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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8997	MEMO	RAYMOND TO MCFARLANE RE CONFERENCE ON THE USSR [1 - 2] R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6	2	10/2/1984	B1
8998	MEMO	CONFERENCE ON THE USSR [3 - 9] R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6	7	10/2/1984	B1
8999	MEMO	LINHARD/LEHMAN/KRAEMER TO MCFARLANE RE TOR FOR ARMS CONTROL WORK [15 - 15] R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6	1	ND	B1
9000	MEMO	TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR UPCOMING WORK PROGRAM [16 - 17] R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6	2	ND	B1

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~~Matlock~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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October 2, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: WALTER RAYMOND, JR. *WR*

SUBJECT: Conference on the USSR

File
USSR - Conference
(Sakharov Inst)

I attended a two day conference on the USSR, sponsored by the Andrei Sakharov Institute from 14-15 September at Hoover in California. The subject of the conference was "How to open the closed society". The participants included 11 recent Soviet emigres and approximately the same number of American academics and officials. Vladimir Bukovsky served as the principal spokesman for the Sakharov Institute. Panels were chaired by Charles Wolf of Rand, Dick Pipes of Harvard, Bob Conquest of Hoover and Herb Ellison, Director of the Kennan Institute in Washington. I have attached to this memorandum a summary of the conference.

Several key points emerged from the conference. Bukovsky underscored that whatever program was developed it should involve Americans, Soviet emigres in the US and the peoples of the USSR in a joint effort to help promote democratization. He commented that changes in the Soviet bloc have not yet represented democratization. Polish Solidarity, Hungarian private markets and the Soviet second economy operate outside of the system. The Soviet emigres at the conference were exploring ways in which to initiate systemic changes. Bukovsky and others made the point that a key element was the creation of independent public opinion within the USSR. This should be sought outside of any "official exchanges", but should be built via a tissue of contacts and arrangements that are not subject to regime control and are independent. This calls for support to Soviet dissidents in the West, the reproduction of more samizdat and infiltration back in, the increase of direct contact with the USSR, the infiltration of cassettes, tapes, VTRs etc--i.e. all steps designed to break the information/propaganda monopoly the Soviets exercise over their own people. A breakdown of the information monopoly increases pressures within for change. Such change might first focus on ways to improve the system; later it would represent a direct challenge to the system itself.

Several Soviets highlighted that Western information flow can not be solely negative--i.e. what is wrong with the system--it must also show them a way to the future. Ex: Describe the use and virtues of free trade unions and private enterprise.

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A number of themes were developed during the course of the conference, particularly focussed on breaking the information monopoly, but also considering the impact of nationalities issues, the growth of a large second economy--operating parallel to, but outside of the state-controlled system. (In some sections of Central Asia the second economy yields more than 50% of the production.) All participants recognized that the rich collection of Soviet emigres now in the West had been under utilized as a source of information and as a vehicle to communicate to and open up the USSR.

While the program ideas transcend what can be done by the Sakharov Institute, the directors of the Institute will draw together some of the better plans discussed and submit them in a major project proposal for the National Endowment for Democracy to consider at its December board meeting. I will include the points raised at the conference in the deliberations of the interagency Soviet Political Action Working Group, which I chair, to see what programs should be pursued by the USG. It was a worthwhile session.

Attachment

Tab I Conference summary

cc: Matlock
Sestanovich
Lenczowski

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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October 2, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conference on the USSR

A two day conference on the Soviet Union, sponsored by the Andrei Sakharov Institute took place from 14-15 September at the Hoover Institution in California. The subject of the conference was "How to open the closed society". The participants included 11 recent Soviet emigres and approximately the same number of American academics and officials. Vladimir Bukovsky served as the principal spokesman for the Sakharov Institute. Panels were chaired by Charles Wolf of Rand, Dick Pipes of Harvard, Bob Conquest of Hoover and Herb Ellison, Director of the Kennan Institute in Washington.

Bukovsky set the tone for the conference. In his opening remarks he said our goal would be to develop a joint program involving the United States, the Soviet peoples and Soviet emigres to help promote democratization in the USSR. Bukovsky said in his judgement traditional democratic institutions, such as parties, labor and the judiciary can not be free within the Soviet system. For example Polish Solidarity does not reflect a democratization of Poland; Solidarity is an alternative power center. The system has not changed. Similarly, in Hungary private enterprise exists, but it exists outside the system; it is tolerated but does not reflect systematic change. This led Bukovsky to raise the rhetorical question: when does the tolerance of activities outside the system change the system?

In Bukovsky's judgement, democratization can start only with the appearance of independent public opinion. It is important for the West to recognize and assist underground writers and other groups to resist the regime. The West, particularly private elements representing the "people", should help provide a surrogate free press. Western public opinion is very important in the absence of internal public opinion. In this context the radios are vital. But he added we must also sponsor interest groups and help families of prisoners. He regretted that Western support tends to be through the medium of "regime identified" exchanges. To reopen a closed communist society we must go beyond the official exchange programs and provide direct assistance to the "private sector." We can stimulate internal activity by infiltrating cassettes, tapes, typewriters, VCRs, etc. In summary we must develop an independent public opinion by feeding it with material, we must stimulate resistance through the flow of ideas, we must reopen these countries and foster economic change.

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Charles Wolf of Rand Corporation tried his hand at defining the basic purposes of the meeting and the program.

-- To improve information and understanding of how things work in the USSR from the many sources that are now available in the West.

-- To improve the circulation and access/availability of this information within the USSR.

-- To prepare positions and ideas on how to improve the situation inside--how to teach them, how to develop a positive program. In sum, how to create a program of democracy to be brought to the Soviet people.

I. Soviet Propaganda:

Lidiya Voronina of VOA spoke about Soviet internal propaganda. She underscored that we must counter Soviet internal propaganda effectively if we are to promote democratization. She traced the development of Marxist ideology from its initial role as a theology into what it is now; a means of control over the population. It is not a belief, it is a system of control. She described the existence of 13 layers of communication designed to deliver the message to the Soviet peoples. She underscored that for our policy to be effective we have to consider how the message can be delivered to the Soviet people. For example, she noted that President Reagan's military buildup was preempted by Moscow who used it to further exert their control over the Soviet people. We must develop a means to communicate that our military buildup has been directly related to a commitment to world peace. Further discussion highlighted the fact that we should try to break the propaganda link between the Soviet leadership and its people by selective communication and also by seeking to redefine key words and concepts which the Soviets have pre-empted, such as peace and security. The Soviet emigres felt that the regime was vulnerable if its information monopoly could be cracked.

Arkady Polishchuk, a Soviet journalist, struck me as an excellent resource who should communicate with a range of audiences in the United States and Europe. He demonstrated, with graphics, how effectively Soviet military propaganda is used to brainwash pre-school and first graders in the Soviet Union. The briefing pointed up the difficulty of our task as this information is unchallenged and tends to be translated into basic belief when poured into the minds of the 4-9 year olds. This thought control is intensified by the fact that in the Soviet Union the State plays a major direct role in the upbringing of children. Perhaps the key benefactor of the Soviet propaganda is the Soviet military man. The army, more than anything else, is placed on a pedestal as the guardian of

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peace. Children's books view the Soviet military role as benign and yet one of vigilance. Soviet soldiers are characterized as "planting trees and building houses." After 1981 Soviet magazines for children described Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan as "planting trees and building houses." Polishchuk thought there would be a vulnerability to the Soviets by broadcasting first hand experiences by Soviets captured in Afghanistan back to the Soviet people.

Yarim-Agaev commented on Soviet propaganda designed to exploit the intense fear of war. He did not think the regime could indefinitely keep people under this type of tension. Sooner or later if there is no war the people will stop believing the propaganda.

Edward Kuznetsov, a senior staff member at Radio Liberty and a former Gulag associate of Bukovsky, elaborated on ways to counter Soviet propaganda. He said a special group should watch every move by the Soviet propaganda machine with an eye to the appropriate response. He added that we must find a way to reach the Soviet citizens and produce information in a manner acceptable to them. He sounded a theme which other spokesman repeated throughout the conference; it is not enough to simply show the Soviet that they have a "bad life" without showing them a way to the future. One strategy is to ensure a much more significant flow of information, including books to the USSR. He stressed the need to create an ability to communicate directly with individuals within the USSR.

Richard Pipes of Harvard said that Soviet propagandists had been very effective in keeping peace and the issues of human rights and democracy separate. It is essential that our information programs to the Soviet Union uphold western values and be more broadly gauged than simply anti-communist. Bukovsky responded that peace and democracy should be inter-linked--peace should be viewed as an elemental part of democracy. The information program should make clear that the continued state of international tension and danger results from the absence of democracy in the USSR. In effect, it is the Soviet system that is the threat to world peace, not western democracy.

II. Market Relations as a Step to Democratization?

Yuri Yarim-Agaev presented a paper on the "development of market relations as a way to democratize the Soviet Union." He underscored the importance of the "second economy" both in terms of its contribution to overall economic activity in the USSR as well as to its continued existence as a form of activity operating outside of the system. Philosophically speaking Yarim-Agaev noted that any process that permits individual expression or action outside the system can provide a focus for dissatisfaction which could create an opposition.

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If those in dissatisfaction join others, it can serve as the basis for a movement. Yarim-Agaev noted that there have been moves toward institutional opposition within the Soviet bloc including religious groups, Helsinki Watch groups and Solidarity. In the Soviet Union there has been little evidence of labor opposition. Workers have not yet transposed their personal dissatisfaction into organized opposition. Workers are objectively underpaid but they still can moonlight. The worker gets a good salary for the low productivity of his work. While Yarim-Agaev noted that a study of real wages could yield interesting information, the second economy tends to permit the worker to meet his minimal needs. Strikes for higher salaries would result in workers being deprived of certain social benefits, higher prices, restricted access to apartments, etc. Therefore Yarim-Agaev does not see the elements present for labor unrest because laborers have found a way to meet their needs via the second economy outside the system. They can not safely crush the second economy without serious alienation. Yarim-Agaev acknowledged the Soviet labor would be vulnerable to outside radio broadcasts which could underscore the level of labor exploitation. Such broadcasts should provide information about western trade union experiences.

Leonid Khotin described his efforts to collate information concerning the Third Wave emigration as a source of information. His briefing confirmed a view that a large number of Third Wavers have important information which has not been exploited. In his detailed compilation and analysis of information about which a number of emigres have considerable knowledgeability, he highlighted several key areas:

- The role of the party at all levels.
- The role of financial institutions.
- Efforts to adopt western management techniques.
- Comparison of Soviet-Western management styles.
- Soviet market economy--free market practices in the USSR.

Khotin's efforts to inventory the Third Wave requires financial support. It is the best clearing house available in the private sector to permit us to identify and utilize the talents of the recent Soviet emigration.

Khotin also described a valuable compilation which he produces on the Soviet and East European emigre press. Such a compilation is helpful in judging what does exist and, if properly utilized, to provide a credible basis on which to select some of the best material already written by Soviet emigres for further distribution/circulation in the USSR. Khotin

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noted that there are a sufficient number of Soviet professionals in the emigration to facilitate research, in collaboration with Western scholars, covering almost any other Soviet discipline. In this manner Soviet emigres and Western scholars can produce material, which subsequently should be sent into the USSR, which would represent the basis for true dialogue with Soviet counterparts still in country.

John Moore of the Hoover Institution reflected on why the Soviets tolerate the second economy. He concluded that the market is tolerated to make the system work. He said that market relations which recognize the role of private property can lead to democracy, but this will not happen if the state controls the means of production. Economic freedom would threaten the leaders but the Soviets have given no indication of tolerating systematic change and without systematic change there will not be political change. Moore thought that more economic liberalization would be possible only if the economy deteriorates further. Clearly the essentials of economic freedom are in our interest and can only be carried out by restricting the exercise of centralized political power. His policy prescription was: maintain pressure on the USSR; do not provide cheap access to Western technology, and tell people of the virtues of a free economy.

Vladimir Bukovsky summarized this portion of the discussion as an examination of ways in which to begin a process--the activation of public opinion--which could ultimately lead to a democratization process. He noted that the second economy is forcing the regime to raise prices and this could cause consumers to be further alienated by the purchasing power as the ruble shrinks. Moore added that the Soviets are faced with the dilemma of how far to let the second economy extend into the system. If it is to push it back it will require repression and a consequent drop off in economic performance. Yarim-Agaev said the potential for increased tension between the market and the government could stimulate nascent labor union activity and/or a further expansion of the market sector. Such tension would initially be on a personal level which he felt was significant as it is at that level in which opposition to a totalitarian state must start. He thought that Andropov's anti-corruption campaign was partially designed to restrict the second economy.

III. Central Asia: How can this region influence the democratization process?

Dr. Nancy Lubin of the Congressional Research Office noted that half the people entering the work force will be Central Asians by the year 2015. Rapid population growth will cause ethnic tensions. Lubin was very reluctant to generalize; the Central Asians are a very diversified lot. The second economy is very strong in Central Asia and as a result Central Asians

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have access to more rather than less. Indeed, some Central Asians hold a position superior to the Soviets. A crackdown on religious particularism or the economic second market could stimulate discontent.

Sergei Zamascikov of the University of California commented on the Central Asian problem as gleaned from detailed interviews with Central Asians who have emigrated to Israel. He focussed on the Central Asian experience in the Soviet military. He was impressed by the very poor language and technical training of the Central Asians. Over 50 per cent of the Central Asians are able to avoid military service by bribing Soviet officials. Those who do serve are generally sent to construction units where they speak their native language. The Soviet army does not serve as a racial integrator; in fact, this experience tends to reenforce ethnic differences. Very few officers in the Soviet army are from Central Asia. The Central Asians stated that the majority of income comes from the second economy.

Michaill Bernstam of the Hoover Institution said that the problem may not be with the Central Asians but the Russians. Welfare colonialism has made the Central Asian relatively well off economically. The Central Asians benefit by being in the empire because of subsidies. A greater percentage of taxes raised in Central Asia is spent in Central Asia as opposed to taxes raised in the RSFSR. Bernstam speculated that this can cause heightened tension as the Russians seek a greater slice of the economic pie. Lubin cautioned that if investments in central Asia were shifted from heavy industry to consumer industry, less money could be spent with more local impact. This would be consistent with the continuation of current cultural patterns in Central Asia where there is no trend toward urbanization. None of the spokesmen felt that the Islamic fundamentalist issue had had much impact in Soviet Central Asia as yet. They also were cautious about the potential impact of the Soviet suppression of Afghanistan.

IV. How to Open a Closed Society

-- Yuri Yarim-Agaev sought to summarize the basic strategy of the Sakharov Institute. He underscored that the center would seek to combine research and action. The research will be goals oriented. Each program should be considered in terms of what could move the "democratization process" forward. He noted that the Soviet regime, in seeking to keep society closed, treats the crackdown and subsequent isolation as virtually a "military expenditure." He noted that internal security had been tightened under Andropov with little reaction from the US. He particularly commented on laws concerning communicating with foreigners, inviting foreigners to homes, greater penalties for receiving materials from abroad, reduced emigrations etc.

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-- Yarim-Agaev identified specific actions which would foster the program goals, including:

- o Keep open channels between the West and independent peoples in the USSR. Be prepared to react to requests from internalists. (Ex: Provide assistance to families of prisoners.)

- o Help internalists communicate better among themselves. This will conclude distribution of VTRs, reproduction capabilities, etc. The publication of material in the West and infiltrated back in assists this effort.

- o The Sakharov Institute can provide a defacto "free university" by bringing together select Soviet emigres and US scholars to comment on exfiltrate Samizdat and then return the Samizdat in multiple copies to the USSR with comments developed in the free environment of the West. Elements of Khotin's program could be absorbed which would permit the Sakharov Institute to have access to the rich inventory of Soviet emigres for program use.

- o Sponsor exchange programs between independent groups in East and West. Promote the flow of ideas and people across borders outside of any official exchange program. Yarim-Agaev made the point that his group knows of several hundred independent scholars scattered throughout the USSR who want outside contacts. (NB. Phillip Siegelman cautioned the Sakharov Institute to select discrete and limited goals. He noted that many American institutions are now actively engaged in exchanges with Soviet institutions and that these contacts are in an appalling mess. He thought NED should assess these existing institutional relationships. He was particularly concerned by the lack of true reciprocity.)

- o Collect information which comes from inside to help publicize events in the USSR. This includes letters from dissidents, information from recent emigres and debriefing of travelers to the USSR. The basis of this information then should be a strong public campaign to protect the dissidents.

- o Every effort should be made to promote official means of communications--mail, telephone, etc. International communications should be systematically examined as a means to stimulating a more open exchange.

Walter Raymond

Walter Raymond, Jr.

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LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

✓ Ms. Elizabeth Arrens	U.S. Senate
✓ Dr. Michail Bernstam	Hoover Institution
✓ Mr. Vladimir Bukovsky	Stanford University
Dr. W. Glenn Campbell	Hoover Institution
✓ Dr. Robert Conquest	Hoover Institution
✓ Dr. Milorad Drachkovitch	Hoover Institution
✓ Mr. Vladimir Dremluga	Journalist
Dr. Peter Duignan	Hoover Institution
✓ Dr. John B. Dunlop	Hoover Institution
✓ Dr. Herbert T. Ellison	Kennan Institute
✓ Dr. Lewis Gann	Hoover Institution
✓ Dr. Boris Gasparov	University of California
✓ Dr. Robert Hessen	Hoover Institution
✓ Dr. Leonid Khotin	University of California
✓ Mr. Eduard Kuznetsov	Radio Liberty
✓ Dr. Seymour Martin Lipset	Hoover Institution
✓ Dr. Edward Lozansky	The Andrei Sakharov Institute
✓ Dr. Nancy Lubin	U.S. Congress
✓ Mr. Steve Mann	State Department
✓ Dr. John H. Moore	Hoover Institution
Mr. Michail Pillsbury	U.S. Senate
✓ Mr. Robert Pickus	World Without War Council
✓ Dr. Richard Pipes	Harvard University
✓ Mr. Mark Planter	National Endowment for Democracy
✓ Mr. Arkady Polishchuk	Journalist
✓ Mr. Walter Raymond	National Security Council

✓ Dr. Phillip Siegelman	San Francisco State University
✓ Dr. Richard F. Staar	Hoover Institution
✓ Ms. Lidiya Voronina	Voice of America
✓ Dr. Robert Wesson	Hoover Institution
✓ Dr. Charles Wolf, Sr.	Rand Corporation
Mrs. Ella Wolf	Hoover Institution
✓ Dr. Yuri Yarim-Agaev	The Andrei Sakharov Institute
✓ Dr. Sergei Zamascikov	University of California

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

Dr. Lydia Voronina

Graduated Moscow University in 1971.

Worked in the USSR Academy of Sciences.

Participated in the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group.

Continued her studies at Catholic University of America and Boston University.

Ph.D. in philosophy.

Currently with the "Voice of America."

In her paper "The Development of Soviet Ideology and the Structure of Internal Propaganda" Voronina comes to the conclusion that through the history of the Soviet state the social functions of Marxist ideology have been constantly changing so that at least six profoundly different forms can be distinguished: Marxism as a political idea; as an alternative economic plan; as a quasi-religious doctrine; as juridical norm; as a nationalistic ideal; and as a means of social integration. Taken as a sequence these forms demonstrate how powerful a dead idea can be, and how it is implemented in everyday Soviet internal propaganda. It is also shown that there is a variety of forms this propaganda takes, and how one can learn its structure to counter it efficiently through available means.

Arkady Polyshchuk

Graduated Moscow University, Department of Philosophy. He became a leading Soviet journalist, was managing editor of the monthly magazine "Asia and Africa Today", had many publications in "Pravda", "Izvestia", and broadcasted on radio and television. He has forsaken his career through involvement in the dissident and Pentecostalist movements. He is currently working on the Russian Bible Project and lecturing on human and religious rights in the USSR.

In his paper "The Children and the War: Soviet Military Propaganda for Preschoolers and First Graders" Polyshchuk simultaneously presents both one of the most important forms of Soviet internal propaganda as well as a particular propaganda campaign which was generally overlooked by outside observers. *Fred Horn*

Yuri Yarim-Agaev

Graduated from Moscow Physical Technical Institute, Ph.D. in physics and chemistry.

Worked in the USSR Academy of Sciences, MIT, Stanford University.

Member of Moscow Helsinki Watch Group.

Author of papers in physics, chemistry, mathematics and Soviet affairs.

In his paper "The Development of Market Relations as an Avenue for Democratization in the USSR", Yarim-Agaev shows that market relations provide both a proper analytical tool to study tensions between labor and government in a socialist economy, as well as contributing to the development of those tensions themselves.

In the paper "How to Open a Closed Society", Yarim-Agaev indicates the

main directions in which practical steps should be taken to make the Soviet Union a more open country and describes several projects serving to implement this goal.

Dr. Leonid Khotin

Worked at the Institute of Sociology, USSR Academy of Sciences and Moscow University

Currently Research Associate at UC Berkeley and consultant for the project "Soviet Economic Bureaucracy."

Editor of "Abstracts of Soviet and East European Emigre Periodical Literature."

In his paper "The Third Emigration as a Source of Information," Khotin indicates that 125,000 recent emigrants from the USSR to the US include among them many specialists in various fields of industry, trade, medicine, education and culture, who come from different areas of the USSR. He shows that surveys of experts provide unique and reliable data on the Soviet Union. He provides methods of finding experts among Soviet emigrants, and speaks of an already existing network of experienced interviewers. Examples of topics in economics and other fields which can be studied with the help of such interviews are given. Another important way of collecting such information is reviewing the numerous periodical emigrant literature.

Dr. Nancy Lubin

Currently with the Office of Technology Assessment, US Congress, and on the adjunct faculty of Georgetown University. A Graduate of Harvard University, she received her doctorate from Oxford University. She spent one year conducting research in Soviet Central Asia on manpower and nationality questions there, and has made several other research trips to the USSR. Her book is scheduled to be out this year.

In her paper "The Role of Soviet Central Asia" Lubin indicates the growing importance of this region to the USSR--demographically, economically, militarily, socially, and in the area of foreign policy. This paper briefly assesses key areas of potential tension in Soviet Central Asia, the problems associated with analyzing them in the past, new ways to approach these issues now; and the implications this might hold for US policy makers interested in the democratization of the USSR.

Sergei Zamascikov

MA in Slavic Studies, 1973, USSR.

MA in Slavic Studies, 1982, USA.

MA in Political Science, 1984, USA.

Currently at UCLA.

Author of the book, "Political Organization in the Soviet Armed Forces" and papers on military-civilian relations and ethnic problems in the Soviet Union.

In his paper Moslem Recruits in the Soviet Army Zamascikov will

(more)

present the results of his recent survey of emigrants from Soviet Central Asia to Israel. He will consider whether the military training of recruits from this area contributes to their sovietization.

*File: USSR-
Arms Control
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MEMORANDUM

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

October 10, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: ^{RLH} BOB LINHARD / ^{for} RON LEHMAN / ^{SV} SVEN KRAEMER

SUBJECT: TOR for Arms Control Work

Attached at Tab A are the NSC staff-recommended draft terms of reference that you requested at last Thursday's SACPG meeting. We have discussed this TOR on a close-hold informal basis with a number of SACPG members and have incorporated their thoughts into our draft.

Recommendation

That you approve the draft TOR provided at Tab A.

Concurrence: J. Matlock *for*

Attachment: Draft TOR (S)

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BY H0J NARA, DATE 12/13/07

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM FOR SENIOR ARMS CONTROL POLICY GROUP PARTICIPANTS

SUBJECT: Terms of Reference for Upcoming Work Program

Based upon the October 4 meeting of the Senior Arms Control Policy Group, the following work program is directed.

Near-term Tasking. An interagency group chaired by Lt. General John Chain should develop a paper for SACPG review which recommends how best to follow up on the following specific initiatives cited in the President's UNGA speech: the exchange of defense plans, the exchanges of observers at exercises and other military locations, and the proposed approach to improved yield verification associated with underground nuclear testing. The paper should draw upon previously accomplished interagency work available on each of these three subjects, including the work of the Nuclear Testing IG and the Confidence-Building Measures Working Group. This paper should be available for SACPG review by November 1, 1984.

Longer-term Tasking. In order to support a review of US arms reduction options for the next term, the Intelligence Community should provide for review by the Senior Group a paper which addresses the following subjects:

- A review of Soviet strategic and INF force projections and associated programmatic trends leading to an assessment of Soviet force goals. This review should involve a balanced and comprehensive treatment of Soviet forces, including not only their ballistic forces, but also addressing bombers, cruise missiles, defensive activities (including strategic and air defenses), and Soviet LRINF and associated SRINF forces.
- An overview of Soviet perceptions of U.S. strategic and INF forces and related U.S. arms control/policies.
- Based upon the above, an assessment of the objectives that the current Soviet leadership and likely successor leaders may have for Soviet arms control activity over the next four years. The assessment should address questions including the following. Will they pursue stabilizing arms control agreements? Where might the Soviets show some flexibility in making reductions? What elements of their forces will they especially wish to fully protect from the arms control process? To what extent are they counting on concealment and deception to help mask their programs and purposes?

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This paper will provide a basis for initiating a general review of longer term U.S. arms reduction options. It should be completed and provided for review by the Senior Group by November 15, 1984.

Additional Work. In addition, work should continue on projects currently in progress including trade-offs and verification issues. For example, a number of issues were identified for future work by the recent interagency paper on ALCM limits. These issues should be continued to be pursued to ensure that to the extent possible the results are available to support the U.S. options review cited above.

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