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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/26/2005

File Folder USSR-DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS 7/8

FOIA

F06-114/6

Box Number 22

YARHI-MILO

2209

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
9213	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE SOVIET RESTRICTION OF MILITARY LIAISON MISSIONS R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6	1	6/7/1984	B1
9219	MEMO	HILL TO MCFARLANE RE NEW SOVIET RESTRICTIONS ON MILITARY LIAISON MISSIONS IN THE GDR R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6	1	6/1/1984	B1
9220	MEMO	DEGRAFFENREID TO MCFARLANE RE SOVIET RESTRICTION OF MILITARY LIAISON MISSIONS R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6	1	6/12/1984	B1
9214	PAPER	USSR-EAST GERMANY PERMANENT RESTRICTED AREAS ALLIED MILITARY LIAISON MISSION	2	6/6/1984	B1
9221	MEMO	JULY 4 REMARKS BY HARTMAN R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6	2	ND	B1
9222	MEMO	JULY 4 REMARKS BY HARTMAN R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6	2	ND	B1
9215	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE LENINGRAD INCIDENT AND TRAVEL ADVISORY R 3/19/2013 F2006-114/6	1	8/3/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/26/2005

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FOIA

F06-114/6

Box Number 22

YARHI-MILO

2209

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
9223	MEMO	HILL TO MCFARLANE RE TRAVEL ADVISORY AND PRESS Q & A ON THE SITUATION IN LENINGRAD <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	4	8/3/1984	B1
9224	CABLE	020917Z AUG 84 <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	2	8/2/1984	B1
9216	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE SHULTZ- DOBRYNIN MEETING SEPTEMBER 18 <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	1	9/18/1984	B1
9217	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE SHULTZ'S MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN, SEPTEMBER 17, 1984 <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	1	ND	B1
9225	MEMO	SHULTZ TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	2	9/17/1984	B1
9218	E-MAIL	E-MAIL PROFS FROM KIMMITT RE SCHEDULING <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	1	9/15/1984	B1
9247	MEMO	REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS	1	9/29/1984	B6

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Matlock:

4440

Diplo

NOTED

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 7, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *frv*

SUBJECT: Soviet Restriction of Military Liaison Missions

State has sent you a memorandum reporting on the Soviet action May 16 to redefine the Permanent Restricted Areas which apply to Allied Military Liaison Missions in East Germany. State is currently consulting with our Allies concerning an appropriate reaction and will keep us informed.

The new restrictions do not expand the overall area declared off bounds to travel by Military Liaison Missions, but seem to have been redefined to impede our intelligence collection. If retaliation is deemed appropriate, we presumably have the means, with Allied concurrence, to redefine areas in the FRG from which the Soviet military missions are excluded.

This or action on hostile presence in U.S.
deGraffenreid, ^{unavailable} Lenczowski, ^{OOT} Dobriansky and ^{unavailable} Robinson concur.
(See Memo)

Attachment:

Tab I Hill/McFarlane Memorandum
Tab II deGraffenreid Memo

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F06-114/6#9213

BY LDS NARA, DATE 12/13/07



S/S# 8415579

United States Department of State

4440

Washington, D.C. 20520

June 1, 1984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSESubject: New Soviet Restrictions on Military Liaison Missions
in the German Democratic Republic

On May 16, the Soviets informed Allied Military Liaison Missions (MLM) in Potsdam of newly redefined Permanent Restricted Areas (PRA) which, in the US MLM's view, severely restrict their intelligence gathering capability, although the overall area covered by the PRA's has not increased. Originally set up in 1947 to perform liaison functions between the respective Allied CINCs and the Soviet CINC in the eastern zone of occupation, the three Allied MLMs currently are useful primarily for intelligence collection. (The Soviets have three missions in the FRG.) The last PRA changes were made by both the Allies and the Soviets in 1978.

We are currently examining more closely the new Soviet restrictions with our Allies and assessing their impact on MLM intelligence collection. We are also considering possible courses of action, including formal protests, with our Allies. While the Soviets do not appear to have abandoned their desire to maintain calm in and around Berlin during the present period of East-West tensions, Soviet and GDR actions regarding Berlin will need to be observed especially carefully.

Factors affecting the Soviet sense of timing in issuing the new PRAs are unclear. The precise delineation of the redrawn PRAs indicates that they must have been under preparation for quite some time, and are intended to prevent Allied MLM intelligence collection as much as possible. In April, there was an exchange of letters of protest regarding Soviet actions toward US MLM officers, while during the same period, an article appeared in the International Herald Tribune which called attention to the MLMs' intelligence capability. At a time when overall relations are poor, these events may have precipitated the Soviet decision to restrict further the MLMs.

We discussed these matters at an Inter-Agency meeting May 24, and have tasked agencies to gather more information for a subsequent meeting to recommend next steps. The US, UK, French and FRG Berlin experts discussed possible coordinated reactions at the NATO Ministerial meeting May 28. We will keep you informed.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F06-114/6 #9219

BY hst NARA, DATE 12/13/07

Richard D. Kazal
Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECL: OADR

~~SECRET~~

4440 (add-on)

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

June 12, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: KENNETH deGRAFFENREID *kd*

SUBJECT: Soviet Restriction of Military Liaison Missions

The Soviet action seriously limits the effectiveness of MLM activities in East Germany. The MLM has been one of our most lucrative sources of intelligence over the years. I don't believe that we can afford to ignore it or to chalk it up as another manifestation of strained relations. Combined with other unilateral Soviet moves to restrict Berlin air travel, it demonstrates, among other things, that the Soviets are able to deal quickly and effectively to limit hostile intelligence threats to themselves.

I recommend that you talk to Secretary Shultz about possible actions which can be taken to counter the Soviet MLM move and, germane to the hostile pressure issue here, invite his attention to the firmness with which the Soviets deal with intelligence threats.

Recommendation

That you call Secretary Shultz on this issue.

Approve *DCM*

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab A Defense Intelligence Summary Topic - USSR-East Germany:
Permanent Restricted Areas, June 6, 1984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F06-114/6 #9220

~~SECRET~~

BY LOT NARA, DATE 12/13/07

USSR/Diplo mid 3pm! 6

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

'84 JUN 27 A10:47

JHM

URGENT

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

B

S/S # 8418441

84 JUN 27 A10:53

URGENT

MESSAGE NO. 4678 CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL No. Pages 3

FROM: Chill S/S 22540
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION H/M: Ctr for Amb Hartman's July 4 Speech in
Moscow

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
NSC	PAUL THOMPSON	395-3044	
	NSC		
	K. T. MUMFITT		
	<u>Onatlock</u>		

FOR: CLEARANCE ☐ INFORMATION ☐ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS: ADVANCE COPY. ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW VIA COURIER.

S/S Officer: B/ack/cay 1/1/85

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 23, 1997
By smf NARA, Date 6/17/02

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1995
By smf NARA, Date 6/17/02



S/S 8418441
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

June 27, 1984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Clearance for Ambassador Hartman's July 4 Speech in
Moscow

We request your clearance for the attached text for Ambassador Arthur Hartman's July 4 speech on Soviet television, calling your attention, in particular, to the next to the last paragraph in which he refers to the President's position. He asked that it be cleared by tomorrow if at all possible since it must be translated and delivered early to Soviet broadcast authorities.

Charles Hill
Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Attachment: As stated.

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

by *smf* NARA, Date *6/19/02*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL:OADR

6

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9

JULY 4 REMARKS BY AMBASSADOR HARTMAN

Good evening. As my country marks the two hundred eighth anniversary of the American revolution, it gives me great pleasure to extend warm greetings to the Soviet people from the people of the United States of America.

On this occasion, we in America remember not only the pride of becoming an independent country, but the ideals that were the foundation of our revolution. These ideals, which rested on the premise that men should freely choose their leaders and make the laws by which they are governed, remain as valid today as they were in the eighteenth century. The responsibility of citizens to participate in the exercise of that freedom to choose is especially felt every four years when, as in this year of 1984, our countrymen go to the polls to choose the President, the full membership of the House of Representatives, and one-third of the Senate.

This is a time when we consider the past four years and look ahead to the next four years. It is a process that requires our political leaders to account for their positions and their actions. It is a time of debate and criticism. But the process has a benefit that strengthens our society; it permits the people to introduce correctives when the government has failed to meet their expectations. The real problems of public life are recognized and openly discussed. When our citizens make their political judgments at the polls or write to their representatives in the Congress or speak out at public forums, they follow only the dictates of their own conscience. Thus the policies and actions of the United States are genuinely a reflection of the freely expressed beliefs of the majority of the people.

The national consensus for peace is strong in the United States, but equally strong is the attachment of Americans to the principles of freedom and independence. We recognize the right of every nation to defend itself, and to meet its obligations to Allies. We insist on no special privilege for ourselves in the world, nor do we believe the security of one country can be achieved at the expense of another.

A constant theme of the participants in political debate in the United States is how to achieve a stronger, more stable peace. It is widely recognized that constructive relations between the United States and the Soviet Union are a crucial factor in determining the international climate. The

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NLS F06-114/16#9271

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BY LDT NARA, DATE 12/13/07

9

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

aspirations of all Americans to improve these relations can best be seen in President Reagan's message to Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko on the occasion of the Supreme Soviet decision to name him as Chairman of its Presidium. The President wrote: "The United States remains ready to pursue a constructive dialogue aimed at reducing the risks of war and the levels of armaments, resolving regional conflicts peacefully and promoting trust and confidence which will enable the people of our two countries, and of the world, to live freer and more prosperous lives."

The situation today in Soviet-American relations shows clearly that understanding between our two countries needs to be strengthened. This requires not only words but concrete deeds. The United States seeks cooperation with the Soviet Union without preconditions. Our president is prepared to meet and discuss these issues. We want agreements to reduce nuclear arms and to lessen the threat of war. We believe that understanding can be built through open, frank dialogue and expanded contact.

I would like to close by quoting the words of an earlier American President, who is much respected in our country by all strata of opinion and is greatly admired by President Reagan. The words of Franklin Roosevelt, spoken in the complex circumstances of the 1930's, could apply equally to the world of the 1980's: "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself."

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

National Security Council
The White House

System #

Package #

~~Matlock~~
→ file USSR/diga
I 10

4872

84 JUN 27 8:56

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y			
Bob Kimmitt	1	K	
John Poindexter	2		
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane	3	M	A
Bob Kimmitt	4	K	
NSC Secretariat	5		N
Situation Room			

I = Information

A = Action

R = Retain

D = Dispatch

N = No further Action

cc:

VP

Meese

Baker

Deaver

Other

Matlock / Thompson

COMMENTS

Should be seen by:

(Date/Time)

- ① Link up w/ package
- ② I passed to State, via Paul, on 6/27

6/27

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

TO: Mr. Kimmitt

Bob -

This speech looks fine to me, but I believe Bud should take a look at the highlighted sentence on p 2, since it goes further than our previous public statements. (If the July 4 address is permitted on Soviet TV, there will be press playback here.)

Jack

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

'84 JUN 27 AIO:47

JHM

URGENT

B

S/S # 8418441

84 JUN 27 AIO: 53

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TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
NSC	[REDACTED]	395-3044	
	NSC-S		
	K. M. MITT		

FOR: CLEARANCE ☒ INFORMATION ☐ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS: ADVANCE COPY. ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW VIA COURIER.

S/S Officer: B. Mack/cay | 1825

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 20, 1997

By [Signature] NARA, Date 6/19/02

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By [Signature] NARA, Date 6/19/02

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14
CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

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CONFIDENTIAL

National Security Council
The White House

System #

I

Package #

4872

84 JUN 27

P 2: 42: 12

SEQUENCE TO 92 HAS SEEN

DISPOSITION

Dep. Exec. Sec'y

Bob Kimmitt

John Poindexter

Tom Shull

Wilma Hall

Bud McFarlane

Bob Kimmitt

NSC Secretariat

Situation Room

1

2

K

[Handwritten signature]

~~X~~

X 3

4

K

Advance

Pass

to M. H. K.

I = Information

A = Action

R = Retain

D = Dispatch

N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by:

(Date/Time)

I don't think this is particularly good. Let's see what Jack comes up with.

[Handwritten signature]



Washington, D.C. 20520

June 27, 1984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Clearance for Ambassador Hartman's July 4 Speech in
Moscow

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BMK Hil
Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Attachment: As stated.

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By smf NARA, Date 6/17/02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL:OADR

USSR - Diplo 17

NSC/S PROFILE

UNCLASSIFIED

ID 8405807

RECEIVED 30 JUL 84 14

TO

MCFARLANE

FROM STATE

DOCDATE 27 JUL 84

File

KEYWORDS USSR

MEDIA

PRESS

SUBJECT US / SOVIET CONSULAR REVIEW TALKS / BACKGROUND & PRESS GUIDANCE

ACTION. FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DUE:

STATUS C FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

SMALL

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(LF LF)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

(C)

National Security Council
The White House

System #

Package #

I

5807

SEQUENCE TO

HAS SEEN

DISPOSITION

Paul Thompson

Bob Kimmitt

John Poindexter

Tom Shull

Wilma Hall

Bud McFarlane

Bob Kimmitt

NSC Secretariat

Situation Room

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

Bob,

Jack has cleared. Please clear with
State, DACOM copy to Bud for
briefing Speaker and send an
info copy to Small. J

UNCLASSIFIED

EUR/SOV/SOBI:JJBORIS
07/27/84 EXT. 28720 {3480B}
EUR:RBURT

EUR/SOV:JFSCHUMAKER
EUR:MPALMER
PA:AROMBERG
L/CA:RHENDERSON

EUR/SOV:TWSIMONS
CA/VO:DMORRIS
CA:EROWELL

IMMEDIATE MOSCOW, LENINGRAD

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: CVIS, UR, US

SUBJECT: U.S.-SOVIET CONSULAR REVIEW TALKS:
BACKGROUND AND PRESS GUIDANCE.

1. AFTER CRT NOTES ARE INITIALLED AND EXCHANGED, WE ASSUME EMBASSY WILL ANNOUNCE AGREEMENT TO THE PRESS IN MOSCOW. WE WILL FOLLOW UP HERE AT MONDAY'S NOON PRESS BRIEFING. FOLLOWING ARE OUR SUGGESTED ANNOUNCEMENT AND Q & A'S. EMBASSY SHOULD NOTIFY US OF ANY MODIFICATIONS BY 00B 7/28.

(2. BEGIN ANNOUNCEMENT. ON JULY 30, 1984, REPRESENTATIVES OF THE U.S. EMBASSY IN MOSCOW AND THE CONSULAR DIVISION OF THE SOVIET MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS EXCHANGED DIPLOMATIC NOTES CONCLUDING THE LATEST ROUND OF THE U.S.-SOVIET CONSULAR REVIEW TALKS (CRT). THE AGREEMENT BRINGS TO FRUITION A SERIES OF DISCUSSIONS ON CONSULAR MATTERS CONDUCTED IN 1976, 1979, 1983, AND 1984, AND RESOLVES A NUMBER OF ISSUES RELATING TO VISAS AND THE FUNCTIONING OF THE DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES.

3. THE ISSUES INVOLVED WERE ESSENTIALLY TECHNICAL ONES, TO BE RESOLVED ON THE BASIS OF MUTUAL BENEFIT.

RB

JJB
JFS
TWS
MP
DM
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ER
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UNCLASSIFIED

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| 2

THE AGREEMENT WILL FACILITATE THE TRAVEL OF PARTICIPANTS IN EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGE PROGRAMS, EXPEDITE THE ISSUANCE OF CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF VISAS, AND IMPROVE CONDITIONS FOR THE TRAVEL OF DIPLOMATS IN THE TWO COUNTRIES BY ALLOWING THEM TO ENTER AND LEAVE THROUGH TWO ADDITIONAL CITIES BEYOND THE THREE CURRENTLY PROVIDED FOR. THE TALKS WERE PROPOSED BY US AS PART OF THE PRESIDENT'S EFFORT TO EXPAND CONTACTS AND TO MOVE FORWARD ON BILATERAL ISSUES THAT CAN BE RESOLVED TO OUR MUTUAL BENEFIT, AS HE MENTIONED IN HIS JUNE 27 REMARKS ON US-SOVIET EXCHANGES, AND IT SEEMED TO US THAT THE SOVIET SIDE APPROACHED THEM IN THE SAME SPIRIT.

4. THE U.S. DELEGATION WAS LED BY RAYMOND F. SMITH, OFFICER-IN-CHARGE OF THE BILATERAL RELATIONS SECTION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE'S OFFICE OF SOVIET UNION AFFAIRS. THE SOVIET DELEGATION WAS HEADED BY IVAN GOROKHOV, DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE CONSULAR ADMINISTRATION OF THE SOVIET MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.)

(5. BEGIN QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS.

Q: WOULD THE ADMINISTRATION CHARACTERIZE THIS AS A MAJOR STEP FORWARD WITH THE SOVIETS?

A: NO. BUT THIS IS ANOTHER MODEST, USEFUL STEP THAT ILLUSTRATES THAT THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION CAN REACH AGREEMENT ON SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES TO THEIR MUTUAL INTEREST.

6. Q: WHAT ARE THE PRECISE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT?

A. THE AGREEMENT FOCUSES PRIMARILY ON VISA QUESTIONS. IT BROADENS THE CATEGORIES OF RANKING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS OF THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION ELIGIBLE FOR DIPLOMATIC VISAS {SUCH VISAS DO NOT AUTOMATICALLY CONFER DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES}. IT STREAMLINES THE ISSUANCE OF VISAS TO DIPLOMATS ON TEMPORARY ASSIGNMENT, TO DIPLOMATS ASSIGNED TO UNITED NATIONS MISSIONS, TO DEPENDENTS AND HOUSEHOLD EMPLOYEES OF DIPLOMATS, AND TO PERSONNEL OF TRADE ORGANIZATIONS. IT ALSO DEALS WITH THE MAXIMUM VALIDITY OF VISAS FOR PERSONS PARTICIPATING IN OFFICIAL EXCHANGE PROGRAMS, AND SIMPLIFIES THE PROCEDURES FOR OFFICIALLY-SPONSORED REQUESTS FOR CHANGES OF VISA STATUS. FINALLY, IT INCREASES THE NUMBER OF ENTRY-EXIT POINTS AVAILABLE TO U.S. AND SOVIET DIPLOMATS, ADDING BREST {ON THE POLISH BORDER} AND NAKHODKA {IN THE FAR EAST} FOR U.S.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

| 3

DIPLOMATS ASSIGNED TO THE USSR AND BALTIMORE AND SAN FRANCISCO FOR SOVIET DIPLOMATS ASSIGNED TO THE U.S.

7. Q: WHAT ARE THE CURRENT ENTRY-EXIT POINTS?

A: MOSCOW, LENINGRAD AND VYBORG ON THE FINNISH-SOVIET BORDER FOR OUR PEOPLE THERE, WASHINGTON, NEW YORK AND ROUSE'S POINT, NEW YORK ON THE US-CANADIAN BORDER FOR THEIR DIPLOMATS ASSIGNED HERE.

8. Q: WHY WAS THE CONSULAR AGREEMENT SIGNED IN MOSCOW? AND AT A COMPARATIVELY LOW LEVEL?

A: THE U.S. AND SOVIET DELEGATIONS TO THE CONSULAR REVIEW TALKS {CRT} HAVE MET ALTERNATELY IN MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON. THE AGREEMENT WAS CONCLUDED IN THE CITY IN WHICH THE DISCUSSIONS MOST RECENTLY TOOK PLACE, IN THIS CASE MOSCOW. THE LEVEL AND FORM OF THE EXCHANGE OF NOTES WAS APPROPRIATE TO THE TECHNICAL SUBJECT MATTER.

9. Q: YOU SAY THE CRT DISCUSSIONS FIRST TOOK PLACE AS EARLY AS 1976. WHY DID IT TAKE EIGHT YEARS TO REACH THIS AGREEMENT?

A: THERE ARE SOME ISSUES THAT TAKE A LONG TIME TO RESOLVE BECAUSE OF THEIR TECHNICAL NATURE. AT TIMES IN THE PAST, THE SOVIETS WERE RELUCTANT TO MOVE FORWARD. AT OTHER TIMES, WE WANTED TO EXAMINE THE RAMIFICATIONS OF NEW SUGGESTIONS.

10. Q: HOW DOES THIS CONSULAR AGREEMENT BENEFIT THE AVERAGE PERSON? IT SEEMS TO APPLY ONLY TO DIPLOMATS.

A: THE AGREEMENT WILL AFFECT NOT ONLY DIPLOMATS, BUT ALSO PARTICIPANTS IN OFFICIAL EXCHANGE PROGRAMS, CERTAIN BUSINESSMEN, AMERICANS WHO ARE ENGAGED AS HOUSEHOLD EMPLOYEES BY U.S. DIPLOMATS IN THE SOVIET UNION, AND SENIOR U.S. AND SOVIET GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS.

11. Q: DOES THIS AGREEMENT BENEFIT THE SOVIETS MORE THAN IT DOES US?

A: OF COURSE NOT. CERTAIN INDIVIDUAL ISSUES DEALT WITH IN THE CRT MAY BE OF MORE CONCERN TO ONE SIDE THAN TO ANOTHER, BUT THE OVERALL PACKAGE OF ISSUES COVERED BY THE NOTES REPRESENTS A BALANCED PACKAGE THAT IS VERY MUCH IN OUR INTEREST.

12. Q: HOW DOES THE CRT AGREEMENT TIE INTO THE ISSUE OF

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CONSULATES IN KIEV AND NEW YORK?

A: IT DOES NOT; THAT ISSUE IS NOT ADDRESSED IN THE AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, THE UNITED STATES HAS MADE CLEAR TO THE SOVIET UNION ITS WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER THE THE ISSUE OF NEW CONSULATES, AND AS WE UNDERSTAND THE SOVIET POSITION THERE ARE NO BASIC OBSTACLES TO MOVING FORWARD.

13. Q: IS THERE ANY RELATION BETWEEN THE CONSULAR REVIEW TALKS AND THE NEGOTIATION OF A NEW EXCHANGES AGREEMENT AS ANNOUNCED BY THE PRESIDENT ON JUNE 27?

A: THE ONLY CONNECTION BETWEEN THE TWO ISSUES IS THAT THE CRT PROVIDES FOR EXPEDITIOUS HANDLING OF VISAS FOR EXCHANGEES UNDER OFFICIAL PROGRAMS. OTHERWISE, THE CRT AND THE NEW EXCHANGES AGREEMENT -- NEGOTIATION OF WHICH SHOULD BEGIN IN THE NEAR FUTURE -- ARE TWO SEPARATE ISSUES.

14. Q: WILL THE AGREEMENT INCREASE THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES?

A: NO. THE AGREEMENT DOES NOT AFFECT THE LIMITS IN EFFECT FOR PERSONNEL OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY AND CONSULATE GENERAL. THE AGREEMENT DOES STREAMLINE THE PROCESS OF ISSUING VISAS TO CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF THOSE DIPLOMATS, JUST AS IT FACILITATES THE ISSUANCE OF VISAS TO CERTAIN AMERICAN DIPLOMATS ASSIGNED TO THE USSR.

15. Q: WILL THE ADDITION OF BALTIMORE AND SAN FRANCISCO AS NEW ENTRY-EXIT POINTS FOR SOVIET DIPLOMATS AFFECT THE SYSTEM OF OPEN AND CLOSED AREAS OF THE UNITED STATES?

A: NO. THE AGREEMENT NEITHER OPENS NOR CLOSES ANY NEW AREAS IN THE UNITED STATES OR THE SOVIET UNION. ONLY TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES IN OPEN PORTIONS OF THOSE ENTRY-EXIT POINTS MAY BE UTILIZED BY THE DIPLOMATS OF THE SENDING STATE, UNLESS AN EXCEPTION FOR TRAVEL IN A CLOSED AREA IS REQUESTED AND APPROVED. NEVERTHELESS, ACCESS TO TWO NEW ENTRY-EXIT POINTS WILL IMPROVE THE FUNCTIONING OF U.S. AND SOVIET DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS BY PROVIDING THOSE MISSIONS WITH GREATER FLEXIBILITY IN THE ROUTING OF PERSONNEL AND SUPPLIES IN AND OUT OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES.

END PRESS GUIDANCE

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115R/114/6 #9215 22

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

August 3, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT:

Leningrad Incident and Travel Advisory

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR File 114/6 #9215

BY *FW* NARA DATE 3/14/13

Attached is a self-explanatory memorandum from State regarding the most recent incident in Leningrad, where a Marine Security Guard at the Consulate General was set upon by Soviet security officials, beaten, and taken to jail. Since this is only the latest in a number of incidents involving American citizens, which were staged by Soviet security officials in Leningrad, State recommends issuing a travel advisory warning against travel to the area.

I believe that this action is the least we should do and would recommend that the travel advisory be approved for issuance early next week. I am not sure it is enough, however, and believe we must find some means for more direct retaliation (short of roughing someone up, of course). I have asked State to discuss with the FBI what possibilities may exist for arranging an unpleasant incident, short of physical attack, involving a KGB employee at the Soviet Consulate General in San Francisco. Though the travel advisory will sting, I believe that something approximating mirror-image treatment affecting the Soviet service which created the incident is the language the Soviets really understand.

I realize that some elements of the media are likely to interpret these incidents as a sign of a dangerous deterioration in US-Soviet relations -- an impression the Soviets are only too glad to encourage at this time. Nevertheless, since the recent incident and some of the preceding ones are already public knowledge, I believe most of our public would expect some action on our part.

Recommendation:

That you approve issuance of the travel advisory early next week.

Approve ____

Disapprove ____

Attachment:

Tab I - Hill-McFarlane Memorandum of August 3, 1984

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Declassify: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Washington, D.C. 20520

August 3, 1984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Travel Advisory and Press Q's and A's
on the Situation in Leningrad

This morning a Marine Security Guard at our Consulate General in Leningrad was lured away from the vicinity of the Consulate building and beaten up by militiamen and plain-clothesmen (see reporting cable at Tab C). The incident was an obvious set-up, and is one of the more egregious examples of official harassment in recent memory, although there have been a number of serious incidents of official harassment involving both American tourists and Consulate General officials in past months.

We have been considering whether to issue a travel advisory about the Leningrad situation for some time, and had warned the Soviets on a number of occasions that unless they took immediate steps to prevent the recurrence of such harassment incidents, there would be significant consequences. We now believe that, on the basis of this latest episode, we should go forward with a strong travel advisory on conditions in Leningrad. Our Embassy has been consulted and agrees.

Under Secretary Armacost met with Soviet Charge Oleg Sokolov at noon today to read him the riot act over this and other recent Leningrad incidents, as well as the problems we are having in Moscow. Armacost told Sokolov that we protested this act in the strongest terms and said we had warned them that if this harassment had to stop or serious consequences would follow. Our Embassy and Consulate General also plan to deliver strong protests. We intend to follow up by issuing the attached travel advisory (Tab A) tomorrow. Short Q's and A's are also attached (Tab B).

Richard D. Kuzla
Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

1. Tab A - Travel Advisory
2. Tab B - Q's and A's
3. Tab C - Leningrad 2000

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS FOI-114/6 # 9223

BY LOT, NARA, DATE 12/13/07

Leningrad Travel Advisory

1. The Department of State advises that during the past few months, there has been a noticeable increase in the number of incidents of harassment involving Americans in the Soviet Union. The majority of serious incidents has occurred in the Leningrad area. There have been several cases of unlawful detention of tourists by the Soviet security organs following innocent contacts with Soviet citizens. During detention Americans have been denied their rights, under the US-USSR Consular Convention, to communicate with an American Consular officer and to be visited by him without delay. American tourists have also been subjected to arbitrary and in many cases unjustifiably embarrassing searches of their personal effects when arriving or departing from Leningrad's international airport. The Soviet authorities have not responded in a satisfactory manner to our urgent requests that they act immediately to correct this situation. Americans travelling to the Leningrad area should be aware that their rights as foreign tourists and the protections afforded them under the US-USSR Consular Convention are not being respected by the Soviet authorities.

2. Expiration date: indefinite.

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NLS FOG-114/6 #92739
BY HOJ, NARA, DATE 12/13/07

LENINGRAD TRAVEL ADVISORY

(After issuing the attached Leningrad Travel Advisory)

Q: Is this connected with our disappointment over the Soviet position on outer space talks in Vienna?

A: No, it has no connection.

Q: Why then are you doing this now?

A: There have been several serious incidents in the Soviet Union over the past few months involving American tourists and officials that show a disturbing pattern of official involvement in a campaign to harass and isolate Americans in the Soviet Union. We have brought this matter up with the Soviets on numerous occasions, but have not received a satisfactory response.

Most recently, there was a serious incident in Leningrad involving one of our U.S. Marine Guards. The Marine in question, who was off duty, had left the Consulate building to investigate a suspicious vehicle that had been circling the Consulate. Two blocks from the Consulate, he was surrounded by militiamen and plainclothesmen, beaten, and taken to a police station. He has since been released by the authorities, and does not require hospitalization. The incident was a clear set-up, and was without any

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NLS F06-114/6 #9223b
BY WJ NARA, DATE 12/13/07

provocation whatsoever. In effect, we now have a situation in Leningrad in which Soviet "goon squads" clearly sent by the security apparat are cruising the neighborhood waiting to pick a fight with Americans who venture off Consulate grounds. This an intolerable situation.

Q: Could you provide us with any more details of this or other incidents which have occurred recently?

A: There have been a significant number of incidents of varying seriousness in recent months, many involving private citizens. It would be inappropriate for me to discuss these incidents in any more detail at this time.

Q: Why are you issuing a travel advisory for tourists if the most recent incident you refer to involved a member of the Consulate General staff?

A: The incident involving our Marine is symptomatic of a broader problem we face: a pattern of official harassment against all Americans in the Leningrad area. Therefore, we believe a travel advisory will be necessary until the overall situation improves.

Department of State

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ACTION EUR-00

LENGING 02000 00 OF 03 020959Z 3535 EUR3498

ACTION OFFICE SOBI-03

INFO PMP-01 EUR-05 PMA-01 PMD-01 SOEC-01 EX-01 SOV-01 SOML-01
OCT-01 PA-01 PMS-01 PH-01 PP-01 PMO-02 FILE-01
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INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
NSAE-00 SSO-00 SY-06 PA-01 MCT-03 CPR-02 INRE-00
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DEPT FOR EUR/SOV

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: ASEC, PREL, UR
SUBJECT: MARINE SECURITY GUARD ASSAULTED AND DETAINED

REFS: (A) Leningrad 1834, (B) Leningrad 1667

1. - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: CONSULATE GENERAL MARINE SECURITY GUARD (MSG), SGT. RONALD CAMPBELL, WAS ASSAULTED AT APPROXIMATELY 3:15 A.M. ON AUGUST 2 BY THREE SOVIET MEN IN PLAIN CLOTHES WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF FOUR SOVIET MILITIA OFFICERS. SGT. CAMPBELL HAD FOLLOWED ON FOOT A SUSPICIOUS AUTOMOBILE THAT HAD BEEN CIRCLING BY THE CONSULATE GENERAL. WHEN HE WAS ABOUT TWO BLOCKS FROM THE CONSULATE GENERAL, A MILITIA CAR APPROACHED FROM BEHIND WHILE THE MEN IN THE OTHER CAR RAN TOWARDS HIM. THE MILITIAMEN GRABBED SGT. CAMPBELL AND THE MEN IN PLAIN CLOTHES REPEATEDLY HIT AND KICKED HIM WHILE HE WAS BEING HELD. AFTER ABOUT ONE MINUTE, THE MILITIA PUT SGT. CAMPBELL IN THEIR VEHICLE AS HE WAS STILL BEING ASSAULTED BY THE OTHER MEN. THE ENTIRE TIME A PHOTOGRAPHER TOOK PICTURES OF THE INCIDENT. SGT. CAMPBELL DOES NOT REQUIRE HOSPITALIZATION.

3. AFTER THE ASSAULT THE MILITIA TOOK SGT. CAMPBELL TO A NEAR-BY MILITIA STATION. AT 5:30 A.M. ACTING DEPUTY PRINCIPAL OFFICER HARMS WAS CALLED BY THE ACTING CHIEF OF THE DIPLOMATIC AGENCY, M.A. VYBORNOV. VYBORNOV REQUESTED THAT HARMS COME TO THE MILITIA STATION TO PICK UP SGT. CAMPBELL, WHO, ALTHOUGH IDENTIFIED BY VYBORNOV, DID NOT HAVE HIS DIPLOMATIC IDENTIFICATION CARD. AT THE MILITIA STATION, VYBORNOV SAID THAT SGT. CAMPBELL WAS PICKED UP BY THE MILITIA BECAUSE HE WAS SEEN THROWING A ROCK AT A PASSING CAR ON LITEYNY PROSPEKT. VYBORNOV CLAIMED SGT. CAMPBELL WAS EXTREMELY DRUNK AND WAS YELLING INSULTING WORDS AT THE TIME. HAVING INTERVIEWED SGT. CAMPBELL AND OTHER MSG'S WHO WERE AWARE OF PARTS OF THE INCIDENT, THE CONSUL GENERAL INTENDS TO LODGE A STRONG PROTEST WITH THE DIPLOMATIC AGENCY AND REQUESTS THAT SIMILAR PROTESTS BE MADE IN MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON AT HIGH LEVELS. END SUMMARY.

4. ON AUGUST 2 AT APPROXIMATELY 0300, CONSULATE GENERAL MARINE SECURITY GUARD (MSG), SGT. RONALD CAMPBELL WAS ASSAULTED NEAR THE CONSULATE GENERAL BY THREE SOVIET MEN IN PLAIN CLOTHES WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF FOUR MILITIAMEN. PARAGRAPHS 5 THROUGH 8 BELOW CONTAIN THE FACTS OF THE INCIDENT AS RELATED BY SGT. CAMPBELL TO RSO JACKSON.

5. SGT CAMPBELL WORKED THE 1600-2400 SHIFT ON AUGUST 1ST.

HE WAS RELIEVED BY CPL. HOFFMAN AT 2400 HRS. AT APPROXIMATELY 0005 HE WENT TO HIS ROOM AND CHANGED HIS CLOTHES. AT 0015 HE WENT TO THE MARINE HOUSE BAR AREA TO RECORD SOME MUSIC (ALSO PRESENT WERE CPL. PITTMAN AND SGT. FRISINA). AT APPROXIMATELY 0115 HE WENT TO THE MARINE HOUSE TELEVISION ROOM TO WATCH TV. CPL. PITTMAN WAS ALSO PRESENT; SGT. FRISINA HAD GONE TO BED AT APPROXIMATELY 0100. AT APPROXIMATELY 0230 SGT. CAMPBELL WENT FOR A WALK IN THE LOCAL AREA FOR 20 MINUTES. UPON RETURNING TO THE CONSULATE GENERAL, HE STOPPED TO TALK WITH SGT. JONES AT THE TEMPORARY MSG POST IN FRONT OF THE BUILDING. SGT. JONES INFORMED HIM THAT A BEIGE VEHICLE HAD BEEN CIRCLING THE AREA AT LEAST THREE TIMES. SHORTLY THEREAFTER THE BEIGE VEHICLE APPEARED AGAIN AND STOPPED IN FRONT OF THE CONSULATE GENERAL. THE VEHICLE HAD THREE, POSSIBLY FOUR, MALE PASSENGERS DRESSED IN SUITS AND TIES. SGT. CAMPBELL APPROACHED THE VEHICLE AND ASKED THEM IF SOMETHING WAS WRONG AND IF HE COULD HELP THEM. HE DID THIS IN AN ATTEMPT TO DETERMINE IF THERE WAS A PROBLEM AS SUCH ACTIVITIES ARE NOT NORMAL. THE PERSONS INSIDE THE VEHICLE DID NOT SPEAK ENGLISH AND, UPON BEING ASKED WHAT WAS WRONG, STATED IN RUSSIAN THAT THEY DID NOT UNDERSTAND. THE VEHICLE THEN DROVE WEST APPROXIMATELY 100 YARDS AND SLOWED TO A STOP. SGT. CAMPBELL ATTEMPTED TO APPROACH THE VEHICLE IN AN EFFORT TO LET THEM KNOW HIS CONCERN ABOUT THEM STOPPING IN FRONT OF THE CONSULATE GENERAL. BEFORE HE REACHED THE VEHICLE THEY DROVE AN ADDITIONAL 400-500 YARDS DOWNTOWN TO THE CORNER OF LITEYNY PROSPEKT AND PETRA LAVROVA. AT THIS TIME THE PERSONS INSIDE THE VEHICLE MOTIONED TO SGT. CAMPBELL TO FOLLOW THEM BY WAVING THEIR ARMS OUT OF THE CAR WINDOWS (BOTH SIDES). SGT. CAMPBELL ATTEMPTED TO APPROACH THE VEHICLE, BUT WHEN HE WAS WITHIN 100 YARDS OF IT, THE VEHICLE DROVE AROUND THE CORNER AND DISAPPEARED FROM HIS SIGHT.

6. BECOMING CURIOUS, SGT. CAMPBELL RAN DOWN TO THE CORNER TO SEE WHAT WAS HAPPENING. UPON REACHING THE CORNER HE NOTICED THE CAR AGAIN APPROXIMATELY 100 YARDS FURTHER DOWN LITEYNY. THE PEOPLE INSIDE THE VEHICLE AGAIN MOTIONED FOR SGT. CAMPBELL TO FOLLOW THEM. AT THIS TIME HE OBSERVED A MILITIA VEHICLE APPROACHING FROM THE NORTH ON LITEYNY. THE MILITIA VEHICLE SLOWED DOWN UPON SEEING SGT. CAMPBELL; AT THE SAME TIME THE BEIGE VEHICLE BACKED UP ABOUT 5 FEET. WHILE SGT. CAMPBELL WAS WATCHING THE CAR BACK UP, THE MILITIA VEHICLE MADE A U-TURN AND CAME UP BEHIND HIM. BEFORE THE MILITIA VEHICLE CAME ALONG SIDE, THREE MEN GOT OUT OF THE BEIGE VEHICLE AND RAN TOWARD SGT. CAMPBELL YELLING SOMETHING. AT THE SAME TIME FOUR MILITIAMEN GOT OUT OF THEIR VEHICLE ALONG SIDE HIM. TWO OF THE MILITIAMEN GRABBED SGT. CAMPBELL, HOLDING HIS ARMS AT HIS SIDE. BY THIS TIME THE THREE MEN FROM THE BEIGE VEHICLE HAD ARRIVED ON THE SCENE. ALMOST IMMEDIATELY ONE OF THESE MEN HIT SGT. CAMPBELL IN THE LEFT EYE. AT THE SAME TIME THE MILITIAMEN FORCED HIS ARMS BEHIND HIS BACK AND BEGAN FORCING HIM TO THE BACK OF THE VEHICLE. ONE OF THE THREE MEN ALSO GRABBED HIS SHIRT, RIPPING IT WHILE FORCING HIM AGAINST THE VEHICLE. THE MILITIAMEN DID NOTHING TO ASSIST OTHER THAN TO HOLD HIM. HE WAS THROWN AGAINST THE BACK OF THE MILITIA VEHICLE WHERE HE WAS KICKED REPEATEDLY BY ALL THREE MEN IN SUITS. THE KICKS WERE DIRECTED MOSTLY AT HIS LEGS, GROIN AND BACK. THIS LASTED APPROXIMATELY 1 MINUTE. SGT. CAMPBELL RECALLS THAT A PHOTOGRAPHER WAS PRESENT AND TOOK FLASH PICTURES OF THE BEATING. HE WAS THEN FORCED INTO THE BACK OF THE MILITIA VEHICLE BY THE MILITIAMEN. THE OTHER THREE MEN WERE STILL HITTING AND KICKING AT HIM AT THIS TIME. WHILE SGT. CAMPBELL WAS SITTING IN THE BACK OF THE VEHICLE, THE MEN STILL ATTEMPTED TO HIT HIM, THROWING NUMEROUS BLOWS.

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CONFIDENTIAL

BY

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NARA, DATE 12/13/07

Department of State

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7. SGT. CAMPBELL WAS ASSISTED BY THE MILITIAMEN IN SHUTTING THE DOOR. HE WAS TRANSPORTED TO A LOCAL JAIL APPROXIMATELY THREE MINUTES TRAVELING TIME. WHILE EXITING THE MILITIA VEHICLE, THE PHOTOGRAPHER WAS AGAIN PRESENT TAKING NUMEROUS PICTURES. SGT. CAMPBELL ATTEMPTED TO HIDE HIS FACE AT THIS TIME. HE WAS PUT INTO A JAIL CELL OCCUPIED BY SIX SLEEPING SOVIETS. WHEN THE JAIL DOOR WAS CLOSED, SGT. CAMPBELL INFORMED THE MILITIA OFFICERS PRESENT IN RUSSIAN THAT HE WAS AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT. HE ALSO GAVE THE CONGEN TELEPHONE NUMBER IN RUSSIAN. HE REPEATEDLY ASKED TO MAKE A TELEPHONE CALL AND WAS LAUGHED AT. THE ENTIRE TIME HE WAS HUMILIATED AND JEERED AT. THE PHOTOGRAPHER CONTINUALLY TOOK PICTURES WHILE HE WAS IN THE JAIL CELL. ALSO PRESENT AT THE JAIL WERE THE THREE MEN THAT BEAT HIM, WHO WERE LAUGHING AND POINTING AT HIM. AT SOME POINT, APPROXIMATELY TWO HOURS LATER, A MAN (PRESUMABLY M.A. VYBORNOV OF THE DIPLOMATIC AGENCY) APPEARED AT THE CELL AND ASKED IN ENGLISH IF HE WAS RON CAMPBELL. SGT. CAMPBELL HAD NOT PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED HIS NAME. THE MAN SAID "WE CALL MR. MAGEE" AND CAMPBELL RESPONDED "YES, PLEASE."

8. A SHORT TIME LATER HE WAS INFORMED THAT THEY COULD NOT REACH MR. MAGEE AND THAT MR. HARMS WAS ON HIS WAY. THE PHOTOGRAPHER AND THE MEN WHO BEAT SGT. CAMPBELL DISAPPEARED JUST PRIOR TO MR. HARMS' ARRIVAL. SGT. CAMPBELL WAS NEVER ASKED HIS NAME OR HIS DIPLOMATIC IDENTIFICATION DURING THE ENTIRE INCIDENT. BECAUSE HE HAD NOT INTENDED TO GO OUT ANYWHERE, SGT. CAMPBELL HAD LEFT HIS DIPLOMATIC KARTOCHKA IN HIS ROOM.

9. AT APPROXIMATELY 5:30 P.M. VYBORNOV, ACTING CHIEF OF THE DIPLOMATIC AGENCY, CALLED RONALD HARMS, ACTING DPO OF THE CONSULATE GENERAL. VYBORNOV SAID THAT SGT. CAMPBELL WAS AT THE MILITIA STATION ON CHEKOV STREET AND ASKED THAT HARMS COME GET HIM. VYBORNOV STATED THAT ALTHOUGH SGT. CAMPBELL DID NOT HAVE HIS DIPLOMATIC IDENTIFICATION CARD, HE WAS ABLE TO IDENTIFY HIM. HARMS REQUESTED THAT SGT. CAMPBELL BE RELEASED IMMEDIATELY, BUT VYBORNOV REFUSED INSISTING THAT HARMS COME TO THE STATION.

10. AT THE MILITIA STATION, VYBORNOV EXPLAINED THAT THEY HAD PICKED UP SGT. CAMPBELL AT 3:15 WHEN THEY SAW HIM THROW A ROCK AT A PASSING CAR ON LITEYNY PROSPEKT. THE MILITIA CLAIMED THAT SGT. CAMPBELL WAS EXTREMELY DRUNK, AND WAS LOUDLY SHOUTING OBSCENITIES. REFERRING TO THE PRIOR ALLEGATIONS AGAINST SGT. CAMPBELL (REF A), VYBORNOV SAID, "THIS IS ANOTHER SERIOUS HOOLIGAN ACT BY CAMPBELL. WE WILL DISCUSS THIS FURTHER." CAMPBELL WAS THEN RELEASED AND RETURNED WITH HARMS TO THE CONSULATE GENERAL.

11. SUBSEQUENT INTERVIEWS OF SGT. FRISINA, SGT. JONES, AND CPL. PITTMAN ALL INDICATE THAT SGT. CAMPBELL WAS NOT UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL. CPL. PITTMAN ADVISED THAT SGT. CAMPBELL HAD HAD TWO MIXED DRINKS PRIOR TO HIS LEAVING THE CONSULATE. SGT. JONES SAID THAT HE TALKED WITH SGT. CAMPBELL JUST PRIOR TO THE INCIDENT AND THAT SGT. CAMPBELL WAS NOT THE LEAST BIT INTOXICATED AND WAS IN "COMPLETE CONTROL". ADDITIONALLY, RSO JACKSON AND ACTING DPO HARMS OBSERVED THAT SGT. CAMPBELL WAS COMPLETELY SOBER AT 0600.

12. CG'S COMMENT: I RECOMMEND THAT THE DEPARTMENT AND EMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATELY PROTEST THIS INCIDENT IN STRONGEST TERMS AND AT VERY HIGH LEVELS. I WILL BE PROTESTING TO THE DIPLOMATIC AGENCY HERE AS SOON AS I CAN GET AN APPOINTMENT. THIS IS THE UGLIEST AND MOST SERIOUS INCIDENT TO OCCUR IN LENINGRAD DURING MY SIX MONTHS HERE, AND THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY NO JUSTIFICATION FOR IT. THE PHYSICAL BEATING AND PSYCHOLOGICAL HUMILIATION TO WHICH

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SGT. CAMPBELL WAS SUBJECTED WAS APPALING BY ANY CIVILIZED STANDARD. THE LENINGRAD SECURITY ORGANS ARE THREATENING TO GET TOTALLY OUT OF HAND. WE ARE NOW TREATED TO THE SPECTACLE OF SOVIET "GOON" SQUADS CRUISING THE NEIGHBORHOOD OF THE CONSULATE GENERAL AT NIGHT, PRIMED TO PROVOKE FURTHER INCIDENTS AND PHYSICALLY HARM MEMBERS OF THE CONGEN STAFF WHO VENTURE OFF-COMPOUND. I AM SERIOUSLY WORRIED FOR THE SAFETY OF THE MARINE GUARD WHO WILL BE ON DUTY AT NIGHT OUTSIDE OUR BUILDING FOR THE NEXT SEVERAL WEEKS UNTIL THE FACADE AND ROOF REPAIR PROJECT IS COMPLETED.

13. THIS INCIDENT AND THE OTHER RECENT ALLEGATIONS AGAINST OUR MSG'S (REFS A AND B) INDICATE THAT THERE IS A CONCERTED CAMPAIGN TO HARASS AND DEMORALIZE THESE YOUNG MEN. SINCE THE SECOND ALLEGED INCIDENT (REF A), OUR MSG'S HAVE RECEIVED "LOCK-STEP" SURVEILLANCE EVERYWHERE THEY GO. ALL OF THIS HAS HAD A SERIOUS EFFECT ON THEIR MORALE. FOR THE PRESENT, WE HAVE DECIDED TO RESTRICT THE MARINES TO THE CONSULATE GENERAL COMPOUND TO PREVENT FURTHER HARASSMENT OR ASSAULTS, ALTHOUGH I DO NOT LIKE TO GIVE IN TO SOVIET PRESSURES IN THIS WAY. BUT IT IS NO LONGER SAFE FOR OUR MARINES TO LEAVE THE COMPOUND EVEN TO TAKE A SHORT WALK AROUND THE BLOCK. THE LENINGRAD AUTHORITIES HAVE GOT TO BE MADE TO RESPECT THE RIGHTS OF OUR DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL, AND TO STOP THESE CRUDE SET-UPS WHICH HAVE SEVERAL TIMES RESULTED IN PHYSICAL INJURY.

MAGEE

CONFIDENTIAL

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

September 12, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT:

Ambassador Hartman Appointment Request

Art Hartman will be in Washington September 17-21, and I believe it would be useful for him to have a brief meeting with the President.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize the Scheduling Request at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Scheduling Request

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONSCHEDULE PROPOSAL

September 12, 1984

TO: FREDERICK J. RYAN, Director
Presidential Appointments and Scheduling

FROM: Robert M. Kimmitt

REQUEST: Meeting with Ambassador Hartman

PURPOSE: To discuss President's Meeting with Gromyko

BACKGROUND: Ambassador Hartman will be in Washington September 17-21, which provides an opportunity for the President to hear his views on prospects for the President's meeting with Gromyko.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: Hartman last met with the President May 11.

DATE & TIME: Sept. 17, 18 or 21 for 30 minutes

LOCATION: Oval Office

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
Mr. McFarlane
Ambassador Hartman
Jack F. Matlock
Meese, Baker, Deaver at their discretion

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: The President greets Hartman and discusses prospects for the Gromyko meeting with him.

REMARKS REQUIRED: None

MEDIA COVERAGE: Staff Photographer

RECOMMENDED BY: Robert C. McFarlane

OPPOSED BY: None

PROJECT OFFICER: Robert M. Kimmitt/Jack F. Matlock

USSR - Dipl

MEMORANDUM

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

September 18, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *SM*

SUBJECT: Shultz-Dobrynin Meeting September 18

Secretary Shultz has submitted the memorandum to the President at Tab A reporting on his meeting with Dobrynin yesterday.

The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the meetings with Gromyko next week. Dobrynin was very general in his comments on what Gromyko would want to discuss, mentioning only an "appraisal of the US-Soviet relationship," issues in the correspondence with Chernenko and "the demilitarization of outer space."

You should note also that Dobrynin stated that Gromyko would be available in the afternoon for another meeting with Secretary Shultz, if desired. The Secretary left the question open, but we should do some preliminary thinking about what criteria we should apply in deciding whether there should be a final meeting with Shultz the afternoon of the 28th.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the attached memorandum to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I - Memorandum to the President

Tab A - Shultz-President Memorandum of September 17, 1984

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Declassify on: OADR

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NLS *F06-114/6# 9216*
BY *L05*, NARA, DATE *12/13/07*

~~SECRET~~

32

MEMORANDUM

SYSTEM II
90981

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz's Meeting with Dobrynin,
September 17, 1984

Secretary Shultz has submitted the attached memorandum (Tab A) on his meeting with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin yesterday.

The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the meetings with Gromyko next week. Dobrynin was very general in his comments on what Gromyko would want to discuss, mentioning only an "appraisal of the U.S.-Soviet relationship," issues in the correspondence with Chernenko and "the demilitarization of outer space."

You should note also that Dobrynin stated that Gromyko would be available in the afternoon for another meeting with Secretary Shultz, if desired. George left the question open, and we should do some preliminary thinking about what criteria to apply in deciding whether George should agree to a follow-up meeting after the meeting and lunch with you.

Attachment:

Tab A - Memorandum from Secretary Shultz of September 17, 1984

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

cc: The Vice President

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F06-114/c#9217
BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 12/13/07

~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

September 17, 1984

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: George P. Shultz *GPS*

SUBJECT: My Meeting Today With Ambassador Dobrynin

Looking toward our upcoming meetings with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, I called in Ambassador Dobrynin today. I told him you are looking forward to your meeting with Gromyko in order to discuss your views of the US-Soviet relationship and your hopes for the future. I said you would also probably want to discuss arms control issues, particularly those raised in conjunction with the Vienna talks proposal, some regional questions, human rights, and bilateral topics.

Dobrynin reported that following his vacation, Gromyko was also eager to talk with us. He essentially accepted my agenda, but did ask if you really needed to raise human rights. I responded that you did and that you would want to explain to Gromyko why they were important to us. Dobrynin said Gromyko would want to give you his appraisal of the US-Soviet relationship and to address the issues raised in your correspondence with Chernenko.

In discussing plans for my meeting with Gromyko in New York, I told Dobrynin we would want to go through our agenda in some detail, as Gromyko and I had usefully done in Stockholm. I also told him that we believed their Vienna Talks proposal had held some promise as a way of organizing discussions on the issues involved, and offered some hope of reenergizing our negotiations; we should therefore pick up on these discussions again, this time in private. Dobrynin replied that they were interested in talking about the demilitarization of outer space and he probed for further indications of our thinking.

We discussed modalities of both meetings. I confirmed that you would meet with Gromyko from 10:00 to 12:00 on Friday and then host a lunch for him. Dobrynin said that he and First Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko would sit in on the meeting (and, of course, lunch). He asked if I was considering a second session with Gromyko before he left, noting that Gromyko would be available Friday afternoon and until late afternoon on Saturday, when he had to leave Washington for return to Moscow. I confirmed I would be available in that period, and we agreed that an additional meeting could be arranged if needed.

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NLS F06-114/6#9225~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
DECL. OADRBY LOJ, NARA, DATE 12/13/07

SECRET/SENSITIVE

- 2 -

Finally, I raised the question of the five Americans detained several days ago on the Siberian coast. I emphasized the men should be released right away so that their detention does not become an irritant in our relationship. Dobrynin noted that our Embassy had been in telephone contact with the captain of the vessel earlier today, but he clearly registered my point, saying that he also hoped the issue would be resolved quickly.

WSR-Dypl
35

6924 re-do

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 18, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *KW*

SUBJECT: President's Meeting with Ambassador Hartman
(Friday, September 21 - 11:30 a.m.)

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President for his meeting with Ambassador Hartman, scheduled for Friday, September 21.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I	Meeting memorandum
Tab A	Talking Points/cards
Tab II	Background

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By *smf* NARA, Date 6/19/02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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6924

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR ARTHUR HARTMAN

DATE: September 21, 1984
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: 11:30 a.m. to 12:00 noon
FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE

I. PURPOSE:

To review U.S.-Soviet relations with Ambassador Hartman.

II. BACKGROUND:

The meeting will give the President the opportunity to discuss the current state of U.S.-Soviet relations in advance of his meeting with Gromyko.

III. PARTICIPANTS:

The President
Secretary of State George P. Shultz
Robert C. McFarlane
Ambassador Arthur A. Hartman
Jack F. Matlock, NSC
Messrs. Meese, Baker and Deaver, at their discretion

IV. PRESS PLAN:

White House photo.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:

The President greets Amb. Hartman and initiates a discussion of the current state of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Attachment:

Tab A Talking Points/card

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By smf NARA, Date 6/19/02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TALKING POINTS

- Glad you're available for consultation before my meeting with Gromyko next week.
- Do you think Gromyko will have anything new to say?
- How do you think we can best get them back in a negotiating mode, without running after them or making substantive concessions in advance?
- Do you think Chernenko will last much longer?
- Is Gorbachev (GOR-BAH-CHOF) likely to succeed him? What sort of a leader would he be?
- I understand that the Soviet regime has made a lot of propaganda about our hostile intent, and that the Russian people are frightened. What can we do about this, to set the record straight?

MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR HARTMAN

- ~~GLAD YOU'RE AVAILABLE FOR CONSULTATION~~
BEFORE MY MEETING WITH GROMYKO NEXT WEEK.
- DO YOU THINK GROMYKO WILL HAVE ANYTHING NEW TO SAY?
- HOW DO YOU THINK WE CAN BEST GET THEM BACK IN A NEGOTIATING MODE, WITHOUT RUNNING AFTER THEM OR MAKING SUBSTANTIVE CONCESSIONS IN ADVANCE?
- DO YOU THINK CHERNENKO WILL LAST MUCH LONGER?
- IS GORBACHEV (GOR-BAH-CHOF) LIKELY TO SUCCEED HIM? WHAT SORT OF A LEADER WOULD HE BE?
- I UNDERSTAND THAT THE SOV REGIME HAS MADE A LOT OF PROPAGANDA ABOUT OUR HOSTILE INTENT, & THAT THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE ARE FRIGHTENED. WHAT CAN WE DO ABOUT THIS, TO SET RECORD STRAIGHT?

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

9/14/84

MEMORANDUM

TO: ROBERT MCFARLANE

FROM: FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR. *FJR*

SUBJ: APPROVED PRESIDENTIAL ACTIVITY

MEETING: with Ambassador Arthur Hartman

DATE: September 21, 1984

TIME: 11:30 am

DURATION: 30 minutes

LOCATION: Oval Office

REMARKS REQUIRED: Talking points to be covered in briefing paper

MEDIA COVERAGE: If any, coordinate with Press Office

FIRST LADY
PARTICIPATION: No

NOTE: PROJECT OFFICER, SEE ATTACHED CHECKLIST

cc: R. Darman	J. Rosebush	R. Kimmitt
R. Deprospero	R. Scouten	
B. Elliott	B. Shaddix	
D. Fischer	W. Sittmann	
C. Fuller	L. Speakes	
W. Henkel	WHCA Audio/Visual	
E. Hickey	WHCA Operations	
G. Hodges	A. Wrobleski	
C. McCain	Nell Yates	
B. Oglesby		

MSG FROM: NSRMK --CPUA TO: NSGVE --CPUA
To: NSPBT --CPUA

09/15/84 10:32:56

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-- ~~SECRET~~ --

NOTE FROM: Robert M. Kimmitt
SUBJECT: longrange readout

1. #5865 Mtg with Air Force Association Enlisted Council - Outstanding Airmen of 1984. Approved for administrative time for the week of September 17-21. Request came from elsewhere in the White House and will be handled by other WH entity. Info Linhard.

2. #5776 Presidential address at Air Force Association Convention Dinner - turned down. Info Linhard.

3. #6818 Diplomatic Credentials Ceremony - scheduled for October 15 at 4:30pm for 30 minutes. Date may shift pending decision on Presidential political travel that week, but planning should begin based on Oct. 15 date. Action Martin.

4. #6786 Mtg with President Fernando Belaunde of Peru - decision deferred pending schedule of 1st Presidential debate. Deaver will advise early next week. Action Burghardt.

5. #6815 Mtg with Ambassador Hartman - scheduled for September 21 at 11:30am for 30 minutes in the Oval Office. Action Matlock.

6. #6612 Mtg with Japanese Finance Minister Noboru Takeshita - approved as brief meeting at the hotel prior to IMF address on September 25. Action Sigur.

7. #6056 redo - Mtg with U.S. National Committee for Pacific Economic Cooperation - scheduled for Tuesday, September 18 at 9:45am for 10 minutes in the Rose Garden. Action Sigur and Martin.

cc: NSRA --CPUA
NSGVE --CPUA
NSTCS --CPUA
NSJMD --CPUA
NSDFP --CPUA

NSFEG --CPUA
NSCEC --CPUA
NSCMB --CPUA
NSWGH --CPUA
NSWFM --CPUA

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NLS FOG-114/16 #9218

BY LDT NARA, DATE 12/13/07

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 18, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SIGNED

GENDIS

SUBJECT:

President's Meeting with Ambassador Hartman
(Friday, September 21 - 11:30 a.m.)

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RECOMMENDATION

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Approve ☒Disapprove ☐

Attachments:

Tab I	Meeting memorandum
Tab A	Talking Points/cards
Tab II	Background

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By smf NARA, Date 6/19/02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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6924

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 20, 1984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Matlock
for Messrs. Dipl.

MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR ARTHUR HARTMAN

DATE: September 21, 1984
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: 11:30 a.m. to 12:00 noon
FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *rcm*

I. PURPOSE:

To review U.S.-Soviet relations with Ambassador Hartman.

II. BACKGROUND:

The meeting will give the President the opportunity to discuss the current state of U.S.-Soviet relations in advance of his meeting with Gromyko.

III. PARTICIPANTS:

The President
Secretary of State George P. Shultz
Robert C. McFarlane
Ambassador Arthur A. Hartman
Jack F. Matlock, NSC
Messrs. Meese, Baker and Deaver, at their discretion

IV. PRESS PLAN:

White House photo.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:

The President greets Amb. Hartman and initiates a discussion of the current state of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Attachment:

Tab A Talking Points/card

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By *smf* NARA, Date *6/19/02*

cc: Vice President
Edwin Meese
James Baker
Mike Deaver

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TALKING POINTS

- Glad you're available for consultation before my meeting with Gromyko next week.
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 18, 1984

ACTION

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JACK MATLOCK *JSM*

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Attachments:

Tab I Meeting memorandum

Tab A Talking Points/cards

Tab II Background material

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By *SH* ~~5/19/02~~ NARA, Date *5/19/02*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR ARTHUR HARTMAN

DATE: September 21, 1984
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: 11:30 ~~A.M.~~ to 12:00 noon
FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

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To review U.S.-Soviet relations with Ambassador Hartman.

II. BACKGROUND:

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III. PARTICIPANTS:

The President ^{space}
Robert C. McFarlane
Ambassador Hartman
Jack F. Matlock, NSC
Meese, Baker, Deaver, at their discretion

*Shultz and/or Burt may also
attend and should be
invited.*

IV. PRESS PLAN:

Release White House ~~staff~~ photo.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:

The President greets Amb. Hartman and initiates a discussion of the current state of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Attachment:

Tab A Talking Points/card

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By Smf NARA, Date 6/19/02