, too soon to know for sure.

The final point that must be stressed is that, during the next four years, in part for reasons discussed above, the Administration is going to have to work more with the Congress as a whole (especially in the Senate) rather than rely entirely on the defense committees to carry us through on key issues, SDI being a prime example.

C. Force Mix in NATO--Nunn Proposals

Senator Sam Nunn's influence on the SASC and in the Senate as a whole is likely to increase over the next four years. He will most likely use his influence and position of ranking Democrat on the SASC to press the NATO high-tech conventional initiatives and for reduced reliance on nuclear weapons in the theater. Others may join Senator Nunn in this endeavor and advocate that funds be transferred from the strategic programs to conventional force improvements. This is sometimes a convenient tool of those who oppose strategic modernization programs, but who do not want to appear anti-defense. This is not the case with Senator Nunn, personally, however.

D. Role of Bipartisan Groups

The trends toward certain bipartisan groupings in support (or in opposition to) particular issues in Congress that were most evident this year will most likely continue. Most likely, we will see Democrat/liberal Republican joint efforts to block SDI, oppose certain counterforce weapons (MX and Trident II), and to promote alternative arms control initiatives with regard to space weapons and possibly in START. This could also occur in the conventional force area, most likely with regard to some of Senator Nunn's proposals for improved conventional force measures, e.g., second echelon deep interdiction and Counter-Air 90.

In addition, we will most likely see pressure to continue the concept of the "bipartisan blue ribbon commission", such as was done with the MX, Social Security, and Central America, for the purposes of evaluating or determining Administration policy on controversial issues. This technique will be employed and advocated by those who are basically opposed to Reagan policies and philosophy in an effort to circumvent or dilute the direct influence of the President. Good candidates for future "bipartisan commissions" are arms control policy, the SDI, and our overall approach towards the Soviet Union.

E. The Compliance Issue

Congressional reaction to the compliance or noncompliance issue is in some respects self-contradictory in that Congress voices concern over Soviet arms control violations but does not demonstrate the resolve necessary for enforcement (i.e., greater support for US strategic force improvements). This was evidenced by the fact that questions of Soviet noncompliance seemed to have little impact on Congress's treatment of the FY-1985 DOD bills.

There are essentially three mutually reinforcing reasons for this apparent contradictory Congressional response:

- a) In the back of their minds, both Congress and the general public have always expected the Soviet Union to cheat on arms control agreements;
- b) the Congress perceives the public to be highly desirous of the arms control process, and Congress is attracted to arms control for other political reasons as well;
- c) the Administration itself appears uncertain, reluctant, and almost apologetic regarding the revelations of Soviet noncompliance that have already been made.

Furthermore, the above three points are reinforced by the fact that the media downplays the issue. It is suggested that to raise compliance issues is to further damage US-Soviet relations and indicates insincerity regarding arms control.

One issue where the compliance issue may become increasingly important is Soviet ABM Treaty violations and the US SDI. For the most part, support for, or opposition to, SDI is independent of Soviet compliance of the ABM Treaty (except for flagrant breakout). However, there are likely to be a few Members, who would otherwise be skeptical, who view the SDI as a hedge or deterrent against further Soviet ABM Treaty violations.

A related second potential pressure point on compliance may occur depending on the Administration's decision regarding our current no-undercut policy.

A final point about the compliance issue lies with how the Senate would likely treat a new strategic offensive arms control treaty in the next two to three years. Any new treaty would be carefully scrutinized as to its net benefit to US national security. If a new treaty were negotiated that reflected previous US START proposals (substantial reductions in Soviet ballistic missiles), verification and compliance concerns of the Senate would tend to focus on only the larger central features of the treaty (and the Senate would most likely consent to ratification). If, on the other hand, a treaty only mildly superior to SALT II were negotiated and submitted, verification and compliance concerns may very well deny the necessary two-

thirds needed for ratification. In this case, the Congress (specifically, the Senate) would find itself in the paradoxical position of rejecting arms control agreements, but unable to muster the support for a US strategic modernization program capable of providing the leverage necessary to ensure compliance.

III. Strategic Programs/Arms Control

While there will be various strategic systems specific issues over the next four years (e.g., MX, Trident II, ATB), ASAT and SDI will probably be the most controversial subject because of their broad policy implications, and because they will be the subject of upcoming negotiations in Geneva. This past Congressional session focused attention on ASAT and to some degree on SDI, but SDI will be the main strategic issue of the 1985 session when planned funding levels double. It will continue to be a central issue in subsequent years when the planned budget continues to increase. Because of the linkage between ASAT and SDI and the connection of SDI to the offense-defense context of proposed talks with the Soviets, we can expect a heavy arms control component to the debate which will logically relate all aspects of our strategic policy, offensive as well as possible future defensive systems, and possible arms control regimes.

Space Weapons/Strategic Defense Initiative

During the past year, ASAT served as the stalking horse for SDI in a program-specific sense. The Administration was notably successful in repealing the Tsongas language which would have required the President to certify his willingness to negotiate a comprehensive ban on weapons capable of attacking satellites. This success indicates that Congress recognizes that Soviet proposals to eliminate all weapons in, and directed toward, space are unrealistic. However, the strong lobby in that direction has not given up, and substantial pressures for significant limitations on ASAT and other space weapons will continue. In fact, they can be expected to increase in connection with debate over the consistency of the SDI program with the letter and spirit of the ABM Treaty.

Next year, SDI will be directly challenged as both a program/budget and policy issue. The FY-86 request for SDI will be double that of FY-85 (which was no more than \$100 million above already existing program activity prior to formalization of

the SDI). During this past year there was little direct debate over SDI from a policy standpoint (arms control, stability, etc.). Next year we can expect this to be at the center of the debate. Assuming the Administration successfully defends its program, and SDI continues to show promise, the intensity of the debate may well increase as demonstration and deployment decision times approach and particularly as the 1987 review of the ABM Treaty approaches.

The concept of strategic defenses enjoys wide approval by the general public in the US and, to a lesser extent, abroad. However, it also seems clear that the public does not understand the issues in any depth, and could turn fickle, particularly if Administration spokesmen seem incoherent. Consequently, those opposed to SDI on theological and doctrinal grounds will be seeking to neutralize and negate any positive impact that this public support may have on the Hill by highlighting any inconsistencies and flaws in the Administration's articulation of the underlying policy, the technical feasibility of achieving policy goals and a viable arms control regime. Administration advocacy for SDI and its policy implications must be very well coordinated, unified, consistent and well reasoned. And we have only a few months at most to get our act together.

Efforts to terminate and/or delay testing of the MV and other possible ASAT programs will likely be made again this year. Again, it should be emphasized that the controversy surrounding ASAT took on new meaning after the President's March 23, 1983, speech. Opponents of SDI on the Hill and elsewhere are fully aware that substantive ASAT testing limitations complicate to varying degrees development and testing of critical SDI components.

Finally, the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) is preparing a new study of the feasibility and desirability of SDI. This, along with other "public" inputs from the Union of Concerned Scientists, the Committee to Save the ABM Treaty, etc., can be expected by February of this year in time for consideration of the new budget request and policy reviews by various cognizant committees. The advisory panel for the OTA study is composed of 19 individuals prominent in the field, eight who oppose SDI, six who favor SDI, and five who have unknown views.

It is clear that SDI is an issue that the Administration must be prepared to take to the Congress as a whole; it will easily transcend the usual national security committees.

Trident II (D-5 Missile)

During the FY-85 Authorization process, the first significant effort to zero funding for the Trident II (D-5) missile occurred as a floor amendment. It was offered by Rep. Ted Weiss (D-NY) and received 127 votes. This year an all-out effort will be made by organized groups to halt further development of the D-5 because of its counterforce capability. It will be argued that Trident II/D-5 is a destabilizing first-strike counterforce system rather than a survivable, assured destruction, second-strike system as had been the nature of all previous SLBM systems.

While these efforts are not expected to succeed next year, the issue will receive considerably more notoriety than during the past session. The D-5 controversy will increase in intensity once MX/Peacekeeper appears decided one way or the other, and will resonate with debate over Midgetman and pressures to place more of our strategic forces at sea unless and/or until the ICBM survivability problem is solved--particularly in the context of pressures to continue interim restraint.

Interim Restraint/The Seventh Trident Boat

In October 1985, the US will exceed the SALT II 1,200 MIRVed missile launcher limit when the Trident submarine, the Alaska, begins sea trials, unless other missiles are decommissioned. Pressure by the Congress to continue the Administration's no-undercut policy for SALT II will likely increase particularly when new US-Soviet arms control talks begin this year. If the US continues its no-undercut policy, we will have to choose whether to retire a Poseidon submarine or to destroy Minuteman III silos to remain within the SALT II limits. Unless the Administration makes compelling arguments to the contrary, Congress is likely to insist (in its present complexion) on complying with these limits in the absence of aggressive Soviet action, and may argue for maintaining Poseidons (which are perceived as survivable) instead of Minuteman, thereby changing the distribution of triad force capabilities.

MX/Peacekeeper Missile-Midgetman

The future of the MX/Peacekeeper ICBM will likely be decided once and for all this year. If the program survives Congressional action next spring (an outgrowth of this year's authorization process), opposition may diminish since procurement will be further along, the missile will go IOC, and other issues of even greater controversy (SDI, Trident II) will be in full debate.

Prospects for the MX have been improved slightly by the advent of renewed negotiations with the Soviet Union. However, the gain in this regard has probably been offset equally or more by the budget squeeze. The perception of the MX (in its present basing mode) as a system of marginal utility makes it highly vulnerable from a budget standpoint. House Minority Leader Bob Michael is reported to have proposed that House Republicans agree to overall lower defense spending levels in return for Democratic support for the MX in some capacity.

While we may expect the Midgetman program to continue to receive Congressional support this year, we may also expect criticism to be raised regarding its cost and its potential first-strike accuracy. Congressional criticism may become more strident if the MX were to be cancelled and efforts might then begin to also cancel the Midgetman program based on the argument made by some for having all our missile deterrent at sea.

There is, however, growing concern over technical and cost aspects of Midgetman from pro-defense sectors in Congress. These may result in closer scrutiny of the program and sharper questioning of this program during FY 86 budget cycle in Congress.

Bomber Force Composition

The question of whether or not to buy more than 100 B-1B bombers or proceed directly to production of the ATB is likely to arise in this year's budget because long-lead procurement funds for additional B-1s will be required in the FY-86 request in order to preserve the efficiency of the current program (regardless of the timing of an ATB production decision).

The severe Congressional budget reductions may very well weight heavily on these bomber decisions. There is support

already, from surprising quarters, for continuing B-1 production beyond the 100th aircraft and deferring ATB production. When Congress addresses the cost/performance analyses of B-1/ATB, the B-1 option could look very attractive unless a convincing case can be made for the ATB in terms of technical maturity, firm cost, and guaranteed performance that is far superior to that of the B-1B.

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C I

So far, support for modernization and improvements in C³ has continued with little controversy. However, there is a soon-to-be-released OTA study that is expected to raise questions as to the technical feasibility of C3I improvements of the kind necessary to ensure survivability and endurance. There is believed to be a linkage between this OTA study and the Brookings Institution which may publish the study (after it is submitted to Congress) with some media fanfare. Whether this will attract controversy to the strategic C3I upgrade efforts remains to be seen.

IV. Theater Programs/Arms Control

A variety of NATO-related issues are possible foci of Congressional attention; many, and perhaps all, could have direct or indirect implications for arms control.

LRINF

Congress is unlikely to seek to modify the remainder of the LRINF missile deployment program (apart from the issues of its inclusion in various strategic freeze proposals). There is likely to be continuing interest (mostly in the committees) in the fate of the INF negotiations; in this context, there could be resolutions that we seek: an INF moratorium if it appeared likely that negotiations once started again could falter; giving up PII if that would achieve a deal along the line of the "walk-in-the-woods" for a resumed INF negotiation. If, in the new talks, the Soviets return, as we expect, to their requirement that deployed missiles be withdrawn as the price for an INF agreement, none of these ideas is likely to go far or even be seriously considered.

Allied adherence to the LRINF deployment schedule may also be one element in Congress' view of Allied burden-sharing efforts.

SNF/SRINF

Considerably more Congressional interest will be shown in shorter-range nuclear systems. The FY-85 DOD Authorization Bill calls for two Presidential reports on this subject: one, due 1/19/85, on reducing pressures for early first-use and on theater nuclear reductions; and one on the final composition of the Montebello warhead withdrawals. (Insert on origins of these requirements.)

So far, there is no sign of Congressional interest in specific arms control negotiations on these systems. This might change if, but probably only if, the Allies or the Soviets advanced proposals in this area.

Raising the Nuclear Threshold/Conventional Substitution

The first Congressionally-mandated Presidential report noted above addresses this issue; it is also likely to be a unifying theme in discussions of conventional force improvements and nuclear warhead levels. To the extent that the Executive Branch and NATO can coherently relate their individual program initiatives to such a goal, bipartisan support in Congress should be substantially increased. Some initiatives from individuals in Congress like Aspin or Nunn are possible, especially if there appears to be a vacuum to be filled.

Conventional Force Improvements

The Armed Forces/Armed Services Committees will, of course, review relevant US programs as part of the normal budget process. In addition, the Committees are likely to put particular emphasis on

- a coherent ET program that combines Allied participation and moderate technical expectations

- progress on infrastructure and sustainability improvements, but there seems to be little interest in RSI issues.

Allied Defense Spending/Burden Sharing

Congressional interest in specific conventional force improvements reflects broader concerns about what is viewed as inequitable US/Allied defense burden sharing. The Nunn/Cohen initiatives of 1984 are likely to be repeated in one form or another, and the explicit or implicit threat of unilateral US troop withdrawals will continue to be a feature of such efforts.

V. Reporting Requirements

With each new session of the Congress, the Administration is requested to supply a whole new series of reports requiring arms control inputs. Including annual reports to the Congress, we are currently responsible for writing or inputting to about ten major reports to the Congress in the current session. As the number of reports required by the Congress increases, we will have to decide on how we will devote our limited resources in response. Moreover, we should begin to reflect on what we can do to stave off the increasing number of Congressional reporting requirements.

VI. Conclusions and Recommendations

While we may expect the President will have at least a brief respite from intense partisan politics at the outset of his second term, we can not be sure of its duration. Indeed, the anticipated return of the Soviets to negotiating in Geneva has already raised dire warnings to the Administration by its critics that the US pursuit of SDI and other strategic programs will cause these talks to founder.

. Thus, we must expect mounting Congressional pressures on a number of the Administration's programs (described above), particularly M-X and SDI. In the SDI debate, which we expect to be a heated one, we should expect that the Congress will focus, inter alia, on its arms control implications with a special focus on its implications for our adherence to the ABM Treaty. Similarly, we can expect some members of the Congress to focus on limiting the testing of ASATs, seeking, in conjunction with the Geneva talks, to limit our ability to undertake SDI research. Congressional concerns will, of course, be fanned by public and media criticism and, thus, any solution to the Congressional problem must consider dealing with the public problems as well.

We should begin to devise and implement an approach and a strategy that will help our cause in the Congress. Specifically, we should undertake to inform and work with key members of the Congress, and especially the Senate and their staffs. Before a detailed plan is adopted seeking Congressional support, we should undertake discussions with those members and staff who are supportive to elicit their ideas on how to proceed with this important task, and to assist in identifying what our substantive priorities should be. We should also seek to coordinate our Congressional affairs approach, to the extent possible, with our other public affairs activities.

A final word about the budget: It is increasingly evident that many of the Congressional actions on strategic modernization programs on SDI will be taken in an atmosphere of severe budget constraints not only for FY 86, but with even greater impact on the FY 87 and FY 88 DOD TOA. This could prove to be the overriding factor on many of these decisions, especially MX, SDI, and bombers. There is very strong support in both the Senate and House for making cuts of the following magnitude in DOD's budget in \$ Billion (TOA):

<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
-\$31	-\$42	-\$60	-\$133.

Reductions of this magnitude will undermine our arms control negotiating posture by delaying or canceling components of strategic modernization programs, as well as by sending a signal to Moscow that Congress simply does not have the political will to deny the Soviet Union decisive strategic military superiority.

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Public Opinion: Post 1984

The results of the recent election bodes well for the Administration and its policies. The overwhelming Presidential victory, coupled with the more modest success in the House of Representatives, gives strong indication that the country may generally support the national security policies of the Administration. Thus, the Administration, now having the momentum, can pursue its national security and arms control agenda. The recent agreement by the Soviet Union and the US to resume START, INF and space/defense negotiations is a clear indication of the Soviet belief in the administrations public support.

A carefully crafted public diplomacy campaign will still be required to support specific policies put forth in the coming year (appropriations for SDI and the strategic modernization program) and to sustain the momentum as long as possible. To the extent that the Administration appears "befuddled" in its approach to national security issues, there is a potential for effective criticism and waning public support, particularly on controversial issues (e.g., MX).

The Administration needs to prepare a vigorous public diplomacy campaign, directed at the Congress, the American people, and our allies. Such a campaign should be flexible enough to pre-empt as well as react to Soviet political actions, disinformation, and deception designed to influence public opinion in the US and Western Europe. This last point is particularly important in light of the upcoming negotiations.

A. The Domestic Scene

Generally, public opinion polls indicate that Americans are increasingly concerned about a strong defense but at the same time they are concerned about the possibility and consequences of nuclear war. They see the latter as a problem some years away, though. The level of concern for US-Soviet nuclear war is no doubt correlated, however falsely, to the existing tensions between the nations. Their concern for their own economic well-being takes precedence over their concern for nuclear war. By a significant majority they prefer to have a verifiable nuclear arms freeze and also do not trust the Soviets to comply with arms control agreements. They worry more about defense spending in times of recession and consistently favor pursuing arms control negotiations with the Soviets. They do not believe there can be a winner in a nuclear war, and by a large margin support the President's SDI program and the return to new negotiations. although a greater percent than ever are not optimistic about the success of these talks.

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The degree of public interest and concern for arms control and national security issues is high, but the public concern about the details of US policies and programs varies among the different polls. The questions and therefore the responses tend to be biased in favor of the poll taker or poll sponsor's point of view. The polls, however, seem to indicate that there is a large segment of the population who are uncertain and seem to fluctuate in their support, or antagonism, for specific arms control and defense policies and programs and thus can be influenced. The polls also state conclusively that public support for a given government policy or program is often the product of current print and especially broadcast media opinion.

The US freeze and anti-nuclear movements, while still very much alive, seem to have receded for now. While the nuclear freeze movement may be quiescent there appears to be no halt to the proliferation of books, articles, polls, lectures, and organizations on the effects of nuclear war, the need for arms control, and the need to lessen America's security role in the world, such as reducing the number of US troops in Europe. With an increasingly stimulated, if not more informed populace, we can expect an ongoing and likely increasing scrutiny of US security and arms control policies and programs. To the extent that our national security and arms control policies are presented as coherent and rational, as well as understandable, they should receive broad public support. With increased pressure by interest groups on the Congress and through media campaigns, the public hostility to the Administration's programs could grow, particularly if it is believed that it is the US that is impeding progress in the new negotiations. It will be a Soviet objective to make the Administration's approach and proposals appear unconstructive, no matter what they contain in substance. This in turn will stimulate additional media attention and public interest in national security and arms control matters.

Specifically, we can expect special interest groups to increase their efforts to convince the public that the President's call for a Strategic Defense Initiative will lead to a new arms race in space or instigation of nuclear war with the Soviet Union; that it will not work and that it will be too expensive; and that it is the major stumbling block in reaching a nuclear arms agreement with the Soviet Union. They will also argue that the Administration is not serious about arms control agreement pointing to the SDI, B-1 bombers, M-X, D-5, and new cruise missiles as indications of that lack of interest. To the extent these criticisms gain public acceptance often with Soviet help, the Administration's security program will be in greater difficulty in the Congress.

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From the opposite side of the political spectrum we may begin to see more concern raised for the lack of comparable defense spending by the NATO allies and a growing public interest, also supported by non-conservative causes, for reducing the number of US troops in Europe. Moreover, the lack of political support from our NATO allies for US policy in Latin America and the Persian Gulf could also give rise to anti-European sentiments in the US.

A recent article in Foreign Affairs by Yankelovich and Doble on "The Public Mood: Nuclear Weapons and the USSR" surveyed the results of numerous public opinion polls and listed five important guidelines necessary for the wide scale public acceptance of US strategic policy. Several of these guidelines have been gleaned from at best inconclusive polling data. Nonetheless, they do illuminate basic trends in thinking in the US:

1. The US must not adopt any policy that the majority of Americans will perceive as "losing the arms race".
2. Americans are convinced that it is time for negotiations, not confrontations with the Soviets.
3. The dominant attitude of Americans is "live and let live" pragmatism, not an anticommunist crusade, nor a strong desire to reform the Russians.
4. A national reconsideration of the strategic role for nuclear weapons is needed.
5. Americans are prepared, somewhat nervously, to take risks for peace.

To the extent these findings are truly reflective of public opinion it suggests that the Administration should be able to develop support for at least some of its new weapons programs as new developments and improvements in Soviet strategic weapons come to light. The Administration should make an effort to publish routinely accounts of major Soviet weapons developments, particularly in the strategic area. Moreover, the desire of the public to review our strategic policy with an eye toward change may represent their uneasiness with MAD. This sentiment could coincide with the President's call for a concerted research effort on ballistic missile defenses to change or eliminate some of the apparent hazards stemming from our current strategic force

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posture. The other findings support the contention that the public wants a US-Soviet dialogue on arms control. In summary it would appear that the public would continue to be supportive of a two track approach toward the Soviet Union, i.e. maintain our military strength but continue to negotiate with the Soviets.

Of all the security-related issues to be debated and discussed next year none will capture the imagination and concern of the US public more than SDI or "Star Wars." It is an issue not well understood by the public. Most wish for the US to proceed to develop a defense to protect them against ballistic missiles. Small numbers of people, but more vocal, will raise concerns about the SDI's impact on arms control and the ABM Treaty. It would appear to be a major priority of the USG to prepare its case to the public for pursuing the SDI and particularly explaining how it could add to our security on the one hand and on the other hand why it can not be offered in trade in the new negotiations for reductions in Soviet offensive weapons. An upwelling of public support for the SDI could have positive fallout in other arms control and security-related areas. Members of Congress will no doubt closely follow the trend lines of public sentiment on this issue.

B. The European Scene:

The trends in American and European opinion on national security questions show agreement on fundamental issues but, in some cases, sharp disagreement as to specifics. Like Americans, Europeans often hold opinions that appear contradictory. As in America the print and electronic media play an important role in molding public opinion in West Europe. Moreover, aided by the media, arms control has become a cottage industry in many of the smaller NATO and neutral nations of Europe. Most of the information presented in the European press has its origins in the English language press in Europe, much of which is hostile to US policy and much of which is just misinformed.

Europeans and Americans share similar views and increasing concern over the military build-up of the Soviet Union, although Europeans show greater concern for the US military build-up than do Americans. At the same time, Americans and Europeans have little concern that their defense is inadequate. Support for arms control and a dialogue with the Soviet Union is high on both sides of the Atlantic. The resumption of US/Soviet bilateral negotiations has been warmly, but cautiously welcomed throughout Europe. General European views on national security matters are as follows.

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Arms Control

Arms control and a continuing dialogue with the Soviet Union are seen as the most important factors in promoting future Western security. On specific arms control issues, Europeans blamed the Soviet Union more for the past rupture in East-West relations and the breakdown in negotiations in Geneva but will remain divided on whether the US is interested in making a genuine effort in arms control. For now the primary European concern is for a renewal of the East-West dialogue on arms control. Arms control negotiations are seen as the personification of that dialogue. There is particularly great support, especially by the arms control cognoscenti, for "blue sky" arms control proposals, such as a non-aggression pact or a nuclear-free zone in one or another part of Europe. There is much greater European support for unilateral nuclear arms control measures than in the US. However, there is also great support, as in the US, for arms control agreements with the Soviet Union that are verifiable.

Large majorities in Europe favor an ASAT weapons ban. SDI is less popular than in the US, but there is some support for defenses against nuclear attack, particularly in Britain. What is clear is that there is a low level of understanding of the US ASAT and SDI programs. This is supported by the view in most European countries that the US is either ahead of or equal to the Soviet Union in ASAT weapons deployment.

Confidence in US and NATO

NATO membership continues to be widely supported. This is exemplified by a general confidence that NATO can deter or defend against a Soviet attack. However, few fear such a Soviet attack, even those who support INF deployment and view the deployment as a contribution to their defense.

There has been an erosion of European confidence that the US will honor its defense commitments in Europe if the US is threatened with nuclear attack. This is particularly true of the West Germans whose confidence in the US dropped from 52% in April 1982 to 27% in May/July of 1984. This stands in contrast to American opinion and apparent willingness to use nuclear weapons to defend Europe, although public support for this commitment may be eroding in the US as well. If it does, it may erode European confidence even more. Despite this, Europeans have a positive view of US troops being stationed in Europe. Majorities support increasing or at least maintaining US troops in Europe at present levels.

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NATO first-use of nuclear weapons is not supported. In fact, opinion is split between those who would use them only if the Soviets did first and those who would not use them under any circumstances. This shows a widespread misunderstanding of current NATO strategy. Except in Britain and Norway, the views tend to favor no use at all. This reflects the sharp division many Europeans make between nuclear weapons for deterrence and nuclear weapons for defense. The former is generally favored while the latter is overwhelmingly condemned.

Modernization

Few in NATO countries support increased defense spending to improve their readiness for conventional war. There is a general consensus that spending is high enough and that the individual European countries are doing their fair share. If more is to be done, however, the public would favor conventional over nuclear modernization, but Europeans (except in Britain) believe conventional forces to be strong enough.

US INF deployment is opposed in Europe (except in Britain and France, where their own national nuclear forces are supported) by significant majorities. The level of awareness on this issue is very high, particularly in the deploying countries. It is most unlikely that any new nuclear modernization initiatives would have European public support. Despite opposition to INF deployment, though, most of the European public believe that the INF missiles promote security rather than increase the chance of a Soviet attack. Again, this probably indicates continued general European acceptance of nuclear deterrence rather than support for INF deployment per se. This is bolstered by the European perception that a "balance" of forces existed in Europe before INF deployment. In any event, the INF issue for now appears to be receding in public concern if not from public view.

US and Soviet Union

The US as a nation and as a people is still viewed much more favorably by Europeans than are the USSR or the Russians. Like Americans, Europeans do not trust the Russians, but they do believe they can deal with them on a political level. Moreover, they believe it is in West Europe's interest to increase trade with the Soviet Union and other East European countries. Although confidence in US foreign policy has been low, it has been increasing since December 1983, according to public opinion

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polls. Europeans continue to perceive the US and the Soviet Union's foreign policies as "more alike than different", reflecting a typical European view of the moral equivalence of the superpowers with their heavy reliance on military power. European criticism of the US policy in Central America and intervention in Grenada are examples of this view regarding US policies, although the US return to new negotiations may obviate or overshadow this criticism.

Shifting Political Factors

The US can expect to see a continued rise in the strength of unilateralist or anti-establishment parties in much of Europe, but more likely in Britain and Germany. While it is unlikely that these parties would come to power, their political influence will increase with time. Recent reports from Germany indicate that the Green party's electoral base is strong, unified, and growing. The Greens are becoming a national political party in their own right, and will undoubtedly influence the policies of the main opposition party, the SPD. The Greens are undergoing a serious internal struggle though. The SPD will seek to attract voters away from the Greens in its challenge of the CDU/FDP coalition for national leadership. In Britain, the Labour Party has called for unilateral nuclear disarmament and the Liberal Party has come out against GLCM deployments in England. Conservative governments in both Britain and Germany will have to reflect on these and other views as they prepare their security policies. Because of a series of scandals, the Kohl government is on a particularly shaky ground. However, the recent political and economic success of the Reagan Administration is likely to bolster conservative governments in Germany and Britain. This is especially true if the dismal economic situation in Europe begins to improve. There is great respect in Europe and Japan for what the Administration has achieved on the economic front over the past four years. Moreover, many US allies are happy to see the "free-trade" Reagan Administration returned to office and the prospect that there will be some continuity in American foreign policy.

US allies, though, and particularly the European continental allies, can be expected, to pressure the US for movement/progress in the resumed nuclear arms talks with the Soviet Union. The Administration's public diplomacy program should be helpful in fending off such pressure if it should prove necessary to do so. Such a campaign could be effective if it can demonstrate, without offering the Soviets substantive concessions, that the US is putting forward conservative proposals that are seen as being in both sides interest.

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C. Soviet Propaganda Campaign

As in the past in Europe, the heavy hand of the Soviet Union will be apparent in their attempt to influence public opinion. For the Soviets, influencing western publics, overtly and by disinformation, can be a relatively inexpensive way to thwart or blunt US and NATO efforts to upgrade their defenses in Europe. With the start of new nuclear weapons negotiations we must be prepared to deal with a Soviet public diplomacy effort to survey the European public as to their point of view and to paint the US as not interested in arms control.

We can expect the Soviets to focus their disinformation, deception, and public diplomacy campaign in Europe on those issues or US initiatives that most affect fundamental Soviet political and military objectives as well as their general arms control strategy. The new arms control negotiations will no doubt be the spearhead of this public diplomacy campaign. Any nuclear modernization initiatives in Europe, of course including the continuing INF deployment, will be the likely focus of Soviet disinformation and deception efforts because of their effect on Soviet politico-strategic objectives (decoupling and US withdrawal) and military strategy (conventional/nuclear war-fighting). On strategic issues, we can expect the Soviet effort in Europe and in the US to focus first on SDI and what they call "the militarization of outer space" and second on planned improvements in US ballistic missile capabilities (MX and D-5). Each of these programs, if completed, would be seen by the Soviets as limiting their ability to carry out their military and strategic objectives. Moreover, it is possible, indeed likely, that the Soviets will mount a "peace offensive", offering or re-offering arms control proposals designed to seize the high ground while constraining US defense programs.

D. Approach to Public Diplomacy: Domestic and Overseas

In 1985 we can expect that contentious issues on defense programs and spending will continue to be raised and debated in the Congress. Debate on US arms control positions will also gain congressional attention. This, in turn, will spark public debate on such issues as SDI and space arms control, anti-satellite weapons development and testing, D-5 and first strike capability, among others. Domestic debates will echo abroad and will instigate debates in the European press and therefore in the parliaments of West Europe. Soviet actions, disinformation and deception will create and play on the hostile themes heard in the

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Congress, and from the media, special interest groups, and our allies. Sufficient public criticism could tip the congressional scales against specific Administration programs and arms control policies.

The discussion above suggests that there exists among the American electorate a substantial number of people who are uncertain and if reached can be persuaded on many important national security and arms control issues. They are for maintaining a strong defense and represent a potential "swing vote" in favor of the Administration.

A priority for the Administration should be the launching of a vigorous public diplomacy campaign as early as possible to garner public and congressional support for its arms control proposals and its defense programs. Creating a consensus among our allies, and blunting the effectiveness of Soviet propaganda will become an essential task next year. In addition to reaching a broad spectrum of the population through the electronic and print media, we must engage members of editorial boards and journalists, specializing in foreign and security affairs, in a dialogue to inform and educate them on the relevant issues and the basis for the Administration's point of view. Not to be vigorous in our approach this year is to assure that Administration critics and contrived anti-nuclear events dominate the news and set the conditions for national and congressional debates on important security matters.

The Administration cannot ignore the potential for some members of Congress stonewalling on needed weapons systems and unnecessarily disrupting the Administration's arms control program. Thus any public diplomacy campaign by the Administration should be aimed at ultimately influencing Congress, and as early as possible this year.

Our public diplomacy campaign at home could help shape public opinion in Europe since Western Europe's media replays much of what is written in the English language press in Europe. However, a well-designed but lower key campaign for Europe, focusing on areas of particular European concern (e.g., US commitment to arms control, extended deterrence, East-West relations, etc.), should also be considered for implementation next year. Moreover, our public diplomacy efforts should be designed to anticipate, but at least respond, to expected Soviet efforts at influencing European publics in NATO and neutral countries. With the start of new and broader bilateral arms

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control negotiations with the Soviets we can anticipate that the Soviets will aim their public rhetoric towards supporting the fairness of their own and the unfairness of the US position in START, INF and especially, the Defense/Space negotiations.

A sustained public diplomacy campaign in Europe along with an ongoing dialogue with allied governments could help blunt European criticism of US foreign policy and go far to strengthen European public support for continuing US INF deployments specifically and US and NATO defense policies and programs generally.

Initial public impressions and concerns for US security and arms control policies are as much influenced by the content of Administration rhetoric as by Administration actions. Most effective in influencing public opinion, domestic and foreign, is the President through his prepared public addresses. Early on in the next term, we should try to take advantage of the President's public addresses--e.g., the State of the Union message--to establish the basis of, and thrust for, US security and arms control policies. Specifically, we should prepare themes that the President might wish to use to support the M-X, D-5, SDI, and cruise missile programs and, at the same time, describe our policy and position, vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, on strategic arms negotiations, INF negotiations, SDI, and defense/space arms control. Properly done, this could maintain the Administration's post-election momentum and be helpful in its efforts to deal with the Congress, the allies, and the public at large.

While Presidential statements and addresses can more readily reach the public, they will not alone stem the tide of criticism from single issue groups and from a generally skeptical, if not antagonistic, press. It is important, therefore, to enlist wider staff participation and to pursue public affairs activities, Op-Ed pieces, lectures, press backgrounders, etc., that will get the basis and rationale for the specific Administration policy and programs presented to the public.

Public diplomacy efforts in Europe are already underway, being led by USIA. While USIA can produce and promote our public affairs events and interests in Europe and elsewhere, they can not write an original national security or arms control script, nor can they deliver the best public performances on their own. ACDA, via PA, is already engaged in supporting USIA promotional efforts abroad. For their program to be effective, ACDA must

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make the effort to help supply the script--or relevant policy statements and themes -- and be prepared to participate in USIA programs as they are developed.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To summarize, the time is propitious for the US to launch a vigorous public diplomacy campaign both at home and abroad in order to garner further support for its policies and programs and sustain the post-election momentum.

We suggest that for the public diplomacy handling up to the start of the new negotiations and beyond that the USG pursue a two-track approach. The first is political in nature and deals with how we would handle public discussion of the new negotiations specifically. The second is educational and should be designed to educate the public, our allies, and the media on a variety of defense and arms control topics with a view toward sustaining our negotiating effort and our force programs and posture.

Track One: Handling the New Negotiations

-- We should seek to limit pronouncements on the new negotiations to those by designated senior administration officials and then only to:

- respond to Soviet criticisms
- temper public expectations

-- The President should use his upcoming State of the Union address to lay out his program for strategic modernization, including SDI, and how these initiatives are complemented by our arms control efforts.

-- Senior administration officials, i.e. Secretary of State Shultz, Secretary of Defense Weinberger, and ACDA Director Adelman, and other appropriate officials, should reiterate the themes of the President's State of the Union address prior to our return to new negotiations.

-- All responsible agencies should continue preparations for public responses to criticisms of U.S. policy and programs by the Soviets and others.

-- The White House should consider having the President meet with the delegation prior to their departure. Remarks by the President laying out general guidance for U.S. positions may be in order. (Photo opportunities)

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-- We need to focus the coordination of our public diplomacy and congressional affairs activities in support of the new negotiations. This will require bringing together high-level expertise on the substantive issues and on public handling.

Track Two: Educational Program

-- This educational effort should present factual information about and provide historical background to the new negotiations and U.S. national security policies, e.g. SDI, ASAT, space utilization, etc. It should appear detached from the new negotiations in a topical sense, however.

-- In addition to the standard publication of op-ed pieces and scholarly articles and addresses by administration officials, we suggest the following specific activities:

- Prepare a compendium of already published articles favorable to SDI for distribution in Europe by Spring 1985.

- Conduct lectures and seminars to educate U.S. political and public affairs officers on SDI and arms control. The first of these is already set for February 13-15 in London.

- Increase programming of USIA and State Department lectures, dialogues, and backgrounders to foreign and domestic journalists, academics, and other elite groups on such topics as SDI and arms control.

- Include important administration reports, e.g. upcoming compliance report, Soviet Military Power, etc., in our overall public affairs campaign.

-- The following is a list of themes on which to focus our educational program:

- Strategic Modernization Program
- Strategic Defense Initiative
- Soviet Strategic Threat: Offense and Defense
- U.S.-Soviet Strategic Competition: History
- Arms Control: History and Soviet Compliance Record