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File Folder COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

FOIA

F06-114/6

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
9001	MEMO	COUNTERINTELLIGENCE/COUNTERMEASURES IMPLEMENTATION TASK FORCE <i>PAR 5/15/2013 F2006-114/12</i>	5	ND	B1
9002	MEMO	NSDD ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE/COUNTERMEASURES IMPLEMENTATION TASK FORCE <i>R 3/19/2013 F2006-114/6</i>	1	ND	B1

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B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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SYSTEM II
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Counterintelligence

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION
DIRECTIVE NUMBER

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR F06-114/6

BY KML NARA DATE 5/15/13

FOIA(b)(1)

13526

E. O. 12958

As Amended

Sec. 3.3(b)(1),

3.3(b)(6)

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE/COUNTERMEASURE IMPLEMENTATION
TASK FORCE (U)

Intelligence collection by foreign intelligence officers and agents operating in the United States presents the greatest counterintelligence (CI) threat confronting the United States. Under cover of diplomatic establishments, foreign-owned commercial entities and exchange student programs, the Soviet, Soviet Bloc, Peoples Republic of China and other criteria countries have emplaced large numbers of professional intelligence officers and other intelligence collectors (economic, scientific and technical, and military) in the United States. The numbers of foreign intelligence officers far surpass the counterintelligence assets the US Government has been able to deploy against them, and the number has been increasing over the years. This issue has been studied extensively by the Interagency Group on Counterintelligence (IG/CI) and a series of recommendations were forwarded to and endorsed by the Senior Interagency Group for Intelligence (SIG/I). These recommendations were reviewed and endorsed by the National Security Planning Group (NSPG) on August 7, 1985. I have decided it is in the national interest to implement each of these proposals. (U)

The NSPG also recommended that the US Government adopt, in principle, the use of aperiodic, non-life style, CI-type polygraph examinations for all individuals with access to US Government that relates to Sensitive Compartment Information, Communications Security Information (COMSEC) and other special access program classified information. I have decided this policy should be established. (U)

In order to facilitate the implementation of these decisions, I am directing the establishment of a task force to develop the time table, procedures and method to implement this Decision Directive. This implementation task force will be chaired by a representative of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The task force will be composed of a representative of each NSPG principal: Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Attorney General, Director of Central Intelligence, and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addition, the task force will include a representative of the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and a representative from Department of State/Office of Foreign Missions (OFM). (U)

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The following agencies will provide an observer to this implementation task force since the timing and method of implementation may have an impact on one or more of them: Diplomatic Security Service (Department of State), Office of Foreign Missions (Department of State), Department of the Treasury, Department of Commerce, US Army Intelligence and Security Command, Naval Intelligence Command, US Air Force Office of Special Investigations, National Security Agency, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. (U)

The Intelligence Community Staff Secretariat will provide necessary administrative support. (U)

The purpose of this task force will be to make decisions on the method, timing and procedures to implement the SIG(I) options; establish implementation policy for the national polygraph program and implement other counterintelligence and countermeasures improvements which have appropriate national policy level implications. Final implementation decisions will be made by the National Security Council. (U)

The SIG(I) options to be implemented are:

Option #1: Equality in US and Soviet Bilateral Representation

Eliminate the disparity in US-USSR representation by July 1988. Accomplish this by ~~undertaking a combination of initiatives to reduce the official Soviet presence in the US and increasing the official US presence in the USSR.~~ The Department of State will develop a plan to accomplish this objective. The NSC will approve the schedule established to implement this plan and achieve equivalence. ~~Advise the USSR that this is our policy and seek agreement on the manner in which both aspects will be implemented. In the USSR, this will be done initially in those positions where contact with the Soviet bureaucracy is least required—plumbers, electricians, mechanics, painters, cooks, recreation caretakers, etc., and in sensitive positions such as the Ambassador's chauffeur. In the absence of agreement, implement the policy unilaterally to replace Soviet support personnel employed in the US establishments in the USSR and deny entry visas for replacement support personnel employed in Soviet establishments in the US until a balance is achieved between the number of US and Soviet personnel with diplomatic immunity.~~

along with a reduction of the Soviet presence if and as possible

priority should be different

Option #2: Expulsion of Soviet Intelligence Personnel

US policy shall be to reduce the Soviet official personnel quota by the number of individuals expelled for espionage or

I doubt wisdom of this

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unless U.S. interests would be damaged. 3

other intelligence-related activity, [^] The Department of State shall give the Soviets notice that the US reserves the right to reduce the personnel ceiling of the Soviet Embassy and Consulate General by the number of persons expelled for espionage or other intelligence-related activity. Decisions on whether to expel personnel and/or reduce the personnel ceiling in specific cases shall be made by the Secretary of State or his designee, after consultation with the Department of Justice, and taking into consideration all relevant foreign policy and counter-intelligence factors. ~~Implementation procedures for this option shall be developed by the CI/CM implementation task force~~ (S)

Option #3: Staffing of Proposed New York and Kiev Consulate

If a Soviet consular office is established
~~In negotiations with the Soviets concerning reopening of their consulate in New York City in return for a US Consulate in Kiev, deny an increase in the overall Soviet official personnel ceiling within the US. (S) a parity of per personnel ceiling~~
providing for parity of the two offices shall be established. (S)

Option #4: Demarche to Peoples Republic of China

Option #5: Increase Funding for INS Computer System

The Department of Justice and the Office of Management and Budget are to provide increased funding in the FY 1987 budget for the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to expedite installation and operation of an INS computerized system to record more effectively arrivals, departures, and locations of foreign nationals visiting the US. (S)

Option #6: UN Secretariat Travel Through the OFM Service Bureau

United Nations Secretariat employees in New York City whose national missions to the United Nations are required to use the Office of Foreign Missions travel service bureau for both official and unofficial travel within the United States shall be also required to use that service bureau for all travel to the United States. (S)

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Option #7: Require East European Officials to Arrange Travel Through the OFM Service Bureau

Require East European hostile country officials to use the OFM service bureau to book commercial transportation and public accommodations ~~unless expressly waived in specific instances by the Secretary of State.~~ (S)

Option #8: Close Areas of the US to East European Travel Following Espionage Activity

when such requirements are imposed on U.S. officials in those countries.

Place the East European allies of the Soviet Union on notice that areas of the United States now closed to travel for the Soviets may also be closed to them if any of their personnel are detected in espionage or intelligence-related activity in those areas. The decision to close an area shall be made by the Secretary of State in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, and the Director of Central Intelligence. In the event the Secretary and Attorney General cannot agree, the NSC shall act as final arbiter. The closing of an area should be made on a selective basis, i.e., six months/one year, and should apply to the offending country officials only. (S)

Option #9: Close East European Commercial Offices Following Espionage Activity

Place the East European allies of the Soviet Union on notice that if a representative of their official commercial offices is detected in espionage or intelligence-related activity, that particular office may be closed. The decision to close the office shall be made by the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General. In the event the Secretary and Attorney General cannot agree, the NSC shall act as final arbiter. The Department of State shall test and/or expand legal authorities as necessary. (S)

Option #10: Controls on Foreign Corporations

Subject hostile country-owned/controlled corporations to the same controls and restrictions that the Office of Foreign Missions applies to the missions of foreign governments, to the extent authorized by the Foreign Missions Act. The Department of Justice and the FBI will study the activities of corporations individually and develop an implementation plan with immediate attention to be given those corporations presenting the greatest counterintelligence threat. The Department of Justice shall complete its study plan by December 31, 1985. (S)


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Option #11: Diplomatic Property Rights and Consolidated Offices



Option #12: Increase Denials of Soviet Military Attache Travel

Refuse
~~Increase turn-downs of travel requests by Soviet military attaches to enforce strict reciprocity.~~ (S)

if their trips exceed those made by U.S. military attaches in the Soviet Union

The task force should submit an initial report on the implementation of this NSDD no later than December 1, 1985. (U)

notes
Strict reciprocity may not be served by increase travel refusals

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

National Security Decision
Directive Number

REPORTING HOSTILE CONTACTS AND SECURITY AWARENESS

In addition to measures presently in place to provide for physical, information and personnel security against the hostile intelligence threat, the provisions of this directive will enhance overall government efforts to protect against illegal or unauthorized acquisition by hostile intelligence services of information and technology vital to our national interest.

Many agencies, particularly those directly involved in the United States intelligence effort, foreign affairs and military matters, have well-developed programs designed to maintain a high level of security awareness and to examine relationships of their employees with foreign nationals. Agencies whose primary mission requires that they maintain classified or otherwise sensitive information, while attractive targets for hostile foreign interests, are by no means the only agencies which are vulnerable to the loss of information or technology which may be critical to the ability of the United States to protect itself.

Responsibility for Security

Each department or agency of the US Government shall establish procedures which will:

- Create and maintain a formalized security awareness program designed to ensure a high level of awareness among its employees of the potential threat to its propriety, sensitive and classified information from foreign sources, whether overt or covert. This program must include a periodic formal briefing of the threat posed by hostile intelligence services.

- Provide for the reporting, under defined circumstances, of employee contacts with nationals of certain foreign countries or political entities as hereafter specified.

The nature and extent of this program will be commensurate with the potential for foreign interest in not only the classified information holdings of the department or agency, but also in its technological or other sensitive activities. The program should be tailored to meet the particular functions of the agency or department and the vulnerability of certain categories

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BY smf / by S. Tilley, NSC
NAVA, Date 6/11/02

of employees who, through either their job functions or access to classified or sensitive information or technology, invite targeting or exploitation by foreign intelligence services. The program should be designed so as not to intrude into the privacy of employees or into their freedom of association.

Reporting of Hostile Contacts

Each department or agency shall establish procedures which require its employees to report certain contacts.

- These procedures will require reporting of all contacts with individuals of any nationality, either within or outside the scope of the employee's official activities, in which:

- Illegal or unauthorized access is sought to classified or otherwise sensitive information.

- The employee is concerned that he or she may be the target of an attempted exploitation by a foreign entity.

- The procedures will also require reporting of any contacts with nationals of the Soviet Union and Soviet Bloc countries as well as other specific foreign countries or foreign political entities, which are determined by the department or agency in coordination with the Federal Bureau of Investigation as being of particular relevance to its security concerns. In implementing this procedure, the security officer or designated official of the department or agency will review and evaluate the reported information in accordance with the standards for reporting. The designation of particular countries as being of greater concern will provide a basis for the security officer or designated official to judge the relative importance of a particular contact. Any facts or circumstances of a reported contact with a hostile country which appear to (1) indicate an attempt or intention to obtain unauthorized access to proprietary, sensitive and classified information, (2) which appear to offer a reasonable potential for such, or (3) indicate the possibility of continued professional or personal contacts, shall be reported promptly by the responsible department or agency to the FBI in the case of employees located in the United States and to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the case of employees located overseas. The CIA in turn will inform the FBI as appropriate.

Other Intelligence or Investigative Interests

Nothing in this directive is intended to modify the authority and responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence or the Central Intelligence Agency for counterintelligence abroad, nor does it in any way change existing procedures or agreements between CIA and the Department of State and other U.S. agencies

regarding the reporting of hostile contacts outside the U.S. Neither does it preclude interagency agreements or directives affecting the relationship between the FBI and other intelligence or investigative agencies regarding their responsibility for personnel, physical or document security or their territorial jurisdiction.

Review of Procedures

The head of each agency or department will provide a copy of its Security Awareness program and its procedures for reporting hostile contacts to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs for review by November 1, 1985.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

SUBJECT: NSDD on Counterintelligence/Countermeasures
Implementation Task Force

The President has signed the attached National Security Decision Directive calling for the establishment of a task force to implement a number of policy decisions designed to limit the hostile intelligence presence in the US and place greater controls on movements. This task force will be chaired by David G. Major, Director of Intelligence and Counterintelligence Programs, National Security Council Staff.

Each recipient should designate a representative to participate on the task force and notify Mr. Major by October 7, 1985.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Attachment
NSDD

cc: Director, National Security Agency
Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization
Director, US Army Intelligence and Security Command
Commander, Naval Intelligence Command
Commander, US Air Force Office of Special Investigations
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Diplomatic Security
Service
Director, Office of Foreign Missions

UNCLASSIFIED

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DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FOI-11416 #9002
BY RW NARA DATE 3/19/13

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE SECRETARY OF LABOR
THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
THE SECRETARY OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR POLICY DEVELOPMENT
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
CHAIRMAN, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
ADMINISTRATOR, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY
ADMINISTRATOR, GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE
ADMINISTRATION
DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
DIRECTOR, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION
DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT
CHAIRMAN, PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
ADVISORY BOARD
CHAIRMAN, PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD
DIRECTOR, INFORMATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT OFFICE
DIRECTOR, WHITE HOUSE MILITARY OFFICE

SUBJECT: NSDD on Reporting Foreign Contacts and
Security Awareness

The President has approved the attached National Security Decision Directive calling for each executive department and agency to establish procedures requiring all U.S. Government

employees to report any request for illegal or unauthorized access to classified or otherwise sensitive information as well as any contacts with Soviet/Soviet Bloc nationals, and other hostile country contacts. This NSDD also calls for each Executive Department or Agency to implement a formalized security awareness program. Each department and agency is to forward these procedures to comply with this NSDD to the National Security Council by November 1, 1985.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Attachment
NSDD