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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: MATLOCK, JACK F.: Files
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File Folder: USRR Arms Control (6)

Archivist: loj/loj
FOIA ID: F00-009, Skinner
Date: 7/30/04

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. cable	4p D 6/24/06 NLSF00-009/1 #143	2/18/81	B1, 63
2. memo	L. Paul Bremer to Nancy Bearg Dyke, et al, re SIG meeting, 1p Part ~ #144	9/29/81	B1 B3
3. paper	"Strategy...." 7p	9/25/81	B1
4. cable	221619Z Jun 81, 10p R 6/24/06 NLSF00-009/1 #146	6/22/81	B1
5. cable	122028Z Jun 81, 3p R ~ #147	6/12/81	B1
6. cable	291253Z May 81, 1p R ~ #148	5/29/81	B1
7. cable	291818Z Aug 81, 3p R ~ #149	8/29/81	B1
8. cable	272039Z Aug 81, 7p R ~ #150	8/27/81	B1

RESTRICTIONS

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
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THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 1 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER. *pg. 1-4*

RECEIVED 04 DEC 82 13

TO

CLARK

FROM BREMER

DOCDATE 04 DEC 82

KEYWORDS: ARMS CONTROL

MEDIA

DISARMAMENT

SUBJECT: PUBLIC SPEAKING THEMES ON ARMS CONTROL & NUCLEAR ISSUES

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARKDUE: 08 DEC 82 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

December 4, 1982

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Public Speaking Themes on Arms Control and
Nuclear Issues During the Next Few Months

Attached for the attention of the Nuclear Arms Control
Information Policy Group, chaired by Bud McFarlane, is a
memorandum suggesting themes to use publicly (and to avoid)
on nuclear arms control-related issues.

Charles Hiel
L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As stated



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

S/S

Qs / As
(Arms Control)

December 3, 1982

TO: The Acting Secretary

FROM: PA - John H. Kelly, Acting *JHK*

SUBJECT: Public Speaking Themes on Arms Control and Nuclear Issues During the Next Few Months

In considering further public programming to support the President's arms control initiatives, we have tried to identify those nuclear-related themes the general public has responded to most favorably and least positively during the last few months, and also to describe the relevant changes in the climate of public opinion which could affect our speakers program. For these purposes, we analyzed: (1) comments from speakers after their appearances, (2) questionnaires returned by 41 officers, covering 110 general audience engagements, and (3) recent poll data, including the nationwide ABC and CBS "exit polls" taken on November 2.

Following are our conclusions.

Most Effective Themes

Speakers found general audiences most responsive to presentations that stressed the following:

- the seriousness of the President's personal commitment and that of his Administration to effective arms control negotiations;
- the balanced, rational, and integrated nature of the Administration's arms control proposals;
- the dangerous aspects of a nuclear freeze;
- the continuous Soviet arms buildup over the past decade;
- the rapid aging of U.S. weapons;
- the view that appeasement of adversaries leads to war; and
- the Soviets' own self-interest in negotiating arms control issues (which undercuts to an extent questions about the usefulness of negotiating with the "unreliable" Soviets).

Least Effective Themes

Conversely, general audiences reacted negatively to presentations that stressed:

- the need for a U.S. arms buildup to match the Soviets;
- the use of force structure data;
- the area of strategic doctrine, including deterrence and weapons technology; and
- the need for increased defense expenditures.

Relevant Changes in Climate of Public Opinion

Poll data indicate certain relevant and important changes have occurred in U.S. public opinion over the past six to eight months that prospective speakers should consider:

- the public continues to give highest priority to dealing with domestic economic problems, particularly the reduction of unemployment;
- nuclear arms control is a top foreign policy concern of the public, but domestic economic concerns clearly predominate over public concern about a nuclear freeze;
- pro-freeze sentiment has declined from the 80-15 percent level last spring to about 70-25 percent last summer -- exit polls and freeze referenda ballots on November 2 suggest that pro-freeze sentiment may have declined further to about the 60-30 percent level;
- no more than one-fifth of any population group polled on November 2 felt that the nuclear freeze issue was "very important" in determining their vote; and
- the proportion of Americans who believe that President Reagan will get us into war has declined from a high of 48 percent last March to 35 percent in October.

Framework for the Presentation of Themes

The information provided above suggests the themes speakers should use in the coming months:

- focus on the fact that our arms policy is designed to protect our way of life and the freedoms we enjoy, thereby suggesting that the objective of peace is too important to be reduced to mere numbers;

- emphasize the historic pattern of Soviet stubbornness in negotiating arms control, thereby suggesting that it may be necessary to continue negotiations over a long period;
- stress the fact that the President shares the concern of the American public about the horrors of nuclear war and its desire to achieve effective arms control, thereby suggesting that is the reason the Administration developed a realistic, rational, and integrated strategy of negotiations;
- point out that the U.S. cannot achieve effective arms control or peace all by itself, thereby countering the unrealistic view that the U.S. can do much more to facilitate arms control and undercutting any tendency to believe that unilateral measures can be effective;
- indicate the unequal nature of the U.S. and USSR arms programs during the past decade, thereby suggesting that the U.S. security position has been detrimentally affected;
- refrain from referring to the arms budget and military expenditures, to avoid stimulating surface or latent concern about "non-productive" or "non-social" uses of tax revenue; and,
- stress that even though the Soviets have proved themselves untrustworthy in adhering to arms agreements, they are motivated by self-interest to achieve nuclear arms control; and that we will insure verification provisions in the next round of agreements.

Conclusion

It is equally important for nuclear speakers to convey a sense of concern, i.e., to identify with the public by recognizing the existence of legitimate angst about the consequences of nuclear war. We have to stress repeatedly that the issue of arms control is fundamental, and larger than mere numbers. This may help us to: disabuse the public of common misperceptions; demonstrate clearly that the President's program offers realistic solutions; and indicate that achieving them is not an overnight or simple task.

Drafted: PA/OAP:SKane:sch
x. 20473 12/3/82

Clearance: PA/OAP - I. Bernick

Pres. Arms Control
Pen

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

June 25, 1982

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

This afternoon we held the latest in a series of National Security Council meetings focused on arms control. At the conclusion of the meeting I gave final approval to the instructions the American negotiating team will carry to Geneva, where negotiations will begin next Tuesday, June 29, on Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START).

Our team will be headed by Ambassador Edward L. Rowny, an outstanding soldier-diplomat, who has participated actively in developing the far-reaching START proposals we have made, and in which the entire world is placing so much hope.

An historic opportunity exists to reverse the massive buildup of nuclear arsenals that occurred during the last decade. We must do all we possibly can to achieve substantial *reductions* in the numbers and the destructive potential of the nuclear forces. As our proposals emphasize we must seek especially to reduce the most destabilizing elements of the strategic arsenals. We must ensure reductions that are verifiable, that go to equal levels, and that enhance stability and deterrence and thereby reduce the risk of nuclear war.

I do not underestimate the formidable nature of this task. But I believe it is in the interest of the peoples of the United States, the Soviet Union, and the entire world to engage fully in this effort. I have the highest confidence that Ed Rowny and his team will work faithfully and tirelessly toward this goal.

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*Arms Control
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TO

LENZ

FROM BREMER

DOC DATE 29 SEP 81

SUSPENSE

KEYWORDS: CBW

SIG

USSR

Arms Control

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION OF SIG MTG FOR OCT 5 & STRATEGY PAPER FOR MTG

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR ALLEN

DUE: 30 SEP 81 STATUS S FILES

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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September 29, 1981

TO: See Distribution List Below

SUBJECT: SIG Meeting on CBW Arms Control

The Department of State will convene a SIG meeting on CBW Arms Control on Monday, October 5, 10:30 a.m. in the Deputy Secretary's Conference Room. The SIG will be chaired by Under Secretary Stoessel. A strategy paper prepared by the CBW Arms Control Working Group is attached.

Attendance is limited to principal plus one from each invited agency. Please advise Sheila Lopez, 632-5804, of your attendees.

William C. Bremer, III
L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

Distribution:

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pp. 5-11

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4127

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NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 6/22/01 (MATLOCK, JACK) OR-M
TAGS: PARM, UR, US
SUBJECT: SOVIET RESPONSE TO U.S. DEMARCHE ON ARMS
CONTROL COMPLIANCE
REF: MOSCOW 7776

1. ~~(S-ENTIRE TEXT)~~.

2. BEGIN SUMMARY: KORNIYENKO CALLED IN CHARGE
JUNE 22 TO PROVIDE OFFICIAL SOVIET REPLY TO OUR
JUNE 5 DEMARCHE ON ARMS CONTROL COMPLIANCE ISSUES.
SOVIET REPLY FOLLOWS LINES OF KORNIYENKO'S COMMENTS
AT TIME -- ABSENT SOME OF HIS COLORFUL LANGUAGE --
AND CAN BE CONSIDERED REFUSAL TO ENTERTAIN OUR
CONCERNS ON ALL ISSUES EXCEPT POSSIBLY VENTING IN
VIOLATION OF LTBT, IN WHICH CASE KORNIYENKO RE-
AFFIRMED SOVIET INTEREST IN "STRICT OBSERVANCE"
OF TREATY. CHARGE REITERATED U.S. POSITION ON THE
VARIOUS ISSUES INVOLVED, MADE CLEAR THAT THEY ARE
NOT "DEAD" ISSUES SO FAR AS WE ARE CONCERNED, AND
STRESSED THAT IT IS IN THE SOVIET INTEREST TO
COOPERATE IN CLARIFYING THEM. AS FOR THE PROFESSED
SOVIET INTEREST IN A DIALOGUE, CHARGE POINTED OUT
THAT AN ATTEMPT BY ONE SIDE TO DETERMINE WHAT IS
RELEVANT AND WHAT IS NOT IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE
VERY CONCEPT OF A DIALOGUE. END SUMMARY

3. CHARGE WAS INVITED TO MEET WITH FIRST DEPUTY
FOREIGN MINISTER KORNIYENKO JUNE 22, AT WHICH TIME
KORNIYENKO DELIVERED THE OFFICIAL SOVIET ORAL REPLY
TO OUR DEMARCHE OF JUNE 5 ON COMPLIANCE ISSUES.

SIT: RVA NAN JP COL VP
EOB: KIMMITT, PIPES, SCHWEITZER, LORD
WHSR COMMENTS:

PAGE 01

MOSCOW 8649

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--(2) BEING ONE OF THE CO-AUTHORS OF THE TREATY ON BANNING TESTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE THREE ATMOSPHERES (EMBASSY COMMENT: I.E., LTBT), THE SOVIET UNION UNFAILINGLY TAKES ALL NECESSARY MEASURES FOR SECURING OBSERVANCE OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY, INCLUDING OBLIGATIONS CONCERNING THE BANNING OF THE VENTING OF RADIOACTIVE FALL-OUT BEYOND THE BORDERS OF NATIONAL TERRITORY.

IT IS KNOWN THAT IN THE PAST THERE WERE CASES WHEN THE SOVIET SIDE ADDRESSED THE AMERICAN SIDE CONCERNING SOME NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS CONDUCTED BY IT. ANALOGOUS INQUIRIES AROSE FROM THE AMERICAN SIDE. THE LAST SUCH INQUIRY WAS MADE IN THE BEGINNING OF LAST YEAR AND AT THAT TIME AN EXHAUSTIVE ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY WAS GIVEN BY US.

THEREFORE, THE QUESTION CANNOT AGAIN BUT ARISE: WHY IS THE AMERICAN SIDE SUDDENLY NOW EXPRESSING "CONCERN" ABOUT THE SUPPOSED VIOLATION BY THE SOVIET SIDE OF THE TREATY BANNING TESTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE THREE ATMOSPHERES?

--(3) THERE IS NO BASIS TO DOUBT THE READINESS OF THE SOVIET UNION TO ADHERE TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE 1974 TREATY LIMITING UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TESTS. THE USSR, AS BEFORE, IS IN FAVOR OF RIGID OBSERVANCE OF THE OBLIGATIONS INCLUDED IN IT, ON CONDITION, OF COURSE, THAT THE AMERICAN SIDE WILL DO THE SAME. CONCERNING THE EXCHANGE OF APPROPRIATE INFORMATION ON TESTING SITES, AS IS WELL KNOWN TO THE AMERICAN SIDE, SUCH AN EXCHANGE HAS BEEN RESTRAINED FOR ONLY ONE REASON -- BECAUSE THE U.S.A., AS BEFORE, DECLINES TO RATIFY THIS TREATY. THUS, IF IN THIS CONNECTION ANY QUESTIONS ARISE, IT IS NAMELY THE U.S.A. THAT SHOULD ADDRESS THEM.

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PAGE 01

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--(4) THE "CONCERN" EXPRESSED IN THE DEMARCHE BY THE AMERICAN SIDE CONCERNING A CASE OF THE OUTBREAK OF MALIGNANT ANTHRAX IN THE REGION OF SVERDLOVSK TWO YEARS AGO HAS NO BASIS. THIS CASE, AS HAS BEEN STATED BY US A NUMBER OF TIMES, HAS NO RELATION TO THE QUESTION OF OBSERVANCE OF THE BACTERIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION TO WHICH THE AMERICAN SIDE REFERS.

IT IS COMPLETELY OBVIOUS THAT ATTEMPTS TO RAISE AGAIN THIS ARTIFICIAL QUESTION, LIKE REPETITION OF FABRICATIONS ABOUT THE APPLICATION BY SOVIET TROOPS OF CHEMICAL WEAPONRY IN AFGHANISTAN, CANNOT SERVE ANY CONSTRUCTIVE GOAL.

IS IT NOT NECESSARY TO RAISE AGAIN SUCH QUESTIONS IN ORDER TO ATTEMPT TO DISTRACT THE ATTENTION OF WORLD OPINION FROM THE PLANS FOR PRODUCTION OF POISONOUS SUBSTANCES IN THE U.S.A. AND FROM FACTS ABOUT THE USE OF CHEMICAL CHARGES OF AMERICAN PRODUCTION BY BANDS OF INTERVENTIONISTS MAKING INCURSIONS ONTO THE TERRITORY OF AFGHANISTAN?

IN SUM, IT IS DIFFICULT TO AVOID THE IMPRESSION THAT, ADVANCING ALLSORTS OF "COMPLAINTS" TO THE SOVIET SIDE, THE U.S.A. ATTEMPTS TO DISTRACT ATTENTION FROM ITS COURSE AT FORCING THE GROWTH OF ARMAMENTS, AT OBLITERATION (RAZMYVANIYE) OF PREVIOUSLY CONCLUDED AGREEMENTS IN THE AREA OF ARMS LIMITATION AND DISARMAMENT IN WHICH THE USSR AND THE U.S.A. ARE PARTICIPANTS.

WE WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT WASHINGTON WILL REACH THE CONCLUSION ABOUT THE NECESSITY OF RESTRAINING THE ARMS RACE AND RESPECTING AGREEMENTS AND TREATIES, IN WHICH THE USSR AND THE U.S.A. ARE PARTICIPANTS. THE SOVIET SIDE WILL WILLINGLY LISTEN TO CONSTRUCTIVE COMMENTS FROM THE U.S.A. SIDE ON THIS SCORE.

4. CHARGE RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT MFA WAS TOTALLY MISTAKEN IN CHARACTERIZING THE U.S. MOTIVES IN RAISING THESE GENUINE CONCERNS AS A PRETEXT FOR AVOIDING DISCUSSION OF THOSE ISSUES IN WHICH THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IS INTERESTED. IN FACT, OUR APPROACH WAS DESIGNED TO OBTAIN CLARIFICATIONS WHICH ARE NEEDED TO PREPARE OUR POSITIONS ON FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS, AND THUS SHOULD BE INTERPRETED AS A SIGN OF INTEREST RATHER THAN THE CONTRARY. IN MISINTERPRETING

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THE U.S. APPROACH, THE SOVIET UNION DOES ITSELF
A DISSERVICE IF IT IS GENUINELY INTERESTED IN
ARMS CONTROL.

5. CHARGE THEN TOOK UP EACH OF THE ISSUES IN TURN,
AS FOLLOWS:

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--SS-19'S: U.S. HAS RAISED THIS ISSUED BECAUSE THE REPLACEMENT OCCURRED IN DIRECT CONTRADICTION OF A FORMALLY STATED U.S. INTERPRETATION OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT AT THE TIME IT WAS SIGNED. THIS ACTION RAISED SERIOUS DOUBTS ABOUT SOVIET GOOD FAITH IN COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND IT IS APPROPRIATE TO BRING THIS TO THE ATTENTION OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT. KORNIYENKO REITERATED THE ARGUMENTS IN HIS ORAL STATEMENT THAT U.S. WILLINGNESS TO COMPLY WITH THE INTERIM AGREEMENT AFTER ITS EXPIRATION DEMONSTRATED U.S. ACCEPTANCE OF THE SS-19 REPLACEMENT. CHARGE POINTED OUT THAT THE SOVIET INTERPRETATION OF PREVIOUS POSITIONS TAKEN BY THE U.S. DOES NOT DISPROVE THE POINT WE ARE MAKING, NAMELY THAT SUCH ACTIONS CANNOT BUT UNDERMINE CONFIDENCE IN SOVIET COMPLIANCE.

•
--LTBT: CHARGE POINTED OUT THAT 26 VIOLATIONS, ONE AS RECENTLY AS LAST YEAR, HARDLY DEMONSTRATED STRICT COMPLIANCE, BUT ASKED IF WE SHOULD INFER FROM THE SOVIET STATEMENT THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD ENSURE STRICT COMPLIANCE IN THE FUTURE. KORNIYENKO SAID: "YOU HAVE THE ANSWER IN OUR STATEMENT: THE SOVIET UNION IS TAKING ALL NECESSARY STEPS TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE."

•
--TTBT: CHARGE ASKED WHY THE SOVIET UNION IS UNWILLING TO PROVIDE THE DATA REQUESTED ON TESTS WHICH MAY HAVE EXCEEDED THE THRESHOLD. KORNIYENKO REPLIED THAT THE MAIN PROBLEM IS THAT THE USG HAS NOT RATIFIED THE TREATY, AND SAID THAT THE TREATY CALLS FOR EXCHANGE OF DATA SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE EXCHANGE OF INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION. HE

SIT:
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THAN ADDED: (A) THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAS MADE NO FINAL DECISION; (B) THE SOVIETS DESIRE RATIFICATION NO MORE AND NO LESS THAN THE U.S. DOES; AND (C) HE QUESTIONED WHY THE SOVIETS ARE BEING ASKED TO "PAY A PRICE" FOR U.S. NON-RATIFICATION. CHARGE POINTED OUT THAT WE ARE NOT EXACTING A PRICE BUT ATTEMPTING TO DETERMINE SOVIET INTEREST IN MEETING OUR COMPLIANCE CONCERNS. IF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WANTS THE TREATY TO BE RATIFIED, WHY IS IT UNWILLING TO PROVIDE DATA REGARDING TESTS IT HAS CONDUCTED SINCE IT WAS SIGNED? SOVIET RESPONSIVENESS ON THIS ISSUE WOULD CLEARLY BOLSTER CONFIDENCE IN COMPLIANCE. KORNIYENKO COMPLAINED THAT SUCH A GESTURE ON THE SOVIET PART "WOULD SIMPLY BE POCKETED WITHOUT A CORRESPONDING GESTURE," AND CHARGE POINTED OUT THAT HE HAS NO GROUNDS FOR SUCH A STATEMENT, SINCE HE WAS UNAWARE THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE RAISED QUESTIONS OF US COMPLIANCE. (COMMENT: OUR IMPRESSION WAS THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT TOTALLY CLOSED THE DOOR ON THE TTBT COMPLIANCE ISSUE, BUT ARE SEEKING ADVANCE ASSURANCES THAT RATIFICATION WILL PROCEED IF THE DATA ARE PROVIDED.)

• --SVERDLOVSK: CHARGE POINTED OUT THAT THIS ISSUE WAS IN NO SENSE ARTIFICIAL; IF THE SOVIETS ARE CORRECT IN THEIR ASSERTION THAT THE ANTHRAX OUTBREAK HAD NO CONNECTION WITH BACTERIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, IT SHOULD BE A SIMPLE MATTER TO DEMONSTRATE THIS TO SPECIALISTS, AND REMINDED KORNIYENKO THAT THE SOVIET REFUSAL TO SATISFY OUR LEGITIMATE AND DEEP CONCERNS COULD ONLY UNDERMINE CONFIDENCE IN COMPLIANCE AND VERIFICATION.

• --CHEMICAL WEAPONS: CHARGE TOLD KORNIYENKO THAT OUR CONCERNS ON THIS ISSUE ALSO COULD NOT BE LIGHTLY DISMISSED. WE HAD CITED IN OUR DEMARCHE AN OFFICIAL REQUEST OF THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL FOR INFORMATION AND WE CONTINUE TO HOPE THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL COOPERATE.

5. KORNIYENKO REITERATED THE ASSERTION THAT THE U.S. DEMARCHE DEMONSTRATES THAT THE US IS NOT INTERESTED IN GENUINE ARMS CONTROL DISCUSSIONS, BUT IS RAISING "ARTIFICIAL" ISSUES IN AN ATTEMPT TO CONVINCE ITS ALLIES THAT IT IS CONDUCTING NEGOTIATIONS BUT IN FACT IS NOT PREPARED TO DO SO. CHARGE REPEATED THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IS ACTING CONTRARY TO ITS

PAGE 02

MOSCOW 8649

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OWN INTERESTS IN DRAWING SUCH AN UNWARRANTED
CONCLUSION. CHARGE ALSO TOOK ISSUE WITH
KORNIYENKO'S ABRUPT DISMISSAL OF THESE ISSUES
AS "FABRICATED" AND "ARTIFICIAL" AND STATED
THAT IT IS UNREASONABLE FOR THE SOVIET SIDE TO
ATTEMPT TO DETERMINE UNILATERALLY WHICH SPECIFIC
QUESTIONS ARE OF MUTUAL INTEREST AND THOSE WHICH
ARE NOT. THIS APPROACH WILL NOT FACILITATE
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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4130

S E C R E T SECTION 04 OF 04 MOSCOW 08649

MODIS
RESOLUTION OF LEGITIMATE U.S. CONCERNS AND OUR
REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATIONS. ALSO, THE SOVIET
APPROACH, BY REJECTING U.S. CONCERNS, CAN PUT INTO
QUESTION THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SOVIET
UNION'S STATED DESIRE FOR A DIALOGUE.

MATLOCK
BT

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PAGE 01 OF 01 MOSCOW 8649

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INFO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 6583

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CU, NARA, DATE 6/21/06

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E.O. 12065: RDS 3 2001 (EAGLEBURGER, LAWRENCE S.)
TAGS: PARM, UR, US

SUBJECT: DEMARCHE TO SOVIETS ON ARMS CONTROL
COMPLIANCE

REF: A) MOSCOW 7776; B) STATE 141431

1. ASSISTANT SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER CALLED IN SOVIET EMBASSY DCM BESSMERTNYKH JUNE 11 TO CONVEY THE SECRETARY'S PERSONAL CONCERN AT SOVIET DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KORNIYENKO'S TOTALLY NEGATIVE RESPONSE TO CHARGE MATLOCK'S JUNE 5 DEMARCHE ON SOVIET ARMS CONTROL COMPLIANCE (REFTEL A). EAGLEBURGER NOTED THAT THE SECRETARY WAS PARTICULARLY DISTURBED BY KORNIYENKO'S DISMISSAL OF THE US APPROACH SIMPLY AS A GAME AIMED AT EMBARRASSING THE SOVIETS AND DEVOID OF ANY SERIOUS CONTENT. EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT HE WISHED TO UNDERSCORE THE FOLLOWING POINTS WHICH HE HOPED BESSMERTNYKH WOULD CONVEY TO HIS GOVERNMENT.

-- THE SECRETARY HAS ASKED ME TO EXPRESS HIS PERSONAL CONCERN AND DISAPPOINTMENT OVER THE THOROUGHLY UNCONSTRUCTIVE INITIAL RESPONSE TO OUR CHARGE'S JUNE 5 DEMARCHE IN MOSCOW ON SOVIET ARMS CONTROL COMPLIANCE. FIRST DEPUTY KORNIYENKO'S RESPONSE TOTALLY

MISINTERPRETED AND MISREPRESENTED OUR INTENTIONS IN RAISING THESE ISSUES, AS WELL AS OUR SERIOUS INTEREST IN FUTURE COOPERATION ON ARMS CONTROL ISSUES.

SIT: SDO

EOB: KIMMITT, PIPES, SCHWEITZER, LORD

WHSR COMMENTS:

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-- WE WANT TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT OUR APPROACH REFLECTED THE CONSIDERED JUDGMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION THAT FULL COMPLIANCE WITH ALL ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS IS A PREREQUISITE FOR A VIABLE SALT PROCESS.

-- FURTHERMORE, IT REFLECTS OUR POSITION THAT THE WILLINGNESS OF THE SOVIET UNION TO DISCUSS COMPLIANCE ISSUES IN A CANDID AND COOPERATIVE MANNER WILL AFFECT THE POSSIBILITY FOR FUTURE PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL.

-- THE SOVIET REACTION THAT THESE ARE DEAD ISSUES AND THAT THE DEMARCHE WAS DESIGNED TO DIVERT ATTENTION FROM THE REAL ISSUES IS TOTALLY UNFOUNDED. IT CONTRIBUTES NOTHING TO A CONSTRUCTIVE DISCUSSION OF THESE ISSUES WHICH GO TO THE VERY HEART OF OUR ABILITY TO NEGOTIATE FUTURE AGREEMENTS.

-- AS CHARGE MATLOCK HAS INDICATED, WE HOPE THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL REASSESS ITS INITIAL RESPONSE; COME TO A CORRECT INTERPRETATION OF THE REASONS BEHIND OUR APPROACH; AND RESPOND CONSTRUCTIVELY IN A SPIRIT OF MUTUAL COOPERATION ON THESE FUNDAMENTAL MATTERS WHICH TOUCH ON BOTH OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS.

2. EAGLEBURGER ADDED THAT WHILE WE DID NOT EXPECT THE SOVIETS TO ACCEPT OUR VIEWPOINT ON ALL ISSUES, WE DO EXPECT THAT OUR APPROACHES WILL BE DEALT WITH SERIOUSLY. FAILURE TO RESPOND CONSTRUCTIVELY ON THIS ISSUE WILL MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR US TO COME TO POSITIVE CONCLUSIONS ON PROCEEDING WITH ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS.

3. BESSMERTNYKH REPLIED THAT THE SUMMARY OF THE JUNE 5 MEETING WHICH HE HAD SEEN FOCUSED MAINLY ON MATLOCK'S DISCUSSION RATHER THAN KORNIYENKO'S. HOWEVER, READ AT A TIME OF MOUNTING TENSION AND AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF US ARMS CONTROL POSITIONS, HE COULD SEE WHAT MIGHT HAVE PROMPTED KORNIYENKO'S RESPONSE. THE US CASE FOR A VIOLATION OF SALT I WAS NOT LOGICAL, AND THE OTHER ISSUES WERE "EMPTY CASKS". IF THE US SIDE WISHED TO STIMULATE A SERIOUS EXCHANGE ON COMPLIANCE IT SHOULD HAVE SELECTED A BETTER PACKAGE OF ITEMS. HE ADDED THAT SVERDLOVSK HAS ALREADY BEEN DISCUSSED SEVERAL TIMES; THE QUESTION OF THE USE OF CHEMICAL WARFARE IN AFGHANISTAN

HAS NO SERIOUS EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT IT; AND, IN THE

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SOVIET VIEW, THE OTHER ITEMS WERE WEAK. HOWEVER, HE
CONCLUDED BY STATING THAT THE SUBJECT OF COMPLIANCE-WAS
ALSO IMPORTANT TO THE SOVIET SIDE AND THAT HE WOULD
REPORT WHAT EAGLEBURGER HAD SAID. STOESSEL

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ARMS CONTROL
INCOMING
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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00215 291330Z
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E.O. 12065: RDS-3, 4 5/27/91 (DEAN, JONATHAN) OR-M
TAGS: MBFR, PARM, NATO
SUBJECT: COMMENTS BY SOVIET DEPREP ON US ATTITUDES TOWARDS ARMS CONTROL

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: ACCORDING TO SOVIET DEPREP KUTOVOY, MOSCOW IS BECOMING CONVINCED THAT THE US ADMINISTRATION HAS NO SERIOUS INTEREST IN ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS INCLUDING MBFR. AS A POSSIBLE REFLECTION OF CURRENT OFFICIAL SOVIET VIEWS, KUTOVOY'S REMARKS ARE SUMMARIZED BELOW AS BEING OF POTENTIAL INTEREST TO WASHINGTON AGENCIES.
END SUMMARY.

3. SOVIET DEPREP KUTOVOY RECENTLY TOLD US DELOFF THAT STATEMENTS BY US ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS HAD RAISED THE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION IN MOSCOW'S MIND OF WHETHER THE US GOVERNMENT WAS AT ALL INTERESTED IN SERIOUS ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS. MOSCOW SAW LITTLE EVIDENCE OF ACTUAL US INTEREST IN ANY ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATION, WHETHER IT BE SALT, TNF OR MBFR. IT SEEMED EVIDENT TO MOSCOW THAT THE US WAS INDEED INTERESTED ONLY IN A WESTERN MILITARY BUILDUP AND WAS USING ARMS CONTROL TALKS AS A FACADE.

4. IT WAS IN PARTICULAR EVIDENT TO MOSCOW, KUTOVOY SAID, THAT THE US WAS NOT INTERESTED IN PROGRESS IN THE VIENNA TALKS, SINCE AN MBFR AGREEMENT, WHICH WOULD REDUCE AND LIMIT CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE, WOULD CONFLICT WITH THE FUNDAMENTAL PURPOSES OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S DEFENSE BUILDUP PROGRAM. THIS US ATTITUDE TOWARD MBFR WAS NOT REALLY NEW, HOWEVER, IN KUTOVOY'S VIEW. HE SAID THAT MOSCOW AUTHORITIES CONSIDERED THAT THE US HAD NEVER SEEN MBFR AS ANYTHING MORE THAN A PLOY TO FEND OFF CONGRESSIONAL PRESSURES FOR UNILATERAL TROOP REDUCTIONS. FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER HAD ADMITTED THIS OPENLY IN HIS LAST BOOK.

5. KUTOVOY BELIEVED THAT THE ONLY INDICATION OF THE SLIGHTEST REAL US INTEREST IN AN MBFR AGREEMENT HAD BEEN IN WEST'S APRIL, 1978 PROPOSAL, TO WHICH THE EAST, IN JUNE, 1978, GAVE A SUBSTANTIAL AND FORTHCOMING RESPONSE. THE SOVIETS SAW THE WEST'S DECEMBER, 1979 PROPOSALS AS BEING A CLEAR RETREAT FROM THE APRIL 1978 POSITION AND AS A CONFIRMATION THAT NEITHER THE US NOR OTHER MAJOR WESTERN POWERS WERE SERIOUSLY INTERESTED IN PROGRESS IN VIENNA.

6. KUTOVOY INSISTED, HOWEVER, THAT THE SOVIET UNION FOR

ITS PART WAS SERIOUS ABOUT CONCLUDING AN MBFR AGREEMENT. KUTOVOY SAID THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE, IN RESPONSE TO THE OBVIOUSLY NEGATIVE US ATTITUDE TOWARDS SUCH AN AGREEMENT, DECIDED TO BE PATIENT AND TO WAIT TO SEE WHAT THE US FINALLY DECIDES ON. UNTIL THE US POSITION BECOMES CLEARER, HOWEVER, MOSCOW DID NOT SEE WHY THE SOVIETS SHOULD MAKE ANY FURTHER MOVE IN THE VIENNA TALKS, ESPECIALLY GIVEN THE EAST'S SUBSTANTIAL MOVES LAST YEAR, INCLUDING EASTERN ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF COLLECTIVITY AND OF THE THREE-YEAR DURATION OF A FIRST AGREEMENT.
DEAN

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EXDIS

E.O. 12065:RDS-1 8/28/93 (HOLMES, H. ALLEN)

TAGS: PARM, NATO, UR

SUBJECT: BRIEFING PERMREPS ON ROSTOW-BESSMERTNYKH MEETING

REF: STATE 229568 (NOTAL)

1. ~~(SECRET-ENTIRE TEXT)~~.

2. AT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY MISSION SHOULD BRIEF PERMREPS ON AUGUST 21 MEETING BETWEEN ACDA DIRECTOR ROSTOW AND SOVIET CHARGE BESSMERTNYKH, DRAWING ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

. -- ON AUGUST 21 ACDA DIRECTOR ROSTOW MET, AT U.S. INITIATIVE, WITH SOVIET CHARGE BESSMERTNYKH. HE SUGGESTED THAT THIS MEETING SHOULD BE THE FIRST OF A SERIES OF INFORMAL US-SOVIET EXCHANGES ON A NUMBER OF DIFFICULT ISSUES RELATING TO FUTURE ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS. THE U.S. DID NOT EXPECT THESE EXCHANGES NECESSARILY TO RESULT IN AGREEMENTS, BUT ENVISAGED THEM AS A MEANS OF PREPARING THE WAY AND AFFECTING THE ATMOSPHERE FOR TNF, SALT, AND OTHER ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS PROPER.

. -- ROSTOW SUGGESTED CERTAIN SPECIFIC AREAS ON WHICH SUCH EXCHANGES COULD MOST USEFULLY FOCUS: HE PARTICULARLY STRESSED VERIFICATION, BUT ALSO MENTIONED DATA EXCHANGES,

SIT:

EOB: PIPES, RENT

WHSR COMMENTS:

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PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTAL WAR, DOCTRINE, AND PURPOSES OF ARMS CONTROL. HE EMPHASIZED THAT VERIFICATION IS CRUCIAL TO THE SUCCESS OF ARMS CONTROL, AND SUGGESTED THIS WOULD BE AN APPROPRIATE FIRST SUBJECT FOR DISCUSSION. ROSTOW NOTED THAT VERIFICATION WOULD BE MUCH MORE DIFFICULT THAN IN THE PAST, AND HIGHLIGHTED THE ASYMMETRY BETWEEN U.S. AND SOVIET CAPABILITIES TO VERIFY EACH OTHER'S COMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS. ROSTOW SAID THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO LOOK TO TECHNIQUES BEYOND THOSE THAT HAVE SUFFICED IN THE PAST. THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE AGREEMENT ON COUNTING RULES AND COOPERATIVE MEASURES TO FACILITATE VERIFICATION, AND BOTH SIDES WOULD HAVE TO PROVIDE THE BASELINE DATA FOR AGREEMENTS (NOT THE U.S. ALONE, AS OFTEN IN THE PAST).

. -- BESSMERTNYKH SAID THAT HE WAS SURE HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD WELCOME THE U.S. PROPOSAL FOR INFORMAL EXCHANGES, AND PROMISED TO BE BACK IN TOUCH WITH ROSTOW ONCE HE HAD RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS FROM MOSCOW.

. -- IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM BESSMERTNYKH, ROSTOW STATED THAT THE INFORMAL TALKS THE U.S. WAS PROPOSING DID NOT REPRESENT A PRECONDITION FOR NEGOTIATIONS PROPER, AND THAT THEY WERE NOT A PRETEXT FOR DELAY. THE U.S. WAS MAKING NO PRECONDITIONS FOR TNF AND SALT TALKS, ALTHOUGH SOME FORM OF LINKAGES WERE A FACT. THE INTENT OF THE PROPOSED EXCHANGES WAS TO PREPARE THE WAY FOR NEGOTIATIONS. BESSMERTNYKH COMMENTED THAT THESE INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS COULD PROCEED IN PARALLEL WITH NEGOTIATIONS.

. -- BESSMERTNYKH NOTED THAT MOSCOW WOULD INEVITABLY ASK IN THIS CONNECTION ABOUT THE STATUS OF SALT. ROSTOW REPLIED THAT THE U.S. WAS WORKING HARD TO REACH A FULLY CONSIDERED POSITION. THIS POSITION WOULD BE A CONSTRUCTIVE ONE THAT WOULD EMBODY CERTAIN CHANGES AND NEW IDEAS AND WOULD BUILD ON THE EXPERIENCES OF THE PAST. BESSMERTNYKH SAID THAT THE USSR WAS PREPARED TO CONTINUE THE SALT PROCESS. WHILE NOTING THAT BOTH SIDES WERE DISSATISFIED WITH (DIFFERENT) PARTS OF SALT II, HE SAID THAT THE WORK OF PREVIOUS YEARS SHOULD BE PRESERVED.

3. FYI: PURPOSE OF THE PROPOSED EXCHANGES IS BOTH SUBSTANTIVE AND POLITICAL. U.S. PRESSURE ON THE USSR FOR COOPERATION IN VERIFICATION AND FULLER PROVISION OF DATA WILL ALSO BE AN IMPORTANT THEME IN ANSWERING SOVIET PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN CENTERING ON ARMS CONTROL ISSUES AND ALLEGING U.S. DELAYS ETC.

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USDEL MBFR VIENNA PRIORITY 0000

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EXDIS
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 8/25/87 (ROSTOV, EUGENE)

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: ARMS CONTROL DISCUSSION: AUGUST 21 MEETING
BETWEEN ACDA DIRECTOR ROSTOV AND SOVIET CHARGE
BESSMERTNYKH

1. ENTIRE TEXT ~~SECRET~~.

2. ROSTOV CALLED BESSMERTNYKH IN FOR INFORMAL DISCUSSION
OF ARMS CONTROL ISSUES. ALSO PRESENT ON US SIDE WERE
AMB. ROWNY, ACTING ASST. DIRECTOR OF ACDA/ISP TIMBIE, AND
EUR DAS HOLMES. BESSMERTNYKH WAS ALONE. FOLLOWING IS
MEMCON.

BEGIN TEXT:

MR. ROSTOV SAID IT WAS THE HOPE OF THE USG THAT THIS
CONVERSATION WOULD BE THE FIRST OF A SERIES OF INFORMAL
EXCHANGES WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON A NUMBER OF PROBLEMS
THE USG REGARDS AS FUNDAMENTAL TO THE POSSIBILITY OF SUC-
CESS IN ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS, INCLUDING START AND
TNF AS WELL AS OTHERS SUCH AS BW AND CW. WE DO NOT EXPECT

SIT: "RVA" JP COL VP
EOB: KIMMITT, PIPES, RENT, SCHWEITZER, LORD
WHSR COMMENTS: CHECKLIST

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THESE TALKS NECESSARILY TO RESULT IN AGREEMENTS AT THIS STAGE, BUT RATHER WE HOPE FOR FRANK AND SEARCHING DISCUSSIONS WHICH COULD AFFECT THE ATMOSPHERE AND THE OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AHEAD OF US. USG BELIEVES THERE IS A

NEED FOR THE TWO GOVERNMENTS TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON A NUMBER OF DIFFICULT AND TROUBLESOME ISSUES -- THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CONVERSATION OR PERHAPS AT SMALL MEETINGS OF EXPERTS, IF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT THINKS WELL OF THE IDEA, IN WASHINGTON OR IN MOSCOW.

USG BELIEVES THE ISSUE OF VERIFICATION WOULD BE A GOOD PLACE TO START SUCH DISCUSSIONS. VERIFICATION OF ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS IS ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF ARMS CONTROL; VERIFICATION WILL BE MUCH MORE DIFFICULT THAN IN THE PAST. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT BOTH SIDES HAVE CONFIDENCE IN THEIR ABILITY TO VERIFY ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS. ONE OF THE PROBLEMS WHICH SALT II FACED IN THE SENATE WAS A LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN VERIFICATION. THERE WERE VERIFICATION PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE NEW TYPES PROVISION, WITH THE MIRV LIMITS, WITH THE DENIAL OF TELEMETRY, AS WELL AS WITH THE BROADER PROBLEM OF MANUFACTURE. FOR THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, IT IS NOT DIFFICULT TO KNOW WHAT USG IS DOING OR TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE. WE HAVE AVIATION WEEK, AND WHAT IS NOT PUBLISHED IN AVIATION WEEK IS PRINTED IN THE WASHINGTON POST. THE SOVIET SITUATION IS ALTOGETHER DIFFERENT. THERE IS A LONG SOVIET TRADITION OF SECRECY, AND THERE IS ALSO A PATTERN OF CONCEALMENT. IT IS MUCH MORE DIFFICULT FOR USG TO VERIFY SOVIET COMPLIANCE, AND MORE BROADLY TO ASSESS SOVIET PLANS AND PROGRAMS. NTM ARE REMARKABLE DEVICES AND IMPRESSIVE IN MANY WAYS, BUT WE ARE REACHING THE LIMITS OF WHAT THEY CAN DO IN VIEW OF THE INCREASING COMPLEXITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS SYSTEMS, THEIR SCALE AND VARIETY. IN FUTURE AGREEMENTS THE TWO GOVERNMENTS MUST GO BEYOND NTM AND USE COOPERATIVE MEASURES TO MAKE VERIFICATION POSSIBLE. WE HAVE MADE A LIST OF COOPERATIVE MEASURES WHICH HAVE BEEN USED AND PROPOSED IN THE PAST. IT IS A LONG LIST, LONGER THAN WE EXPECTED, AND WE ARE LEARNING ALL WE CAN FROM PAST EXPERIENCE.

IN THE TNF AND START NEGOTIATIONS, THE TWO GOVERNMENTS WILL HAVE TO AGREE ON TREATY PROVISIONS WHICH ARE RELEVANT TO THE CONDITIONS THEY FACE TODAY -- NOT THOSE OF THE PAST -- RULES WHICH LIMIT THE DESTRUCTIVE POWER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS EQUALLY, EQUITABLY, AND IN THE INTEREST OF STABILITY, AN INTEREST WHICH BOTH GOVERNMENTS SHARE. WHAT IS THE BEST WAY TO COMPARE THE DESTRUCTIVE POWER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS? HOW CAN EACH SIDE VERIFY THESE ATTRI-

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BUTES OF THE OTHER'S SYSTEMS? THESE ARE THE PROBLEMS TO BE SOLVED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. ROSTOW SUGGESTED THAT THE PROBLEMS WILL PROVE TO BE INSOLUBLE UNLESS BOTH GOVERNMENTS UNDERTAKE TO SOLVE THEM TOGETHER. HE COMMENT-

ED THAT HE HAD BEEN STRUCK BY A RECENT ARTICLE IN THE SOVIET PRESS BY A MR. KRASIKOV. (ROSTOW HANDED OVER AN EXCERPT FROM THE TASS ARTICLE OF AUGUST 16 WHICH STATES, I.A., THAT "AS NEW TYPES AND MODIFICATIONS OF WEAPONS ARE COMING INTO BEING IT IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO FIND A COMMON DENOMINATOR FOR DEFINING THE EQUILIBRIUM OF FORCES, AND TO VERIFY ARMS LIMITATIONS.") THIS IS EXACTLY THE PROBLEM USG HAS IN MIND.

THERE IS ALSO THE ISSUE OF DATA. THE DAYS WHEN THE US PROVIDED ALL THE DATA ARE OVER. USG WAS ENCOURAGED BY SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO PROVIDE SOME DATA IN SALT AND IN MBFR, BUT THAT IS ONLY A BEGINNING. MUCH MORE IS NEEDED, AS THE ROME COMMUNIQUE OF NAC POINTED OUT.

THERE ARE OTHER SUBJECTS WHICH IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO DISCUSS: FOR EXAMPLE, MEANS TO IMPROVE PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTAL WAR AND OUR RESPECTIVE VIEWS OF WHAT ARMS CONTROL IS SUPPOSED TO ACCOMPLISH. MANY OF OUR DIFFERENCES ARISE FROM DIFFERENCES IN DOCTRINE AND INTENTION, AND PERHAPS FROM MISUNDERSTANDINGS ABOUT WHAT THE OTHER SIDE WANTS. DOCTRINE MIGHT WELL BE A FRUITFUL SUBJECT TO EXAMINE. THE SCC HAS BEEN A USEFUL FORUM FOR DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION BUT THAT FORUM IS LIMITED. THE LAST SESSION WAS A DISAPPOINTMENT FOR USG. THE ISSUES RAISED BY THE AMERICAN SIDE WERE NOT RESOLVED. THEY MUST BE RESOLVED AT THE NEXT SESSION. THE ISSUES THAT MATLOCK RAISED IN MOSCOW MUST ALSO BE RESOLVED.

THE TWO GOVERNMENTS HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO TALK TO EACH OTHER. THE DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND OTHER ASPECTS OF SOVIET POLICY HAVE PRODUCED A SITUATION OF INSTABILITY WHICH COMPELS SOVIET-AMERICAN COOPERATION. THERE ARE MARRIAGES OF LOVE AND THERE ARE MARRIAGES OF CONVENIENCE. THE RELATION BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES IS SUCH AS TO REQUIRE SOMETHING LIKE A MARRIAGE OF NECES-SITY. THE ALTERNATIVES ARE MUCH WORSE.

BESSMERTNYKH SAID HE WAS SURE HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD WELCOME ROSTOW'S PROPOSAL. HE WANTED TO CLARIFY WHETHER OUR INTEREST IN FIRST RAISING QUESTIONS ABOUT VERIFICATION AND DATA APPLIES TO ALL THE NEGOTIATIONS OR ONLY TO SALT AND TNF. DID WE BELIEVE IT WAS ADVISABLE TO DISCUSS VERIFICATION GENERALLY, OR SPECIFICALLY WITH REGARD TO

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SALT? BESSMERTNYKH THOUGHT WELL OF THE WORD START ROSTOW HAD SUGGESTED AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR SALT.

ROSTOW SAID THAT VERIFICATION WAS FUNDAMENTAL TO ALL ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS. ITS APPLICATION, OF COURSE, WOULD BE DIFFERENT IN THE DIFFERENT AREAS. IF WE COULD REACH AN UNDERSTANDING ON THE CRITICAL IDEA THAT THERE MUST BE MORE COOPERATION, THAT VERIFICATION WOULD NO LONGER BE A CAT-AND-MOUSE GAME, THIS WOULD APPLY TO ALL THE NEGOTIATIONS. THEN WE COULD GO ON TO AGREE HOW IT WOULD BE MOST USEFUL TO PROCEED, -- DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS LIKE THIS, MEETINGS OF EXPERTS, PERHAPS NO FOLLOW-UP AT ALL EXCEPT IN THE SEVERAL NEGOTIATIONS THEMSELVES.

BESSMERTNYKH SAID THAT IF THE GENERAL IDEA OF VERIFICATION WERE DECOUPLED FROM THE TALKS THEMSELVES, THIS MIGHT GET US UP TOO HIGH, OR WE MIGHT FIND OURSELVES IN THE FOREST. THE VERIFICATION ISSUES ARE INTIMATELY CONNECTED WITH SPECIFIC AREAS. THE PROCEDURES IN EACH AREA ARE DIFFERENT; THE SOLUTIONS IN EACH AREA ARE DIFFERENT.

ROSTOW AGREED.

BESSMERTNYKH WELCOMED THE IDEA OF THE NECESSITY OF COOPERATION. RECOGNITION OF THE IMPORTANCE OF COOPERATION IS A FIRST STEP. PERHAPS THIS IS A GOOD START. HE ACCEPTS THE NOTION THAT WE HAVE A MARRIAGE OF NECESSITY, A PHRASE TO WHICH HE RETURNED SEVERAL TIMES. ON DATA, HE UNDERSTOOD THE IMPORTANCE OF DATA AND THOUGHT THAT WE HAD COME TO A CERTAIN LEVEL ON THIS SUBJECT. HE THOUGHT THE KEY POINT WAS NOT WHO PROVIDES THE DATA BUT THE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE DATA. FOR EXAMPLE, IN VIENNA THE SOVIETS HAD PROVIDED DATA BUT THE WEST HAD NOT ACCEPTED IT. IN SALT IT WAS DIFFERENT, AND THE SALT EXPERIENCE WAS NOT A BAD WAY TO GO.

ON SALT II, BESSMERTNYKH NOTED THAT THE USG IS NOT SATISFIED WITH CERTAIN PARTS OF SALT II; AND USSR IS NOT SATISFIED WITH OTHER PARTS. EACH SIDE MUST TRY TO IMAGINE WHAT THE OTHER SIDE IS TRYING TO DO. ROSTOW HAD MENTIONED CERTAIN WEAK POINTS IN VERIFICATION. THE SOVIET UNION ON THE OTHER HAND BELIEVES IT GAVE USG GIFTS ON VERIFICATION. FOR EXAMPLE, D AND P. THE USSR ACCEPTED THAT ALL THE MISSILES IN THAT CATEGORY ARE MIRVED, EVEN THOUGH EVERYBODY KNEW ONLY A SMALL NUMBER OF THEM ACTUALLY ARE. ON THE QUESTION OF DISTINGUISHING MINUTEMAN II FROM MINUTEMAN III, A COMPARABLE ISSUE AROSE, AND THIS TOO WAS RESOLVED IN THE US FAVOR. FOR THE USSR, THIS WAS A GESTURE, AND IF WE HAD A SENATE WE WOULD HAVE HAD GREAT DIFFI-

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CULTY EXPLAINING TO THAT SENATE WHAT WE HAD DONE.

ROSTOW SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THE CONCEPT OF COMPROMISE AND THAT THE SOVIET VIEW WAS A NATURAL ONE IN VIEW OF THE PAST. ON THE DATA QUESTION IN VIENNA THAT YOU REFERRED TO, HE THINKS THIS IS A GOOD EXAMPLE OF THE PROBLEMS WE FACE. WHEN HE TALKS TO PEOPLE HE EXPLAINS THAT ALL THE DATA HAS UNTIL RECENTLY BEEN PROVIDED BY THE US SIDE, AND PEOPLE CAN'T BELIEVE IT. THEY TELL ME THEY WOULD NEVER BUY A HOUSE THAT WAY, OR A CAR. TIME IS THE ONLY POSSIBLE CURE FOR THESE SUSPICIONS BASED ON PAST EXPERIENCE, TIME AND A BETTER EXPERIENCE WITH GENUINE COOPERATION.

BESSMERTNYKH POINTED OUT THAT THE FIRST QUESTION MOSCOW WILL ASK IS WHAT IS THE SALT SITUATION. TO SAY THAT THERE IS NO SALT II IS IMPOSSIBLE. WHAT IS THE STATUS OF THE SALT II TREATY? IT IS IN THE SENATE, IT IS SIGNED, BUT YOU HAVE NO POSITION.

ROSTOW REPLIED THAT WE ARE WORKING HARD, NIGHT AND DAY, TO REACH A FULLY CONSIDERED POSITION. YOU MAY BE SURE IT WILL BE A CONSTRUCTIVE POSITION, AND IT WILL EMBODY SOME OF THE WORK DONE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR SALT II. WE WILL HAVE IDEAS ON OUR OWN, BOTH ON TNF AND ON SALT. THEY WILL BE POSITIVE AND THEY WILL BUILD UPON THE EXPERIENCE OF THE PAST.

BESSMERTNYKH SAID THAT THE USSR IS PREPARED TO CONTINUE THE SALT PROCESS. THE WORK OF ALL THOSE YEARS, OF GENERAL ROWNY AND OTHERS, SHOULD BE PRESERVED. ROSTOW SAID THAT WAS OUR VIEW TOO, ALTHOUGH WE SHALL PROPOSE CERTAIN CHANGES.

ROSTOW REFERRED AGAIN TO THE KRASIKOV ARTICLE, SAYING THAT AS WE MOVE TOWARD MORE MODERN MEASURES FOR COUNTING THE DESTRUCTIVE POWER OF WEAPONS, VERIFICATION BECOMES MORE DIFFICULT. THIS IS A PROBLEM WE WILL HAVE TO FACE UP TO.

BESSMERTNYKH SAID HIS SIDE PAYS MORE ATTENTION TO THE GENERAL STRATEGIC SITUATION AND THOUGHT DISCUSSIONS ABOUT STRATEGIC DOCTRINE MIGHT BE USEFUL. HE NOTED ROSTOW'S REFERENCE IN HIS CONFIRMATION HEARINGS TO AMBIGUITY AND APPROVED ROSTOW'S COMMENT THAT SOME AMBIGUITY WAS INEVITABLE, BUT THAT WE SHOULD TRY TO MINIMIZE IT. ROSTOW SHOULD KNOW THAT THE SOVIETS DON'T LIKE AMBIGUITY EITHER. HE NOTED THE EXAMPLE OF CIRCUMVENTION WHICH TURNED OUT TO BE TOO AMBIGUOUS, AND HAD TURNED OUT BADLY FOR THEM. HE SAID AN AGREEMENT WITH AN ADVANTAGE TO ONE SIDE WAS

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IMPOSSIBLE.

ROSTOW SAID HE WELCOMED BESSMERTNYKH'S VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE OF STRATEGIC DOCTRINE, OF DISCUSSING WHAT EACH SIDE WANTS. HE AGREED THAT THESE QUESTIONS WERE FUNDAMENTAL AND SHOULD BE EXAMINED CAREFULLY.

BESSMERTNYKH ASKED WHETHER THE INFORMAL TALKS ROSTOW WAS PROPOSING WERE PRECONDITIONS FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS THEMSELVES, AND A PRETEXT FOR DELAYING THE NEGOTIATIONS. ROSTOW SAID HE WAS GLAD BESSMERTNYKH HAD BROUGHT THAT POINT UP. THE PRESIDENT HAS MADE NO PRECONDITIONS FOR THE TNF OR START NEGOTIATIONS. SECRETARY HAIG HAS POINTED OUT THAT CERTAIN LINKAGE WAS A FACT. ROSTOW RECALLED THAT HE WAS IN THE GOVERNMENT DURING THE INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN 1968. HE REMEMBERED THE EFFECT THAT HAD HAD ON THE PROSPECTS FOR NEGOTIATIONS AT THAT TIME.

BESSMERTNYKH SAID HE ACCEPTED LINKAGE IN THIS SENSE.

ROSTOW SAID THAT THE CONVERSATIONS STARTED TODAY ARE NOT PRECONDITIONS FOR TNF OR START; AND THEY ARE NOT INTENDED TO DELAY THE START OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. ON THE CONTRARY, THEY ARE INTENDED TO PREPARE THE WAY FOR THOSE NEGOTIATIONS. THAT IS WHY ROSTOW HAD NOTED EARLIER THAT THESE TALKS NEED NOT NECESSARILY RESULT IN AGREEMENTS OR UNDERSTANDINGS AT THIS STAGE. WE HAVE NO IMPULSE TO DELAY, BUT WE MUST BE WELL PREPARED.

BESSMERTNYKH SAID THESE DISCUSSIONS COULD GO ON IN PARALLEL WITH THE NEGOTIATIONS. WE COULD DISCUSS DOCTRINE. PEOPLE COULD COME TOGETHER, DIPLOMATIC PEOPLE, MILITARY PEOPLE. WE BELIEVED THAT WE HAD REACHED A CERTAIN LEVEL OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN EACH OTHER BY HANDLING THE MOST SENSITIVE ELEMENTS TOGETHER. IF THE NEW ADMINISTRATION BELIEVES A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IS POSSIBLE, THEN PROGRESS IS POSSIBLE. IF THERE IS NO TRUST AND CONFIDENCE, THE SITUATION IS HOPELESS. WE WELCOMED THE NEW ADMINISTRATION, AND THOUGHT HAVING NEW PEOPLE WAS A GOOD IDEA. THEY BRING WITH THEM FRESH THOUGHTS.

ROSTOW MENTIONED THAT HE HAD READ ABOUT PERSONAL ATTACKS ON HIM IN THE SOVIET PRESS. BESSMERTNYKH SAID HE FOLLOWED THE AMERICAN PRESS MORE THAN THE SOVIET PRESS, BUT HE THOUGHT ROSTOW HAD BEEN SPARED, AND THAT HE SHOULD NOT TAKE IT PERSONALLY IF HE WAS CAUGHT UP IN THIS EXCHANGE OF SALVOS. ROWNY WAS ALSO SOMETIMES MENTIONED IN THE PRESS. WE ARE PROFESSIONALS AND THIS SORT OF THING

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SHOULD NOT CLOUD OUR RELATIONS.

ROSTOW HANDED OVER A COPY OF THE TALKING POINTS, AS WELL AS A BRIEF ACCOUNT FOR THE PRESS OF THE FACT, BUT NOT THE CONTENT, OF THESE DISCUSSIONS. BESSMERTNYKH SAID HE APPROVED THE ANNOUNCEMENT. BESSMERTNYKH ALSO TOOK A COPY OF THE KRASIKOV EXCERPT, SAYING THAT KRASIKOV HAD BEEN EXPOUNDING THE AMERICAN VIEW.

BESSMERTNYKH SAID HE WOULD REPORT THE CONVERSATION TO MOSCOW AND WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH ROSTOW WHEN HE RECEIVES INSTRUCTIONS. END TEXT. HAIG
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