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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer JET 4/28/2005

File Folder DISSIDENTS (10/23)

FOIA F06-114/6 YARHI-MILO 2310

Box Number 23

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
9385	CABLE	PRISONER EXCHANGE: SHCHARANSKIY R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6	2	12/13/1982	B1
9380	MEMO	DOBRIANSKY TO CLARK RE SHCHARANSKIY CASE: POSSIBLE NEW STEPS R 3/19/2013 F2006-114/6	2	12/16/1982	B1
9386	MEMO	BREMER TO CLARK RE SHCHARANSKIY R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6	2	12/10/1982	B1
9383	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #9381 R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6	1	12/22/1982	B1
9387	CABLE	201545Z DEC 82 R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6	1	12/20/1982	B1
9381	MEMO	WHEELER TO BREMER RE SHCHARANSKIY CASE: POSSIBLE NEW STEPS R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6	1	12/22/1982	B1
9382	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #9380 R 3/19/2013 F2006-114/6	2	12/16/1982	B1
9388	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #9386 R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6	2	12/10/1982	B1
9384	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #9380 R 3/19/2013 F2006-114/6	2	12/16/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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9390	MEMO	SHCHARANSKIY R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6	1	12/30/1982	B1
9391	CABLE	111524Z JAN 83 R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6	2	1/11/1983	B1
9392	CABLE	152004Z JAN 83 R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6	2	1/15/1983	B1
9393	CABLE	201647Z JAN 83 R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6	4	1/20/1983	B1

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dissidents

NYT 11/1/82

SHCHARANSKY

With Shcharansky

By Avraham Weiss

Anatoly Shcharansky is more than a mere person. Arrested five years ago by the Soviet regime, he was sentenced to a 13-year prison term on charges that he worked for the Central Intelligence Agency — an allegation denied by President Jimmy Carter. Before his arrest, he was an active member of the Helsinki Watch Committee and he agitated for the right of Jews to emigrate to Israel. Thus, he is being oppressed not only as a man but also as a representative of the human spirit — and particularly of the Jewish quest to be identified with the people and land of Israel.

Those of us who have never met him have come to know him through his wife, Avital. On the morning after their wedding eight years ago, Mrs. Shcharansky, who had received permission to emigrate, left the Soviet Union with the assurance that her husband would join her within six months. She was further informed that if she did not leave then, she would find it virtually impossible to leave later. As time passed, it became clear that the Kremlin had no intention of granting Mr. Shcharansky a visa. During their separation, Mrs. Shcharansky has labored tirelessly to bring his plight before the eyes of the world. If you have not seen her pain, you cannot understand the meaning of anguish. Recently, Mr. Shcharansky embarked on a hunger strike to protest the cutting off of the very few letters and visits that he had been permitted yearly.

Many people have tried to reach out to the Shcharanskys, to tell them that others really care. I, too, have tried. For six consecutive days, beginning on Oct. 31, I fasted in front of the Soviet Mission to the United Nations. During this period, I was joined by well over 1,000 people who, on a daily basis, fasted, prayed, studied the Bible and protested on Mr. Shcharansky's behalf. I did not embark on this enterprise merely to test myself or to discover what it would be like. For this form of protest to have an impact on those who are holding Mr. Shcharansky, it was necessary that the public hear about it.

The block where the Soviet Mission is situated, 67th Street, between Third and Lexington Avenues, is oppressive. Sitting behind police barriers, diagonally across from the Soviet Mission, we felt imprisoned. K.G.B. spies peered from the roof; agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation took photographs from ground level; the police often made life miserable for the demonstrators; and irate tenants, annoyed by our presence, dropped water and eggs from apartment windows. Although we had voluntarily imprisoned ourselves in an open street, we could get up and walk away whenever we chose. Mr. Shcharansky cannot.

A hunger strike is exhilarating but painful. At night, you feel hunger pangs; during the day, you feel weak, your legs wobble, you're ready to keel over. To fast, you must be totally committed to the cause, and the mind must overcome the body's needs. When alone, the body predominates and hunger seems intolerable; when surrounded by friends, you feel reinforced and find it possible to continue. Fasting among supporters — that's not real fasting; but Mr. Shcharansky in the Gulag, alone — that's a true hunger strike.

On the fourth day, Mrs. Shcharansky joined us. Her eyes reflected her sadness. When asked to say a few words, she responded: "I can't speak now. All I can do is cry." A friend explained: "The joy Avital feels in seeing people who empathize with her and Anatoly has moved her to speak without words, to speak with tears." When Mrs. Shcharansky was leaving, she said: "We are one. We are together." But the truth was that in the end we would go back to our families, while she would remain alone.

By the fifth day, a "high" set in — not one imposed from the outside but generated from within. The energy normally used to consume and digest food is deflected elsewhere. Intellectual and spiritual powers seem to be expanded rather than diminished. Inner masks are removed. No food clogs the body. One becomes more honest, more open, more expressive of his feelings.

Russian diplomats came and went in droves, looking harried, ambivalent about what was happening. I knew the Russians were people but wondered whether they could really display emotion. Can they laugh, cry, love? As the new leader, Yuri V. Andropov, assumes power, will he make a gesture of good faith by freeing Mr. Shcharansky?

Will the political leaders of our country, when speaking with Mr. Andropov, mention Mr. Shcharansky by name? Or will the discussion focus only on such issues as Poland and Afghanistan — masses not individuals, countries not people?

As I look back at that week, it seems unreal. It's as if those days didn't exist — an empty space in my life. For Anatoly Shcharansky, such emptiness has continued for years. But in emptiness there is often deep meaning. The Shcharanskys, in fighting for human rights, lead full lives.

Avraham Weiss is rabbi of the Hebrew Institute of Riverdale, an assistant professor at Stern College of Yeshiva University and a vice chairman of the Student Struggle for Soviet Jewry.

07 7825 4217
Shcharansky
12/13/82

SECRET

EUR/SOV:JFSCHUMAKER:LCL
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HA:MLEVITSKY
INR:GSHERRY

EUR/SOV:TWSIMONS, JR.
P:DJOHNSON
L/LEI:JSMITH
NSC:~~RPIPES~~ ?
EUR: TMT Niles

PRIORITY BERLIN

PRIORITY BONN, MOSCOW PRIORITY, USMISSION BERLIN PRIORITY

ROGER CHANNEL

RDB
JFS
REC
TWS

DECL: OADR

TAGS

PRISONER EXCHANGE: SHCHARANSKIY

REF: BERLIN 4942 [ROGER CHANNEL]

1. [S - ENTIRE TEXT.]

2. OVER THE PAST FEW WEEKS, WE HAVE MADE A NUMBER OF OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL APPROACHES TO THE SOVIETS ON SHCHARANSKIY. THEY HAVE BEEN UNIFORMLY REBUFFED.

3. THE LEAST NEGATIVE SIGNAL [UNTIL VOGEL] HAS COME FROM USA/CANADA INSTITUTE DIRECTOR ARBATOV, WHO HAS SAID THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT TO CONSIDER A SHCHARANSKIY RELEASE, SINCE THE U.S. WOULD SEEK TO USE IT FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES, BILLING IT AS EVIDENCE THAT PRESENT U.S. POLICIES TOWARD SOVIET UNION WERE WORKING. ARBATOV ALSO VOICED CONCERN THAT FIRST THING THE U.S. WOUD DO WOULD BE TO INVITE SHCHARANSKIY TO THE WHITE HOUSE FOR A MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT.

4. AT THE NEXT APPROPRIATE OPPORTUNITY, YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO RELAY TO VOGEL THAT WE DO NOT INTEND TO "LEAN ON ANDROPOV" ABOUT SHCHARANSKIY. YOU MAY ALSO

TELL HIM THAT IF SHCHARANSKIY WERE RELEASED, IF NECESSARY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH WOULD DO NOTHING TO TAKE PROPAGANDA ADVANTAGE OF THIS, AND WOULD SEEK TO DISCOURAGE CONGRESSIONAL AND PRIVATE GROUP COMMENTARY THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WAS "FORCED" TO GIVE IN ON SHCHARANSKIY, OR THAT U.S. POLICIES HAD "TRIUMPHED." YOU ARE ALSO AUTHORIZED TO SAY THAT IF NO WHITE HOUSE MEETING WERE A CONDITION OF SHCHARANSKIY'S RELEASE, THIS CONDITION WOULD BE HONORED. //

Dobriansky
FICE
468 Sharansky
Dissidents

National Security Council
The White House

Package # 8586

02 DEC 16 P7:17

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	1	✓	A
Bud McFarlane	2	Rcvd	
Jacque Hill	3		
Judge Clark	4	✓	A
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

I–Information A–Action R–Retain D–Dispatch N–No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other_____

URGENT

COMMENTS

Note that the recommendation for approval does not refer to the President. This is intentional. We do not believe we should refer to the President in this unofficial channel.

5

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL December 16, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY

SUBJECT: Shcharansky Case: Possible New Steps

During this Administration, both official and unofficial U.S. steps have been taken on behalf of imprisoned Soviet dissident Anatoly Shcharansky. Most of these actions have been rebuffed by Moscow. However, at the U.S. Trade and Economic Council (USTEC) meeting in Moscow in mid-November, Arbatov mentioned to several USTEC members that if Shcharansky were released, the U.S. Government would reap considerable propaganda mileage. Yet, he asserted that if he were to raise the case with the appropriate authorities, certain U.S. guarantees would be needed.

At Tab I is a memorandum from State which indicates that James Giffen, President of Armco International, will be going to Moscow on December 18. Since the Soviets have suggested that USTEC be used as a "special channel" of communication, State's memorandum recommends that Giffen transmit a message to Arbatov about the Shcharansky case. The verbal message would state, "that the Executive Branch will do nothing to take propaganda advantage of any unilateral Soviet gesture to help Shcharansky's plight" and that " we will work with Congress and private groups to discourage commentary that the Soviets were forced to give in or that U.S. policies have triumphed." State also suggests that Giffen be authorized to say "if no White House meeting were made a condition of Shcharansky's release, this condition would be honored." According to State, both Mrs. Shcharansky and the Israelis have supported this approach.

I recommend that we utilize this "special channel" for it has the advantage of not being "official". It would also meet Arbatov's stated concerns about Shcharansky's conditional release and would satisfy Mrs. Shcharansky's request that the USG send a "special emissary" to speak with Soviet authorities on her husband's behalf. A decision is needed by noon, Friday, December 17.

Richard Pipes concurs.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

RECOMMENDATION

That James Giffen be authorized on behalf of the Executive Branch to transmit the message (in the second paragraph, above) on Shcharansky to Arbatov.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment:

Tab I State's memorandum, dated December 10, 1982

S/S 8238015
8586

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

December 10, 1982

82 DEC 10 P10: 35 ~~SECRET/NODIS~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Possible New Step to Help Anatoliy Shcharanskiy

Following on the President's letter to Brezhnev, there have been a number of official and unofficial U.S. attempts to raise with the Soviets the plight of imprisoned Soviet dissident Anatoliy Shcharanskiy. Unfortunately, these attempts have been almost uniformly rebuffed. In Madrid, Max Kampelman sent a letter on November 24 to Soviet delegation leader Kovalev requesting reconsideration of the Sakharov, Orlov and Shcharanskiy cases. The letter was returned. In Moscow, Senator Dole raised the Shcharanskiy case with USA/Canada Institute Director Arbatov, who rejected linking the case with other issues of interest to the Soviets. Also in Moscow, our Embassy attempted to pass a letter from Avital Shcharanskiy to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, asking that it be forwarded to Anatoliy Shcharanskiy. The letter was returned, with a note stating that our request to facilitate its delivery "was completely inappropriate."

The least negative signal on Shcharanskiy was given by Arbatov in conversations with members of the U.S. Trade and Economic Council (USTEC), which met in Moscow during mid-November. On that occasion, Arbatov said that he did not think that taking action on Shcharanskiy at this time was necessarily a good move since people would then argue that present U.S. policies were working. He also noted that dissidents, when let out, tended to make a lot of noise, and that the first thing that would happen if the Soviets released Shcharanskiy would be that he would meet in the White House with President Reagan. Arbatov said that if he were to approach someone who could release Shcharanskiy, he would need answers for these questions.

USTEC personnel could not, on that occasion, speak for the U.S. government, and therefore had no answers for Arbatov. In view of past Soviet performance on this issue, we doubt that, even if the USG does answer Arbatov's questions to his satisfaction, it would make much difference in the Shcharanskiy case. However, there is still a good reason for trying to get back to Arbatov. Avital Shcharanskiy recently met with Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Mark Palmer to ask whether -- in the wake of the Soviet leadership changes -- it wouldn't be a good time to take another initiative with the Soviet authorities on behalf of her husband. Specifically, her idea was that we send a "special

~~SECRET~~/NODIS
DECL: ~~OADR~~

emissary" (someone like Henry Kissinger) to talk to the Soviets about her husband. Palmer was understandably pessimistic about the prospects for such an effort, but agreed that the USG would consider the proposal.

We now understand that USTEC member James Giffen (President of Armco International) may be returning to Moscow before Christmas for business reasons. The Soviets have suggested that they would like to use USTEC Co-chairman C. William Verity as a "special channel" of communication to build towards a Reagan-Andropov summit and expanding trade. We have naturally warned USTEC officials that this Soviet line is not new and is probably just a ploy to probe U.S. policy intentions without commitment from the Soviet side.

However, the fact that the Soviets have themselves opened up this "special channel" does mean that messages should be able to go both ways, and it has the advantage of being not quite official in the Shcharanskiy case, since Verity raised the issue with Arbatov with our encouragement but not in the name of the Administration. We think it should be used to satisfy Mrs. Shcharanskiy's desire for additional efforts on behalf of her husband, and can be used for this single purpose without committing us to a broader and more durable extra-official "channel" to the Soviets of a type inappropriate to relations at this point. Accordingly, we recommend that the USG give Giffen a message to take to Arbatov on Shcharanskiy. We recommend that the message be that the Executive Branch will do nothing to take propaganda advantage of any unilateral Soviet gesture to help Shcharanskiy's plight, and we will work with Congress and private groups as well to discourage any commentary suggesting that the Soviet side was "forced" to give in or that U.S. policies have "triumphed." We would also recommend that Giffen be authorized to say, on behalf of the President, that if no White House meeting were made a condition of Shcharanskiy's release, this condition would be honored (in our informal contacts with Mrs. Shcharanskiy and the Israelis about possible conditions the Soviets might impose for Shcharanskiy's release, both parties have supported this strategy).

As noted, we do not think that such assurances, if passed to Arbatov, stand much chance of moving the Soviets on the Shcharanskiy issue. But we should at least be on record as having made our best effort to help Shcharanskiy. In doing this, we will have gone most of the way toward satisfying Mrs. Shcharanskiy's request, and we will have deprived the Soviets of the ability to reiterate the Arbatov arguments in any credible manner in the future.

L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

SECRET

SHCHARANSKY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER

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S E C R E T MOSCOW 15391

EXDIS
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: SHUM, UR
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH SHCHARANSKIY'S MOTHER AND BROTHER
REF: MOSCOW 15220

EXDIS

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. EMBOFFS MET WITH ANATOLIY SHCHARANSKIY'S MOTHER IDA MILGROM AND BROTHER LEONID IN ELENA BONNER'S APARTMENT ON DECEMBER 20. MILGROM SAID THAT SHE HAD BEEN CONFINED TO HER APARTMENT FOR ALMOST A MONTH SUFFERING FROM "NERVOUS EXHAUSTION" INDUCED BY THE ORDEAL OF ANATOLIY'S HUNGER STRIKE AND HAD VENTURED OUT OF DOORS FOR THE FIRST TIME ONLY ON DECEMBER 19. EARLIER ON DECEMBER 20, SHE CONTINUED, SHE HAD GONE TO THE MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS (MVD) IN AN ATTEMPT TO MEET WITH GENERAL BORIS KANAVALOV, WHO ON TWO PREVIOUS OCCASIONS HAD DECLINED TO RECEIVE HER. MILGROM ARRIVED AT THE MINISTRY AT 9 AM AND WAS INSTRUCTED TO WAIT IN THE RECEPTION AREA. AFTER AN INORDINATELY LONG WAIT DURING WHICH SHE HAD ALMOST GIVEN UP HOPE OF SEEING KANAVALOV, HE AND A COLONEL DANILOV FINALLY RECEIVED HER. ACCORDING TO MILGROM, BOTH OFFICIALS INITIALLY PROFESSED IGNORANCE ABOUT SHCHARANSKIY. AFTER SHE HAD READ TO THEM A LONG STATEMENT ON HIS CASE WHICH, SHE TOLD THEM, SHE HAD GIVEN DANILOV IN OCTOBER ON HIS ASSURANCES THAT HE WOULD PASS IT ON TO KANAVALOV, SHE DEMANDED THAT SHE BE ALLOWED TO MEET WITH ANATOLIY TO ATTEMPT TO PERSUADE HIM TO RENOUNCE HIS HUNGER STRIKE. AFTER SOME HEMMING AND HAWING, KANAVALOV TOLD HER TO RETURN TO RECEIVE HIS DECISION. MILGROM PLANS TO RETURN TO MVD ON WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 22. BOTH LEONID AND SHE PROMISED TO CALL EMBOFFS TO ARRANGE ANOTHER MEETING WITH THEM FOLLOWING HER NEXT VISIT TO MVD.
HARTMAN
BT

EXDIS

SECRET

DOBRYNIN

8586
(S/S 8238015)

Brezhnev

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL

December 22, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR L. PAUL BREMER, III
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Shcharansky Case: Possible New Steps (U)

We have reviewed and concur with State's proposal that James Giffen, President of Armco International, be authorized on behalf of the Executive Branch to transmit a message to Arbatov about the Shcharansky case. The verbal message would state, "that the Executive Branch will do nothing to take propaganda advantage of any unilateral Soviet gesture to help Shcharansky's plight" and that "we will work with Congress and private groups to discourage commentary that the Soviets were forced to give in or that U.S. policies have triumphed." We also concur that Giffen indicate "if no White House meeting were made a condition of Shcharansky's release, this condition would be honored." However, as Giffen will be utilizing an "unofficial" channel, he should not make this or any other statement on behalf of the President -- only on behalf of the Executive Branch or the Administration. (C)

Michael O. Wheeler

Michael O. Wheeler
Staff Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR

8586 add-on

CONFIDENTIAL Attachment December 22, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL O. WHEELER

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY

SUBJECT: Shcharansky Case

Although Judge Clark approved the package attached at Tab II last week and State was advised, they need the memo attached at Tab I showing the decision in writing for their records.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove ____

Attachments:

Tab I Memo to State
Tab II Original Pkg.

CONFIDENTIAL Attachment

CDS 7/12/02

12

[illegible]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ December 16, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY

SUBJECT: Shcharansky Case: Possible New Steps

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Richard WP Pipes concurs.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

RECOMMENDATION

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Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment:

Tab I State's memorandum, dated December 10, 1982

S/S 8238015

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

December 10, 1982

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Possible New Step to Help Anatoliy Shcharanskiy

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emissary" (someone like Henry Kissinger) to talk to the Soviets about her husband. Palmer was understandably pessimistic about the prospects for such an effort, but agreed that the USG would consider the proposal.

We now understand that USTEC member James Giffen (President of Armco International) may be returning to Moscow before Christmas for business reasons. The Soviets have suggested that they would like to use USTEC Co-chairman C. William Verity as a "special channel" of communication to build towards a Reagan-Andropov summit and expanding trade. We have naturally warned USTEC officials that this Soviet line is not new and is probably just a ploy to probe U.S. policy intentions without commitment from the Soviet side.

However, the fact that the Soviets have themselves opened up this "special channel" does mean that messages should be able to go both ways, and it has the advantage of being not quite official in the Shcharanskiy case, since Verity raised the issue with Arbatov with our encouragement but not in the name of the Administration. We think it should be used to satisfy Mrs. Shcharanskiy's desire for additional efforts on behalf of her husband, and can be used for this single purpose without committing us to a broader and more durable extra-official "channel" to the Soviets of a type inappropriate to relations at this point. Accordingly, we recommend that the USG give Giffen a message to take to Arbatov on Shcharanskiy. We recommend that the message be that the Executive Branch will do nothing to take propaganda advantage of any unilateral Soviet gesture to help Shcharanskiy's plight, and we will work with Congress and private groups as well to discourage any commentary suggesting that the Soviet side was "forced" to give in or that U.S. policies have "triumphed." We would also recommend that Giffen be authorized to say, on behalf of the President, that if no White House meeting were made a condition of Shcharanskiy's release, this condition would be honored (in our informal contacts with Mrs. Shcharanskiy and the Israelis about possible conditions the Soviets might impose for Shcharanskiy's release, both parties have supported this strategy).

As noted, we do not think that such assurances, if passed to Arbatov, stand much chance of moving the Soviets on the Shcharanskiy issue. But we should at least be on record as having made our best effort to help Shcharanskiy. In doing this, we will have gone most of the way toward satisfying Mrs. Shcharanskiy's request, and we will have deprived the Soviets of the ability to reiterate the Arbatov arguments in any credible manner in the future.

L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

National Security Council
The White House

Package # 8586

87 JUN 27 P7:17

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	1	✓	A
Bud McFarlane	2	✓	
Jacque Hill	3		
Judge Clark	4	✓	A
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

I–Information A–Action R–Retain D–Dispatch N–No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other_____

ALGERT

COMMENTS

Note that the recommendation for approval does not refer to the President. This is intentional. We do not believe we should refer to the President in this unofficial channel.

8586 add-on

CONFIDENTIAL Attachment

December 22, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL O. WHEELER

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY

SUBJECT: Shcharansky Case

Although Judge Clark approved the package attached at Tab II last week and State was advised, they need the memo attached at Tab I showing the decision in writing for their records.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve_____ Disapprove_____

Attachments:

Tab I Memo to State
Tab II Original Pkg.

CONFIDENTIAL Attachment

OS 7/12/02

18

8586
(S/S 8238015)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

CONFIDENTIAL

22 Dec 82

MEMORANDUM FOR L. PAUL BREMER, III
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Shcharansky Case: Possible New Steps

We have reviewed and concur with State's proposal that James Giffen, President of Armco International, be authorized on behalf of the Executive Branch to transmit a message to Arbatov about the Shcharansky case. The verbal message would state, "that the Executive Branch will do nothing to take propaganda advantage of any unilateral Soviet gesture to help Shcharansky's plight" and that "we will work with Congress and private groups to discourage commentary that the Soviets were forced to give in or that U.S. policies have triumphed." We also concur that Giffen indicate "if no White House meeting were made a condition of Shcharansky's release, this condition would be honored." However, as Giffen will be utilizing an "unofficial" channel, he should not make this or any other statement on behalf of the President -- only on behalf of the Executive Branch or the Administration. (C)

/S/

Michael O. Wheeler
Staff Secretary

rec'd by D. Lee
State Sec Tarrant

CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR

19

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL

December 16, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY

SUBJECT: Shcharansky Case: Possible New Steps

During this Administration, both official and unofficial U.S. steps have been taken on behalf of imprisoned Soviet dissident Anatoly Shcharansky. Most of these actions have been rebuffed by Moscow. However, at the U.S. Trade and Economic Council (USTEC) meeting in Moscow in mid-November, Arbatov mentioned to several USTEC members that if Shcharansky were released, the U.S. Government would reap considerable propaganda mileage. Yet, he asserted that if he were to raise the case with the appropriate authorities, certain U.S. guarantees would be needed.

At Tab I is a memorandum from State which indicates that James Giffen, President of Armco International, will be going to Moscow on December 18. Since the Soviets have suggested that USTEC be used as a "special channel" of communication, State's memorandum recommends that Giffen transmit a message to Arbatov about the Shcharansky case. The verbal message would state, "that the Executive Branch will do nothing to take propaganda advantage of any unilateral Soviet gesture to help Shcharansky's plight" and that " we will work with Congress and private groups to discourage commentary that the Soviets were forced to give in or that U.S. policies have triumphed." State also suggests that Giffen be authorized to say "if no White House meeting were made a condition of Shcharansky's release, this condition would be honored." According to State, both Mrs. Shcharansky and the Israelis have supported this approach.

I recommend that we utilize this "special channel" for it has the advantage of not being "official". It would also meet Arbatov's stated concerns about Shcharansky's conditional release and would satisfy Mrs. Shcharansky's request that the USG send a "special emissary" to speak with Soviet authorities on her husband's behalf. A decision is needed by noon, Friday, December 17.

Richard Pipes concurs.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

RECOMMENDATION

That James Giffen be authorized on behalf of the Executive Branch to transmit the message (in the second paragraph, above) on Shcharansky to Arbatov.

Approve Disapprove

Attachment:

Tab I State's memorandum, dated December 10, 1982

S/S 8238015

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

December 10, 1982

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Possible New Step to Help Anatoliy Shcharanskiy

Following on the President's letter to Brezhnev, there have been a number of official and unofficial U.S. attempts to raise with the Soviets the plight of imprisoned Soviet dissident Anatoliy Shcharanskiy. Unfortunately, these attempts have been almost uniformly rebuffed. In Madrid, Max Kampelman sent a letter on November 24 to Soviet delegation leader Kovalev requesting reconsideration of the Sakharov, Orlov and Shcharanskiy cases. The letter was returned. In Moscow, Senator Dole raised the Shcharanskiy case with USA/Canada Institute Director Arbatov, who rejected linking the case with other issues of interest to the Soviets. Also in Moscow, our Embassy attempted to pass a letter from Avital Shcharanskiy to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, asking that it be forwarded to Anatoliy Shcharanskiy. The letter was returned, with a note stating that our request to facilitate its delivery "was completely inappropriate."

The least negative signal on Shcharanskiy was given by Arbatov in conversations with members of the U.S. Trade and Economic Council (USTEC), which met in Moscow during mid-November. On that occasion, Arbatov said that he did not think that taking action on Shcharanskiy at this time was necessarily a good move since people would then argue that present U.S. policies were working. He also noted that dissidents, when let out, tended to make a lot of noise, and that the first thing that would happen if the Soviets released Shcharanskiy would be that he would meet in the White House with President Reagan. Arbatov said that if he were to approach someone who could release Shcharanskiy, he would need answers for these questions.

USTEC personnel could not, on that occasion, speak for the U.S. government, and therefore had no answers for Arbatov. In view of past Soviet performance on this issue, we doubt that, even if the USG does answer Arbatov's questions to his satisfaction, it would make much difference in the Shcharanskiy case. However, there is still a good reason for trying to get back to Arbatov. Avital Shcharanskiy recently met with Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Mark Palmer to ask whether -- in the wake of the Soviet leadership changes -- it wouldn't be a good time to take another initiative with the Soviet authorities on behalf of her husband. Specifically, her idea was that we send a "special

emissary" (someone like Henry Kissinger) to talk to the Soviets about her husband. Palmer was understandably pessimistic about the prospects for such an effort, but agreed that the USG would consider the proposal.

We now understand that USTEC member James Giffen (President of Armco International) may be returning to Moscow before Christmas for business reasons. The Soviets have suggested that they would like to use USTEC Co-chairman C. William Verity as a "special channel" of communication to build towards a Reagan-Andropov summit and expanding trade. We have naturally warned USTEC officials that this Soviet line is not new and is probably just a ploy to probe U.S. policy intentions without commitment from the Soviet side.

However, the fact that the Soviets have themselves opened up this "special channel" does mean that messages should be able to go both ways, and it has the advantage of being not quite official in the Shcharanskiy case, since Verity raised the issue with Arbatov with our encouragement but not in the name of the Administration. We think it should be used to satisfy Mrs. Shcharanskiy's desire for additional efforts on behalf of her husband, and can be used for this single purpose without committing us to a broader and more durable extra-official "channel" to the Soviets of a type inappropriate to relations at this point. Accordingly, we recommend that the USG give Giffen a message to take to Arbatov on Shcharanskiy. We recommend that the message be that the Executive Branch will do nothing to take propaganda advantage of any unilateral Soviet gesture to help Shcharanskiy's plight, and we will work with Congress and private groups as well to discourage any commentary suggesting that the Soviet side was "forced" to give in or that U.S. policies have "triumphed." We would also recommend that Giffen be authorized to say, on behalf of the President, that if no White House meeting were made a condition of Shcharanskiy's release, this condition would be honored (in our informal contacts with Mrs. Shcharanskiy and the Israelis about possible conditions the Soviets might impose for Shcharanskiy's release, both parties have supported this strategy).

As noted, we do not think that such assurances, if passed to Arbatov, stand much chance of moving the Soviets on the Shcharanskiy issue. But we should at least be on record as having made our best effort to help Shcharanskiy. In doing this, we will have gone most of the way toward satisfying Mrs. Shcharanskiy's request, and we will have deprived the Soviets of the ability to reiterate the Arbatov arguments in any credible manner in the future.

L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

National Security Council
The White House

Package # 8586

87 JUN 27 P7:17

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	1	/	A
Bud McFarlane	2	/	
Jacque Hill	3		
Judge Clark	4	/	A
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other_____

NORTH

COMMENTS

Note that the recommendation for approval does not refer to the President. This is intentional. We do not believe we should refer to the President in this unofficial channel.

8779 Dissidents

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

December 23, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY
DENNIS C. BLAIR

SUBJECT: Proposed Presidential Telephone Calls

Attached at Tabs I and II, respectively, are "Recommended Telephone Call" memoranda proposing that the President, in the spirit of the season, make telephone calls to Pope John Paul II and to Lisa Alexeyeva Semyonova (Sakharov's daughter-in-law).

RECOMMENDATION

That you initial and forward the memoranda proposing these calls at Tabs I and II (to Pope John Paul II and Mrs. Semyonova, respectively).

Approve_____ Disapprove_____

Attachments:

Tab I Recommended Telephone Call Memo to Pope John Paul II
Tab II Recommended Telephone Call Memo to Mrs. Semyonova

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

RECOMMENDED TELEPHONE CALL

TO: His Eminence Pope John Paul II

DATE: December 24-25, 1982

RECOMMENDED BY: William P. Clark

PURPOSE: It is appropropriate that President Reagan, the political leader of the West, talk at the end of the year (Christmas) to Pope John Paul, the most important spiritual leader in the West. The call would demonstrate the President's concern with the moral dimension of the many problems in the world: Poland, the Middle East, and arms control in particular.

TOPICS OF DISCUSSION:

1. Concern about the sincerity and seriousness of purpose of the Polish regime's recent announcement of the suspension of martial law.

2. The Administration's deep concern about and support for the Polish people, and commitment to continue to send humanitarian assistance.

3. Concern for the people of Lebanon, and determination to negotiate the withdrawal of all foreign forces from that country.

4. Determination to continue to press for reductions in the world's nuclear arsenals.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

RECOMMENDED TELEPHONE CALL

TO: Elizaveta (Lisa) Alexeyeva Semyonova, daughter-in-law of Andrei Sakharov, the leading Soviet human rights activist, renowned scientist, and Nobel Prize Laureate.

DATE: December 24 - 25, 1982

RECOMMENDED BY: William P. Clark

PURPOSE: To express your concern for Sakharov's (her father-in-law's) plight in the Soviet Union and your admiration of his undying courage and outspoken advocacy of human rights.

BACKGROUND: Lisa Alexeyeva applied for a regular Soviet visa for over three years, while her fiance was already in the U.S. She was refused on the grounds that she had no marital status. In 1980, she married Mr. Aleksei Semyonov by proxy. In November 1981, Sakharov and his wife, Elena Bonner, went on a two-week hunger strike to protest the repeated refusal of Soviet authorities to grant an exit visa to Lisa Alekseyeva to join her husband in the U.S. After continued protests from the West, Lisa was finally granted an exit visa on December 9, 1981.

In January 1980, Andrei Sakharov was exiled by Soviet authorities to Gorky, where he has been subjected for two years to villainous harassment, punishment, loss of his livelihood and acts of physical violence in retaliation for his outspoken advocacy of human rights.

TOPICS OF DISCUSSION:

1. Concern about the continued harassment of her father-in-law.

2. Your strong admiration for Sakharov's undying courage and persistent struggle for basic freedoms and human rights.

3. The Administration's belief that Mr. Sakharov should be permitted to take up residence in a place of his own choice where he will be able to reestablish contact with fellow scientists and resume his important research.

4. What is Sakharov's current state of health?

5. The Administration has made and will continue to make official representations to Soviet authorities on behalf of Andrei Sakharov.

NOTE: A translator will be needed.

Documents 27

filed 11/30/12

SHCHARANSKY

(1) – 10 days of hunger strike – husband on
– mother see him in Jan.

[a. contact Russians at highest level (letter from Reagan to Brezhnev)
b. prisoner exchanges

(2) Mefarlane – [over the years – public statements
private pressure -- applied]

[Le exchanges w/ Russians
publicly & privately.
[Pres. Reagan – appealed on your behalf
& the Sec. of State

(3) Pres. Would seek to make some kind of intervention on his behalf.

(4) Shcharansky – interested in receiving notes of what P. seeks to do.

(5) Bud will be back in touch w/ her.
↓ emph. it needs to remain private.

Wash. D.C. – 265-8114

N.Y. – (212)

Nat'l Conf. – Jerry Goodman

> 10 Days of Hunger Strike
(Coordinate
Letter for him to Pres.)

> midday – friday.
(have a letter)
to Shcharansky...

a. Report it
b. was moved –
& talked about
his strong feelings
– hoped to make
> was willing to an
intervention

INTERNAL NSC ROUTING

BOVERIE	NORTH
CHILDRESS	POLLOCK
DEGRAFFENREID	POSA
DOBRIANSKY	RAYMOND
DUR	REED
FONTAINE	REGER
FORTIER	REIS
GUHIN	ROBINSON
HELM	RUSSELL
KEMP	RYE
KIMMITT	SAPIA-BOSCH
KRAEMER	SIGUR
LAUX	SIMS
LENCZOWSKI	SOMMER
LEVINE	STEARMAN
LILAC	TAMBS
LINHARD	TEICHER
LORD	TYSON
MANFREDI	WEISS
MARTIN	WETTERING
MCMINN	WHEELER
MORRIS	

FILE -
DCSS
CSAKH

S. J. Res. 51

Ninety-eighth Congress of the United States of America

AT THE FIRST SESSION

Begun and held at the City of Washington on Monday, the third day of January, one thousand nine hundred and eighty-three

Joint Resolution

Designating May 21, 1983, as "Andrei Sakharov Day".

Whereas Andrei Sakharov has earned the admiration and gratitude of all the peoples of the world for his tireless and courageous efforts to secure basic human freedoms for the peoples of the Soviet Union, including those rights and freedoms proclaimed and guaranteed in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe signed at Helsinki, August 1, 1975; and

Whereas Andrei Sakharov has been awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace for "his love of truth and strong belief in the inviolability of human beings . . . his courageous defense of the human spirit . . ." and a life that has made him "the conscience of mankind"; and

Whereas Andrei Sakharov, in direct consequence of his tireless work for world peace and human rights, has been illegally confined by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the remote city of Gorky, where, on May 21, 1983, he will spend his sixty-second birthday in almost total isolation; and

Whereas even under conditions of isolation and harassment by Soviet authorities, Andrei Sakharov has continued to speak with eloquence and great moral force for the causes of human rights and world peace, for amnesty for all prisoners of conscience, and for full compliance by all signatory states with the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act and the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That May 21, 1983, is designated "National Andrei Sakharov Day" and the President of the United States is authorized and requested to issue a proclamation calling upon the people of the United States to observe that day with appropriate ceremonies and activities.

SEC. 2. The President of the United States is authorized and requested to call upon all nations of the world to designate May 21, 1983, as "National Andrei Sakharov Day" within their respective nations.

SEC. 3. The President of the United States is authorized and requested to urge the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to permit Andrei Sakharov and his wife, Elena Bonner, freely to choose their place of residence.

SEC. 4. The President of the United States is authorized and requested to direct the American delegation to the United Nations to introduce a resolution in the General Assembly calling upon that body to designate May 21, 1983, as "International Andrei Sakharov Day", to be observed by the United Nations with appropriate ceremonies and activities.

Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Vice President of the United States and
President of the Senate

SHCHARANSKY 31

CONFIDENTIAL

INCOMING TELEGRAM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 0369 DTG: 111524Z JAN 83 PSN: 072550
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C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 00369

EXDIS
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: SHUM, UR
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH SHCHARANSKIY'S BROTHER

REF: 82 MOSCOW 15391

EXDIS

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

EXDIS

2. EMBOFF SPOKE WITH ANATOLIY SHCHARANSKIY'S BROTHER LEONID ON JANUARY 10 DURING A MEETING BETWEEN LOCAL DISSIDENTS AND REFUSENIKS AND MEMBERS OF CODEL LANTOS. LEONID BASICALLY CONFIRMED THE INFORMATION ON THE MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN HIS BROTHER'S HUNGER STRIKE AS REPORTED RECENTLY IN WESTERN MEDIA. ACCORDING TO LEONID, MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS (MVD) OFFICIALS INFORMED HIS MOTHER IDA MILGROM AND HIM IN LATE DECEMBER THAT A MEETING WITH ANATOLIY WOULD BE POSSIBLE AFTER JANUARY 4. ACCORDINGLY, THEY TRAVELED TO CHISTOPOL' PRISON ON JANUARY 4. THERE, PRISON COMMANDER ROMANOV RECEIVED ONLY MRS. MILGROM AND INFORMED HER THAT ON THE PREVIOUS DAY HE HAD TOLD ANATOLIY THAT HE WAS DEPRIVED OF THE RIGHT TO MEET WITH RELATIVES BECAUSE OF HIS HUNGER STRIKE. ROMANOV ADDED THAT HE WOULD ALLOW ANATOLIY TO MEET WITH THEM IF HE ENDED THE STRIKE OR IF ONE OF ROMANOV'S SUPERIORS IN KAZAN OR MOSCOW INSTRUCTED HIM (ROMANOV) TO DO SO. MRS. MILGROM THEN CALLED MOSCOW, EVIDENTLY FROM ROMANOV'S OFFICE, AND THEN PASSED HIM THE TELEPHONE. THE SUBSTANCE OF THE CONVERSATION OBVIOUSLY

EXDIS

ANGERED ROMANOV, AND HE CATEGORICALLY REFUSED TO CONTINUE THE DISCUSSION WITH MRS. MILGROM AND LEONID. SHE DECIDED TO STAY IN A HOTEL NEAR THE PRISON IN THE HOPE THAT SHE SOON WOULD BE ALLOWED TO MEET WITH ANATOLIY; SHE STILL WAS THERE AS OF JANUARY 10, AND LEONID DOES NOT KNOW HOW LONG SHE INTENDS TO REMAIN THERE. LEONID RETURNED TO MOSCOW AND MET WITH MVD OFFICIALS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF CORRECTIVE LABOR CAMPS ON JANUARY 7 TO PLEAD FOR A MEETING FOR ANATOLIY. THEY INFORMED LEONID THAT HE WOULD RECEIVE AN ANSWER ON JANUARY 10. WHEN HE RETURNED TO MVD, HE WAS TOLD THAT "ALL QUESTIONS PUT TO US MORE THAN ONCE HAVE BEEN ANSWERED BY THE APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES." (COMMENT: WE INTERPRET THIS REMARK TO MEAN THAT SOVIET AUTHORITIES DEFINITELY

HAVE DECIDED NOT TO ALLOW MRS. MILGROM OR LEONID TO MEET WITH ANATOLIY UNTIL HE ENDS HIS HUNGER STRIKE. THE SOVIETS APPEAR TO BE STONEWALLING WITH REGARD TO HIS CONDITION. END COMMENT.)

3. LEONID ADDED THAT CHISTOPOL' COMMANDANT ROMANOV HAD INFORMED MRS. MILGROM THAT ANATOLIY WAS BEING FORCE FED EVERY THIRD DAY.

4. MRS. MILGROM AND LEONID SHCHARANSKIY STILL DO NOT KNOW FOR CERTAIN WHAT ANATOLIY'S CONDITION IS. THEY FEAR THAT HE WILL SUFFER IRREPARABLE DAMAGE TO HIS HEALTH IF HE PROLONGS HIS HUNGER STRIKE AND SO ARE EXTREMELY ANXIOUS TO MEET WITH HIM NOW TO ATTEMPT TO CONVINCE HIM TO END IT.

5. LEONID PLANS TO REMAIN IN MOSCOW AT LEAST FOR THE NEXT FEW DAYS. HARTMAN
BT

EXDIS

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VOA Editorial Summary for 14 Jan. 83

Free Anatoly Shcharansky

The USG-ed has discussed the fate of Anatoly Shcharansky on several occasions in the past few months since he began his hunger strike. Fears for his life have grown in that time. Shcharansky's wife says that today he is being force fed every three days--and that she doubts that he can survive much longer.

The editorial repeats the unjust charges which the Soviets have used to imprison Shcharansky and calls on the Soviet rulers, "however much they detest him (to) understand at this pont that there can be no justification for allowing him to die."

Editorial 0-0465 January 14, 1983

Free Anatoly Shcharansky (OUR42)

Anncr:

Next, a VOA Editorial, reflecting the views of the U.S. Government.

Voice:

It has been almost six years now since the arrest of Soviet human rights activist Anatoly Shcharansky, and more than three months since he began a hunger strike in a desperate effort to gain his freedom. Fears for Mr. Shcharansky's life been growing ever since then, and now his wife says that he may not survive much longer.

Mrs. Shcharansky has appealed to French President Francois Mitterrand, asking him to use whatever influence he has in the Kremlin to secure her husband's release. She says that Mr. Shcharansky is being force-fed every three days by officials of the prison in Chistopol, where he is being held. But that, she warned, is not enough to keep him alive.

Officially, Mr. Shcharansky is serving out a 13-year sentence for committing espionage. In fact, he is being punished for his political views. Anatoly Shcharansky was an active member of the Helsinki group of activitists who monitored Soviet compliance with the Helsinki Final Act, in which Moscow pledged to observe minimum internationally accepted standards of human rights. He was also involved in the movement among Soviet Jews to escape religious persecution by emigrating to Israel. If Mr. Shcharansky is ever allowed to go free, that is where he intends to live.

We have often complained about the Soviet Union's unconscionable treatment of political dissenters. We have often decried the violations of fundamental and universal human rights that are committed by regimes that imprison people for having or expressing views that are not officially sanctioned by their governments. We have often been appalled by the mockery of law that takes place when a government concocts criminal charges against political dissenters just to shut them up.

But the evidence suggests that Mr. Shcharansky's condition may be too critical to leave time for further argument. Now it is simply a matter of saving a human life. Whatever the Soviet authorities may think of Anatoly Shcharansky, however much they detest him, even they must understand at this point that there can be no justification for allowing him to die.

Anncr:

That was a VOA Editorial, reflecting the views of the U.S. Government.

FILE SHCHARANSKY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

January 18, 1983

TO:

BOB SIMS
WALT RAYMOND
PAULA DOBRIANSKY

FROM:

CARY LORD

FYI.

SECRET

SHCHARANSKY

Dissidents 37

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER

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AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 6911
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 9586
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AMCONSUL ANTWERP IMMEDIATE 8Ø69
AMCONSUL ROTTERDAM IMMEDIATE 4ØØ7
USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 4365

S E C R E T STATE Ø13245

EXDIS
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OFDP, PREL, UR, NL, NATO, SHUM
SUBJECT: ANATOLIY SHCHARANSKIY AND SOVIET INTEREST IN A PERMANENT PRESENCE IN ROTTERDAM

REF: A) STATE Ø11260, B) STATE Ø13113, C) THE HAGUE ØØ359

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. AMBASSADOR IS REQUESTED TO APPROACH APPROPRIATE MFA OFFICIAL PER REF A AND MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS CONCERNING SOVIET EFFORTS TO OBTAIN A PERMANENT PRESENCE IN ROTTERDAM:

-- THE US AND OTHER ALLIES HAVE EXPRESSED THEIR SERIOUS CONCERN IN NATO ABOUT THE SOVIET REQUEST TO ESTABLISH A COMMERCIAL/CONSULAR PRESENCE IN ROTTERDAM;

-- WE WOULD HAVE STRONGLY PREFERRED THAT THE DUTCH GOVERNMENT NOT HAVE AGREED TO A PERMANENT SOVIET PRESENCE OF ANY KIND IN ROTTERDAM GIVEN THE SERIOUS ALLIANCE SECURITY CONCERNS INVOLVED AND BELIEVE THEIR CONDITIONS OF RESIDENCY SHOULD TAKE THOSE CONCERNS FULLY INTO ACCOUNT;

-- SINCE THE GON HAS EVIDENTLY DECIDED TO ALLOW A PERMANENT SOVIET PRESENCE IN ROTTERDAM, WE WOULD HOPE THAT THE NETHERLANDS WOULD EXTRACT AN EQUALLY SIGNIFICANT CONCESSION FROM THE SOVIET UNION;

-- IN THIS CONNECTION, WE UNDERSTAND THAT AVITAL SHCHARANSKIY RECENTLY MET WITH PRIME MINISTER LUBBERS. AS YOU ARE PROBABLY AWARE, SECRETARY SHULTZ MET WITH MRS. SHCHARANSKIY ON OCTOBER 16, SHORTLY AFTER HER HUSBAND ANATOLIY DECLARED AN INDEFINITE HUNGER STRIKE TO PROTEST HIS SOVIET JAILERS' REFUSAL TO ALLOW HIM CONTACT WITH THE OUTSIDE WORLD--EVEN WITH HIS OWN FAMILY.

-- SINCE THEN, WE AND OTHERS IN THE WEST HAVE BEEN PURSUING A NUMBER OF AVENUES IN AN ATTEMPT TO HELP MR. SHCHARANSKIY-

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER

AND TO PERSUADE THE SOVIETS TO RELEASE HIM AND ALLOW HIM TO EMIGRATE TO ISRAEL;

-- GIVEN THE NETHERLANDS STRONG HUMAN RIGHTS TRADITION, WE ASK THAT THE GON USE ITS DISCUSSION WI, H THE SOVIETS YO RAISE THE SHCHARANSKIY CASE AS A QUID PRO QUO AND TO EFFECT HS RELEASE AND EMIGRATION FROM THE SOVIET UNION. SHULTZ
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FILE—
Shcharansky

Vol.VII No.6 January 18, 1983

Lynn Singer, President/Judith Slovin, Editor

INFORMATION FROM
THE UNION OF COUNCILS FOR SOVIET JEWS

EXODUS

WEEKLY UPDATE

Shcharansky turns 35

Mother and Brother Denied Visit

Anatoly Shcharansky

ANATOLY SHCHARANSKY will be thirty-five years old on January 20. That same day will mark the 116th day of his hunger strike.

At the end of December, IDA MILGROM and LEONID SHCHARANSKY met with Konovolov, an officer in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, USSR, who issued them permission to visit Anatoly on January 4, 1983, one year to the day since their last visit. They were told that the authorization would be forthcoming. They did receive official authorization, and on January 3, left on the 500 mile journey to Chistopol Prison. Upon their arrival, they met with Camp Commandant Romanov. He denied them permission to visit Anatoly, saying "you are entitled by law to have a visit, but I need instructions from Moscow. You wouldn't want to see him anyway, because he does not look like you or me." Romanov confirmed that Shcharansky was still on hunger strike and was being force-fed once every third day.

Leonid returned to Moscow on January 6 in an effort to investigate the reason for Soviet authorities' sudden reversal of their decision to grant a family visit. He went to the Communist Party Central Committee and to the Main Administration of Prisons where he was informed that the decision to allow a visit rested with the Camp Commandant.

At this writing, Ida Milgrom remains at Chistopol Prison in the hope that she will finally be permitted to see her son.

According to former POC IOSEF MENDELEVICH, under Soviet law a person in the fourth month of a hunger strike must be fed twice a day. The continued inhumane treatment of Anatoly Shcharansky is yet another vivid demonstration

of Soviet authorities' blatant disregard of their own laws and of all accepted international norms of civilized behavior.

Urgent Appeal for Begun

Soviet authorities continue to hold YOSEF BEGUN in Vladimir Prison. The UCSJ received the following urgent appeal from INNA SHLOMOVNA SPERANSKY.

To the Procurator of the Vladimirskaya Oblast
To the Procurator of the RSFSR
To the Procurator General of the USSR

I consider that the activities of my husband in the field of Jewish culture does not constitute any element of criminality. I am convinced that the desire to emigrate to Israel cannot be a crime against the state of the USSR.

The answer that my husband is in the possession of any state secrets, when in fact he has had no contact of any such kind for the last 15 years is an excuse with no foundation and can only be considered by people of unclear conscience who do not wish to go to the heart of the matter.

I earnestly beg you to let me have an answer as to where my husband's guilt really lies.

Inna Shlomovna Speransky
January 12, 1983

1982: Emigration Plummets

Soviet Jewish emigration reached its lowest level in twelve years. Only 2,670 Jews were allowed to emigrate from the USSR in 1982. This represents a 95% drop since 1979 when over 51,000 Jews left the Soviet Union.

The State Department, voicing deep concern over this precipitous decline, pledged to continue its efforts to convince the USSR to lifts its stringent restrictions on emigration. Spokesman Alan Romberg said, "The severe constriction of emigration by the Soviet authorities in recent years is a matter of deep concern to the U.S. government and this concern has been communicated to the Soviet government at every level, both in public forums and through diplomatic channels. We regard the Soviet reductions in emigration as clearly contradictory to the principle of freedom of movement and family reunification contained in the Helsinki Final Act to which the USSR is a signatory."

Deterioration has occured in every facet of Soviet Jewish life:

- ANATOLY SHCHARANSKY continues to languish on hunger strike, while ALEXANDER PARITSKY was resentenced to punishment cell for six months.

- Over ten refuseniks from Moscow and Leningrad were issued final refusals for exit visas. They were told, "Don't reapply, you will never get visas."

- Arrests of prominent activists continued in 1982 with IOSEF BEGUN, FELIKS KOCHUBIEVSKY, and ALEXANDER KREMEN. In Odessa, seven refuseniks including YAKOV and MARINA MESH, YURI and LIDIA PEVZNER and ALEXANDER KUSHNIR were threatened with arrest in retaliation for their appeal for Shcharansky.

- "Guardian Angel" IDA NUDEL was released from exile only to be denied a residency permit in both Moscow and Riga; she has been forced to settle in Bendery, Moldavia in order to avoid rearrest.

- Jewish cultural expression has been nearly extinguished. Hebrew teachers and seminar participants have been harassed relentlessly and interrogated by the KGB.

The desperate situation of Soviet Jews is poignantly expressed in a letter recently received by long-term refuseniks VLADIMIR and IZOLDA TUFELD of Moscow. . . .

. . .We believe this holiday of Hanukkah with miracles helps for our family reunion as miracles were done for our people before now. . . . I'd like to write to you good news but I must write otherwise because we have a very difficult life here and so we decided to share it with you, our friends.

About a week ago we spoke to our son Igor. He, his wife Anna, our little grandson Danik (he was born on January 12,1982) are well but they are very worried about us; we're not able to be with them at this difficult time. Danik is very active but we cannot enjoy him. It will soon be six years since Igor left Moscow for Israel. We miss Igor's family terribly. Reuniting our family is the biggest dream of our whole life. We did not receive Igor's letters or he from us since February although we are writing to each other regularly.

Now we are waiting for an answer from OVIR again and we don't give up hope for the best and our family reunion in the near future.

News Briefs

*The KGB visited LEONID BRAILOVSKY in an investigation to determine whether his father, VICTOR, should be released from prison ahead of schedule. Leonid was told, "People who recant their crimes and reform are entitled to early release. Your father has not done so and therefore he is not entitled to early release."

*POC VLADIMIR TSUKERMAN is meeting with his parents on January 10th to the 13th.

*Former POC SIMON SHNIRMAN of Zaprohzia, who served two and a half years in labor camp because of his refusal to join the army, was called up again last month. If he does not comply this time, he could face five years of imprisonment.

*Fifteen year old EMMA SHIFRIN was recently threatened with arrest by KGB officers, who accused her of "spreading propaganda." Soviet official harassment seemingly has no limits.

*POC VLADIMIR YELCHIN, who was sentenced to five years in labor camp for "defaming the Soviet state" in May 1982 has been denied correspondence for the next two years. POC LEV SHEFER, sentenced at the same time on a similar charge was beaten up by criminal elements in his labor camp.

*Seventeen year old SASHA KREMEN was recently arrested under Article 146 of the Soviet Criminal Code, "assault with the attempt to commit robbery." This charge carries the sentence of three to six years. His father MIKHAIL fears that the photographic equipment which was confiscated from his apartment (ALERT 12/10/82) will be used against Sasha as evidence of smuggling.

*FELIKS KOCHUBIEVSKY's appeal was supposed to have been heard at the court in Moscow on January 10th.

*Fifteen more refuseniks in Moscow were called to the OVIR and were given "life refusals", according to the decision of the Interior Ministry. Among them are YURI ILIN-ADAYEV and ISSAK KAIZLIN.

*The following note was written by YURI TARNOPOLSKY after he ended his unsuccessful forty day hunger strike which he undertook in the hope of winning permission for him and his family to emigrate.

> *". . . . I thank you and all other people who are struggling for our freedom. . . .I am all right. I didn't want to harm myself though I admitted that possibility. I didn't want to trouble my friends. I simply couldn't live without protesting this outrage. . ."*

Around the Country

The Union of Councils for Soviet Jews will hold its fourth biennial Congressional Briefing on Soviet Jewry, dedicated to Soviet POC Anatoly Shcharansky, on January 26, 1983. Guest speakers at the Briefing will include representatives from the Helsinki Commission, State Department, and the National Security Council. Also included in the program will be Harvard law professor Alan Dershowitz, and former refusenik professor Mark Azbel. The briefing is co-sponsored by Senators Alan Cranston (D-CA) and Alfonse D'Amato (R-NY) and Representatives Tim Wirth (D-CO) and Norman Lent (R-NY).

*Senator Paul Tsongas (D-MA) has filed an appeal for POC ALEXANDER PARITSKY, according to the Soviet Jewry Legal Advocacy Center. Tsongas, who holds a power of attorney from Paritsky's brother in Israel, has submitted the brief to the Soviet Embassy for forwarding to the highest Soviet law enforcement official, the Procurator General.

The Public International Law Committee of the Boston Bar Association has joined in the petition of Senator Tsongas in seeking the release of Paritsky.

*A 15-member Congressional delegation led by Representative Tom Lantos (D-CA) visited the Soviet Union January 8-11, 1983. They met with several refusenik families in Moscow and Leningrad, and raised the issue of Soviet Jewry with officials in both cities.

Shcharansky's Wife Asks Mitterrand for Help

By E. J. DIONNE Jr.
Special to The New York Times

PARIS, Jan. 12 — Avital Shcharansky, wife of the imprisoned Soviet dissident Anatoly B. Shcharansky, urged President François Mitterrand of France today to ask Soviet leaders to free her husband.

"I hope President Mitterrand can act quickly," she said during an interview on French television. "If not, I'm afraid it will be death."

Mr. Shcharansky was sentenced in 1978 to 13 years at hard labor on charges of spying for the United States. He has been on a hunger strike for three and a half months.

"I'm very afraid, and I am not the only one," she said. "His mother, his brother, the whole family in the Soviet Union and all those who are interested in him are afraid that something has already happened, or could happen in the next few days. It could be too late very soon."

'They Don't Dare Show Him'

Mrs. Shcharansky, who also held a news conference here, said she learned that her husband was being force-fed once every three days. She added that no one had seen him or received a letter from him in a year, and that the authorities had denied Mr. Shcharansky's mother the right to see him.

"He must be in such a state that they don't dare show him to his mother," she said.

At her news conference, Mrs. Shcharansky said that although she did not believe, as some have said, that the new Soviet leader, Yuri V. Andropov, espouses "liberalism," she hoped that Mr. Andropov would respond to appeals by Mr. Mitterrand and others.

"The fate of my husband," she said, "today symbolizes the fate of the Jews from the Soviet Union."

New York Times
1/13/83

Alexander Paritsky's Chanukah

During this year's celebration of Chanukah, the Jewish feast dedicated to a people's unending fight for freedom, the fate of Alexander Paritsky has been of especial concern.

It is now just a year since Paritsky, a 45-year-old ocean engineer, was sentenced to three years in a Siberian labor camp on charges of anti-Soviet agitation which were initiated after he and his family had applied for permission to emigrate to Israel. Reports reaching his friends in the Boston area indicate that his health is failing and that he has been placed in an isolation cell for not fulfilling his assigned work quota in a lumber mill.

Some efforts have been initiated by his supporters to secure his release. Sen. Paul Tsongas and the Boston-based Soviet Jewry Legal Advocacy Center have filed an appeal of his conviction, arguing that the "evidence" – a petition which he signed complaining about delays in securing exit visas and a school essay written by his daughter Dorina expressing a wish to live in Israel – did not prove the charge that Paritsky had knowingly disseminated false statements about the Soviet state.

Elie Wiesel, the historian of the Holocaust, sees Paritsky – like Chanukah itself – as a symbol of his people's "struggle of the few against the many, the weak against the mighty, the human spirit against the inhuman system of oppression." That is every people's struggle, and one in which we all can join – perhaps tonight by lighting the Chanukah candles which Alexander Paritsky cannot light himself.

THE BOSTON GLOBE FRIDAY, DECEMBER 17, 1982

Rise of KGB Officers to Top Soviet Posts May Mean Increased Use of Forced Labor

By David Satter
Special to The Wall Street Journal

Soviet leader Yuri Andropov, who has begun to consolidate his hold on power with the help of important officers in the country's KGB security police, may soon decide whether to resort to coercion in an attempt to improve the faltering Soviet economy.

Although Mr. Andropov hasn't announced any concrete steps intended to improve the performance of the Soviet economy, which is expanding at its slowest rate since World War II, he has solicited suggestions from Soviet citizens.

The answers include not only the traditional calls to eliminate corruption and alcoholism but also several unusual suggestions for increasing the already tight policy control over ordinary Soviet citizens.

Foreign Insight

In the Soviet Communist Party newspaper Pravda there have been demands that quitting a job be forbidden outright and that the vagrancy laws be tightened so that a person out of work only two weeks could be arrested. These suggestions come at a time when the influence of the KGB in the Soviet political heirarchy has never been stronger. Mr. Andropov has made only a few important appointments but, for the first time in Soviet history, past and present KGB men are on the verge of taking over all of the principal nonmilitary posts in the Soviet government.

The accession of Mr. Andropov himself, who was head of the KGB for 15 years, from 1967 to 1982, is the realization of the longstanding aspiration of the security police to dominate the Communist Party.

The most important of the new appointments announced by Mr. Andropov's Politburo so far has been that of Geidar Aliyev who was named a first deputy prime minister. Mr. Aliyev is a former head of the KGB in the Soviet republic of Azerbaidzhan.

If, as is expected, Mr. Aliyev, who led a drive against corruption in Azerbaidzhan, succeeds 77-year-old Nikolai Tikhonov as Soviet prime minister, it would complement KGB control of the party by establishing a KGB career officer as the supreme administrator of the centralized Soviet economy.

Another sign that Mr. Andropov plans to run the country with the help of KGB career officers was the appointment of Vitaly Fedorchuk, who succeeded Mr. Andropov as head of the KGB last year, to be the new minister of internal affairs.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs is responsible for the thousands of prisons and labor camps in the Soviet Union and the three million to five million ordinary convicts who participate as forced laborers in the Soviet economy.

Not Since Stalin's Time

The appointment of Mr. Fedorchuk to head the Internal Affairs Ministry represents the first time in 30 years that the separation between the KGB and the Internal Affairs Ministry, which was established by Stalin's successors to prevent any group from gaining too great a concentration of police power, has been breached.

It is difficult to predict what the promotion of KGB career officers to high positions in the government will mean, but KGB men are generally believed to be better informed and quicker to resort to coercion than their frequently more corrupt counterparts in the Communist Party.

In 1982, industrial production, the heart of the Soviet annual plan, grew by only 2.8% against a planned rise of 4.7%. This was the worst result since the war, and because Soviet production figures include shoddy goods that were produced but never purchased, it doesn't accurately reflect the level of consumption, which in 1982 probably didn't rise at all.

Agricultural production in 1982 didn't increase significantly and this can only mean that the food shortages in the Soviet provinces won't be allayed in 1983.

Blame Put on Workers

When Mr. Andropov made his first major speech to the Communist Party Central Committee in November, he called for greater economic efficiency and hinted that there might be greater reliance on punishments to compel Soviet workers to perform conscientiously.

"Shoddy work, inactivity, and irresponsibility should have an immediate and unavoidable effect on the earnings, social status and prestige of workers," he said.

Other suggestions of ways to compel Soviet workers to work harder are now appearing in the Soviet press in articles with headlines such as "Be Intolerant Toward Violators of Discipline," "Strengthen Discipline," and "no Loafers in the Brigade."

The thrust of these articles has been to place the blame for the Soviet Union's economic stagnation on the laziness and inefficiency of Soviet workers, rather than on any fault in the centralized Soviet economic system, a further indication that the new Soviet leadership isn't considering fundamental economic changes.

Many of the articles have referred to the tendency of Soviet workers to change jobs, sometimes as often as two or three times a year. One suggestion to the newspaper Pravda, coming, ostensibly, from "coal miners" in the Ukraine, was that workers be forbidden to quit their jobs.

More Forced Laborers?

This would appear to suggest that workers be tied to their factories in the same way in which enserfed farmers in the Soviet Union are tied to their collective farms.

The appearance of such letters in a Soviet newspaper is never accidental. The letters often are written by party officials and signed by workers, who fear the consequences of not signing. In a sense, letters in the Soviet press are a vehicle for the party to prepare the public for potential policy changes.

A letter to Pravda from workers in Siberia, apparently officially inspired, suggested that the time to find a new job be reduced from four months to two weeks. The practical effect of such a ruling would be to render almost all of the Soviet Union's large number of transient workers vulnerable, at almost any time, to be put in a labor camp.

Other suggestions called for a crackdown on the black market operators who sell fruit and vegetables in the private markets, not by improving the goods available in the state stores but rather by putting the speculators to work, a suggestion that also seemed to hint that an increased use of forced labor was being considered.

Wall Street Journal

THE WASHINGTON POST, MONDAY, DECEMBER 27, 1982

R. Emmett Tyrrell

Andropov's Next PR Stunt

Did it ever occur to you that this whole Cold War pother extending from the 1940s to the present could have been avoided if Stalin or one of his successors had been astute enough to hire a sharp New York PR agent? The idea is not all that silly. Surely it has crossed the mind of that eminent student of Soviet affairs, George F. Kennan. He and many like him see much of the friction between the United States and the U.S.S.R. as the painful consequence of two nations' failure to communicate. Well, I hereby offer my services to Soviet party leader Andropov on a pro bono basis.

His proposal to reduce the U.S.S.R.'s European arsenal of over 600 medium-range nuclear missiles to the 162 presently maintained by Britain and France was a splendid public relations gesture. I congratulate him; but there is something else he can do: he could free a sick and anguished man now wasting away in one of his modern prisons, Anatoly Scharansky.

Scharansky, once something of a whiz kid on the Helsinki Watch Committee, was arrested five years ago and sentenced to 13 years in prison. Since then, a growing international chorus composed of practically every element of political expression, from Ronald Reagan to Francois Mitterrand, has sought his release. The catalyst of all this has been Scharansky's wife, a very sympathetic lady who so far as I can tell is no political threat whatsoever to Andropov and the colleagues. Releasing Scharansky now would be a very savvy act.

When it comes to politics, Westerners are stupendously optimistic given the paucity of good news they have had to go on. There is no nation on earth, at least no socialist nation, that they are not willing to see in a new light if only some pretty music can be played. Andropov's promise to reduce his nuclear force was a lovely lilt, a trio by Schubert on a cold Bavarian night. Now, why not raise Scharansky from his cell; send him to Zurich on the first plane. Let him grumble about the treatment he has been getting. The Solzhenitsyn lament has already, it seems, been played out in the West. Scharansky has been on a hunger strike and is in dreadful physical condition. Surely the Soviet government can depreciate his complaints as the delusions of a sick man or a spoilsport.

Western intellectuals of a distinctly anti-Soviet passion are getting a lot of mileage out of Scharansky's imprisonment; I counsel releasing him post-haste.

Recently, the Wall Street Journal's Suzanne Garment alleged that Soviet jailers under Andropov's direct control have been particularly cruel: raising Scharansky's expectations for amelioration of his penal regimen and then plunging him into the most ghastly form of solitary confinement, starving him, isolating him bringing him close to death with "the worst possible treatment." Scharansky's wife insists "they were playing with him." Well, by freeing him, Andropov would both rekindle Western optimism and shut off such troublesome animadversions.

By virtue of 15 years as head of that incomparable information-gathering device the KGB, Andropov is reputed to understand the West well. If he does, he must also understand the vast dimensions of his public relations problems. Many in the West cannot understand why the Soviets maintain such a huge military force. They remember that after World War II Washington cheerfully reduced its forces from 12 million to 1.5 million in seven months while the Soviets inexplicably reinforced their armies and gobbled up practically all of Hitler's East European acquisitions. Then they kept getting into rows even farther from their borders. Their troops were soon in trouble in Berlin and West Germany; their spies were being picked up in the capitals of their erstwhile allies.

Since those early days, many Westerners have been alienated by such Soviet policies as sending the Red Army with yellow rain into Afghanistan. They believe the Soviet Union is a police state that by nature must be armed to the teeth and in iron control of all that lies at its borders. I suggest that Andropov try again to demonstrate the error of this grim characterization. Hand out a "U.S.S.R. Love It or Leave It" sign, and let this fellow Scharansky leave it. Not only will the conservative Reagan be charmed but so will millions of other optimistic Westerners.

For Soviet Jews, increasing peril

By Vladimir Solovyov

ONE HUNDRED years ago, one of Empreror Alexander III's closest advisers, High Procurator of the Holy Synod Konstantin Pobedonostsev, predicted that the Jewish question in Russia would soon be solved: one-third of the Jews would leave Russia, one third would die out, and one-third would be assimilated. All of these processes have actually taken place, but not in the proportions predicted.

After the defeat of Hitler and the death of Stalin, Russian Jews were no longer destroyed physically. The process of assimilation, which before the October Revolution depended only on the Jews (it sufficed to convert to Christianity), was in Soviet times blocked by the requirement that, on one's passport and in questionnaires, one's "nationality" be shown. Finally, Jewish emigration, which only recently was a mighty flow by Soviet standards, has been transformed into a little rivulet that may at any moment dry up completely.

Recently, only a few hundred Jews have been arriving in Vienna each month, 10-to-12-times less than in, say, 1979, when 51,000 people emigrated from Russia. Everything indicates that the Soviet authorities are stopping Jewish emigration.

A YEAR AGO in Moscow, a rumor was circulating to the effect that Galina Brezhnev had advised one of her Jewish acquaintances to hurry up and apply for an exit visa: "When papa goes out of commission, it will be too late." Yet it has already become too late while Brezhnev is still alive, an indirect indication of the weakening of his power.

The cutting off of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union is more alarming than might appear at first glance; for the Jewish question remains one of the country's most acute—along with chronic poor harvests, demographic problems, alcoholism, the fear of China and military rivalry with the U.S.

With emigration cutoff and assimilation impossible, the country's constantly growing anti-Semitism may reach any excesses. It has already reached verbal excesses, and they have become a norm of Soviet propaganda.

For example, "The Weapon of the Doomed," a book by Ivan Artamonov recently published in Minsk, contains "discoveries" that would have been impossible in the Soviet press a few years ago. Does the reader know, as Artamonov "discloses," that the Zionists welcomed Hitler's advent to power and used the services of the German military, including the SS and the dreaded Gestapo? That Adm. Wilhelm Canaris, chief of the Wehrmacht's counterintelligence service, sent Jewish spies into the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition? That the Zionists sent their agents to death camps, helping to send old men, women and children to Maidanek and Auschwitz? That Adolf Eichmann knew Hebrew and Yiddish and was close to the Zionists? That the tragedy of Babi Yar near Kiev, where 70,000 Ukranian Jews were destroyed, was an embodiment not only of the cannibalism of the Hitlerites but of the indelible disgrace of their accomplices and followers among the Zionists? That one of them, Menachem Begin, considers Hitler and Mussolini his idols and is similar to them?

If this book were the only example, one could write it off as a clinial case—but it is only one among many.

THE NEWSPAPER Komsomolskaya Pravda pedantically counts how many Jews, half-Jews and converts are in the American government. Another recently published book, "Alien Voices on the Air," recounts how the Jews have taken over radio, television and newspapers in the U.S. Even Pionerskaya Pravda, a newspaper for children, warns its young readers that funds from the sale of Levi jeans are used in the subversive activities of the Zionists.

Consider, too, three other books published recently: Lydia Modzhoryan's "Zionism as One Kind of Racism and Racial Discrimination" and Vladimir Begun's "Creeping Counter-revolution" and "Intervention with Weapons." The latter, recommended as a manual for new recruits, suggests the rehabilitation of the concept of pogroms as "an elemental reaction of the oppressed laboring masses to their barbarous exploitation by the Jewish bourgeoisie."

Another of the books declares, "Today we are not sorry that our fathers, grandfathers and great-grandfathers treated their oppressors without any respect."

The question then arises: How far is it from justifying pogroms to renewing them?

Knowing their people, the authorities are not too anxious to let the genie out of the bottle. As one highly placed Communist Party member on the Leningrad regional committee said, "Today they are beating up Jews; tomorrow it will be communists."

A certain restraining influence is exercised by the Kremlin gerontocrats, one of whom, Brezhnev, is married to a Jewess. Ironically, such a mixed marriage today would block even the most modest party career. The gerontocrats, however, won't live forever, and chauvinism and anti-Semitism are on the rise among the party elite.

In view of Russia's economic failures and the discontent of the population, the need for a scapegoat—historically tested and hence a sure thing—may outweigh all other considerations.

MEANWHILE, THE authorities are intensifying and diversifying anti-Semitic measures. Now, for instance, they are purging the scientific disciplines of Jews. In mathematics, "problems for geniuses" are given to Jews taking entrance examinations for state scientific institutes. One such problem could not be solved even by the noted physicist Andrei Sakharov. Also, arrests of Jews wanting to leave the country have been stepped up.

For one noted Russian Jew, Anatoly Shcharansky, serving a 13-year term for the stereotyped Jewish "crime" of treason, his conditions of confinement were recently worsened, so that his health has suffered.

Along with many of their lesser-known brethren, other leading Soviet Jews have been sentenced to various prison terms on the basis of plainly fabricated charges: mathematician Alexander Lavut; engineer Kim Friedman; electronics engineer Vladimir Slepak; physicist Vladimir Kislik; computer specialist Victor Brailovsky; historian Arseny Roginsky; and poet Igor Guberman.

Interestingly, immediately after the inauguration of Ronald Reagan, Soviet authorities sharply increased the emigration quota. Unlike his three predecessors, however, Reagan remained indifferent to that proferred olive branch decorated with 2,000 Jewish emigrants. Soviet Jews had ceased to be a medium of exchange in Soviet-American relations.

In the Kremlin, Soviet leaders are apparently rethinking their belief in the omnipotence of the Jewish lobby in the U.S., now regarding it as exaggerated.

Under the conditions of a stepped-up cold war, Soviet Jewry is increasingly imperiled. With the cutting off of massive emigration and the relentless growth of traditional Russian anti-Semitism, Soviet Jews find themselves in a trap from which there is no way out internally. Only international intervention will work.

Vladimir Solovyov is a Russian-born historian and journalist. He recently completed a book, "Russian Paradoxes," in collaboration with his wife, Elena Klepikova.

CHICAGO TRIBUNE

George F. Will

A Question for Andropov: Where Is Raoul Wallenberg?

The gauze of lies that the Soviet regime wraps around reality has never been thick enough to muffle this question: Where is Raoul Wallenberg?

Now it is asked again, in the wake of the most recent in a long series of tormenting reports. A Russian immigrant in Israel says that when he was hospitalized in 1972 on the way to prison, he met a man who "looked Jewish, so I asked who he was. He answered in accented Russian that he was Swedish and was there because he helped the Jews. He said his name was Raoul Wallenberg." That occurred a quarter of a century after 1947, the year the Kremlin says Wallenberg died.

Last May, when tardily releasing documents about the Wallenberg case, a Swedish official said, "We are working on the supposition that he is still alive." (Sweden's lethargy concerning the case—lethargy born of cowardice—hardly constitutes "working.") If alive, he is 70. It is 38 years since he disappeared from Hungary into the Soviet Union.

On Jan. 17, 1945, he was seized by Soviet forces that were "liberating" Hungary from their former allies, the Nazis. Three weeks later he was in the emblematic institution of the Soviet regime, Moscow's Lubyanka prison.

At 32, representing neutral Sweden, Wallenberg was in Budapest at America's request, working with breathtaking bravery and saving scores of thousands of Jews from Adolf Eichmann's final chapter of the "final solution," the destruction of Hungarian Jews. He bought buildings and draped them with Swedish flags as diplomatically protected territory. He dressed "Aryan-looking" Jewish men in SS uniforms to protect Jewish havens. He distributed fake passports, and used sheer audacity to intimidate Nazi soldiers into opening the doors of cattle cars. Thanks to him, the 120,000 Jews in Budapest were the most substantial Jewish community surviving in Europe when the war ended.

One certainty is that Andrei Gromyko lied in the

1957 memorandum asserting that Wallenberg's "sojourn in the Soviet Union"—Gromyko's words—ended with a heart attack in prison in 1947. This memorandum came after 12 years of Kremlin denials that Wallenberg had ever been in Soviet hands. Gromyko cited the evidence of two Soviet functionaries, both conveniently dead, and said the body had been cremated—a transparent fabrication, given Soviet practices.

There has been a steady trickle of reports about Wallenberg, first from returning German prisoners of war, then from released political prisoners and Jewish emigrants. The reports give dates and places—prisons, cell numbers—that trace a tantalizing trail across the years and through the gulags.

For example, in 1961 a Soviet professor of medicine told a visiting Swedish physician that he had recently examined Wallenberg in a "mental hospital." In 1977 a Muscovite just released from the gulag called his daughter in Israel and mentioned meeting in a Moscow prison a Swede "who had served 30 years." Two years later the Muscovite was back in prison because, his wife said, he wrote a letter about Wallenberg. Sources in Eastern Europe report that in 1981 Wallenberg was moved to a prison hospital near Leningrad.

Why was he arrested in the first place? The Soviet machinery of brutality operates so automatically it leaves little room for, and certainly does not require, much mind. But Soviet repressors certainly did not want brave witnesses to the breaking of Eastern Europe. Why was he kept? Perhaps, in part, to show contempt for Western disapproval. Why did Soviet troops using horses and ropes drag away the statue erected to him in Budapest in 1948? Because the Kremlin disapproved of what he did.

It is prudent that we insistently ask what happened when Wallenberg ended his dance of death with the Third Reich and fell into the hands of its moral twin. When the Soviet Union gets away with such acts—acts that are as contemptuous as they are contemptible —it gets the idea that it can unleash "yellow rain" and can shoot the pope with little to fear from the West's fitful disapproval.

Besides, if this case is not America's business, what is? On Oct. 5, 1981, Wallenberg became only the second person (Winston Churchill was the first) to be made an honorary American citizen.

Signing the bill conferring this honor, President Reagan said "we're going to do everything in our power" to locate Wallenberg. But we have not done that. So before Reagan agrees to meet with Yuri Andropov, he should receive an answer, beyond the routine mendacities, to this question: Where is Raoul Wallenberg?

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Inside Today's Alert

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The **Alert** is published by the Union of Councils for Soviet Jews, an organization dedicated to helping the Jews of the Soviet Union, especially those desiring to leave.

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HDVANCE FOR SATURDAY, JAN. ZZ

BY JHCK HNDERSUN

UNITED FEATURE

WHSHINGIUN - PRESIDENT KEAGAN HAS SAID HE IS WAITING FOR A POSITIVE SIGN FROM YURI HNDROPOV BEFORE HE WILL CONSIDER THE SOVIET LEADER'S EXPRESSED HOPES FOR FRIENDLIER RELATIONS MORE THAN JUST EMPTY RHETORIC.

SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM HFGHANISTAN OR A RELAXATION OF THE REPRESSION IN POLAND IS PROBABLY TOO MUCH TO EXPECT. BUT THERE IS A SIMPLE ACT OF DECENCY HNDROPOV COULD MAKE THAT WOULD DEMONSTRATE HIS GOOD INTENTIONS - AND WOULD COST HIM NOTHING.

HE COULD LET HNATOLY SHCHARANSKY GO.

SHCHARANSKY IS THE 3S-YEAR-OLD ''REFUSENIK'' WHO ANGERED THE KREMLIN BY CHAMPIONING THE CAUSE OF SOVIET JEWS WHO WANT TO EMIGRATE TO ISRAEL. IN 19?? HE WAS SENTENCED TO 13 YEARS IN PRISON FOR TREASON.

EVEN IN THE DEPTHS OF THE GULAG, SHCHARANSKY HAS REFUSED TO SURRENDER. HE IS ENGAGED IN A HUNGER STRIKE AS A DESPERATE, DRAMATIC PROTEST. HIS JAILERS HAVE BEEN FORCE-FEEDING HIM, BUT HIS HEALTH IS REPORTEDLY PRECARIOUS.

THE MEN IN THE KREMLIN WOULD DEARLY LOVE TO HAVE THE WORLD FORGET SHCHARANSKY. BUT THIS WILL NOT HAPPEN. JUST THIS WEEK, WASHINGTON JEWS STAGED A SYMBOLIC ONE-DAY HUNGER STRIKE AND MOUNTED A VIGIL NEAR THE SOVIET EMBASSY TO MARK HIS 3?TH BIRTHDAY.

THE SINGLE GREATEST OBSTACLE TO THE WORLD'S FORGETFULNESS IS HIS WIFE, AVITAL. SINCE SHE WAS FORCED TO LEAVE RUSSIA THE DAY AFTER THEIR MARRIAGE IN 19?4, SHE HAS TRAVELED THE WORLD APPEALING FOR HELP IN WINNING HER HUSBAND'S RELEASE.

LAST MONTH, SHE MET WITH SENIOR WHITE HOUSE ADVISERS, WHO PROMISED HER THE PRESIDENT'S SUPPORT. BEFORE SHE WENT TO THE WHITE HOUSE, SHE SPOKE AT LENGTH WITH MY ASSOCIATE, INDY BADHWAR.

SIMPLY DRESSED, A RUSSIAN PEASANT SHAWL WRAPPED AROUND HER HEAD, MRS. SHCHARANSKY SPOKE SOFTLY, BUT WITH DEEP EMOTION.

ASKED HOW IT FELT TO BE THE WIFE OF A SYMBOL, SHE REPLIED: ''FOR ME HE IS NOT A SYMBOL. HE IS MY HUSBAND. WE ARE TERRIBLY SUFFERING. EVERYTHING THAT WE WANTED (WAS) JUST TO BE TOGETHER LIKE A WHOLE, NORMAL FAMILY, TO BE IN ISRAEL, IN A PLACE WHERE WE BOTH WANT TO GO. WE ARE SEPARATED. HE IS PERSECUTED. HE IS TORTURED.''

HER LAST DIRECT WORD FROM HER HUSBAND WAS IN A LETTER SMUGGLED OUT OF HIS PRISON CELL THREE YEARS AGO. ''I CAN HEAR HIS VOICE AND HIS VOICE IS STRONG,'' SHE SAID. ''THROUGH THIS LETTER I FEEL HE IS NOT BROKEN BY SPIRIT. BUT I'M VERY WORRIED ABOUT HIS CONDITION NOW.''

UNTIL RECENTLY, SHE WAS ABLE TO MAINTAIN SOME CONTACT WITH HER HUSBAND THROUGH HIS MOTHER, IDA NUDEL, WHO WAS ALLOWED TO VISIT HIM ONCE EVERY SIX MONTHS. HE WAS ALSO ALLOWED TO WRITE TO HIS MOTHER ONCE A MONTH. BUT BOTH THESE PRIVILEGES HAVE BEEN SUSPENDED SINCE HE BEGAN HIS HUNGER STRIKE LAST YOM KIPPUR.

"HE ABSOLUTELY CAN'T BE AFRAID," MRS. SHCHARANSKY SAID. "HE IS VERY FREE ... THEY CAN DO WHAT THEY WANT WITH HIM, BUT THEY CAN'T BREAK HIS SPIRIT."

SOURCES IN THE WHITE HOUSE SAY SHCHARANSKY'S RELEASE WOULD BE TAKEN AS A SIGNAL THAT ANDROPOV IS SERIOUS IN HIS EXPRESSED HOPES FOR A RELAXATION OF TENSION BETWEEN EAST AND WEST.

IT WOULD BE A BOLD GESTURE FOR ANDROPOV - PERHAPS TOO BOLD FOR HIM TO MAKE UNTIL HE HAS CONSOLIDATED HIS POWER IN THE KREMLIN.

AND IT WOULD BE ONLY A FIRST STEP. THERE ARE STILL ABOUT 10,000 SOVIET JEWS WHO HAVE APPLIED FOR EXIT VISAS AND HAVE BEEN REFUSED. SINCE OCTOBER 1979, WHEN EMIGRATION REACHED ITS PEAK OF 4,746, THE NUMBER OF JEWS ALLOWED TO LEAVE THE SOVIET UNION HAS FALLEN DRASTICALLY. IN 1980, ONLY 1,424 WERE PERMITTED TO EMIGRATE; IN 1981 THE TOTAL WAS 368; LAST YEAR, ONLY 168.

THERE IS NO TELLING WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF ANDROPOV CHOOSES TO LET SHCHARANSKY GO. HE UNDOUBTEDLY REALIZES THAT HE CAN'T LET SHCHARANSKY ALONE EMIGRATE. AN EMBARRASSMENT TO THE KREMLIN EVEN IN PRISON, SHCHARANSKY WOULD BE EVEN MORE TROUBLESOME OUTSIDE RUSSIA IF THE OTHER REFUSENIK'S WEREN'T ALLOWED TO LEAVE ALSO.

AND THAT MIGHT WELL OPEN THE FLOODGATES. OFFICIAL ESTIMATES PUT THE NUMBER OF SOVIET JEWS AT 1.8 MILLION; MY SOURCES SAY THE TRUE FIGURE IS PROBABLY CLOSE TO 2.5 MILLION. GIVEN THE KREMLIN'S LONG HISTORY OF JEWISH PERSECUTION, MANY - PERHAPS MOST - OF THESE SOVIET JEWS WOULD LEAP AT THE CHANCE TO EMIGRATE.

HEADLINES AND FOOTNOTES:

-PENTAGON SOURCES SAY THERE ARE SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES IN THE AEGIS AIR-DEFENSE ESCORT SHIP. FOR ONE THING, ITS BILLION-DOLLAR COST MEANS ONLY A FEW CAN BE BUILT. BUT WORSE THAN THAT, THE RADAR ON THE AEGIS DEFENSE SYSTEM IS A STRONG BEACON FOR INEXPENSIVE ENEMY MISSILES TO HOME IN ON. INCOMING MISSILES COULD COME IN AT 10 FEET ABOVE THE WATER AND PROBABLY EVADE DETECTION. EVEN IF THE AEGIS CREW COULD SHOOT DOWN THE FIRST THREE OR FOUR, "HOW ABOUT THE TENTH?" AS A PENTAGON SOURCE ASKED.

-THREE NORTHERN MICHIGAN HOSPITALS HAVE REFUSED TO COOPERATE WITH THEIR LOCAL PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS REVIEW ORGANIZATION, WHICH WAS CREATED TO MAKE SURE THAT HEALTH CARE DELIVERED TO MEDICARE AND MEDICAID PATIENTS IS NECESSARY, APPROPRIATE AND OF ACCEPTABLE QUALITY. ADMINISTRATORS AT MUNSON MEDICAL CENTER, NORTHERN MICHIGAN HOSPITAL AND TRAVERSE CITY OSTEOPATHIC HOSPITAL SIMPLY DECIDED THAT THEY COULD MONITOR THEMSELVES. SO THEY STOPPED SUBMITTING THE NECESSARY FORMS. THIS MEANT A COSTLY DUPLICATION OF EFFORT. BUT AS JOHN BAY, PRESIDENT OF MUNSON MEDICAL CENTER, SAID AT A MEETING WITH THE LOCAL REVIEW ORGANIZATION, "LET THE FEDS PAY THE DUPLICATE COST."

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SUBJECT: THE MEDVEDEV AFFAIR

1. (U - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: MAVERICK HISTORIAN ROY MEDVEDEV HAS GIVEN US AN ACCOUNT OF HIS JANUARY 18 MEETING WITH SOVIET PROCURACY AND KGB OFFICIALS IN WHICH THEY WARNED HIM NOT TO PURSUE HIS ACTIVITIES. THE HISTORIAN SAYS THAT SINCE BREZHNEV'S DEATH HE HAS RECEIVED OTHER REMONSTRATIONS BY LOWER-LEVEL OFFICIALS, AND THAT HE HAD EARLY HINTS OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE COMPLAINTS TO BE MADE AGAINST HIM BY THE PROCURACY. THIS ENABLED HIM TO PREPARE HIS RESPONSE TO PROCURATOR GENERAL REKUNKOV IN ADVANCE, AND HE SURPRISED HIS INTERLOCUTORS WHEN HE HANDED THEM HIS WRITTEN ANSWER TO THE ACCUSATIONS AT THE MEETING. HE HAS SINCE MADE HIS RESPONSE AVAILABLE TO THE WESTERN PRESS (WE PRESUME THE SUBSTANCE OF THE STATEMENT IS AVAILABLE IN THE WESTERN MEDIA.) MEDVEDEV SPECULATES THAT LEADERSHIP TURBULENCE (SEPTEL) IS BEHIND HIS OWN PROBLEMS, THE VLADIMOV AND OTHER DISSIDENT CASES, THE CULTURAL CRACKDOWN, AND ALLEGED REGIME INDECISION ON PURSUING THE COURT CASE AGAINST THE EUROCOMMUNISTS. THE HISTORIAN SEEMS TO FEEL THAT FURTHER STEPS AGAINST HIM WILL NOT BE TAKEN AT THIS TIME, ALTHOUGH HE ASSERTS THAT THE FACT THAT HE AND OTHER DISSIDENTS ARE "PAWNS" IN AN ONGOING STRUGGLE FOR POWER MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO PREDICT HOW OR IN WHAT DIRECTION THE REGIME WILL MOVE ON THEIR CASES. MEDVEDEV'S PAST ABILITY TO CONTINUE WRITING AND PUBLISHING ON LEADERSHIP ISSUES HAS LONG BEEN A PUZZLE. THE THRUST OF HIS MESSAGE HAS CONSISTENTLY HAD A PRO-ANDROPOV SLANT, HOWEVER, AND WE HAVE ASSUMED THAT ANDROPOV OR PEOPLE ASSOCIATED WITH HIM HAVE FOR THIS REASON BEEN PROTECTING THE HISTORIAN. THE MOVE AGAINST HIM MAY HAVE RESULTED FROM MEDVEDEV'S NOT HAVING UNDERSTOOD, OR FROM HIS INTENTIONAL FAILURE TO HEED, WARNINGS IMMEDIATELY AFTER BREZHNEV'S DEATH THAT HE SHOULD LIE LOW. HIS RECENT SPATE OF ARTICLES IN THE SWEDISH, ITALIAN AND U.S. PRESS MAY HAVE MADE IT DIFFICULT FOR ANDROPOV TO ACCORD MEDVEDEV THE SAME LEVEL OF PROTECTION. END SUMMARY.

3. DURING A JANUARY 19 INFORMAL DINNER AT AN EMBOFF'S APARTMENT TO SHOW USG SUPPORT FOR GEORGII AND NATASHA VLADIMOV, HISTORIAN ROY MEDVEDEV (TO WHOM AN INVITATION HAD BEEN EXTENDED LAST WEEK AT THE VLADIMOVS' SUGGESTION) OFFERED TO THE DCM AND EMBOFFS AN ACCOUNT OF HIS JANUARY 18 MEETING WITH DEPUTY PROCURATOR GENERAL SOROKA, PROCURATOR GENERAL REKUNKOV'S AIDE P.M. GORBUNOV, AND KGB OFFICIAL GUSHIN. MEDVEDEV PREFACED HIS REMARKS BY NOTING SOMEWHAT CRYPTICALLY THAT SOME THREE YEARS AGO, AND THEN AGAIN SINCE BREZHNEV'S DEATH HE HAD RECEIVED OTHER WARNINGS FROM LOWER LEVEL PROCURACY OFFICIALS ON HIS ACTIVITIES (NATASHA VLADIMOVA INTERJECTED TO NOTE THAT MEDVEDEV HAD PREVIOUSLY TOLD HER THAT HE HAD BEEN WARNED NOVEMBER 13 TO CURTAIL HIS WRITINGS AND PUBLICATIONS. MEDVEDEV SEEMED TO ACKNOWLEDGE HER ACCOUNT, BUT AVOIDED ELABORATING.) THE HISTORIAN CLAIMED TO HAVE IGNORED SUMMONSES TO APPEAR BEFORE REGIONAL PROCURACIES BUT FELT HE COULD NOT AVOID COMPLYING WITH THE SUMMONS TO THE GENERAL PROCURACY. HE ASSERTED THAT APPROXIMATELY ONE WEEK IN ADVANCE OF JANUARY 18 AN UNKNOWN WOMAN HAD COME TO HIS APARTMENT WITH A COPY OF THE PROCURACY AGENDA, WHICH INCLUDED A REFERENCE TO A SOROKA-MEDVEDEV MEETING ON JANUARY 18 AND APPARENTLY SOME DETAILS OF THE COMPLAINTS TO BE LEVELLED AGAINST THE HISTORIAN. HE THUS HAD AN

OPPORTUNITY TO GIVE THOUGHT TO AND ACTUALLY TYPE UP IN ADVANCE A REPLY TO SOROKA'S WRITTEN COMPLAINT.

PRESS INVOLVEMENT

4. ACCORDING TO MEDVEDEV, HE PUT IN A CALL TO HIS
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BROTHER ZHORES IN LONDON (FINALLY GETTING A LINE TO LONDON AT 3 AM JANUARY 19) TO REPORT THAT HE HAD BEEN SUMMONED BY SOROKA. ZHORES THEN APPARENTLY TOLD LONDON CORRESPONDENTS AND WORD SPREAD QUICKLY IN THE WEST. WASHINGTON POST CORRESPONDENT DODER CALLED MEDVEDEV ON THE STORY THE MORNING OF JANUARY 19 AND A BEVY OF REPORTERS CALLED ON HIM UNANNOUNCED THAT AFTERNOON, WHEREUPON HE RELEASED TO THEM THE TEXT OF HIS STATEMENT. BEFORE ZHORES WENT TO THE JOURNALISTS, HE APPARENTLY HAD NOT MADE UP HIS MIND ON HOW TO INFORM THE MOSCOW-BASED PRESS CORPS OF HIS CASE.

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THE MEETING WITH SOROKA

5. MEDVEDEV SAID THAT SOROKA HAD DONE MOST OF THE TALKING FOR THE SOVIET SIDE. HE WAS POLITE THROUGHOUT THE MEETING. MEDVEDEV COULD TELL THAT KGB OFFICIAL GUSHIN WAS BITING HIS TONGUE TO KEEP FROM INTERJECTING WITH WHAT WOULD HAVE NO DOUBT BEEN LESS THAN POLITE LANGUAGE. ACCORDING TO THE HISTORIAN, WHEN SOROKA ACCUSED HIM OF ANTI-SOVIET ACTIVITIES, ROY ASKED FOR SPECIFICS. SOROKA REPLIED TO THIS AND OTHER MEDVEDEV RIPOSTES BY SAYING HE DID NOT WANT TO ENTER INTO A DISCUSSION, BUT TO SIMPLY MAKE CLEAR THAT MEDVEDEV'S ACTIVITIES SHOULD CEASE. THE HISTORIAN NOTED THAT HE HAD BEEN WRITING ABOUT SOVIET HISTORY FOR OVER TWENTY YEARS AND WONDERED WHY ONLY NOW THE GENERAL PROCURACY HAD TAKEN THIS POSITION. SOROKA REPORTEDLY ASSERTED THAT "WE HAVE BEEN PATIENT WITH YOU," TO WHICH MEDVEDEV REPLIED THAT THE TWENTY YEAR PERIOD DEMONSTRATED AN UNUSUAL DEGREE OF PATIENCE BY ANY STANDARDS.

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6. SOROKA PASSED TO MEDVEDEV A DOCUMENT, WRITTEN IN MUCH "CRUDER" LANGUAGE THAN SOROKA HAD USED, INTER ALIA ACCUSING MEDVEDEV OF HAVING "FABRICATED" A SERIES OF SLANDEROUS "LIBELS." MEDVEDEV REFUSED TO SIGN AND TOOK HIS INTERLOCUTORS BY SURPRISE WHEN HE PRODUCED FROM HIS BRIEFCASE A TYPEWRITTEN REPLY TO THE CHARGES IN SOROKA'S DOCUMENT. "SO YOU FORESAW THIS MEETING?", REPORTEDLY ASKED SOROKA. "I AM ALWAYS PREPARED FOR SUCH MEETINGS," REPLIED THE HISTORIAN. SOROKA READ MEDVEDEV'S STATEMENT AND PROMISED TO BRING IT TO REKUNKOV'S ATTENTION. ROY TEMPORARILY RETRIEVED THE DOCUMENT TO AMEND IT TO SHOW THE NAMES OF THE AUTHORITIES PRESENT. THE DEPUTY PROCURATOR CLOSED BY SAYING THAT HE HOPED THE MEETING HAD NOT BEEN IN VAIN, TO WHICH MEDVEDEV RETORTED THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO MEETING BUT SIMPLY A BARRAGE OF THREATS AGAINST HIM. ACCORDING TO MEDVEDEV, SOROKA MADE NO REFERENCE TO THE CRIMINAL CODE OR TO POSSIBLE LEGAL ACTION AGAINST HIM. NOR WAS ANY REFERENCE MADE TO CONTACTS WITH THE VLADIMOVS, FOREIGN JOURNALISTS OR DIPLOMATS. SOROKA'S ONLY CONCERN WAS MEDVEDEV'S UNACCEPTABLE WRITINGS. -.-' ' --ACCEETABLE

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HUMAN RIGHTS AND LEADERSHIP POLITICS

7. MEDVEDEV SPECULATED AT LENGTH ON HOW HIS AND OTHER CASES, SUCH AS THE VLADIMOVS', APPEAR TO REFLECT RECENT PERTURBATIONS IN THE LEADERSHIP (SEPTEL). ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS FRONT, MEDVEDEV NOTED THAT THERE ARE CURRENTLY PENDING FOUR TYPES OF CASES: 1) THE EUROCOMMUNISTS, WHO HE CLAIMED WERE TO HAVE BEEN TRIED LAST WEEK, POSTPONED UNTIL THIS WEEK, AND AGAIN POSTPONED UNTIL SOME TIME IN THE FUTURE. THE CONTINUED POSTPONEMENT OF A HIGHLY CONTROVERSIAL CASE ORIGINATING WELL BEFORE BREZHNEV'S DEATH, SPECULATED MEDVEDEV, IS EVIDENCE OF HIGH-LEVEL DISAGREEMENTS AND POSSIBLY ATTEMPTS BY ONE OR ANOTHER POLITBURO MEMBER TO "USE" THIS AND OTHER CASES TO ADVANCE THEIR OWN INTERESTS; 2) AN APPARENTLY NEW CASE AGAINST UNNAMED REFUSENIKS; 3) THE BORODIN-KRAKHMAL'NIKOVA BT

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AND POSSIBLY OTHER NATIONALIST/RELIGIOUS DISSENTERS CASE (WHICH HAS ALSO DRAGGED ON FOR SOME TIME); 4) THE VLADIMOV CASE. (NATASHA REMINDED HIM OF THE PERSECUTION OF THE SOVIET PEACE GROUP AS WELL.)

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8. MEDVEDEV ADMITS THAT THE EVIDENCE IS SKETCHY, BUT HE SEEMS TO HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THESE SIGNS OF WHAT HE TERMED RECENTLY INVIGORATED PERSECUTION OF DISSIDENTS, AS WELL AS THE CULTURAL CRACKDOWN (MOSCOW 733), IS NOT REFLECTIVE OF ANDROPOV'S PREFERRED WAY OF DEALING WITH THESE ISSUES. WE ARE "PAWNS IN THE GAME" BETWEEN INDIVIDUALS IN THE LEADERSHIP, HE SAID. WHILE ANDROPOV CERTAINLY IS AWARE OF THE ACTIONS BEING TAKEN AGAINST MEDVEDEV AND OTHERS, HE IS NOT IN A POSITION TO OPPOSE THEM. IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE, ASSERTED MEDVEDEV, THAT ANDROPOV IS GIVING INTERIOR MINISTER FEDORCHUK AND KGB HEAD CHEBRIKOV A FREE HAND TO DEAL WITH THESE CASES AS THEY WISH IN ORDER TO USE THEIR CURRENT CRACKDOWN AT A LATER TIME AGAINST THEM POLITICALLY. IN SHORT, MEDVEDEV CLAIMS THAT WHETHER ANDROPOV IS NOW IN A POLITICALLY WEAKENED POSITION OR IS PURSUING A SHREWD STRATEGY TO FURTHER CONSOLIDATE HIS HOLD, THE DISSIDENTS ARE LIKELY IN FOR A ROUGH AND UNPREDICTABLE TIME IN THE NEAR TERM.

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MEDVEDEV'S STATUS
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9. THE HISTORIAN'S SPECULATION IS CONSISTENT WITH THE RELATIVELY POSITIVE PICTURE HE HAS SOUGHT TO PROJECT OF ANDROPOV FOR SEVERAL YEARS -- IN THIS CASE, MEDVEDEV APPARENTLY WISHES TO BELIEVE THAT THE CRACKDOWN IS NOT NECESSARILY THE GENERAL SECRETARY'S DOING. THERE IS A SURFACE PLAUSIBILITY TO THIS ARGUMENT. ANY ATTEMPT BY THE NEW LEADER TO DISCOURAGE A HUMAN RIGHTS OR CULTURAL CRACKDOWN COULD BE USED BY HIS COLLEAGUES TO WEAKEN HIM AND WOULD RUN COUNTER TO HIS DISCIPLINE THEMES. AT THE SAME TIME, ANDROPOV IS HARDLY SHEDDING ANY TEARS FOR VLADIMOV, THE EUROCOMMUNISTS, OR OTHERS. AS A CLEARLY SIGNAL-CONSCIOUS LEADER THE GENERAL SECRETARY IS AWARE THAT PERSECUTION OF THESE GROUPS SENDS A SIGNAL TO INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC AUDIENCES ABOUT HIS POLICIES, AND THAT HE WILL BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR THEM.

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1Ø. MEDVEDEV'S OWN ROLE IS PARTICULARLY MURKY. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT HIS INTERPRETATIONS HAVE BEEN BASED ON INFORMATION PASSED TO HIM BY SOURCES CLOSE TO ANDROPOV, ALTHOUGH THERE MAY NOT HAVE BEEN EXPLICIT ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THIS NOR AGREEMENT BETWEEN HIM AND HIS SOURCES THAT HE GIVE AN ANDROPOV SPIN TO HIS INTERPRETATION. THIS WAS, IN OUR VIEW, A TACIT ARRANGEMENT CONVENIENT TO ALL PARTIES CONCERNED. WE DO NOT KNOW THE NATURE OF THE NOVEMBER 13 WARNING TO MEDVEDEV, BUT JUDGING FROM THE MORE AUTHORITATIVE BUT RELATIVELY "SOFT" APPROACH OF SOROKA, IT WAS PERHAPS ONLY A HINT THAT HE SHOULD LIE LOW AND NOT CREATE AN ISSUE WITH WHICH ANDROPOV WOULD BE FORCED TO DEAL. HE HAS OBVIOUSLY CHOSEN NOT TO INTERPRET THE EARLIER WARNING(S) IN THIS WAY. IN THE LAST TWO MONTHS HE HAS INCREASED HIS WRITING AND HAS HAD PIECES ON BREZHNEV AND OTHER ISSUES PUBLISHED IN THE SWEDISH, ITALIAN, U.S. AND PERHAPS OTHER MEDIA.

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11. SOROKA'S RELATIVELY GINGERLY TREATMENT OF MEDVEDEV, THE REPORTED FAILURE OF SOROKA TO MENTION HIS CONTACTS WITH FOREIGN DIPLOMATS AND JOURNALISTS, SOROKA'S RELUCTANCE TO DISCUSS SPECIFIC MEDVEDEV WRITINGS, THE ADVANCE WARNING OF THE JANUARY 18 SUMMONS, AND HIS ABILITY TO CONTACT HIS BROTHER BY TELEPHONE -- ALL SUGGEST THAT THE AUTHORITIES HAVE NOT YET DECIDED TO TAKE HIM OUT OF CIRCULATION AND THAT HE CONTINUES TO HAVE SOME PROTECTION. HIS PROFESSED REFUSAL TO COMPLY

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AMEMBASSY ROME 8286
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 1884
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 8432
AMEMBASSY BERLIN 4517
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 8827
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 7923
AMCONSUL MUNICH 6752
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 8585
AMEMBASSY SOFIA 7900
AMEMBASSY WARSAW ØØ44

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION Ø4 OF Ø4 MOSCOW ØØ781

LIMDIS
MADRID FOR USDEL CSCE
WITH THE PROCURACY WARNING AND HIS WILLINGNESS TO CONTINUE TO MEET WITH EMBOFFS SUGGEST THAT HE DISMISSES THE POSSIBILITY THAT HIS UTILITY TO THE ANDROPOV CAMP HAS COME TO AN END.

12. THE THOUGHT MAY CROSS SOME MINDS THAT THE ENTIRE EVENT HAS BEEN STAGED TO INCREASE MEDVEDEV'S CREDIBILITY IN THE WEST. IF THAT IS THE GAME-PLAN (AND WE HAVE SERIOUS DOUBTS) IT COULD WELL BACKFIRE. MEDVEDEV HAS BEEN VALUABLE TO MANY OF HIS WESTERN CONTACTS PRECISELY BECAUSE OF THE SUSPICION THAT HE IS PRIVY TO INSIDE INFORMATION, NOT BECAUSE OF HIS DISSIDENT CREDENTIALS. MORE TO THE POINT, THE ACTIONS AGAINST MEDVEDEV, COINCIDING WITH THE MORE SINISTER THREATS AGAINST VLADIMOV, COULD ADD SIGNIFICANTLY TO GROWING CONCERN IN THE WEST OVER THE DIRECTION OF ANDROPOV'S HUMAN RIGHTS AND DOMESTIC POLICIES, WITH POTENTIAL NEGATIVE SPILL-OVER INTO HIS PUBLIC RELATIONS EFFORT VIS-A-VIS WESTERN EUROPE.
HARTMAN
BT

470 FYI

Dobriansky

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

January 21, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY PD

SUBJECT: Proposed Presidential Call to Mrs. Shcharansky

Mrs. Avital Shcharansky sent a cable to the President (Tab B) informing him that her husband's life is in grave danger and that he is being force-fed every three days. I recommend that the President make a telephone call to Mrs. Shcharansky to express his deep concern about her husband's condition. At Tab I is a memorandum to the President recommending that he telephone Mrs. Shcharansky. At Tab A is a Recommended Telephone Call memorandum for the President.

The Department of State concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memoranda at Tabs I and A.

Approve_____ Disapprove_____ ✓ See Comm

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Recommended Telephone Call

Tab B Cable from Mrs. Avital Shcharansky, January 13.

cc Charles Tyson

1/27

Paula,

The Judge would like for either you or someone else to call her.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Proposed Telephone Call to Mrs. Shcharansky

Avital Shcharansky, wife of imprisoned Anatoly Shcharansky, sent you a cable (Tab B) stating that her husband's life is in grave danger and that he is being force-fed every three days. Given Mr. Shcharansky's remarkable courage and persistent struggle for basic freedoms and human rights in the Soviet Union, I recommend that early next week you telephone Mrs. Shcharansky to express your concern about her husband's serious state of health. I believe this would be a meaningful gesture. Attached at Tab A is a Recommended Telephone Call Memorandum for your use.

RECOMMENDATION

OK No

__ __ That you call Mrs. Shcharansky.

Attachments:

Tab A Recommended Telephone Call

Tab B Mrs. Shcharansky's cable, January 13, 1983

Prepared by:
Paula Dobriansky

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

RECOMMENDED TELEPHONE CALL

TO: Avital Shcharansky, wife of imprisoned Soviet dissident Anatoly Shcharansky -- founder of Moscow Helsinki Watch Group; martyr for cause of Judaism and human rights in the USSR.

DATE: At your early convenience. (Telephone: Jerusalem 2/531-437). Currently in N.Y. 212/679-6122

RECOMMENDED BY: William P. Clark

PURPOSE: To express your concern for Shcharansky's condition and your admiration of his outspoken advocacy of human rights.

BACKGROUND: Shcharansky was arrested in March 1977 and given a show trial in July 1978. Accused of serving U.S. secret services, he drew an unusually severe sentence of 13 years imprisonment, followed by five years of internal exile. In September 1982, he began a hunger strike to protest the denial to him by Chistopol' prison authorities of permission to write letters to his relatives and friends or to receive visits from his mother and brother. He has continued his hunger strike and is reportedly being force- fed every three days.

Mrs. Shcharansky,who resides in Israel, has worked indefatigably for the last nine years for the release of her husband of one day. You met her here on May 28, 1981.

TOPICS OF DISCUSSION:

1. Concern about the grave condition and continued imprisonment of her husband.

2. What are the most recent reports concerning Shcharansky's state of health?

3. The Administration's belief that Mr. Shcharansky should be permitted to communicate with his family, should be released from prison and allowed to join his wife in Israel.

4. Your strong admiration for Shcharansky's courage and persistent struggle for basic freedoms and human rights.

5. The Administration has made and will continue to make official repesentations to Soviet authorities on behalf of Mr. Shcharansky.

ACTION: _____

GRAPHNET
Electronic Mail Service Center
99 WEST SHEFFIELD AVENUE, ENGLEWOOD, NEW JERSEY 07631 (201) 569-7707

FAX GRAM®

TNEF

C015 261-1 D703 41 01/13/93 14:32 YC

******* HAND DELIVERY******

6B 01/13 12:37 I042 335-1 C015 261 01/13/93 14:30
RGB335 VIA ITT KIT779 JTA1054 1120157
USNX HL ILJM 022

JERUSALEMISRAEL 22/21 13 1200

LT
PRESIDENT REAGAN
WASHINGTON DC

HUSBANDS LIFE GRAVE DANGER FORCEFED EVERY THREEDAYS
ACCORDING PRISON OFFICIAL APEALING
URGENTLY SAVE ANATOLYS LIFE
AVITAL SCHARANSKY

COLL

NNNN
TNEF

5.4

National Security Council
The White House

Package # 4721

'83 JAN 24 A11 :18

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	1	JP	A
Bud McFarlane	2	BM	
Jacque Hill	3		
Judge Clark	4		A
John Poindexter	5	JP	
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			
DOBRIANSKY	6		

I–Information A–Action R–Retain D–Dispatch N–No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other_____

0470

Document No. 111707

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 1/17/83 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: ----------

SUBJECT: ATTACHED CABLE

	ACTION	FYI		ACTION	FYI
VICE PRESIDENT	☐	☐	FULLER	☐	☐
MEESE	☐	☐	GERGEN	☐	☐
BAKER	☐	☐	HARPER	☐	☐
DEAVER	☐	☐	JENKINS	☐	☐
STOCKMAN	☐	☐	MURPHY	☐	☐
CLARK	☑	☐	ROLLINS	☐	☐
DARMAN	☐P	☐SS	WILLIAMSON	☐	☐
DOLE	☐	☐	VON DAMM	☐	☐
DUBERSTEIN	☐	☐	BRADY/SPEAKES	☐	☐
FELDSTEIN	☐	☐	ROGERS	☐	☐
FIELDING	☐	☐	_____	☐	☐

Remarks:

Richard G. Darman
Assistant to the President
(x2702)

Response: