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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: MATLOCK, JACK F.: Files
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Archivist: loj/loj
FOIA ID: F00-009, Skinner
Date: 7/30/04

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. cable	150524Z Jan 85, 5p <i>R 6/21/06 NLSF00-009/1 #100</i>	1/15/85	B1
2. memo (8409125)	John Lenczowski to Robert McFarlane, re Soviet Self-Interest, 1p <i>R " " #101</i>	12/17/84	B1
3. memo (8409125)	McFarlane to the President, re Soviet Self-Interest, 1p <i>R " " #102</i>	ND	B1
4. paper	"...Soviet Self-Interest?" 4p <i>R " " #103</i>	ND	B1
5. notes	Handwritten re USSR, 2p <i>R " " #104</i>	ND	B1
6. memo	Matlock to McFarlane, re ...January Talks, 4p <i>R " " #105</i>	11/28/84	B1
7. memo	Matlock to McFarlane, re Thoughts..., 1p <i>R " " #106</i>	10/29/84	B1
8. schedule	November 26-January 5, 1p <i>R " " #107</i>	ND	B1
9. paper	"...Some Basic Considerations" 4p <i>R " " #108</i>	ND	B1
10. paper	"Draft Talking Points...", 6p <i>R " " #109</i>	ND	B1
11. memo	E. Rowny to Secretary Shultz, re Following up the Gromyko Meetings, 4p <i>R " " #110</i>	10/24/84	B1
12. outline	Re first phase discussions...." 2p <i>R " " #111</i>	ND	B1
13. outline	Re suggested talking points, 2p <i>R " " #112</i>	ND	B1
14. cable	301841Z Jan 84, 3p <i>R " " #113</i>	1/30/84	B1
15. report	Re Soviet Union, 2p	11/23/83	B1
16. memo	William Staples to Kimmitt et al, re US Initiatives/Soviet responses, 1p <i>R 6/21/06 NLSF00-009/1 #115</i>	10/14/83	B1

RESTRICTIONS

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
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- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
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DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
17. working paper	"US Initiatives in INF", 3p R 6/21/06 NUSF00-009/, # 116	ND	B1
18. working paper	"US Initiatives in START", 3p R " u # 117	ND	B1
19. list	(partial of 1p) Part " u # 118	10/13/83	B3
20. calendar	Arms Control October 10-December 31, 1983, 5p R " u # 119	ND	B1

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EXDIS CAPE TOWN ALSO FOR EMBASSY

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PARM, SF, US
SUBJECT: DEPARTMENT BRIEFS SAG ON SHULTZ-GROMYKO
MEETINGS

1. ~~2~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AS PART OF DEPARTMENT'S EFFORT TO ADVISE WESTERN AND
NON-ALIGNED NATIONS OF RESULTS AND PROSPECTS OF US-SOVIET
DISCUSSIONS ON ARMS REDUCTIONS HELD IN GENEVA LAST WEEK,
EUR/SOV DEPUTY DIRECTOR VERSHBOW PRESENTED A HALF-HOUR
BRIEFING TO SAG EMBASSY IN THE DEPARTMENT ON JANUARY 1.
ROD FISK, POLITICAL COUNSELOR AT THE EMBASSY, ATTENDED THE
BRIEFING ON BEHALF OF AMBASSADOR FOURIE.

3. BRIEFING WAS BASED ON PRESENTATION BELOW. EMBASSY
MAY DRAW UPON FOLLOWING IN RESPONSE TO QUERIES FROM MFA.

BEGIN TEXT:

-- US WANTED TO BE SURE THAT FRIENDS RECEIVED EARLY READ-
OUT ON SECRETARY'S MEETINGS WITH GROMYKO IN GENEVA. AS
PRESIDENT MADE CLEAR IN HIS JANUARY 9 PRESS CONFERENCE,
WE WERE QUITE SATISFIED WITH RESULTS OF GENEVA. IT IS AN
IMPORTANT BEGINNING. WE HOPE EE ARE NOW ENGAGED IN A
PROCESS THAT CAN PRODUCE BENEFICIAL RESULTS FOR THE US
AND ITS FRIENDS AND ALLIES, AS WELL AS FOR OTHER SIDE.
FOLLOWING REFLECTS SECRETARY'S THOUGHTS ON WHAT WE HAVE
ACCOMPLISHED AND WHERE WE WOULD LIKE TO GO.

-- PREPARATIONS FOR GENEVA PRODUCED AN EXTENSIVE REVIEW
NOT ONLY OF THE IMMEDIATE TACTICAL QUESTIONS FACING ;S IN
THESE "TALKS ABOUT TALKS," BUT ALSO OF MANY OF THE
BROADER ISSUES AND ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING BOTH CURRENT
AND FUTURE STRATEGIC BALANCE.

-- WE WERE ALSO CONSCIOUS OF THE FACT THAT ALTHOUGH ARMS
CONTROL WOULD BE CENTERPIECE OF MEETING, IT IS ONLY ONE
PART OF BROADER US-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP ALSO INVOLVING
REGIONAL ISSUES, BILATERAL PROBLEMS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS
CONCERNS AS WELL. THUS, DESPITE ARMS CONTROL FOCUS,
SECRETARY REITERATED TO GROMYKO THAT FORWARD PROGRESS

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WILL BE POSSIBLE ONLY IF THE SOVIETS TAKE INTO ACCOUNT OUR BROADER CONCERNS.

-- WE WENT TO GENEVA PREPARED NOT ONLY TO EXPLAIN TO THE SOVIETS THE BASIC CONCEPTUAL UNDERPINNING OF OUR EFFORT TO MAKE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP MORE STABLE, BUT ALSO TO MOVE EXPEDITIOUSLY TOWARD PRACTICAL AGREEMENT ON SUBJECT AND OBJECTIVES OF NEW TALKS ON RANGE OF NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS AND TO AGREE ON THE APPROPRIATE NEGOTIATING FORMAT.

US APPROACH

-- EARLY ON IN THE MEETING, THE SIDES SET FORTH THEIR VIEWS ON THE NATURE OF THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP WE SHOULD SEEK.

-- THE SECRETARY EMPHASIZED THAT THE US IS DETERMINED TO MAINTAIN FORCES TO DETER ATTACK AGAINST ITSELF AND ITS ALLIES. WE EXPECT THE SOVIETS TO DO THE SAME. HOWEVER, IT IS OUR BELIEF THAT THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP CAN BE MADE MORE STABLE AND SECURITY MAINTAINED AT SIGNIFICANTLY LOWER LEVELS OF ARMAMENTS IF THE RELATIONSHIP IS REGULATED THROUGH EFFECTIVE ARMS CONTROL.

-- THE SECRETARY DISCUSSED AT LENGTH OUR VIEWS ON THE FUTURE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT, INCLUDING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS, THAT LIE AT THE HEART OF THE APPROACH WE ARE SEEKING TO TAKE IN MOVING TOWARD A SAFER AND MORE STABLE STRATEGIC BALANCE WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

-- WE EXPLAINED HOW THE PRESIDENT HAS SET AS A MAJOR OBJECTIVE FOR THE NEXT DECADE THE DETERMINATION OF WHETHER NEW DEFENSIVE TECHNOLOGIES CAN MAKE IT FEASIBLE TO MOVE AWAY FROM A SITUATION IN WHICH SECURITY IS BASED ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY ON THE THREAT OF DEVASTATING NUCLEAR RETALIATION.

-- HE STRESSED THAT A FUTURE SITUATION IN WHICH BOTH SIDES COULD SWIFT TOWARD GREATER RELIANCE ON EFFECTIVE DEFENSES COULD BE MORE STABLE THAN THE CURRENT SITUATION.

-- THE SECRETARY STATED THAT WE BELIEVE ANY ATTEMPT TO BAN RESEARCH WOULD BE NEITHER EFFECTIVE NOR VERIFIABLE, EVEN WERE IT DESIRABLE. MOREOVER, NO STEPS BEYOND RESEARCH COULD BE CONSIDERED FOR SEVERAL YEARS AND ARE IN ANY CASE COVERED BY THE ABM AND OUTER SPACE TREATIES.

-- NONETHELESS, WE ARE PREPARED TO DISCUSS NOW THE QUESTION OF DEFENSES, BOTH FUTURE AND EXISTING, AS WELL AS THE QUESTION OF THE CURRENT AND FUTURE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP.

-- THIS PRESENTATION TOOK UP MUCH OF THE FIRST SESSION WITH GROMYKO. WHILE HIS OWN COMMENTS MADE CLEAR THE SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCES IN OUR RESPECTIVE APPROACHES, GROMYKO NONETHELESS TOOK NOTE THAT THIS WAS AN IMPORTANT AND PRINCIPLED STATEMENT ON OUR PART.

US PRESENTATION REGARDING NEGOTIATIONS

-- THE OPERATIONAL GOAL OF THE MEETING WAS TO AGREE ON NEW NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS. THE SECRETARY MADE CLEAR WE WERE PREPARED TO AGREE ON THE "SUBJECT AND OBJECTIVES" OF TALKS ON THE FULL RANGE OF OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE ARMS, INCLUDING SPACE ARMS, AND TO AGREE TO APPROPRIATE FORA.

-- WE SAID WE WOULD PREFER THREE SEPARATE FORA, COVERING STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS, INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES, AND DEFENSIVE AND SPACE ARMS, BUT WERE FLEXIBLE

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ON THIS QUESTION. WE WERE READY TO AGREE TO 3, 2 OR EVEN ONE FORUM, AS A MEANS OF GETTING ON WITH REDUCING NUCLEAR ARMS AND ENHANCING STABILITY.

-- THE SECRETARY CAME PREPARED TO ENGAGE NOT ONLY IN "TALKS ABOUT TALKS," BUT IN A SUBSTANTIVE EXPLORATION OF NUCLEAR ARMS ISSUES AS WELL. GROMYKO, HOWEVER, DID NOT

SEEM TO BE INTERESTED IN GETTING DEEPLY INTO SUBSTANCE, AND THE SECRETARY PROVIDED ONLY A GENERAL STATEMENT OF OUR APPROACH:

- - ON START, AFFIRMING US READINESS TO GO BEYOND WHERE WE LEFT OFF IN THE LAST ROUND AND EXPLORE TRADE-OFFS THAT WOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ASYMMETRIES IN FORCE STRUCTURES;
- - ON INF, INDICATING WE ARE PREPARED TO EXPLORE NEW WAYS OF ACHIEVING REDUCTIONS TO EQUAL GLOBAL LEVELS, BUILDING UPON THE FLEXIBILITY IN OUR FALL 1983 POSITION.

- - WE ALSO MADE CLEAR WE WERE PREPARED TO ADDRESS SPACE ARMS ISSUES IN THE DEFENSIVE AND SPACE ARMS FORUM.

GROMYKO'S PRESENTATION

-- FOR HIS PART, GROMYKO WAS SERIOUS, BUSINESSLIKE AND RELATIVELY PREDICTABLE. NOT SURPRISINGLY, HE REITERATED AT SOME LENGTH SOVIET ARGUMENTS ON THE DANGERS OF SDI AND THE NEED FOR A SWEEPING "PREVENTION OF THE MILITARIZATION OF SPACE" THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS TO BAN ALL "SPACE ATTACK WEAPONS."

-- IN THE SOVIET VIEW, HE SAID, SYSTEMS THE US DEFINED AS DEFENSIVE WERE REALLY ELEMENTS OF AN "OFFENSIVE PLAN" TO ACHIEVE A FIRST-STRIKE CAPABILITY (THE "SHIELD" TO ACCOMPANY THE "SWORD" REPRESENTED BY OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR MISSILES).

-- ON STRATEGIC ARMS HE SPOKE OF SOVIET READINESS TO CONSIDER "RADICAL REDUCTIONS" AND RENUNCIATION OF NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS, SUCH AS LONG-RANGE CRUISE MISSILES, ICBMS, SLBMS, AND BOMBERS. HE GAVE NO SPECIFICS, SO IT IS NOT CLEAR TOGETHER THE SOVIETS SEEK "RADICAL REDUCTIONS" IN THE SENSE WE HAVE PROPOSED.

-- ON INF, GROMYKO REPEATED FAMILIAR ELEMENTS OF THE SOVIET POSITION, E. G., THAT US LRINF MISSILES ARE "STRATEGIC" SYSTEMS AND THAT BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.

-- AS EXPECTED, HE SAID THE IMMEDIATE GOAL IN NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE A HALT TO US INF DEPLOYMENTS AND SOVIET "COUNTERMEASURES," TO BE FOLLOWED BY "REDUCTIONS TO AGREED LEVELS" IN MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES IN EUROPE. HE DID NOT DEMAND WITHDRAWAL OF ALREADY-DEPLOYED US MISSILE SYSTEMS, AS A PRECONDITION FOR NEGOTIATIONS OR OTHERWISE.

-- GROMYKO STRESSED THE INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THESE ISSUES, STATING THAT REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC AND INF SYSTEMS WOULD BE POINTLESS WITHOUT A BAN ON "SPACE ATTACK WEAPONS."

-- ON FORMAT, GROMYKO SUGGESTED DIVIDING THE SUBJECT MATTER INTO THREE GROUPS: STRATEGIC, MEDIUM-RANGE AND SPACE-ATTACK ARMS. TO SOME EXTENT THIS STRUCTURE PARALLELED OUR OWN, THOUGH GROMYKO LINKED THE FORA CLOSELY, EMPHASIZING THEIR INTERRELATIONSHIP AND SAYING

THEY WOULD PERIODICALLY CONVENE TOGETHER.

THE US RESPONSE AND THE AGREEMENT

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EXDIS

-- AFTER GROMYKO'S INITIAL PRESENTATION WE CONCENTRATED ON OBTAINING AGREEMENT TO A FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATING STRUCTURE. WHILE PREFERRING THREE SEPARATE FORA, WE SAID WE AGREED THE ISSUES WERE INTERRELATED AND SHOULD BE CONSIDERED WITHIN A SINGLE COMPLEX OF NEGOTIATIONS.

-- THIS WAS THE BASIS ON WHICH AGREEMENT WAS REACHED. THE DEGREE OF OVERLAP ON BOTH PROCEDURES AND SUBSTANCE PROVED SUFFICIENT TO PERMIT THE AGREEMENT REGISTERED IN THE JOINT STATEMENT. THREE ELEMENTS STAND OUT:

- (I) ON THE SUBJECT OF NEGOTIATIONS, WE AGREED THAT IT WILL BE A COMPLEX OF QUESTIONS CONCERNING SPACE AND NUCLEAR ARMS -- BOTH STRATEGIC AND INTERMEDIATE-RANGE -- TO BE CONSIDERED AND RESOLVED IN THEIR INTERRELATIONSHIP.

- (II) ON THE OBJECTIVE OF NEGOTIATIONS, WE WILL SEEK EFFECTIVE AGREEMENTS AIMED AT PREVENTING AN ARMS RACE IN SPACE AND TERMINATING IT ON EARTH, LIMITING AND REDUCING NUCLEAR ARMS, AND STRENGTHENING STRATEGIC STABILITY.

- (III) ON PROCEDURES, WE AGREED THAT NEGOTIATIONS ON THIS COMPLEX OF ISSUES WILL BE CONDUCTED BY A DELEGATION WITH THREE GROUPS.

-- THERE IS NECESSARILY SOME AMBIGUITY IN THESE FORMULATIONS. NEITHER SIDE UNDERESTIMATES THE DIFFERENCES THIS REFLECTS.

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-- AMONG THEM IS THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE GROUP TO ADDRESS DEFENSIVE AND SPACE ARMS. WHILE THE JOINT STATEMENT DOES NOT REFER TO NON-MILITARIZATION OF SPACE, SOVIETS CAN BE EXPECTED TO TRY TO MAKE THIS THE FOCUS OF

NEGOTIATIONS IN THIS AREA.

-- FOR OUR PART, WE INTEND TO ADDRESS NOT ONLY SPACE BUT ALSO OTHER DEFENSIVE ARMS. AS NOTED, THE SOVIETS VIEW SDI, WHICH WE CALL "DEFENSIVE," AS AN OFFENSIVE THREAT.

-- WHILE WE ARE NOT SURE OF THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE SOVIETS ARE WILLING TO PUT THEIR OWN EXTENSIVE DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS AND PROGRAMS ON THE TABLE, THEY DID AGREE THAT THE BASIC TERM "SPACE ARMS" INCLUDED GROUND-BASED A0M SYSTEMS THAT CAN TARGET OBJECTS IN SPACE, AS WELL AS SPACE-BASED WEAPONS SYSTEMS.

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-- BUT THE MOST IMPORTANT ACHIEVEMENT OF THESE TALKS IS THE RECOGNITION BY BOTH COUNTRIES THAT THERE IS A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN DEFINING THE SUBJECTS AND OBJECTIVES OF NEGOTIATIONS, AS THEY AGREED TO DO IN THEIR JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT OF NOVEMBER 22, AND PREJUDGING THE RESULTS OF NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE THEY BEGIN.

-- SINCE SOVIETS WALKED OUT OF GENEVA TALKS IN NOVEMBER 1983 WE HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT WE WERE READY TO RETURN WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS. ONE CAN ONLY SPECULATE ON WHAT PROMPTED THE SOVIETS TO JOIN US IN NEW NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT INSISTING ON A NUMBER OF THINGS THEY HAVE VERY STRONGLY PROMOTED IN THE INTERIM.

-- ONE PLAUSIBLE MOTIVE, HOWEVER, IS THAT THEY WISHED TO RECREATE THE INSTRUMENT FOR PRESSURING THE US THAT NEGOTIATIONS UNIQUELY PROVIDE. THEIR WALKOUT MADE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR THEM TO MOBILIZE PUBLIC OPINION IN EUROPE AND AMERICA AGAINST THE US.

-- WE CAN EXPECT THEM TO USE THE FACT OF NEGOTIATIONS TO ARGUE ONCE AGAIN THAT US PROGRAMS AND NEGOTIATING

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APPROACHES JEOPARDIZE THE PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS IN THE
NEGOTIATIONS.

END TALKING POINTS

4. FISK ASKED WHETHER THE NEGOTTATIONS WOULD BE AD
REFERENDUM OR WHETHER THE NEGOTIATORS WOULD HAVE FULL
AUTHORITY TO CONCLUDE AGREEMENTS ON THEIR OWN. THE
NEGOTIATIONS WILL OF COURSE REQUIRE REFERENCE TO
WASHINGTON.) FISK ASKED WHETHER ANY OTHER ISSUES ROSE
OUTSIDE OF US-SOVIET BILATERAL MATTERS, E.G. AFRICA.
THE ANSWER WAS NO.; FISK EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE
BRIEFING, THE CONTENTS OF WHICH HE UOULD RELAY TO
AM0ASSADOR FOURIE AND PRETORIA. SHULTZ
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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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December 17, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI JL

SUBJECT: Is Arms Control In The Soviet Self-Interest?

As we begin a new round of talks with the Soviets, we face different types of dangers than those of the first years of the Administration. Although, as you are probably aware, I feel less comfortable with the dangers of negotiating with the Soviets than with the risks involved in a more oppositional stance, I realize that the current policy may be necessary in order to win the support of Congress and maintain the cohesion of NATO. I also realize that you are aware of the dangers of inflated expectations and the false sense of security that can result from a policy of negotiations -- especially when stoked by an irresponsible press -- and that such feelings can shift enough votes in Congress to prevent the President from getting the defense budget he needs to maintain our security as well as our strong negotiating position. Your remarks on Face the Nation were a sobering reminder that we must keep alive the "realism" component of the President's policy of "realism, strength and dialogue," and I, for one, thank you for them.

Although inflated expectations and unwarranted euphoria may be essential factors in tipping the balance in Congress against the defense budget, there is one other idea which I believe may have a corrosive effect: The idea that the Soviets have it in their self-interest control arms. Although I was a supporter of SALT I as an experiment in attempting to realize an agreement on the basis of mutual self-interest, I have since been persuaded that there is little or no evidence to demonstrate that complying with arms control agreements is in the Soviets' self-interest.

At Tab A is a memorandum outlining my thoughts on why this may be so. Since the possibility exists that this is so, I believe that such a disturbing possibility must always be kept in mind by our highest decisionmakers, and that we remain prepared to act accordingly.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I forwarding the "think piece" at Tab A for the President's weekend reading.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab I Memorandum for the President
- Tab A Paper by John Lenczowski

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE

SUBJECT: Is Arms Control in the Soviet Self-Interest?

Attached at Tab A is a think piece for your weekend reading by a member of my staff, John Lenczowski, who is Director of European and Soviet Affairs. It raises the disturbing possibility that in spite of our long-held assumptions, the Soviets may not indeed have it in their self-interest to comply with arms control agreements. I am not sure I agree with everything therein, but I believe that we must not dismiss the possibility that this analysis is correct. If it is, it would have considerable implications for the conduct of our policy.

Attachment:

Tab A Paper by Dr. John Lenczowski

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Is Arms Control in the Soviet Self-Interest?

The Administration is currently faced with a variety of pressures to reach an arms control agreement with the Soviets. Our allies, whose governments have come under their own pressures from European peace movements, are one source. Similarly, there is considerable pressure from the Congress. Meanwhile, the press has been responsible for generating inflated expectations and even euphoria about the prospects for U.S.-Soviet negotiations. Unfortunately this climate of high expectations and a false sense of security poses the danger of shifting Congressional votes against the President's defense budget and endangers our entire defense policy. This atmosphere of both optimism and pressure, however, depends entirely on one critical idea which remains the cornerstone and underlying premise of our own policy: namely, that the Soviets have a self-interest in arms control that is similar to our own. If this premise turns out to be false, then it would not only have vast implication for our policy of negotiations but it could inject a dose of sobriety into an atmosphere of pressure that, as of now, only assists the Soviets in their entire arms control strategy.

The Basic Premise

It has long been the policy of successive Administrations to say, "We do not rely on trusting the Soviets as the basis for negotiations; instead, we negotiate with them because we can trust the fact that arms control is in their self-interest." However much this aphorism may appear to be true, I believe that there is so much evidence today of its falsity that the occasions when it is true are to be found only under the most limited circumstances -- and even then its validity is subject to question.

The Problem of Mirror-Imaging

It has been long acknowledged that "mirror-imaging" -- i.e., attributing to others that behavior which we would expect of ourselves -- is the principal pitfall in analyzing Soviet behavior. And yet, our aphorism appears to be true only through the perspective of mirror-image perceptions. This is not to say that mirror-imaging is always wrong -- but in the case of viewing the USSR, it is wrong most of the time.

1. A Self-Interest in Defense or Offense? Mirror imaging tells us that the Soviets have legitimate cause to fear U.S. military forces which could represent a potential threat. From this is inferred that if the U.S. threat were reduced by arms control, then the Soviets could afford to spend less on "defense." But this proposition about Soviet fears is simply not true. Although some parochial military force planner might feel threatened, the Soviet leadership knows very well that our forces are purely for

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defensive purposes and have never been designed for offense. They know that there is no political constituency in the West in favor of taking any offensive military or geopolitical action against them. The only reason they might fear our military is insofar as it serves to prevent the forces of history from advancing as fast as they might. But this is not the same thing as having reason to fear an offensive threat. When viewed in light of the defense requirements of the Soviet state, and the offensive configuration of Soviet military forces, one cannot conclude that those forces are designed principally for defensive purposes. If all this is so, then it follows that Soviet self-interests lie in putting a greater priority on offensive military power at the expense of domestic expenditures rather than relying on a doctrine of strategic sufficiency for defensive purposes so that more resources could be devoted for domestic needs.

2. Is the Soviet System in Crisis? Mirror-imaging tells us that the Soviet system and particularly the domestic economy are "in crisis." From this it is inferred: a) that the very survival of the Soviet system is at stake; b) that the excessive expenditure on arms is the principal cause of the crisis; c) that the Soviets would much rather spend money on domestic needs than on arms -- not only to save the system but to demonstrate the superiority of socialism; and d) that the Soviets would welcome a respite offered by an arms control agreement to do this. The problem here is that the Soviet system can be seen to be in crisis only if viewed by Western standards of success and failure. It would be in crisis if increasing the standard of living of the people were the Soviet state's principal purpose. But that is not its purpose, and as a result, the priorities by which it spends its resources are different than ours.

The real purpose of the Soviet state is to protect the power of the Communist Party and to extend the influence of Communism throughout the world. For this, it needs more military power rather than less, and unless the arms control process can yield it relatively more than its adversaries possess, reducing or limiting its arsenals simply does not further the fundamental purposes of the state. Thus when one views the visible spending priorities it does set for itself, the Soviet system is quite successful at what it does -- and it will not face a crisis until it runs into problems in those spheres where it must be successful:

- Its instruments of power and coercion: its military power, the secret police, the internal discipline and cohesion of the Party structure;
- Its means of maintaining ideological and political conformity and mass mobilization: the domestic and international propaganda apparatus, the education system, the mass public organizations (e.g., Komsomol, Trade Unions, etc.), leadership of the international Communist movement;

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- Its ability to keep its military forces up-to-date: its ability to buy or steal Western technology to spare the expense of research and development, its ability to secure Western financing, its ability to incorporate Western technology into Soviet weapons systems, its ability to buy those non-military goods (e.g., grain) that would cost them prohibitively more to produce themselves than to purchase with hard currency earned by gulag and semi-gulag labor; and
- Its underground economy, which is the single vehicle ensuring the survival of the population and compensating for the inefficiencies of the planned economy.

These are the essential pillars of the Soviet system and there is no trouble in any one of these that amounts to anything approaching crisis proportions. Thus there is considerable doubt that the Soviets are "up against the wall" and very much in need of an arms agreement.

3. Economic Strain and Domestic Unrest? Mirror-imaging tells us that in spite of the above, the Soviet military-industrial complex is straining to keep up in the arms race, that it may be reachings its limits, and that an arms control agreement would be a welcome cushion against risking any potential domestic unrest. This scenario is the only one which may have some truth. But for it to be true, there must have occurred either a) a change in the Party leaders' assessment of the precariousness of their internal rule, or b) a change in the Politburo's willingness to impose harsh privations on its subject peoples.

The latter option would necessarily mean that the Kremlin bosses have become more soft-hearted and that it is now possible in a communist state for merciful sentiments to find political realization. Unfortunately, there is simply no evidence whatsoever to demonstrate this possibility. To the contrary, all evidence indicates that the Soviets would be willing to subject their peoples to even harsher privations and have in fact demonstrated their ability to prepare the people psychologically for these. (After all, there are only a mere four million in forced labor today and that number could be very handily increased.) Thus, the Soviet military-industrial complex has not reached its limits, since there remains a massive supply of as-yet-untapped resources in the form of subsidies by forced labor and underpaid labor. This leaves only the possibility that the Soviets may need arms control to mitigate the risks of internal unrest -- risks that they prefer not to take as a result either of a changed assessment of vulnerability or of uncertainty.

Since we do so little intelligence collecting and analysis on civil unrest in the USSR, we have little basis upon which to make judgments on this. What evidence we do have suggests that the regime does not appear to face any imminent domestic threat -- even if it were forced to escalate military expenditures to ever

higher levels. Nevertheless, one must concede that since the internal security threat is the single greatest threat the Soviets face, we cannot rule out the possibility that they might find it expedient to take such external actions, including arms control, to reduce that threat. Under the current circumstances, however, this appears to be only the slimmest of possibilities.

The Real Soviet Self-Interest in Arms Control

Outside of this last narrow possibility, how else could the Soviet self-interest be served by arms control? The answers cannot be repeated too often:

1. The Soviets seek to gain military advantages by restraining U.S. military programs while they exploit treaty loopholes (thereby violating the spirit of arms control) and violate the letter of arms treaties. The accumulating evidence of this is mounting as each day passes.
2. The Soviets seek to deceive the West about their global political-strategic intentions. The principal theme of Soviet strategic deception is to convince us that the political transformation of the U.S. is not a Soviet objective. Exploiting and encouraging our tendencies to engage in mirror-image perceptions of them is one of the principal techniques of this deception effort. The very act of sitting at a negotiating table accomplishes this task by leading us to believe that a live-and-let-live policy (i.e., a social status quo) is acceptable to the Soviets, when in fact it is not acceptable whatsoever.
3. The Kremlin seeks to exploit the peace-loving passions of Western publics so that pressure can be placed on NATO governments to cut defense spending in the false hope that this will reduce East-West tensions.

The last three items demonstrate an abiding Soviet self-interest in the arms control negotiating process. But in light of the ever growing evidence of Soviet cheating, treaty circumventions, and negotiating deceptions, one must search long, hard and imaginatively to find credible evidence that it is in the Soviet self-interest to comply with arms treaties. If that evidence is as tenuous or as scarce as I have suggested, then the very premise on which all our negotiations are based may be a falsehood and a self-deception.

Prepared by:
John Lenczowski

December 17, 1984

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

1. Need private & informal consultation -
 - a - Sov att low compromise
 - b - Need to structure proposals & prepare way so Sovs can support.
2. Need to communicate with elements of Sov bureaucracy outside MFA
3. Need for feedback on Sov. bureaucratic problems.

Sov attitude:

1. Will want if if they are serious

2. Pref. wld be for AD

Ball because:

- a - Gives him access to us, but as none to them
- b - Gives him sole control over communications

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

- 3 - Will ^{prob} accept ~~in~~ more reciprocal arrangement.

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MEMORANDUM

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November 28, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JGM*

SUBJECT: CIA Analysis of Soviet Arms Control Policy and
How to Prepare for the January Talks

I believe that the CIA report prepared for the SACG is basically sound in its analysis of the Soviet attitude toward specific issues, and also in its description of the basic thrust of Soviet policy. However, I believe it is weak on the predictive side for two basic reasons:

-- By treating Soviet arms control policy largely in isolation from other issues confronting the Soviet leadership, it neglects the possible impact of internal Soviet factors on overall arms control policy.

-- While describing accurately the Soviet reaction to past U.S. proposals, it does not really address the question of the role any future U.S. proposals might play in the Soviet decision-making process. (An understandable omission since we have not yet decided what sort of proposals we will make.)

Domestic Factors and Soviet Arms Control Policy

While the Agency is doubtless right in observing that no Soviet leader is likely to see it in his interest to push for policies agreeable to the U.S., and also that economic considerations have not in the past had a noticeable impact on Soviet arms control policy, both of these issues deserve more searching examination.

-- It seems clear that, important as the military is to the Soviet leadership, its overriding priorities at the moment are issues related to the succession and issues related to management of the domestic economy -- and society as a whole. They are doubtless struggling over resource allocation for the five-year plan beginning in 1986, are working to revise the Party statutes for the first time in decades, and must have a Party Congress by February, 1986.

-- It is difficult to predict exactly what impact new U.S. proposals would have on the debates on these issues, and on which issues various aspirants in the succession struggle would choose

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to use. Major changes in the past -- for example, Khrushchev's anti-Stalin speech -- have never, to my recollection, been predicted by foreign intelligence agencies, including our own. While I do not profess an ability to make such predictions myself, experience tells me that it is not wise totally to discount the possibility in advance.

-- Certainly, no Soviet leader will wish to appear pro-U.S., nor will any argue that necessary military expenditures give way to non-military ones. These are truisms and require no particular insight to state. There may well be an argument over which military expenditures are necessary, however. And if we suppose that the issues are discussed not simply as pro or anti-U.S., or as necessary guns versus desirable butter, but in a much more complex policy-making environment, possibilities emerge. For example, what about an American proposal which offers the prospect of alleviating some of the pressing domestic concerns? Or the consideration that whatever the sacrifices they make, they may not be able to keep up with the U.S. technologically should there be no agreed restraint on U.S. options?

-- Although the whole Ogarkov affair is still murky, it is very likely that it was related both to succession maneuvering and to resource allocation questions. Clearly the Soviets are wrestling with a very real dilemma. There is no way they can be sure we will not achieve a technological breakthrough which leaves them behind in some key area, and they are unable to do all things at once. There are, therefore, more potential Soviet incentives for a more controlled development of technological change than are apparent in the CIA analysis.

Impact of U.S. Proposals

One important factor which the CIA study could not address is the potential impact on Soviet policymaking of U.S. proposals. The "key judgments" in the paper might lead one to conclude that no responsible U.S. proposal is likely to be successful. This could be right, but it is not necessarily the case. For the fact is that our proposals, if offered in the proper way -- confidentially and initially without publicity -- will themselves be factors influencing Soviet policy decisions. If there is something in them for the Soviets, then there will be those tempted by them, not because they want to do us a favor, but in their own self interest.

For this reason -- and a number of others -- I believe we should take Art Hartman's observations seriously (TAB I). As he points out, the resumption of negotiations by the Soviets will require us to present proposals which ultimately are defensible both at home and among the Allies. Otherwise we risk losing the high ground we have occupied for the past year.

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Unfortunately, I do not see emerging from the interagency process the sort of comprehensive thinking that will be required for this. The sort of proposals State is toying with seem to me simultaneously too much and too little: too much in the sort of specifics which could handicap us in future negotiations, and too little as regards definition of what our overall objectives are. So far as DOD and ACDA are concerned, I have noted even less in the way of realistic ideas. I believe it is clear that the interagency process cannot produce the sort of proposal we need. Even if it miraculously should, the ideas would probably leak before we took them up with the Soviets, which would militate against serious Soviet consideration.

What We Need for Geneva

We need to engage the Soviets in a frank discussion of the objectives of our arms reduction efforts over the next four years. The purpose would be to develop the "road map" the President spoke of in his UNGA address. The initial step should be to try to get some general agreement on where we want to arrive; mapping the course over the terrain could be a job for the umbrella talks to follow. One of our objectives in the initial meeting should be to get Soviet agreement on these talks by special representatives of both sides.

This will require, in the first instance, decisions by the President of what our objectives are, and then decisions regarding the best intermediate steps to achieve them and finally, the way our initial proposals should be formulated to attract serious Soviet attention. It will be imperative to develop these plans with a very small circle of advisers with absolute security against leaks.

Given the long history of negotiations on many of the separate issues and the relatively frozen attitudes which have developed on both sides, our effort will have a better chance of success if we can come up with an innovative conceptual framework: one that will allow both sides to claim a fresh start. For us, this would have the advantage of accentuating the specific Reagan stamp on our approach; for them it could provide the means to finesse (at least initially) some of their more persistent hang-ups with our proposals up to now. This, of course, cannot be done simply by fiddling with proposals now on the table (though these of course involve real issues which must be addressed). It will require, at a minimum, recasting our approach in a framework which at least looks different. We need an approach which does not look like a return to 1972 detente; they need an approach which does not look too much like a return to the Geneva of 1983.

Modalities

For obvious reasons, we normally give more thought to substance than to modalities and tactics. However, I cannot stress too

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much the vital role that appropriate modalities play in successful implementation of a sound strategy. In the past, the U.S. has frequently handicapped itself by using tactics which doomed its proposals to failure -- or had the effect of diluting them and delaying implementation.

The Carter-Vance proposal of March, 1977, is a classical example of using counterproductive tactics. There were two basic mistakes in the tactics used then: Carter went public with his new proposals before they had been discussed with the Soviets; and the proposals were suddenly presented to the Soviets without any advance discussion. The combination of these two factors (plus Soviet annoyance at a noisy human rights campaign) caused immediate, emotion-laden Soviet rejection, and doomed the deep cuts idea for the balance of the Carter Administration. (One of our major achievements, by the way, has been to gain Soviet acceptance of the idea that there must be substantial cuts in the future.)

We should absorb the lessons of the past and make sure the mistakes are not repeated. This means, in regard to our upcoming talks, the following:

- We should not actually name publicly our special representative for the umbrella talks until the Soviets have accepted the idea and have been informed of the person involved. (Since this will be a form of diplomatic negotiation, we should go through a quasi "agrément" process in advance, to make sure both representatives are acceptable to both sides.)
- We should take extraordinary steps to make sure that our proposals do not leak before they are presented to the Soviets, or even thereafter for a reasonable period of time (say, a couple of months).
- We should make some effort to convey to the Soviet leadership, entirely privately and informally, the drift of our thinking, in advance of submitting formal proposals. Unless we develop a mechanism to do this, it is more than likely that we will soon find ourselves in an acrimonious public dispute which will greatly complicate our ability to manage Congress, the Allies and the Soviets simultaneously.
- We should not expect to be able to work out agreed approaches in a series of meetings of the foreign ministers. These meetings may well be desirable for a number of reasons, but unless they are supplemented by informal, preparatory discussions -- both by special representatives on arms control issues and by broader informal discussions -- progress will be slow, if it occurs at all.

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October 29, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Thoughts on a Private Channel to the Soviet
Leadership

I have compiled some thoughts on the whys and hows of a private channel which may be useful to you in further discussions with Secretary Shultz and the President. They are at TAB 1. Also, I have made an initial stab at describing what I would recommend discussing in a private meeting, if it is decided to arrange one (TAB 2). The latter is very preliminary and is meant to be indicative of the way the issues would be discussed. Some of the talking points need to be elaborated in more detail (particularly those for contingency use), and some key points are subject to decision and guidance. (The more important of these are underlined.)

Even if the Soviets accept a request for a meeting, we should not expect immediate results. They will doubtless wish to feel their way a bit and to gain some experience before they rely totally on the pledges of confidentiality. But even in the early stages, it would provide them a vehicle for conveying messages if they choose to send some. The most useful thing we are likely to obtain initially, however, will be comments which will improve our ability to assess Soviet priorities among the various proposals they have made, as well as hints as to how some of our proposals could be framed to make them more palatable.

I am not sure of the reasons for Secretary Shultz's caution. If it is a fear of offending Gromyko, I would argue that the fear is misplaced: if Gromyko does not want the meeting to occur, it will not. It is more likely that he would find it acceptable since it does not violate jurisdictional distinctions as the Soviets interpret them. In any event, requesting the meeting will do nothing to complicate anything we have proposed.

If it would be helpful for me to be present when the matter is discussed (to answer questions about how it could be done and the way the Soviets look at the various issues involved), I of course will be glad to join you.

Attachments: As stated.

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Ad
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CIA paper

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NSAPG - Soviet
foreign Plans

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SACG: To Discuss
US/Soviet Objectives

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NSAPG - US/Soviet
Objectives for
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SACG: To Discuss
-format Issues

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NSAPG - Issues of
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Papers on substantive
options to the files.

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SACG: To Discuss results
of SAC and nature of
instructions

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That instructions for
Geneva to the files.

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Ad
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A PRIVATE CHANNEL TO SOVIET LEADERSHIP:
Some Basic Considerations

Reasons for Channel:

- Need for mechanism to consult privately, informally, and off the official record.
- Need for a better feel for the factors entering into Soviet decision-making.
- Need for conveying our views to the Soviet leadership without the Foreign Ministry filter.
- Need for total confidentiality, the best insurance for which is that the public and the bureaucracy be unaware that the channel exists.

Possible Modes:

- Use of Ambassadors in both capitals.

[While this is probably the best arrangement in theory, it is not immediately available to us because of Soviet bureaucratic hang-ups. It would, additionally, require an Ambassador who is and is believed by the Soviets to be an "insider" in the decision-making process and who can deal with all the issues comfortably in Russian -- some important Soviet interlocutors are not comfortable in English and introducing interpreters undermines the informality necessary and discourages candor.]

- Use of someone thoroughly familiar with the President's thinking and the decision-making process in Washington, but outside the normal structure for diplomatic contact.

[The first qualification is necessary to ensure the reliability of the messages we send, and the accuracy of feed-back; the second to get around Soviet "turf" considerations. The latter are minimized when the contact appears to be "counterpart to counterpart."

- Use of a "special negotiator" from outside the USG.

[Potentially useful for discussions in a particular, well-defined area, but less so for broader discussions since a person not a part of the policy-making machinery would be hampered in interpreting and reacting to comments on the

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whole range of problems. It also runs a greater risk of becoming public knowledge.]

-- Use of intermediaries for specific messages.

[Useful in arranging specific deals which are delicate for one or the other side (e.g., a prisoner exchange), but of limited utility for a broader discussion since it does not provide direct contact with persons active in the decision-making process.]

Soviet Attitudes

-- They understand the need for confidential and informal consultation and will desire it if and when they are serious about solving problems.

-- They would probably prefer to establish Dobrynin as the sole interlocutor, since this would serve their interest by giving them access to our decision-making process but denying the same to us.

-- Since we have made it clear that an exclusive role for Dobrynin is not acceptable, there are indications that the Soviets will probably accept informal contacts in another form.

-- "Knowledgeable" officials have been suggesting such since the beginning of the Reagan Administration (several approaches in 1981).

-- Central Committee officials have periodically sent "messages" via third parties, implicit invitations to initiate a dialogue.

-- We were informed earlier this year that White House/Central Committee contacts had been approved by the Politburo, including Gromyko.

-- The Soviets doubtless feel "burned" by some of the earlier efforts to communicate unofficially by other means.

-- The contact with Kampelman backfired for reasons which are unclear, but our selective briefing of Allies may have played a role, since knowledge of the contact was spread very widely among NATO delegations at Madrid, their home capitals and even their Embassies in Washington.

-- Publicity given the "walk in the woods" and the subsequent informal conversations between Nitze and Kvitsinsky is likely to make the Soviets hypercautious for some time to come in dealing with U.S. negotiators on the private level.

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-- The facts that the abortive Scowcroft mission became public knowledge and that private comments by Soviet diplomats in Washington to senior U.S. officials reach the press rapidly also act to reinforce Soviet doubts of our ability or willingness to keep any contact completely private.

-- Once the election is over, the Soviet suspicion that we seek contacts for their own sake (i.e., just to claim that we are negotiating for a public impact) will be attenuated. If we judge that a private channel would be useful to us, it would be a good time to try again.

Basic Operating Principles

-- A private channel should not be used as a substitute for any other mode of communication, but rather as a supplement which may help both sides to make formal channels as productive as possible.

-- Both sides must insure that everything discussed in the channel, and knowledge of its very existence, is kept scrupulously confidential.

[On our side this will require direct knowledge of the channel to be limited to a very small number of the most senior officials, probably designated by name, and with a strict injunction against mentioning it to anyone not on the list, including personal aides and secretaries. Illustratively, such a list might include, in addition to the President, the Vice President, the National Security Adviser and his deputy, the Secretary of State and the Undersecretary for Political Affairs, and our Ambassador in Moscow.]

-- It should be used for tactical policy guidance, not concrete negotiations or precise commitments. At most, commitments should be in contingent form (e.g., "if you do x, we will respond with y"). Any general understandings reached would be subject to confirmation and detailed negotiation in formal channels.

-- All positions taken in the "channel" -- including general guidelines for "personal remarks" -- should be cleared in advance by the Assistant to the President for National Security and the Secretary of State, and as regards the more important issues, by the President personally.

-- A clear understanding should be reached on these matters (except those relating to internal USG procedures) at the outset, and it should be made clear that establishing the "channel" does not imply an effort to bypass any principal policymaker in either country.

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Steps Necessary to Activate

If we decide that we wish to explore whether the Soviets are willing to allow private contacts between the White House staff and the Central Committee staff, we can initiate the matter as follows:

-- Request Ambassador Hartman, by secure telephone, to pass a message to Zagladin that we do not fully understand some of the comments passed by his staff recently to us, and if he agrees, we feel a meeting might be useful.

-- If the Soviets want to pursue the contact, he will respond favorably and set a date; if he does not we will know that the time is not ripe from their point of view.

-- If Zagladin accepts, arrangements could be made to travel to Moscow for consultation with the Embassy (perhaps as part of a trip with other stops).

-- If he prefers to meet here or somewhere in Western Europe, that also could be arranged.

-- After setting a date, the talking points could be developed, discussed, and cleared in detail.

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DRAFT TALKING POINTS FOR PRIVATE CONVERSATION
(Preliminary)

Introduction

-- I sought the appointment because some of the messages sent recently to us (e.g. through Giffen) were not entirely clear by the time they got to us, and also because we feel a frank and completely private conversation about the future of our relations would be useful at this point.

-- In seeking this discussion, we want to make clear that we are not trying to supplant any of our normal channels of communication. But we think it will be useful to both sides to have a means of consulting privately and completely off the official record, as we try to find ways to narrow our differences.

-- One of the things that has made resolution of our differences difficult in the past has been excessive publicity of our respective positions. We think the time has come to find a way to deal candidly and off the record, in the hope that we can identify ways to proceed officially which will lead to productive results.

-- We will consider this conversation, and any that may follow, as totally private and unofficial, and will take great care that no mention of anything said reaches the public or the formal record.

-- At the same time, I will make every effort to explain the President's desires and ideas to you, and to convey to him and his closest associates any comments or suggestions you may wish to offer.

-- Now that our election is over, I trust that we can put to rest the suspicion that our earlier proposals were meant mainly for electoral effect. As we have said many times, they were not. Our policy is a steady one, and in fact the President has just received an overwhelming mandate from our voters to continue on that track.

-- The President wants me to reiterate what he told Minister Gromyko: he has no higher priority than lowering the level of nuclear weapons and forging a more productive relationship with the Soviet Union. Over the coming years, he will be playing a direct and active role in this process. Frank and informal comments and suggestions from your highest political authority will be of great use to him in devising mutually acceptable approaches. He hopes that we can use these conversations, along with those in more formal channels, to move the relationship forward.

-- It seems to us that we have reached important understandings on some very important basic principles. Mr. Gromyko described

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some as "the question of questions," and we agree. Among these are:

- We both want to move our relations onto a more peaceful track.
- We both agree that we must reduce the enormous stockpiles of weapons we possess.
- We agree that this must be done without damage to the security of either side.
- We agree that we must deal with each other on the basis of equality.
- We agree that neither side can seek superiority over the other.

Are we correct in assuming agreement on these points?

- [If answer is yes] Then it seems clear that our task is to find ways to implement principles upon which we already agree.
- We have noted and carefully studied the various proposals Chairman Chernenko has made. Many of them have merit, if we can find the proper context for them..
- We also have made numerous proposals, and obviously we think they all have great merit.
- We have noted, however, that you seem to expect us to make move after move in advance of anything you do to improve the relationship. We have already made quite a few, to no appreciable effect. (List some)
- Frankly, we think we have more right than the Soviet Union to ask for concrete steps to prove sincerity. In fact we haven't seen many.
- But we must recognize that neither of us is going to respond to one-sided demands from the other. We must find a way to move in step toward narrowing our differences.

Defining Priorities

- I'm prepared to give our current view of the specific issues before us. The President has of course studied carefully those mentioned in his correspondence with Chairman Chernenko, as well as the four issues Mr. Chernenko named in his Washington Post interview.
- But before we get into the specifics, let me ask you frankly and directly, what precisely are you looking for? What do you want from us right now?

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[Respond and discuss as appropriate, but without going into too much detail on the individual questions.]

-- As for the President, I would list his agenda as follows:

-- Moderate and manage our competition in third areas, particularly the military aspects, which are the most dangerous. History demonstrates that failure to manage these issues can spill over into everything else. But we don't have in mind deals behind the backs of others or establishing spheres of influence. What we need at this point is at least an implicit understanding on mutual restraint. We probably couldn't codify the rules in writing to the satisfaction of both of us, but we can make a greater effort to understand the other's point of view. This is why we have proposed regular consultations on regional issues. Even if our specialists disagree on a lot of things, the pattern of consultation could help us manage our competition safely. We don't understand why you seem reluctant to agree. Maybe you could explain.

-- Reduce nuclear weapons and reach understandings which would either limit new technologies or provide for their introduction in an agreed, stabilizing fashion. We understand the positions you have taken regarding negotiations on nuclear weapons, and frankly we feel that they have brought us to a dead end in this crucial area. In proposing umbrella talks, we are trying to get us both out of that dead-end street. Do you have a problem with this proposal, and if so, what is it?

-- Improve our working relationship in a realistic manner. This includes such matters as observing the Helsinki Final Act, establishing agreed conditions for expanding trade, reviving cooperative agreements and improving contacts and the flow of information between our peoples. We've made a lot of proposals here, but you seem very reluctant to move ahead, even while accusing us of undermining what was achieved in the past.

-- Let me point out one thing about our proposals. None require any advance concessions on your part. In fact, we don't see any reason for you not to welcome them, if you are really interested in improving the relationship. Do you really have problems with them or have you simply not yet decided whether you are ready to deal with us or not?

[As regards Soviet proposals in general]

-- Surely you must recognize that some of your proposals have been designed to make them unacceptable to us. What are we to make of a demand that we remove our LRINF missiles before you will even talk to us about controlling nuclear weapons? Or

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demands for binding, ill-defined agreements before talks can even begin on weapons in space? You know these are non-starters.

-- Now, if you are serious, let's try to figure out a way we can get around these artificial "obstacles."

The Specific Issues

[Here we will need fairly detailed points to be made -- and contingency points to use in discussion. The following is just a rather cryptic start. Underlined formulations require further discussion and specific decisions.]

Umbrella Talks

-- Describe the concepts and the objectives as we would define them and press for reaction and comment.

-- Mention identity of person President is considering placing in charge.

Chernenko's Four Suggestions:

-- Given cooperation on your part, two of them should be doable (TTBT and Space talks--see details below), but you know very well that the freeze and no-first-use commitment are not acceptable.

-- Regarding the freeze proposal, we really can't believe you are serious. You must understand the problems of verifying production as thoroughly as we do, and as for the rest, it is clearly better to negotiate on reductions.

-- You also understand very well the place of nuclear weapons in NATO's deterrence strategy. We obviously are going to do nothing to undermine that strategy.

-- This does not mean that we would never consider discussing the possibility of some sort of "Code of Nuclear Conduct." We already have a "Prevention of Nuclear War" agreement. And we consider the non-use-of-force provisions of the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act binding in respect to nuclear first strikes. Could you be more specific about what you are looking for here?

-- [If he indicates that negotiations on a "Code of Nuclear Conduct" might be an inducement to resume negotiations on nuclear weapons:] So long as it is understood that we must reserve the right to respond to a conventional attack on us or our Allies with nuclear weapons if this should prove necessary to avert defeat, we would consider the possibility of discussing such a "Code" in conjunction with broader arms control talks which included negotiations on reducing nuclear weapons.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

INF

-- We have not forgotten the issue and would like to solve it.

-- The basic issue is political: we must avoid decoupling U.S. and West European nuclear security. We do not regard this as contrary to Soviet security interests. Indeed, a decoupling could ultimately create a destabilized Europe with trends contrary to Soviet interests. If they do not feel protected by American nuclear forces, how long do you think the Germans will continue to renounce an independent deterrent of their own? Do you really want to run the risk of this issue emerging in a decade or two? You have as much interest in the coupling of American and West European security, over the longer run, as we do.

-- Now clearly, we cannot agree to an arrangement which has a decoupling effect. Therefore, we cannot agree to any of the following:

- removal of deployed missiles without an agreement;
- a change in the deployment timetable without an agreement;
- counting British and French systems;
- zero for us and something for you.

-- Otherwise, we are flexible. Note President's proposals of September, 1983.

-- Personally, I think we ought to take another look at the "walk-in-the-woods" formula. That is in the negotiating ball park. If you are interested, we would certainly be willing to give it another look.

-- We might also consider ways in which you could reduce your SS-20's and NATO would halt its deployments at a point when both sides are in balance.

-- The problem is not so much finding the right formula as agreeing on what the end result should be. Our only desire is for an equitable solution with levels as low as possible. If you can agree to that, I'm sure our negotiators can find a formula to reflect it.

START

-- Our thinking has evolved.

-- Willing to take Soviet concerns into account.

-- Examine potential for trade-offs and the build-down concept, as processes which might be useful in bridging our differences.

-- We are willing to put forward specific ideas when you are willing to listen and take them seriously.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

-- Umbrella talks would be a good place for this.

[If question raised regarding the possibility of combining INF and START]

-- We feel we could reach agreement faster if we stay with the negotiations as they have already been defined.

-- If that impossible, we would not exclude some change in the negotiating format.

-- Appropriate subject for umbrella talks.

Space

-- Review our current position and readiness to sit down any time without preconditions.

-- Reiterate that progress will be difficult unless we can find way to deal with nuclear weapons concurrently.

-- Re moratorium, if he raises, ask if this is a precondition, and point out that while a precondition is unacceptable, we have already agreed to discuss what measures of mutual restraint would be appropriate during the negotiations.

-- These are also appropriate subjects for umbrella talks.

TTBT/PNET

-- Problem is improving possibilities for verification so that the treaty can be ratified without reservations.

-- This need not necessarily involve a change in the text. An exchange of delegations, as we have proposed, could provide improved means for verification. Or we could agree on certain measures which would come into effect when the treaties are ratified.

-- If you are willing to discuss how this problem can be resolved and cooperate in solving it, then it should not be too difficult to create conditions which would make ratification possible.

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TO

MCFARLANE

FROM HILL, C

DOCDATE 05 NOV 84

ROWNY, E

24 OCT 84

KEYWORDS: START

ARMS CONTROL

GROMYKO, ANDREI A

USSR

SUBJECT: FOLLOW UP TO GROMYKO MTGS RE ARMS CONTROL

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 08 NOV 84 STATUS S FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

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November 5, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. McFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Following Up the Gromkyo Meetings:
Arms Control

The Secretary wanted you to see a copy of the
attached memorandum from Ed Rowny.

Buckinley
Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
As stated.

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DECL:OADR

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Department of State, July 21, 1997
By LOT RAAA, Date 3/8/01

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UNITED STATES DELEGATION
STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS TALKS WITH THE SOVIET UNION
Geneva, Switzerland

2405

October 24, 1984

MEMORANDUM

TO: Secretary Shultz
FROM: E. Rowny (R)
SUBJECT: Following Up the Gromyko Meetings: Arms Control

This memo outlines a strategy for following up the September meetings with Gromyko and for resuming strategic arms control negotiations after the election.

In my view, it is in our interest to move rapidly to be in a position to conclude a START agreement by the end of 1985, when SALT II would have expired. Even before the end of 1985, continuation of our current policy of interim restraint based on SALT II will begin to bite into some of our modern strategic forces. It would be unfortunate if the Reagan Administration, which entered office committed to opposing SALT II, ended up "observing" that fatally flawed treaty even beyond its "expiration" date.

Because of the continued robust pace of the Soviet strategic buildup, however, it is not in our interest to allow Soviet strategic forces to remain unconstrained. (The Intelligence Community estimates that, in the absence of any arms control constraints, the Soviets could, by the mid-1990s, roughly double their current numbers of ballistic missile warheads.) Accordingly, one of our primary objectives in 1985 should be to negotiate a new agreement which could replace SALT II. In my view, achieving an agreement by the end of 1985 is possible. The Soviets, for their part, will have to demonstrate more flexibility in their position.

I am convinced that the Soviets recognize it is in their interest to return to the negotiations. Initial Soviet commentary after the meetings with Gromyko held out the possibility of a positive evolution in US-Soviet relations. Chernenko's recent interview in the Washington Post, although unyielding on substance, was at least positive in tone. The Soviets have

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indicated that they share our interest in reducing the risk of nuclear war. They also realize that they have painted themselves into a corner through their INF walkout, their harsh rhetoric, and their opposition to resumption of negotiations.

-- However, the Soviets have dug themselves so deeply into their current position that they are unlikely to abandon their insistence on "deeds, not words" until they have a better idea about what we have in mind by trade-offs. We must not offer concessions simply to get the Soviets to resume the talks. This principle should not, however, preclude truly mutual compromises where both sides show a willingness to move off their original positions as we have repeatedly done. More modest agreements, however, based on mutual compromise, are not only possible, but, in my view, would be highly beneficial to our national security.

In any meetings with the Soviets prior to the election, we should keep the discussion on strategic arms control at the level of "first principles." After the election, however, we should begin a cautious, step-by-step process of exploring Soviet receptivity to moves we would be willing to make if the Soviets would match them. Initially, we would seek to draw the Soviets into a substantive discussion of the compromises both sides will need to make if we are to achieve a mutually acceptable agreement. Our primary objective in this phase would be two-fold. First, we will need to assure ourselves that the Soviets are prepared to negotiate seriously and in good faith toward an agreement. Second, once the Soviets have demonstrated a willingness to move off their current sterile positions, we should be prepared to discuss in general terms the trade-offs we are prepared to make if the Soviets match our flexibility.

Some suggested points to make in these discussions are at Tab A.

If the Soviets demonstrate sufficient responsiveness, we would go beyond the initial discussions and make a specific proposal, based on trade-offs. We should remain flexible regarding modalities but should make it clear to the Soviets that our objective is not prolonged backchannel discussions. Rather, we seek prompt Soviet agreement to resume the strategic arms negotiations. As the process develops, and if warranted by Soviet responsiveness, we could propose a Vladivostok-type accord which would serve as a set of "guidelines" for resumed START negotiations. This accord could be signed at the Presidential level or at between you and Gromyko.

In effect, the process I have outlined could constitute the first steps toward the regular ministerial or cabinet-level US-Soviet meetings which President Reagan suggested in

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his UNGA speech. In the course of discussing this "umbrella" concept we would stress its flexibility. The precise nature of the umbrella could evolve in the course of discussions with the Soviets and in the light of actual experience with the umbrella forum. In my view, the umbrella should be chaired by senior officials on both sides, preferably at the Foreign Minister level. Setting up an outside "super-negotiator" would be counterproductive to us. In any case, it would in my view be unacceptable to the Soviets.

The umbrella should meet at mutually agreed intervals, either annually or, at most, semi-annually. Although the umbrella should not be considered an automatic "court of appeal" from START or other negotiations, it could play a useful role in helping resolve major policy issues, particularly if we are to conclude an agreement with the Soviets by the end of 1985.

A draft of a set of "guidelines" is attached at Tab B.

The Vladivostok-type agreement is designed to meet the Soviets halfway, through an agreement based on trade-offs and offsetting asymmetries. It accepts some elements of the Soviet proposal, e.g., an aggregate of 1800 SNDVs. However, it preserves major elements of our current position, especially the non-aggregation of nuclear weapons to maintain the distinction between more and less destabilizing weapons. It would establish a ceiling of 6500 ballistic missile warheads; that is, 1500 more than in our current position but still almost a 20 percent reduction from current US and Soviet levels.

Trade-offs are based on a combined subceiling which would result in offsetting asymmetries in ALCM-carrying heavy bombers and heavy ICBMs. The Soviets would also be allowed more ballistic missile throw-weight than the United States, and the mechanism for achieving throw-weight reductions would be simplified. The proposal would give us all the ALCMs we intend to deploy, but would limit us to levels well below the 8000 ALCMs theoretically allowed by the current US position. This would capitalize on the fact that the Soviets have said that their most serious concern is our "planned large-scale US ALCM deployments." Gravity bombs and SRAMs are not limited, as compensation for Soviet air defenses. We would modify our position to explicitly allow mobile ICBMs, but only in designated areas and only if effective verification measures can be devised. This will most likely require more cooperative measures and probably some form of on-site presence or inspection. In view of the impending Soviet deployment of mobile ICBMs, it is important that we be in a position to begin discussing verification with the Soviets.

While the approach I have outlined focuses on START issues, it is possible that the negotiations will be broadened to include other issues. On INF, for example, we would stress initially our preference for resumption of separate INF

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negotiations. If, however, as is likely, the Soviets resist this approach, we would indicate our willingness to "take account of" INF in the START context. A suggested approach for doing this is contained in Tab B.

-- Resumed START talks will also be the most appropriate forum in which to discuss the offense-defense relationship. Initially, our efforts in this area should be directed toward resassuring the Soviets that SDI does not represent an attempt on our part to obtain unilateral advantage. We will want to stress that SDI research is being conducted within the ABM Treaty. A high-level US statement reiterating this commitment could help set the stage for more productive discussions with the Soviets on the offense-defense relationship.

On ASAT, we can follow up the President's commitment to consider restraint measures during the talks by holding out the possibility of a one-time, three-year ban on flight testing of ASAT interceptors. Any such ban, however, should not take effect until after we have conducted sufficient successful tests of our own MV interceptor to demonstrate a credible off-the-shelf capability. We should also be willing to discuss the possibility of an Incidents in Space agreement and a ban on high altitude ASAT interceptors, provided this would not restrict SDI.

We would stress that the proposal is a "package deal." While we would avoid giving the impression that the proposal was being offered on a "take-or-or-leave-it" basis, we would stress that we would not permit the Soviets to pick and choose selectively only those elements of the proposal they prefer.

Attachments:

- Tab A - First Phase Discussions
- Tab B - Suggested Talking Points

cc: OSD - Secretary Weinberger
JCS - General Vessey
CIA - Mr. Casey
NSC - Mr. McFarlane
ACDA - Ambassador Adelman
INF - Ambassador Nitze

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First phase discussions should include the following:

Trade-Offs:

- Stress our desire to meet Soviets halfway through trade-offs.
- This will require compromise on both sides.
- Trade-offs can be accomplished through offsetting asymmetries which take account of the difference in US and Soviet force structures.
- Without discussing numbers, indicate that one way to accomplish trade-offs which relate the destructive capacity of ballistic missiles and heavy bombers would be through limits on the numbers of ALCM-carrying heavy bombers and heavy missiles.
- Indicate a continued willingness to consider seriously any Soviet approach on trade-offs.

Reductions

- Stress that any agreement must reduce the nuclear threat faced by both nations, i.e., an agreement which allowed substantial increases in the numbers of RVs, as the Soviets have proposed, would be unacceptable.
- Without providing any numbers, we could hint that we are prepared to be flexible about some of the levels in our current position, provided the Soviets agree to reductions from current levels of warheads and prevent future growth.

Stability

- Stress our longer term interest in mutual movement toward a stable strategic balance, based on more survivable systems.
- Stress the difference between more and less destabilizing systems.
- Reassure the Soviets that we do not seek a radical restructuring of their strategic forces, but merely wish to encourage trends which are already evident on both sides, i.e., mobile ICBMs and greater reliance on sea-based and air breathing forces.
- Stress our desire to find other ways to reduce the risk of nuclear war, e.g., CBMs, further Hot Line improvements.

Offense-Defense:

- Stress the inherent linkage between limits on offensive and defensive systems. Reiterate our desire to discuss this issue in resumed START negotiations.

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- Stress that SDI, at this stage, is simply a program of scientific research and is being conducted within the limits of the ABM and Outer Space Treaties.
- Encourage the Soviets to discuss how we could move together in a cooperative fashion toward an era characterized by greater stability through reliance on strategic defense.

ASAT

- Reiterate our willingness to consider possible measures of restraint during ASAT discussions without, however, agreeing to an ASAT testing moratorium as a precondition for beginning talks.
- Stress our preference to separate discussions of possible limits on ASAT from discussions on SDI.

INF

- Make it clear that we will not agree to a unilateral removal of US INF missiles as a precondition for resuming INF negotiations.
- Stress our preference for separate INF negotiations but indicate a willingness to take account of INF in the START context if the Soviets prefer.
- Stress that any agreement which included US P-IIs and GLCMs would also have to include Soviet SS-20s.

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Tab B

Suggested Talking Points and Proposal on
Strategic Arms Control
for

Secretary Shultz' Meeting with Gromyko

-
-
- For the past year, the US has said it is ready to meet the USSR halfway through an agreement which will trade off US and Soviet advantages.
- The following are the basic guidelines of a START agreement which the US is ready to conclude with the USSR. It incorporates some elements of both of our original positions.
- We plan to keep this proposal strictly confidential.
- We are prepared to meet again to discuss this proposal more fully. Our approach is to reach mutual agreement on a set of guidelines for further negotiations. These could be signed at the Foreign Minister or Head of State level, along the lines of the 1974 Vladivostok Accord.
- We would prefer to handle the detailed negotiations on this proposal in resumed strategic arms talks. Our respective negotiators would be instructed to handle the detailed negotiations with a view to concluding the agreement based on these guidelines by the end of 1985.
- The following are our proposed guidelines.
 - o An aggregate of 1800 SNDVs. Within this aggregate, a sub-limit of no more than 200 heavy ICBMs and ALCM-carrying heavy bombers.
 - o Maximum of 20 ALCMs allowed per ALCM heavy bomber.
 - o Neither side will deploy more than 6,500 ballistic missile RVs.
 - o The USSR will agree to reductions in its ballistic missile throw-weight proportional to its reductions in ballistic missile RVs.
 - o Nuclear-armed SLCMs of a type deployed after January 1, 1984 will be banned, provided effective verification procedures can be agreed.

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- o Deployment of mobile ICBMs will be allowed within designated deployment areas, provided effective verification procedures can be agreed.
- o Within the framework of an agreement, the US and the USSR will also agree to take account of INF systems. The US
- o will agree to halt its deployment of warheads on LRINF missiles in Europe at the level of X provided the Soviet Union limits its warheads on INF missiles worldwide to no more than 2X. The specific level of "X" to be a matter for negotiations.
- o Both sides agree on the importance of reaching agreement on confidence-building measures which reduce the risk of nuclear war.
- o Both sides agree that effective verification is essential to an agreement, and that specific provisions to ensure effective verification will be included in the agreement.
- o The agreement based on these guidelines will last ten years from entry into force.
- o Both sides recognize the inherent connection between limits on strategic offensive and defensive weapons and agree to enter into further negotiations with a view toward concluding a more comprehensive agreement covering both strategic offensive and defensive weapons before the end of 1995.
- o Both sides recognize the value of considering the possibilities of mutual movement into a defensive-dominant regime, accompanied by further substantial reductions in strategic offensive arms.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 18, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI JL

SUBJECT: Lord Article on Arms Control Compliance

Attached at Tab A is an article by Cary Lord on the arms control compliance issue and the question of Soviet intentions. Recognizing that I do not see all the paper on the details of arms control issues, I nevertheless have not yet seen an internal memo which might reach the President's desk that so clearly and concisely highlights some of the points in this article. If the President has indeed not seen much material giving this point of view, I believe it would be worthwhile if you shared with him Cary's article.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I forwarding Lord's article to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Lord Article, Wall Street Journal, April 13, 1984

cc: Sven Kraemer

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By 18J NARA, Date 3/8/01

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE

SUBJECT: Article on Arms Control Compliance

Attached at Tab A is an article by NSC consultant Carnes Lord on arms control complaince and the question of Soviet intentions. It makes some important points which are worth reviewing.

Prepared by:
John Lenczowski

Attachment:

Tab A Lord article, Wall Street Journal, April 13, 1984

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By LDK NARA, Date 3/8/01

An Arms-Control Craving

By CARNES LORD

Four years ago, there was every reason to believe that the 1980s would be marked by a new realism in the American approach to arms control. The failure of arms control to constrain the Soviet military buildup of the 1970s had become generally apparent; the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan shattered whatever hopes continued to be harbored for detente and stopped in its tracks the second strategic arms limitation agreement (SALT II). The election of Ronald Reagan brought to power an administration that was deeply concerned about the deterioration in the U.S.-Soviet military balance and was disposed to lay at least some of the blame for this on the exaggerated expectations generated by the advocates of arms control and on the political dynamics of the "arms-control process." This skepticism about the virtues of arms control seemed to be in harmony with the mood of the American public and Congress. To the incautious observer, it very much looked as if the Reagan administration had a clear mandate to take the problem of arms control and fix it.

Instead, of course, the past four years have witnessed a surge of anti-nuclear feeling in the country at large. And among the intellectual and policy elite there has been a renewal of enthusiasm for arms control that seems remarkably untimely by the experience of the recent past. As the 1984 presidential election approaches, the Democratic hopefuls have vied with one another in support for new arms-control initiatives of varying degrees of irresponsibility. More surprisingly, the president has come under steady pressure from Republicans in Congress and from elements of his own administration to demonstrate ever new flexibility, including unilateral concessions, in arms-control talks with the Soviet Union. This is in spite of the demonstrative Soviet walkouts from negotiations on nuclear weapons, and in spite of the mounting evidence of Soviet violations of existing agreements.

Verification and Compliance

Nothing is more revealing of the dubious impulses animating the unilateralist arms-control revival than the failure of its champions to come to grips with the problem of verification and compliance. For many years, arms-control enthusiasts have paid lip service to the need for effective verification of agreements, but have failed to devote serious attention to the operational and political difficulties (as opposed to the technical limitations) that face any verification effort. On the contrary, the efficacy of existing verification methods and approaches has been consistently overstated, while compliance problems have been played down.

Above all, the evidence that has accumulated over the past decade or so of Soviet violations, near-violations, exploitation of loopholes and negotiating deception has been treated in cavalier and exculpatory fashion, when it has not been simply ignored. As if the purpose and context of agreements were wholly irrelevant to the issue, the U.S. government has been asked to concern itself only with violations in a strictly legal sense. Moreover, it has been expected to employ standards of legality which, though proper in a criminal prosecution under domestic law, are wholly inappropriate to a situation where (Russian) witnesses cannot be forced to appear, evi-

dence is incomplete (or deliberately withheld), sources cannot always be revealed because of intelligence sensitivities, and the law itself lacks an authoritative neutral interpreter. Ambiguities in factual evidence or in the language of agreements have been taken by many as sufficient reason for disregarding possible violations. Not only have Soviet explanations been credited that were palpably false; arms-control advocates have actually constructed briefs for hypothetical Soviet positions of greater ingenuity than anything the Soviets themselves were able to come up with. And even where a legal violation is recognized as certain or highly probable, its significance tends to be dismissed. In all cases (but most notably in the area of Soviet anti-ballistic missile activity), evidence for violations has been dealt with in piecemeal and isolated fashion, with little attempt to see it in the broad context of Soviet compliance behavior generally or of Soviet strategic intentions.

This complex of attitudes is currently facing its most severe test. A report sub-

A report by the Federation of American Scientists contained a claim that the Krasnoyarsk radar is primarily for space tracking, and is thus permitted. That is simply false.

mitted by President Reagan to Congress on Jan. 23 lays out the results of an intensive study of the evidence for Soviet non-compliance with arms-control agreements in seven areas. In one of these areas—chemical and biological warfare—the U.S. has for some time formally accused the Soviets of violating the relevant agreements. Despite strenuous and continuing efforts to discredit these charges, they have been confirmed by refugees and by independent analyses carried out in a number of European countries. Of the other issues, the most significant concerns the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972. The construction of a phased-array ballistic missile early warning (BMEW) radar by the Soviets near Krasnoyarsk in southern Siberia—in contravention of the treaty requirement that such radars can only be deployed at locations on the national periphery and oriented outward—opens an entirely new chapter in the history of Soviet compliance behavior. If Soviet activities in the chemical and biological area may be said to be the first unambiguous treaty violations of major military significance, the Krasnoyarsk radar is the first unambiguous treaty violation whose military significance bears importantly and directly on the U.S.-Soviet strategic nuclear balance.

The intent of the relevant provision of the ABM Treaty was to prevent either party from creating the base for a territorial ABM system by building a network of BMEW radars that could be used not only to warn of a missile attack but also to aid in the tracking and interception of incoming nuclear warheads. While there is room for disagreement as to the extent to which this and similar radars already in operation on the Soviet periphery were specific-

ally designed to perform an ABM "battle management" function, they have an inherent capability to perform that function. And the characteristics of the new radar as well as its location near a number of ICBM deployment areas suggest that its primary purpose is indeed ballistic missile defense.

A recent report by the Federation of American Scientists contained a claim that the Krasnoyarsk radar is primarily for space tracking rather than early warning or missile defense and is thus allowed under the treaty. That is simply false. While the president's report stops short of simply calling the radar a violation (it uses the phrase "almost certainly"—for reasons that have not been explained), there has been remarkable unanimity among government analysts familiar with the relevant data as to the radar's characteristics and its impermissibility.

In assessing the significance of the Krasnoyarsk radar, it is necessary to consider both how it fits into the overall picture of Soviet ABM-related activities and what it reveals about Soviet intentions. What is worrisome is not the Soviet BMEW radar net by itself, but its potential when linked with other air defense and ABM radars and interceptor missiles. For years, the Soviets have taken advantage of ambiguities in the ABM Treaty to develop and test air-defense systems against ballistic missile targets, and they have developed small ABM radars that probably could be rapidly deployed throughout Soviet territory. Should the Soviets choose to free themselves from the treaty's constraints, they would now have in place the long lead-time elements that would permit rapid expansion to an effective nationwide ABM system. As for Soviet intentions, the very fact that they seem to have been prepared to face the consequences of a deliberate and massive violation of the ABM Treaty must raise ominous questions about their next moves.

Bankrupt Approaches

What is to be done? While no one will deny that it is difficult to devise effective strategies for response to violations, it is also clear that current approaches have proved to be bankrupt and are no longer an effective deterrent to further violations. To continue to pretend that all compliance issues can be resolved simply through patient discussion with the Soviets in confidential channels such as the Standing Consultative Commission is perfectly idle. This view assumes that all compliance issues rest on misunderstanding and that both parties are dealing in good faith, whereas nothing could be further from the truth.

What are needed are real penalties—withdrawal from agreements or suspension of particular provisions, and political and military countermeasures. The U.S. has never exacted such penalties for any Soviet action in any arms-control area. Unless and until we do, the Soviets will grow more brazen yet in their disregard for treaty obligations, and the U.S. will approach ever more closely that condition—familiar from the annals of Western disarmament efforts in the 1930s—where generous forbearance and blind hope give way to impotence and appeasement.

Mr. Lord, on the National Security Council staff from 1981 to 1983, is a defense and arms-control consultant.

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ARMS CONTROL

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ALL ADDRESSEES TAKE AS IMMEDIATE ACTION
E.O. 12356 DECL: OADR
TAGS: NUC, PARM
SUBJECT: SOVIET COUNTERCHARGES ON ARMS CONTROL.
COMPLIANCE: QS & AS

THE SOVIETS HAVE PUBLISHED AN AIDE MEMOIRE DELIVERED TO THE DEPARTMENT ON JANUARY 27, IN APPARENT RESPONSE TO THE JANUARY 23 US STATEMENT AND REPORT TO CONGRESS ON SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS. FOLLOWING ARE PRELIMINARY QS-AND-AS WHICH DEAL WITH THE COUNTERCHARGES IN THE AIDE MEMOIRE. AT THEIR DISCRETION ADDRESSEES MAY DELIVER THE QS-AND-AS TO HOST GOVERNMENTS. NATO POSTS SHOULD DO SO IMMEDIATELY. ADDRESSEES MAY USE THE QS & AS IN RESPONDING TO PRESS INQUIRIES.

Q: WHAT IS THE US RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET STATEMENT ALLEGING ARMS CONTROL VIOLATIONS BY THE US?

A: WE ARE DISAPPOINTED WITH THE INITIAL SOVIET RESPONSE TO EXPRESSED US CONCERNS REGARDING SOVIET ARMS CONTROL NONCOMPLIANCE.

AS THE PRESIDENT SAID IN HIS LETTER TRANSMITTING A REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THIS SUBJECT, "IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT ALL PARTIES TO AGREEMENTS COMPLY WITH THEM." THE PRESIDENT STATED THAT AFTER A CAREFUL REVIEW OF MANY MONTHS, AND NUMEROUS DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES WITH THE USSR, THE ADMINISTRATION HAD DETERMINED THAT VIOLATIONS OR PROBABLE VIOLATIONS HAD OCCURRED WITH RESPECT TO SEVEN INITIAL ISSUES ANALYZED.

THE USSR HAS BEEN INFORMED OF THESE DETERMINATIONS.

REGRETTABLY, IT HAS RESPONDED INITIALLY NOT BY TREATING THE ISSUE SERIOUSLY BUT BY DUSTING OFF A FAMILIAR LIST OF SPURIOUS COUNTERCHARGES.

THE SOVIET CHARGES OF US ARMS CONTROL VIOLATIONS ARE BASELESS. AS THE PRESIDENT SAID ON JANUARY 23, THE US IS CONTINUING TO CARRY OUT ITS OWN OBLIGATIONS AND

COMMITMENTS UNDER RELEVANT AGREEMENTS.

WE HOPE THE INITIAL SOVIET REACTION IS NOT THEIR LAST WORD, AND THE SOVIETS WILL PROVE READY TO ENGAGE IN A CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE WITH US ON COMPLIANCE, BY UNDERTAKING EXPLANATIONS, CLARIFICATIONS, AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS, AS APPROPRIATE.

ABM TREATY

Q: WHAT ABOUT THE SOVIET CHARGE THAT THE US IS DEVELOPING SPACE-BASED ABM SYSTEMS IN CONFLICT WITH THE ABM TREATY?

A: THE ABM TREATY DOES NOT PROHIBIT RESEARCH, AND BOTH SIDES HAVE HAD RESEARCH PROGRAMS SINCE THE SIGNING OF THE TREATY. SOVIET RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS IN THE ABM FIELD HAVE BEEN CONTINUOUS AND MORE EXTENSIVE THAN OUR OWN. OUR PROGRAM CALLS ONLY FOR ENHANCED RESEARCH IN THIS AREA. THE PRESIDENT STATED IN HIS MARCH 23, 1983, SPEECH THAT US ACTIVITIES IN THIS AREA WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH US TREATY OBLIGATIONS.

Q: WHAT ABOUT THE SOVIET CHARGE THAT THE SHEMYA ISLAND AND PAVE PAWS RADARS VIOLATE THE ABM TREATY?

A: THERE IS NO MERIT WHATSOEVER IN THESE CHARGES. THE SHEMYA ISLAND RADAR IN THE ALEUTIANS IS FOR NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION, AND THE PAVE PAWS RADARS ARE BALLISTIC MISSILE EARLY WARNING (BMEW) RADARS LOCATED ON THE PERIPHERY OF NATIONAL TERRITORY AND ORIENTED OUTWARD, AS SPECIFICALLY PERMITTED BY THE TREATY. (FYI.

THE US NOW OPERATES PAVE PA'S RADARS ON THE US EAST AND WEST COASTS, AND IS CONSTRUCTING TWO NEW RADARS IN THE SOUTHERN US.)

Q: WHAT ABOUT THE SOVIET CHARGE THAT THE US IS DEVELOPING MOBILE AND MIRVED ABM SYSTEMS, CONTRARY TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE ABM TREATY?

A: THE US HAS CONDUCTED ALL ITS RESEARCH ACTIVITIES CONSISTENT WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE ABM TREATY. NO MOBILE ABM RADARS OR MIRVED ABM INTERCEPTOR MISSILES ARE UNDER DEVELOPMENT.

Q: WHAT ABOUT THE SOVIET CHARGE THAT THE MINUTEMAN I ICBM WAS BEING TESTED TO GIVE IT AN ANTIMISSILE CAPABILITY?

A: THESE TESTS WERE PART OF A RESEARCH PROGRAM CONDUCTED IN FULL CONFORMITY WITH THE ABM TREATY. THE TESTS INVOLVED STAGES OF THE MINUTEMAN I MISSILE, BUT NOT THE WHOLE MISSILE. THE MINUTEMAN I ICBM IS NO LONGER DEPLOYED BY THE US.

SALT

Q: WHAT ABOUT THE SOVIET CHARGE CONCERNING THE USE OF SHELTERS OVER US ICBM LAUNCHERS?

A: DURING INITIAL MINUTEMAN CONSTRUCTION, AS WELL AS THE MINUTEMAN SILO UPGRADE PROGRAM DURING THE MID-70S, ENVIRONMENTAL SHELTERS WERE EMPLOYED TO PROTECT CONSTRUCTION AT THE LAUNCHERS FROM THE WEATHER. THE FACTS CONCERNING THE ACTIVITIES BEING CARRIED OUT AT THE LAUNCHERS WERE PROVIDED AND EXPLAINED IN FULL DETAIL TO THE SOVIETS, AND WERE ALSO AVAILABLE IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN. IN RESPONSE TO SOVIET EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN,

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THE SHELTERS WERE MODIFIED, AND THEIR USE WAS DISCONTINUED AFTER THE COMPLETION OF THE MINUTEMAN SILO UPGRADE PROGRAM IN EARLY 1979.

IN THE CASE OF THE TITAN II SILO, A COVER WAS USED TO PROTECT IT FROM THE WEATHER DURING REPAIR WORK ON DAMAGE DUE TO AN ACCIDENT. IT WAS SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED TO AVOID ANY IMPEDIMENT TO NTM, AND WAS REMOVED PROMPTLY AFTER THE NEED FOR IT ENDED. THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN FULLY AWARE OF THESE FACTS FOR AT LEAST SEVERAL YEARS.

Q: HOW ABOUT THE SOVIET CHARGE THAT BY NOT RATIFYING SALT II, THE US HAS NOT FULFILLED THE PROVISIONS IN THE PROTOCOL CONCERNING THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOLUTIONS FOR LONG-RANGE SEA- AND LAND-BASED CRUISE MISSILES?

A: THE SALT II PROTOCOL WOULD HAVE EXPIRED ON DECEMBER 31, 1981, EVEN IF SALT II HAD BEEN RATIFIED AND ENTERED INTO FORCE. THE US WAS IN FULL COMPLIANCE WITH ALL PROVISIONS OF THE PROTOCOL WHEN IT WOULD HAVE BEEN IN EFFECT. THE US MADE IT CLEAR AT THE TIME SALT II WAS SIGNED THAT THE PROTOCOL WOULD NOT BE EXTENDED. THE SUBSEQUENT NATO DECISION TO DEPLOY LAND-BASED LONGER-RANGE INF MISSILES IN EUROPE WAS MADE IN RESPONSE TO A SPECIFIC AND GROWING SOVIET THREAT, NAMELY SS-20 DEPLOYMENTS. THE US REMAINS WILLING TO NEGOTIATE ON ALL LRINF SYSTEMS, INCLUDING GROUND-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES (GLCMS). IT IS THE SOVIETS WHO HAVE BROKEN OFF THE INF TALKS AND THEREBY IMPEDED EFFORTS TO NEGOTIATE AN AGREEMENT INVOLVING GLCMS.

Q: WHAT ABOUT THE SOVIET CHARGE THAT THE US HAS NOT COMPLIED WITH SALT II NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISIONS?

A: THE US MADE CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS DURING THE SALT II NEGOTIATIONS, AND SUBSEQUENTLY STATED PUBLICLY FOLLOWING SIGNATURE OF THE TREATY, THAT THE SALT II NONCIRCUMVENTION PROVISION WOULD NOT ALTER EXISTING PATTERNS OF COOPERATION WITH OUR ALLIES OR PRECLUDE TRANSFER OF SYSTEMS AND WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY.

THE ONLY PROVISION OF SALT II WHICH WOULD HAVE APPLIED TO LRINF SYSTEMS WAS CONTAINED IN ITS PROTOCOL. THIS LIMITED DEPLOYMENT UNTIL DECEMBER 31, 1981, OF CRUISE MISSILES CAPABLE OF A RANGE IN EXCESS OF 600 KM ON SEA-BASED OR ON LAND-BASED LAUNCHERS. THAT PROVISION WOULD HAVE EXPIRED IN 1981, HOWEVER, EVEN IF SALT II HAD BEEN RATIFIED.

THE PERSHING II AND GLCM ARE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES BEING DEPLOYED TO COUNTER THE THREAT TO THE US ALLIES POSED BY THE SS-20 AND OTHER SOVIET INF SYSTEMS. RECENTLY, A SOVIET SPOKESMAN ASSERTED THAT THESE SYSTEMS ARE VIEWED AS STRATEGIC BY THE SOVIET UNION AND, THEREFORE, CIRCUMVENT ARTICLE XII OF THE SALT II TREATY. BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT, HOWEVER, THE TREATY DEFINES LAND-BASED STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILES AS THOSE HAVING A RANGE OF 5,500 KM OR MORE. SINCE OUR INF SYSTEMS DO NOT FALL INTO THAT CATEGORY, THE SOVIET SPOKESMAN'S CONTENTION IS GROUNDLESS. MOREOVER, IN SIGNING SALT II, THE US STATED EXPLICITLY THAT ANY FUTURE LIMITATIONS ON US SYSTEMS PRINCIPALLY DESIGNED FOR THEATER MISSIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY APPROPRIATE LIMITS ON SOVIET THEATER SYSTEMS LIKE THE SS-20.

Q: WHAT ABOUT THE SOVIET CHARGE THAT US POLICY CONFLICTS WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SOVIET-US AGREEMENTS WHICH SPECIFY THAT NEITHER SIDE SHALL STRIVE FOR MILITARY

SUPERIORITY AND THAT BOTH SIDES SHALL BE GUIDED BY THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY?

A: THE US DOES NOT SEEK MILITARY SUPERIORITY OVER THE USSR. THE USSR INTERPRETS THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY, HOWEVER, IN SUCH A WAY AS TO ATTEMPT TO JUSTIFY FOR ITSELF A ONE-SIDED MILITARY ADVANTAGE. FOR EXAMPLE, IN START AND INF THE SOVIET CONCEPT OF "EQUAL SECURITY" WOULD ALLOW THE USSR TO HAVE THE SAME LEVEL OF NUCLEAR FORCES AS ALL OTHER NUCLEAR POWERS COMBINED. THIS IS UNACCEPTABLE AS A PRINCIPLE FOR ARMS CONTROL. WE REMAIN COMMITTED TO VERIFIABLE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS AT SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCED, EQUAL LEVELS OF FORCES ON BOTH SIDES.

Q: WHAT ABOUT THE SOVIET CHARGE THAT THE MIDGETMAN ICBMS DO NOT MEET THE TASK OF LIMITING STRATEGIC ARMS REFLECTED IN EXISTING AGREEMENTS?

A: UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE SALT II TREATY THE PARTIES UNDERTAKE NOT TO FLIGHT-TEST OR DEPLOY MORE THAN ONE NEW TYPE ICBM PER SIDE; THE TREATY DOES NOT PROHIBIT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PRIOR TO FLIGHT-TESTING. THE US HAS DECLARED THE MX PEACEKEEPER TO BE ITS ONE ALLOWED NEW TYPE ICBM. THE PLANNED NEW US SMALL ICBM IS STILL ON THE DRAWING BOARD, THUS, IT IS NOT CONSTRAINED BY SALT II PROVISIONS SINCE IT WILL NOT BE READY FOR FLIGHT-TESTING UNTIL AFTER DECEMBER 31, 1985, WHEN THE SALT II TREATY WOULD HAVE EXPIRED.

Q: WHAT ABOUT THE SOVIET CHARGE THAT SOME MINUTEMAN II SILOS OVER WHICH SHELTERS WERE PLACED MAY BE ASSUMED TO CONTAIN MIRVED MINUTEMAN III ICBMS, IN NON-COMPLIANCE WITH SALT I AND II?

A: THE MINUTEMAN II SILOS WERE NOT CONVERTED TO MINUTEMAN III LAUNCHERS. THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN INFORMED THAT ANY LAUNCHERS OF MINUTEMAN II ICBMS CONVERTED TO LAUNCHERS OF MINUTEMAN III ICBMS WOULD BE MADE DISTINGUISHABLE ON THE BASIS OF EXTERNALLY OBSERVABLE DESIGN FEATURES, AS

REQUIRED BY THE SALT II TREATY. IN THE COURSE OF THE SALT II NEGOTIATIONS THE US HAD 550 MINUTEMAN III ICBMS, AS IS WELL KNOWN.

SCC

Q: WHAT ABOUT THE SOVIET CHARGE THAT THE US IS VIOLATING THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION IN GENEVA?

A: THE US CONTINUES PROPERLY TO DISCHARGE ITS OBLIGATIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE REGULATIONS OF THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION. THE US GOVERNMENT IS NOT MAKING PUBLIC THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMISSION. THE APPEARANCE OF STORIES IN THE PRESS ABOUT THE SCC AND POSSIBLE SUBJECTS UNDER DISCUSSION THERE DOES NOT REFLECT A CHANGE IN THAT POLICY.

NPT

Q: WHAT ABOUT THE SOVIET CHARGE THAT US POLICY DOES NOT CONFORM TO ARTICLE VI OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY?

A: US ARMS CONTROL POLICY IS FULLY CONSISTENT WITH THE NPT ARTICLE VI REQUIREMENT THAT PARTIES TO THE TREATY PURSUE NEGOTIATIONS IN GOOD FAITH ON EFFECTIVE ARMS CONTROL MEASURES. US PROPOSALS IN THE START, INF, AND MBFR TALKS, AND IN OTHER FORA, EMBODY THE US COMMITMENT

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TO PURSUING EFFECTIVE ARMS CONTROL. THE SOVIETS SHOULD ASK THEMSELVES WHETHER THEIR WALK-OUT FROM THE INF TALKS, AND THEIR REFUSAL TO SET A DATE FOR RESUMPTION OF START TALKS, ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE NPT'S OBLIGATION.

HELSINKI FINAL ACT

Q: WHAT ABOUT THE SOVIET CHARGE THAT US MILITARY EXERCISES AND OTHER ACTIONS VIOLATE THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT?

A: THE UNITED STATES IS IN COMPLIANCE WITH ALL THE UNDERTAKINGS, HUMAN RIGHTS AS WELL AS SECURITY, CONTAINED IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. OUR MILITARY ACTIVITIES ARE COMPLETELY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE FINAL ACT.

WE AND OUR ALLIES NOTIFY ALL EXERCISES WHICH EXCEED THE THRESHOLD OF 25,000 TROOPS ESTABLISHED BY THE FINAL ACT, AND OFTEN NOTIFY SMALLER-SCALE MILITARY MANEUVERS, AS A VOLUNTARY EFFORT TO STRENGTHEN MUTUAL CONFIDENCE.

WE REGRET THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS NOT ALWAYS

RECIPROCATED. NOT ONLY HAVE THE WARSAW PACT NATIONS GENERALLY DECLINED TO PROVIDE VOLUNTARY NOTIFICATION OF ANY EXERCISE WHICH DID NOT REACH THE 25,000 TROOP THRESHOLD, AS THE PRESIDENT'S REPORT TO CONGRESS ON COMPLIANCE INDICATED, BUT THE SOVIET UNION, IN A CLEARCUT FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE FINAL ACT, FAILED ADEQUATELY TO NOTIFY THE EXERCISE ZAPAD 81, WHICH INVOLVED SOME 100,000 TROOPS.

-- THE SOVIET ACCUSATION'S LACK OF SUBSTANCE IS DEMONSTRATED BY THE FACT THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS NEVER FORMALLY APPROACHED THE US CONCERNING POSSIBLE US FAILURES TO COMPLY WITH THE SECURITY PROVISIONS OF THE FINAL ACT. ONLY IN RESPONSE TO US CONCERNS ABOUT SOVIET COMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS HAS THE SOVIET UNION SEEN FIT TO LODGE THESE UNSUBSTANTIATED CHARGES.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Q: WHAT ABOUT THE SOVIET CLAIM THAT THE US IS AVOIDING BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS ON PROHIBITING CHEMICAL WEAPONS, AND AT THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN GENEVA THE US IS BLOCKING ACHIEVEMENT OF A MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT?

A: THE US IS COMMITTED TO THE ELIMINATION OF ALL CW AND TO THE CONCLUSION OF A COMPLETE, EFFECTIVE, AND VERIFIABLE GLOBAL CW BAN. THIS COMMITMENT AND US EFFORTS TO PROMOTE GENUINE PROGRESS TOWARD A BAN IN THE CD NEGOTIATIONS ARE WIDELY RECOGNIZED AND SUPPORTED BY THE MEMBERS OF THE CD AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. IT IS THE USSR WHICH MUST TAKE CONCRETE STEPS TO CONVINCE THE WORLD THAT IT IS TRULY SERIOUS ABOUT CW ARMS CONTROL BY WORKING WITH THE US AND THE CD TO DEVELOP EFFECTIVE AND MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE APPROACHES TO BANNING CW WORLDWIDE.

NUCLEAR TESTING

Q: WHAT ABOUT THE SOVIET CHARGE THAT THERE HAVE BEEN NUMEROUS CASES WHEN US NUCLEAR TESTS HAVE EXCEEDED THE LIMIT ESTABLISHED BY THE UNRATIFIED THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY AND PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATY, AND THAT THIS PRACTICE APPARENTLY CONTINUES?

A: SINCE THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE TTBT AND PNET TREATIES THE US HAS CONDUCTED NO NUCLEAR TESTS HAVING YIELDS WHICH EXCEEDED THE 150 KILOTON THRESHOLD OF THESE TREATIES.

Q: WHAT ABOUT THE SOVIET CHARGE THAT RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT FROM US NUCLEAR TESTS HAS SPREAD BEYOND NATIONAL BOUNDARIES, IN VIOLATION OF THE 1963 LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY?

A: BOTH THE US AND USSR HAVE ENCOUNTERED SOME DIFFICULTY IN TOTALLY CONTAINING ALL THEIR UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TESTS. THE US, HOWEVER, HAS HAD ONLY A FEW PROBLEMS IN THE PAST WITH THE VENTING OF RADIOACTIVE DEBRIS FROM UNDERGROUND TESTS AT THE THE NEVADA TEST SITE. AS MORE EXPERIENCE WAS GAINED WITH THE CONTAINMENT OF UNDERGROUND TESTS, VENTING FROM US TESTS BECAME EVEN MORE RARE. OVER FOR THE PAST DECADE THERE HAS BEEN ONLY ONE INCIDENT OF LOCAL AND MINOR VENTING. THE SOVIETS HAD NOT RAISED THEIR CONCERNS ABOUT US VENTING WITH US SINCE 1976, UNTIL THE LATEST REFERENCE TO IT. SHULTZ
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SUBJECT CHRONOLOGY US INITIATIVES / INF & START

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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Washington, D.C. 20451

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

October 14, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Robert M. Kimmitt,
Executive Secretary, National Security Council

Charles Hill,
Executive Secretary, Department of State

Colonel John H. Stanford,
Executive Secretary, Department of Defense

Thomas B. Cormack
Executive Secretary, Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: U.S. Initiatives/Soviet Responses

Attached is a chronology of U.S. initiatives in INF and START and Soviet responses to these initiatives. This working paper, prepared by ACDA, is provided for information and use by your Agency. We are also preparing a similar chronology of Soviet initiatives and will forward these to you when completed.


William B. Staples
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
As stated

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US INITIATIVES IN INF

US Initiative

Soviet Response

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|--|---|
| 1. Agreed Data Base: December 4, 1981, Nitze informally suggests an agreed data base will be necessary to set a starting point for reductions. | Negative: December 8, 1982, Kvitsinskiy states negotiations could become "enmeshed" in data like MBFR. |
| 2. Zero Proposal: December 11, 1981, Nitze formally presents the concrete elements of the US "zero-zero" proposal. | Negative: December 15, 1981, Soviet side rejects as one-sided and biased. |
| 3. Data: January 28, 1982, Nitze tables data on US and Soviet INF aircraft and missiles. | Negative: February 2, 1982, Kvitsinskiy rejects US data; claims approximate equality in "medium-range" systems in Europe and tables supporting Soviet data. |
| 4. Draft Treaty: February 2, 1982, US Delegation tables draft zero Treaty text. | Negative: March 9, 1982, following informal criticism Kvitsinskiy formally states that US draft Treaty is not a basis for an acceptable agreement. |
| 5. Data Working Group: June 7, 1982, Nitze suggests the establishment of working group on data. | Positive: Kvitsinskiy agrees. First Working Group meeting convened June 16, 1982. |
| 6. Treaty Text Working Group: June 24, 1982, Nitze proposes establishment of working group to negotiate selected articles of draft Treaty. | Positive: July 1, 1982, Kvitsinskiy agrees. Treaty Text Working Group meets first on July 6. |
| 7. Missile Destruction Procedures: October 28, 1982, Nitze tables procedures necessary to assure verification of missile destruction. | Negative: November 18, 1982, Kvitsinskiy states that verification is secondary and must follow resolution of main issues, and that specific measures bear the imprint of the inequitable US approach. |

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8. CBMs: Nov. 23, 1982, US formally proposes agreement on advance notification of INF ballistic missile test launches.
Negative: Nov. 23, 1982, Kvitsinskiy rejects US proposal on the basis it would imply acceptance of P-II deployments.
9. Working Group on Verification: February 1, 1983, Nitze proposes to negotiate destruction procedures.
Negative: February 1, 1983, Kvitsinskiy sees "no need" for such a working group until agreement is reached on central issues.
10. CBMs: February 1, 1983, Nitze tables draft text of a Treaty on advance notification of LRINF ballistic missile launches and proposes formation of working group.
Negative: March 17, 1983, Kvitsinskiy states that US draft CBM proposal assumes zero option and is unacceptable.
11. Criteria for an Agreement: February 3, 1983, Nitze sets forth President's five criteria by which US will evaluate acceptability of US Soviet proposals.
Negative: March 24, 1983, following informal criticism Kvitsinskiy formally rejects criteria as reflective of "zero-zero" position. Insists on four Soviet "prerequisites" for an agreement.
12. Interim Agreement: Mar. 29, 1983, US proposes Interim Agreement which calls for equal levels of US and Soviet LRINF warheads on a global basis.
Negative: May 19, 1983, When negotiations resume following recess, Kvitsinskiy rejects the interim solution because it entails U.S. deployments and no compensation for third-country systems.
13. Starting Date for Round V: March 28, 1983, Nitze proposes that the sides begin Round V in mid May (i.e. May 17) rather than early June.
Positive: March 29, 1983, Kvitsinskiy accepts early starting date.

14. Interim Proposal Treaty: May 19, 1983, Delegation tables draft Treaty based on proposal for Interim Agreement.

Negative: July 12, 1983, following informal criticism Kvitsinskiy formally rejects as the "stillborn twin brother" of the Zero Treaty.
15. Specific Warhead Limits: June 16, 1983 Nitze proposes, within 0 and 572 constraints, LRINF missile warhead numbers, in increments of 50, between 50 and 450.

Negative: July 12, 1983 Kvitsinskiy says any numerical combination in an "interim solution" is unacceptable.
16. Reciprocal Collateral Constraints: July 12, 1983, US Delegation tables revised Treaty language which applies collateral constraints to US Pershing I.

Negative: July 12, 1983, Kvitsinskiy asserts peripheral questions must wait until central issues are resolved.
17. Destruction Working Group: Sept. 13, 1983, Nitze urges formation of working group to discuss destruction measures without prejudice to composition of arms.

Positive: Sept. 22, 1983, Delegations agree that the reformed Data Experts/Destruction Working Group can discuss destruction procedures.
18. New Proposals: Sept. 22, 1983, Nitze introduces new US proposals for limits on land-based LRINF aircraft, US LRINF missile levels in Europe, and P-II/GLCM mix at reduced levels.

Negative: October 5, 1983, Kvitsinskiy affirms Andropov's Sept. 29 statement as authoritative and says that US proposals are neither a basis for productive work nor a solution to the problem as a whole.
19. New Meeting Formats: Sept. 27, 1983 Nitze suggests less formal Heads of Delegation or limited attendance plenaries to complement existing procedures.

Non-committal: Sept. 29, 1983 Kvitsinskiy resists idea. Work schedule could be intensified, but negotiating record requires official statements.

US INITIATIVES IN START

US Initiative

1. Exchange of Data on Current Forces: October 19, 1982, Rowny tabled data on US forces and urged Soviets to reciprocate.
2. Working Group: December 2, 1982, Rowny proposes three working groups to deal with CBMs, Definitions, and Exchange of Data.
3. Request for Specific Information: US has repeatedly asked USSR for their specific proposed numerical limits on total "nuclear charges" and MIRVed SNDVs.
4. US Basic Elements: March 1 1983, US tabled Basic Elements to counter Soviet claims that US proposal was not comprehensive. March 3, Rowny suggests working group to address this text and Soviet Basic Principles document.
5. CBMs: March 8, 1983, US tabled draft CBMs agreement, and indicated areas of mutual concern; offered to set aside format and discuss merits.
6. Limit on Deployed Ballistic Missiles: June 23, 1983, US indicated that it was relaxing the 850 limit. We left the number blank, telling the Soviets it was negotiable.

Soviet Response

- Negative: November 2, 1982, Karpov responds that exchange on existing balance is unnecessary and data exchange for new agreement is premature.
- Negative: February 2, 1983, Karpov said it was premature prior to agreement on the basics.
- Incomplete: They provided figures for MIRV aggregates in Round IV, but state that their exact overall weapons limit would depend upon resolution of other issues.
- Negative: March 3, 1983, Karpov stated that working groups are instruments of negotiating teams and were doomed to stand still unless there was consensus first.
- Negative: March 8, 1983, Soviet side believes CBMs should be considered in overall START agreement. Soviets tabled draft Treaty article on CBMs.
- Feigned indifference: June 28, 1983, Soviets said step was taken only to accommodate Midgetman, not to move talks forward. In any event, they said missiles and bombers should be aggregated, not kept separate.

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7. Draft Treaty: July 7, 1983, US tabled draft Treaty.

Mixed: July 12, 1983, Soviets said it was worthwhile procedurally to have concrete proposals on table, but argued that US draft did not change unacceptable nature of US position.

8. Combine Phases: July 7, 1983, US draft called for a single-phase agreement instead of original two-phase approach, thus permitting ALCMS to be limited from the outset.

Feigned indifference: July 6, 1983, Karpov said privately that it was a positive step, but Soviets maintain original US proposal was unrealistic and a non-starter.

9. Limit on ALCM Loading: July 12, 1983, US proposed a maximum of 20 ALCMs on any heavy bomber (compared to average loading limit of 28 in SALT II).

Cool: July 12, 1983, Soviets state that 20 was lower than 28, US still permitted 8,000 ALCMs. Also, ALCMs (and other bomber weapons) should be aggregated with missile warheads. In post-plenary, Karpov proposed a limit of 16 ALCMs per bomber.

10. Throw-Weight Flexibility: July 21, 1983, US offered to withdraw its indirect limits on throw-weight (210/110/2,500) if the Soviets preferred to adopt a direct limit at a mutually-agreed level (implying it could be higher than the current US level). We said we would consider any effective means of reducing throw-weight proposed by the Soviets. To underline our flexibility, we left the provision on throw-weight blank in the US draft Treaty.

Negative: July 19, 1983, Soviets continued to argue that throw-weight was not an important measure of strategic capability and that US proposals were designed to achieve the restructuring and emasculation of Soviet forces. They professed to see nothing significant in our willingness to deal with throw-weight in a variety of ways.

11. CBM Working Group: July 21 1983, US proposed a mandate for a CBM Working Group that left open whether agreed CBMs would be incorporated into a START Treaty or dealt with in a separate agreement.

Uncertain: August 2, 1983, While Soviets hinted that they were ready to set up a CBM Working Group, they did not agree to the neutral mandate we proposed.

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12. Build-Down: In Round V, US proposes: a mutual, guaranteed build-down of ballistic missile warheads by either 5% a year or reductions linked to modernization using variable ratios, depending upon which is greater; concurrent build-down of bombers; additional limits on ALCMs; negotiating trade-offs between US advantages in bomber forces and Soviet advantages in ballistic missile forces; establishment of a build-down working group.

Reserves judgment: Soviets await more details. Initial private reaction on October 12, 1983, is that build-down is nothing new -- a repackaging of US proposal.

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ARMS CONTROL*

KEYWORDS ARMS CONTROL

SUBJECT REVISED VERSION / ARMS CONTROL CALENDAR

ACTION PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK DUE 19 OCT 83 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

KRAEMER

LEHMAN, R

MATLOCK

LEHMAN, C

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ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

October 14, 1983

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7107

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Arms Control Calendar

Attached is a revised version of the arms control
calendar for the remainder of 1983.

Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As stated

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State, 1997

By WOS NARA, Date 3/8/01

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DECL:OADR

Drafted: PM/TMP:HStoffer *8/2*
632-8681 10/13/83

Clearance: PM/TMP:OGrobel
PM:RDean *8/2*
EUR:RBurt *8/2*
PM:JTHowe *8/2*
CIA: *8/2*
NSC:RLinhard *8/2*
OSD:RPerle *8/2*
JCS:ASMoreau *8/2*
ACDA:MGuhin *8/2*
P:AKanter *8/2*

Drafted: PM/TMP:HStoffer *8/2*
632-8681 10/13/83

Clearance: PM/TMP:OGrobel
PM:RDean *WJH*
EUR:RBurt *WJH*
PM:JTHowe *M*
CIA: [REDACTED] *B3*
NSC:RLinhard *WJH*
OSD:RPerle *WJH*
JCS:ASMoreau *WJH*
ACDA:MGuhin *WJH*
P:AKanter

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NLS FOO-009/1 #118
By CW, NARA, Date 6/7/06

ARMS CONTROL CALENDAR OCTOBER 10 - DECEMBER 31, 1983

<u>DATE</u>	<u>EVENT</u>	<u>POSSIBLE ACTIONS*</u>		
		<u>INF</u>	<u>START</u>	<u>OTHER ISSUES</u>
Oct 10-16	Release of Dutch defense White Paper	Prior consultations with Dutch and NATO	Amb Rowny continues to present new proposals	MBFR policy decisions
		SACPG consideration of refinements of Sept 21 initiatives (aircraft, geographic scope, PII/GLCM mix) and INF contingency guidance.		ACVC or SACPG review of compliance strategy
	2nd M-X Flight Test			
	Soviet threat not to continue negotiations beyond this date			
	INF Protest Week in FRG--Oct 15-22 (activities peak Oct. 22)	Adelman trip to Europe		
	UNGA First Committee debate on arms control resolutions begins in New York			

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CH NARA, DATE 6/21/06

* A critical unknown in planning for the remainder of 1983 is whether the Soviets reciprocate US interest in making progress in arms control.

<u>DATE</u>	<u>EVENT</u>	<u>POSSIBLE ACTIONS</u>		
		<u>INF</u>	<u>START</u>	<u>OTHER ISSUES</u>
Oct 17-23	Peace Demonstrations in Rome and Comiso Oct 22		JCS presentation to SACPG on strategic requirements?	Possible MBFR trilateral
	Italian P.M. Craxi Visit to Washington Oct 20			Initiate compliance strategy
	SCG--Oct 20 (Dobbins) Brussels			
Oct 23-30	Peace demonstrations in UK, Netherlands, Belgium	Public diplomacy	Possible SACPG review of build- down "details" and "tradeoffs"?	Possible intro- duction of new MBFR proposal in NATO
	CDE prepcon begins in Helsinki--Oct 25			NATO proposes CDE procedures at Helsinki
	Defense Appropriations Bill (House Action)			
	NPG in Ottawa--Oct 27-28 HLG on NPG margins, Ottawa, Oct 26	Approve HLG study on <u>SNF/SRINF; publicize reductions</u>		
<u>NOVEMBER-</u> <u>DECEMBER</u>				
Oct 31- Nov 6	Defense Appropri- ations Bill (Senate Action)	Anticipate possible Soviet Proposal/ Military countermeasures/ walking out of talks; response by US		Compliance report to Congress

<u>DATE</u>	<u>EVENT</u>	<u>POSSIBLE ACTIONS</u>		
		<u>INF</u>	<u>START</u>	<u>OTHER ISSUES</u>
		FRG security policy debate; bilateral consultations with FRG		Preparation for BWC review
	First GLCM missiles, TELs and LCCs arrive Greenham Common, UK --Nov 1.			NSC meeting on compliance (?)
	President's Asia Trip--Nov 2-16	Consider a comprehensive presentation of what we have done in Geneva		
Nov 7-13	Meetings at UNGA to prepare BWC pre-con and Review Conference		SACPG/NSC Approval of builddown details and tradeoff work	Propose timing, venue, participation, procedures and substance of BWC conference
	SCG--Nov 10 (Burt) Rome C.R.A. Expires Nov 10			
Nov 14-20	German SPD, FDP Party Congresses on INF			Hotline/Communications Meeting with Soviets in Washington?

<u>DATE</u>	<u>EVENT</u>	<u>POSSIBLE ACTIONS</u>		
		<u>INF</u>	<u>START</u>	<u>OTHER ISSUES</u>
	CW Verification workshop for CD members in Utah			Hotline/Communications Meeting with Soviets in Washington (?)
	SCC session ends-- Nov 18			
	Organizational meeting for BWC Strengthening Conference, New York			SACPG discussion of BWC conference
	First GLCM missiles, TEL and LCC arrive in Italy --Nov '83			
Nov 21-27	SCG-- Nov 22 (Dobbins) Brussels	SACPG on possible INF initiative in con- nection with IOC		NSC meeting on nuclear testing
	Bundestag debate on INF deployments--Nov 21			
	First P-II missiles arrive in FRG on Nov 22			
Nov 28- Dec 4		Possible NSC meeting on INF initiative in connection with IOC		
Dec 5-11	End START Round V		2 day seminar on tradeoffs, asymmetries, and concepts	
	DPC and NAC Ministerials	Ministerial communiques supporting deployments/ reiterating Soviet non- cooperation on arms control		

<u>DATE</u>	<u>EVENT</u>	<u>POSSIBLE ACTIONS*</u>		
		<u>INF</u>	<u>START</u>	<u>OTHER ISSUES</u>
	SCG--Dec 8 on margins of NAC			
Dec 12-31	End MBFR round-- Dec 15			Technical round of Hotline/Communications talks with USSR (?)
	Possibility of no agreement on end of INF round			
	INF IOC--Dec 15-31			
	CDE opens Jan 17 in Stockholm			
	Prepcon for BWC Review Conference in 1st quarter 1984			