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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/26/2005

File Folder USSR-DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS 3/8

FOIA

F06-114/6

Box Number 22

YARHI-MILO

2205

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
9129	MEMO	CLARK TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE SHULTZ MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	1	ND	B1
9145	MEMO	SHULTZ TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	2	3/28/1983	B1
9146	MEMO	SHULTZ TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	3	4/7/1983	B1
9147	MEMO	SHULTZ TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE APRIL 21 MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	2	4/21/1983	B1
9148	MEMO	HILL TO CLARK RE DOBRYNIN DEMARCHE OF APRIL 25, 1983 <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	1	4/27/1983	B1
9149	LETTER	DOBRYNIN DEMARCHE OF APRIL 25, 1983 <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	1	4/25/1983	B1
9150	MEMO	DAM TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN---APRIL 25, 1983 <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	1	4/26/1985	B1
9132	MEMO	LENCZOWSKI TO CLARK RE KENNETH DAM MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN <i>R 3/19/2013 F2006-114/6</i>	1	5/10/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

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B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
9133	MEMO	CLARK TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE DAM'S MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	1	ND	B1
9151	MEMO	DAM TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN --- MAY 5, 1983 <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	2	ND	B1
9134	MEMO	LENCZOWSKI TO CLARK RE APPOINTMENT REQUEST BY HARTMAN <i>R 3/19/2013 F2006-114/6</i>	1	5/12/1983	B1
9135	MEMO	LENCZOWSKI TO CLARK RE APPOINTMENT REQUEST BY HARTMAN <i>R 3/19/2013 F2006-114/6</i>	1	5/12/1983	B1
9137	MEMO	LENCZOWSKI TO CLARK RE DOBRYNIN'S MAY 11 MEETING WITH DAM <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	1	5/16/1983	B1
9152	MEMO	HILL TO CLARK RE DAM'S MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN---MAY 11 <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	1	5/12/1983	B1
9153	MEMO	HILL TO CLARK RE SOVIET DEMARCHE ON LEBANON <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	1	5/12/1983	B1

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FOIA

F06-114/6

Box Number 22

YARHI-MILO

2205

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
9154	MEMO	SOVIET MAY 11 ORAL STATEMENT ON LEBANON TRANSLATED FROM THE RUSSIAN <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	3	5/11/1983	B1
9138	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #9137 <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	1	5/16/1983	B1
9139	MEMO	CLARK TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS: DECISIONS ON NEW CONSULATES, CULTURAL EXCHANGE AGREEMENT AND RECIPROCITY <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	1	5/21/1983	B1
9155	MEMO	POINDEXTER TO DOBRIANSKY/LENCZOWSKI RE SHULTZ EVENING REPORT OF MAY 19 <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	1	5/21/1983	B1
9140	MEMO	LENCZOWSKI TO CLARK RE SOVIET REQUEST FOR MEETING WITH FEDLSTEIN <i>R 1/20/2015 F2006-114/6</i>	1	6/15/1983	B1
9141	MEMO	KIMMITT TO MATLOCK RE BORIS GOLOVIN <i>R 1/20/2015 F2006-114/6</i>	1	6/13/1983	B1
9156	MEMO	SHULTZ TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN, JULY 15 <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	3	7/15/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
9157	MEMO	SOVIET ORAL STATEMENT OF JULY 15, 1983 TRANSLATED FROM THE RUSSIAN <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	8	7/15/1983	B1
9142	MEMO	MATLOCK TO CLARK RE NEW MAP OF AREAS CLOSED TO SOVIET DIPLOMATS <i>R 3/19/2013 F2006-114/6</i>	1	8/2/1983	B1
9143	MEMO	HILL TO CLARK RE NEW AREAS CLOSED TO TRAVEL BY SOVIET DIPLOMATS <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	2	7/29/1983	B1
9144	MEMO	DRAFT MEMO OF NEW AREAS CLOSED TO TRAVEL BY SOVIET DIPLOMATS <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	17	ND	B1

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SYSTEM II
90398

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~Sensitive

March 30, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI

SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz's Meeting with Dobrynin

Attached at Tab A is Secretary Shultz's report to the President on his latest meeting with Dobrynin. Your cover memo to the President (Tab I) briefly summarizes the main points of the Secretary's memo.

RECOMMENDATIONOKNO

—

—

That you sign the memo at Tab I to the President

Attachments:

Tab I	Memorandum to the President
Tab A	Memorandum to the President from Secretary Shultz, March 28, 1983

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By Smf NARA, Date 6/18/02~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON~~SECRET~~SENSITIVEINFORMATION

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz's Meeting with Dobrynin

At Tab A is Secretary Shultz's report on his latest meeting with Dobrynin. Its main points are as follows:

- Dobrynin said that he believed that Andropov was "angry" about your televised defense speech.
- He repeated the Soviet charge that your speech contradicted the spirit if not the letter of the ABM Treaty.
- In response to George's explanation of our latest INF proposal, Dobrynin said "It is difficult to see that we will sign an agreement introducing American nuclear missiles into Europe."
- Dobrynin then rejected our recent proposals for improvement in the verification provisions of the threshold test ban and peaceful nuclear explosions treaty, claiming that existing provisions were adequate and urging us to ratify these treaties.
- He finally urged us to resume negotiations on a comprehensive test ban--a move George describes as a propaganda ploy.

Attachment:

Tab A Memorandum from Secretary Shultz

DECLASSIFIED

NLS

FOI-114/6#9129

BY MDI NARA, DATE 12/13/07

Prepared by
John Lenczowski

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

March 28, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
From: George P. Shultz *GPS*
Subject: Meeting with Dobrynin

My meeting with Dobrynin today covered four subjects: Andropov's statements about your speech, our new INF proposal, the dialogue on the overall US-Soviet relationship, and the Soviet response to our proposal on the Threshold Test Ban.

I began by pointing out that your speech last week was not polemical but descriptive -- setting forth the facts as we see them. The evidence that deployment of the SS-20s was not frozen is overwhelming. I said that Andropov's claiming you had lied was troublesome and unnecessary, particularly when you had stayed away from invective. I reiterated that your statements on ballistic missile defense were consistent with the ABM Treaty and designed to enhance stability. I noted that the Soviet Union was doing work in this field and alone has a deployed ABM system.

Dobrynin responded that the Soviets believe the facts you set forth were not correct, that they should know better whether or not they are adding SS-20s, and that based on the language of the interview Dobrynin believed Andropov was "angry." Dobrynin stressed that the word Andropov used was "untruth" not "lie," and that there is a difference in Russian. He said your speech contradicts the spirit if not the letter of the ABM Treaty.

After once more reiterating the stabilizing objective of your remarks on ballistic missile defense, I turned to INF. I informed Dobrynin that today Paul Nitze had given Kvitsinskiy the approach you had authorized him to make, and I gave Dobrynin the essence of the approach. I stressed that this is consistent with the principles you set forth in the American Legion speech. I noted that we deliberately had not set it in highly explicit form with specific numbers as we regarded this as a matter of negotiation, wanted to invite a Soviet response, but will be ready to put in numbers when the time comes. I underlined that we continue to believe that zero-zero is the best outcome. However, we are not making agreement in principle

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DECL: OADR

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NLS *F06-114/6#9145*

BY *LOT*, NARA, DATE *12/13/07*

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- 2 -

to zero-zero a condition for agreement on our interim approach. I noted you would be mentioning your proposal in a speech later this week. And I suggested that it be useful for Dobrynin to get together with me and Ambassadors Nitze and Rowny to discuss INF and START respectively between rounds. I urged the Soviets to study our proposals carefully as they are made in the utmost seriousness.

Dobrynin responded in a "preliminary" and uninstructed way by stating that there is a difference in philosophy -- the Soviet Union wants reductions, but the United States wants to increase for itself, while asking the Soviet Union to go down. The Soviet Union insists on "equal security" and that French and British systems must be counted. And in perhaps his most important point, Dobrynin said: "It is difficult to see that we will sign an agreement introducing American nuclear missiles into Europe."

I reiterated the seriousness of our approach and said that it should be viewed in the context of our discussions on bilateral relations. I informed Dobrynin that I would be prepared later this week to resume our discussions on the broad agenda: arms control, including the Andropov message on MBFR; the Pente-costalists, Shcharanskiy and other such cases; regional issues; and bilateral issues.

Dobrynin then delivered an oral statement in response to our proposal for improvements in the verification provisions of the threshold test ban and peaceful nuclear explosions treaties. We are sending you the full text separately. The Soviets reject our proposals, claiming that the treaties as written have adequate verification provisions. They urge us to go ahead with ratification of the treaties. They also urge that we resume negotiations on a comprehensive test ban (CTB) in April or May, 1983. This is obviously a propaganda ploy, as they know we will not renew the CTB talks at this point. We will have further analysis and suggestions for you on this issue.

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File
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTONSYSTEM II
90452

April 7, 1983

83 APR 7 P10: 59

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
WPC HAS SEEN

TO: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: George P. Shultz *gps*
SUBJECT: Meeting with Dobrynin -- April 7, 1982

Pursuant to our discussion of yesterday, Cap Weinberger and I met today with Dobrynin for approximately 70 minutes. We covered the full range of our established agenda for US-Soviet relations -- arms control, regional issues, human rights, and bilateral relations. The tone of the meeting was businesslike and generally constructive, and there will be a number of follow-up actions to be undertaken in coming days.

I. Arms Control:

Confidence-Building Measures: Cap began by outlining the new proposals for confidence-building measures you have recently approved, emphasizing that our purpose is to reduce the risk of a misunderstanding or accident that could lead to the inadvertent outbreak of war. Dobrynin expressed interest in our proposals and asked a number of substantive questions. Cap and I agreed to provide him more details in writing tomorrow and asked that he seek an early response from his government. Dobrynin suggested that our public announcement of the proposals -- now scheduled to go to Congress April 11 -- be delayed until Moscow has had an opportunity to respond privately. Cap and I noted that our proposals are, in part, a response to Congressional interest and that their transmission to the Hill could not be held up for long. Nevertheless, we agreed to see whether a short delay is possible and again urged Dobrynin to seek a quick response from his government.

START and INF: I noted that we continue to look for ways to make progress and suggested that Dobrynin and I meet separately with Paul Nitze and Ed Rowny during the current break between rounds. In offering these meetings, I emphasized that their purpose would not be negotiation but clarification and informal discussion of our respective positions. After noting that he hoped these discussions would not be simply a sterile rehash of our respective positions in Geneva, Dobrynin agreed to go ahead with these meetings.

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DECL OADR

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NLS F06-114/6*9/46BY NOJ NARA, DATE 12/13/07

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- 2 -

TTBT and PNET: I reminded Dobrynin that we had made a serious proposal to negotiate stronger verification provisions for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET), and that we had been disappointed by the negative Soviet response. Dobrynin responded with the usual Soviet line that we should first ratify the treaties as they are and then consider whether additional verification measures might be needed. He also asked whether we intended to continue observing the 150 kiloton limit on underground nuclear tests provided for by the unratified TTBT. Finally, he reiterated the suggestion that we resume trilateral negotiations for a Comprehensive Test Ban.

In response, I noted that we have no plans, at present, for underground tests above the 150 kt. level, but that serious concerns about verification precluded our ratification of the TTBT until these concerns were addressed. I added that the Soviet emphasis on a CTB seemed to reflect a desire to run before walking in the field of nuclear testing limitations. Finally, I stated that Assistant Secretary Rick Burt would be calling in one of Dobrynin's deputies soon on our TTBT proposal. I urged that the Soviet side reconsider our proposal. Dobrynin offered to consider whatever information we provided on our proposal.

II. Human Rights

After underscoring again the importance we attach to these issues, I told Dobrynin of your personal appreciation for the positive Soviet actions in the Pentecostalist case. Emphasizing the need to keep up the momentum toward final resolution of this problem, I told Dobrynin of your letter to the Pentecostalists in the Embassy and Olin Robison's visit to Moscow. I noted that we had proceeded quietly in this case, as is our general intention in handling human rights issues, and pressed Dobrynin for Soviet action on other "Madrid" issues, such as the level of Jewish emigration.

III. Regional Issues

Noting that Soviet misconduct in regional conflicts had been a major source of tension in our relationship, I pressed Dobrynin for concrete Soviet actions on Afghanistan, in southern Africa, and other regional trouble spots. I reiterated our readiness to play a positive role and told him that Art Hartman has instructions to see Gromyko on Afghanistan and the Middle East. Dobrynin suggested that we identify three or four priority areas for discussion on regional issues and develop specific proposals for solutions. I responded that we had tried to establish such a dialogue, but that the talks had seemed to us more academic than operational. Nevertheless, it would be difficult to move far in improving our relations

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unless there was concrete evidence of Soviet action to meet our concerns on these regional issues.

IV. Bilateral Issues

Having placed discussion of our bilateral relations in this overall context, I informed Dobrynin of your decisions to extend the fisheries agreement for one year and to propose negotiations for a new grains LTA. Noting that the decision on a grains LTA had been a particularly difficult one for us, I told Dobrynin that we intended to make an announcement on Saturday. Dobrynin was noncommittal on a new LTA and again noted that we were planning a public announcement before the Soviets could reply to our proposal. I replied that it would be extremely difficult to maintain the confidentiality of this decision while waiting for a Soviet reply. Dobrynin did not say when we might expect a reply, but later told Rick Burt that our proposal might have to be put on the weekly Politburo agenda -- thus delaying a Soviet reply until at least the end of next week. While making no commitments about the timing of our announcement, I pressed Dobrynin to seek an early reply from Moscow.

Next Steps:

I will be taking the following actions to follow-up on today's meeting:

1. Rick Burt and Richard Perle will call in an appropriate official from the Soviet Embassy tomorrow to convey more information in writing on our CBMs proposals and to press for an early Soviet response. Cap and I will confer on whether to delay transmission of the proposals to Congress for a few days in order to give the Soviets an opportunity to reply. Rick will also convey to the Soviet Embassy further information on our TTBT proposal as soon as possible.

2. I will schedule a meeting with Dobrynin next week to discuss either START or INF with Nitze or Rowny.

3. We will take another look at possibilities for dialogue on regional issues in light of Dobrynin's suggestion that we identify three or four issues for priority work.

4. On the grains LTA, I believe we should try to give the Soviets a reasonable opportunity to respond before we make a public announcement, despite the difficulties this will cause us. Senators Dole and Percy have agreed to hold off on their legislation. I have already informed Jack Block of your decision and asked that it remain confidential for at least a few days. We have therefore told the Soviets that we intend to postpone an announcement for a few days.

Lenczowski

National Security Council
The White House

602
USSR/Diplo 8

MAR 8 0 1983

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Package # 70398

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter			
Bud McFarlane	1	M	A
Jacque Hill			
Judge Clark			
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary	2		R
Sit Room			
I-Information	A-Action	R-Retain	D-Dispatch
			N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

Need not go forward
since Alex has seen
Shultz memo.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

Sensitive

March 30, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

ROM HAS SEEN

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI

SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz's Meeting with Dobrynin

Attached at Tab A is Secretary Shultz's report to the President on his latest meeting with Dobrynin. Your cover memo to the President (Tab I) briefly summarizes the main points of the Secretary's memo.

RECOMMENDATION

OK

NO

—

—

That you sign the memo at Tab I to the President

Attachments:

Tab I	Memorandum to the President
Tab A	Memorandum to the President from Secretary Shultz, March 28, 1983

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By smf NARA, Date 6/18/02

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

File
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTONCONFIDENTIAL
SITUATION ROOM

April 21, 1983

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM TO: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: George P. Shultz *GPS*
SUBJECT: My April 21 Meeting With Dobrynin

In accordance with our earlier discussions, I met with Dobrynin today to talk about the INF negotiations. Paul Nitze, Ken Adelman, Ken Dam, and Mark Palmer joined me. The meeting also touched briefly on the Pentecostals, Shcharanskiy, your new confidence-building measures proposals, and our bilateral fisheries agreement.

On INF, I underscored for Dobrynin that the zero option remained on the table, but that we had presented an alternative, interim proposal in order to emphasize our flexibility and our willingness to discuss any reasonable approach based on equality. I then posed a series of four questions for Moscow to ponder, in order to determine whether there is any give in the Soviet position:

First, was there any finite, equal level of U.S. and Soviet INF warheads-on-missiles that the Soviet Union was prepared to accept?

Second, did the USSR insist that an INF agreement must totally exclude Soviet systems located in the Eastern part of the Soviet Union? (I cited the mobility and transportability of the SS-20 as arguments against a Europe-only approach.)

Third, is it the Soviet view that even an interim INF agreement must include aircraft as well as longer-range INF missiles? (I noted that the U.S. was prepared to consider aircraft in the context of a two-phased approach.)

Fourth, is it conceivable that we can design an INF agreement between the U.S. and USSR based on parity and equality (i.e. without accounting for British and French forces)?

On each of these questions, Dobrynin interjected with comments indicating no change in the Soviet positions as had

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NLS FOUO-114/6#9147BY LDI, NARA, DATE 12/13/07~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
DECL: OADR

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- 2 -

been set forth earlier either in Geneva or at Gromyko's recent press conference. I took issue with Dobrynin's consistent "No's," noting that this suggested no progress at all was possible in INF. In light of his earlier comments to me that Soviet negotiators never act without instructions, I expressed some puzzlement how he could square this with Paul Nitze's exploratory conversations with his Soviet counterpart last year ("The Walk in the Woods"), during which there had been some deviation from these Soviet positions.

In response, Dobrynin tacitly admitted it had been the Soviet side which broke off those discussions on the grounds they were apprehensive they "were negotiating with an individual and not with a government." I stressed to him that we were seeking precisely that sort of informal, exploratory discussion to find a mutually-agreeable INF solution.

After reiterating various familiar Soviet arguments (the "strategic" threat posed by the Pershing II, the need to be compensated for UK and French systems, and a refusal to negotiate on systems beyond Europe), Dobrynin attempted to put the onus on the U.S. for coming up with new ideas to solve the current stalemate. I reminded him that no such ideas would be possible if the Soviets continued in their inflexibly negative responses to questions expressing our basic concerns. Dobrynin promised to pass on our questions to Moscow, but was not particularly sanguine about the likely replies.

Other issues

On the Pentecostalists, I noted that the two families were now back home in Siberia waiting for their visas. I expressed the hope that Moscow would proceed in a reasonable fashion to grant them permission to leave. I also reminded Dobrynin that we want the Soviets to release Anatoliy Shcharanskiy soon. He did not respond on either of these subjects.

With respect to your new confidence-building measures proposals, I told Dobrynin that we would be approaching them soon with ideas on how to begin discussions on the two which Moscow had accepted (upgrading the Hotline, and developing a multilateral convention for consultations in the event of the use or acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorists). I also urged the Soviets to reconsider their position on the two proposals they did not accept, including the proposed Joint Military Communication Link.

On economic matters, Dobrynin confirmed that the Soviets today had conveyed their acceptance of our proposal for a one-year extension of the bilateral fisheries agreement.

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File US-Sov.
Diplo 12

NSC/S PROFILE

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

ID 8390576

RECEIVED 02 MAY 83 19

TO CLARK

FROM HILL, C

DOCDATE 27 APR 83

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By smf NARA, Date 6/18/02

KEYWORDS: USSR

ARMS CONTROL

DOBRYNIN, ANATOLIY F

SUBJECT: AMB DOBRYNIN DEMARCHE RE ANTI BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

LENCZOWSKI

DOBRIANSKY

BLAIR

KRAEMER

LINHARD

COMMENTS

REF# 8312936

LOG

NSCIFID NSDD0085

(B / B)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

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MAY 02 1963

John Poindexter			
Bud McFarlane			
Jacque Hill			
Judge Clark			
John Poindexter	1		
Staff Secretary	2		I
Sit Room			

DISTRIBUTION

COMMENTS



ES SENSITIVE
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14

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

SYSTEM II
90576

~~SECRET~~

03 APR 27 P 8: 08
April 27, 1983

SENSITIVE

SITUATION ROOM

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Dobrynin Demarche of April 25, 1983

Attached is a copy of the "non-paper" Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin presented to the Acting Secretary during their meeting on April 25, 1983. In it, the Soviet Union proposes that a small number of prominent Soviet and American scientists meet later this spring in Stockholm or a similar venue to "discuss the consequences of creating a large-scale anti-ballistic defense system" and to analyze its presumed destabilizing effect on the arms race.

Katherine Seib

Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Attachment: As stated

DECLASSIFIED
NLS FOI-114/6# 9148
BY hvj NARA, DATE 12/13/07

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

DECL: OADR

The Soviet side would like to draw the attention of the U.S. Government to the idea expressed by the General Secretary of the CPSU Yuri V. Andropov that a meeting of Soviet and American scientists be held to discuss the consequences of creating a large-scale anti-ballistic defense system.

In our view, such a meeting would permit to objectively and authoritatively analyze this whole problem from the point of view of the existing serious concerns that if the plans to create such an ABM system are carried out in practice, it would constitute a destabilizing factor and encourage a sharp upturn in both offensive and defensive strategic arms race.

Thereby the proposed meeting of the scientists could play a very useful role in preventing the events from going in a direction which, in the long run, would serve nobody's interests.

Specifically, the Soviet side proposes that the scientists' meeting take place by the end of May - early June maybe in Stockholm (Sweden) or in any other mutually agreed place.

The Soviet side would be represented at the meeting by 4 or 5 authoritative scientists (with participation of experts). Other issues pertaining to the organization of the meeting, could be agreed upon additionally.

We hope that the American side will consider our proposal with due attention and in a constructive manner.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F06-114/6*9149

BY 105 NARA, DATE 12/13/07

File US Soviet

SUPER SENSITIVE
8312718

Diplo 16

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F06-114/6#9150

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

SYSTEM II
90544

BY LOT, NARA, DATE 12/13/07

SECRET/SENSITIVE

April 26, 1983

TO: THE PRESIDENT
From: Kenneth W. Dam, Acting *KWD*
Subject: Meeting with Dobrynin -- April 25, 1983

In accordance with your decision, I called in Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin this afternoon to reiterate in strong terms our concerns over the new Soviet PL-5 ICBM. I stated that the earlier Soviet response of March 12 had failed to answer adequately our various questions about this missile in regard to their compliance with the relevant provisions of SALT II. Drawing on the interagency approved language, I called for urgent Soviet clarification of the RV to throw-weight issue. In the absence of an early clarification, I indicated we would be forced to assume their February 8 test of the PL-5 had not been in fact in compliance with SALT II. I also raised our serious concerns regarding the "new types" rule, the relationship to the SS-16, and telemetry encryption.

In reply, Ambassador Dobrynin essentially drew upon the earlier Soviet response of March 12 to state that the PL-5 had not been a new type but rather a modernization of an existing missile, the SS-13, and thus had not required any special notification. He further asserted that the Soviet Union had not made any special effort to encrypt the telemetry of the February 8 test. When he asked why he had been called in on an urgent basis, I noted the special importance we must attach to such compliance questions.

Dobrynin then took the opportunity of our meeting to present a demarche of his own. Picking up on comments contained in General Secretary Andropov's recent interview with Der Spiegel, the Soviet Union formally proposed that a small number (4 to 5) of key Soviet and American scientists meet in late May or early June in Stockholm (or some other agreed place) "to discuss the consequences of creating a large-scale ABM system" and to analyze whether such a system would "constitute a destabilizing factor." In accepting Dobrynin's demarche, I noted we would reply to this invitation in due course.

There are obvious pitfalls to this invitation to debate the merits of advanced ABMs on terms and in a venue loaded against us. At the same time, a flat refusal on our part would also have obvious drawbacks. In the next few days, we will be recommending possible courses of action for responding to this initiative.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
DECL: OADR

Diplo Dobrynin 17

SYSTEM II
90601

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~ . SENSITIVE

May 10, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI *JK*

SUBJECT: Summary of Acting Secretary Dam's Meeting with
Ambassador Dobrynin, May 5, 1983

Acting Secretary Kenneth Dam has sent the President a memcon of his meeting with Dobrynin (Tab A). Your cover memorandum to the President (Tab I) briefly summarizes Dam's memo but adds no further comment.

The only comment this memo might deserve is that it demonstrates yet again how fruitless most of our dialogue with the Soviets really is. This is not to say that the dialogue is politically worthless to the United States: the mere fact that we can say we are talking to the Soviets is beneficial. But it is to say that the President's policy of general caution in dealing with the Soviets and avoiding putting too large an investment in this dialogue in hopes of achieving true peace with the Soviets is a wise and far-sighted policy.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Acting Secretary Dam's memorandum, May 5, 1983

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR FOI-114/6 #9132
BY RW NARA DATE 3/12/13

MEMORANDUM

SYSTEM II
90601

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Acting Secretary Kenneth Dam's Meeting with
Ambassador Dobrynin

At Tab A is a memorandum of Ken Dam's conversation with Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin. The meeting covered two basic areas: INF and the Middle East.

Summary of Conversation

On INF, Dobrynin broke no new ground, avoided answering several questions that Secretary Shultz has posed to him on April 21, and implicitly repeated the Soviet threat to put intermediate range missiles near our borders. In addition, Dobrynin made no reference to Andropov's latest public proposal for equality on warheads with the British and French. This suggests that the Soviets themselves see that proposal as simply propagandistic.

On the Middle East, Ken conveyed several messages to Dobrynin encouraging the Soviets to exercise restraint with regard to the Lebanon withdrawal question. Dobrynin repeated the usual Soviet concerns about possible Israeli aggression, but acknowledged that if we succeed in getting Israel to withdraw from Lebanon, this would improve the situation.

Prepared by:
John Lenczowski

Attachment:

Tab A Acting Secretary Dam's memorandum, May 5, 1983.

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F06-114/6# 9133

BY LOT, NARA, DATE 12/8/07

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F06-114/64#9157
BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 12/13/07

19
SYSTEM II
90601

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON 5-10-44

SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Kenneth W. Dam, Acting Secretary *KWD*
SUBJECT: My Meeting with Dobrynin -- May 5, 1983

Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin came in on May 5 to deliver the response from Moscow to the various INF-related questions the Secretary had posed in their April 21 meeting. Paul Nitze was present. I also used this meeting to convey to Dobrynin our serious concerns about rising Israeli/Syrian tensions and the unhelpful Soviet role in stimulating them. In this connection, I reminded Dobrynin of our own commitment to help bring about withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon and of our hope and expectation that all parties will act with restraint during this critical period.

INF: The general tenor of his presentation was tough and rhetorical, offering nothing in the way of substance that might be construed as movement in the Soviet position. Dobrynin began his presentation by noting that the very phrasing of the Secretary's questions had indicated an "unconstructive" U.S. attitude and continued unwillingness to make progress in INF. Essentially turning aside our April 21 queries, he posed counter-questions of his own.

In response to the Secretary's question whether there was any finite number of deployed U.S. LRINF missiles acceptable to the Soviet Union, Dobrynin asked what number of comparable Soviet missiles able to reach the U.S. would we find acceptable. In regard to British and French systems, he questioned how the U.S. would propose to count similar missiles if they were at the disposal of other Warsaw Pact nations. As for the Asian theater, which he asserted had nothing to do with the current negotiations, he raised the issue of nuclear weapons systems other than the Soviet SS-20's in that region. Stating the inclusion of aircraft was "indispensable" in any INF agreement, he asked what new military parameters for the possible reduction and limitations of aircraft would be acceptable to us.

Concluding with a claim of Soviet interest in a "radical solution" to the problem, he urged U.S. consideration of the

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
~~DECL: OADR~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 2 -

Soviet proposal to remove all nuclear weapons from Europe (though his subsequent comment made clear that as before, this offer would not affect Soviet strategic weapons within the U.S.S.R.).

In sum, Dobrynin broke no new ground, essentially reiterating Soviet assertions we have already heard at length in Geneva. His rhetorical question to us about numbers of Soviet LRINF missiles able to reach the U.S. was an explicit repetition of the Soviet threat to put the U.S. in an "analogous position." It is interesting to note, however, that although Andropov's latest negotiating offer to accept equality in warheads with the British and French is barely three days old, Dobrynin's message from Moscow and his personal comments made no mention of this at all. This absence suggests that the Soviets themselves see Andropov's proposal as primarily a public diplomacy ploy rather than a serious negotiating position.

Israeli/Syrian Tensions: On the Middle East, I reminded Dobrynin that the Secretary is currently engaged in difficult and personally hazardous negotiations which could lead to real progress toward peace in the region. At the same time, Soviet statements had not been helpful and had indeed contributed to rising Israeli/Syrian tensions. I told Dobrynin that this is a particularly sensitive period in which all parties should exercise restraint in the interest of peace. Finally, I expressed the hope that, if we were able to obtain Israeli and Syrian agreement on the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon, the Syrians would keep their own commitments to withdraw.

In the ensuing discussion, Dobrynin asserted that Syrian forces are in Lebanon under Arab League mandate and questioned whether the Government of Syria had undertaken any commitment to withdraw them. I reminded Dobrynin that we considered the Lebanese Government sovereign in this matter. Shifting his ground, Dobrynin said that Israel might attack Syria and asked whether we could give any guarantee concerning Israeli behavior. I replied that guarantees were not the issue; we would continue to work for peace and were urging the Soviets to exercise their influence in a constructive manner. Finally, I told Dobrynin that we had no evidence of Israeli preparations for an attack on Syria and asked if the Soviets had any such evidence. Dobrynin did not reply directly, but said that, if the U.S. could achieve an agreement for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon, this would improve the situation.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

RECEIVED 06 MAY 83 14

TO PRESIDENT FROM DAM, K

DOCDATE 05 MAY 83

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By smf NARA, Date 6/18/02KEYWORDS: USSR
INF

LEBANON

DOBRYNIN, ANATOLIY F

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF DAM MTG W/ AMB DOBRYNIN ON 5 MAY

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR PRES

DUE:

STATUS S

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

LENCZOWSKI

DOBRIANSKY

KEMP

COMMENTS

REF#

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(B /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

ISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

Lenkowski

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*file USSR
Diplo*

22

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 12, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI *JK*

SUBJECT: Appointment Request by Ambassador Hartman

Ambassador Hartman will be in town May 18 - 20 and would like to meet with you and the President. His reasons for doing so are routine: to discuss U.S.-Soviet relations, the leadership situation, Soviet foreign policy and arms control. Unless the Ambassador has more specific or compelling reasons for seeing the President, or unless you or the President have cause to see him, I see no particular reason for a Presidential meeting. Hartman just saw the President two months ago. And in the intervening period, little that is new or of particular consequence has occurred.

PD
Paula Dobriansky and Roger Robinson concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you meet with Hartman.

Approve *10:30*

Disapprove _____

That on the basis of what Hartman has to say to you, you decide on whether he should see the President.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

*Friday, May 20 JB (Hartman informed)
no time with Pres*

cc: Charles Tyson

Attachment:

Tab I State's memorandum, May 10, 1983

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FDG-114/6 #9134

BY *RW* NARA DATE *3/19/13*



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

May 10, 1983

MAY 10 PM: 00

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Appointment Request - Arthur Hartman, US Ambassador
to the USSR

Ambassador Hartman will be in Washington May 18-20 for consultations and would like to meet with President Reagan and with you to review the state of US-Soviet relations. The Ambassador's observations of the leadership situation in the USSR and his feel for the dynamics of Soviet foreign policy and the state of arms control negotiations are particularly timely. We recommend that these meetings be scheduled if possible.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Charles Hill".

Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

National Security Council
The White House

660

Package # 3219

1610
MAY 1 2 1983

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	<u>A</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	<u></u>
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u></u>
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter	<u></u>	<u></u>	<u></u>
Staff Secretary	<u></u>	<u></u>	<u></u>
Sit Room	<u></u>	<u></u>	<u></u>
<u></u>	<u></u>	<u></u>	<u></u>
I-Information	A-Action	R-Retain	D-Dispatch
			N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

Concur with recommendations

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 12, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI JV

SUBJECT: Appointment Request by Ambassador Hartman

Ambassador Hartman will be in town May 18 - 20 and would like to meet with you and the President. His reasons for doing so are routine: to discuss U.S.-Soviet relations, the leadership situation, Soviet foreign policy and arms control. Unless the Ambassador has more specific or compelling reasons for seeing the President, or unless you or the President have cause to see him, I see no particular reason for a Presidential meeting. Hartman just saw the President two months ago. And in the intervening period, little that is new or of particular consequence has occurred.

Paula Dobriansky^{PD} and Roger Robinson concur.RECOMMENDATION

That you meet with Hartman.

Approve_____

Disapprove_____

That on the basis of what Hartman has to say to you, you decide on whether he should see the President.

Approve_____

Disapprove_____

cc: Charles Tyson

Attachment:

Tab I State's memorandum, May 10, 1983

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FOIb-114/6 #9135

BY RW NARA DATE 3/19/13



26
S/S 8314201

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

May 10, 1983 MAY 10 P11:00

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

RECEIVED
SITING ROOM

Subject: Appointment Request - Arthur Hartman, US Ambassador
to the USSR

Ambassador Hartman will be in Washington May 18-20 for consultations and would like to meet with President Reagan and with you to review the state of US-Soviet relations. The Ambassador's observations of the leadership situation in the USSR and his feel for the dynamics of Soviet foreign policy and the state of arms control negotiations are particularly timely. We recommend that these meetings be scheduled if possible.

Charles Hill

Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

MEMORANDUM

Sov / Diplo 27
SYSTEM II
90625
90627

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

May 16, 1983

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI JL

SUBJECT: Ambassador Dobrynin's May 11 Meeting with
Acting Secretary Dam

Attached at Tab I is the State Department's report of the May 11 Dam-Dobrynin meeting where Dobrynin presented the Soviet position on the PL-5 and Lebanon. The non-paper on Lebanon which Dobrynin presented is attached at Tab II.

Dobrynin's comments on both issues reflect standard Soviet formulations and offer little that is new. He repeated the Soviet claim that the PL-5 is a modernization of the SS-13 providing some technical details, and charged that the withdrawal agreement is a cover for the partition of Lebanon.

Dobriansky ^(P) concurs. No comment from Kemp or Kraemer.

Attachments:

Tab I State's memorandum, May 12, 1983, re PL-5
(II 90627)
Tab II Soviet demarche on Lebanon (II 90625)

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE
Declassify on: OADR

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NLS F06-114/6 #91000 37
BY LOS, NARA, DATE 12/13/07



83 MAY 12 P11: 06

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

SYSTEM II
90627~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

SITUATION ROOM

May 12, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK --
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Acting Secretary Dam's Meeting with Dobrynin -- May 11

Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin called on Acting Secretary Dam on the morning of May 11 to deliver two "oral statements" from Moscow -- the first responding to our April 25 request for clarification of the ambiguities surrounding their new PL-5 ICBM, and the second setting out sharp Soviet criticism of the new Lebanese troop withdrawal agreement.

Not surprisingly, the Soviet statement on the PL-5 continued to describe their new ICBM first tested last February 8 as a "modernization" of the existing SS-13. It was not a flat rejection of our April 25 questions, but a lengthy explanation of the Soviet position including some new assertions as to the specific characteristics of the missile and the statement that the weight of the PL-5 is not less than 50% of the throw-weight of the missile.

The Soviet non-paper on Lebanon, which Dobrynin did not elaborate on, was an especially harsh attack on the new withdrawal agreement, charging the "Shultz plan" was the result of U.S. "arm-twisting" and was a cover for the partition of Lebanon. The Acting Secretary strongly rejected these allegations, noting the Soviet characterization of the agreement was basically inaccurate. He called Dobrynin's attention to the dangers of the situation developing through the well-publicized introduction of additional Syrian and PLO forces in Lebanon over the past few days. Citing a particularly troublesome recent TASS commentary on the Middle East, he again urged that the Soviet Union exercise restraint and refrain from actions and statements which might exacerbate tensions in the region. Dobrynin offered no substantive reaction.

The texts of the two speaking notes left by Dobrynin have been forwarded to the White House by separate memorandum.


Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F06-114/6#9152BY L01 NARA, DATE 12/13/07~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
~~DECL: OADR~~



Washington, D.C. 20520

SYSTEM II
90625

JUN 12 1983

May 12, 1983

~~SECRET~~ SITE INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Soviet Demarche on Lebanon

Attached is the text of the demarche on Lebanon delivered by Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin to Acting Secretary Dam on May 11.

Attachment: As stated


Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET~~
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F06-114/6#9153
BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 12/13/07

~~SECRET~~

Translated from the Russian

Soviet May 11 Oral Statement on Lebanon

I am instructed to present the Soviet assessment of what is happening in Lebanon and around it.

Contrary to the assertions of the American side that the U.S. and Israel are undertaking efforts toward finding a peaceful solution in Lebanon, the actual state of affairs indicates otherwise.

The situation in Lebanon is not improving, rather it is continuing to worsen seriously. In essence, attempts are being made actually to dismember Lebanon, to perpetuate the occupation of a part of that country by Israeli forces. The terms of the settlement being imposed on the Lebanese side would undermine the sovereignty of Lebanon, its territorial integrity and independence. The threat to security would not be diminished for the neighboring Arab states, but would become even greater.

One cannot assess otherwise such provocative demands of Tel Aviv, encouraged by the United States, as the establishment of a so-called "security zone" on Lebanese territory, deployment there of the Israeli "monitoring stations," and patrolling by Israeli troops. One can only regard as an encroachment on the sovereign rights of the Lebanese state the attempts to dictate

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NLS FOG-114/6# 9154

BY LOI NARA, DATE 12/13/07

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DECL: OADR

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- 2 -

the composition of its armed forces, the kinds and types of weapons they can be equipped with, and the restrictions on flights of Lebanese aircraft over a considerable part of their own territory.

Nothing similar is envisaged for Israeli territory, though it is precisely Lebanon which, having repeatedly been a victim of aggression on the part of Israel, has every reason to be apprehensive about hostile actions across the Lebanese-Israeli border.

There is no doubt that the "peace agreement" being imposed on Lebanon and placing it in an unequal position does not promise real peace and tranquility for that country. Such a way of treating an independent country is unacceptable and incompatible with the principles of relations among states.

U.S. actions in the affairs of Lebanon -- beginning with support for Israeli aggression and concluding with the current maneuvering aimed at imposing on Beirut the terms of an ultimatum under the pretext of a settlement -- not only are not leading to stability in that region but, on the contrary, are aggravating the Mideast situation and negatively affecting the general international situation.

~~SECRET~~

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- 3 -

The Soviet Union resolutely favors ensuring the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon.

If the U.S. is genuinely striving for a just settlement in Lebanon, then there is one road leading to it: to act in accordance with the resolutions of the U.N. Security Council, which were supported in their day by the U.S. Along that road mutual action between our countries is possible.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

LENCZOWSKI
SYSTEM II
90625
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File 33
Sor/Dupls

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

May 16, 1983

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI JL

SUBJECT: Ambassador Dobrynin's May 11 Meeting with
Acting Secretary Dam

Attached at Tab I is the State Department's report of the May 11 Dam-Dobrynin meeting where Dobrynin presented the Soviet position on the PL-5 and Lebanon. The non-paper on Lebanon which Dobrynin presented is attached at Tab II.

Dobrynin's comments on both issues reflect standard Soviet formulations and offer little that is new. He repeated the Soviet claim that the PL-5 is a modernization of the SS-13 providing some technical details, and charged that the withdrawal agreement is a cover for the partition of Lebanon.

Dobriansky ^{AD} concurs. No comment from Kemp or Kraemer.

Attachments:

Tab I State's memorandum, May 12, 1983, re PL-5
(II 90627)
Tab II Soviet demarche on Lebanon (II 90625)

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F06-114/G#9138

BY MT NARA, DATE 12/13/07

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Fran, John dictated this memo
5/20, Orig given to Adm P.
Bud will dacom to P on Sat.

DP

JEX
File JL Cherry
USSR
Dylo 34

INFORMATION

May 21, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: U.S.-Soviet Relations: Decisions on New
Consulates, Cultural Exchange Agreement
and Reciprocity

In several memos in the past month, the State Department has recommended the opening of new consulates in Kiev and New York and beginning negotiations on a new cultural exchange agreement. At the last meeting you had with Secretary Shultz on these and other bilateral issues, you agreed that these two issues be presented again with more elaboration of the pros and cons. State then sent such a memo to me. Unfortunately, it did not include the views of other agencies.

Specifically, Defense and the Intelligence Community are concerned with the hostile intelligence presence. As I understand it, however, views of both sides do not appear to be irreconcilable -- especially on the cultural exchange agreement -- as certain steps are taken, such as visa control, to help ensure strict reciprocity.

I have, therefore, requested State to produce an interagency approved paper taking all views into account, in preparation for an NSC meeting scheduled for June 10 to present these issues to you in the presence of your National Security Council.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F06-114/6#9139

BY LOI, NARA, DATE 12/13/07

JL

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON~~SECRET~~*Sensitive**May 23, 1983*

MEMORANDUM FOR:

*Paula Dobrynin
John Lenzowski*

FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER

SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz's Evening Report of *May 19*

The following excerpt is for your information only. Please do not refer to it in any discussions.

1. Meeting with Dobrynin. I called Dobrynin in on a number of topics today, and we met for an hour and twenty minutes. I began by making points on four issues. On Sakharov, I expressed our concern about his health and that of his wife, and urged the Soviets to let the couple come to Moscow for medical treatment; he replied that this was an internal matter. On MBFR, I told Dobrynin I would have something more to say to him in some weeks' time. On the Long Term Grain Agreement, I told him I was not in a position to respond to his suggestion that the scheduled June 1-2 agricultural consultations be used for preliminary talks, but thought it a good idea in general; he said we could deal confidently on the agreement with the man leading the Soviet delegation. On the Lebanon-Israel agreement, I reviewed the negotiating history, stressed that the Lebanese will deal with their problems best without foreign forces in the country, and said now that the Israelis were on board we should get the others out; Dobrynin said he would report to Moscow but had no specific questions. In a tete-a-tete at the end, I registered our strong concerns about Syria, and the dangers of the situation. Dobrynin said that he understood, and that the Soviets had counselled the Syrians to be careful; I said we had done the same with the Israelis. We also reviewed the state of play in the bilateral relationship. I said we were not satisfied, and in this situation it was hard for us to envisage high-level meetings unless there was more progress on the issues. Dobrynin said the Soviets were not satisfied either. They think they have made more moves than we have, and consider that we were essentially hostile toward them. Dobrynin and I agreed that we need to keep in touch, and we will be meeting again in the first week of June. I will be sending you a more complete report on the meeting tomorrow. (SECRET/SENSITIVE) *D*

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLS

F06-114/b#9100

BY

*LOJ*NARA, DATE *12/13/07*

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 15, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI

SUBJECT: Soviet Request for Meeting with Feldstein

The economic attache from the Soviet embassy has requested a meeting with Martin Feldstein. The general consensus here, at State and CIA, is that Feldstein should not meet with such a low-ranking officer, but should offer that the attache meet with one of his junior assistants.

This is a matter of reciprocity. The access of our officers in Moscow to high Soviet officials is extremely limited, and until it improves, we should not give the Soviets here any special favors.

Jack Matlock concurs.

Recommendation

That you inform Feldstein that he direct the Soviet attache to one of his assistants.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

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NLRR FD6-114/6 #9140
BY RW NARA DATE 1/20/15

4/48 422
Reciprocity
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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

37
JR responded
6/15/83

June 13, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JACK MATLOCK

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT *Bih*

SUBJECT: Boris Golovin

The Soviet Economic Attache, Boris Golovin, has called Marty Feldstein asking to meet. Judge Clark would like your views, coordinated with State and CIA, as to whether the two should meet.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FD6-114/6 #9141

3Y RW NARA DATE 1/20/15

File 4905
Diplo 38

SS 8321805

SYSTEM II
90894

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 15, 1983

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
From: George P. Shultz
Subject: My Meeting with Dobrynin, July 15

I had an hour-long session with Dobrynin this morning. It was business-like, focussing on the Madrid wrap-up and the Shcharanskiy problem, but also U.S.-Soviet relations across-the-board.

I led off the discussion by emphasizing the importance we attached to the Soviet commitments on human rights as part of the conclusion of the Madrid meeting. I especially stressed the Shcharanskiy case, quoting the commitment the Soviets made to us that he would be released from jail and allowed to leave the country shortly after January 1984. I also urged that they release him when half his term is over on September 15 or earlier, given his ill health. Having set the context, I informed him we intended to join the consensus at Madrid.

Dobrynin took in my points without reacting and then gave me a long "oral statement" (translation attached). The statement predictably begins with arms control and makes points supporting their freeze proposal, complaining about our negative reaction. Otherwise, it includes the following:

--On INF and START, it contains standard criticisms of our positions, calls on us to respond to their move to limit rather than ban ALCMs, but also conveys their agreement to discuss our CBM ideas at Geneva in a special working group which they had resisted until now.

--On MBFR, the Soviets agree to continued exploratory discussions with Ambassador Abramowitz in Vienna and state their willingness to consider further verification measures beyond what they have tabled, but are otherwise not helpful on substance.

--On BMD, the statement turns aside our proposal to discuss ballistic missile defense on an official basis in START and the SCC, reaffirming the propagandistic Soviet proposal for open discussion among scientists. At this point, I told Dobrynin that I thought existing official channels were sufficient to discuss this issue. If necessary, of course, our delegations could be augmented by appropriate scientists, but a confidential official setting was necessary. We concluded by urging each other to reconsider positions.

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BY LOJ NARA DATE 12/13/07

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- 2 -

--On bilateral issues, Dobrynin stated Soviet agreement to hold negotiations on the opening of Consulates General in Kiev and New York and on a new cultural exchange agreement. He also gave the expected consent to extension of the transportation and atomic energy agreements. To Dobrynin's query as to whether we were thinking in terms of a more narrowly-defined cultural agreement, I responded that we are prepared to have a broader agreement similar to the last one.

Dobrynin also asked about my plans at the UNGA this year. When I said that I thought my participation would be much the same as last year, he responded that Gromyko's plans would also be similar to the past. I took this comment as some confirmation of other reports that Andropov does not plan to come to the UNGA.

We also discussed in carefully non-committal terms the possibility of a meeting with Gromyko in Madrid. Dobrynin noted that Gromyko was planning to begin his vacation on July 25. I said that we were not pushing for a Foreign Ministers' meeting to conclude the Madrid meeting, but that we would look at the issue as it arose.

was said
Finally, we touched briefly on summit prospects. Here we agreed that a summit is desirable in principle but should be well prepared and offer a good prospect of substantive results.

In conclusion, I emphasized once again that although arms control is important to us, as to the Soviets, Soviet conduct on regional issues has caused tremendous damage to the relationship in the past, and no issue is more central than human rights. I noted that we welcome progress on the Pentecostals, but reiterated once again that progress is necessary on Shcharanskiy. In general, I stressed that we have to address the issues before us across-the-board if we wish to get anywhere. Dobrynin did not disagree.

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Drafted:EUR/SOV:BLPascoe
7/15/83 632-9559

Cleared:EUR/SOV:TSimons
EUR:RBurt/MPalmer
P:LSEagleburger

amck

BY H0J, NARA, DATE 12/13/07~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~Soviet Oral Statement of July 15, 1983

Translated from the Russian

1. It has been noted in Moscow that the Secretary of State in a conversation with the Soviet Ambassador spoke of the wish of the U.S. leadership to see Soviet-American relations somewhat more improved.

As is known, we, for our part, have already expressed the view as to the basis on which Soviet-American relations can and should be built, if one is guided by the goal of their improvement, which would undoubtedly be of great significance both in itself and from the standpoint of the positive impact it would have on the entire international situation.

Unfortunately, frankly speaking, we see no signs of readiness on the part of the U.S. to move jointly in this direction and to introduce substantive corrective changes into its policy with regard to the Soviet Union. In fact, the Secretary of State himself did not deny that we may have reasons to draw such a conclusion

Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that it would be possible realistically to count on the normalization of Soviet-American relations in the absence of a mutual desire to seek points of contiguity or to take into account one another's interests on the central issues determining the nature of those relations and, above all, on questions concerning the security interests of our two countries -- in other words, questions of war and peace.

But it is precisely in searching for a common language on questions of safeguarding and consolidating peace and strengthening international security that lies the key both to

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- 2 -

the rectification of the abnormal situation that has developed in our relations and to the improvement of the general political atmosphere in the world.

In this connection we would like to draw attention, in particular, to the necessity in the present situation -- as has been emphasized at the recent meeting in Moscow of the leaders of a number of Socialist countries -- of taking immediate steps capable of pushing back the danger of war and turning the course of world events in the direction of detente, toward healthier relations among states.

Guided by these objectives, the Soviet Union has put forward a program of far-reaching measures aimed at putting an end to the perilous development of events and ensuring a decisive turn for the better in the international situation. It would seem there is no need to enumerate all of those measures once again. They are well known. We would like only to recall our recent proposal that all the nuclear powers freeze their nuclear arsenals.

It is regrettable that the U.S. side hastened to express a negative reaction to this proposal. The arguments advanced in this regard can in no way be considered convincing. Such a position can only reinforce the view that the U.S. is not interested in taking practical steps to curb the nuclear arms race.

We would like to hope that the American side will consider this question further. A positive answer to the nuclear arms freeze proposal would demonstrate U.S. readiness, together with the Soviet Union, to set a good example in the cause of peace.

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- 3 -

2. Of great importance, without a doubt, are the negotiations now being conducted between our two countries on nuclear arms. The state of affairs taking shape at the Geneva negotiations on the limitation of nuclear arms in Europe is, to be frank, totally unsatisfactory.

Of one asks the question what the reasons are, there can only be one and the same answer: the explanation lies in the absolutely unconstructive position of the American side, one that is, indeed, totally divorced from reality.

It is impossible, after all, seriously to count on reaching agreement when the objective of the negotiations is posed not as the reduction of European nuclear arms, but as the deployment in Europe of new American missiles, whose numbers we are called upon now to discuss. Such an approach can in no way be regarded as constructive.

We would also like to express the hope that the American leadership will once again weigh from all angles all the consequences of such a course.

3. What is also taking place in Geneva at the negotiations on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms looks no better. Here too there is no evidence whatsoever of a desire on the part of the U.S. side to seek mutually acceptable solutions.

References to the fact that some flexibility has appeared in the U.S. position are not substantiated by reality. All this "flexibility" is designed to achieve the same purpose: to destroy the existing structure of the Soviet strategic forces while leaving the U.S. a free hand to build up its own nuclear arms.

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~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 4 -

Of course, we will not accept this, and no prospect of reaching agreement on the problem of strategic arms will emerge, until the U.S. approach to this problem is brought into line with the principle of equality and equal security.

For our part we have proposed solutions which do not prejudice anyone's security. Guided by a desire to seek mutually acceptable outcomes on specific issues, the Soviet side has taken a substantial step to meet the U.S. position: it expressed readiness to agree not to a total ban on air-launched cruise missiles but to their limitation to a specified level in the context of the resolution of other questions. So far, no adequate reciprocal step on the part of the American side has followed.

As to the confidence-building measures being discussed in Geneva, we remain convinced that such measures should be an integral part of the general agreement on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms. Proceeding on this basis and taking into account the expressed readiness of the U.S. side to consider not only its own confidence measures but also the ones proposed by the Soviet side, we do not object to continuing the discussion of such measures at the Geneva negotiations, including in a special working group.

Overall, we would like to hope that the U.S. government will weigh carefully the situation that now obtains, and that it will take steps which would open up the possibilities for reaching a mutually acceptable agreement on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms. It is our deep conviction that the U.S. should be interested in this no less than the Soviet Union.

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- 5 -

4. We are bewildered by the reaction of the U.S. side to our proposal concerning a discussion of the consequences of the creation of a large-scale ABM system.

The U.S. idea of creating a comprehensive ABM system not only is in direct contradiction with the 1972 treaty of unlimited duration between the USSR and the U.S. on the renunciation of wide-area ABM systems, but also does not correspond to the aims of the current negotiations on strategic arms. The creation of such a system would, in effect, result in discarding the very principle on which negotiations on strategic arms -- both offensive and defensive -- have thus far been based.

The rationale for our proposal to convene a meeting of authoritative scientists of our two countries is to form a clearer perception of the nature and scale of the consequences for the entire strategic situation that could result from the development of a comprehensive ABM system. The American side alters the subject of the exchange of views that we are proposing: it, in essence, proposes to give the discussions such a form and content as if the advisability of developing comprehensive ABM systems were a given, and as if the only thing to do were to discuss practical questions connected with it.

We can in no way agree with such an approach. And we confirm our proposal that Soviet and American scientists meet and assess in an authoritative way a problem which, in the long run, could have very serious and dangerous consequences.

5. On the part of the American side there appears to be a readiness to make an effort to overcome the impasse at the

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- 6 -

Vienna negotiations on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe, and to forego the fruitless data discussion. Such an intention would be welcome. However, an examination of those preconditions which are set forth and the way the verification issue is posed does not confirm such a conclusion. In this case, too, the negotiations would be deadlocked, albeit by a different method.

The socialist countries have recently put forward at the Vienna negotiations a draft agreement designed to bring those obviously protracted negotiations to a speedy and successful conclusion. This draft also provides for verification measures corresponding to the task posed and adequate to the scale of the reductions. In this regard, we do not rule out the possibility of also considering certain additional measures, if the need arises for them in the process of practical reductions. What is necessary, however, is that the verification measures not be an end in themselves, inasmuch as the purpose of the negotiations is different.

If the American side is actually prepared to conduct constructive discussions, the head of the Soviet delegation in Vienna will be ready to listen to the considerations of the U.S. representative.

6. Concerning the Madrid meeting: We are working actively and constructively in favor of its successful conclusion. It is also from this perspective that we approach the well-known initiative of the government of Spain. The Soviet delegation in Madrid is maintaining appropriate contacts with the U.S. delegation. What is important is that no new and fresh obstacles be raised to a positive conclusion to this meeting.

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- 7 -

7. On the set of questions on bilateral relations, our position was presented concretely and thoroughly in February to the Secretary of State. At that time and subsequently, the U.S. side on more than one occasion confirmed that it owed us an answer. Since the June 18 conversation between the Secretary of State and the Soviet Ambassador touched upon only some of those questions, we proceed on the assumption that the American side is continuing to consider the views that we have expressed.

In regard to what was said by the Secretary of State in that conversation, we would like, first of all, to stress the need not to mix questions of mutual interest with questions concerning only one side -- let alone those strictly in its own internal competence. It is simply not proper to raise such questions.

With respect to the few specific proposals made by the Secretary of State, we would like to say the following.

a) We have no objections to the extension of the agreements on cooperation in the field of transportation as well as on peaceful applications of nuclear energy.

b) Taking into account the readiness of the U.S. side to do so, we agree to hold negotiations on the opening of Consulates General in New York and Kiev.

c) In principle, we have no objections to holding negotiations on the conclusion of a new agreement on exchanges in the field of culture. However, it is not clear what is meant here by the U.S. side, since the previously existing agreement dealt with contacts, exchanges and cooperation not only in the cultural area, but also in a number of other

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fields. In any case the conclusion of such an agreement -- and it is important that the American side know this beforehand -- can be considered possible only given readiness on the part of the U.S. to provide official guarantees of security for Soviet participants in such exchanges.

Second Soviet Oral Statement, July 15, 1983

As to the practical discussion of the questions of Consulates General and a cultural exchanges agreement, the Soviet Embassy in Washington has been instructed to conduct such a discussion with the participation, as necessary, of appropriate representatives from Moscow.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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(S/S 8322974)

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8/83

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: New Map of Areas Closed to Soviet Diplomats

We have reviewed and concur in the recommendations proposed by State as set forth in their memorandum of July 29.

Robert M. Kimmitt
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By smf NARA, Date 6/12/02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

National Security Council
The White House

System # I

Package# 5294

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87-5002-75: 22
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Executive Secretary	<u>1</u>	<u>mm</u>	
John Poindexter			
Bud McFarlane			
Jacque Hill			
Judge Clark			
John Poindexter			
Executive Secretary			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			
<u>Matlock</u>	<u>2</u>		<u>4</u>

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Act

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

Joch: Prepare a memo indicating our concurrence.
Kemmitt -> Hill
Bels

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**National Security Council
The White House**

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8:20
SEQUENCE TO

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Executive Secretary	<u>1</u>	<u>MML</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>2</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>✓</u>
Bud McFarlane			
Jacque Hill	<u>✓</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Judge Clark	<u>✓</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>✓</u>
John Poindexter			
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Judge: This is a fairly routine action, but I wanted you to see Josh's good note in TP 3. Bol

I decided you should see TP 3.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~INFORMATION~~ACTION

August 2, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: New Map of Areas Closed to Soviet Diplomats

State has submitted, in the memorandum attached at Tab I, a new map of areas in the U.S. closed to Soviet diplomats and a draft note to the Soviet Embassy notifying it of the changes in the travel rules.

These changes were coordinated with Defense and other interested agencies and should insure both more exact reciprocity in the travel controls and more effective protection of security-sensitive areas. I therefore consider them desirable and recommend that they be approved.

One aspect of State's proposed Note deserves special attention. That is the reiteration of our longstanding offer to abolish travel controls on Soviet diplomats if they drop their controls on ours. This has been the U.S. position since we instituted travel controls, in response to Soviet controls, in 1952, and I agree with State that we should hold to this position. It is not only consistent with traditional U.S. policy, but with our desire for better access to Soviet society and for more effective verification of arms control agreements. There is no likelihood that it will be accepted, but it should be maintained to make clear that our controls are established on the basis of reciprocity, and that we can live with a more open system of travel if the Soviets are willing.

Oliver North, Richard Beal and Gilbert Rye concur.

Tab I Hill to Clark Memo with attachments

Tab II Proposed Kimmitt/Hill Memorandum

Approve Kimmitt / Hill memo

Yes *[Signature]*

No —

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FOC-11476 #9142

BY *RW* NARA DATE 3/19/13

United States Department of State 5294

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 29, 1983

A 1: 26

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: New Map of Areas Closed to Travel by Soviet Diplomats

As part of the Administration's effort to enforce reciprocity with the Soviet Union, the Department of State has for some time been engaged in revising the list of areas closed to travel by Soviet diplomats in the United States. This map of closed areas was last revised in 1967. Since then, the Soviets themselves have revised their map. Moreover, there have been substantial changes in the areas to which we deny access to Soviet travelers. A prime example of this is the Silicon Valley area of California, which we have closed de facto for some time and which will now be formally closed.

The new map will match the reductions in percentage of closed territory made by the Soviets in 1978. It will also add Alaska and Hawaii -- areas excluded from the 1967 map. By closing all points in Hawaii, and the five major cities in Alaska, we will be able to reduce the percentage of closed area with only a modest reduction in the actual square mileage of closed areas in the 48 contiguous states, and at the same time meet all the major security concerns of the Department of Defense.

Attached at Tab 1 is a draft diplomatic note to the Soviet Embassy announcing these changes, at Tab 2 a list of areas proposed for closing, at Tab 3 a list of open cities in closed areas, and at Tab 4 a list of approved transit routes through closed areas. There are, of course, substantial changes in the lists of closed areas, open cities, and approved transit routes. The draft note, which sets forth the framework of our travel control program and delineates the note-free travel zones, does not incorporate any procedural changes in the system. The only major change in the draft note from the 1967 version is a complete revision of the accessible area for Soviets assigned to the Consulate General in San Francisco. The note also re-states existing regulations and reduces to writing some practices long-followed, but not previously included in any formal notification to the Soviet Embassy.

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DECL: OADR

BY LOJ NARA, DATE 12/13/07

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Attached at Tab 5 is a list of significant cities and areas that will be newly opened or closed. We anticipate presenting this package to the Soviets in a positive spirit, noting its reciprocal nature but also indicating that a number of previously closed cities and areas will now be open to them. As has been our practice since 1952, and in accordance with long-standing U.S. policy, we intend to re-state our offer to abolish travel controls on a mutual basis.

This proposal has been fully discussed with the Army, Air Force and Navy to ensure that all areas of military sensitivity have been included in closed areas. This project has also been fully discussed with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. All areas of concern have been fully worked out at the working level with each of the services and the Bureau. In addition, we have also consulted the National Security Agency and, to the extent possible, have met their concerns as well. Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Burt will be transmitting copies of the proposed closed areas to members of the Interagency Coordinating Committee for US-Soviet Affairs (ICCUSA), which is comprised of all agencies concerned with US-Soviet affairs, for their comment. The Bureau of Intelligence and Research will be transmitting this material to intelligence community agencies not represented on ICCUSA.

The new maps will enter their final stage of production about August 15. Any proposals for changes received after that date would, naturally, present nearly insurmountable problems to incorporate.

Charles Hill

Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:
As stated.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The Department of State refers to its note of July 26, 1967, to the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, concerning regulations applicable to certain Soviet citizens traveling in the United States.

The Soviet Government first instituted a system of stringent travel restrictions for foreigners in 1941. After attempts to secure the abolition of travel controls and closed areas in the Soviet Union, the United States reluctantly instituted its own system of closed areas for Soviet citizens on January 3, 1955. Since then, the United States has on many occasions proposed mutual abolition or reduction of all travel restrictions. The United States avails itself of this opportunity to reiterate its offer to abolish or reduce travel restrictions or closed areas on the basis of reciprocity.

The United States Government, taking into account Note. No. 1/Pr of January 4, 1978, issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, has reduced the percentage of United States territory closed to Soviet travelers. The areas closed to Soviet travelers are listed in enclosure 1. Open cities in closed areas are listed in enclosure 2. Open transit routes through closed areas are listed in enclosure 3. Special permission is required for travel to United States possessions, territories and areas under United States administration.

These regulations apply to travel in the fifty United States by all Soviet citizens possessing valid passports issued by the Government of the USSR, except for Soviet citizen officers and employees of the Secretariat of the United Nations while their conduct is the responsibility of the Secretary General of the United Nations and Soviet tourists on private visits to the United States. Soviet citizens who are visiting the United States within the framework of US-USSR exchanges agreements may visit closed areas in accordance with the particular exchange program and itinerary as approved by the Department of State.

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NLS F06-114/6-49144BY 101 NARA, DATE 12/13/07

Except as otherwise provided herein, all Soviet citizens to whom these regulations apply who have not declared their itinerary for travel in the United States at the time of application for a United States visa must submit official notification at least forty-eight hours in advance of any travel to any point outside the free-movement zones of New York, Washington, or San Francisco as defined herein. In the case of Soviet citizens assigned permanently or temporarily to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, the Soviet Mission to the United Nations, or to Soviet commercial organizations in the United States, this notification must be addressed in writing to the Department of State, the Army, Navy or Air Force Foreign Liaison Offices, or the United States Mission to the United Nations, as appropriate. In the case of Soviet correspondents temporarily or permanently assigned in the United States, written notification is to be addressed to the Department of State. In the case of persons present in the United States in the framework of US-USSR exchange agreements notification is to be made to the Department of State. Notifications will include the names of all travelers, description of their itinerary, identification of means of transportation used, route numbers of all roads traveled by car listed in the order in which the roads are taken, and the location of each overnight stop. Listing of any city by name in the itinerary shall be deemed to include only such areas as are within the city limits unless specifically stated otherwise. (In the case of diplomats and journalists the listing of San Francisco, New York or Washington shall be deemed to include all areas within the respective free-movement zones.)

Travel by railroad or commercial airlines through closed areas is permitted when necessary to reach open areas or open cities in otherwise closed areas. During such transit travel Soviet citizens may not leave the immediate vicinity of rail or

air terminals within closed areas. Transit travel by automobile is permitted only on the designated transit routes listed in enclosure 2. While utilizing these transit routes, no stops or deviations are permitted except at public facilities (i.e., restaurants, gas stations and roadside rests) in the immediate vicinity of the transit route.

Soviet citizens subject to these regulations may not hire unchauffered motor vehicles nor may they charter helicopters, ships or aircraft. Boat travel through closed areas or within United States territorial waters bordering closed areas is also prohibited. Unless specifically authorized, entry into or stopping in the vicinity of identifiable military installations is prohibited.

The zone of free movement in the Washington, D.C. area for diplomats and journalists, and for other Soviets subject to these regulations and resident in Washington, D.C., is defined as follows. First, all open areas within 25 miles of the White House. Second, King's Dominion amusement park in Doswell, Virginia via route I-95. Third, Front Royal, Virginia via routes I-66 and U.S. 340. Fourth, Luray, Virginia via routes I-66 and U.S. 340. Fifth, Annapolis, Maryland via route U.S. 50. Sixth, Colonial Williamsburg and William and Mary College at Williamsburg, Virginia via routes I-95, I-295 and I-64. Sixth, Ocean City, Maryland via route U.S. 50. Seventh, the Soviet recreational property at Pioneer Point, Maryland via routes U.S. 50, U.S. 301 and Maryland 18.

The zone of free movement in the New York City area for diplomats and journalists, and for other Soviets subject to these regulations and resident in New York City, is defined as all open areas in the States of New York and Connecticut within 25 miles of Columbus Circle, and in the State of New Jersey those portions of the counties of Bergen, Essex (except for the City of Nutley), Hudson (except for the City of Bayonne),

Middlesex, Monmouth, Morris, Passaic, and Union within 25 miles of Columbus Circle.

The zone of free movement in the San Francisco area for diplomats and journalists, and for other Soviets subject to these regulations and resident in San Francisco, is defined as follows. First, the City and County of San Francisco. Second, San Francisco International Airport via route U.S. 101 from and to the City and County of San Francisco. Third, in Alameda and Contra Costa Counties (via the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge) an area bounded by California Route 17 from the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge to its intersection with route I-580, thence east on route I-580 to route I-680, thence north on route I-680 to California Route 24, thence west on California Route 24 to the point where California Route 24 intersects an arc of 18.5 statute miles radius centered at the intersection of the roads Skyview Way and City View Way (southwest of Twin Peaks Park) in San Francisco, thence northwest along the arc to the Contra Costa County/Marin County boundary in San Pablo Bay. Fourth, in Marin County (via the Golden Gate Bridge) an area bounded by a continuation of the 18.5 mile radius arc from its intersection with the Contra Costa/Marin County boundary in San Pablo Bay to its intersection with route U.S. 101 in Marin County, thence north on U.S. 101 to Lucas Valley Road, thence west on Lucas Valley Road to Nicasio Valley Road, west on Nicasio Valley Road to Petaluma-Pt. Reyes Road, and west on Petaluma-Pt. Reyes Road to its intersection with California Route 1 (Shoreline Highway), and thence north on California Route 1 for two statute miles, thence by a line due west to the low water line in Tomales Bay, thence, following the low water line, along the west side of Tomales Bay to the Pacific Ocean and south to the Golden Gate Bridge. Drake's Estero, Estero de Limatour and Bolinas Lagoon are included within the free movement zone. In Marin County, only those portions of San

Francisco Bay within one kilometer of the low water line are included in the free movement zone. Angel Island is included in the free movement zone and may be reached by any commercial means of transport.

The Chief of Mission of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, and the Principal Representative of the USSR to the United Nations in New York may travel without prior notification by any means of transport not otherwise prohibited herein to open areas and cities in the United States accompanied by members of his or her immediate family, an interpreter, and personal chauffeur. Family members unaccompanied by the Chief of Mission may also travel without prior notification and may be accompanied by a chauffeur if travel is by automobile.

Embassy and Consulate General personnel, and Soviet journalists, may travel by any means of transport not otherwise prohibited herein, on the basis of notification in writing at least 24 hours in advance (eight hours of which correspond to one working day), between Washington and San Francisco and between Washington and New York, and to cities and towns otherwise open to travel by Soviet official personnel which are located either on the interstate highway network in the States of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, West Virginia, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, and Tennessee, or in the State of California on interstate route 80 and on interstate route 5 north of Kern County.

This note does not modify or supersede the provisions of the Department's note of March 18, 1983, regarding the furnishing of travel services by the Office of Foreign Missions.

The United States Government wishes to emphasize again that its firm preference is to abolish all restrictions on free travel, and repeats its earlier offers to discuss with the Soviet Government any proposal to this end.

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DRAFT

Enclosures:

1. Areas closed to Soviet citizens subject to US travel regulations.

2. Open cities in closed areas.

3. Open transit routes through closed areas.

Department of State,
Washington, _____, 1983.

Enclosure 1

AREAS CLOSED TO SOVIET CITIZENS
SUBJECT TO US TRAVEL REGULATIONS

Names listed under each State are names of
counties, unless otherwise indicated.

Mississippi River (entire length)

ALABAMA

Blount
Calhoun
Coffee
De Kalb
Dale
Etowah
Fayette
Geneva
Henry
Jackson
Jefferson
Lamar
Marion
Marshall
Madison
Russell
St. Clair
Talladega
Walker
Winston

ALASKA

City of Anchorage
City of Fairbanks
City of Juneau
City of Ketchikan
City of Nome

ARIZONA

Apache
Cochise
Coconino
Maricopa
Mohave
Navaho
Pima
Pinal
Santa Cruz

ARKANSAS

Cleburne
Conway
Crittenden
Cross
Faulkner
Jefferson
Lee
Mississippi
Monroe
Ouachita
Pulaski
St. Francis
Van Buren
White
Woodruff

CALIFORNIA

#Alameda
#Contra Costa
Fresno
Humboldt
Inyo
Kern
*Los Angeles
Merced
Monterey
Napa
Orange
Riverside
Sacramento
San Bernardino
San Diego
San Joaquin
San Luis Obispo
San Mateo
Santa Barbara
Santa Clara
Solano
Sonoma
Yuba

COLORADO

Adams
Arapahoe
Bent
Boulder
City of Denver
Douglas
Elbert
El Paso
Jefferson
Las Animas
Logan
Powers
Pueblo
Teller
Weld

CONNECTICUT

Fairfield
Hartford
New London

DELAWARE

Kent

FLORIDA

Alachua
Baker
Bay
Bradford
Brevard
Columbia
Dade
Duval
Franklin
Gulf
Hillsborough
Holmes
Monroe
Nassau
Orange
Osceola
Okaloosa
Polk
Pinellas
Santa Rosa
Seminole
Union
Walton

GEORGIA

Bibb
Bryan
Bullock
Burke
Camden
Cobb
Chattahouchee
Columbia
Crawford
Dawson
DeKalb
Fanin
Forsyth
Fulton
Houston
Jefferson
Jenkins
Lincoln
Lumpkin
Marion
McDuffie
Muscogee
Quitman
Richmond
Stewart
Talbot
Taylor
Union
White

HAWAII
All points

IDAHO

Butte
Canyon
Elmore
Fremont
Owyhee
Payette

ILLINOIS

Carroll
Cook
De Kalb
Du Page
Henry
Kane
Lake
Lee
Mercer
Ogle
Rock Island
Scott
St. Clair
Whiteside
Will

INDIANA

Allen
Bartholomew
Boone
Brown
Clark
Daviess
Decatur
Dearborn
Floyd
Franklin
Greene
Hamilton
Hancock
Jackson
Jefferson
Jennings
Johnson
Lawrence
Marion
Martin
Miami
Morgan
Ohio
Ripley
Scott
Shelby
Switzerland
Vermilion

IOWA

Clinton
Des Moines
Louisa
Mills
Muscatine
Pottawatamie
Scott

KANSAS

Butler
Chataqua
Cherokee
Crawford
Cowley
Douglas
Elk
Harvey
Jefferson
Johnson
Kingman
Labette
Leavenworth
Meosho
Montgomery
Reno
Sedgwick
Shawnee
Sumner
Wilson

KENTUCKY

Bourbon
Bullitt
Calloway
Carlisle
Christian
Clark
Fulton
Graves
Hickman
Hardin
Jefferson
Lyon
Marshall
Madison
McCracken
Meade
Oldham
Todd
Trigg
Trimble

LOUISIANA

Beauregard
Bossier
Caddo
De Soto
Jefferson
Natchitoches
Plaquemines
Rapides
Sabine
St. Bernard
St. Charles
Vernon
Webster

MAINE

Androscoggin
Aroostook
Cumberland
Kennebec
Lincoln
Penobscot
Sagadahoc
Somerset
Washington
York

MARYLAND

Allegany
**Anne Arundel
Baltimore
Charles
Frederick
Harford
Howard
Kent
Washington

MASSACHUSETTS

Barnstable
Essex
Middlesex
Norfolk
Plymouth
Suffolk
Worcester

MICHIGAN

Arenac
Charlevoix
Emmett
Iosco
Macomb
Marquette

MINNESOTA

City of Minneapolis
City of St. Paul
Hennepin
Ramsey

MISSISSIPPI

Hancock
Harrison
Jackson
Lowndes

DRAFTMISSOURI

Benton
Barton
Bates
Boone
Camden
Cass
Cedar
Cooper
Dallas
Dent
Henry
Hickory
Howard
Iron
Jackson
Jasper
Jefferson
Laclede
Madison
Moniteau
Morgan
Pettis
Pulaski
Reynolds
Shannon
Sr. Francois
St. Genieve
Saline
St. Clair
St. Louis
Texas
Vernon

MONTANA

Cascade
Chouteau
Fergus
Judith Basin
Liberty
Pondera
Teton
Toole
Wheatland

NEBRASKA

Adams
Banner
Burt
Cheyenne
Douglas
Hall
Kimball
Sarpy

NEVADA

Clark
Lincoln
Mineral
Nye

NEW HAMPSHIRE

Hillsborough
Rockingham

NEW JERSEY

Atlantic
#Bergen
Burlington
Camden
#Essex
#Hudson
Mercer
#Monmouth
#Morris
Ocean
#Passaic
Salem
#Union

NEW MEXICO

Bernalillo
Curry
Dona Ana
Lincoln
Los Alamos
McKinley
Mora
Otero
Roosevelt
Santa Fe
Sierra
Socorro
Taos
Torrance

NEW YORK

Albany
Broome
Cayuga
Clinton
Erie
Jefferson
Lewis
Madison
Niagara
Oneida
Onondaga
St. Lawrence
Saratoga
Schenectady
Seneca
Suffolk
Tioga

NORTH CAROLINA

Brunswick
Buncombe
Cumberland
Dare
Harnett
Hoke
Hyde
Johnston
Madison
Moore
Sampson
Scotland
Transylvania
Wayne

NORTH DAKOTA

Bottineau
Burke
Burleigh
Cass
Cavalier
Emmons
Grant
Grand Forks
Griggs
McHenry
McLean
Mercer
Morton
Mountrail
Nelson
Oliver
Pembina
Ramsey
Renville
Sioux
Sheridan
Steele
Walsh
Ward

OHIO

Ashland
Ashtabula
Auglaize
Allen
Butler
Champaign
Clark
Delaware
Franklin
Greene
Hardin
Logan
Madison
Marion
Miami
Morrow
Medina
Montgomery
Pike
Preble
Portage
Richland
Shelby
Summit
Union

OKLAHOMA

Comanche
Jackson
Oklahoma
Pittsburg

OREGON

Coos
Douglas
Morrow
Multnomah
Umatilla
Washington

PENNSYLVANIA

Adams
Allegheny
Beaver
Centre
Cumberland
Dauphin
Franklin
Lackawanna
Lebanon
Monroe
Montgomery
York

SOUTH CAROLINA

Aiken
Barnwell
Beaufort
Berkeley
Calhoun
Charleston
Colleton
Dorchester
Edgefield
Horry
Lexington
McCormick
Orangeburg
Richland
Sumter

SOUTH DAKOTA

Butte
Corson
Haakon
Jackson
Lawrence
Meade
Pennington
Ziebach

TENNESSEE

Anderson
Blount
Bradley
Benton
Cocke
Carroll
Cheatham
Coffee
Crockett
Dyer
Decatur
Dickson
Franklin
Greene
Grundy
Hamblen
Hamilton
Hawkins
Henry
Houston
Humphreys
Jefferson
Knox
Loudon
Lauderdale
Lincoln
Marion
Meigs
Monroe
McMinn
Montgomery
Moore
Obion
Polk
Perry
Rhea
Roane
Sequatchie
Sevier
Stewart
Sullivan
Unicoi
Washington
Weakley

TEXAS

Bell
Bexar
Bowie
Coryell
Dallas
El Paso
Harris
Harrison
Hunt
Lampasas
McLennan
Potter
Randall
Tarrant
Taylor
Tom Green
Travis

UTAH

Davis
Salt Lake
Tooele
Weber

VERMONT

Chittenden

VIRGINIA

Albermarle
Campbell
Clarke
Craig
Gloucester
Isle Of Wight
King George
#Loudon
Matthews
Montgomery
Northampton
Prince William
Pulaski
Surry
York
City of James
City of
Chesapeake
City of Newport
News
City of
Virginia Beach
City of Norfolk
City of
Portsmouth
City of Hampton

WASHINGTON

Benton
Clark
Cowlitz
Franklin
Jefferson
King
Kitsap
Kittitas
Lewis
Mason
Pierce
Spokane
Thurston
Yakima

WEST VIRGINIA

Mineral
Pendleton

WISCONSIN

Brown
Kenosha
Milwaukee
Racine

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DRAFT

WYOMING

Big Horn
Campbell
Converse
Goshen
Laramie
Natrona
Platte
Sweetwater
Weston

Except for those portions within the New York, San Francisco or Washington free-movement zones.

* Except for the open city of Los Angeles, as defined in Enclosure No. 2.

** Only those portions north of route 50.

Enclosure 2

OPEN CITIES IN CLOSED AREAS

Albany, New York
Anaheim, California
Atlanta, Georgia
Austin, Texas
Baltimore, Maryland
Birmingham, Alabama
Boston, Massachusetts
Bridgeport, Connecticut
Brookline, Massachusetts
Buffalo, New York
Cambridge, Massachusetts
Camden, New Jersey
Chattanooga, Tennessee
Chicago, Illinois (incl O'Hare Airport)
Columbia, South Carolina
Columbus, Ohio
Great Adventure Amusement Park, New Jersey
Hartford, Connecticut
Independence, Missouri
Indianapolis, Indiana (incl all enclaves)
Kansas City, Kansas
Kansas City, Missouri
Kenner, Louisiana
Knoxville, Tennessee
Lawrence, Kansas
Little Rock, Arkansas
*Los Angeles, California
Louisville, Kentucky
Macon, Georgia
Metairie, Louisiana
Miami Beach, Florida
Miami, Florida
Milwaukee, Wisconsin
New Orleans, Louisiana
Omaha, Nebraska
Phoenix, Arizona
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
Portland, Oregon
Savannah, Georgia
Shreveport, Louisiana
Somerville, Massachusetts
Spokane, Washington
Stamford, Connecticut
Stockton, California
Topeka, Kansas
Trenton, New Jersey
Tucson, Arizona
Worcester, Massachusetts

* Only those portions of the County of Los Angeles within the following boundaries are open: the Pacific Ocean coast from route I-10 (the Santa Monica Freeway) northwest to California route 27 (Topanga Canyon Road) thence north on California route 27 to route US 101 (the Ventura Freeway), east on U.S. 101 to California route 2, and north and east on California route 2 to the area of "Little Jimmy Spring" in Angeles National Forest (34° 20' 43" N., 117° 49' 42" W), then south along a straight line bearing 183.5° East of North to California route 39, thence south on California route 39 to route I-10 (the San Bernardino Freeway), west on route I-10 to California route 19 (Rosemead Blvd.), south on California route 19 to route I-5 (the Santa Ana Freeway), north on route I-5 to Slauson Avenue, west on Slauson Avenue to route I-465 (the San Diego Freeway), north on route I-465 to route I-10 (the Santa Monica Freeway), and west on I-10 to the Pacific Coast. Off shore, along the Pacific Coast between I-10 and California route 29, the open area is limited to an area within 100 meters of the low water line.

OPEN TRANSIT ROUTES
THROUGH CLOSED AREASCalifornia

I-5	Entire length north of Anaheim
I-80	Entire length
I-580	between Castro Valley and junction of I-5
Cal.152	between intersection of I-5 and Santa Cruz County line.

Connecticut

I-95	Entire length
I-91	Entire length

Georgia

I-75	between Macon and Monroe County line
I-16,I-95	between Savannah and Candler County line

Illinois

I-190	between O'Hare Airport and Chicago
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Kansas

I-70	between Kansas City and Lawrence
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Maine

Maine 202	between Rochester and Augusta
Maine 105	between Augusta and Knox County line

Maryland

I-95	entire length
US 301	between Pioneer Pt. and Delaware State line
I-270	between Rockville and junction of I-70
I-70	between junction of I-270 and Pennsylvania State line

Massachusetts

- I-90 entire length
- I-95 between Rhode Island State line and junction of I-90

New Jersey

- N.J. Turnpike entire length
- N.J. 33, 571 between NJT exit 8 and Princeton
- US 206 between NJT and Trenton
- NJ 73 between Philadelphia and NJT exit 4
- I-195 between NJT and Great Adventure
- NJ 38 between Camden and NJT exit 4

New York

- I-87 between Albany county line and Glens Falls
- I-87 between exit 34 and exit 41
- US 9, 9B between I-87 and Rouse's Point through Chazy and Coopersville (transit to and from Canada only)
- I-90 entire length
- I-190 between Buffalo and Niagara Falls

Pennsylvania

- Pa. Turnpike entire length

South Carolina

- I-26 between Columbia and exit 85 (Little Mountain)

Tennessee

- I-75 between Knoxville and Caryville

Virginia

- I-95 between Alexandria and Fredricksburg
- I-66 between Fairfax and Front Royal

Washington

- I-90 between Spokane and Coeur d'Alene

Wisconsin

- I-94 between Milwaukee and Waukesha County line

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MAJOR CHANGES FROM 1967 MAP

CITIES NEWLY CLOSED

Denver, Colo.
Fremont, Calif.
Houston, Texas
Minneapolis, Minn
Oklahoma City, Okla.
San Antonio, Texas
San Jose, Calif.
Seattle, Washington
St. Paul, Minn.

CITIES NEWLY OPENED - 100,000+

Birmingham, Alabama
Cedar Rapids, Iowa
Cleveland, Ohio
Columbia, S.C.
Duluth, Minn.
Indianapolis, Ind.
Little Rock, Ark.
Livonia, Mich.
Louisville, Ky.
Lubbock, Texas
Memphis, Tenn.
Metairie, Louisiana
Mobile, Alabama
Montgomery, Alabama
New Bedford, Mass.
Parma, Ohio
Peoria, Ill.
Phoenix, Ariz.
Raleigh, N.C.
Rochester, N.Y.
Rockford, Ill.
Savannah, Georgia
Shreveport, Louisiana
Spokane, Wash.
Springfield, Mass.
Stockton, Calif.
Topeka, Kansas
Tucson, Ariz.
Warren, Mich.
Winston-Salem, N.C.

NEWLY OPENED - UNDER 100,000

Adirondack Mtn. Area, N.Y.
Boise, Idaho
Carson City, Nevada
Decatur, Alabama
Eugene, Ore.
Helena, Mont.
Lake Tahoe Area, Calif./Nev.
Newport, R.I.
Oxnard, Calif.
Port Huron, Mich.
Provo, Utah
Reno, Nevada
Saginaw, Mich.
Salem, Ore.
Salina, Kansas
Sioux City, Iowa
Springfield, Ill.
Terre Haute, Ind.
Twin Falls, Idaho
Ventura, Calif.