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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. cable	090040Z Feb 83, 2p	2/9/83	B1
2. memo (8290267)	Michael Wheeler to Bremer, et al, re Study Group (with notations), 1p <i>R 6/21/06 NLSF00-009/1 #137</i>	ND	B1
3. memo (8290267)	William Clark to the President, re Senator Jackson's proposal, 1p <i>R " " #138</i>	5/10/82	B1
4. memo (8290267)	Same text as item #2 (no notations), 1p <i>R " " #139</i>	ND	B1
5. cable	201534Z May 82, 4p <i>Part " " #140</i>	5/20/82	B1
6. notes	Handwritten on yellow paper, 2p <i>R " " #141</i>	ND	B1
7. cable	191503Z Aug 81, 5p <i>R " " #142</i>	8/19/81	B1

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pp. 1-2

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MESSAGE NO. 134 CLASSIFICATION _____ No. Pages 23
FROM: Clayton E. McManaway S/S 23126 7224
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Draft Speech on US Arms Control Policy

TO (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
NSC	Mr. David Gergin		
NSC	Mr. Dennis Blair	395-5732	
NSC	Mr. Sven Kramer		
NSC	Mr. Robert McFarlane	456-2257	

FOR: CLEARANCE ☐ INFORMATION ☐ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS: PLS RESEND LAST
3 PAGES TO C1

S/S Officer: Clayton E. McManaway *for*

Subject: Draft Speech on U.S. Arms Control Policy

Attached is a draft speech on the general issue of U.S. arms control policy, for use by American speakers in Europe. It is easily adaptable to use in the United States.

The text is long, but modular, and can be reduced in length as circumstances may require. In addition to quotes indicated, it heavily paraphrases public remarks by the President, by Secretary Shultz, Gen. Rowley, the daily press briefers, and other administration officials.

This text is designed to:

- build recognition of the President's genuine commitment to arms reductions and to peace, which have been under doubt;
- reinforce positive aspects of the President's position, and support for the two-track decision;
- avoid reactive discussion of specific negotiating proposals, but to make Soviet responsibilities clear.

We would appreciate the comments of the NSC staff on the draft and ask that you pass a copy to Mr. Gergen.

Comments may be returned to the author, Mr. Robert M. Smalley, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Public Affairs. We are simultaneously seeking comments from Messrs. Burt, Howe, Bosworth, and Lehman (ACDA).

Today the world is engaged in a great debate on an over-riding issue that has become the fundamental concern of our age.

It is the issue of preserving nuclear peace.

The issue of nuclear arms control.

The centerpieces of this debate are the proposals now on the table in Geneva to bring about deep reductions in Soviet and American long-range nuclear missiles, and the removal of a whole class of intermediate-range weapons from European soil.

These are President Reagan's proposals.

They are bold and imaginative initiatives designed to secure peace--peace with justice, with security, and with freedom for all of us who cherish it.

From the beginning of his Administration, President Reagan has seen that the road to a more secure peace for the world lies in dramatic reductions in armaments.

Today for the first time in the nuclear age, arms control negotiators are not dealing with proposed limits on the rate of growth in weapons. Today we are dealing in substantial cutbacks of numbers ... in arms reductions.

The basis of the START talks in Geneva is the President's call for major reductions on both sides in the arsenals of intercontinental missiles; and the INF negotiations result from his call for elimination of weapons which currently threaten Western Europe.

In both cases, very strong and firm U.S. arms reduction policy is being implemented by very strong and firm negotiators.

In recognizing that the numbers of weapons must come down, the Soviets have followed President Reagan's lead, suggesting smaller cutbacks to less precise levels. "The Soviets have responded in both negotiations with their own proposals," Mr. Reagan said last month, "so a serious foundation for progress has been laid."

And the President has stated emphatically that we will stay at the negotiating table as long as there is any chance of achieving an agreement.

He is absolutely committed to arms control agreements based on equality of strength ... which would produce political stability, with a lessening of world tensions ... and agreements which will ensure effective verification.

PARADOX

Today I want to talk about the President's arms control policies and their close relationship with all of you here in Western Europe.

On the face of it, his proposals have been so bold and so clear that controversy over the issue is almost ironic.

But the challenge of reducing the risks and dangers of the nuclear age is a subject replete with paradox.

Nuclear war has become so unthinkable that the only conceivable use of nuclear weapons is to preserve the peace.

The intricacies of nuclear deterrence require great expertise; yet we don't always trust the experts.

And no subject carries a greater demand for calm, rational thought--but few subjects so vividly stir our emotions.

There is a great need for enlightenment on the issue--yet much of the public discussion about it, on both sides of the Atlantic, has been filled with innocence and ignorance.

As recently as last November, many Americans were virtually unaware that President Reagan had put forward unprecedented proposals to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons--and in one class of weapons, to zero--in the interest of peace.

But today that has changed. The American public has become sharply aware that the Reagan proposals actually are on the table being negotiated with the Soviets.

The issue of nuclear arms control is being widely discussed in the American press.

People have begun to realize the complexities of achieving nuclear arms control agreements with the Soviets.

And on Capitol Hill, the Congress again is debating the issue of a nuclear freeze, along with complex questions of nuclear arms production, deployment and policy.

HISTORY

The Congress is no stranger to Great Debates on historic issues of defense and foreign policy. And history is never hesitant to judge the outcome.

The Neutrality Acts of the 1930s were fiercely debated--and they effectively removed the United States from playing any role in the deterrence of World War Two.

In 1952, there was another great debate in the United States Senate, with a different outcome. An historic decision was reached to station American troops in Europe--and with that, we cast our lot irrevocably with the people of this continent.

That commitment to security and peace for all of us remains in effect today. It has been supported and continued by every American administration, Republican and Democratic, for more than three decades.

It is the foundation of our NATO partnership, and the cornerstone of peace...a partnership which has given us the longest peace Europe has known in this century.

Our partnership is firmly based on shared values--political, economic and cultural, as well as military. We also share whatever risks may be inherent in our mutual commitment to resist aggression.

From his first day in office, President Reagan has joined in the American commitment to Europe, to NATO and to peace. His foremost concern and responsibility has been to preserve peace with justice--and to strengthen the NATO alliance which protects it.

He sent Vice President Bush to Europe to reaffirm our policy of close consultation with our allies on common

political and security issues--and to signal both our allies and the Soviet Union that we are firm in our commitment to peace and security in Europe and to genuine arms reduction.

ARMS CONTROL AND PEACE

The great public discussion over the issue of arms control, on both sides of the Atlantic, has drawn upon the honest fears of nuclear disaster held by many well-meaning people.

In some instances, supporters of the nuclear freeze concept and related ideas have tended to cast the issue--wittingly or otherwise--as though it were a referendum on who wants war and who doesn't.

It is not. The fact is, no one holds a monopoly on the abhorrence of nuclear war. Everyone wants peace.

The great discussion is over the question of how to preserve it. Secretary of State Shultz put it clearly into focus when he said, "Everyone shares the hope that we can construct a world which is at peace and has an increasing element of justice...but we are not the only people with awesome weapons. We understand the fears that people have. We also understand that when you are confronting with a strong aggressor, the worst thing you can do is to let your own defenses decline and allow fear to lead you into appeasement."

President Reagan spoke for all Americans when he said, "A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. So to

those who protest against nuclear war, I can only say, I'm with you.... No one feels more than I the need for peace."

This is not just rhetoric.

He has said privately, and with great feeling, that his deepest hopes as President are to achieve peace in two ways-- peace in the Middle East, and arms control agreements which will restore the world's sense of security.

That kind of peace is not just the absence of war, but the peace of mind that comes from not being threatened by war-- by nuclear blackmail--or by conquest. Not a fragile peace that hangs in danger day by day, but the security of knowing that peace will continue over the long-term.

The commitment to peace which all of us share as members of NATO is based upon the policy of deterrence. Deterrence is the prevention of war by making the cost of aggression unacceptably high.

In today's world, this means that any surprise attack, by any potential aggressor, would end in disaster, not victory. No one must ever risk starting a nuclear war.

In the nuclear age, no other policy makes sense. And no other policy offers better assurance of permanent peace.

The validity of deterrence was proved in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. Here was a genuine dangerous confrontation-- yet nuclear peace prevailed because the United States clearly had the deterrent to preserve it--and the Soviets knew we had the will to do so.

DETERRENCE

Since WW II, two threads of deterrence policy have run throughout every American administration.

Each has joined in the commitment to maintain whatever nuclear strength was needed to preserve peace.

And every American President has tried to advance the cause of nuclear arms control.

Today we continue to have those same two policies for the nuclear age--preserving nuclear peace through strength, while trying to negotiate nuclear security for all ages to come.

This so-called Two Track policy is shared by our NATO allies here in Europe--to maintain strength for peace on the one hand, and to negotiate for arms controls on the other.

On the record, these policies have succeeded. Despite the outbreak of more than 100 wars around the globe since the end of World War Two, nuclear peace has been maintained, and some significant arms control agreements have been achieved.

Together with the Soviets and others, we have achieved treaties which controlled or banned the testing or use of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under the sea. Anti-ballistic missiles, nuclear proliferation, nuclear accidents, and limitations on strategic missile launchers--all were dealt with by treaties and agreements.

Unfortunately, our efforts were not always successful. The Soviets turned down the Baruch Plan of 1946, in which we

offered to turn over all American atomic weapons to an international body--at a time when we had an atomic monopoly--and went on to develop their own atomic weapons.

They also rejected President Eisenhower's proposals for "open skies" and "atoms for peace."

But over the years there has been enough progress to encourage us to continue the search for agreements with the Soviet Union to control nuclear weapons.

That quest is underway today on the basis of President Reagan's initiatives.

And President Reagan is firmly committed to nuclear peace through deterrence.

He believes that deterrence will continue to work--that it can keep the peace--if three conditions prevail.

First, the United States must be roughly in balance with the Soviets in nuclear strength. If the balance were to be lost and the scales tipped in their favor, they would not only hold a military advantage but also a dangerous capacity for diplomatic blackmail and political intimidation throughout the world.

Second, the President knows that deterrence will work only if a potential aggressor has no doubt that the United States has the will as well as the means to retaliate. It must be clear--as it was in Cuba--to our adversaries and allies alike that aggression against Western Europe would be repaid with devastating force--just as it would be against the U.S.

Third, for deterrence to be assured, our forces must be able to survive a preemptive attack and retaliate effectively. The ability to strike back would lose its sting--and its peace-keeping force--if old missiles were frozen into silos, or old bombers and submarines frozen in their obsolescence.

THE SOVIET BUILD-UP

Today our nuclear deterrent capability is based on a balanced Triad of forces--B-52 manned bombers, nuclear submarines and intercontinental missiles, land-based in the United States.

With this triad, we reached a level of deterrent capability in the early 1970s which we thought, in effect, was sufficient to preserve the peace--and we rested on our oars. We believed the Soviets had achieved rough parity with us in all the measurable elements of nuclear strength, and we thought they would be satisfied, as we were, with a nuclear balance.

But they were not.

For their part, the Soviets launched the most massive buildup of nuclear weapons and delivery systems in the history of the nuclear age. By the end of the 1970s:

- They had achieved numerical superiority in strategic weapons and bombers, as well as conventional military forces.

- Their total number of nuclear weapons increased, while ours actually declined.

- They have concentrated on developing land-based missiles which have a first-strike capability--very large, accurate,

long-range weapons which could cause severe damage to deterrent forces within the United States itself.

--And as you know so well here, they have deployed an arsenal of some 340 SS-20 intermediate range nuclear missiles (not to mention another 300 older models) aimed at all the NATO allies in Europe--with no comparable systems or numbers yet deployed to defend against them.

Today Western Europe is looking down the gun barrel of thousands of warheads, each more powerful than the one used against Hiroshima. And the number of these deployed Soviet weapons continues to grow.

Yet there is still not a single comparable NATO weapon in place.

This is the stuff of which nuclear blackmail and political intimidation can be made.

The hard fact is that the Soviet buildup has been vastly greater than anything they would have needed for their own defense, their own policy of deterrence, or to "keep up" with American efforts.

By this runaway buildup of weapons, it was the Soviets themselves who raised grave questions about their own purpose and intentions.

It was they who started an arms race when there was none.

In a period of crisis, the advantages they hold today are dangerous capabilities indeed in the hands of a nation that has already put a gun at the heads of Afghanistan and Poland.

Nor has their buildup ended. Today they are testing new missiles, which would further expand their ability to attack Europe and the United States. And by 1987, Soviet spending for strategic weapons is projected to be almost 2 to 1 greater than ours.

THE AMERICAN BALANCE

Now what of the American capability, which we once thought to be sufficient?

While over 85 percent of Moscow's nuclear missile warheads are on systems deployed in the last 10 years, only 45 percent of ours are on systems deployed in that same period.

-- We have allowed our bombers to grow old, while the Soviets built new ones and developed efficient air defense systems.

-- We settled for an aging submarine fleet, and did not begin to launch the new Trident super submarines until 1981.

-- Our land-based missile systems aged in their silos while the Soviets went on deploying and deploying new systems.

As a result of all this, we do not have the deterrent capability that we had just 20 years ago. Our long-range missiles--those deployed in the United States--as well as other deterrent weapons--are vulnerable to attack--the famous window of vulnerability.

To be sure, the American nuclear shield is still the world's best hope for peace. Our strength and our resolve have widespread respect.

But we face imbalances which are not just a numbers game. Because of the nuclear weapons aimed at both Europe and America today, the future is less secure. Peace itself is less secure.

NATO's INF DECISION

The NATO alliance has set out to restore the balance-- and to do it on twin tracks.

We are rebuilding strength to maintain peace, and at the same time pursuing negotiations to preserve it.

We do not seek military superiority in any sense, now or in the future ... but neither can we afford to play a game of nuclear roulette, based upon unilateral weakness.

Militarily, we are reinforcing our deterrent capabilities by upgrading land, air and seapower. We are modernizing the deterrent forces that have grown old.

In this effort, your American partners recognize and appreciate that the overwhelming majority of conventional forces in Europe today are Europeans.

But perhaps of greatest importance to our common future is the fact that the NATO allies are now prepared to redress the imbalances that have been created by Soviet intermediate-range missiles aimed at Western Europe.

The NATO governments made a decision in 1979--and they have reaffirmed it repeatedly, as recently as last December--to deploy similar weapons beginning at the end of this year.

Those deployments will proceed unless the Soviets agree, through negotiations, to remove the weapons which they now have deployed against this continent.

The decision to deploy the Pershing Two and the ground-launched Cruise missile is a direct response by NATO to the massive Soviet deployment of SS-20s, which has already occurred. If the Soviets wish to prevent NATO's modernization program, the solution is on the table in Geneva.

This is a European initiative. It is a NATO dual-track decision to which the United States is subscribing. This is not a question of the United States imposing its policy on Western Europe. This is a decision of the alliance.

The Soviets have made it clear, up to now, that they do not want offsetting missiles to be deployed in Western Europe. They want to maintain their monopoly--and therefore, implicitly, their capability to strike, or to threaten.

President Reagan has called on the Soviets to "refrain from propaganda and join us in genuine disarmament. We believe the best solution for both sides is zero-zero," he said. "We have also said we will listen to and negotiate any fair proposals that are made." But he added: "The Soviet Union is demanding the right to ... hit every population center in Europe, but they don't want a single weapon of deterrent nature there on the other side."

The alliance will not permit this dangerous monopoly to continue. The Soviets have a choice of seriously negotiating an agreement or allied deployment.

The zero/zero proposal is a fair, balanced, necessary effort to neutralize a threat to western security.

NEGOTIATIONS

Yet we do not believe it is impossible to negotiate significant, verifiable reductions in nuclear weapons with the Soviets.

The history of past negotiations tells us that when we are ready to deploy weapons, they become ready to join us at the negotiating table. The ABM treaty was a major case in point.

Today the alliance is ready to deploy weapons in the interest of its own safety and protection--and President Reagan now says of both the INF and START talks, "I am convinced that we can make real progress."

His words are very clear. "We will consider every serious proposal," he said, "and we have the determination to succeed in this, the most important undertaking of our generation."

And so our negotiators listen carefully to what the Soviets have to say. We hope their words will be translated into positive actions in Geneva and elsewhere.

We believe that progress toward sound agreements--toward the withdrawal of weapons--can be made, if the Soviets negotiate seriously, rather than through public gestures.

Our senior INF negotiator, Ambassador Nitze, has declared, "In order to negotiate seriously, it requires 'give' on the Soviet side. If they 'give,' I am sure we will give serious consideration to any serious proposal."

President Reagan not only addressed himself to the INF talks when he spoke of the most important undertaking of our generation.

At the START talks, also being held in Geneva, we are vigorously pursuing his proposals for dramatic reductions in long-range, intercontinental strategic missiles. Our goal is to reduce the numbers of missiles by one-half, the numbers of warheads by one-third, and to achieve total balance in numbers with the Soviets. The chief American negotiator, Edward Rowney, has expressed guarded optimism on the outcome of these talks.

President Reagan also has offered the Soviets a series of proposals which we call Confidence Building Measures-- designed to reduce international tensions, and the risk of surprise attack, as we try to achieve major arms control agreements. The Soviets have expressed interest in these concepts.

Beyond Geneva, in the same spirit, we are negotiating with the Soviets in Vienna for mutual reductions of conventional forces to balanced levels.

In each of these efforts, the U. S. and the NATO alliance have taken the lead. In each, we have consulted closely with our friends in Western Europe, to assure that we are serving our common interests as well as our own national interests. And in each of these, we will continue to work at your side for arms reduction and for peace.

The President has said, "The Soviet leadership must understand that the way to reduce the nuclear threat is by negotiating in a sincere spirit, and not by trying to sow division between the American people and our NATO partners."

We are not rigidly rejecting overtures to peace. We are considering with our allies every proposal which might genuinely help to produce peace.

VERIFICATION

Wherever the negotiating path may lead us, one thing is certain.

No agreement is possible, and none can be of lasting value to generations to come, unless it includes effective means of verifying arms reductions.

The whole concept of a treaty to reduce nuclear arms becomes meaningless and even dangerous unless the terms of the treaty can be effectively verified.

In the case of arms control and arms reduction, this is a highly technical challenge, involving satellite observance and other means. The United States has made it clear that any future agreements must go beyond these national methods of verification.

Compliance cannot be left to trust alone.

Unfortunately, the Soviet record for compliance with international agreements is less than perfect. Recent evidence of violations of existing treaties prohibiting chemical warfare is a case in point.

But our chief negotiator at the SALT talks, General Rowney, says he is "encouraged and pleased" by recent Soviet statements that proper and advanced verification means should be employed.

SALT II

In the world's troubled search for an end to the tensions of the nuclear arms race, it may sometimes be tempting to think that there is a quick or easy fix to the dangers of our time.

We hear many quick fix proposals today.

For example, some have said we should still ratify SALT I.

But SALT Two would have permitted the Soviets to increase the number and destructive potential of their nuclear weapons dramatically--thereby increasing the Soviet threat to deterrent forces based within the United States. The President's reductions in the numbers of weapons would be far more preferable.

NUCLEAR FREEZE

Other quick-fix advocates honestly believe that both sides should commit themselves to a so-called nuclear freeze--on the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons.

That idea is being debated again in the United States.

But there would be glaring problems with a freeze--problems which would actually jeopardize peace, rather than strengthen hopes for it.

-- A freeze would lock the Soviets into their present nuclear advantages and monopolies--and would lock us into the imbalances that exist today--the very ones we must redress.

-- So a freeze would eliminate any incentive for the Soviets to negotiate real agreements to reduce nuclear weapons to equal levels. It would handicap the talks that are now underway in Geneva.

-- A freeze could jeopardize our commitments to the security of Europe, Japan and elsewhere.

-- And finally, a freeze is just not good enough. Reductions--serious cuts in numbers--are much more preferable. A freeze could take years to negotiate.

So the price of a freeze to the United States and the western alliance would be unacceptably high--and dangerous to peace.

"NO FIRST USE"

We have also heard quick-fix proposals that the United States and the Soviet Union should pledge "No First Use" of nuclear weapons.

But the fact is, no such pledge is necessary.

What is needed is respect for existing commitments.

Every nation that has signed the United Nations Charter and the Helsinki Final Act already has renounced aggression or the threat or use of force.

The Warsaw Pact contains its own article renouncing the use or threat of force.

And the NATO alliance is founded on the principle that force can be used only in self-defense. This was reaffirmed as recently as June of last year, when the NATO nations pledged that none of our weapons--nuclear or conventional--will ever be used except in response to attack.

The need today is not so much for a new declaration of purity or good intention as it is for a demonstrable improvement in behavior by some nations. President Reagan has specifically stated that improved relations "must result from moderation in Soviet conduct, not just our own good intentions. We and our democratic partners eagerly await any serious actions and proposals the Soviets may offer ... which can genuinely advance the cause of peace."

Such actions, he specified, must include ending the bloodshed in Afghanistan, allowing reforms in Poland, and showing restraint in the Middle East.

UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT

Finally, there are those few on both sides of the Atlantic who believe simplistically that the road to peace lies in disarmament--even if it is unilateral disarmament.

Theirs is perhaps the most dangerous folly of all.

History is littered with examples of one-sided impotence.

There were pacifists in both Europe and America in the 1930s, who were instrumental not in deterring war--but in deterring the preparations which might have prevented war.

After World War Two, the first thing we did in the United States was to demobilize immediately. Within a matter of months, we had stripped ourselves to a point where we could not have put a single unified division in the field.

And before long, we learned the price of not having a capability to ensure and enforce world peace.

In quick order, Joseph Stalin crushed a revolution in Poland in 1947, seized Czechoslovakia in 1948, sealed off Berlin in 1949, and dominated huge chunks of Eastern Europe.

We know what his political successors went on to do to Hungary in 1956, to Berlin in 1961, to Prague in 1968. Not to mention Afghanistan, Poland and elsewhere within our own experience.

The question that must face the so-called peace movements of today is, "How do you propose that we protect the peace if we are not strong enough to deter war and aggression? How do you propose to organize a durable peace in a world where some men and some nations inevitably thirst for dominion over others? What will you do if and when the armed battalions start to move again--or the missiles begin to fly?"

CONCLUSION

Nuclear war today is unthinkable to all of us, and we see preparedness as an instrument of peace.

Nuclear weapons have changed both the nature and the consequences of war. They have made surprise attacks and accidents incredibly more dangerous than before.

But they have brought about very little, if any, change in the basic causes of war. They have done nothing to eliminate the taste for aggression that some nations always have--nor do they abolish the danger of confrontation between nations.

The terrible fact is that the genie is out of the bottle and cannot be put back in. Man cannot disinvent the bomb.

So if we cannot abolish it, our challenge is to tame it and control it.

This is what we seek to do through agreements that would control and reduce nuclear arms levels in the world in which we live.

Treaties and other international agreements are means of regulating the behavior of nations--including any who might find aggression tempting.

In our common efforts to secure a peace in which men can practice justice and freedom, we must deal not only with the bomb--but with the behavior of nations which possess the terrible weapons mankind has developed.

The arms control and reduction agreements we seek are investments in peace for all mankind.

President Reagan spoke for the hopes of all people when he said, "I have and I will continue to seek realistic arms control agreements on nuclear and conventional forces. Our proposals for massive reductions in strategic arsenals and

for the elimination of an entire class of nuclear missiles
... deserve the support of all who seek genuine arms reduc-
tions. I want an agreement on strategic nuclear weapons
that reduces the risk of war, lowers the level of armaments,
and enhances global security. We can accept no less."

PA:RMSalley:bds
1/24/83

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May 27th
meeting

VIA LDX

Arms Ctl

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. L. PAUL BREMER, III
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COLONEL ROBERT T. MEEHAN
Assistant for International Matters
Office of the Secretary of Defense

MR. THOMAS B. CORMACK
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COLONEL CHARLES F. STEBBINS
Executive Assistant to the Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Study Group to Review Proposal for a Joint
U.S.-USSR Communications and Information Center

The President has directed that the National Security Council undertake a study of a proposal for a joint U.S.-USSR Communications Information Center. A meeting on this subject under the chairmanship of the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs has been scheduled for Thursday, May 27, 1982, at 3:00 p.m. in Room 305 of the Old Executive Office Building. Please advise my office (395-3044) of the name of the representative who will attend the meeting from your agency. (S)

Michael O. Wheeler
Staff Secretary

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NLS FOO-009/1 #137

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Review May 20, 1988.

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FROM JACKSON, HENRY M

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PIPES

30 APR 82

PIPES

04 MAY 82

KEYWORDS: USSR

CCO

SUBJECT: SENATOR JACKSON LTR TO PRES

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK

DUE: 07 MAY 82 STATUS P FILES

FOR ACTION

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WHEELER

BAILEY

COMMENTS ** NO COPIES OF LETTER TO COMMENT/INFO STAFFERS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (B /)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

DISPATCH W/ATTCH FILE (C)

National Security Council
The White House

Package #

98267

2011/11/11 P1:19

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	1	<i>[initials]</i>	_____
Staff Secretary	2	_____	<i>D/A</i>
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver

Other _____

COMMENTS

*Further action
required.*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

System II
90267

3

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE

ACTION

May 10, 1982

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *WPC*

SUBJECT: Senator Jackson's Proposal for a Joint U.S.-USSR
Communications and Information Center

Senator H. Jackson has written you a letter, dated April 28 (Tab B) in which he urges the establishment, in cooperation with the Soviet Union, of a Joint Communications and Information Center to forestall a nuclear war breaking out between our two countries through misunderstanding or miscalculation. This proposal addresses itself to the danger that, as new countries gain access to nuclear weapons and the risk rises of terrorists laying their hands on them, a third-party nuclear attack on either the U.S. or the USSR could be misinterpreted either in Washington or in Moscow as launched by the other "superpower", producing a massive retaliatory strike. Senator Jackson believes that a group of high-level U.S. and Soviet officials, working side by side (presumably in a neutral country) and enjoying instant access to the top leadership in their respective capitals could defuse such a dangerous situation. (C)

The initiative for such a Center was first made by Senator Nunn in November 1981 and formally introduced by him on the Senate floor on April 26 as an amendment to the FY 1983 Defense Authorization Bill. It is substantially identical to Senator Jackson's proposal. (C)

The Jackson (and Nunn) proposals certainly merit serious attention. Attached (Tab A) you will find a response from you to Senator Jackson which thanks him for his initiative and promises that a study group will be set up to analyze the proposal and come up with recommendations. (C)

RECOMMENDATION

Yes No

- | | | | |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------|----|---|
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | 1. | That you sign the letter to Senator Jackson at Tab A. |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | 2. | That a study group be appointed to analyze and report on Senator Jackson's proposal at: |

☐ The Department of Defense
☐ The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
☒ The National Security Council.

Prepared by:
Richard Pipes

CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE
Review April 30, 1988.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

cc Vice President
Ed Meese
Jim Baker
Mike Deane

CLASSIFIED
EEO-009/1-#138
NLS
CII
NARA, DATE 6/2/06

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON


May 11, 1982

Dear Senator Jackson:

Pursuant to your telephone call ten days ago, I briefed the President on your proposal for a Joint US-USSR Communications and Intelligence Center. As you will note from his response a fast interagency review is under way.

Thank you for your good counsel in this matter and we will be back to you when we have reached a plateau -- however large.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Bill Clark".

William P. Clark

The Honorable
Henry M. Jackson
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 11, 1982

Dear Senator Jackson:

Thank you for your letter of April 28 in which you suggest the creation of a Joint U.S.-USSR Communications/Information Center. The idea, which Senator Nunn has also raised, is very intriguing.

I am instructing that steps be taken for an interagency review of this proposal. I shall certainly notify you of the results. In the meantime, thank you for sharing your thoughts with me.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Ronald Reagan". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a large initial "R".

The Honorable Henry M. Jackson
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Attachment

May 4, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

SIGNED

FROM: RICHARD PIPES *RP*

SUBJECT: Letter to the President from Senator Jackson

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President providing the preliminary analysis requested, along with an interim response to Senator Jackson (Tab A). The incoming letter is at Tab B. Sven Kraemer is drafting a Presidential letter to Senator Nunn.

Sven *SK* Kraemer concurs. *Bob* Robert Kimmitt concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign and forward the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I	Memorandum to the President
Tab A	Interim response to Senator Jackson
Tab B	Incoming letter of April 28, 1982

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Attachment

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

105
3/19/01

~~SECRET~~

SYSTEM II
90267

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SECRET

VIA LDX

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. L. PAUL BREMER, III
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COLONEL ROBERT T. MEEHAN
Assistant for International Matters
Office of the Secretary of Defense

MR. THOMAS B. CORMACK
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COLONEL CHARLES F. STEBBINS
Executive Assistant to the Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Study Group to Review Proposal for a Joint
U.S.-USSR Communications and Information Center

The President has directed that the National Security Council undertake a study of a proposal for a joint U.S.-USSR Communications Information Center. A meeting on this subject under the chairmanship of the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs has been scheduled for Thursday, May 27, 1982, at 3:00 p.m. in Room 305 of the Old Executive Office Building. Please advise my office (395-3044) of the name of the representative who will attend the meeting from your agency. (S)

Michael O. Wheeler
Staff Secretary

SECRET
Review May 20, 1988.

DECLASSIFIED
NLS 100-00911 #139

4- CIS NARA, DATE 6/21/06

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

HENRY M. JACKSON
WASHINGTON

ROOM 137
RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510
(202) 224-3441

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C.

COMMITTEES:
ENERGY AND
NATURAL RESOURCES
ARMED SERVICES
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
INTELLIGENCE

April 28, 1982

SYSTEM II
90267

CLOSE HOLD
SENSITIVE

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I deeply appreciated your thoughtful phone call following my appearance on Face the Nation last Sunday. This is my promised personal letter to you to follow up on my suggestion for a Joint U.S.-USSR Communications/Information Center. As you may know, this is an aspect of arms control on which Senator Nunn has worked for some time and in which he is also greatly interested.

What I have in mind is that our government now put a high priority on establishing, with the Soviets, a permanent Joint Communications/Information Center which -- particularly in times of heightened international tension or crisis -- could minimize the risk of U.S.-Soviet hostilities or conflict being precipitated by inadvertence, miscalculation or simple misunderstanding. As more and more countries acquire nuclear weapons or devices -- and proliferating terrorist groups are on the loose -- the danger increases of incidents that, unless quickly controlled or contained, might trigger a nuclear conflict, particularly incidents subject to initial misinterpretation or misunderstanding.

The prime purpose of such a center would be to provide a continuing U.S.-USSR dialogue and cross-checking of information at a very senior staff level with immediate access to the top leadership in both countries, able, as necessary, to get the chiefs-of-state themselves into direct communication at a moments notice. Such continuing reciprocal communication would have the added advantage of making the prime communicators more or less known quantities to each other -- a phenomenon that, of itself, would facilitate or ease meaningful dialogue in any period of stress or crisis.

In any such communications exchange, we would obviously need at all times to protect and safeguard essential aspects of American defense and of intelligence-gathering capabilities.

There are actually two long-standing precedents for the sort of thing I have in mind: Panmunjom and the Berlin Air Safety Center (BASC). Neither is an exact model, but both offer a rich

April 28, 1982

history that can be drawn upon.

In practical terms, I believe we would want (1) to use and build on the current hot-line (teletype) for head-of-state direct, personal interchange, (2) establish a joint U.S.-USSR facility, manned by small highly professional staffs, and (3) provide an immediately adjacent American facility (with presumably a matching Soviet facility) which would house the terminals of secure communications links to Washington, plus rooms where senior Americans and their staffs could talk in private.

From the start, it should be understood and agreed with the Soviets that this center was not to be a vehicle or forum for polemics or propaganda, and that it would function in private.

As I see it, the burgeoning popular focus on nuclear weapons, and the widespread fears of nuclear holocaust are due in very great measure to the concern that a nuclear war might break out just because Moscow and Washington were out of touch with each other so that accidents and other incidents could "get out of hand". I am convinced that a joint institution along the lines I am suggesting -- that would represent and assure continuing superpower dialogue -- would go far to lessen these anxieties and fears.


Moreover, given that START negotiations are bound to take considerable time, this initiative offers the possibility that our government could conclude an early arms control agreement with the Soviet Union that could help build world confidence in the possibilities for stability and peace.

I would hope the kind of initiative I have outlined here only in preliminary fashion would intrigue you, and that there would be an opportunity for a small bipartisan group of us from the Congress to talk with you personally about it in the very near future. At this time I know that Senator Nunn and Senator Warner who is chairman of the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces would be glad to join in that meeting.

I'm sure you would share my view that it is important to insulate this kind of effort from the political adversary arena, particularly during the coming election campaigns.

With best regards.

Sincerely yours,


Henry M. Jackson U.S.S.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BI

JOINT
GROUP
(JACKSON -
NUMM)

Arms Control

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 01 OF 02
EOB530

MOSCOW 6169
AN002633

DTG: 201534Z MAY 82 PSN: 036750
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INFO USMISSION USNATO 1782
USMISSION GENEVA 5932
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 06169

EXDIS
E.O. 12065: TDS-2 5/22/02 (MCCALL, SHERROD) OR-P
TAGS: MNUC, PARM
SUBJECT: [REDACTED] PROPOSES ARMS CONTROL
- TOPICS FOR REAGAN-BREZHNEV SUMMIT
REF: A) FBIS USSR 26 APR 82, B) MOSCOW 4888,
- C) MOSCOW 5169

1. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT)~~.
2. SUMMARY: [REDACTED] HAS ASKED FOR OUR VIEWS ON TWO QUESTIONS WHICH HE SUGGESTS THAT REAGAN AND BREZHNEV MIGHT DISCUSS AT A SUMMIT: 1) OPPORTUNITIES FOR JOINT US-SOVIET ACTIONS ON NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION, AND 2) THE CREATION OF A MECHANISM FOR COORDINATION ON NUCLEAR CONFLICTS INVOLVING THIRD POWERS, ALONG THE LINES OF THE "JACKSON-NUNN" PROPOSAL. THE ANALYST CLAIMS THAT THE MAIN FOCUS OF SOVIET CONCERN IS THE "NEW NUCLEAR POWERS NEAR THE USSR," ISRAEL AND PAKISTAN. REGARDING THE FIRST QUESTION, THE ANALYST APPEARS TO BE REITERATING SOVIET INTEREST IN FURTHER CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN NUCLEAR EXPORTING STATES. THE ANALYST'S SECOND QUESTION REVEALS AN INTEREST IN USING THE PROPOSED NUNN AMENDMENT TO RESUSCITATE A PROPOSAL ADVANCED BY THE USSR TEN YEARS AGO BUT REJECTED BY THE U.S. IN THE NEGOTIATIONS THAT LED TO THE 1973 US-SOVIET AGREEMENT ON THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR. THE ANALYST SUGGESTED THAT THE USSR MIGHT BE WILLING TO SUPPORT THE U.S. PROPOSAL FOR A MIDDLE EAST NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE, AND PERHAPS A SIMILAR PROPOSAL FOR SOUTH ASIA. EMBASSY REQUESTS WASHINGTON'S GUIDANCE ON WHAT RESPONSE, IF ANY, SHOULD BE MADE. END SUMMARY.

3. ON MAY 17 [REDACTED] GAVE EMBOFF A LONG-REQUESTED APPOINTMENT WITH [REDACTED] THE MEETING [REDACTED] OPENED THE MEETING BY READING

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS FOUO-0091 #140
By CU, NARA, Date 6/21/06

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5
B1

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 6169

DTG: 201534Z MAY 82 PSN: 036750

TWO QUESTIONS FROM A PREPARED TEXT:

-- DOES THE U. S. SEE ANY OPPORTUNITIES FOR JOINT
US-SOVIET ACTIONS IN THE FIELD OF NUCLEAR NON-
PROLIFERATION? WHAT CONCRETE MEASURES COULD BE
UNDERTAKEN?
-- WHAT IS THE U.S. VIEW OF THE PROPOSAL BY SENATORS
"JACKSON AND NUNN" FOR THE CREATION OF A JOINT
US-SOVIET MECHANISM FOR COORDINATION OF NUCLEAR
CONFLICTS INVOLVING THIRD POWERS?

4. [REDACTED] SAID THAT "PERHAPS THESE PROBLEMS COULD
BE A SUBJECT FOR DISCUSSION BETWEEN PRESIDENTS
BREZHNEV AND REAGAN AT A SUMMIT."

5. [REDACTED] ASKED EMBOFF FOR HIS VIEWS. EMBOFF
BEGGED OFF BY SAYING THAT HE WAS NOT AT THE
MOMENT ABLE TO RESPOND AUTHORITATIVELY. HE WOULD
HAVE TO CONSULT FIRST. [REDACTED] THEN LAUNCHED INTO
AN APPARENT BACKGROUND EXPLANATION ON WHY HE WAS
ASKING THE QUESTIONS. [REDACTED] MAIN POINTS WERE:
-- THE FALKLANDS CRISIS ILLUSTRATES THE NECESSITY
OF KNOWING EXACTLY WHAT NUCLEAR POTENTIALS ARE OF
THIRD COUNTRIES, IN ORDER TO PREVENT NUCLEAR
CONFLICTS AND THE INVOLVEMENT OF GREAT POWERS.
-- WE MUST DISCUSS THE QUESTION OF NUCLEAR POTENTIALS
IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO TAKE CONCRETE ACTIONS.
-- AS FOR THE SOVIET UNION, THERE ARE ESSENTIAL
NONPROLIFERATION QUESTIONS NEAR ITS BORDERS.
THE MIDDLE EAST IS AN ESPECIALLY SERIOUS PROBLEM
AND SO IS INDIA-PAKISTAN.
-- WE KNOW THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN IS NOT GOING TO
RECONVENE THE LONDON SUPPLIERS GROUP, ALTHOUGH
THERE IS CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR THIS STEP. FOR
EXAMPLE, SENATOR HART AND CONGRESSMAN OTTINGER,
WHO HAVE PROPOSED A RESOLUTION TO LIMIT THE TRANSFER
OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY, FAVOR THIS APPROACH. THUS
WE CANNOT EXCLUDE THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN MAY DO
SOMETHING.

-- IS PRESIDENT REAGAN, IN HIS APPROACH TO STRATEGIC
ARMS TALKS, DIRECTED BY THE CONCEPT OF THE CARTER
ADMINISTRATION THAT NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT AND
NONPROLIFERATION ARE LINKED IN ACCORDANCE WITH
ARTICLE 6 OF THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT)?
-- THE PROBLEMS OF DISARMAMENT ARE NOT JUST THOSE
OF THE U. S. AND THE USSR, BUT OF OTHER STATES,
ESPECIALLY THE ISSUE OF NONPROLIFERATION. SOONER
BT

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31

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 01 OF 02
EOB529

MOSCOW 6169
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DTG: 201534Z MAY 82 PSN: 036767
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INFO USMISSION USNATO 1783
USMISSION GENEVA 5933
AMEMBASSY VIENNA 8952

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 06169

EXDIS

OR LATER THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION MAY TAKE THE
POSITION OF THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION ON NON-
PROLIFERATION.

-- IT IS A PITY THE 1980 NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE DID
NOT END SUCCESSFULLY.

-- THE AGREEMENT ON THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR
WAR DOES NOT CONTAIN ENOUGH FROM A PRACTICAL
POINT OF VIEW.

-- WE MUST HAVE DISCUSSIONS TO DEAL WITH THIRD
COUNTRIES. (EMBOFF ASKED IF [REDACTED] WAS THINKING
OF CHINA; [REDACTED] SAID THE FOCUS SHOULD BE ON NEW
NUCLEAR POWERS.)

-- MAYBE THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE READY TO SUPPORT
THE U. S. PROPOSAL FOR A MIDDLE EAST NUCLEAR FREE
ZONE. MAYBE THE SOVIET UNION WOULD TAKE THE
SAME POSITION TOWARD SOUTH ASIA. WE ARE CONCERNED
THAT THE U. S. IS PAYING TOO LITTLE ATTENTION
THERE.

-- MAYBE IT IS NECESSARY TO MAKE THESE ISSUES A
PRIORITY PROBLEM FOR OUR TWO COUNTRIES. THE
OTTINGER PROPOSAL CONCERNS ONLY TECHNOLOGY,
BUT THE "JACKSON-NUNN PROPOSAL" IS BETTER BECAUSE
IT CONCERNS JOINT ACTIONS ON NUCLEAR CONFLICTS
INVOLVING THIRD COUNTRIES.

7. COMMENT: [REDACTED] PRESENTATION SEEMS TO BE
AN EFFORT TO FLOAT TRIAL BALLOONS. THIS MAY BE AT
[REDACTED] OR IT MAY HAVE A
HIGHER-LEVEL IMPRIMATUR. WE CANNOT BE SURE.

8. IN RAISING HIS FIRST QUESTION [REDACTED] SEEMS TO BE
ASKING WHAT IDEAS THE U. S. MAY HAVE IN MIND REGARDING
FUTURE MECHANISMS FOR NUCLEAR SUPPLIER CONSULTATIONS.

9. IN PUTTING HIS SECOND QUESTION [REDACTED] APPEARS
TO BE ASKING WHETHER THE U. S. MIGHT BE INTERESTED IN
EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF THE 1973 AGREEMENT TO PREVENT
NUCLEAR WAR, PERHAPS ALONG THE LINES OF THE PROPOSED
NUNN AMENDMENT WHICH WOULD ESTABLISH A
CRISIS CENTER FOR MONITORING AND CONTAINING NUCLEAR
WEAPONS USED BY THIRD PARTIES.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7
31
CONFIDENTIAL

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 6169

DTG: 201534Z MAY 82 PSN: 036767

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12. [REDACTED] APPEARS TO EXPECT A RESPONSE TO HIS
QUESTIONS. WE WOULD APPRECIATE WASHINGTON'S
GUIDANCE ON WHAT, IF ANY, RESPONSE SHOULD BE
MADE.
HARTMAN
BT

IS

EXDIS

EXDIS

CONFIDENTIAL

CU NARA, DATE 6/21/06

Sov. - A.C. mtg:

- counterforce
- strategic active / passive defense (civil &)
- offensive ↑ + theater superiority


Arms Control in Sov. Strategy: (1) Adh to Soviet military policies
(2) consistent w/ Sov. mil. objectives & force requirements

Sov. Doctr. Concepts: War (polends); Warwinning str. (total force concept); War is not inevit. but possible; Victory is sought
↓ requires a) protect Sov. assets - Sov. mil. cap., leaders, econ. assets to sustain war
b) offensive forces

- 1) nuclear weap. decisiv.
- 2) initial period of war is decisive
- 3) preemption & surprise
- 4) seize strategic regions
- 5) occupy enemy territory
- 6) stress on strateg. initiative
- 7) decouple US strategic forces from Europe

Sov. Aims to A.C.: (1) seek to elimin. West's efforts that threaten to undermine Sov. warfighting, warwinning strategy
(2) avoid constraints on Sov. efforts to meet Sov. doctrinal requirements
(3) pursue pol./mil. objectives that enhance credibility of Sov. strategy

Institutional Structure (Dec. Making) - A.C.:



[2: - leadership of Def. of State
- " of the Armed Forces]

Defense Council: (functions): (1) determining strateg. pol./mil. obj.
approves 5 yr. defense plan (2) approve mil. doctrine & strategy
(3) ↓ war plans

membership = GenSec, Sec. CPSU, Premier, Chm. KGB, Chm. Gosplan, Min. of Def., Chief-Gen. Staff
Brezhnev, Chernenko/Girke, Tikhonov Andropov Baykov Ustinov Ogarkov


Defense Council Mtg. (1974) Nov. 20: calls upon those w/ special expertise

Admin. Organs (Dept. CC): coord./approves all correspond to/from Def. Council
(Part of CC) monitors decs. of Def. Council decs.
provides party oversight of USSR nat'l security resp. to GenSec.
determ. data to be presented

Milit. Affair (MOD); KGB; DOSAAF; Civil Def.; Justice; MVD

- Sov. General Staff (= major player) ^{in arms control}
 - control military forces
 - prepares war plans
 - provides input for ^{arms} control negot., (provides this Defense Council)
 - oversees R & D prog.
 - formulates military doctrine & strategy

Struct. of A.C. Dec. Making:



Def. Council -

- 1) small unified group w/ final dec.-making auth
- 2) stable, infreq. changes

Examples - Pt. to Sovs. always in treaties support their doctrinal tenets

- 1) protecting counterforce cap.
- 2) ↓ civil def. (damage limitation)

[force survivability
 - damage limitation
 - counterforce 1st strike] Goals maintained throughout -

(contends - in START will seek protection of force survivability)

DECLASSIFIED
NLS FOU-009/1 #142
NARA, DATE 6/2/06

10
US - USSR
(ARMS CONTROL)

EOB702

*****~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~*****E COPY

IN

OP IMMED
UTS3366
DE RUEHMO #1648/01 2311506
O 191503Z AUG 81
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6045

INFO USICA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 0153
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY 1242
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 3424
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0367
AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 5907
USDEL MBFR VIENNA PRIORITY 1628
USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 5164
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 9774
USNMR SHAPE BE PRIORITY
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE PRIORITY
CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE PRIORITY
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK PRIORITY
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD PRIORITY 3930

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 11648

E.O. 12065: GDS 8/19/87 (MCCALL, SHERROD B) OR-M
TAGS: MNUC, PARM
SUBJECT: RED STAR ON SECRETARY HAIG'S ARMS CONTROL
- SPEECH
REF: MOSCOW 9851

1. ~~(0~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: RED STAR HAS PUBLISHED A LENGTHY, RELATIVELY RESTRAINED CRITIQUE OF SECRETARY HAIG'S ARMS CONTROL SPEECH OF JULY 14. IT ADDRESSES FOUR OF THE ARMS CONTROL PRINCIPLES SET FORTH BY THE SECRETARY, AND WARNS THAT A U.S. EFFORT TO SEEK STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY WOULD CONTRAVENE THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY AGREED TO IN SALT. WE BELIEVE THIS ARTICLE IS INTENDED

SIT:
EOB: KIMMITT, PIPES, RENT, GUHIN, SCHWEITZER, LORD
WHSR COMMENTS:

PAGE 01

MOSCOW 1648

DTG: 191503Z AUG 81
TOR: 231/1512Z

PSN: 015381
CSN: HCE477

*****~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~*****E COPY

11
*****CONFIDENTIAL*****E COPY

TO INDICATE THAT THE SOVIETS REMAIN SERIOUSLY INTERESTED IN ARMS CONTROL, DESPITE THE RECENT BARRAGE OF HARSH ANTI-ERW/TNF PROPAGANDA. END SUMMARY.

3. RED STAR AUGUST 19 PUBLISHED A CAREFULLY REASONED ANALYSIS BY THE USA INSTITUTE'S L. SEMEYKO OF THE SECRETARY'S SPEECH TO THE FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION. ENTITLED "WASHINGTON BLOCKS TALKS," THE ARTICLE ADDRESSED FOUR OF THE SIX ARMS CONTROL PRINCIPLES SET FORTH BY THE SECRETARY (OMITTING HIS FOURTH AND SIXTH PRINCIPLES REFERRING, RESPECTIVELY, TO THE NEED FOR "BALANCED AGREEMENTS" AND "GENUINE PARITY," AND FOR CONSIDERATION OF THE TOTALITY OF ARMS CONTROL PROCESSES AND WEAPONS SYSTEMS). BY RECENT SOVIET STANDARDS SEMEYKO'S RHETORIC WAS MILD AND HE ESCHewed THE SHRILL PROPAGANDA COMMON TO RECENT SOVIET COMMENT ON U.S. STATEMENTS OR THE DISTORTIONS INCLUDED IN THE ORIGINAL COVERAGE (REFTEL).

4. FIRST PRINCIPLE -- ARMS CONTROL MUST COMPLEMENT MILITARY PROGRAMS. SEMEYKO CALLED THIS VIEW OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ARMS AND ARMS CONTROL AN "ACROBATIC TRICK." HE CHARGED ITS INTENT WAS TO MASK U.S. INTENTIONS TO REGAIN STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY, HENCE UNDERMINING THE "ALREADY AGREED PRINCIPLES OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY." SEMEYKO REITERATED THE STANDARD SOVIET OBJECTION, BY CITING BREZHNEV'S STATEMENT THAT THE USSR WOULD NOT ACCEPT AN AGREEMENT WHICH GAVE A ONE-SIDED ADVANTAGE TO THE U.S.

5. SECOND PRINCIPLE -- AGREEMENTS THAT REINFORCE DETERRENCE. SEMEYKO COMMENTED THAT THE SECRETARY'S SECOND PRINCIPLE -- AGREEMENTS MUST TRULY ENHANCE SECURITY AND REINFORCE DETERRENCE -- REALLY MEANS THAT AGREEMENTS MUST INCREASE RATHER THAN LIMIT U.S. MILITARY POWER. HE EXPRESSED SURPRISE THAT THE U.S. DID NOT BELIEVE SALT-II SERVED THIS PURPOSE, AND HE SPECULATED THAT THE U.S. WANTED TO USE BOTH ITS MILITARY PROGRAMS AND SALT AGREEMENTS AS MEANS TO GAIN SUPERIORITY.

6. THIRD PRINCIPLE -- SOVIET CONDUCT WORLDWIDE. THE U.S. PROPOSED THE "LINKAGE" PRINCIPLE, SEMEYKO CONTENDED, IN ORDER TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE USSR,

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AND TO PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY TO BREAK OFF
NEGOTIATIONS AT ANY TIME OR TO ADOPT A TOUGHER
POSITION. SEMEYKO CITED AS AN EXAMPLE ACDA
DIRECTOR ROSTOW'S WARNING THAT THE SITUATIONS
IN POLAND AND AFGHANISTAN COULD PUT INTO DOUBT
THE START OF SALT TALKS NEXT MARCH. (COMMENT:
THE MENTION OF POLAND AND AFGHANISTAN AS MATTERS
OF SUCH IMPORTANCE TO U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE
USSR IS UNUSUAL.) REFERRING TO ASSISTANT
SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER'S COMMENT THAT U.S.-SOVIET
RELATIONS WERE "THE MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY," SEMEYKO CALLED FOR THE U.S.
TO APPLY "REALISM IN ASSESSING THE WORLD SITUATION."
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USDEL MBFR VIENNA PRIORITY 1629
USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 5165
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 9775
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CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE PRIORITY
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK PRIORITY
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7. FOURTH PRINCIPLE -- VERIFICATION. COMMENTING ON THE SECRETARY'S STATEMENT THAT AN AGREEMENT WOULD NEED EFFECTIVE MEANS OF VERIFICATION AND MECHANISMS FOR COMPLIANCE, SEMEYKO AGREED THAT THESE WERE NECESSARY. HE CAUTIONED, HOWEVER, THAT THE U.S. COULD ALWAYS USE THIS PRINCIPLE AS A PRETEXT FOR PUTTING STUMBLING-BLOCKS IN THE PATH OF NEGOTIATIONS.

8. IN HIS CONCLUDING REMARKS, SEMEYKO ONCE AGAIN WARNED THE U.S. THAT SEEKING STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY CONTRAVENED THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY AGREED TO IN 1972. HE ASSERTED THAT THE ERW PRODUCTION DECISION AND OTHER REAGAN ADMINISTRATION ACTIONS TO DATE RAISED DOUBTS

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ABOUT WASHINGTON'S ARMS CONTROL INTENTIONS. IF THE U.S. CONTINUED TO SEEK ONE-SIDED MILITARY ADVANTAGES, SEMEYKO SAID, ARMS TALKS WOULD GO NOWHERE. HE REITERATED THAT THE USSR WAS READY TO LIMIT AND REDUCE "MILITARY POTENTIALS," BUT ONLY ON THE BASIS OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO PRESERVE EVERYTHING POSITIVE IN THE SALT PROCESS, SEMEYKO SAID, AND TO MOVE FORWARD TOWARD PRACTICAL UNDERSTANDINGS WHICH WOULD REDUCE THE LEVEL OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE U.S. THIS WAS IN OUR COMMON INTERESTS. THE CURRENT U.S. COURSE OF "UNDERMINING" THE CHANCES FOR REACHING FUTURE UNDERSTANDINGS WAS, IN SEMEYKO'S VIEW, "EXTRAORDINARILY DANGEROUS."

9. COMMENT: THE SEMEYKO PIECE IS THE MOST RESTRAINED SOVIET ASSESSMENT TO DATE OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY TOWARD ARMS CONTROL AND U.S. RELATIONS WITH THE USSR. WE BELIEVE IT IS INTENDED MAINLY TO SIGNAL THAT THE SOVIETS REMAIN SERIOUSLY INTERESTED IN ARMS CONTROL PRIOR TO THE HAIG-GROMYKO MEETINGS NEXT MONTH, DESPITE THE RECENT HEAVY SOVIET PROPAGANDA BARRAGE ON ERW AND TNF. THE ARTICLE MAY ALSO BE INTENDED TO LET US KNOW THAT, PROPAGANDA NOTWITHSTANDING, MOSCOW IS PAYING SERIOUS ATTENTION TO HIGH-LEVEL STATEMENTS OF U.S. POLICY. THE SEMEYKO PIECE HAS THE ADDED VALUE OF INFORMING SERIOUS SOVIET READERS THAT THE U.S. HAS PUT SOME BASIC IDEAS ON THE TABLE WHICH THE SOVIETS THEMSELVES WILL BE EXPLORING IN THE MONTHS TO COME.

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