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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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File Folder USSR-ASIA 2/4

FOIA

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2102

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8708	CABLE	260940Z FEB 81	2	2/26/1981	B1
8714	MEMO	ASEAN MILITARY COOPERATION	1	6/18/1981	B1
8709	MEMO	SOVIET ARMS SUPPLIES TO VIETNAM: A REVIEW	1	ND	B1
8722	CABLE	261217Z FEB 81 R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6	2	2/26/1981	B1
8723	MEMO	ASIAN RESPONSE TO SOVIET PROPOSAL ON CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6	1	3/24/1981	B1
8710	MEMO	KAMPUCHEA AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY: MOSCOW DIGS IN R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6	1	ND	B1
8721	MEMO	NORTH KOREA--USSR: RELATIONS REMAIN COOL PAR 11/16/2015 F2006-114/6	2	3/24/1981	B1
8711	TABLE OF CONTENTS	EAST ASIA REVIEW PAR 11/16/2015 F2006-114/6	1	3/24/1981	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8712	MEMO	DOBRIANSKY RE SOVIET WORKING GROUP: NOTES ON SOVIET DEPLOYMENTS IN EAST ASIA	4	4/14/1981	B1
8713	MEMO	DOBRIANSKY RE SOVIET WORKING GROUP: NOTES ON SOVIET DEPLOYMENTS IN EAST ASIA	2	4/16/1981	B1
8724	MEMO	OUTLOOK FOR THE SOVIETS AT CAM RANH, VIETNAM <i>P 12/1/2009 F06-114/6</i>	2	4/24/1981	B1
8715	CABLE	100400Z SEP 81	2	9/10/1981	B1
8725	CABLE	111547Z SEP 81 <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	9	9/11/1981	B1
8726	CABLE	151639Z SEP 81 <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	8	9/15/1981	B1
8727	CABLE	SOVIET MILITARY FORCES IN THE FAR EAST	1	9/15/1981	B1
8728	CABLE	SOVIET DEVELOPMENT AID TO KAMPUCHEA SUPPLANTS EMERGENCY RELIEF	1	10/5/1981	B1

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2102

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8716	MEMO	LILLEY TO ALLEN RE THAI PRIME MINISTER PREM'S MEMORANDUM R 3/19/2013 F2006-114/6	1	10/7/1981	B1
8729	PAPER	THAILAND R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6	7	10/6/1981	B1
8730	PAPER	SOVIET REGIONAL SECURITY PROPOSALS FOR ASIA R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6	2	2/23/1982	B1
8731	PAPER	ASIAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6	6	ND	B1
8717	MEMO	MOSCOW COURTS SEOUL	1	10/25/1982	B1
8718	MEMO	USSR: CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES IN THE FAR EAST	1	3/17/1983	B1
8732	CABLE	260942Z JAN 83 R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6	4	1/26/1983	B1
8719	MEMO	USSR: MILITARY POSTURE IN THE FAR EAST	1	1/27/1984	B1
8720	MEMO	COUNTERING SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO PENETRATE THE SOUTH PACIFIC R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6	2	2/26/1985	B1

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Soviets in Asia: Evolution of a Blueprint

*Sumit
Umin*

By MARIAN K. LEIGHTON

In 1969 Moscow floated a proposal for a Soviet-sponsored collective security system in Asia. Washington, preoccupied with the Vietnam war, tended to ignore the proposal, while most Asian capitals adopted a wait-and-see attitude. Peking denounced the plan as a schedule to isolate and "contain" China. The Soviet initiative helped propel China into a rapprochement with the United States.

Details of the Soviet proposal were deliberately vague (there were even hints that Chinese participation would be welcome), but the USSR apparently aspired to fill a vacuum that it foresaw as a result of the impending British withdrawal from areas east of Suez and of a greatly reduced U.S. military presence in post-Vietnam Asia.

With the hindsight of a decade, it is evident that Moscow has constructed the foundations of an Asian security system under its aegis. One aspect has been a Soviet diplomatic offensive for closer relations with the non-Communist governments of Asia, many of which harbor a traditional distrust of the Kremlin. However, in view of the waning appeal of Communist ideology and of Moscow's inability to match the West in providing trade, economic aid and credits, the overwhelming thrust of Soviet policy in Asia has been military.


Aided by a favorable shift in the overall U.S.-Soviet strategic equation, by an impressive Soviet naval buildup in the Pacific and Indian Oceans and by the consolidation of a united, militarily powerful Vietnamese ally, the USSR has drawn Cambodia, Laos and Afghanistan toward its orbit by sheer military force and has intimidated many other Asian states with the specter of growing military strength in the region and willingness to use it.

U.S. Reluctance

For example, the perceived U.S. reluctance to counteract the Soviet bid for hegemony in Asia has led some members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to contemplate closer ties with the USSR in the wake of the Cambodian crisis and has prompted Pakistan and Iran to reassess their foreign policies in view of the Soviet invasion of neighboring Afghanistan.

There is a further danger that the growing strength and influence of the Soviet Union in Asia will erode Peking's confidence in close Sino-American ties and bolster the position of those in the Chinese leadership who reportedly favor a rapprochement with the USSR.

Though membership in Moscow's proposed system is ostensibly open to all countries in the region, those singled out for mention in the original proposal (published in *Izvestia* May 28, 1969) offer a clue to Soviet intentions. Political commentator Vykenty Matveyev, author of the article, cited India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Burma, Singapore and Cambodia as important members of the proposed system. Except



for Cambodia, all these countries either lie along the Indian Ocean littoral or control air access (by means of overflights in the case of Afghanistan) to that ocean. They also constitute a gateway to the strategic Indian subcontinent, which forms as much of a linchpin for a potential *Pax Sovietica* as it did for the British Empire.

The ultimate scope of Soviet ambitions in Asia was manifested in a Radio Moscow broadcast of Aug. 17, 1969, which declared that "India, Pakistan and Afghanistan would form the nucleus of the [collective security] system, which would eventually embrace all countries from the Middle East to Japan." Soviet friendship treaties with such Asian states as Iraq (in 1972), India (1971), Afghanistan and Vietnam (both in 1978) subsequently paved the way for an extension of Soviet influence in the Middle East, the subcontinent and Southeast Asia. It is less well known, however, that in February 1978 Moscow handed Tokyo the draft of a Soviet-Japanese treaty of good neighborliness and cooperation. Japan rejected the pact, which apparently aimed (without success) at forestalling a Sino-Japanese peace treaty. Having failed to win over Japan with diplomatic overtures, however, the Kremlin resorted to a pattern that has become distressingly familiar elsewhere in Asia — a military buildup (in this case, beginning in 1978 on the disputed southern Kuril Islands) designed to intimidate Japanese policymakers.

The invasions of Afghanistan by Soviet troops and of Cambodia by those of Moscow's Vietnamese proxy bespeak the development of a two-pronged strategy aimed at Soviet control of access to the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Malacca, key arteries for transport of Middle Eastern oil to Western Europe and Japan. Moreover, the strait affords entree to the South China Sea which,

by virtue of unimpeded Soviet access to Cam Ranh Bay and other Vietnamese naval facilities, has become a Communist lake.

In addition to its strategic significance, the South China Sea is believed to contain rich oil deposits and is the locus of regional disputes (for example, over ownership of the Paracel and Spratly Islands, or rights to seabed minerals) that are potentially as serious as those among the quarreling states of the Persian Gulf and as conducive to Soviet meddling. Also, naval and air supremacy in the South China Sea puts the Soviet Union in position to exert political pressure against the Philippines.

"Dumbbell" Strategy

When one considers that dominance of the Strait of Malacca would enable the USSR to link the Pacific and Indian Ocean subregions, the far-reaching implications of a Soviet-sponsored Asian collective security system emerge clearly. China has already warned of a Soviet "dumbbell" strategy focused on the strait and aimed at outflanking Western Europe, the United States and Japan. The success of such a strategy would also effectively sever the links among the members of ASEAN by isolating Thailand and western Malaysia from the rest of the group.

In this broad context, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia represent not isolated regional crises but parts of a broader Soviet strategy. In its general outlines, a Soviet-style collective security system already exists in Asia—in fact if not in name.

While the timing and tactics of Moscow's move into Afghanistan were probably dictated mainly by domestic developments in that country, the invasion sug-

(See SOVIETS, Pg. 10-F)

Marian K. Leighton is an analyst in the National Foreign Assessment Center of the Central Intelligence Agency. The article does not imply a CIA endorsement of the author's views.

ASIA *Far East*
(Thailand) 5

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AMCONSUL HONG KONG 1552
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 4858
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR 6580
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EO 12065: GDS- 2 26 87 (ABRAMOWITZ, MORTON I.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, ASEAN, VM, TH, UR
SUBJ: REACTION TO SOVIET DEMARCHE TO ASEAN ON INDOCHINA
REF: A. FBIS BK 240704, B. FBIS BK 240121, C. FBIS LD
212252, D. MANILA 4233, E. JAKARTA 2797

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. THAIS RESPONDED NEGATIVELY TO THE SOVIET CALL FOR
ASEAN RECONSIDERATION OF THE INDOCHINESE STATES' PROPO-
SALS ON KAMPUCHEA. WITHOUT HAVING YET RECEIVED THE SO-
VIET DEMARCHE, FOREIGN MINISTER SITTHI SAVETSILA ON MON-
DAY, FEBRUARY 23, DISMISSED IT AND THE PARENT INDOCHI-
NESE PROPOSAL AS OLD HAT. NO OFFICIAL TEXT OF SITTHI'S
REMARKS HAS BEEN MADE AVAILABLE; BOTH THAI DOMESTIC RADIO
AND THE CLOSE-TO-THE-GOVERNMENT BANGKOK POST BRIEFLY
PARAPHRASED HIS REJECTION OF THE SOVIET EFFORT (REFS A
AND B). PM PREM HAS REPORTEDLY ALSO TOLD PRESS THAT THE
PROPOSAL OFFERS NOTHING NEW. A SOVIET EXPERT AT THE MFA,
HOWEVER, COULD NOT CONFIRM PREM'S STATEMENT, WHICH RE-

* * * * * W H S R C O M M E N T * * * * *

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BY WJ NARA, DATE 12/13/07

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CEIVED ALMOST NO MEDIA COVERAGE.

3. MFA DESK OFFICER SAID THAT THE SOVIET'S WRITTEN DEMARCHE IS RECEIVING FURTHER STUDY, BUT THE THAIS PROBABLY WILL NOT REPEAT NOT FORMALLY RESPOND. HE SPECULATED THAT THE REGULAR ASEAN MEETING SCHEDULED FOR JAKARTA IN TWO WEEKS MIGHT ISSUE SOME JOINT RESPONSE.

4. SOVIET EMBASSY MADE THE DEMARCHE HERE BY HAVING AN ATTACHE LATE FEBRUARY 23 DELIVER PAPER TO MFA'S EUROPEAN DIVISION. ENVELOPE WAS ADDRESSED TO PRIME MINISTER AND CONTAINED UNSIGNED PAPER TITLED "APPEAL TO THE THAI GOVERNMENT," THE TEXT BEING IN ESSENCE IDENTICAL TO THAT GIVEN TO PHILIPPINES (REF D). BY THE TIME IT DRIFTED UP TO SITTHI'S OFFICE, HE HAD ALREADY GONE HOME FOR THE EVENING.

5. COMMENT: THE CASUAL, LOW-KEY SOVIET DELIVERY OF THE MESSAGE WOULD INDICATE THAT THE SOVIETS DID NOT EXPECT TO GET VERY FAR WITH IT HERE. THEY DIDN'T
ABRAMOWITZ
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BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH - ANALYSIS: MARCH 24, 1981

1. ASIAN RESPONSE TO SOVIET PROPOSAL ON CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES

Brezhnev's proposal to discuss confidence building measures (CBMS) in Asia is viewed by Tokyo, Beijing, and Seoul as an effort to drive a wedge between the US and its friends and allies. While Brezhnev gave no details in his February 23 speech at the Soviet Party Congress, the measures may involve notification of military movements and exercises and the presence of observers, as in Europe.

* * *

Japan views the proposal as a Soviet attempt to ease relations with Tokyo in order to short-circuit its efforts to build a public consensus in favor of an expanded security role in coordination with the US. The Japanese have not yet formally replied to the Brezhnev proposal. But last week, Foreign Minister Ito chided Soviet Ambassador Polyansky for talking about building confidence and improving bilateral relations while the Soviet Union was occupying (and constructing military facilities on) Japan's "inherent" territory of the northern islands.

Ito indicated that a peace treaty between the two countries could not be signed, or relations improved significantly, until the Soviets squarely faced the northern islands issue. He also told Polyansky that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and support for the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea augured poorly for building confidence in the USSR.

Beijing attributes Moscow's current emphasis on dialogue to its internal and external problems and to its "unprecedented" isolation in the world. The Chinese see CBMS as a tactical, rather than a fundamental, shift in Soviet strategy to divide Western Europe and the US. They also believe that reconnaissance satellites reduce the value of CBMS. Beijing does not plan to provide the Soviets with a formal response.

South Korea sees Brezhnev's proposal as aimed at driving a wedge between the US and the ROK -- perhaps to hamper such military cooperation as the ongoing "Team Spirit '81" joint military exercise. Seoul believes that any consideration of CBMS should be preceded by a change in North Korea's posture toward the South, including acceptance of the ROK's proposal for North-South talks at presidential level and dual Korean UN membership.

North Korea has not commented publicly. It is likely to feel even more isolated than usual by any indication -- perceived or real -- that Moscow may be seeking an accommodation with the US, Japan, and South Korea. Pyongyang probably believes that neither Beijing nor Moscow is a dependable ally.

2. KAMPUCHEA AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY: MOSCOW DIGS IN

Brezhnev's bilateral discussions with the leaders of Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea earlier this month, and the recent tough Soviet statement on Southeast Asia delivered to the ASEAN states, indicate Moscow will show little flexibility on Kampuchea at this fall's UNGA. Although there may be some cosmetic variations on the standard formulas, the Soviets are evidently prepared to confront the opposition head-on rather than take positions that might suggest less than full endorsement of the Heng Samrin regime and its Vietnamese supporters.

* * *

The Kampuchean issue appears to have been a major agenda item for Brezhnev's recent meetings with each of the Indochinese party leaders. The primary focus was on longer-term tactics to erode ASEAN opposition to the Vietnamese occupation rather than on new formulations to blunt the ASEAN UN offensive.

The USSR's Indochinese allies evidently intend to pursue consultations with the ASEAN states and to keep trying to improve their ties with other third world countries. Among the ASEAN countries, Indonesia and Malaysia will be the object of particular Soviet attention, since they are the most suspicious of Chinese intentions in supporting the resistance in Kampuchea.

Soviet commentators likened Brezhnev's sessions with the Indochinese to the Crimea bilaterals with the USSR's East European and Mongolian allies. This comparison presumably was intended to underscore the alliance relationship and therefore the firmness of Soviet support for Indochinese interests. Vietnam received particularly solicitous treatment. Its primary role in Laos was affirmed when Brezhnev and Laotian leader Kaysone emphasized the importance of Laos' ties with the other Indochinese states.

The UN conference on Kampuchea in July and vigorous efforts by some of the ASEAN countries to unify and strengthen Kampuchean opposition groups have added to the pressures on the Indochinese regimes. They also face serious economic difficulties, continuing diplomatic isolation, and varying degrees of popular opposition.

Soviet and Indochinese proposals for a regional conference, already rejected by ASEAN, will not be an effective weapon in the UN debate on Kampuchea. But the Soviets apparently have concluded that under present circumstances any indications of flexibility will be interpreted as a weakening of support for Vietnam and their other Indochinese allies.

FOIA(b)(3)

NORTH KOREA - USSR: RELATIONS REMAIN COOL

The atmospherics surrounding North Korea's participation at the recent Soviet party congress indicate that the relationship between the two countries remains cool, despite Pyongyang's upgraded representation at the congress. Soviet party leader Brezhnev, in his major address on 23 February, omitted North Korea from the list of "fraternal" socialist states in attendance and made only a passing reference to Moscow's support for Pyongyang.

Premier Yi Chong-ok, fifth ranking member of the North Korean party, led the delegation to Moscow, thus raising the level of Pyongyang's representation a notch or two above that at similar gatherings in Moscow in 1971 and 1976. The selection of Yi, who visited China in January, seemed calculated to reflect a more even-handed approach by Pyongyang in its relations with Moscow and Beijing. Yi was not received by Brezhnev but did meet once with his Soviet counterpart, Premier Tikhonov, on 4 March, one day after the congress closed.

The major impediment to improved relations between the Soviet Union and North Korea is Kim Il-song's long-standing ambition to reunify the Korean peninsula under Pyongyang's control. Moscow, because of its broader strategic interests, prefers the status quo in Northeast Asia and is wary of Kim's propensity to escalate tensions in an attempt to advance his reunification policy. The Soviet distrust of Kim evidently is so strong that Moscow has demonstrated little enthusiasm in recent years for competing against China for influence with the North Korean leader.

North Korea's determination to follow an independent path has put Pyongyang at odds with Moscow on an increasing number of issues. In the nonaligned movement, for example, North Korea, in its efforts to curry favor with the Third World, routinely warns against the danger of

24 March 1981

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BY RW NARA DATE 11/16/15

Soviet expansionism--the threat from so-called "dominationist" forces. More recently North Korea took an active hand in arranging a conference led by former Kampuchean leader Sihanouk aimed at opposing the pro-Soviet regime in Phnom Penh. These actions clearly rankle the Soviets and call into question the seriousness of Pyongyang's efforts to repair its ties with Moscow.

The Soviet Union is drafting an economic cooperation agreement with North Korea for the period 1981-85. According to a brief Soviet press announcement, Premier Tikhonov discussed the five-year package with Yi Chong-ok at their meeting in Moscow. The scope of that agreement may help indicate the direction of Soviet-Korean relations. Soviet technicians continue to work on about 15 longstanding projects in North Korea, but no major new ones appear to be in the works.



24 March 1981

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FOIA(b)()

EAST ASIA REVIEW

24 March 1981

CONTENTS

North Korea - USSR: Relations Remain Cool 1

by []/OPA, []

The atmospherics surrounding North Korea's participation at the recent Soviet party congress indicate that the relationship between the two countries remains cool, despite Pyongyang's upgraded representation at the congress. []

South Korea - Japan: Slight Thaw in Relations 3

by []/OPA, []

President Chun Doo Hwan, believing that South Korea holds a diplomatic advantage over Japan, is pressing for concessions--principally economic--as the two sides move cautiously to improve their strained relations. []

Kampuchea: Hanoi's Elections 8

by []/OPA, []

Hanoi is likely to cite the results of elections now under way in Kampuchea as further evidence of a return to normalcy there. []

NOTE: Please change the serial number on the cover of the last issue of East Asia Review, 10 March 1980, to read: PA EAR 81-005.

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BY RW NARA DATE 11/16/15

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Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Current Analysis Series

April 24, 1981

POLITICO-MILITARY ANALYSES

Outlook for the Soviets at Cam Ranh, Vietnam (TOP SECRET/UMBRA/NOFORN):

Improvements by the Soviets to the physical facilities at Cam Ranh Bay Vietnam are continuing, and we expect that the Soviet presence will slowly increase over the next 18 months. But we believe that Cam Ranh will continue to be only a forward operating facility of very modest maintenance and logistic capability for both ships and aircraft. Soviet warships will be supported primarily by deployed tankers, repair and logistic ships (rather than by elaborate shore facilities). Additional Tu-95 Bear naval reconnaissance and anti-submarine warfare aircraft deployments will be limited unless the Soviets install significant maintenance support units at the airfield.

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The airfield improvements have been minor. They Soviets refurbished about six small barracks in February 1980 (possibly for both Fix-24 and airfield personnel) and added some storage sheds and a parking lot. In March the Soviets set up a ground controlled approach system and runway lighting, and also installed horizontal fuel tanks holding about three million liters of aviation fuel, but they did not make runway improvements. Even so, the Soviets were able to shift Tu-95 operations to shift from Da Nang to Cam Ranh last summer.

Likewise, the Soviets have made little change in port facilities, beyond improving road and pier surfaces, building a small

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BY RW NARA DATE 12/1/09

~~TOP SECRET/UMBRA/NOFORN~~

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generator shed and a support building, and installing a water and a fuel pipeline, the latter probably to the airfield fuel farm. The 4,500-ton transporter dock, delivered in November 1980, can provide only limited hull maintenance and is supplemented by the continuous presence of a repair ship, which also has housed a naval command element. The Lema-class missile tender was deployed only temporarily during early 1980 to Cam Ranh, providing a "missile magazine" for the additional Soviet ships deployed to the Indian Ocean during the Afghanistan invasion and US-Iranian tensions.

In sum, the Soviets have made only a limited investment ashore-- one that could be removed within weeks and that conforms to their austere operating pattern at Dahlak, Ethiopia. They can fuel about 600 Tu-95 flying hours, but cannot at present maintain aircraft to that extent. Moscow can support about six combatant ships and two submarines, given its present level of one repair ship and 6-9 other auxiliaries, and could support warship deployments of about six months' duration. More support ships could easily be deployed.

Despite the limited nature of the improvements, Moscow:

--can more easily maintain a larger naval presence off South China, in the Indian Ocean, and in the sea lanes between them;

--enjoys substantially better range, duration and responsiveness from its maritime surveillance operations in Indochina;

--can position a "surge force" for the Indian Ocean 7-10 days closer than can be done from Vladivostok; and

--visibly signals support to Vietnam and the need for China and ASEAN states to take the Soviets into account in their foreign policies.

Briefly Noted:

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Prepared by: INR/PMA - T.Williams, M.Miller
Approved by: INR/CA - P.H.Stoddard

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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 12808

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 9/11/01 (MCCALL, SHERROD B) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, UR, IO, ASEAN

SUBJECT: SOVIET DISCUSSIONS WITH ASEAN COUNTRIES

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: DURING INDONESIAN FOREIGN MINISTER MOCHTAR'S SEPTEMBER 4 STOPOVER IN MOSCOW, SOVIET DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER FIRYUBIN APPEARED MOST CONCERNED TO FIND WAYS TO REDUCE HANOI'S ISOLATION AND TO PROBE FOR INDONESIAN FLEXIBILITY ON KAMPUCHEA, WHILE AVOIDING ANY CONCESSIONS ON THE KAMPUCHEAN ISSUE HIMSELF. MOCHTAR EMPHASIZED THAT THE WAY OUT FOR THE SOVIETS WAS TO ENCOURAGE HANOI TO MEET ASEAN HALFWAY ON KAMPUCHEA ALONG THE LINES OF THE UN RESOLUTION. HE ALSO SOUGHT TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT SOVIET EFFORTS TO DRIVE WEDGES IN ASEAN BY SINGLING OUT INDONESIA FOR SPECIAL TREATMENT WERE UNACCEPTABLE AND TO UNDERLINE INDONESIAN COMMITMENT TO ASEAN UNITY. JUST BEFORE THE MOCHTAR VISIT, THE MFA HAD CALLED IN OTHER ASEAN REPRESENTATIVES TO HAND OVER A HARSH,

SIT:

EOB: NAU, GREGG, LILLEY, PIPES

WHSR COMMENTS:

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MOSCOW 2808

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NLS F06-114/6 #8725

BY 101 NARA, DATE 12/13/07

UNCOMPROMISING PAPER ON THE SOVIET POSITION ON SOUTHEAST ASIAN ISSUES, A GESTURE THAT MAY HAVE BEEN INTENDED TO INGRATIATE THE SOVIETS WITH LE DUAN WHO ARRIVED IN MOSCOW AT THE SAME TIME FOR HIS VISIT. THE INDONESIAN S TURNED ASIDE SOVIET HINTS FOR A MOCHTAR-LE DUAN MEETING IN MOSCOW. END SUMMARY.

3. ACCORDING TO THE INDONESIAN DCM (PROTECT), FOREIGN MINISTER MOCHTAR'S VISIT TO MOSCOW WAS A FAIRLY ROUTINE AFFAIR. THE INDONESIANS TURNED ASIDE VARIOUS SOVIET OFFERS OF HOSPITALITY TO EMPHASIZE THAT THIS WAS ONLY A STOPOVER, NOT AN OFFICIAL VISIT, AND DID NOT ASK TO SEE GROMYKO OR OTHER RANKING SOVIETS. (MOCHTAR PLANS TO COME BACK FOR AN OFFICIAL VISIT IN NOVEMBER.) WHILE MOST OF MOCHTAR'S DISCUSSION DEALT WITH PURELY BILATERAL AFFAIRS, FIRYUBIN DID MAKE A STRONG PITCH FOR INDONESIAN SUPPORT FOR HANOI'S PROPOSALS FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA. MOCHTAR EMPHASIZED THAT INDONESIA WAS FIRMLY COMMITTED TO ASEAN AND SUPPORTED THE UN RESOLUTION AS THE APPROPRIATE WAY TO SETTLE THE KAMPUCHEAN ISSUE AND IMPROVE RELATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. THE BULK OF FIRYUBINI'S TALKING POINTS ARE INCLUDED IN THE HANDOUT GIVEN ASEAN COUNTRIES QUOTED IN FULL IN PARAGRAPHS 6-14. THE INDONESIANS DID, HOWEVER, NOTE HIS OBVIOUS CONCERN FOR HANOI'S ISOLATION FROM OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE REGION AND THE WORLD. TO AN EXPRESSION OF GRATITUDE THAT INDONESIA RETAINED DIPLOMATIC TIES WITH HANOI, MOCHTAR REPLIED IT WAS NATURAL THEY SHOULD HAVE RELATIONS AND THAT ASEAN HELD NO ILL-WILL FOR VIETNAM. HE ARGUED FOR THE SOVIETS TO ENCOURAGE HANOI TO BE MORE REASONABLE AND TO FOLLOW THROUGH ON PROMISES MADE OF PEACEFUL INTENT. FIRYUBIN STUCK TO HIS BRIEF AND MADE NO SUGGESTION THAT MOSCOW WOULD EXERT ANY PRESSURE ON HANOI.

4. THE INDONESIANS TELL US THAT MOCHTAR CONCLUDED FROM HIS TALK THAT THE SOVIETS WERE PROBING FOR WEAKNESSES IN ASEAN, LOOKING FOR POSSIBLE AREAS OF COMPROMISE, AND HOPING THAT OTHER COUNTRIES WOULD PUT FORWARD MORE PROPOSALS THAT MIGHT BE COMBINED WITH SOME OF HANOI'S POSITIONS TO MOVE TOWARD A SETTLEMENT IN THE AREA. THUS, HIS STRONG EMPHASIS ON THE SOLIDITY OF ASEAN AND THE NEED FOR HANOI TO COMPROMISE. HE TURNED ASIDE SOVIET HINTS OF A POSSIBLE MEETING WITH LE DUAN WITH THE

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COMMENT THAT HE HAD NO REASON TO TALK TO THE VIETNAMESE AT THE MOMENT. THE INDONESIANS ALSO CONCLUDED THAT THE SOVIETS WERE EXTREMELY ANXIOUS TO PROVE TO HANOI THEY WERE BACKING THE VIETNAMESE FULLY IN ORDER TO FORESTALL ANY VIETNAMESE INTEREST IN SEEKING ACCOMMODATION WITH CHINA.

5. ON SEPTEMBER 2 (VIRTUALLY ON THE EVE OF THE MOCHTAR AND LE DUAN VISITS), THE MFA CALLED IN OTHER SENIOR ASEAN REPRESENTATIVES TO PRESENT THEM WITH A TOUGH STATEMENT OF THE SOVIET POSITION
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 12808

EXDIS

ON SOUTHEAST ASIA. REPORTEDLY THE MEETING WITH THE SINGAPORE AND MALAYSIAN REPRESENTATIVES BECAME HEATED AS THE SINGAPORE CHARGE REFUTED THE STATEMENT POINT-BY-POINT. TEMPER ON BOTH SIDES FLARED UNTIL THE MALAYSIAN STEPPED IN TO EASE THE TENSION. BY CONTRAST AT A SEPTEMBER 7 MEETING IN WHICH THE PAPER WAS HANDED OVER TO THE INDONESIAN AMBASSADOR, THE SOVIETS WENT OUT OF THEIR WAY TO BE CORDIAL AND EMPHASIZE THAT FIRYUBIN HAD ESSENTIALLY ALREADY COVERED THE POINTS WITH MOCHTAR. THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS CARRY THE TEXT OF THE SOVIET PAPER HANDED OVER ON SEPTEMBER 2 AND 7. ADDRESSEES SHOULD HOLD THE TEXT CLOSELY, AS WELL AS THE INDONESIAN COMMENTS ABOUT THEIR ASEAN COLLEAGUES AND THE MOCHTAR MEETING. BEGIN QUOTE:

6. CONTINUED TENSION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, AND STEPPED UP ACTIVITY IN THIS AREA BY FORCES HOSTILE TO THE CAUSE OF PEACE AND SECURITY HAVE PROMPTED THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP TO APPROACH ANEW THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA.

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7. THE AGGRAVATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, AND ENGINEERING BY WASHINGTON AND PEKING OF CONFLICT SITUATIONS IN VARIOUS PARTS OF THE WORLD HAVE AN EXTREMELY NEGATIVE IMPACT ON THE SITUATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AS WELL. IT IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY OBVIOUS THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A "STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP" BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE PRC BRINGS WITH IT QUITE A REAL AND TANGIBLE DANGER TO THE COUNTRIES OF SOUTHEAST ASIA. THE UNITED STATES NOT ONLY ENCOURAGES CHINA TO PURSUE AN EXPANSIONIST POLICY, BUT BY GIVING IT ACCESS TO AMERICAN ARSENALS THE U.S. IN FACT PROVIDES PEKING WITH MATERIAL MEANS FOR REALIZING CHINA'S FAR-REACHING AMBITIONS. THERE CAN HARDLY BE ANY DOUBT THAT THESE MEANS WILL SOONER OR LATER BE USED BY PEKING FOR ACHIEVING ITS EXPANSIONIST AIMS IN THE AREA OF SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIA WITH REGARD TO PLANS TO MILITARIZE JAPAN, THE IMPLEMENTATION OF WHICH WILL NO DOUBT AGGRAVATE EVEN FURTHER INSTABILITY IN ASIA.

8. IGNORING THE DESIRE OF THE PEOPLES OF SOUTHEAST ASIA FOR PEACE AND SECURITY, THE SAME CIRCLES ARE TAKING VARIOUS STEPS TO UNDERMINE PROSPECTS FOR NORMALIZING THE SITUATION IN THAT AREA, AND TO ELIMINATE EVERYTHING POSITIVE THAT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED IN ESTABLISHING A DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE ASEAN STATES AND THE STATES OF INDOCHINA. THEY ARE WORKING FOR A FURTHER EXACERBATION OF TENSION AROUND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KAMPUCHEA, AND SEEK TO PIT THE ASEAN COUNTRIES AGAINST THE STATES OF INDOCHINA IN AN OPEN CONFRONTATION.

9. TO THESE ENDS, CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES HAVE ALSO USED THE SO CALLED "INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON KAMPUCHEA" RECENTLY HELD IN NEW YORK. THEY DID EVERYTHING TO ERECT NEW OBSTACLES IN THE WAY OF IMPROVING THE SITUATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, IN THE WAY OF TURNING THAT AREA INTO A ZONE OF PEACE AND STABILITY. THE HOLDING OF THAT "CONFERENCE" IN DISREGARD OF THE PROTESTS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KAMPUCHEA WAS NOTHING BUT A FLAGRANT INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF A SOVEREIGN STATE. THE KAMPUCHEAN PEOPLE HAVE MADE THEIR CHOICE AND THEY ARE MARCHING WITH CONFIDENCE ALONG THE ROAD OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC REVIVAL, ALONG THE ROAD OF PEACE, FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY. THE RECENT ELECTIONS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF

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KAMPUCHEA HAVE ONCE AGAIN CONVINCINGLY CONFIRMED THE EXISTENCE OF A BROAD SUPPORT FOR THE PEOPLE'S POWER, FOR ITS DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICIES ON THE PART OF THE POPULATION OF THE COUNTRY. THEREFORE, ANY ATTEMPTS TO DIVERT THE KAMPUCHEAN PEOPLE FROM THE CHOSEN PATH ARE HOPELESS AND DOOMED TO FAILURE FROM THE VERY START.

10. IT IS QUITE OBVIOUS THAT GREAT-POWER INTERFERENCE FROM THE OUTSIDE IN THE AFFAIRS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 MOSCOW 12808

EXDIS

RUNS COUNTER TO THE BEST NATIONAL INTERESTS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THAT REGION AND IS DIRECTED TOWARDS CREATING CONDITIONS FOR IMPOSING IMPERIALIST AND HEGEMONIST DIKTAT ON THE PEOPLES OF SOUTHEAST ASIA.

11. IT IS CERTAINLY NOT AN EASY PROCESS TO ELIMINATE ENMITY, SUSPICION AND MISTRUST AND TO ESTABLISH GOOD-NEIGHBORLINESS AMONG STATES WITH DIFFERENT SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SYSTEMS, BUT THERE IS NO OTHER WAY. INDEED, NOBODY HAS YET INVENTED A METHOD OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES OTHER THAN THAT OF EXCHANGE OF OPINIONS, DISCUSSION, AND NEGOTIATION. ONLY BY SETTING ASIDE EVERYTHING THAT CAUSES DIVISION IT IS POSSIBLE TO FIND POINTS OF CONTACT, A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE BASIS FOR ACHIEVING OBJECTIVES COMMON TO THE COUNTRIES OF SOUTHEAST ASIA.

12. FOR ITS PART, THE SOVIET UNION HAS ALWAYS SUPPORTED CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSALS OF ASIAN COUNTRIES WHICH BRING CLOSER THE SETTLEMENT OF PROBLEMS EXISTING ON THE ASIAN CONTINENT. STARTING FROM THE DECISIONS OF THE BANDUNG CONFERENCE, WE HAVE

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WELCOMED MANY INITIATIVES OF DEVELOPING STATES, INCLUDING THOSE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA, AIMED AT ESTABLISHING A FAVORABLE CLIMATE IN THAT REGION. NOW AS WELL, WE IN THE SOVIET UNION NOTE WITH SATISFACTION THE INTEREST DISPLAYED BY A NUMBER OF ASIAN STATES IN STABILIZING THE SITUATION ON THE ASIAN CONTINENT IN GENERAL AND IN SOUTHEAST ASIA IN PARTICULAR. THE SOLUTION OF THAT PROBLEM IS PRIMARILY THE CONCERN OF THE PEOPLES OF THE COUNTRIES WHICH ARE DIRECTLY AFFECTED AND BY NO MEANS THAT OF WASHINGTON OR PEKING, WHICH ARE SEARCHING FOR EVER NEW MEANS TO AGGRAVATE INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS AND TO FOMENT CONFLICTS AMONG PEOPLES.

13. WE SHARE THE INITIATIVES ADVANCED BY THE STATES OF INDOCHINA AND SUPPORTED BY A NUMBER OF PROMINENT PUBLIC AND POLITICAL FIGURES OF THE ASEAN COUNTRIES CONCERNING REGIONAL CONSULTATIONS AND THE SETTLEMENT OF THE PROBLEMS FACING THAT REGION THROUGH THE EFFORTS OF THE COUNTRIES OF SOUTHEAST ASIA THEMSELVES. THOSE INITIATIVES, AS HAS BEEN REPEATEDLY STATED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF VIETNAM, LAOS AND KAMPUCHEA, REMAIN IN FORCE. WHAT IS ALSO KNOWN IS THE READINESS OF THE STATES OF INDOCHINA TO DISCUSS ALL INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE SITUATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, INCLUDING THE SITUATION AROUND KAMPUCHEA.

14. THE LEADERS OF ASEAN COUNTRIES, TOO, HAVE MORE THAN ONCE DECLARED THEIR INTEREST IN NEGOTIATIONS AND NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH VIETNAM AND OTHER COUNTRIES IN INDOCHINA. IT APPEARS TO US THAT IN THIS SITUATION THE INTERESTS OF PEACEFUL FUTURE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA DICTATE THAT THE STATES OF THE REGION BY DISPLAYING PATIENCE, REALISM AND A SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY, SHOULD REFRAIN FROM STEPS WHICH COULD MAKE THE SITUATION STILL MORE COMPLICATED AND THAT THEY SHOULD RESUME AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE THE COMMON SEARCH FOR WAYS TO NORMALIZE THE SITUATION. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE SOONER STEPS ARE MADE IN THIS DIRECTION, THE EARLIER AN ATMOSPHERE OF GOOD NEIGHBORLINESS, MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND COOPERATION WILL BE ESTABLISHED IN THE POLITICAL LIFE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA, WHICH WOULD CORRESPOND TO THE VITAL INTERESTS OF THE

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PEOPLES OF THE COUNTRIES IN THAT PART OF THE WORLD.
END QUOTE. MCCALL
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NOTE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 12994

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-3 9/15/91 (MCCALL, SHERROD) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, UR, VN, ASEAN, CB, LA

SUBJECT: SOVIET POLICY TOWARD SOUTHEAST ASIA

1. ~~C~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: EVENTS OF THE PAST TWO WEEKS HAVE
UNDERScoreD ONCE AGAIN THAT THE BASIC SOVIET
STRATEGY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA IS TO HANG ON TO
ITS STRATEGIC FOOthOLD IN VIETNAM DESPITE THE
CRIMP ON SOVIET RESOURCES, THE DAMAGE CAUSED
TO RELATIONS WITH THE MORE DYNAMIC COUNTRIES OF
ASEAN, AND THE INTERNATIONAL DISCOMFORT OF
SUPPORTING VIETNAM'S OCCUPATION OF KAMPUCHEA.
THE SOVIET UNION IS INTERESTED IN A COMPROMISE

SIT: PUBS

EOB: NAU, KEMP, GREGG, LILLEY, PIPES

WHSR COMMENTS:

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MOSCOW 2994

DTG: 151639Z SEP 81

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TOR: 258/2259Z

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NLS - FOG-114/6 # 8726BY WOT NARA, DATE 12/13/97

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SETTLEMENT IN KAMPUCHEA ONLY TO THE EXTENT VIETNAM IS AMENABLE. MEANWHILE, IT HELPS PROP UP THE PEN SOVAN/HENG SAMRIN REGIME INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY AND PRODS THIRD WORLD FRIENDS SUCH AS INDIA AND SYRIA TO ASSIST. THE SOVIETS WILL CONTINUE TO TRY TO COUNTER CHINESE ADVANCES IN THE AREA AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE AND WILL BE PARTICULARLY ATTENTIVE TO THE MOST ANTI-CHINESE STATES IN ASEAN -- INDONESIA AND MALAYSIA -- BUT EFFORTS IN NON-COMMUNIST SOUTHEAST ASIA ARE BASICALLY TACTICAL AND DESIGNED TO PROBE FOR WEAKNESSES IN ASEAN RATHER THAN PART OF A LONG-TERM EFFORT TO DEVELOP OTHER ALLIES IN THE REGION. VIETNAM IS THE KEY TO SOVIET STRATEGY NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF ITS STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE VIS-A-VIS CHINA AND THE BASES IT PROVIDES AGAINST THE U.S., BUT ALSO IN A TIME WHEN THE SOVIETS FEEL UNDER PRESSURE, ONLY VIETNAM AND INDIA CAN BE COUNTED AS SIGNIFICANT SOVIET FRIENDS IN ASIA. GIVEN THE CURRENT SOVIET TOUGH AND UNCOMPROMISING STANCE, WE SEE NO EVIDENCE THAT MOSCOW WOULD BE WILLING TO RISK THIS TIE IN ANY WAY BY BROKERING A COMPROMISE IN ORDER TO IMPROVE SOVIET-U.S. OR SOVIET-ASEAN TIES. END SUMMARY.

3. THE RECENT VISITS OF SEVERAL SOUTHEAST ASIAN LEADERS TO MOSCOW HAS BROUGHT INTO SHARPER FOCUS THE CENTRALITY OF VIETNAM IN SOVIET POLICY TOWARD SOUTHEAST ASIA. THE SOVIETS CLEARLY SEE THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH VIETNAM AS AN HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY THAT SHOULD BE NOURISHED AND DEVELOPED. IT PROVIDES AN OBVIOUS DIVERSION FOR CHINA ON ITS SOUTHERN FLANK, ITS CONTINUED HOSTILITY TO THE UNITED STATES HELPS CONSOLIDATE THE MAJOR U.S. DEFEAT THERE, AND IT SERVES AS AN IMPORTANT STAGING AREA FOR SOVIET SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT IN THE WORLDWIDE STRATEGIC COMPETITION WITH THE UNITED STATES. IN AN OTHERWISE TOTALLY BLEAK LANDSCAPE OF SOVIET RELATIONS

IN EAST ASIA AND AT A TIME WHEN SOVIET POLICY MAKERS FEEL BELEAGUERED ON ALL FRONTS, A FRIENDLY VIETNAM SEEMS TO LOOM EVEN LARGER IN MOSCOW'S EYES. VIEWED FROM MOSCOW, THE VIETNAM TIE IS ONLY SECOND TO THAT WITH INDIA IN IMPORTANCE TO THE SOVIET STRATEGIC POSITION IN ASIA.

4. THE SOVIETS ARE QUITE AWARE OF THE COSTS OF THIS "FRIENDSHIP." THEY KNOW THEIR ECONOMIC AID IS BEING

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USED INEFFICIENTLY AND GIVEN THE SOVIET UNION'S OWN ECONOMIC STRINGENCIES, THEY COULD USE THE RESOURCES AT HOME. THE AID PROGRAM IS NOT POPULAR IN MOSCOW AND MORE THAN ONE MUSCOVITE HAS AGREED THAT THEY ARE POURING MONEY DOWN A RATHOLE. PRAVDA'S REPORT ON THE LE DUAN - BREZHNEV MEETING, HOWEVER, STRONGLY SUGGESTS THAT DESPITE THE GRUMBLING, SOVIET LEADERS ARE WILLING TO INCREASE THE AID. SUPPORTING VIETNAM ALSO MEANS, OF COURSE, BACKING HANOI'S HARDLY NECESSARY AND STRATEGICALLY DUBIOUS (FROM THE SOVIET POINT OF VIEW) OCCUPATION OF KAMPUCHEA. WITH ASEAN'S
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 12994

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OPPOSITION TO THIS OCCUPATION AND ITS EFFECTIVE
INTERNATIONAL LOBBYING, THE SOVIETS UNDERSTAND WELL
THEY WILL CONTINUE TO PAY THE PRICE OF BAD RELATIONS
WITH THESE ECONOMICALLY DYNAMIC STATES OF SOUTHEAST ASIA
AND EMBARRASSMENT AT THE UN AND ELSEWHERE ON AN ISSUE
IRRELEVANT TO THE USSR'S SECURITY INTERESTS.

5. THE SOVIETS ALSO SEEM TO HAVE FEW ILLUSIONS ABOUT
THE PRICKLY NATURE OF THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH VIETNAM.
THERE IS A NOTABLE LACK OF WARMTH IN ANY SOVIET
STATEMENTS PUBLIC OR PRIVATE ABOUT VIETNAM; NOTHING
IN ANY WAY COMPARABLE TO THE TREATMENT OF INDIA OR
THE TREATMENT OF VIETNAM A DECADE AGO. VIETNAM
IS TREATED ESSENTIALLY FOR WHAT IT IS -- A RENTED
ALLY CREATED MORE BY MUTUAL ENMITY TOWARD CHINA

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THAN IDEOLOGICAL AFFINITY OR LONGSTANDING TIES WITH THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP. (THE PERSONAL CONNECTION WITH LE DUAN BY THE WAY MAY HAVE RECENTLY UNDERGONE ADDITIONAL STRAIN IF A STORY SOON TO BE PUBLISHED BY THE LOS ANGELES TIMES IS CORRECT: LE DUAN'S DAUGHTER, WHO LIVED IN MOSCOW WITH HER RUSSIAN HUSBAND, SUPPOSEDLY DIED IN CHILDBIRTH A FEW WEEKS AGO DUE TO A KREMLIN HOSPITAL'S NEGLIGENCE, AND THERE WAS A RUCKUS ABOUT CUSTODY OVER THE OTHER CHILDREN DURING LE DUAN'S VISIT.) BECAUSE OF THE TOUCHINESS IN THE SOVIET-VIETNAMESE RELATIONSHIP, MOSCOW APPEARS TO BE GOING

TO GREAT LENGTHS IN RECENT WEEKS TO AVOID ANY SUGGESTIONS THAT IT IS STAKING OUT A POLICY OF ITS OWN ON KAMPUCHEA OR DEVELOPING SEPARATE STRONG TIES TO VIETNAM'S PUPPETS IN VIENTIANE AND PHNOM PENH. LEAVING KAYSONE AND PEN SOVAN TO COOL THEIR HEELS AT THE TIME OF THE CRIMEA MEETINGS MUST HAVE BEEN MEANT AS A CALCULATED DEMONSTRATION OF SOVIET RECOGNITION OF HANOI'S SUZERAIN ROLE. WE WERE TOLD THE LAOTIAN WAS IN THE CRIMEA AND PEN SOVAN ALSO BY ALL APPEARANCES WAS SET FOR A BREZHNEV MEETING, BUT A DECISION WAS OBVIOUSLY MADE AFTER THEIR ARRIVAL TO SEE LE DUAN FIRST IN MOSCOW. THE COMMUNIQUE ON THE PEN SOVAN AND KAYSONE MEETINGS WITH BREZHNEV WHEN THEY WERE EVENTUALLY HELD SEEMED DESIGNED TO SHOW THEY WERE HUMDRUM AFFAIRS. SOVIET TIES WITH LAOS AND KAMPUCHEA WERE DEEMPHASIZED: THE LAOTIAN REPORT SPECIFICALLY NOTED THE NEED FOR INCREASED INDOCHINESE UNITY AND KAMPUCHEA WAS KEPT AT ARM'S LENGTH.

6. THIS KID GLOVE TREATMENT OF VIETNAM'S FEELINGS IS PARTICULARLY EVIDENT IN SOVIET HANDLING OF THE EXTERNAL ASPECTS OF THE KAMPUCHEAN ISSUE. THE SOVIETS HAVE HAD REPEATED OPPORTUNITIES TO PORTRAY THEMSELVES TO THE ASEAN COUNTRIES AS INTERESTED IN A SETTLEMENT AND AS NUDGING VIETNAM IN THAT DIRECTION. SOME ASEAN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE VIRTUALLY PLEADED WITH THE SOVIETS TO HELP. HOWEVER, SUPPORT FOR DISCOURSE HAS BEEN REMARKABLY CONSISTENT FOR THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS. MOSCOW IS, OF COURSE, AWARE COUNTRIES AND HAS WATCHED NERVOUSLY WHILE CHINA USED VIETNAM'S OCCUPATION OF KAMPUCHEA TO IMPROVE TIES IN THE AREA AND THE U.S. MOVED BACK IN TO REPAIR ITS ROLE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. TO COUNTER THESE

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TRENDS, THE SOVIETS HAVE SOUGHT TO PLAY ON ANTI-CHINESE CONCERNS IN THE AREA, TREATED ASEAN EXTREMELY LIGHTLY IN THEIR PROPAGANDA (E.G., THE U.S. AND CHINA WERE BLAMED FOR THE KAMPUCHEA CONFERENCE), AND WARNED THE ASEAN STATES ABOUT BECOMING TOOLS IN U.S., JAPANESE, AND CHINESE GLOBAL STRATEGIES. INDONESIA'S CONTINUED FAILURE TO REESTABLISH EMBASSIES WITH BEIJING AND RECENT ANTI-CHINESE STATEMENTS OUT OF MALAYSIA HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGING SIGNS FOR THEM. HOWEVER, THE HANDLING OF MOCHTAR'S STOPOVER, AND THE BT

PAGE 03 OF 03 MOSCOW 2994

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CAN BE EXPECTED TO PRESSURE THEIR OTHER THIRD WORLD FRIENDS TO BE MORE HELPFUL TO VIETNAM ON KAMPUCHEA THAN THEY HAVE BEEN IN THE PAST. SOVIET REPORTING ON THE MEETING OF KAMPUCHEAN RESISTANCE LEADERS IN SINGAPORE CLEARLY RECOGNIZED THE THREAT OF SIHANOUK'S PRESTIGE BEHIND THE RESISTANCE AND THE POSSIBILITY OF A GROWING OPPOSITION TO VIETNAM IN KAMPUCHEA ITSELF. THEIR RECENT REFERENCES TO SIHANOUK HAVE BEEN HARSH AND THERE WERE HINTS OF INCREASED SOVIET MILITARY AID TO VIETNAM DURING LE DUAN'S VISIT. CLEARLY, THE SOVIETS WILL WORK TO COUNTER ASEAN EFFORTS TO REPEAT THEIR STRONG SHOWING IN THE UN.

8. GIVEN CURRENT SOVIET PRIORITIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, WE SEE VIRTUALLY NO HOPE THAT GROMYKO OR OTHER SOVIET LEADERS WILL BE WILLING TO SHOW ANY INCLINATION TO COMPROMISE ON KAMPUCHEA OR TO ENCOURAGE VIETNAM TO MODERATE ITS POSITION ON A SETTLEMENT. EMPHASIZING THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH VIETNAM AT THE PRESENT TIME, THE SOVIETS SEE VERY HIGH COSTS IN ACCEDING TO OUR DEMANDS FOR MODERATION ON THIS ISSUE. THEY SEEM QUITE WILLING TO CONTINUE TO PAY TO KEEP VIETNAM IN ITS ANTI-CHINESE POSTURE AND PROTECTED AGAINST ANY VIETNAMESE-U.S. RAPPROCHEMENT. THERE HAS BEEN SOME SPECULATION THAT THE SOVIETS ARE HAPPY WITH THE KAMPUCHEAN STANDOFF PRIMARILY BECAUSE IT KEEPS THE VIETNAMESE IN A SUPPLICANT'S POSITION, DEPENDENT ON SOVIET largesse. OUR GUESS IS THAT THE SOVIET CALCULATION OF THE PLUSES AND MINUSES IS NOT THAT CLEARCUT AND LEANS TO ENCOURAGING A VIETNAMESE WITHDRAWAL. HOWEVER, WHAT IS APPARENTLY QUITE OBVIOUS IN MOSCOW, IS THAT IT IS NOT IN THE SOVIET INTEREST TO CHANCE A VIETNAMESE SEARCH ELSEWHERE FOR PARTNERS BY PRESSING HANOI TO TAKE A MORE NUANCED APPROACH ON A KAMPUCHEA SETTLEMENT. MCCALL
BT

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cc. *[Signature]* 42

MEMORANDUM

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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~~ATTACHMENT~~

ACTION

October 7, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: JAMES LILLEY *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: Thai Prime Minister Prem's Memorandum (U)

The attached memorandum was given to the President by Prem after their lunch on 6 October. You have asked for my immediate comments and recommendations. Here is what I've done and what my recommendations are. (U)

The Thais also gave this same memorandum to State and Holdridge and Company are reviewing it right now. Defense, according to Rich Armitage, does not have a copy and would like one right away. As far as I know, CIA does not have a copy. (C)

I've read the contents and almost all of these issues have been discussed during Prem's visit. The Thais are asking for a little more, but these matters are negotiable. (S)

I recommend:

-- That I send copies to Armitage and CIA;

-- That a meeting be convened of State, Defense and CIA under the chairmanship of State to examine the paper and draft an answer, and then establish the channel through which this answer should be sent. (S)

RECOMMENDATION: That you approve my proceeding on these lines.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab A Prem memo

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Review 10/7/87

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DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-1146 #8716
BY *[Signature]* NARA DATE 3/19/13

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NLS F06-114/6#8729BY LOJ NARA DATE 12/13/07~~TOP SECRET~~MEMORANDUM

Thailand is deeply concerned over the growing Soviet military presence and influence in the Southeast Asian region. The Soviet Union now has a firm foothold on the mainland of Southeast Asia. It has established facilities for its naval fleet and airforce in Vietnam, and thus possesses greater capabilities than ever before to project its power in Asia and the Pacific. Moreover, the Soviet Union's increasingly influential role in regional affairs is assured by its Treaty of Friendship with Vietnam as well as by the current instability in Kampuchea.

The Soviet entry into Southeast Asia represents yet another major progression in its unwavering goal of global domination. The Soviet Union has repeatedly demonstrated that it will exploit all opportunities and employ any means, including the use of force, both directly and indirectly, as in Afghanistan and Kampuchea, to gain strategic objectives.

Thailand and its ASEAN partners are important strategically, politically and economically to the United States and U. S. strategic interests. For this reason, a threat to ASEAN, either individually or collectively, constitutes a threat to the free world. It is thus in the common interest of ASEAN and other like-minded countries to undertake concerted actions to check Soviet expansionist ambition.

In Southeast Asia, Soviet ambition and interests are furthered through Vietnam and its aggressive policy. Vietnam maintains close military and political as well as economic ties with the Soviet Union. The one quarter million Vietnamese troops in Laos and Kampuchea, deployed close to the Thai border and supported by massive Soviet assistance, are an immediate and real threat to Thailand's security. The Vietnamese record of disrespect for the territorial integrity of others has aggravated this threat. In light of this, the possibility of another Vietnamese incursion or even an outright invasion against Thailand must be taken seriously.

Another matter of concern is the latent threat posed by China to the security of the region. China continues to maintain active links with the various communist parties in Thailand and elsewhere in Southeast Asia. This is a source of disquiet and concern to the ASEAN countries in developing their bilateral relations on a government-to-government basis with China. While at present China advocates a moderating policy toward these countries, the future of this current state of affairs may abruptly change for the worse should such a change be perceived as favorable to China's long-term objectives.

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Besides these external threats, the problems of communist infiltration and subversion also constitute a challenge to the security and stability of Thailand and other Southeast Asian countries. These problems provide further avenues for outside powers to deepen their involvement and to expand their influence in regional affairs. With Indochina already in the communist orbit, another victory by a communist party in the area would have far-reaching implications to all other countries in the region as well as beyond.

Appropriate response to the threats cited in the foregoing should, as a minimum, consist of the following:

- Reassertion of U.S. global role commensurate with its strength and demonstration of its will to rise to the challenges from the Soviet Union and its proxies.
- Continued application of political and economic pressures on Vietnam to desist from aggressive actions.
- Continued denial of economic aid to and establishment of diplomatic relations with Vietnam unless and until Vietnam agrees to a political solution of the Kampuchean problem acceptable to ASEAN.
- Continued U.S. support of the UN-proposed political solution to the Kampuchean problem.
- Assumption of greater responsibilities by Japan, Australia and New Zealand in the task of safeguarding the peace and security in the region.
- Positive actions to strengthen the defense and economic capabilities of ASEAN countries as a group and individually.
- Strengthening of defense and economic capabilities of non-communist countries in the Asian and Pacific region.
- Being the "front-line" state affected by the Kampuchean conflict and having already experienced Vietnamese incursions and harassments, Thailand's military capabilities must be upgraded sufficiently to deter possible external intervention and aggression.
(Annex)
- Development of U.S.-Thai contingency plans to support Thailand in the event of an all-out Vietnamese attack or aggression.
- China at present is in a position to play a positive role in containing Soviet expansion in Southeast Asia. China's future role, however, is far from certain should circumstances change. With its strength and interests in this region, the United States is in a strong position to exercise a beneficial and stabilizing influence on the future development of relations between the smaller countries in the region and China.

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ANNEX

In view of the Soviet and Vietnamese immediate as well as the potential Chinese threat to Thailand's security, and, taking into account Thailand's military requirements to deter such threats, increased security assistance support from the U.S. Government is essential. Thailand is a strong advocate of self-help and has budgeted 19.5% of the FY-82 budget for defense. This reflects an increase of 13.2% over the FY-81 allocation.

Nonetheless, Thailand does need to have increased military sales credits on more favorable terms than are presently available. Thailand therefore requests:

- Increase in FMS Credits extended on government-to-government basis; direct loans; and longer-term repayments. Thailand's FMS Credit requirement for FY-83 is \$120 million.
- Grant of military material and equipment or the sale of such equipment on concessionary or preferential terms.
- Request approval of procurement from production procedure to procurement from stock.
- Sale of military equipment, ammunition, explosives and spare parts according to the needs of the Thai Armed Forces.
- Agreement on immediate delivery of military equipment replacement for that destroyed in the event of external aggression.
- Approval for the transfer of Electronic Communications equipment and delivery of Strategic and Tactical Communications Systems purchased by the Thai Armed Forces.
- Effective military equipment support under the WSSSFAF Regulations.
- Increase in the enrollment of Thai officers under U.S. military training programs on a continuing basis as well as an increase in financial assistance under these programs.
- Sending of qualified U.S. military advisors to Thailand. At the present time, the number of U.S. military advisors assigned to Thailand is not adequate for our requirements.
- Provision of logistics support to Thailand in the event of external aggression.
- Access to more modern and higher level military technology.
- Agreement to assist the Thai Armed Forces to upgrade all military command communications to secure systems.

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MEMORANDUM

THAI - U.S. ECONOMIC COOPERATION

The Government of Thailand has been greatly encouraged by the recent manifestation of the U.S. Government in its awareness and interest in furthering economic and political ties with the countries of Southeast Asia. In particular, the U.S. Government has reiterated its support for the political well-being and security of Thailand. It is therefore hoped that the strengthening of Thai-U.S. political relations will be supported by tangible economic cooperation, for only in this manner can the security of Thailand be enhanced through economic progress and development.

The Government of Thailand has continuously given foremost priority to economic, social and especially rural development as well as eradication of poverty, which were implemented throughout the two decades covered by the four Five-Year Plans. At present, Thailand is embarking upon another Five-Year Plan, with full awareness of difficulties ahead. But judging from the average annual economic growth of over seven percent so far, we are optimistic and have reasonable expectation that this objective will be achieved.

The Government of Thailand fully believes that the participation of the U.S. Government and private enterprise would further ensure Thailand's economic progress and further strengthen our existing relations.

However, as Thailand has diversified exports of agricultural and agricultural-based products as well as industrial raw materials, it is inevitably sensitive to the world market situation. Thailand is deeply concerned that the U.S. Government policy should not adversely affect its interests, and wishes to invite the U.S. Government's attention to the following areas of its anxiety and concern.

(a) International Commodity Agreements

Thailand is particularly concerned with the delay in the conclusion of the Sixth International Tin Agreement and looks forward to the renewal of the Multi Fiber Agreement under which the Thai-U.S. bilateral agreement can be made to accommodate equitable interests of both parties.

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(b) Surplus Disposal

The U.S. policy towards surplus disposal, especially in connection with tin and certain agricultural products such as rice and maize, may have unfavorable impact on Thailand. Therefore, prior consultation on this matter between our two countries is highly desirable and is requested.

(c) Agricultural Exports

Thailand is of the opinion that agricultural exports should be bought and sold in the international markets under competitive conditions with minimal governmental, administrative, fiscal, and monetary intervention.

(d) Market Access

Thailand believes in the further improvement of import/export facilities, further tariff liberalization and the removal of non-tariff barriers, and is particularly concerned with the U.S. policy to reduce import of sugar and to impose an import levy on the product. It is the earnest wish of the Government of Thailand that Thailand's interest as a major sugar exporter should be given due consideration by the U.S. Government.

(e) Gatt Membership

It is Thailand's earnest hope that the U.S. Government, as Thailand's major trading partner and ally, will take a positive attitude in the forthcoming tariff negotiations between Thailand and its trading partners.

(f) Technology Transfer

To achieve the objectives of the Fifth Plan, Thailand urges the U.S. to participate fully in our development of medium and large industries as outlined in the Plan, with particular emphasis on the U.S. assistance in the training of its personnel in the field of energy and resource development.

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6 October 1981

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MEMORANDUM

REFUGEE PROBLEM

Thailand still has a heavy burden with the refugee problem. Currently, there are 189,036 Indochinese refugees in various refugee camps. Among these 94,496 are Kampuchians, 92,923 Laotians and 1,617 Vietnamese. Moreover, Thailand is also faced with the problem of 170,000 Kampuchean people seeking food along the Thai-Kampuchean border, as well as the problem of some 80,000 Thai families uprooted by the influx of these refugees into Thailand.

In solving the refugee problem, Thailand continues to pursue a policy based on humanitarian and national security considerations. At the same time, Thailand continues to cooperate closely with other nations and international organizations. The implementation of this policy has resulted in hundreds of thousands of refugees being resettled in third countries or being voluntarily repatriated. Nonetheless, as the above figures have shown, too many refugees still remain in Thailand and more are expected to arrive due to the food shortage in Kampuchea after the next harvest season. Therefore, Thailand has adopted measures in an effort to reduce the number of refugees already in Thailand and humanely deter others from leaving their countries. In this respect, the Thai Government, in cooperation with the UNHCR, has set up a voluntary repatriation program for the refugees to their country of origin. This program complements the voluntary relocation program established for the Kampuchians. Those arriving after 15 August 1981 will no longer be considered as genuine refugees. Furthermore, Thailand is closing down, within the next year, all refugee camps, with the exception of four, located at Khao-I-Dang, Panat Nikhom, Nakhon Panom and Loei provinces.

On this matter, the U.S. Government has been rendering positive and beneficial cooperation and support which is greatly appreciated by the Thai Government. Thailand also hopes for continued U.S. support to resolve the refugee problem, especially in resettling the remaining refugees from Thailand and in encouraging other nations to assist in the resettlement efforts as well as in supporting Thailand's voluntary repatriation program.

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6 October 1981

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MEMORANDUM

NARCOTICS PROBLEMS

It is Thailand's firm policy to make a realistic effort and to fully cooperate with the United States and other friendly nations in the suppression and prevention of illicit narcotics trafficking. Thailand is strongly committed to solving the narcotics problem as already stated in the Thai Prime Minister's Note of 5 August 1981, addressed to the President of the United States of America. The record of the present Thai Government clearly demonstrates its determination and resolve to deal seriously with the problem which is one of the major causes of human suffering and socio-economic insecurity.

Thailand also attaches high priority to solving the problem of drug addicts and to effectively eradicating opium cultivation. In this respect, U.S. cooperation remains an essential element to Thailand's efforts. In particular, the Government of Thailand is looking forward to further assistance from the U.S. on the following matters:

- Support of Preventive Education Program in terms of equipment, technology, setting up of preventive educational mobile units, training of key personnel and setting up of audio-visual aids production centers.
- Assistance in Treatment and Rehabilitation Program. The present narcotics treatment centers can only admit 30,000 to 40,000 patients annually, while Thailand has about 500,000 to 600,000 drug addicts.
- Support of Narcotics Law Enforcement in terms of equipment and training both inside Thailand and abroad.
- Technical support to establish a Research and Information Center to determine the best possible means to resolve the narcotics problem.

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6 October 1981

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BUREAU OF
INTELLIGENCE
AND RESEARCH

ASSESSMENTS
AND
RESEARCH

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F06-446#8730
BY LOJ NARA, DATE 12/13/07

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Asia P.D 50
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(U) SOVIET REGIONAL SECURITY PROPOSALS FOR ASIA

Key Judgments

(U) A series of Soviet regional schemes for Asia includes proposals for an Asia-wide collective security system and zones of peace for Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean. In 1981, Chairman Brezhnev proposed that confidence-building measures (CBMs) be extended to the Far East, and Mongolian party boss Tsedenbal proposed a convention on non-aggression and the non-use of force among Asian states which Brezhnev personally endorsed three months later.

(LOU) Soviet initiatives toward Asia usually share features that suggest basic Soviet priorities. In advancing them, Moscow seeks to:

- assert its claim, as an Asian power, to a voice in political arrangements throughout the continent and in the western Pacific;
- insure recognition of existing borders disputed by China and of Soviet possession of the "northern territories" claimed by Japan;
- gain acceptance of the political status quo whenever Soviet interests are concerned (now including the Soviet-backed regime in Afghanistan and the Vietnamese-backed regime in Kampuchea); and
- prevent, or complicate, formation of coalitions or alliances by other Asian countries among themselves, or by Asian and non-Asian countries (Moscow regards alignments which it does not dominate as almost invariably directed against itself).

(C) The 1981 proposals are not a comprehensive master plan for Asia. Like most of the

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Report 323-AR
February 23, 1982

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earlier schemes, they were conceived in response to specific, often transient, political needs and will be altered, adapted, or even abandoned in accordance with changing priorities and circumstances. The Mongolian initiative seems designed primarily to facilitate a more active role on the diplomatic stage for Moscow's only dependable ally in North Asia. Its future, even as useful propaganda, seems dim.

(C) On the other hand, Soviet tacticians probably will attempt to develop the Asian CBMs initiative more extensively. They are already using it as a major propaganda theme, especially with respect to Japan, in the context of exploiting public apprehension over military and nuclear tensions. Over the longer term, Moscow apparently hopes to induce the powers in the region to enter into negotiations on CBM-like measures, with the process of engagement itself giving the Soviets more influence in the region.

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NLS F06-114/6#8731BY WDT, NARA, DATE 12/13/07(LOU) Asian Collective Security

The first and broadest Soviet regional proposal for Asia called for the establishment of a continent-wide collective security system. Brezhnev suggested it in 1969. He was vague about its intended structure or what it was to do, and Soviet commentators have been similarly vague ever since. Surfacing so soon after the flare of hostilities on the Sino-Soviet border, it was widely regarded as an anti-Chinese propaganda ploy. In any event, Moscow did little to promote it at the time, but Soviet leaders began pushing it again in 1972.

The proposal's early, anti-Chinese tactical cast appeared to give way gradually between 1969 and 1972 to one of broader strategic conceptions. The US was seeking to extricate itself from Southeast Asia, and American-built alliances were dissolving. (Brezhnev in 1971 suggested that a collective security system would be the best replacement for existing political-military groupings.) Moreover, the Soviet Union had just acted as mediator between India and Pakistan after the 1971 war and perhaps had visions of a similar mediating role continent-wide.

Soviet descriptions of Asian collective security in the years since have differed as circumstances altered. At times they have included vitriolic anti-Chinese polemics. On other occasions the importance of Chinese participation in any such grouping was stressed. Sometimes Moscow appeared to be trying to exclude the US from the continent, describing regional security in terms of Asia for Asians. Other formulations implied that the US would be expected to take part or at least to cooperate. Soviet propagandists have sometimes traced their scheme back to Asian roots, especially the 1955 Bandung Conference. At other times, they emphasized its European origin, describing it as "an application of detente" in Asia with the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) as a model.

The collective security proposal never aroused much interest in Asia and, although it has never been formally abandoned, Moscow has given it less attention in recent years. The Asian political climate changed significantly at the end of the 1970s. With the invasions of Kampuchea and Afghanistan and the Soviet military buildup in the Far East, receptivity among non-communist Asian

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states toward various forms of military and political cooperation with each other, the US, and the PRC increased markedly. In response, the USSR lessened its emphasis on comprehensive collective security schemes to enable it to fill the role of the departing Americans and began to concentrate instead on more specific subregional initiatives, some of them longstanding, to help prevent the Americans from returning. These initiatives included the Southeast Asian zone of peace and stability, and CBMs for the Far East.

Southeast Asian Zone of Peace and Stability

(LOU) The Foreign Ministers of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) first proposed a neutralization of the region in November 1971. Their proposal, like ASEAN itself, was long regarded with suspicion and hostility by Hanoi and by the USSR. Moscow's attitude began to moderate in 1976, but Central Committee Asian specialist Ivan Kovalenko still wrote disparagingly that year that the Soviet collective security plan for all of Asia would be more realistic, because it was "highly improbable that the five ASEAN countries had adequate political, economic and military strength to force the imperialist powers to withdraw from Southeast Asia."

(U) In the late 1970s, however, the Soviets and their Vietnamese allies began to express a more positive attitude toward ASEAN. Judging from Moscow's statements, the Soviet change of view was motivated primarily by the competition between its Vietnamese ally and the PRC, which was itself wooing the ASEAN states. The Vietnamese incursion into Kampuchea added impetus to this shift in policy--it created a need to counter the ASEAN reaction to the Kampuchean affair. In a communique following conversations with the Thai Prime Minister in September 1979, the USSR said it regarded the peace zone idea positively, although it still opposed closed military, political, and economic blocs.

(LOU) The Indochinese states themselves subsequently began pushing various versions of a Southeast Asian zone of peace. In January 1981, the Foreign Ministers of Vietnam, Kampuchea, and Laos proposed a regional conference of the Indochinese and ASEAN states with the aim of concluding a "treaty on peace and stability" in Southeast Asia. Laos elaborated on this idea in a September 1981 memorandum on the principles of peaceful coexistence between the two groups. These Indochinese initiatives were obviously advanced to head off or moderate international reaction to developments in Kampuchea and were so interpreted by ASEAN. The political dialogue involved was intended to legitimize developments in Kampuchea and discourage security cooperation with the US or the PRC.

East Asia--Confidence-Building Measures

(S/NF) Brezhnev's February 1981 proposal that CBMs be extended to Asia, "taking into account, of course, the region's specific character," was repeated in a letter to President Reagan in March. Soviet diplomats made formal demarches advocating such measures (some of them accompanied by letters to chiefs of state from Brezhnev) to Japan, China, North Korea, the US, and a number of other countries. In the course of these representations, the diplomatic spokespersons made a number of comments, not all of them consistent, about the proposal:

- The region to which the measures were to be applied was variously said to include "countries among which tension exists," countries "where there are US military bases or installations," and countries where "intensive military activity is underway." The Soviet charge in Washington, Bessmertnykh, stated specifically that the measures applied only to the USSR, Japan, North Korea, and South Korea. He said the inclusion of Mongolia was not foreseen.
- Soviet representatives in Beijing told Chinese leaders that measures the USSR contemplated included prior notification of troop movements and exercises and provision for foreign observers to attend large-scale maneuvers.
- The status of the Republic of Korea (ROK) was left somewhat ambiguous. Brezhnev specifically mentioned only three countries--China, Japan, and the USSR--as participants, although US participation was implied by his references to US bases. Some subsequent Soviet statements included North Korea, but Soviet officials in Moscow later denied that the Korean states would be included. The only clear expression of intent to include the South Koreans was in the presentation in Washington, when the Soviet chargé orally requested that the US inform the ROK of the proposal. The Soviets for their part apparently did approach the North Koreans directly. The response they received is unknown, but North Korea had rejected the earlier Soviet collective security proposal and was unlikely to accept this one.
- Given the usual association of CBMs with easing geographical tensions, the specific omission of Mongolia, whose long border with China is policed jointly by Mongolian and Soviet forces, is an anomaly which has been compounded by Mongolian statements praising the CBMs proposal. Since the Soviets have never publicly delimited the geographical area to be covered, they may have deliberately created this ambiguity for tactical reasons. Mongolian statements reinforce the impression that Mongolia was left out of the original scheme in order to be included at a later time as a bargaining concession.

(S/NF) The apparent confusion in early Soviet efforts to define the Brezhnev proposal more specifically, as well as a notable lack of enthusiasm last spring and summer on the part of several Soviet Foreign Ministry representatives nominally charged with its promotion, suggests that Foreign Ministry officials may not have been consulted in advance.

(C) While the proposal may have been somewhat ad hoc, it is fully consistent with Soviet objectives in the Far East and has since become a major theme in Moscow's diplomatic and propaganda campaigns. A Soviet commentator recently remarked, "Like the previous idea of collective security in Asia, this is one of those long-term ideas which appears today to be relatively distant and unrealistic but may become reality tomorrow." Moscow apparently hopes the CBMs proposal will eventually prove useful in engaging China, Japan, and the US in arms control discussions which would improve Soviet leverage over their military activities in the region. The Soviet commentator confirmed the model when he went on to say, "As an example I will mention the idea of European security. We promoted this idea for a very long time and in the end we achieved Helsinki."

(C) By the end of April 1981 when it became clear that none of the countries directly concerned was buying the proposal, Soviet treatment of it changed. The Soviets have offered no further official elucidation; instead, academicians and editorial commentators have elaborated on it with considerable apparent freedom. One Asian specialist, Henrik Trofimenko, said the CBMs might include such measures as mutual provision of information on troop locations and movements, naval movements, and exchanges of information on such economic-security issues as open sea lanes. Other commentaries implied that the measures could be worked out bilaterally; still others appeared to be talking of multilateral arrangements.

(U) The Director of the Soviet Institute of Oriental Studies, E. M. Primakov, recently gave the CBMs the catch-all quality of the old collective security proposal, saying that measures to enhance trust in the Far East could include a convention on mutual non-aggression and the non-use of force between the countries of Asia and the Far East (i.e., the Mongolian initiative). He went on to say they might also include coordinated actions to:

- prevent accidents or non-sanctioned use of nuclear arms;
- halt proliferation of nuclear arms;
- prevent armed conflicts;

- renounce unilateral "control" of conflict situations;
- turn individual areas into zones of peace; and
- agree on the military neutralization of areas where buildup of armed forces and armaments is taking place.

(C) CBMs and the Peace Offensive in Japan

Japan is a prime example of the Soviet effort to adapt to Asia approaches which have proved effective in Europe. For some time, the Soviets have been trying to broaden their relationships with Japanese center and left political groups, and the festering rift with the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) has given them somewhat more freedom in this respect. Many Soviet officials, including Ivan Kovalenko, the Central Committee International Department official responsible for Japanese relations, periodically visit Japan. Kovalenko's last visit was in December 1981, when he met with representatives of all political parties. The USSR is making a special effort to cultivate the Socialists, the largest opposition party.

These activities have not been notably successful, however. CPSU letters to leftist parties in Japan last May urging support for the Soviet peace offensive (the JCP, for example, was urged to form a new "anti-American united front" on the left) failed, partly because of the northern territories issue.

Still, high-level Soviet attention to Japan has been heightened by recent increases in the Japanese defense budget and US statements concerning the deployment of nuclear weapons in the Far East. In an obvious attempt to build on Japanese fears about nuclear confrontation, Radio Moscow in November charged that the US was studying a plan to deploy theater nuclear arms, including such intermediate-range missiles as the cruise and Pershing II, to Japan and the surrounding waters. Another broadcast in December observed that limiting medium-range nuclear arms had now emerged as a pressing issue in the Far East and involved Japan because "the introduction of nuclear arms into Japan is not in the least controlled by the Japanese."

Soviet hints about limitations on missiles indicate that these limitations must in the last analysis be multilateral. But some variants of the Brezhnev CBM scheme are likely to be put forward on a bilateral basis, in the Japanese case perhaps playing to Japanese concern about the Soviet military buildup in the Kuriles and the deployment of SS-20 missiles in the Far East. As one Soviet commentator put it, "The [Japanese] attitude toward the Soviet proposal offers an unmistakable criterion in determining whether Japan really believes the figment of the Soviet threat or

is using it to justify the anti-Soviet propaganda and the military buildup."

In the gamut of Soviet peace proposals to Japan, the ultimate goal is still a peace treaty. Intermediate goals include a treaty on mutual non-aggression and non-use of force with confidence-building measures a more immediate objective on that general route.

Mongolian Proposal for Non-Aggression Convention

(S/NF) Mongolian leader Tsedenbal proposed last May, at the 18th Congress of the Mongolia People's Revolutionary Party, that Asian and Pacific states agree to a convention on mutual non-aggression and non-use of force. This proposal was endorsed by Brezhnev during his August meeting with Tsedenbal in the Crimea. The Mongolians have subsequently said little about the content of their scheme, except that the convention should be ratified at a conference which they would convene. They have, however, been busily promoting it through letters to chiefs of state (including President Reagan) and sending delegations to Asian countries to discuss the matter. Except for the expected endorsements from Vietnam, the Heng Samrin regime in Kampuchea, and Afghanistan, the convention has met only silence.

(C) The most likely motivation for Tsedenbal's initiative was less substantive than operational: the initiative provides an issue around which to promote greater Mongolian diplomatic activity in Asia, something both Moscow and Ulan Bator find desirable given China's new foreign policy activism. The other socialist countries on the continent are either unreliable from the Soviet point of view (North Korea) or so involved with internal difficulties and regional rivalries (Vietnam, Kampuchea, Afghanistan) to be of limited value as propaganda stalking-horses.

Prepared by Frank Crump
x28657

Approved by Martha Mautner
x29536

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ASIA 60
~~JAPAN~~ INCOMING
8 TELEGRAM

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 TOKYO 01609

CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PARM, MNUC, JA, KS, UR, US

SUBJECT: JAPAN PROTESTS SOVIET STATEMENTS: ON SS-20
DEPLOYMENTS FOR THE FAR EAST--AND ON GOJ POLICIES
ON DEFENSE, ROK, US

1. ~~(C-ENTIRE TEXT)~~

2. MOFA SOVIET DIVISION PROVIDED EMBOFF JANUARY 25
WITH TEXT OF REPRESENTATION TO BE MADE LATER THAT
DAY TO SOVIET AMBASSADOR PAVLOV BY VICE FOREIGN
MINISTER NAKAJIMA PROTESTING SOVIET STATEMENTS ON
PLANS TO REDEPLOY SOME SS-20S FROM EUROPE TO SIBERIA
IN THE EVENT OF CONCLUSION OF AN INF AGREEMENT.
NAKAJIMA'S REPRESENTATION ALSO PROTESTS SOVIET
MEDIA ATTACKS ON THE JAPANESE DEFENSE BUDGET,
ON INTIMATIONS THAT THE F-16S IN MISAWA COULD
MAKE JAPAN A TARGET OF SOVIET NUCLEAR ATTACK, AND
ON SOVIET PRESS CRITICISM OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S
VISITS TO THE ROK AND TO THE US. TEXT OF REPRESENTATION
FOLLOWS:

3. BEGIN TEXT

I WISH TO SET FORTH AS FOLLOWS, THE JAPANESE SIDE'S
BASIC VIEWS ABOUT THE RECENT STATEMENTS BY SOVIET LEADERS
CONCERNING THE DEPLOYMENT OF INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES
IN SIBERIA, AND THE RECENT COMMENTS BY SOVIET NEWS MEDIA
CONCERNING OUR COUNTRY'S DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES, ETC.

4. ON JANUARY 17, FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO TOUCHED UPON

THE PROBLEM OF THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCE
NEGOTIATIONS, IN THE COURSE OF HIS VISIT TO THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, AND MADE A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT
THAT "AMONG THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES, THOSE
EXCEEDING THE NUMBER AGREED UPON IN THE EUROPEAN REGION,
WILL PROBABLY BE DEPLOYED BEYOND THE BORDERLINE OF
SIBERIA, FROM WHERE THEY WILL NOT BE ABLE TO REACH THE
TARGETS IN WEST EUROPE." AS WE HAVE BEEN REPEATEDLY
MAKING CLEAR, OUR COUNTRY, ON ITS PART, DESIRES
SUBSTANTIAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE US-SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS
ON INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES AND HOPES TO SEE
THE MILITARY BALANCE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST BALANCED
AT THE LOWEST POSSIBLE LEVEL. HOWEVER, IF THE SOVIET
UNION IS CONSIDERING THE INTRODUCTION OF INTERMEDIATE-
RANGE MISSILES BY MOVING THEM TO SIBERIA, AS A RESULT
OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS, THE JAPANESE SIDE CANNOT BUT
TAKE IT SERIOUSLY. WEST GERMAN PAPERS HAVE RECENTLY
REPORTED THAT SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY GENERAL SECRETARY
ANDROPOV TOLD VOGEL, THE CANDIDATE FOR HEAD OF THE
SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
GERMANY, THAT "SOME OF THE SOVIET WEAPONS WILL BE
DISMANTLED, WHILE SOME OF THEM WILL BE WITHDRAWN AND
WILL BE TRANSFERRED TO THE FAR EAST, IN AN EFFORT TO
ACHIEVE A BALANCE WITH THE NEW BASES IN JAPAN." IF
THESE REPORTS ARE CORRECT, THE JAPANESE SIDE CANNOT
ACCEPT THIS VIEWPOINT OF THE SOVIET SIDE, AND IT CANNOT
BUT REGRET SUCH A DANGEROUS WAY OF THINKING.

5. FROM THE BEGINNING, JAPAN HAS SOUGHT ONLY THE
MINIMUM NECESSARY DETERRENT POWER AS REQUIRED FOR
SELF-DEFENSE, AND WE CAN ONLY SAY THAT THE TRANSFER
OF SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO THE FAR EAST, ON THE
GROUNDS OF JAPANESE DETERRENT POWER FOR DEFENSE

PURPOSES, IS OFF THE MARK. THE TRANSFER OF NEW
MISSILES TO THE FAR EAST, IN ADDITION TO THE
INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES WHICH ARE ALREADY IN
THE FAR EAST, WILL UNNECESSARILY INCREASE TENSION
IN ASIA, AND IT WILL INCUR THE CRITICISM NOT ONLY
OF OUR COUNTRY, BUT ALSO OF OTHER ASIAN NATIONS. IN
REGARD TO THE PROBLEM OF THE REDUCTION OF MISSILES IN
THE FAR EAST, THE LATE GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV
CLARIFIED THE POSITION, IN MAY OF LAST YEAR, THAT
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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 TOKYO 01609

CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PARM, MNUC, JA, KS, UR, US
SUBJECT: JAPAN PROTESTS SOVIET STATEMENTS: ON SS-20
THE SOVIET UNION WILL NEGOTIATE ONLY WITH THE
POSSESSORS OF NUCLEAR MEANS, WHICH ARE IN CONFRONTATION
WITH SOVIET MISSILES. THIS ATTITUDE IS NO OTHER THAN
THE "LOGIC OF THE STRONG," WHICH REFUSES EVEN TO HOLD
TALKS ON THE PROBLEM OF THE REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS WITH NATIONS WHICH DO NOT POSSESS NUCLEAR
WEAPONS.

6. STILL FURTHER, THE SOVIET UNION'S RAPID ARMAMENTS
EXPANSION IN THE FAR EAST IN RECENT YEARS IS GIVING
GREAT UNEASINESS TO THE PEACE AND STABILITY OF THIS
REGION. IT IS EXTREMELY REGRETTABLE THAT, DESPITE
THE REPEATED PROTESTS BY THE JAPANESE SIDE, THE
SOVIET UNION'S ARMS BUILD-UP IN OUR COUNTRY'S
NORTHERN TERRITORY IS CONTINUING, SUCH AS THE
INTRODUCTION OF NEW SOVIET MILITARY PLANES, TO OUR
COUNTRY'S NORTHERN TERRITORY TOWARD THE END OF LAST
YEAR. ON THIS OCCASION, WE WISH TO EXPRESS THE
JAPANESE SIDE'S VIEWS ON THIS POINT, TOO.

7. WE ALSO WISH TO EXPRESS THE JAPANESE SIDE'S
VIEWPOINT IN REGARD TO THE FOLLOWING PROBLEMS.
RECENTLY, THE SOVIET SIDE'S NEWS MEDIA HAVE BEEN CARRY-
ING EXTREMELY ONE-SIDED REPORTS AND COMMENTARIES REGARD-
ING OUR COUNTRY. IN CONNECTION WITH THE PRIME
MINISTER'S VISIT TO THE ROK, THE SOVIET MEDIA
EXPRESSED GROUNDLESS CRITICISM AGAINST WHAT THEY CALLED
A MILITARY COOPERATION STRUCTURE AMONG THE THREE
NATIONS, THAT IS, JAPAN, THE US AND THE ROK, CENTERING

ON THE US. IN REGARD TO THE PROBLEM OF OUR COUNTRY'S
FISCAL 1983 DEFENSE BUDGET AND THE PROBLEM OF OUR
COUNTRY'S WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY TO THE US, THE SOVIET
MEDIA CRITICIZED THIS AS JAPAN'S PARTICIPATION,
IN A MORE POSITIVE WAY, IN THE UNITED STATES' WORLD
STRATEGY, AND AS A DANGEROUS MEASURE WHICH WILL LEAD
IN THE DIRECTION OF MILITARISM. THE RECENT JAPAN-US
SUMMIT TALKS WERE HELD FOR THE STILL GREATER STRENGTHENING
OF THE RELATIONSHIP OF TRUST WITH THE US. HOWEVER, THE
SOVIET SIDE'S NEWS MEDIA CONCLUDED THAT THIS WILL MAKE
THE SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST AND ASIA, AS A WHOLE,
STILL MORE COMPLICATED, AND EVEN WENT TO THE EXTENT
OF VOICING COMMENTS WHICH ACTUALLY SEEMED TO HINT AT
THE POSSIBILITY OF OUR COUNTRY'S BECOMING AN OBJECT
OF THE SOVIET UNION'S NUCLEAR ATTACK.

8. THE JAPANESE SIDE CANNOT BUT VIEW THIS SERIES OF
COMMENTS BY THE SOVIET SIDE AS BEING EXTREMELY UNJUST
AND INAPPROPRIATE, AND THEY ARE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE
JAPANESE SIDE. OUR COUNTRY THINKS THAT THE STRENGTHENING
OF FRIENDLY AND COOPERATIVE RELATIONS WITH THE ROK,
WHICH IS OUR NEIGHBOR, WILL CONTRIBUTE TO THE PEACE AND
STABILITY OF ASIA. THERE IS NO REASON WHATSOEVER FOR A
VISIT ON THIS BASIS TO THE ROK BY OUR COUNTRY'S PRIME
MINISTER TO BE CRITICIZED BY THE SOVIET SIDE. IT IS
ALSO A MATTER OF COURSE FOR OUR COUNTRY TO MAKE DEFENSE
EXPENDITURES OF A PROPER SCALE TO ENSURE ITS OWN PEACE
AND SECURITY, AND FOR JAPAN TO TAKE MEASURES FOR THE
SMOOTH OPERATION OF THE JAPAN-US SECURITY TREATY
STRUCTURE. THEY ARE NOT MATTERS WHICH CAN REASONABLY
BE CRITICIZED BY THE SOVIET SIDE. RELATIONS WITH THE US
ARE THE BASIC AXIS OF OUR COUNTRY'S DIPLOMACY. OUR
COUNTRY'S STRENGTHENING ITS RELATIONSHIP OF FRIENDSHIP
AND TRUST WITH THE US WILL CONTRIBUTE TO THE PEACE AND
STABILITY OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION, AND CONSEQUENTLY
THE PEACE AND STABILITY OF THE WORLD. AS FOR THE COMMENT
WHICH COULD EVEN BE TAKEN AS HINTING AT A NUCLEAR
ATTACK AGAINST OUR COUNTRY, IT CANNOT BUT BE VIEWED AS
HAVING THE PURPOSE OF UNWARRANTEDLY STIRRING UP
UNEASINESS AMONG THE PEOPLE OF OUR COUNTRY.

9. JAPAN AND THE SOVIET UNION ARE NEIGHBORS TO
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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 04 TOKYO 01609

CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PARM, MNUC, JA, KS, UR, US

SUBJECT: JAPAN PROTESTS SOVIET STATEMENTS: ON SS-20
EACH OTHER, AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN
THE TWO COUNTRIES WILL CONTRIBUTE TO THE PEACE AND
STABILITY OF ASIA, AND CONSEQUENTLY TO THE PEACE
AND STABILITY OF THE WORLD. THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT
CONTINUES TO PERSEVERE IN ITS WISH TO HOLD TALKS WITH
THE SOVIET SIDE, BASED ON THE SPIRIT OF FRIENDSHIP,
IN ORDER TO SETTLE THE PENDING PROBLEM BETWEEN THE
TWO COUNTRIES AND THEREBY TO ESTABLISH TRUE RELATIONS
OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION. IT DESIRES THAT THE
SOVIET SIDE WILL SHOW BY CONCRETE ACTIONS ITS WORDS
THAT IT DESIRES THE POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT OF JAPAN-
SOVIET RELATIONS.
END TEXT

10. FOLLOWING VICE MINISTER NAKAJIMA'S MEETING WITH
AMBASSADOR PAVLOV, THE FOREIGN MINISTRY BRIEFED THE
PRESS CORPS IN DETAIL ON THE TEXT OF THE REPRESENTATION
AND ON NAKAJIMA'S AND PAVLOV'S EXCHANGE OF REMARKS.
LENGTHY ACCOUNTS APPEARED ON THE KYODO WIRE AND IN
THE TOKYO DAILIES, AND THERE WAS WIDE RADIO-TV
COVERAGE (DETAILS IN UNCLASSIFIED USIS MEDIA REACTION
REPORT FOR JANUARY 25, VIA SEPTEL). MOFA SOVIET
DIVISION DEPUTY DIRECTOR TAKANO CONFIRMED THE
ACCURACY OF PRESS REPORTING ON THE MEETING AND
PROVIDED ADDITIONAL DETAILS. HE SAID PAVLOV HAD
DISMISSED GOJ PROTESTS OVER SOVIET PRESS ATTACKS
AS INAPPROPRIATE GIVEN "UNOFFICIAL" NATURE OF
SOVIET MEDIA. PAVLOV SAID SUCH SOVIET PRESS REACTION
WAS TO BE EXPECTED SINCE PUBLIC OPINION IN THE USSR
IS INCREASINGLY CONCERNED ABOUT STRENGTHENED SECURITY

ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE US IN EAST ASIA.
PAVLOV ACKNOWLEDGED THAT GROMYKO'S STATEMENT ON
DEPLOYMENT OF INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES WAS OFFICIAL
BUT HAD NOTHING TO SAY ABOUT SS-20'S IN SIBERIA.
INSTEAD, HE ASSERTED THAT JAPAN HAS NO GROUNDS
WHATSOEVER FOR REFERRING TO A THREAT FROM THE
SOVIET UNION AND COMPLAINED THAT JAPAN CONTINUES TO
REJECT SOVIET PROPOSALS ON MEASURES FOR FOSTERING
MUTUAL TRUST. PAVLOV SAID THE SOVIET UNION COULD
NOT OVERLOOK THE FACT THAT JAPAN HAD DISCUSSED THE
SOVIET UNION WITH BOTH THE US AND THE ROK. HE
CLAIMED JAPAN WAS BECOMING MORE EMBROILED IN US
STRATEGY, AS SHOWN BY GOJ CONCURRENCE WITH THE
DEPLOYMENT OF F-16'S TO MISAWA. HE ALSO SAID THE
USSR HAS NO INTENTION TO USE NUCLEAR FORCE FIRST,
BUT MUST BE PREPARED TO DEFEND ITSELF IN ASIA AND ELSE-
WHERE. TAKANO SAID THE VICE MINISTER MADE CLEAR THAT
NONE OF PAVLOV'S COMMENTS ANSWERED GOJ CONCERNS, AND
PAVLOV UNDERTOOK TO CONVEY THE MESSAGE TO MOSCOW.

11. COMMENT: THE REPRESENTATION BY NAKAJIMA CONTAINS
SOME OF THE STRONGEST AND LEAST EQUIVOCAL LANGUAGE THE
SOVIETS HAVE HEARD FROM THE JAPANESE FOR SOME TIME.
IT REPRESENTS NOT SO MUCH A TOUGHENING OF THE GOJ
STANCE TOWARD THE USSR AS AN INEVITABLE JAPANESE
REACTION TO A SERIES OF EXCEPTIONALLY CRUDE AND
BLATANT ANTI-JAPANESE STATEMENTS FROM THE SOVIET SIDE.
WHILE THERE HAS BEEN OFFICIAL JAPANESE CONCERN SINCE
THE INCEPTION OF THE INF PROCESS OVER THE POTENTIAL
THREAT TO THEMSELVES SHOULD AN EVENTUAL INF AGREEMENT
BE CONCLUDED WITHOUT GLOBAL RESTRAINTS ON SS-20'S,
GROMYKO'S AND ANDROPOV'S REMARKS HAVE NOW MADE THE
THREAT SEEM MORE IMMINENT THAN POTENTIAL, AND HAVE

BROUGHT THE PROBLEM TO THE ATTENTION OF THE JAPANESE
PUBLIC. ONE CAN ONLY ASSUME -- AS THE FOREIGN MINISTRY
HAS -- THAT GROMYKO AND ANDROPOV HAD THEIR ATTENTION
FOCUSED VERY FAR FROM JAPAN AT THE TIME. HOWEVER,
THAT DOES NOT EXPLAIN THE CRUDE ATTEMPT TO CAPITALIZE
ON JAPANESE NUCLEAR SENSITIVITY WITH THE THREAT THAT
JAPAN COULD BECOME A TARGET OF SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 TOKYO 01609

CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PARM, MNUC, JA, KS, UR, US
SUBJECT: JAPAN PROTESTS SOVIET STATEMENTS: ON SS-20
IT IN FACT AROUSED MORE IRE THAN FEAR -- THE JAPANESE
UNDERSTANDABLY REACT MORE STRONGLY THAN MOST
TO THE SPECTACLE OF A NUCLEAR-WEAPONS STATE THREATENING
A NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPONS STATE WITH NUCLEAR HOLOCAUST.
AS FAR AS WE CAN RECALL, THE SOVIETS HAVEN'T MADE THIS
PARTICULAR THREAT TO THE JAPANESE SINCE KHRUSHCHEV.
THE PERSONAL ATTACKS ON THE PRIME MINISTER AND ON HIS
TRAVELS TO THE ROK AND TO THE US SIMPLY ADDED INSULT
TO INJURY. THE GOJ IS GENERALLY RESTRAINED IN ITS
RESPONSES TO SOVIET PROPAGANDA, NOT WISHING TO STRAIN
RELATIONS UNNECESSARILY AND RESIGNED TO THE FUTILITY
OF DEBATING WITH THE SOVIETS OVER PRESS ATTACKS. SOVIET
PROPAGANDISTS HAVE THEREFORE OUTDONE THEMSELVES IN
MOUNTING AN ATTACK SIMULTANEOUSLY ON TWO OF THE VERY
FEW ISSUES THAT SIMPLY COULD NOT FAIL TO PRODUCE A
VIGOROUS JAPANESE RESPONSE. TAKANO COMMENTED THAT
"THE SOVIETS SIMPLY DO NOT WANT GOOD RELATIONS WITH
THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN AT THIS TIME." END COMMENT.
MANSFIELD
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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

*File USSR/Asia-Pacific 45*SITUATION ROOM CHECKLIST

February 26, 1985

~~SECRET~~Countering Soviet Attempts to Penetrate the South Pacific

Embassy Suva reports the Soviet Union is exploiting fisheries issues -- our weakest point -- to gain a foothold in the South Pacific. The USSR has selected two of the most economically vulnerable island states as targets.

- o The Soviets are particularly exploiting the islanders' resentment over the unrestrained activities of the U.S. fishing fleet in the Pacific.

The Soviet effort comes at a time when our two traditional allies, Kiribati and Tuvalu, are redefining their security relationships with the U.S. British retrenchment in economic assistance has created an atmosphere of quiet desperation.

- o While the embassy believes President Tabai of Kiribati would prefer licenses for fishing boats be sold to U.S., Japanese or Korean tuna boats, he will not jeopardize his nation's economic future by refusing a Soviet offer in the absence of assurances that U.S. boats will buy licenses.

The embassy suggests we give high priority to early conclusion of the regional fisheries agreement. It also recommends that consideration be given to arranging high level briefings for the U.S. industry and interested members of Congress on the Soviet efforts, to try to obtain industry cooperation in avoiding confrontations while regional negotiations continue.

- o The embassy also believes that by funding a portion of Fiji's bilateral program out of what will be seen as regional monies, we will put one of our closest and most anti-Soviet regional allies in an awkward position with respect to its neighbors.
- o Moreover, when leaders realize that Mara's visit to the White House cost them money, it will not enhance his influence as a regional leader.

~~SECRET~~

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According to the embassy, only a commitment of additional resources to the region, combined with active diplomacy aimed at both thwarting the Soviet initiative and blunting the impact of New Zealand's decision to ban U.S. warships, can protect the U.S. position. (S)

Suva 735, PSN 2079

~~SECRET~~

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IN APRIL 1987

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