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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/26/2005

File Folder USSR-DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS 4/8

FOIA

F06-114/6

Box Number 22

YARHI-MILO

2206

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
9160	MEMO	MATLOCK TO CLARK RE STRATEGY PAPER FOR CONSULATES IN KIEV AND NEW YORK PAR 5/15/2013 F2006-114/12	3	8/8/1983	B1
9172	MEMO	HILL TO CLARK RE STRATEGY PAPER FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON ESTABLISHMENT OF CONSULATES IN KIEV AND NEW YORK	1	8/5/1983	B1
9161	PAPER	STRATEGY PAPER KIEV AND NEW YORK CONSULATES PAR 5/15/2013 F2006-114/12	6	ND	B1
9162	PAPER	KIEV AND NEW YORK CONSULATES: TERMS OF REFERENCE	2	ND	B1
9173	MEMO	KIMMITT TO HILL RE STRATEGY PAPER FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON ESTABLISHMENT OF CONSULATES IN KIEV AND NEW YORK	2	8/8/1983	B1
9187	MEMO	DORNAN TO DOBRIANSKY R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6	1	8/16/1983	B1
9174	PAPER	STATE DEPARTMENT INPUT TO "HOSTILE PRESENCE" STUDY R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6 DOCUMENT PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233	3	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

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B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
9175	PAPER	COUNTERING THE HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE THREAT STATE DRAFT R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6 DOCUMENT PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233	3	10/8/1982	B1
9176	CHARTS	HOSTILE OFFICIALS AND NON-OFFICIAL PRESENCE IN THE U.S. R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6	2	ND	B1
9177	MEMO	PROPOSALS REGARDING HOSTILE PRESENCE/TRAVEL CONTROLS R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6	2	ND	B1
9178	PAPER	DISCUSSION OF PROPOSALS ON HOSTILE DIPLOMATS PAR 3/14/2011 F2006-114/6	6	ND	B1
9163	PAPER	RESTRICTIONS ON TRAVEL OF SOVIET AND EASTERN EUROPEAN DIPLOMATS	3	ND	B1
9164	MEMO	LIMITATIONS ON HOSTILE FOREIGN PRESENCE IN THE U.S.	3	8/30/1982	B1
9165	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #9164	3	8/30/1982	B1
9179	MEMO	FOREIGN MISSIONS ACT R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6	2	ND	B1

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
9166	MEMO	DISTRIBUTION OF MEMO LIST	1	ND	B1
9167	MEMO	DEGRAFFENREID TO PIPES RE STATE DEPARTMENT PAPER ON TRAVEL CONTROLS ON SOVIET/BLOC	1	11/10/1982	B1
9168	COVER SHEET	BREMER TO CLARK TRAVEL CONTROLS RE SOVIET AND EASTERN EUROPEAN DIPLOMATS <i>R 11/16/2015 F2006-114/6</i>	1	11/9/1982	B1
9180	MEMO	BREMER TO CLARK RE TRAVEL CONTROLS ON SOVIET AND EASTERN EUROPEAN DIPLOMATS <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	1	11/9/1982	B1
9181	MEMO	A PLAN FOR SECURITY ENHANCEMENT AT EMBASSY MOSCOW <i>D 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	2	ND	B1
9182	MEMO	STEPS WHICH SHOULD BE INITIATED IN THE PRESENT CHANCERY <i>D 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	1	ND	B1
9183	MEMO	PROPOSED POST POLICY WITH REGARD TO ACCESS OF SOVIET STAFF IN THE NEW CHANCERY COMPLEX <i>D 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	1	ND	B1

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
9169	MEMO	COBB TO KIMMITT RE POSSIBLE DEFECTION BY SOVIET YOUTH R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6	2	8/11/1983	B1
9158	LETTER	ANDY BEREZHKOVA TO PRESIDENT REAGAN	1	ND	B6
9159	LETTER	SAME TEXT AS DOC #9158	1	ND	B6
9170	MEMO	KIMMITT TO FIELDING R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6	1	8/12/1983	B1
9184	MEMO	SHULTZ TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE POSSIBLE SOVIET EMBASSY DEFECTOR R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6	1	8/12/1983	B1
9171	FAX COVER SHEET	LENZKOWSKI RE USSR PAR 11/16/2015 F2006-114/6	1	8/15/1983	B1
9186	REPORT	USSR D 11/16/2015 F2006-114/6	1	8/18/1983	B1
9185	MEMO	INFORMAL WORKING GROUP ON ANDREI BEREZHKOV SITUATION REPORT NO. 5 R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6	2	8/14/1983	B1

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USSR-Dipl
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SYSTEM II
90965

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

August 8, 1983

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FOIA(b)(1)

ACTION

13526
E.O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 3.3(b)(1)

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Strategy Paper for Consulates in Kiev and New York

State's memorandum outlining recommended strategy for negotiating an opening of consulates in Kiev and New York is attached at TAB A.

Background: Following agreement at the 1974 Nixon-Brezhnev summit, steps were taken to open consulates general in Kiev and New York. The Soviets had long resisted an American office in Kiev, offering instead less advantageous locations, but finally agreed to Kiev under the pressure of reaching agreements for the 1974 summit. Subsequently, the Soviets were allowed to purchase a building in New York (the location of which was approved by the FBI) for their consulate general and we were offered the choice of several properties in Kiev for rental (no sale of real estate is permitted by Soviet law). We selected a large building, with NSA's concurrence, had American architects design the reconfiguration for our use, and both sides sent small "advance parties" to oversee preparations for formal openings, which we insisted be simultaneous, so that the Soviets could not open in New York before our building was ready in Kiev.

We had invested \$1.5 million in the renovation of the building when we ordered the withdrawal of both advance parties in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Soviets still have title to their building in New York, while we have continued to pay rent on three apartments (previously occupied by our advance party) in Kiev. We have not paid rent on the building we had selected for the office and a number of staff apartments, and our understanding is that, after holding it for us for more than a year, the Soviets are now using it. Its status, therefore, is not entirely clear.

This complicated background is relevant to some of the questions raised in the strategy paper. Broadly speaking, our options are to aim for an opening as quickly as possible, and thus establish our presence in the capital of the largest non-Russian republic, or to attempt to improve on the arrangements already negotiated, which could entail considerable delay with little prospect of significant improvement.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR F06-114/6 #9160

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Declassify on: OADR

BY KNL NARA DATE 5/16/13

Issues: There is general interagency agreement on the negotiating plan except for the following three points:

A. Office Site: State and NSA believe that we should accept the old building if it is available. The FBI believes that we should press for a new one.

B. Staffing: State and NSA believe that the staffing level should be set according to need; the FBI, supported by CIA, believe that we should insist that the Soviets staff their consulate from the current personnel allowed them in Washington, or from their mission to the UN.

C. Status of Property: State and NSA believe that we should seek more advantageous rental arrangements (i.e., a long-term lease with guarantees on the rent), while the FBI wants us to demand either the right to purchase the building in Kiev, or divestiture of the building owned by the Soviets in New York, followed by a rental arrangement.

Analysis: My judgment on the three issues above is as follows:

A. Since the building already selected and partially reconfigured for our use is acceptable, and we already have a substantial sum invested in it, no useful purpose would be served by demanding another one. The State-NSA position seems sound.

B. If we insisted that the Soviets staff their consulate from their current quota in Washington and New York, we would have to staff Kiev from our Embassy in Moscow. The sixteen persons necessary for Kiev could not be spared from Moscow without seriously impairing the Embassy's ability to perform its functions. Therefore, it seems preferable to set our staff at the level we need, and then impose an identical quota on the Soviets in New York. This would preserve reciprocity, and while the FBI's task in New York would be increased, its additional problems would be no greater than those faced by the KGB in Kiev.

C. Although it is unfortunate that the Soviets were allowed to purchase their consulate building in New York, it will be most difficult to turn the clock back on this arrangement. In the interest of moving as rapidly as possible to establish our presence in Kiev (a net gain for us, since we have no one there now) in return for a small incremental gain for the Soviets (they already have hundreds of officials in New York), I would recommend using the Soviet ownership of their building in New York as leverage to insist upon favorable long-term rental arrangements in Kiev.

I believe that two other points should be covered specifically in the NSC response:

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- 3 -

(1) State should be instructed that any staffing arrangement provide for strict reciprocity of numbers at the two consulates. This need not be the subject of negotiation, but simply a statement of U.S. policy, comparable to that used in imposing personnel ceilings on the Soviet Consulate General in San Francisco.

(2) Before proceeding to plan for 12 local employees, a close study should be made of the feasibility of staffing Kiev entirely with American citizens.


The foregoing recommendations are incorporated in a memorandum to State at TAB B.

¹⁷
Paula Dobriansky and John Lenczowski concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the memorandum at TAB B.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab A State's Memo
Tab B Memo to State

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13526

E.O. 12958-

As Amended

Sec. 3.3(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~Strategy Paper
Kiev and New York ConsulatesSummary:

1. Initial Step: There is agreement that we should inquire officially of the Soviets whether the previously designated office site will be available to us in Kiev.

2. Issues for Decision:

A. Office Site. If the Soviets say the building is not available, all agencies agree that we should press for a new and better site. If the Soviets tell us the old site is available, State and NSA believe we should accept it, and send an inspection team to determine its adequacy and assess further work needed on both apartments and office site. FBI believes we should press for a new site, whether or not the old site is available.

B. Staffing. State and NSA believe we should set staffing patterns according to need, without imposing demands that the Soviets would counter with unacceptable reciprocal requirements. FBI, supported by CIA, believes we should initially insist that the Soviets staff New York under the present 320 ceiling in order to maintain existing levels of coverage, recognizing that if the Soviets refuse we will have to revert to the State/NSA approach.

C. Purchase vs. Lease. State and NSA believe we should seek more advantageous long-term rent arrangements without insisting on purchase in Kiev, and hence on full reciprocity, which Soviets certainly would turn down. (The legality of requiring Soviets to sell their present building and lease it instead is questionable. Legal action in any case would result in prolonged delays if we adopted this course.) FBI believes we should make the demand despite the probability that the Soviets would turn it down, forcing us to fall back on a demand for long-term leasing arrangements.

Recommendation:

NSC concurrence with the interagency proposal to inquire officially of the Soviets as to the availability of the previous site; and NSC concurrence with the State/ NSA positions on office site, staffing and purchase vs. lease.

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DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR F06-114/6 # 9161

BY KML NARA DATE 5/15/13

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BACKGROUND

Secretary Shultz informed Ambassador Dobrynin on June 18 that the President had approved in principle the establishment of new Consulates in Kiev and New York. Judge Clark subsequently requested the State Department to convene an interagency meeting to draft the terms of reference and develop a negotiating strategy. At the July 1 meeting called by the State Department, representatives of CIA, FBI, and NSA accepted the attached terms of reference (Tab A) and agreed to reconvene with the objective of forwarding an agreed negotiating strategy to the NSC. The group, augmented by USIA representatives, met on July 26, and it did not prove possible fully to reconcile agency views. Divergent views are set forth, where appropriate, in this paper.

POLICY OBJECTIVES

In noting that the USG should seek to reach agreements which "protect and enhance US interests and are consistent with the principle of strict reciprocity", NSDD-75 provides the fundamental policy framework for establishing the new Consulates. A Consulate in Kiev will

mark a major new US penetration in a key geographical area, which contains the second largest Soviet nationality group and significant numbers of religious minorities. In addition, it will give us a unique vantage point for economic and political reporting, a base in the Soviet agricultural heartland for crop monitoring, a facility to provide on-the-spot consular protection and assistance to American visitors in the area, and the opportunity to initiate new cultural, informational, and educational exchanges, thereby heightening awareness of US values and goals in the region.

MODALITIES OF NEGOTIATIONS

On July 15, Secretary Shultz received a positive Soviet response on the Consulates from Ambassador Dobrynin. Assistant Secretary Burt will work out with Chargé Sokolov the modalities of the negotiations. The State Department will handle the actual negotiations using normal diplomatic channels, in coordination with interested agencies.

The Department anticipates opening the talks in Washington as soon as is mutually convenient. Technical discussions may subsequently take place in Moscow. Since our logistical problems in Kiev may well prove greater than those of the Soviets in New York, it might be advantageous to hold such talks at closer range.

SPECIFIC GOALS

1. Early Establishment of U.S. Presence: Our first agenda item in negotiating with the Soviets will be to obtain agreement on the terms under which we will send advance parties to the two

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consular sites. The fact that we and the Soviets have both had previous advance teams in Kiev and New York, respectively, under mutually agreed arrangements, should ease our negotiations with them on this matter, but it would be unrealistic not to expect problems. Nevertheless, our retention of three apartments in Kiev from the time of the original Advance Party should enable us to put an advance team into place rather quickly (within three months). Having personnel on the spot will be a key to gaining movement from the Soviets on housing and office facilities, as well as support from the home front on logistics and funding.

[REDACTED]

2. Acquisition of Suitable Housing and Office Facilities:
Concurrently, we must ascertain whether the Soviets are still holding for our use the previously designated office building and Consul General residence.

[REDACTED]

State and NSA agree that if the Soviets tell us they have kept the building available, we should accept it. We have already invested \$1.5 million in renovation, which would be lost if we refused the building. Moreover, the negotiations for a more desirable site would be long and the end result would not necessarily be a site preferable to the one we now have. If the current site remains available, State and NSA believe that we should send a team to Kiev as soon as possible for an inspection and evaluation of the work and time that will be required to put it into suitable condition. The FBI, on the other hand, would prefer that we seek new facilities whether or not the Soviets are willing to make the previously designated office site available, in order not to set our sights too low at the outset.

Finally, with regard to terms of occupancy we should note that the previous agreement on establishing Consulates permitted the Soviets to purchase property in New York in return for short-term leasing rights in Kiev. This situation was clearly not reciprocal and cannot be allowed to recur. Further negotiations on the reopening of our respective Consulates will include insistence on greater reciprocity vis-a-vis our housing and office space requirements. The FBI has suggested that we try to purchase property in Kiev. Since, to the best of our knowledge, the

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-4-

Soviets have never permitted a foreign mission to own property and there is no chance that they would reverse this long-standing policy in this instance, State's view is that no purpose is served by making such a demand. Although we could theoretically insist that the Soviets divest themselves of their property and require a lease arrangement, such an approach would be quite problematical. The Office of Foreign Missions has indicated that a forced divestiture of this type could be legally contested and if so could involve legal proceedings.

We should instead concentrate on obtaining what is possible -- long-term leases at reasonable prices. The Soviets will have a strong incentive to move on our requirements. We fully expect them to seek immediate occupancy of the building that they previously purchased in New York for their Consulate. Consequently, State believes our approach should be to insist on an agreement to the effect that the Soviets may only occupy their building when we have obtained the following in Kiev: adequate temporary offices for the Consulate, an official agreement on our permanent facilities, and approved construction plans for necessary renovations.

3. Reciprocal Agreement on Staffing Patterns: As soon as we have decided on the number of persons we wish to send to Kiev both as a TDY-Advance Team and as a permanent staff (recommendations on these issues follow below), we will raise the issue of a reciprocal staffing arrangement with the Soviets. We will need to proceed cautiously on this point, with strict reciprocity as a goal. The FBI, concerned about increases in the size of the Soviet diplomatic establishment in New York, prefers that the Consulate there be staffed by personnel transferred from the Embassy or SMUN. State anticipates strong Soviet resistance to such a proposal. Having frequently decried the existence of the current ceilings, the Soviets will balk at a perceived attempt to reduce staffing levels at existing posts as a precondition to an agreement on opening Kiev and New York. If pressed, they would probably demand a similar arrangement in Kiev, which would prove extremely costly in terms of staffing at our Moscow Embassy. The Department and NSA believe that we should negotiate on the basis of our requirements - consular, political, and intelligence -- in Kiev and insist on reciprocity in any final decision on staffing patterns.

4. Resolution of Long-Range Issues and General Problems: Although Kiev's location is ideal in certain respects, its isolation, coupled with the absence of a large diplomatic community, may produce a difficult work environment for consular personnel, as well as create numerous logistical problems. In our negotiations we shall also address these general issues and attempt to arrive at mutually agreed solutions to both existing and potential problems. Specifically, we shall strive to obtain clearly defined privileges and immunities for American personnel;

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-5-

an expansion of exit/entry points to facilitate shipment of requisite materials to put our facilities into shape for the final opening (we are currently limited to entry at Moscow, Leningrad, and Vyborg near Leningrad); a relaxation of travel controls in the area; and a commitment to provide a suitable recreational facility for the permanent staff.

5. Implementation of USG Scenario: An interagency group will have to make some immediate decisions with regard to timing, personnel, and funding. It will also have to address questions of logistical support and the acquisition of financial and other resources. For preliminary planning purposes, we propose the following timetable and base our discussion of estimated costs and resource requirements on this opening scenario, which assumes that we will obtain the previously designated office building.

1. Fall 1983 - Initial TDY Advance Team takes up residence in Kiev;
2. Summer 1984 or earlier - Permanent Advance Staff arrives in Kiev;
3. Summer 1985 - Consulate is officially opened.

A. Funding:

State has already presented to Congress its FY-84 budget submission, which does not include a request for funds or positions for the opening of Kiev. Therefore, the estimated \$200,000 operating costs needed to support the initial TDY presence in Kiev would have to be secured either by amendment to the FY-84 budget, or reprogrammed from within State's existing budget.

State anticipates an additional outlay of \$2.5 million annually (for two years) to prepare for the opening of the Consulate (total estimated cost of \$5.2 million). Not included in this estimate is the cost of a suitable recreational facility for the permanent staff assigned to Kiev, which would contribute substantially to improving morale and the quality of life at an extremely isolated post (roughly another \$1.0 million).

Ultimately, any decision to move ahead on establishing a Consulate in Kiev is conditioned on our ability to secure supplemental funding from Congress. In view of budgetary stringencies, we should anticipate questions from Congress as to why we are taking this step at the present time. We should be prepared to brief key members whose support will be necessary in order to obtain the requisite funds.

B. Personnel:

In selecting an Advance Team, we will try to identify personnel for permanent assignment, but may initially have to use

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-6-

personnel from Embassy Moscow and appropriate Washington offices on a 1-3 month TDY basis. The initial Advance Team should include a Team Leader, an Administrative Officer, and a Political/Consular Officer with reporting responsibilities.

In tandem with these arrangements, we need a prompt decision on the size of our permanent advance team. Language training and the vagaries of the assignment process will make it difficult to assign people to Kiev for regular tours prior to the summer of 1984. Even meeting that deadline will require speedy action to obtain positions, identify individuals for particular slots, and secure funding. We believe that with the addition to the advance team of a General Services Officer and a secretary we will have the personnel necessary to prepare for the official opening of the Consulates.

We suggest that the consular staff consist of 16 Americans plus 12 Soviet National employees. In the past, this was considered the right size to advance our interests in Kiev and it still appears to meet our needs. We intend, however, to schedule interagency meetings as soon as feasible to determine whether their personnel requirements for the Consulate warrant a larger or smaller staff. We will also solicit Embassy Moscow's views on both the question of timing and its ability to provide personnel and logistical support. The following are the proposed permanent positions for Kiev:

Principal Officer
Deputy Principal Officer
Consular Officer
Administrative Officer
Agricultural Officer
Press and Culture Officer
Communications Program Officers (2)
Secretaries (2)
Marine Security Guards (6)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

August 16, 1983

TO: PAULA DOBRIANSKY

FROM: DIANE DORNAN

Returned for your files.

17 Sept. 1982 17

Ken - FYI.
Jms.

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Kinal
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1. Rationale for Maintaining the Ceiling of 320 on Soviet Diplomatic and Consular Personnel in the U.S. The ceiling on Soviet diplomatic personnel in the United States was enacted as an Afghanistan sanction in January of 1980. The ceiling was set at 320 in order to be roughly equivalent to the total number of persons employed by the U.S. at Embassy Moscow and ConGen Leningrad. About 180 members of our Embassy and ConGen staff were U.S. citizens, and about 140 were locally-hired Soviet citizens in non-sensitive jobs. The Soviets do not hire local U.S. employees, so all their positions at Washington and San Francisco were (and still are) filled by Soviet nationals with diplomatic status. Since the sanction was put in place, the number of Soviet employees has stayed at 320, while the number of U.S. positions in the USSR has grown to 401 (187 U.S. citizens, 214 Soviets and third-country nationals).

320
187

Any U.S.-imposed reductions would certainly be met with Soviet retaliation on a reciprocal basis, and would have a disproportionately harmful impact upon the smaller number of American diplomats now in the USSR. The Soviets could also increase the damage by reducing our Soviet locals back to pre-Afghanistan numbers, thus reducing our total staff in the USSR by 81 personnel, plus the amount by which we reduced the Soviet ceiling. Any substantial reductions in U.S. diplomatic staff would seriously detract from our ability to manage Soviet-American relations and to monitor the internal Soviet scene, and would have a direct and further negative effect on the conduct of our relations with the USSR. It is for these reasons that we believe that such reductions should not be contemplated solely on counterintelligence grounds -- the foreign policy implications of such a step should also be considered.

Finally, there is a more tangible and practical reason why a reduction in the Soviet ceiling should not be undertaken: such a reduction would not achieve the objective of reducing overall Soviet presence in the U.S. Any reductions which the Soviets would suffer in terms of their personnel accredited to the U.S. could be fully offset by a compensatory increase in their presence at the United Nations, which is not subject to ceiling limitations. Attempts to place a ceiling on Soviet UN Personnel -- particularly Secretariat employees -- would be extremely controversial politically and probably would also go counter to U.S. treaty obligations. It would in any event cause very significant diplomatic and political difficulties for the U.S.

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NLS F06-114/6 #9174

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BY LOT, NARA, DATE 12/13/07

2. Soviet Commercial Representation -- why present numbers should be retained.

Presently there are seven non-diplomatic Soviet commercial organizations operating in the U.S. with a total of 70 employees against a ceiling of 72 (current staff numbers and visa categories in parentheses):

1. Aeroflot (7, L-1)
2. Amtorg (39 L-1)
3. Belarus (7, L-1 and B-1)
4. Intourist (4, L-1)
5. Sovfracht (3, L-1)
6. US-USSR Marine Resources (1, B-1)
7. US-USSR Trade and Economic Council (9, B-1)

This total represents a sharp reduction from the total of 99 in 1980. In an effort to reduce Soviet commercial presence to the level necessitated by actual business conducted we eliminated 17 positions in 1981. The most recent USG reduction in Soviet commercial representation was made by the President on December 28, 1981, when, as a Poland-related sanction, he ordered the closing of the Soviet Purchasing Commission and the departure of the 10 staff members. We oppose further reduction of Soviet commercial representation at this time.

Control over the number of Soviets in the U.S. is an important foreign policy tool. Should the situation in Poland deteriorate or Soviet behavior elsewhere mandate U.S. sanctions, the reduction of Soviet commercial representatives in the U.S. could convey a political message to the Soviets. However, the effectiveness of that message would be greatly diminished if the USG had already reduced Soviet staff for reasons unrelated to foreign policy. In addition, we are presently not pursuing a policy of economic warfare against the Soviet Union, despite Soviet claims, and are with great difficulty convincing our Allies that the Poland-related sanctions are not a form of economic warfare. A reduction of Soviet commercial staff would work counter to our efforts.

Soviet commercial representatives are in the United States for two reasons: 1) they facilitate trade between our two countries, and 2) they encourage the Soviets to reciprocate by

— they are spies.

19

~~SECRET~~

allowing U.S. businessmen to reside in Moscow. As noted above, we are not engaged in cutting off all US-Soviet trade. On the contrary some of the trade is of significant importance to the U.S. economy, witness our almost \$2 billion trade surplus with the Soviets in 1981 and the large amounts of U.S. grain sold to the Soviets.

There are about 30 U.S. firms currently represented in the Soviet Union with permanent U.S. employees. The businessmen who reside and travel in the Soviet Union are not only necessary for the conduct of trade, but also provide the USG with valuable information on the Soviet Union. These representatives and visiting U.S. businessmen on occasion are permitted to travel to areas that are inaccessible to USG employees. Should the U.S. reduce the Soviet commercial presence in the U.S., it is likely that the Soviets would reciprocate by cutting back on the number of U.S. businessmen in the Soviet Union and by applying stricter travel controls.

3. Why Soviet Journalistic Representation in the U.S. should not be reduced.

According to our count, the Soviets currently have 37 correspondents in the US, not counting Melor Sturua, Chief Izvestiya Correspondent in Washington, DC, who will not be permitted back into the US in retaliation for the expulsion of Newsweek correspondent Andrew Nagorski. According to our Embassy in Moscow, the Soviets currently count 36 American correspondents in the USSR, including correspondents of Pilot and The Daily World. Our count (30) is lower, allowing for the fact that the Soviets count as "American correspondents" the following: a Soviet photographer with UPI, a West German cameraman with CBS, an NBC technician stationed in Berlin but accredited in Moscow, and three currently empty offices (Newsweek, ABC, and Chicago Tribune).

While we acknowledge the hostile intelligence threat which some Soviet correspondents may pose, we do not believe, on balance, that a cutback in the number of Soviet correspondents here would be beneficial to U.S. interests. Due to the closed nature of Soviet society, our correspondents in Moscow are far more valuable to the USG and the public as information gatherers than are their Soviet counterparts in the U.S. US correspondents provide one of our few windows into the Soviet world, and our real objective should be to get more U.S. news organizations to send correspondents to Moscow, not to cut down Soviet strength here. Therefore, we believe that we should not encourage Soviet retaliation which might reduce our Press Corps in Moscow further. We should instead seek to put adequate security measures into effect so that those Soviet correspondents who do pose an intelligence threat are thoroughly monitored, and thus neutralized.

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STATE DRAFT

~~SECRET~~

October 8, 1982

Countering The Hostile Intelligence ThreatSummary

In seeking ways to counter the hostile intelligence threat we should focus on approaches that do not involve disproportionate foreign policy and intelligence collection costs. Rather than arbitrary unilateral demands for cuts in personnel and unilateral insistence on travel notification by Soviet, Bloc, and PRC diplomats in the US, we should seek an avenue that will permit us to keep track of these people without costs to our other interests. The newly enacted Foreign Missions Act offers such an alternative.

The Problem

There is presently a rough parity in numbers between US and Communist Embassy and Consulate presence here and in the target countries, except for the UN presence, unique to NY. To the extent that ceilings and travel restrictions have been imposed by us (currently only the Soviets, the Cubans, and the PRC are affected) they are reciprocal, i.e., imposed on them in retaliation for their imposition on us. In this and other areas, reciprocity has been and remains the keystone to our treatment of foreign officials. As for the UN, we cannot, as a practical matter, unilaterally impose limitations or constraints on hostile UN Secretariat staff nor on hostile UN mission representation. The former would violate the UN Headquarters Agreement and the latter would not only have undesirable bilateral reciprocity consequences but would bring us into conflict with the entire UN system and possibly involve us in unwanted compulsory arbitration by the World Court. We can and do impose travel restrictions on certain hostile UN Mission personnel on a reciprocal basis.

We can, of course, impose whatever restrictions we choose on hostile Embassies and Consulates in the US, be they staff reductions, travel reductions, and/or notification, or whatever. Doing so unilaterally, however, would inevitably result in similar restrictions being imposed on our own representatives. Such actions on our part would, firstly, signal a downgrading of relations, a very serious matter that should be a result only of the most thoughtful examination of the foreign policy considerations in all their ramifications, not just counter-intelligence concerns. This is of particular relevance with respect to the PRC, in view of the President's stated interest in building a strong and lasting relationship with that country which he considers vital to our long-term national security interests. Secondly, inevitably retaliation for our moves would seriously degrade our ability to conduct our own foreign relations. As an example, we would lose the ability we now have to travel at will in Eastern Europe.

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DECL. OADR

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NLS

F06-114/6 #9175

BY

H0J

NARA, DATE

12/13/07

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- 2 -

Over the years we have slowly pried open each of the Eastern European countries by patient insistence on a policy of easing restrictions on them only in return for their easing them on us. In such closed communist societies our ability to travel freely greatly helps us in obtaining the information we need. Conversely, cuts by us in their personnel here would have less impact on their ability to acquire information openly in our free society. We must carefully weigh our ability to close an open society as opposed to trying to open a closed one.

A Proposed Solution

The recognized need for US counter-intelligence agencies (primarily the FBI) to have greater knowledge of and control over the activities of hostile agents requires a more imaginative solution. Rather than attempting largely counter-productive and perhaps ineffective unilateral impositions of reductions and restraints, we believe a different, two pronged attack should be tried. Firstly, there should be a very serious effort to increase US counter-intelligence strength and resources, including an improved data retrieval system and improved liaison both with State and with the Immigration and Naturalization Service. We think our own bureaucracy can function much more effectively. Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, the newly enacted Foreign Missions Act offers great counter-intelligence possibilities which, if fully exploited, should result in the desired increase in control over the hostile presence.

The Foreign Missions Act empowers the Secretary of State to regulate the activities of all official missions of foreign governments in the US on the basis of reciprocity and national security. Under the Act, an Office of Foreign Missions is being established by the Department of State with, we anticipate, liaison officers from the FBI, DIA, NSA and the Intelligence Community Staff. This office will be charged with carrying out the provisions of the Act and will be initially exploring the following: procedures to control real estate acquisition by foreign missions; possibilities for agreements on limitations in numbers of personnel assigned to embassies, consulates, and missions; establishment of a "travel agency" through which all ticketing must be accomplished and itineraries filed; use of surcharges; providing for a centralized, compulsory agency for "service companies", e.g., plumbers, electricians, heating/AC maintenance, cleaning personnel, etc.; coordination with state and local agencies on motor vehicle registration and licensing, zoning, building codes, etc.; coordination with private sector, e.g., public utilities; use of notification requirements. As can be seen, the possibilities under the new Act for greatly improving control and surveillance by US counter-intelligence officials of the hostile presence are limited only by the ingenuity of its administrators and the resources made available. Of equal importance, as the target countries all require that we utilize centralized, purchasing, rental, ticketing, and service agencies, reciprocity should not be a significant problem.

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- 3 -

Recommendation

That the IG-CI, in seeking means to counter the hostile intelligence threat, give immediate attention to:

1) Identifying and resolving problems of data retrieval and information exchanges within our bureaucracy to strengthen the effectiveness of the system.

2) Assuring that the counter-intelligence potential of the new Foreign Missions Act is fully exploited as the prime tool for exercising enhanced control over the hostile presence.

To that end, the IG-CI should, within 60 days, provide the SIG/I with a detailed action plan.

~~SECRET~~

October 1982

Hostile Official and Non-Official Presence in the US

<u>Country</u>	<u>Embassy/Consulate</u>	<u>UN Mission (NY only)</u>	<u>UN Secretariat (NY only)</u>	<u>Other</u>
USSR	287*	277	312	171
Bulgaria	30	27	0	20
Czechoslovakia	30	19	4	24
East Germany	34	34	4	18
Hungary	28	24	3	23
Poland	66	15	13	124
Romania	19	17	3	23
Cuba	28	53	1	3
Total Soviet Bloc	<u>522</u>	<u>466</u>	<u>340</u>	<u>406</u>
PRC	277	134	44	**
Total Hostile Presence	<u>799</u>	<u>600</u>	<u>384</u>	<u>406</u>

* Does not include 62 working spouses (all wives)

** Not available

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NLS F06-114/6 #9176

BY LOT, NARA, DATE 12/13/07

U.S. OFFICIAL AND NON-OFFICIAL PRESENCE IN HOSTILE COUNTRIES
AND AT THE UNITED NATIONS

October 1982

	<u>U.S. Embassy/Consulates</u>	<u>U.S. Mission to UN</u>	<u>U.S. Employees to UN Secretariat</u>	<u>Other (commercial, media, students, etc.)</u>
USSR	260 ^{1, 4}			48
Bulgaria	33 ¹			116 ²
Czechoslovakia	36			681 ²
East Germany	41 ¹			N/A
Hungary	40 ¹			1800 ²
Poland	85 ¹			1000 ²
Romania	53 ¹			295 ²
Cuba	20			N/A
Total	<u>568¹</u>			<u>3940²</u>
PRC	129			1100
Total	<u>697¹</u>	<u>110</u>	<u>1897³</u>	<u>5040²</u>

¹Includes dependents employed part-time or as contractors.
²Includes large number of elderly pensioners.
³Includes 508 officers.
N/A = Not available.
⁴Does not include 140 Soviet local employees

#

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rec'd 8 Sept 82 26
from MAC S.

INTERAGENCY GROUP - COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

Proposals regarding Hostile Presence/Travel Controls--

A. Minimum effectiveness (Likely agreement - low risk of foreign policy problem/retaliation)

1. Discontinue multiple entry visas
2. Limiting stay of UNGA reps to one week before and one week after meeting
3. Distinctive license plates
4. Consolidation of commercial offices (NY, for example - Aeroflot/Intourist)
5. Gradual reduction of Chinese students
 - a. Chinese Government
 - b. Visa overstays
 - c. 12th Party Congress
 - d. Shoemith briefing (paper)
6. Tightening controls on Soviets
 - a. Revise closed areas
 - b. Foreign Missions Act (mandatory central travel & hotel reservation service)
 - c. Further restrict Soviet entry points into U.S. from Canada & Mexico
 - d. Subject non-official Soviets, including tourists to same travel restrictions as on Soviets

B. Moderate effectiveness (Some disagreement, possible foreign policy problem/retaliation)

1. Polish commercial representatives
 - a. There are about 65 in U.S. in Atlanta, Boston, Buffalo, Chicago, Detroit, Houston, Los Angeles, Newark, New York, Pittsburgh, & San Francisco
 - b. Representing - Polish American Machinery
Toolmex
Cepelia
Gdynia
Pekao Trading Corp
 - c. We are proposing a 50% reduction
 - d. State could tie to Bell/Zacharski

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NLS Feb-114/6 #9177

BY LOI, NARA, DATE 12/13/07

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CONTINUED - OVER

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2. Cuban Mission to the UN

a. Now 55

b. Reduce to 25-30 level of Bloc Missions (DOJ opinion re visa)
(27 & 29 of INA)

3. Soviet Correspondents

a. Agreed level is 36

b. Soviets have 35 - U.S. has 28

c. We propose a reduction to 30 level

4. The ceiling on Soviet commercial presence in the U.S. is now 72

Our examination shows that neither Intourist nor Aeroflot are apparently counted in this ceiling. We will recommend they be so counted. They have 20 here and this would have effect if a 20 man reduction.

5. Finally Soviet Embassy & Soviet Consulate, San Francisco, have a combined ceiling of 320. U.S. Embassy, Moscow, and U.S. Consulate, Leningrad, have 187.

We are proposing a 10% cut in Soviet ceiling - or a reduction by 32.

Total 109

C. Most effective - (Major disagreement, probable foreign policy problem/retaliation)

1. Reduction through visa control of USSR Mission to # equal that of the U.S. Mission to UN
2. Equal #'s in U.S. & each Eastern European Embassy
3. Equal #'s at U.S. & U.S.S.R. Embassies
4. Notification (48 hrs.) of travel by Bloc officials
 - a. Scanlan briefing

The above rankings as to effectiveness relate to lessening the CI burdens. The more effective vis-a-vis CI, the greater will be the probability of foreign policy problems/retaliation.

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IV. DISCUSSION OF PROPOSALS

[The page contains multiple rows of redacted text, each consisting of ten horizontal bars.]

The numbers of U.S. official personnel in the Soviet Union and the PRC are considerably less than the comparable representation in this country.

State's view is that further reductions in the current ceilings on Soviet and PRC official personnel in the U.S. would invite one-for-one retaliation.

Since there are fewer Americans in Moscow, Leningrad, Beijing, and Shanghai to

No - This should be taken up with them & so

start with, the U.S. would suffer more from such action. Again, considering *we want to retaliate* the comparative number of experienced specialists in the foreign services, the Soviets would be more capable of adjusting to a lower staffing level than would the U.S. In most East European countries the U.S. official presence is larger and reducing the number of East European personnel would invite one-for-one retaliation at greater cost to the U.S. (S)

Consequences of limiting the Soviet, East European, and PRC official presence and the expected retaliation would be fewer day-to-day diplomatic contacts and a lessened ability for overt data gathering in those countries on which to gauge their capabilities and intentions. In addition, the Soviets, East Europeans, and Chinese at UN Headquarters would still represent a substantial base in the U.S. from which to carry out intelligence activities. (S)

how much use?
yes but some work

American media organizations have indicated no interest in staffing offices outside of Moscow, unlike the Soviets who have correspondents in Washington, New York, and San Francisco. These organizations have, however, unsuccessfully sought entry/exit visas and accreditation from the Soviets for non-resident correspondents which would have made the numbers more equal. (U)

So what?

Further limitations on non-official Soviets, East Europeans, or Chinese could face strong opposition from the U.S. business and academic communities, as well as from the East European and Chinese ethnic community. In the case of the PRC, limitations could be seen as a reversal of the policy which has encouraged increased exchanges. (S)

Reduction

No what?

U.S. actions to limit the number of Cubans at their UN Mission could be used by Cuba to portray the U.S. as illegally frustrating its mission's proper

functioning. The Cubans would probably also suggest to other countries whose interests conflict with ours that similar actions may be aimed at them in the future. (S)

Nice to have
State is in the process of tightening travel controls in several areas:

1. Revision of designated areas closed to the USSR and PRC is under way in consultation with the Departments of Defense and Energy.

2. Enactment of the Foreign Missions Act will make possible implementation of a mandatory central travel and accommodations reservation service. This will allow complete, flexible, and discretionary control over the travel of all official Soviets (and other country officials as decided on).

3. In consultation with INS and the FBI, State is studying restrictions on Soviet entry points into the U.S. and institution of exit controls on Soviet holders of A, G, and C-3 visas.

4. Also in consultation with INS and the FBI, consideration is being given to implementing stricter travel controls on all Soviet nationals. These would limit them to specific ports of entry and exit and require non-officials, including tourists, to remain within a certain radius of their destination unless approval was obtained to deviate from their itinerary. (S)

Any further travel controls beyond those in force or under consideration on Soviet officials and certain categories of non-officials are seen as posing serious political problems and impacting adversely on the ability of U.S. personnel to carry on their official activities in the USSR. State views enforcement of existing travel restrictions as the key to controlling the

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V. CONCLUSIONS

[illegible]

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The issue then is what cost the U.S. is willing to bear in its foreign policy and in its conduct of diplomatic activities in order to blunt the hostile intelligence threat and satisfy U.S. foreign counterintelligence concerns. (U)

After weighing all of the pros and cons involved in the proposals detailed in Part III and discussed thereafter, the IG/CI recommends the NSC should authorize the following actions:

(NOTE: To be prepared following receipt of comments on this draft and concomitant IG/CI discussion at its next meeting.)

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V

FOREIGN MISSIONS ACT P.L. 97-241I. Authorities Given to the Department

- (1) The Foreign Missions Act authorizes the Secretary of State to regulate activities of official missions of foreign governments in the United States, on the basis of (a) reciprocity and (b) national security.
- (2) The Act authorizes establishment of an Office of Foreign Missions, under direction of an Under Secretary.
- (3) International organizations and missions to those organizations may also be required to comply with the Act as appropriate, in view of their differing status from foreign government missions.
- (4) Broad contracting authority, including personnel services, is provided to enable the Department to respond timely to requirements which are not normally encompassed by standard procurement or appointment authorities.
- (5) "Foreign Missions" and "international organization" are broadly defined to cover political entities such as the EEC, PLO, etc.
- (6) Authority vested in the Secretary may be subject to guidelines of the President. (U)

II. Purposes

The Act is intended to accomplish five basic objectives:

- (1) Support USG missions abroad and send a strong signal to foreign governments that USG diplomatic practice will be premised on reciprocity; this may increase our ability to ameliorate adverse conditions under which USG posts operate abroad to the extent that such matters are under the control of receiving states.
- (2) Assist the Department in reducing the operating costs of USG missions abroad which are imposed arbitrarily or which can reasonably be modified by receiving states.
- (3) Increase national security agencies' capability to perform oversight functions in connection with foreign government activities in the United States.
- (4) Increase coordination between State and NSC agency functions.

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NLS F06-114/6 #9179BY LOS, NARA, DATE 12/13/07

- (5) Comply with congressional concern that a meaningful policy of reciprocity be established in the conduct of our diplomatic relations and that domestic national security concerns be appropriately reflected in that policy. (U)

III. Implementation

The Office of Foreign Missions will commence operations on October 1. The Office has requested assignments of liaison officials from DIA, CIA, FBI, and NSA. (S)

The Office of Foreign Missions, in concert with concerned national security agencies, is exploring "avenues" within the legislative authorities. These will include:

- (1) Procedures for real estate acquisition by foreign nations.
- (2) Procedures for limitations on number of foreign personnel assigned to embassies, consulates, and missions.
- (3) Establishing a "travel agency."
- (4) Reviewing opportunities for "service companies"--plumbers, electricians, heating/AC maintenance, cleaning personnel, etc.
- (5) Advance travel plan notifications for approval/disapproval.
- (6) Use of surcharges.
- (7) Coordination with private sector--public utilities.
- (8) Coordination with state/local agencies--motor vehicle registration and tags, zoning commissions, building code procedures, etc.
- (9) Opportunities using paper/notifications requirements. (S)

Suggestions for additional "avenues" from the IG/CI and IG/CM will be welcomed. (U)

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RECEIVED 09 NOV 82 1.

TO CLARK FROM BREMER

DOCDATE 09 NOV 82
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URGENT

DECLASSIFIED

KEYWORDS: USSR

INTELLIGENCE

EUROPE EAST

LEGAL ISSUES

NLRR FDC-114/12 #9168
BY RW NARA DATE 4/16/15SUBJECT: TRAVEL CONTROLS RE SOVIET & EASTERN EUROPEAN DIPLOMATS REQUESTED
BY PFIAB

ACTION: MEMO WHEELER TO CAROL PATRICK DUE: 10 NOV 82 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

PIPES

DOBRIANSKY

ROBINSON

MYER

KIMMITT

DEGRAFFENREID

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RAYMOND

COMMENTS

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LOG 8206345

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ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C



~~SECRET~~

Washington, D.C. 20520

November 9, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Travel Controls on Soviet and Eastern European
Diplomats in the United States and on US Diplomats in
the USSR and Eastern Europe

Enclosed is a summary of the travel controls imposed on
American diplomats in the Soviet Union and on Soviet diplomats
in the United States, as requested by Carol Patrick of the
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

The situation for Eastern Europe is as follows. There are
no travel restrictions on American diplomats in the German
Democratic Republic, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and
Romania. In Bulgaria, American diplomats must make travel
arrangements through the official state travel agency, but
travel is not otherwise restricted. There are no restrictions
on the travel of Eastern European diplomats assigned to the
United States.


L. Paul Bremer, II
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:
As stated.

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DECL: OADR

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NLS F06-114/6 # 9180
BY LOJ NARA, DATE 12/13/07

500 Ripls
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NON-LOG

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

August 11, 1983

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT W. KIMMITT

FROM:

TYRUS W. COBB *TWC*

SUBJECT:

Possible Defection by Soviet Youth

1. ANDREI BEREZHKOVA: Born 1967 (15 or 16 years old). Son of the First Secretary at the Soviet Embassy and the USA Institute's representative in Washington.

-- Apparently left family Chevy Chase home between 1:00 and 3:00 p.m., August 10. Took the family car; left without ID cards or belongings.

2. Berezhkov family called the Soviet Desk at State about 4:30 p.m., who in turn called the local police. Police put out missing persons report. (NOTE: Strange that he would call that quickly unless this was a festering problem.) Berezhkov indicated that he thought that foul play was possible.

-- Police and Soviet Embassy called State about 2:30 a.m., August 11, to report that the son had returned home. There is no indication that he was brought home under coercion, but not certain that he just returned voluntarily.

3. Department of State, EUR/SOV (Simons) received a call from Les Gelb, New York Times (about 3:00 p.m.), who informed State that the New York Times had a letter from an Andy Berezhkov indicating that he planned to defect on August 11 (letter at Tab I). He provided the letter to State on a privileged basis and asked for State's reaction. Gelb also indicated that the New York Times was considering publishing the letter. Simons called me on secure at 4:37 p.m.

-- We agreed with State's recommendation that the New York Times not publish now; particularly to hold off for a day.

-- The FBI reported that the wife and son were slated to leave for New York City tomorrow (August 12) and from there presumably to go to the USSR.

-- At 5:10 p.m. Gelb called to report that the New York Times headquarters had not only decided to publish the letter, but had called Minister Sokolov at the Soviet Embassy and read the contents of the letter to him.

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SENSITIVE

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NLS F06-114/b# 9/69

BY LOI, NARA, DATE 12/13/07

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

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4. We checked Correspondence Office and found a letter addressed to the President from the young man (Tab II), which he indicated in the letter to the New York Times that he intended to do.
5. Copies of the letters and this memorandum have been provided to Bob Sims per your instructions.
6. The FBI has the Berezhev's under tight surveillance. State is consulting with their legal, human rights, and desk people to decide on a course of action.

Attachments:

Tab I	Berezhev letter to the <u>New York Times</u>
Tab II	Berezhev letter to the <u>President</u>

cc: Bob Sims

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

Ralph Bunche



USA
20c




Washington D.C. 20036

New York Times Bureau
News.

1000 Connecticut Ave., NW





Ralph Bunche

Washington

D.C. 20036

Mr. President.

White House

1600 Pennsyl valnia Av. NW

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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NON LOG

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

MEMORANDUM FOR FRED FIELDING

August 12, 1983

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SUBJECT: Berezhev Incident

We understand you wanted the following information on the Berezhev incident:

-- Leslie Gelb from the New York Times received the letter on August 11.

-- Gelb called Tom Simons, Director of Soviet Affairs at the State Department, at about 3:45 to tell him about the letter.

-- Gelb offered a copy of the letter to the State Department; Annette Bohr, a State intern, picked it up and hand-carried it back to State.

-- Tom Simons informed Ty Cobb of our staff of the Berezhev letter at about 4:30; shortly afterwards State delivered a copy of letter to Cobb.

-- Anne Higgins' office received the separate letter addressed to the President in the August 11 morning mail. In response to a call from Tom Shull of our staff, Anne hand-delivered the letter to me at around 5:00 p.m. At that time, we provided a copy of the letter to the President to Judge Clark's office.

For your further background, I have attached a copy of an internal NSC memo on the Berezhev situation as we knew of it at 6:00 p.m. on August 11.

cc: Judge Clark

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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NLS F06-114/6 #9170
BY LM, NARA, DATE 12/13/07

file USSR/dep Lenczowski
National Security Council
The White House

RECEIVED

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83 AUG 12 P 6: 56

SEQUENCE TO

HAS SEEN

DISPOSITION

Executive Secretary

1

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John Poindexter

2

J

Bud McFarlane

Jacque Hill

Judge Clark

John Poindexter

Executive Secretary

NSC Secretariat

Situation Room

I-Information

A-Action

R-Retain

D-Dispatch

N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by:

(Date/Time)

*An advance copy of Tab A
has already gone to the judge.*

63

SYSTEM II
90988

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~ ~~SENSITIVE~~

August 12, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI JL

SUBJECT: Possible Soviet Defector

Attached at Tab A is a memorandum from Secretary Shultz to the President reporting on State's action on young Berezhkov.

At Tab I is a memorandum forwarding this report to the President.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove  _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Memorandum from Secretary of State Shultz,
dated August 12, 1983

~~SECRET~~ ~~SENSITIVE~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By LOT NARA, Date 2/17/05

PRESERVATION COPY

MEMORANDUM

64
SYSTEM II
90988

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~ ~~SENSITIVE~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK
SUBJECT: Possible Soviet Defector

Attached at Tab A is a progress report from George Shultz on State's handling of the case of the Soviet Embassy official's son. His main point is that State is insisting that we have the opportunity to interview the young man and ascertain his true intentions before we permit the Soviets to take him back to the USSR.

Prepared by:
John Lenczowski

Attachment:

Tab A Memorandum from Secretary Shultz, August 12

~~SECRET~~ ~~SENSITIVE~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By LOI NARA, Date 2/17/05

PRESERVATION COPY

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

August 12, 1983

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: George P. Shultz *WPS*
SUBJECT: Possible Soviet Embassy Defector

We have been working closely with the FBI and INS to ensure that we have an opportunity to interview the son of the Soviet Embassy official who wrote you saying he wanted to stay in the United States. It is, of course, a matter of principle that we ascertain his true intentions before we allow the Soviets to take him back to the Soviet Union.

We have told the Soviets orally, and by note, that we insist on the interview before he departs. The Soviets responded this morning, saying they reject our right to hinder the departure of the dependent of a Soviet Embassy official and protest our actions. Soviet Charge Sokolov, in conversations with Rick Burt, has complained about the heavy press and other activity around their Embassy and housing compound. We have taken steps to ensure outsiders are kept at least one hundred feet away from Soviet property in order to reduce somewhat the possibility of Soviet retaliation against our exposed Embassy personnel in Moscow. Rick also told the Soviet Charge that we hoped to discuss this matter in greater detail and exchange any information to see if there is some way we could resolve the problem. Sokolov agreed to get back to Moscow to see what further he could say.

We will follow this closely throughout the weekend and keep you fully informed. There is obviously a great deal of press interest in this case. We are saying that we have had several discussions with the Soviet Embassy and exchanged notes on this issue and that we are insisting that the young man not depart the United States prior to an interview.

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John Lenzkowski, NSC; Old Executive Office Bldg.

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REMARKS:

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INFORMAL WORKING GROUP ON ANDREI BEREZHKOSITUATION REPORT NO. 5SITUATION AS OF 0500 EDT, AUGUST 14, 1983

Press Coverage. Media coverage remains moderate, but is beginning to concentrate on the "superpower confrontation" angle. Sunday's Washington Post headlines its article "Standoff Intensifies..." The Berezkhov story was the lead item on the CBS Evening News Saturday, which also emphasized the confrontation element. CBS reported "no progress" in Saturday's US-Soviet meeting at the State Department, and noted that the President was receiving reports on the situation. This morning's Post also indicated the President's interest, but quoted the White House as saying he is "leaving the handling to the State Department." The Post quoted from a Cable News Network interview with Soviet Minister-Counselor Isakov, who termed U.S. actions a "gross violation of international law." CBS carried a brief clip of the same CNN interview and also showed film of the incident with the TASS family at Dulles Airport Friday evening. CBS and the Post both noted US denials of harassing or enticing Soviet officials. NBC's Saturday evening news show quoted a Soviet diplomat describing the Berezkhov affair as "just a case of a son angry with his father," and concluded with a brief clip of KGB defector Stanislav Levchenko, who stated that "the boy's life would be ruined" if he returned to the USSR. ABC's Nightline had little to add to the other two networks' earlier reports but raised the question of whether and how the Soviets might reciprocate towards American diplomats in Moscow. All three networks showed film of Chargé Sokolov leaving the Department Saturday. CBS and NBC also mentioned that the USG's legal experts had determined that there is precedent for its position in the 1980 Soviet ballerina incident. The New York Times this morning leads off its front-page article with the Soviet insistence that no interview take place, but concentrates mainly on FBI surveillance efforts and attempts to verify the authenticity of Andrei's two letters.

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Contacts with the Soviets. Assistant Secretary Burt telephoned Sokolov about Isakov's appearance on CNN, telling him that going to the press and public at this point was not helpful. Sokolov responded that Isakov's interview was "several days old," and that the Soviets did not plan to give any more interviews on the subject.

Situation at Soviet residences. FBI reports that there has been no unusual activity overnight, and that the situation is calm.

Situation in Moscow. Embassy Moscow reports no change in their situation as of Sunday morning.


John M. Ordway
Berezkhov Working Group


Thomas L. Randall
Senior Watch Officer

Cleared:EUR:RBurt^{TW}

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