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JET 4/25/2005

File Folder USSR-CBM (CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES) BOX
21

FOIA

F06-114/6

Box Number 21

YARHI-MILO

2112

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8964	MEMO	CLARK TO SHULTZ AND WEINBERGER RE TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR US-USSR JOINT MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS LINK R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6	1	7/26/1983	B1
8965	MEMO	LINHARD/KRAEMER TO CLARK RE TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE US-USSR JOINT MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS LINK R 3/19/2013 F2006-114/6	1	7/18/1983	B1
8966	MEMO	POINDEXTER RE TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE U.S.-USSR JOINT MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS LINK	5	7/8/1983	B1
8967	MEMO	LINHARD/KRAEMER TO CLARK RE CBM DISCUSSIONS IN MOSCOW R 3/19/2013 F2006-114/6	1	6/24/1983	B1
8968	CABLE	240236Z JUN 83 R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6	2	6/24/1983	B1
8969	CABLE	RESPONSE TO DOBRYNIN'S QUESTIONS ON MX AND CBMS R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6	7	12/2/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SYSTEM II
90855

FYI

July 26, 1983

~~Leuczowski~~

COBB

F.6
CBMs


MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
The Secretary of State

THE HONORABLE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER
The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: Terms of Reference for the US-USSR Joint
Military Communications Link (JMCL) (C)

The terms of reference for the US-USSR JMCL that you have developed, and which were provided for review by the Secretary of Defense on July 8th, are approved. (C)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:



William P. Clark

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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DECLASSIFIED
NLS F06-114/6#8964
BY LOT NARA, DATE 12/13/07

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~~SECRET~~

SYSTEM II
90855

mu 2

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

July 18, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: BOB LINHARD ^{by} SVEN KRAEMER ^{SK}

SIGNED

SUBJECT: Terms of Reference for the US-USSR Joint
Military Communications Link

On February 9th you directed the Departments of Defense and State to develop detailed procedures for the control and employment of the proposed US-USSR Joint Military Communications Link (JMCL). The JMCL was one of the four new confidence building measures endorsed by the President on May 24th. At Tab A you will find, for your approval, terms of reference that would govern the operation of the JMCL. These terms of reference would also serve as a guideline in preparing the U.S. text of a draft JMCL agreement, assuming the Soviets accepted the JMCL concept. We intend to discuss this concept with the Soviets in Moscow on August 9th and 10th.

The terms of reference have been agreed to by the Departments of State, Defense, and Energy and by ACDA and the CIA.

We would recommend approval of these terms of reference at this time. If you agree, the memo at Tab I notifies the Secretaries of State and Defense that the terms of reference have been accepted and approved as written.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the terms of reference at Tab A and notify the Departments of State and Defense using the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve ✓

Disapprove _____

Concurrence: Rm Ron Lehman

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Secretaries of State and Defense (U)
A Terms of Reference for US-USSR JMCL (S)

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/16 #8965

BY RW NARA DATE 3/11/13

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SYSTEM II
90795

CBM 8
~~Matlock~~
File

MEMORANDUM
~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

June 24, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: BOB LINHARD / SVEN KRAEMER

SUBJECT: CBM Discussions in Moscow

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FOL-114/6 #8967

BY RW NARA DATE 3/19/13

Attached at Tab A is a message reporting on a demarche made on June 22nd by Richard Burt. It offered the Soviets the opportunity to begin discussions leading to negotiations on CBMs relating to communications improvements (i.e., hotline improvements, joint military communications link, better data capability to Embassies in Moscow and Washington). Burt suggested that the initial exchange on these subjects take place in Moscow on July 7th and 8th.

This report of the demarche to the Soviets on this subject caught us at the NSC Staff completely off-guard. We were not offered the opportunity to coordinate on the contents of the demarche before it was made. We have complained about this to both Defense and State and have asked for the immediate development of terms of reference for the proposed conversations in Moscow and for the drafting of a set of instructions to guide the conduct of the US representatives involved. The CBM working group is now developing a set of draft instructions. They will be available for review by the middle of next week and should form the basis for any US/Soviet discussion.

State and Defense currently plan to have Ambassador Hartman begin the discussion supported by the following individuals from Washington:

-- OSD: Bill Hoehn and Sally Horn

-- State: Stuart Branch plus one (PM) and Craig Dunkerley (EUR).
(State representatives are unknown to Kraemer and Linhard.)*

State has not yet informed the Soviets of the composition of the U.S. team. Nor have we received from the Soviets a formal response to the proposal to begin discussions on July 7th and 8th. Once we have received additional feed back from the Soviets, we may wish to adjust the size, composition, or level of the U.S. Delegation. However, we feel that it would be very useful to have Linhard (who has been actively working this issue) attend the initial discussions in Moscow.

RECOMMENDATION

That we ensure a formal review of instructions for these discussions prior to permitting them to occur and that we consider adding an NSC representative (Bob Linhard) to the U.S. Delegation for this meeting.

Approve RCM

Disapprove _____

Concurrence: Jack Matlock. Ron Lehman is unavailable.

Attachment: Message Reporting on Demarche

* Jack Matlock tells us
Stu Branch is head of the
Office of Communications
at State - a good man
with Moscow experience.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 5654
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DTG: 240236Z JUN 83 PSN: 015479
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INFO USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 3666

~~S E C R E T~~ STATE 175654

EXDIS GENEVA FOR USSTART/USINF
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, US, UR
SUBJECT: U.S. PROPOSAL FOR DISCUSSIONS IN MOSCOW ON
COMMUNICATIONS IMPROVEMENTS CBMS

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. DURING JUNE 22 MEETING WITH SOVIET EMBASSY MINISTER
COUNSELOR OLEG SOKOLOV, EUR ASSISTANT SECRETARY RICHARD
9URT MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS (WHICH WERE SUBSEQUENTLY
HANDLED OVER AS A NON-PAPER). BEGIN TEXT:

-- THE PRESIDENT HAS OFFICIALLY ENDORSED THE VARIOUS
C3MS PROPOSALS SET FORTH IN THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE'S
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS OF LAST APRIL.

-- AS EXPLAINED IN THE APRIL 7 MEETING BETWEEN
AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN AND SECRETARIES SHULTZ AND
WEINBERGER, THREE OF THESE PROPOSED MEASURES INVOLVE
U.S.-SOVIET COMMUNICATIONS IMPROVEMENTS -- SPECIFICALLY,
THE TECHNICAL UPGRADING OF THE DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS LINK
(OR HOTLINE); IMPROVED COMMUNICATIONS AT OUR RESPECTIVE
EMBASSIES IN MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON; AND THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF A JOINT MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS LINK.

-- IN CONVEYING THE SOVIET RESPONSE TO THAT ORIGINAL
PRESENTATION, AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN EXPRESSED AN INTEREST
IN DISCUSSIONS ON THE HOTLINE, BUT ALSO A GENERAL
WILLINGNESS TO HEAR US OUT FURTHER ON OTHER MEASURES.
THUS, WE WOULD LIKE TO PRESENT OUR THINKING IN GREATER
DETAIL ON THE DESIRABILITY AND FEASIBILITY OF THESE THREE
MEASURES. AT SAME TIME, WE WOULD WISH TO HEAR SOVIET
IDEAS IN REGARDS THIS GENERAL QUESTION OF U.S.-SOVIET
COMMUNICATIONS IMPROVEMENTS.

-- AS NOTED AT THE APRIL 18 MEETING IN THE
SECRETARY'S OFFICE, WE HOPE FOR THAT PURPOSE TO SEND OUT
SENIOR REPRESENTATIVES FROM BOTH THE STATE AND DEFENSE
DEPARTMENTS TO JOIN AMBASSADOR HARTMAN IN MOSCOW TO MAKE
SUCH A PRESENTATION IN EARLY JULY.

-- WE WOULD SEE THIS OCCASION AS A CHANCE FOR A
GENERAL DISCUSSION OF POSSIBLE U.S.-SOVIET COMMUNICATIONS
IMPROVEMENTS. WE WOULD HOPE AS WELL THAT THROUGH SUCH A

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NLS FOI 7/14/6 #8968

BY 101 NARA, DATE 12/13/07

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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TELEGRAM

PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 5654

DTG: 240236Z JUN 83 PSN: 015479

SESSION, WE COULD SET UP DATES AND VENUE FOR MORE THOROUGH FOLLOW-ON DISCUSSIONS OF OUR RESPECTIVE IDEAS. THESE SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSIONS COULD INCLUDE THE NEGOTIATION OF THE SPECIFIC DETAILS OF THOSE PROPOSALS WHICH WE COULD AGREE MIGHT BE RIPE FOR IMPLEMENTATION.

-- WE PROPOSE THAT THIS INITIAL EXCHANGE TAKE PLACE IN MOSCOW ON JULY 7 AND 8.

-- WE BELIEVE THAT TAKEN TOGETHER, THESE MEASURES WOULD BE USEFUL STEPS TOWARDS REDUCING THE DANGERS OF MISCALCULATION AND MISINTERPRETATION BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. AS SUCH, THEY ARE AN IMPORTANT COMPLEMENT TO OUR CONTINUING EFFORTS IN START AND INF TO REDUCE THE THREAT OF WAR THROUGH REDUCTIONS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

-- WE LOOK FORWARD TO A PROMPT AND POSITIVE RESPONSE ON YOUR PART AND TO PRODUCTIVE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE U. S. AND SOVIET UNION IN THIS AREA.

END TEXT.

3. SOKOLOV PROMISED TO CONVEY THE U. S. PROPOSAL IMMEDIATELY BACK TO MOSCOW. HE OFFERED THE OPINION THAT WHILE MOSCOW HAD ALREADY EXPRESSED INTEREST IN DISCUSSING HOTLINE IMPROVEMENTS, IT WAS UNLIKELY THE SOVIET POSITION ON THE OTHER TWO CBMS (THE JMCL AND EMBASSY COMMUNICATIONS IMPROVEMENTS) WOULD CHANGE. BURT NOTED THAT THE U. S. RECOGNIZED THE EARLIER SOVIET RESPONSE, BUT NONETHELESS WISHED TO OFFER OUR THOUGHTS AND IDEAS ON THIS GENERAL

SUBJECT. BURT STRESSED THAT IN PROPOSING THE MOSCOW MEETING, WE SOUGHT NOT THE BEGINNING OF FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS, BUT RATHER AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS.

4. BURT ADDED THAT GIVEN THE DIFFERENT SUBJECT MATTER, WE DID NOT PLAN TO RAISE THE OTHER U. S. CBMS PROPOSAL OF A MULTILATERAL CONVENTION ON NUCLEAR TERRORISM AT THE PROPOSED MOSCOW MEETING, BUT RATHER HOPED TO BE ABLE TO PRESENT SPECIFIC THOUGHTS ON THIS MEASURE WITHIN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS. SOKOLOV EXPRESSED INTEREST IN ANY SUCH PRESENTATION, NOTING THAT UNLIKE THE HOTLINE, A CONVENTION ON NUCLEAR TERRORISM WOULD APPEAR TO BE BREAKING NEW GROUND. FOR THAT REASON, HE WENT ON, THE SOVIET UNION WAS INTERESTED IN LEARNING PRECISELY WHAT THE U. S. WAS INTENDING WITH SUCH AN AGREEMENT.

5. BURT NOTED THAT BECAUSE OF TIGHT SCHEDULING PROBLEMS FOR WASHINGTON PARTICIPANTS, WE HOPED THE SOVIET UNION COULD GIVE AN EARLY ANSWER AGREEING TO THE PROPOSED JULY 7-8 DATES. SOKOLOV AGAIN PROMISED TO REPORT THIS IMMEDIATELY TO MOSCOW.

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BT

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WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

B

S/S #

RECEIVED

82 DEC 10 P 4: 34

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

MESSAGE NO. 206 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ No. Pages 6
FROM: APAdams S/S 28448 7224
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Telegram to Moscow: Response to Dobrynin's
Questions on MX and CBMs

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
NSC	Mike Wheeler	395-3044	

FOR: CLEARANCE ☒ INFORMATION ☐ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS: CLEARANCE PLEASE BY CAB 12/11

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Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By smf NARA, Date 6/10/02

S/S Officer: A

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RETURN TIME-STAMPED COVERSHEET TO S/S.

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FOI-11416#8969

BY

LOT

NARA, DATE

12/13/07

Please see
Additional
Clearances under
separate page.

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12/02/82 EXT. 21671
P:LSEAGLEBURGER

EUR: MPALMER S/S: LEBRENER III
EUR: RBLACKWILL
START: EROWNY
DOB/OSD: ASHULSKY

EUR/SOV: TMSIMONS, JR.
PMTIDEAN
ACDA: RGREY
NSC: SKRAEMER

IMMEDIATE MOSCOM

IMMEDIATE SECRETARY

NOBIS
FOR THE AMBASSADOR

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PARM, UR, US

SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO DOBRYNIN'S QUESTIONS ON
MX AND CBMS

REF: STATE 330407

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. IN HIS NOVEMBER 23 LUNCHEON MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY, AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN RAISED SEVERAL QUESTIONS AS TO THE MX DEPLOYMENT DECISION AND CBMS PROPOSALS OF THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH OF THE PREVIOUS DAY. THE SECRETARY PROMISED HE WOULD BE MAKING A FORMAL REPLY. (REFTEL) IN A SUBSEQUENT MEETING WITH EUR DAS MARK PALMER, SOVIET EMBASSY MINISTER COUNSELOR OLEG SOKOLOV, WORKING FROM TALKING POINTS APPARENTLY PREPARED BY THE EMBASSY FOR DOBRYNIN'S USE WITH THE SECRETARY, CLARIFIED AND AMPLIFIED THESE QUESTIONS.

3. THE QUESTIONS FOLLOW BASICALLY PREDICTABLE LINES IN REGARDS THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE MX CSB DEPLOYMENT TO PREVIOUS SALT PROVISIONS ON FIXED LAUNCHERS, THE MX CANISTER-LAUNCHER RATIONALE, THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ABM

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TREATY AND FUTURE DEPLOYMENTS, AND U.S. THINKING BEHIND THE ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY EXERCISES CBM. WE HAVE PREPARED THE FOLLOWING RESPONSES WHICH, AS YOU WILL NOTE, HAVE ALREADY BEEN USED IN PART BY USG SPOKESMEN.

4. OUR ANSWERS SHOULD THUS COME AS NO SURPRISE TO THE SOVIETS. MOREOVER, WE DO NOT WISH TO GET INTO A DEBATE OVER MX AND CBM SPECIFICS OUTSIDE OF GENEVA. NEVERTHELESS, WE BELIEVE IT MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE AND USEFUL FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF STRENGTHENING AMEMBASSY MOSCOW'S ACCESS IF YOU WERE TO DELIVER THESE ORAL REPLIES TO FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO OR ONE OF HIS SENIOR DEPUTIES. ANY SUCH CALL COULD BE EXPLICITLY TIED TO DOBRYNIN'S MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY WHERE HE RAISED THE QUESTIONS. IT WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH THE SECRETARY'S COMMENTS TO DOBRYNIN ON THAT OCCASION THAT YOU SHOULD BE AFFORDED MORE REGULAR AND WIDER ACCESS TO SENIOR OFFICIALS AND THE LEADERSHIP. (SHORTLY SUBSEQUENT TO YOUR CALL, WE WOULD OF COURSE PROVIDE THE SAME RESPONSES TO THE EMBASSY WORKING LEVEL HERE IN WASHINGTON).

5. DOBRYNIN'S QUESTIONS AND THE ANSWERS YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO DELIVER ORALLY FOLLOW. WE WILL LEAVE TO YOUR BEST JUDGMENT THE PRECISE LEVEL AND TIMING OF GIVING THESE RESPONSES TO THE MFA.

6. BEGIN TEXT:

DOBRYNIN QUESTIONS

Q: HOW CAN THE MX DEPLOYMENT IN SUPER-HARDENED SILOS BE CONSISTENT WITH THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENTS HE WILL REFRAIN FROM ACTIONS WHICH WOULD UNDERCUT EXISTING ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS?

A:-- THE MX CSB PROGRAM IS FULLY CONSISTENT WITH THE PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCED POLICY OF TAKING NO ACTION WHICH WOULD UNDERCUT EXISTING ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS SO LONG AS THE SOVIET UNION SHOWS EQUAL RESTRAINT.

-- THE MX CSB SYSTEM WILL NOT UNDERCUT THE LETTER OR THE SPIRIT OF EXISTING ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS IN ANY RESPECT. MX AND ITS PLANNED DEPLOYMENT ARE FULLY CONSISTENT WITH SALT II'S QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE MISSILE LIMITS. THE RELEVANT NUMERICAL LIMITS WHICH AFFECT MX ARE THE FRACTIONATION LIMIT OF 10 WARHEADS ON A

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NEW TYPE OF ICBM, AND THE LIMITS OF 1200 AND 820 ON LAUNCHERS OF MIRVED BALLISTIC MISSILES AND MIRVED ICBMS RESPECTIVELY. THE MX MISSILE WILL NOT BE TESTED OR DEPLOYED WITH MORE THAN 10 WARHEADS. NOR WILL THE DEPLOYMENT OF MX PREVENT US FROM MEETING THE MIRV LIMITS OF SALT II SINCE OLDER AND LESS CAPABLE SYSTEMS CAN BE RETIRED TO ENSURE THAT WE DO NOT EXCEED THE CEILINGS. IN ADDITION, THE CSB DEPLOYMENT OF 100 MX CANISTERS IN 100 SILOS WILL BE READILY VERIFIABLE.

Q: MORE SPECIFICALLY, HOW CAN CSB BE CONSISTENT WITH SALT I AND II PROHIBITIONS AGAINST THE CONSTRUCTION OF NEW FIXED ICBM LAUNCHERS OR THE RELOCATION OF EXISTING FIXED LAUNCHERS?

A:-- MX CSB IS IN NO WAY CONTRADICTORY TO THE PROVISIONS OF THOSE AGREEMENTS CONCERNING FIXED LAUNCHERS.

-- THE CSB SYSTEM DOES NOT INVOLVE FIXED LAUNCHERS AS SET FORTH IN SALT. THE LAUNCHER FOR THE MX MISSILE IN THE CSB SYSTEM WILL BE A CANISTER SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED TO BE CAPABLE OF BEING TRANSPORTED FROM ONE VERTICAL SHELTER TO ANOTHER. THE VERTICAL SHELTER, THOUGH FIXED, IS NOT A LAUNCHER; THE TRANSPORTABLE CANISTER ITSELF CONTAINS ALL THE EQUIPMENT NEEDED TO LAUNCH THE MISSILE. AS IN THE CASE WITH THE NPS SYSTEM FOR THE MX, SUCH A TRANSPORTABLE LAUNCH CANISTER IS NOT A FIXED LAUNCHER FOR SALT PURPOSES.

{IF ASKED FURTHER ON THE RELATIONSHIP OF SHELTER AND LAUNCH CANISTER}

-- WHILE IN THE OPERATIONAL CONCEPT OF CSB, THE MX WOULD BE LAUNCHED FROM OUT OF THE CSB SILO, THE SILO ITSELF IS NOT THE MX LAUNCHER. THE CANISTER, CONTAINING ALL THE SUPPORT EQUIPMENT NECESSARY TO LAUNCH THE MISSILE, IS THE MX LAUNCHER. SINCE THE SILO DOES NOT CONTAIN THE LAUNCH EQUIPMENT, IT CANNOT LAUNCH THE MISSILE. THE SILO SERVES ONLY TO HOLD THE CANISTER AND PROVIDES THE PROTECTION NECESSARY TO SURVIVE ATTACK. IN FACT, EARLY TEST FLIGHTS OF THE MX WILL BE CONDUCTED FROM AN ABOVEGROUND CANISTER.

{IF DEFENSE MINISTER USTINOV'S CHARGES OF DECEMBER 6 THAT MX VIOLATES THESE ACCORDS ARE SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED}

-- WE REJECT MINISTER USTINOV'S ASSERTIONS AND REGRET HIS

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IMMODERATE LANGUAGE. WE PARTICULARLY REJECT HIS CHARGES THAT THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE MX MISSILE REPRESENTS A "CHALLENGE" TO THE SOVIET UNION. IN FACT, DEPLOYMENT OF THE MX MISSILE IS A MEASURED US RESPONSE TO THE MASSIVE SOVIET EXPANSION OF ITS ICBM CAPABILITIES DURING THE 1970'S. WE DO NOT BELIEVE HIS COMMENTS WERE A CONTRIBUTION TO FURTHERING CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

Q: HOW DOES THE STATEMENT IN THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO CONGRESSMEN ON MX THAT HE IS PREPARED TO CONSIDER BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE (BMD) FOR THE MX IF THE SOVIET MILITARY BUILD-UP CONTINUES AGREE WITH THE WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT ON MX THAT IT DOES NOT ENDANGER THE ABM TREATY AND THE EARLIER POLICY STATEMENT OF REFRAINING FROM UNDERCUTTING EXISTING AGREEMENTS?

A:-- WE BELIEVE THAT MX CSB -- WITHOUT BMD -- IS AN EFFECTIVE MEANS OF GUARANTEEING U.S. RETALIATORY CAPABILITY IN THE EVENT OF AN ATTACK ON OUR STRATEGIC FORCES. SHOULD TECHNOLOGIES BE DEVELOPED THAT ARE POTENTIALLY THREATENING TO CSB, THERE ARE A NUMBER OF OPTIONS WHICH WOULD BE COMPATIBLE WITH THE SYSTEM WHICH COULD COUNTER THESE THREATS. BMD IS ONE OF THESE OPTIONS.

{IF USTINOV'S ASSERTION THAT THE ABM TREATY PROHIBITS THE RELOCATION OF OUR DESIGNATED BMD SITE FROM GRAND FORKS TO ANOTHER DEPLOYMENT AREA IS REPEATED}

-- NO. THE ABM TREATY PROTOCOL DEFINES CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH A BMD SITE COULD BE RELOCATED FROM AN ICBM FIELD TO THE NATIONAL CAPITAL AND VICE VERSA. IT DOES NOT PROHIBIT RELOCATION OF A BMD SITE FROM ONE ICBM DEPLOYMENT AREA TO ANOTHER.

Q: THE PRESIDENT HAS STATED THAT IF NO AGREEMENT ON START CAN BE REACHED AND IF THE SOVIET UNION DEVELOPS "MORE POWERFUL AND DEADLY WEAPONS," HE WILL BE PREPARED TO ADD ON TO HIS INITIAL DEPLOYMENT OF 100 MX MISSILES. CAN YOU BE MORE SPECIFIC AS TO THESE CONDITIONS FOR MORE THAN 100 MX'S?

A:-- WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT IT IS USEFUL TO SPECULATE IN ANY GREATER DETAIL ABOUT HYPOTHETICAL SITUATIONS AND POSSIBLE U.S. RESPONSES.

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-- WE THINK THAT A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE START AGREEMENT ACHIEVING SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS LEVELS WOULD CLEARLY BE IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF BOTH NATIONS.

-- IT IS EQUALLY CLEAR THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT ON REDUCTIONS, A CONTINUATION OF THE SOVIET UNION'S MAJOR MILITARY BUILD-UP WILL HAVE A SIGNIFICANT EFFECT ON OUR OWN DEFENSE PLANNING.

Q: AMONG THE CBMS THE PRESIDENT PROPOSED WAS THE ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF MILITARY EXERCISES. WHAT KIND WOULD THIS INVOLVE? TYPES SUCH AS GLOBAL SHIELD? THOSE THAT ARE ALREADY COVERED UNDER THE HELSINKI AGREEMENTS? WHERE WILL THESE BE NEGOTIATED?

A:-- THE PURPOSE OF THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL IS TO REDUCE THE DANGER OF MISINTERPRETING AN EXERCISE AS THE PREPARATION FOR AN ACTUAL USE OF FORCE. THUS, THE EXERCISES WHICH WE WOULD INCLUDE IN THIS PROPOSAL WOULD BE THOSE LARGE ENOUGH TO BE SEEN AS POTENTIALLY THREATENING BY THE OTHER SIDE. THE SPECIFIC SOVIET AND AMERICAN EXERCISES TO BE NOTIFIED WILL BE DETERMINED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

-- AN EXAMPLE OF SUCH AN EXERCISE WHICH MIGHT BE NOTIFIED BY THE AMERICAN SIDE WOULD BE GLOBAL SHIELD.

-- MAJOR MANEUVERS ALREADY COVERED UNDER THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT WOULD CONTINUE TO BE NOTIFIED UNDER THOSE PROCEDURES ALTHOUGH IT IS NOT IMPOSSIBLE THAT THIS MIGHT OVERLAP UNDER SOME CIRCUMSTANCES.

-- AS YOU ARE AWARE, OUR NEGOTIATORS HAVE FORMALLY RAISED THESE VARIOUS CBM PROPOSALS DURING THE MOST RECENT ROUNDS OF THE START AND INF TALKS IN GENEVA. WE SEE CBMS AS AN ISSUE ON WHICH US-SOVIET COOPERATION MIGHT BE POSSIBLE IN THE NEAR-TERM, RESULTING IN A PROMPT AND SEPARATE BILATERAL AGREEMENT.

{IF THE VARIOUS SOVIET CBM PROPOSALS OFFERED EARLIER IN START ARE RAISED}

-- AS AMBASSADOR ROMNY OF OUR START DELEGATION HAS NOTED IN HIS PLENARY STATEMENT OF NOVEMBER 30, WE BELIEVE THE SOVIET PROPOSAL ON NOTIFICATION OF ICBM

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LAUNCHES IS A GOOD BEGINNING, BUT DOES NOT GO FAR ENOUGH. IT SHOULD BE BROADENED TO INCLUDE ALL ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHES AS WE HAVE PROPOSED. AS FOR THE PROPOSED NOTIFICATION OF MASS TAKE-OFFS OF BOMBERS, WE BELIEVE THAT THE MUTUAL CONCERNS OF BOTH COUNTRIES IN THIS REGARD MIGHT BE BETTER ADDRESSED IN OUR PROPOSAL FOR THE NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY EXERCISES.

-- WE CANNOT, HOWEVER, ACCEPT THE OTHER SOVIET PROPOSALS PROHIBITING THE FLIGHTS OF HEAVY BOMBERS OR MOVEMENTS OF AIRCRAFT CARRIERS IN DESIGNATED ZONES OR ESTABLISHING SPECIFIC SSBM SANCTUARIES. SUCH MEASURES WOULD LIMIT IN AN UNACCEPTABLE WAY RIGHTS OF NAVIGATION AND OVERFLIGHT RECOGNIZED BY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SEVERELY RESTRICT THE OPERATING AREAS OF US FORCES IN SUPPORT OF OUR NATIONAL DEFENSE INTERESTS AND THOSE OF OUR ALLIES. END TEXT.44

C.451 ~~SECRET~~

18
EUR/SOV:CGDUNKERLEY
12/2/82 x 21671
P:LSEagleburger

ADDITIONAL CLEARANCES

S/S:

S/S-O:TRandall