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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/27/2005

File Folder USSR-DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS 8/8

FOIA

F06-114/6

Box Number 22

YARHI-MILO

2210

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
9229	MEMOCON	SHULTZ MEETING WITH TIKHONOV NOVEMBER 3, 1984 [3 - 6] R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6	4	ND	B1
9228	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO MATLOCK RE SHULTZ MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN, DECEMBER 7, 1984 [27 - 28] R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6	2	12/7/1984	B1
9230	MEMO	SHULTZ TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE MEETING TODAY WITH DOBRYNIN [30 - 31] R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6	2	2/13/1985	B1
9231	MEMO	NON-PAPER DELIVERED BY DOBRYNIN IN RUSSIAN LANGUAGE [33 - 34] R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6	2	1/9/1986	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

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RECEIVED 05 NOV 84 17

TO MCFARLANE FROM HILL, C DOCDATE 05 NOV 84

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By smf NARA, Date 6/17/02*F.de! US-USSR-
Diplomatic Contacts*

KEYWORDS: USSR

INDIA

TIKHONOV

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF SHULTZ MTG W/ TIKHONOV ON 3 NOV

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

KEMP

TEICHER

TAHIR-KHELI

FORTIER

MATLOCK

COBB

COMMENTS

REF# 8430157

LOG

NSCIFID

(B / B)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)



84 NOV 5 P 5:05

2
ES SENSITIVE 8430157
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520 SYSTEM II
91136

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

November 5, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz's Meeting with USSR Council
of Ministers Chairman Tikhonov, November 3, 1984

Attached, for your information, is the memorandum
of conversation of this meeting.

Charles Hill
Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
As stated.

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By smf NARA, Date 6/19/02

~~SECRET/NODIS~~
DECL: OADR

SECRET/NODIS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

The Secretary's Meeting with USSR Council of Ministers
Chairman Tikhonov, November 3, 1984

The Secretary met with USSR Council of Ministers Chairman
Tikhonov, November 3 (1900-1934). Participants were:

U.S. Side

Secretary Shultz
Senator Baker
Senator Moynihan
Assistant Secretary Burt
Executive Assistant Hill
Deputy Assistant Secretary Palmer

USSR Side

Chairman Tikhonov
Deputy ForMin Maltsev
Interpreter Sukhodrev

The Secretary began by saying that the funeral had been moving and different than anything he had experienced. Tikhonov replied that it was also the first time he had been to such a funeral. These were tragic circumstances, almost incredible that one of her own bodyguards had hit her with eight bullets. She was a wise, great woman, with a high degree of erudition. India took its right place in the world under her, almost like a great power. Of course, they have their problems. But she continued the cause of her father Nehru. Now Nehru's grandson is the leader. The Soviet Union will do all it can to ensure that India remains stable, to help. India has many problems: housing, cultural level, educational level, and external problems. All these are big matters which must be resolved.

The Secretary said he agreed that the assassination seemed incredible. We were shocked in the United States by radio Moscow's statements suggesting that somehow the United States was behind this event. We believe it is important to develop constructive dialogue on regional problems involving instability and danger such as Pakistan and India, and Afghanistan and the Soviet forces there. So we were very upset at Soviet suggestions that the United States would have anything to do with such a shocking event.

Tikhonov replied that he was not in Moscow at the time (of these reports). But he had looked into it especially, and the Soviet media reference was to a source not in the Soviet Union,

SECRET/NODIS

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F06-114/6 #9229

BY LOT NARA, DATE 12/13/07

to a report of some agency. The Soviet Union has not made and does not intend to make a statement that the U.S. is connected to this tragic event. "It's out of the question -- it is excluded that the United States was related to this event in any way." The region is dangerous, Tikhonov continued, and "ample fuel" has accumulated. Such things must be judged soberly and great powers need to do all they can to see that it develops in calm and tranquility and without aggravation.

Secretary Shultz thanked Tikhonov for his statement. Tikhonov interjected that even before he knew that he would be meeting the Secretary, he had looked into the matter and the reference was not to a Soviet source.

The Secretary said he had a report for Tikhonov, who said he would be happy to accept it if it was pleasant. The Secretary said he hoped it would be.

The Secretary said that last Wednesday he had spent an hour talking alone with President Reagan just before his last campaign swing. The President is superstitious, and does not believe in acting as though the election has been won -- and in our country elections are never won until the votes are in and counted. But the President did talk to the Secretary at some length about the President's plans. The President had reflected on his meetings with Mr. Gromyko and on our own thinking about relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. And since Mr. Gromyko had been in Washington, the Secretary had met with Ambassador Dobrynin and Art Hartman had talked further with Mr. Gromyko. We had all the reports.

The Secretary continued that this discussion with President Reagan had not been in preparation for his coming to Delhi, but just a private chat in general about the outlook as we see it. The President had expressed his determination if elected to do everything he can to help bring about a relationship with the Soviet Union that would be a problem-solving relationship. So the Secretary was reporting to Tikhonov, as a statement, that the President Reagan you see before the election will be the same President Reagan you will see after the election. The efforts he has been making to improve our relationship will continue.

Tikhonov responded that if the President remains the same Ronald Reagan it would not be that good. But if he were to change course and really seek solutions to problems that would be good. Now the U.S. and the Soviet Union have very different points of view on practically all issues between us. The

questions of armaments are not stabilizing, just growing. All other areas such as the economic field are in stagnation. "So is this talk not just a pre-election tactic?" Tikhonov continued by saying he had visited the United States twice during the Eisenhower presidency. He remembered walking streets absolutely freely, he had even been a guest in homes and had been pleased. But today probably no one would invite him to their home. He hoped that all this is temporary.

The Secretary said Tikhonov missed the point. Insofar as events in U.S.-Soviet relations could influence our election, the campaign is over. Nothing would happen now to affect an outcome only 2-3 days off. The Secretary's point was that as the post-election period, he spoke privately to the Secretary -- not in front of the TV cameras, and not as a public statement. He spoke of improved relations, if possible.

The United States, the Secretary said, sees strains in the relationship as principally due to positions the Soviet Union takes. If there is no give on the part of the Soviet Union, then there can be no improvement. "But I can assure you," the Secretary said, "that President Reagan will be working towards constructive ends."

The Secretary noted that Chairman Tikhonov might be interested in hearing the views of the two Senators in our bipartisan delegation -- the Majority Leader and a leading democrat, Senator Moynihan.

Senator Baker said he wanted to underline what the Secretary had said. The President will be re-elected and is sincerely anxious to pursue a dialogue with the Soviet Union that will lead to better understanding and concrete results. Senator Baker said that he knew the mood of the Senate and it would welcome and would participate in improving relations. So he hoped that the Soviets would take at face value the statement that the Secretary had just made. The U.S. and the Soviet Union have an obligation to each other to try to accomplish peaceful objectives together.

Tikhonov said he could only say one thing. If President Reagan does indeed move not towards talks for the sake of talks, but towards solutions, the Soviets "will not be found wanting for reciprocity." Then he could say without reservation that the U.S. may rest assured the Soviets would make their own contribution.

Senator Moynihan mentioned that when he had served as American Ambassador he had spent pleasant evenings in this house. He recalled that when Brezhnev visited Delhi in 1973 he had made the strongest statements about improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations. Senator Moynihan warmly recalled that the Soviet translator then, as today, was Mr. Sukhodrev. He made no mistakes then, and would not surely make any today in conveying the Secretary's point. Certainly President Reagan will have the support of the Senate for what he proposes. But both sides in Congress fail to understand why the Soviets have been so unforthcoming in recent years when he believed progress was being made ten years ago. The Senate will support constructive measures to help progress and improve relations.

Tikhonov said he could only say he did not know anyone in his right mind in the Soviet Union who was against better U.S.-Soviet relations. Tikhonov did not want to get into a polemic about who is to blame for the past. Soviets have their opinion and the U.S. has its. But if President Reagan wants better relations, then he will find that all on Soviet side are prepared to return the favor. The Secretary concluded by saying the two should shake hands on that note.

(Comment on Tikhonov. Tikhonov entered the room with a show of energy, looking quite healthy and smiling. Throughout he was alert and making a clear effort to be pleasant, without giving an inch on substance. Given his extensive travel and work in the preceding few days --he had just come from a trip to Cuba and had been holding extensive talks in Delhi -- he looked in remarkably good shape for a man of 79 fast approaching 80.)

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 8, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *GW*SUBJECT: Congratulatory Message to President from Presidium
of Supreme Soviet

The text of a message of congratulations to the President from the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium is at TAB B. You will note that the message is relatively upbeat, and also that it comes, not from Chernenko personally, from the the Supreme Soviet Presidium collectively. This is presumably intended to make clear that the message has broad backing in the Soviet leadership.

TASS released the message even before it was delivered here, and it was published in the Soviet media along with the President's message in connection with the November 7 national day.

I recommend that the President acknowledge the congratulatory message, and attach a draft at TAB A.

Recommendation:

That you sign the attached Memorandum to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab I - Memorandum to the President
- Tab A - Draft Message from the President to the Supreme Soviet Presidium
- Tab B - Message from the Supreme Soviet Presidium to the President

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By *smf* NARA, Date *6/17/02*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Congratulatory Message from the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium

Issue

Whether to acknowledge a message from the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium congratulating you on your reelection.

Facts

The USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium (the collective Soviet "Chief of State," of which Chernenko is Chairman) has sent you a message congratulating you on your reelection and expressing the hope that "the coming years will be marked by a turn for the better in relations between our countries." The Soviet news agency has released the text of the message, which is at Tab B.

Discussion

An acknowledgement of this message, in which you express your hope for improved relations, would be appropriate. A suggested text is at Tab A.

Recommendation

That you authorize transmittal of the message at Tab A.

OKNo

—

—

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By Smf NARA, Date 6/19/02

-2-

Attachments:

Tab A - Draft Message to USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium
Tab B - Congratulatory Message from USSR Supreme Soviet
Presidium

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

cc: Vice President

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

8292

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT

TO: The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet

Thank you for your message on the occasion of my reelection as President of the United States. I share your hope that the coming years will be marked by improved relations between our countries.

Despite our different political beliefs and perspectives on international problems, I am confident we can make progress on strengthening peace and resolving our differences through discussions and negotiations. We hope you will join us in the critical work needed to reduce international tensions and to create a safer world.

Ronald Reagan

The Presidium,
Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
Moscow

Translation from Russia

November 7, 1984

Esteemed Mr. President,

Please, accept congratulations on your reelection as President of the United States of America.

It is to be hoped that the coming years will be marked by a turn for the better in relations between our countries. This would be in the interests of both our peoples and the cause of world peace.

On its part, the Soviet Union is prepared for joint work to rectify Soviet-American relations on the basis of equality and respect for the legitimate interests of each other, remove the threat of war and radically improve the international situation.

PRESIDIUM OF THE SUPREME
SOVIET OF THE USSR

His Excellency Ronald W. Reagan
President of the United States of America
The White House, Washington

7 ноября 1984 года

Уважаемый господин президент,

Примите поздравления по случаю переизбрания Вас на пост президента Соединенных Штатов Америки.

Хотелось бы надеяться, что предстоящие годы ознаменуются поворотом к лучшему в отношениях между нашими странами и это было бы в интересах как наших народов, так и дела мира во всем мире.

Со своей стороны Советский Союз готов совместно работать для выправления советско-американских отношений на основе равенства и уважения законных интересов друг друга, для устранения угрозы войны и радикального оздоровления международной обстановки.

ПРЕЗИДИУМ ВЕРХОВНОГО
СОВЕТА СССР

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
РОНАЛЬДУ У. РЕЙГАНУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ
ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ

Вашингтон, Белый дом

AMBASSADOR OF THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
1125 SIXTEENTH STREET, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036

38 NOV 7 22:41

November 7, 1984

My dear Mr. President:

It gives me great pleasure to transmit to you the congratulation of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on your reelection as President of the United States of America (the text is enclosed).

As the Soviet Ambassador may I add my personal congratulations on this occasion.

With best wishes,



Anatoly F. DOBRYNIN

The Honorable
Ronald W. Reagan
President of the United States of America

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

8414

File
USSR
DIP
FC
14

Matlock

November 15, 1984

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JACK C. MATLOCK *JCM*

SUBJECT: Dobrynin on "Umbrella" Talks

McM HAS SEEN

Attached at Tab I is a Hill-McFarlane memorandum giving some background on the Oberdorfer article in the Post this morning. It seems that Dobrynin was the Soviet Embassy briefer.

Attachment:

Tab I Hill-McFarlane memorandum

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By *smf* NARA, Date 6/19/02



Washington, D.C. 20520

November 14, 1984

34 NOV 14 P11:39

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SITUATION ROOM

SUBJECT: Dobrynin Backgrounder

The Soviets had a ceremony at their embassy in Washington today to mark the publication of a collection of Chernenko's statements.

After it a senior Soviet official (Dobrynin) backgrounded a number of American correspondents.

According to one of them (Oberdorfer) Dobrynin said:

1. In the Dobrynin-Shultz and Gromyko-Hartman talks following Gromyko's Washington visit, the Soviets have been probing American intentions on umbrella talks. The Soviets have been asking what these talks would mean, who would participate, at what level, and what the structure would be. According to the correspondent who gave us a rundown on this, Dobrynin gave the impression the Soviets did not think much would come of the umbrella talks concept.

2. Dobrynin said that following these probes, the ball was now in the American court. The Soviets were waiting for the Americans to come back with amplifications.

3. On a Shultz-Gromyko meeting in Moscow in January, Dobrynin apparently gave pretty much the same answer as did the Secretary in response to the Tanjug report: Nothing has been set, or arranged, but the two did talk about the possibility of a meeting when Gromyko was in Washington, and certainly anything is possible.

4. Finally, Dobrynin gave correspondents the impression that the Soviet Minister of Culture would soon be in Washington.

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By smf NARA, Date 6/19/02

Charles Hill
Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

NSC/S PROFILE

UNCLASSIFIED

ID 8408559

RECEIVED 23 NOV 84 09

TO PRESIDENT

FROM DOBRYNIN, ANATOLIY F DOCDATE 07 NOV 84

HILL, C

21 NOV 84

KEYWORDS: USSR

SUBJECT: PRES RESPONSE TO DOBRYNIN CONGRATULATORY MSG / DEAN OF DIPLOMATIC
CORPS

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 26 NOV 84 STATUS S FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

LENCZOWSKI

SESTANOVICH

ROBINSON

LEHMAN, R

STEINER

THOMPSON

KIMMITT

COMMENTS

REF#

8430465

LOG 8408271

NSCIFID

(CM *CH*)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
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<i>McFarlane</i>	X 11/26	<i>Pres Signature</i>		
<i>Pres</i>	P NOV 29 1984	<i>Signature</i>		<i>CP</i>
	DEC 03 1984	<i>Pres spl ltr</i>		
<i>STATE</i>	DEC 03 1984	<i>for dispatch</i>		

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

(C)

National Security Council
The White House

17

System # I

Package # 8559

04 NOV 2 5:00

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson			
Bob Kimmitt	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>		<u>D</u>
Situation Room	<u>3</u>	<u>3</u> <u>DEC 8 3 1984</u>	<u>LDX</u>

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other Sims

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

RECEIVED

84 DEC 3 P 8:11

SITUATION ROOM

WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

C

UNCLASSIFIED

MESSAGE NO. 960 CLASSIFICATION _____ PAGES one

FROM ROBERT KIMMITT 456-2224
(NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PRES REPLY TO AMB DOBRYNIN LTR (NSC 8559)

<u>TO (AGENCY)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO:</u>	<u>DEPT/ROOM NO.</u>	<u>EXTENSION</u>
<u>STATE</u>	<u>CHARLES HILL</u>	<u>EXECUTIVE SECRETARY</u>	

REMARKS FOR INFORMATION; ORIGINAL TO BE SENT TO YOU FOR DISPATCH.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

19
ID 8408559

REFERRAL

DATE: 04 DEC 84

MEMORANDUM FOR: EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: TC: AMB DOBRYNIN

SOURCE: PRESIDENT

DATE: 03 DEC 84

KEYWORDS: USSR

SUBJ:

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DULDATE: 04 DEC 84

COMMENTS: ASAP


FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 3, 1984


Dear Mr. Ambassador:

I would like to thank you, and through you the entire Diplomatic Corps in Washington, for your message of congratulations on the occasion of my reelection.

Over the next four years I look forward to working with you and with the members of the Corps to promote peaceful and productive relations among our nations.

Allow me to extend my own greetings to you and the members of the Corps, and my best wishes for peace and prosperity.

Sincerely,



His Excellency
Anatoly F. Dobrynin
Ambassador of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics
Dean of the Diplomatic Corps
Washington, D.C.

DECLASSIFIED / Released
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By smf NARA, Date 6/19/02

MEMORANDUM

8559

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

1984 NOV 29 PM 4:30

November 29, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *Jul 30*
SUBJECT: Response to Ambassador Dobrynin on Your Reelection

In his capacity as Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, Ambassador Dobrynin has forwarded a note of congratulations on the occasion of your reelection (Tab B). At Tab A is a proposed response for your signature, which has been cleared with the Department of State and Speechwriters.

RECOMMENDATIONOK No

OK — That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A	Proposed response
Tab B	Incoming Letter

cc Vice President

WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

C

UNCLASSIFIED

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION _____ PAGES one

FROM ROBERT KIMMITT 456-2224 _____
(NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PRES REPLY TO AMB DOBRYNIN LTR (NSC 8559)

<u>TO (AGENCY)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO:</u>	<u>DEPT/ROOM NO.</u>	<u>EXTENSION</u>
<u>STATE</u>	<u>CHARLES HILL</u>	<u>EXECUTIVE SECRETARY</u>	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
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REMARKS FOR INFORMATION; ORIGINAL TO BE SENT TO YOU FOR DISPATCH.

8430465

AMBASSADOR OF THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
DEAN OF THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Washington, D.C. November 7, 1984


My dear Mr. President,

On behalf of my colleagues, Ambassadors and Chiefs of Mission accredited in Washington, I am privileged to convey to you our congratulations on the occasion of your reelection to the highest office of the United States of America.

We would like to assure you that all of us representing our countries here in Washington will do everything in our power in rendering you, Mr. President, our utmost support during your second term in all your undertakings in the field of disarmament and elimination of the threat of nuclear war, in promoting peace on Earth and good relations among nations.

Please accept, Mr. President, my personal congratulations to you and Mrs. Reagan and best wishes of prosperity and peace to the people of the United States.

Respectfully,



Anatoly F. Dobrynin
Dean of the Diplomatic Corps

The Honorable
Ronald Reagan
President of the United States of America



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

November 21, 1984

UNCLASSIFIED

64 23 A6 31

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SITUATION ROOM

**SUBJECT: Presidential Reply to Dobrynin's Message of
Congratulations**

Soviet Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin, acting in his capacity as Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, has sent the President a message of congratulations on the occasion of his re-election (Tab B). Attached (Tab A) is a suggested draft reply for the President's signature.

Charles Hill
Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

Tab A: Draft Presidential Reply
Tab B: Ambassador Dobrynin's Message

UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUGGESTED REPLY

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

I would like to thank you, and through you the entire Diplomatic Corps in Washington, for your message of congratulations on the occasion of my re-election.

Over the next four years I look forward to working with you and with the members of the Corps to promote peaceful and productive relations among our nations.

Allow me to extend my own greetings to you and the members of the Corps, and my best wishes for peace and prosperity.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

His Excellency Anatoly F. Dobrynin,
Dean of the Diplomatic Corps,
Washington, D.C.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

November 23, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McPARLANE

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *SM*

SIGNED

SUBJECT:

Response to Congratulatory Message from Ambassador Dobrynin

The Department of State has forwarded a proposed response (Tab A) to Ambassador Dobrynin's congratulatory message to the President, in his capacity as Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, on the occasion of his reelection (Tab B). Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President forwarding this message for signature.

The text of the message has been cleared by Speechwriters.

JK
John Lenczowski and Steve Sestanovich concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That the signed, proposed response be forwarded to Ambassador Dobrynin.

Approve

[Signature]

Disapprove

Attachment:

Tab I	Memorandum to the President
Tab A	Proposed response to Ambassador Dobrynin
Tab B	Incoming message, November 7, 1984

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

December 7, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *[Signature]*

SUBJECT:

Shultz Meeting with Dobrynin, December 7, 1984

Mark Palmer called me on secure to give me a readout on today's meeting between Secretary Shultz and Dobrynin. He said that the Secretary would be reporting directly to the President (and I presume that you will be present), but to make sure no details slip, here is what Palmer reported to me:

Shultz opened the meeting by saying that he had just come from the meeting of the President with Bishop Tutu and that the President had made some strong statements about apartheid in South Africa. He then turned to the Geneva meetings and said that the President and he were taking it very seriously and that they felt it offered promise for real results.

Dobrynin replied that he subscribed to everything the Secretary had said.

Shultz then said that he would be taking a rather large group with him, but that he would not have them all in the meetings; they would just be available to render advice to him. He said that he would have Nitze with him in the meeting, but this was not meant to prejudge subsequent arrangements. When Dobrynin asked who precisely would be accompanying Shultz to Geneva, the Secretary said that it would be Nitze, some of his own staff and representatives from DOD and NSC, but reiterated that only a couple of these would join him and Nitze in the meeting.

Dobrynin said he could tell the Secretary exactly who would accompany Gromyko: Korniyenko (the First Deputy Foreign Minister), Dobrynin, Karpov, Obukhov (the MFA official who took notes for Gromyko during his visit here in September), and Sukhodrev. Dobrynin added that Gromyko was prepared to stay in Geneva the afternoon of January 8 if a meeting then is needed. (Sokolov had earlier informed State that Gromyko would want to depart the afternoon of the 8th.)

Shultz said that this sounded good, and suggested a reception for both delegations the evening of January 7. Dobrynin said he understood why this could be useful but added that Gromyko had indicated that he did not wish dinners or lunches. But he

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promised to float the idea of a reception and to recommend it personally.

Shultz then said that, while the meetings should focus on arms control, it would be useful to review some bilateral issues. For example, VE Day is coming up and it might be useful to discuss whether any joint commemorations would be appropriate. Dobrynin said that this would be a most welcome subject; World War II provides a "living example" of how the U.S. and USSR can cooperate and added that he would be happy to receive any thoughts we have on the subject in advance of the Geneva meeting. But, in general, he expressed doubt that Gromyko would want to spend much time on bilateral subjects.

Shultz said that he did not disagree, but suggested that perhaps a working lunch to deal with these subjects would be a good idea. He also said that Hartman will be meeting him in Germany December 15, and that if Gromyko has any further thoughts on these matters they could be conveyed through Hartman.

Dobrynin then complained about statements that Ken Adelman "and other Administration spokesmen" have been making, and cited Ken's Foreign Affairs article in particular. He also asked when they could expect a reply to Chernenko's letter of November 17. (Palmer did not mention what response, if any, Shultz gave to this.)

Comments:

1. It would appear that Dobrynin did not push hard on matters of substance, and was content to confine the discussion to modalities.
2. Shultz apparently did not go as far as his talking points in raising the possibility of subsequent meetings by special representatives. However, Gromyko's inclusion of Karpov in his delegation may indicate that the Soviets are in fact preparing for just such an eventuality.
3. Shultz did not mention the possibility of parallel talks at the Assistant Secretary level on regional and bilateral issues. This is unfortunate, since this would be one means of keeping our entire agenda up front. Unless we make such a proposal and it is accepted, I doubt that Gromyko will be willing to talk about anything other than arms control and VE Day.
4. Although Shultz did not commit us to anything regarding VE Day, his raising the subject means that it will be imperative for us to coordinate positions with the Allies before the Geneva meeting, since we will not be able to duck discussion with the Soviets at that time now that the subject has been mentioned.

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TO

PRESIDENT

FROM SHULTZ, G

DOCDATE 13 FEB 85

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By smf NARA, Date 6/19/02

*File:
US-USSR-
DIPomatic Contacts*

KEYWORDS: ARMS CONTROL

USSR

DOBRYNIN, ANATOLIY F

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF SHULTZ 13 FEB MTG W/ AMB DOBRYNIN

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DUE:

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FOR ACTION

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90161THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

February 13, 1985

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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: George P. Shultz *ups*

SUBJECT: My Meeting Today with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin

I called in Dobrynin today for an extended session to take stock of the overall US-Soviet agenda. My purpose was to emphasize to the Soviets that we expect progress on all aspects of the relationship in the months ahead and to warn them of some possible 'stumbling blocks.

Arms Control: To lead off the discussion, I stressed that you are pleased talks are to begin in Geneva and have been saying so publicly, and that our approach is serious. I noted that we have a strong new delegation and are taking a fresh look at the issues. I chided Dobrynin on Soviet reports that question US seriousness in the negotiations. Dobrynin replied that the Soviets also want the negotiations to be successful, but insist on strict adherence to the terms of the January communique, a line approved by the Politburo at a meeting he said he had attended. He complained about US statements that some things are not negotiable. I also told Dobrynin I hoped we would see some serious movement in the on-going arms control talks in Stockholm and Vienna.

Regional Issues: Referring to the February 19-20 talks in Vienna between Dick Murphy and his Soviet counterpart, I said we would want to talk about Iran-Iraq, Lebanon, Arab-Israeli issues, and Afghanistan. I expressed concern that the Afghanistan war might be broadened by actions against Pakistan, and reaffirmed our support for the UN peace efforts. Dobrynin said they were prepared to discuss all Mideast issues in Vienna, but that they "did not intend" to talk about Afghanistan since it did not fall under their man Polyakov's area of responsibility. I am sure he understands we will make our Afghanistan points in the meeting regardless of whether they choose to respond. He had nothing new on Iran-Iraq or the Mideast other than to say that they believe the Vienna talks can be useful.

I reviewed with Dobrynin our concerns over their support for Vietnamese actions in Cambodia. He excused the Vietnamese, as usual, by referring to the past abuses by the Khmer Rouge. I responded that I did not believe the people of Cambodia wanted either the Khmer Rouge or the Vietnamese, that a way needs to be found for them to make their own choice, and that the ASEAN

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proposals have merit. Turning to Ethiopia, I sketched out the tragedy of three million starving people in contested areas and urged the Soviets to persuade the Ethiopians to allow food into these areas. Dobrynin agreed that the humanitarian issues were beset with political complications, but he said that the distribution was a purely Ethiopian issue and we should discuss the problems directly with the Ethiopian government.

Bilateral Issues: I told Dobrynin that we were pleased with the Shcherbitskiy visit to the United States and would work to make the trip a success. The visit offered an excellent opportunity to move on new consulates in Shcherbitskiy's Kiev base and in New York. Dobrynin agreed that we should discuss the Kiev Consulate with Shcherbitskiy, but then reiterated the Soviet line that the Soviets had no interest in a New York consulate unless Aeroflot was giving it some visitors to deal with. I responded that we needed to resolve the issues that had led to Aeroflot suspension. Indicating he understood the linkage, Dobrynin noted that we have proposed that talks on Northern Pacific safety measures begin February 26, and hoped this would help clear the way. We both agreed that the exchanges negotiations should move ahead rapidly, and I gave him our views on several economic issues including fishing and the unacceptability of Soviet whaling practices.

I reiterated US interest in your space rescue proposal and the possibility of joint commemoration this July of the Tenth Anniversary of the linkup of Apollo and Soyuz spacecraft. Dobrynin was interested if we had anything on their proposals for the V-E Day anniversary, but I put him off for the present. I also used the session to get Dobrynin's attention on our strong opposition to a new payroll scheme they are attempting to institute for Soviet employees of foreign embassies in Moscow.

Human Rights: I took the time to once again underline our deep concern over the human rights situation in the Soviet Union. I encouraged movement on Shcharanskiy and Sakharov, deplored the recent wave of arrests of Hebrew teachers and the increase in anti-Semitism in the USSR, and told him we expected some progress on the emigration of people with a claim to American citizenship and the Soviet spouses of Americans.

In closing, we both agreed that the US-Soviet relationship was better than a year or two ago, but that it still has a long way to go.

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В связи с договоренностью, достигнутой между руководителями СССР и США на встрече в Женеве 19-21 ноября 1985 г. относительно необходимости поставить на регулярную основу и активизировать диалог между нашими странами, мы предлагаем провести, скажем, в январе-июне 1986 г. встречи советских и американских экспертов для двустороннего обмена мнениями по следующим вопросам.

Область безопасности

1. Нераспространение ядерного оружия - в июне в Москве.
2. Запрещение химического оружия, в том числе вопросы контроля и нераспространения этого оружия - на уровне руководителей делегаций СССР и США на конференции по разоружению в феврале в Женеве.
3. Международная конвенция о запрещении радиологического оружия - на уровне глав делегаций СССР и США на конференции по разоружению в феврале в Женеве.
4. Вопросы Стокгольмской конференции - в апреле в Вашингтоне.

Региональные проблемы

1. Юг Африки (положение дел в вопросах предоставления независимости Намибии и обеспечения безопасности Анголы) в феврале в Женеве.
2. Положение вокруг Афганистана - в первом квартале в Москве (конкретные сроки уточнить позднее).
3. Ближневосточное урегулирование и положение на Ближнем Востоке - апрель в Стокгольме.
4. Обстановка в Центральной Америке - в начале мая в Москве.
5. Положение на Дальнем Востоке и в Юго-Восточной Азии - в июне в Вашингтоне.

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BY h05, NARA, DATE 12/13/07

Двусторонние соглашения

Вопросы расширения обменов и контактов в ряде областей науки, культуры, образования, медицины и спорта – в январе в Москве (имеется в виду приезд в СССР группы экспертов из ЮСИА).

Эти обсуждения целесообразно, на наш взгляд, проводить на том уровне, на котором они проходили ранее.

Если предлагаемое нами приемлемо для американской стороны, то соответствующие детали, связанные с организацией встреч экспертов, можно было бы конкретно согласовать уже в ближайшее время.