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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Box Number 24

Withdrawer

JET 5/3/2005

FOIA

F06-114/7

YARHI-MILO

2404

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
9526	REPORT	USSR: OFFICIAL ANTI-SEMITISM GROWS R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7	1	1/29/1985	B1
9527	MEMO	KELLY/MURPHY TO SHULTZ RE MEETING WITH AVITAL SHCHARANSKIY, MAY 10 R 6/25/2009 NLRRF06-114/7	4	5/10/1984	B1
9520	MEMO	COBB TO POINDEXTER RE PENTECOSTAL ATTEMPT TO ENTER EMBASSY MOSCOW R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7	2	ND	B1
9521	MEMO	LENCZOWSKI TO MCFARLANE RE HUNGER STRIKE OF YURI BALOVLENKOV R 6/25/2009 F2006-114/7	2	5/24/1985	B1
9522	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE HUNGER STRIKE OF YURI BALOVLENKOV R 6/25/2009 F2006-114/7	1	ND	B1
9528	LETTER	PRESIDENT REAGAN TO GORBACHEV RE YURI BALOVLENKOV R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7	1	ND	B1
9523	MEMO	DOBRIANSKY TO MCFARLANE RE MEETING WITH MRS. SHCHARANSKIY R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7	2	5/30/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
9524	MEMO	DOBRIANSKY TO MCFARLANE RE PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL LETTER RE: SHCHARANSKIY R 6/25/2009 F2006-114/7	1	6/4/1985	B1
9529	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO DOBRIANSKY AND MATLOCK RE PRESIDENT REAGAN LETTER TO GORBACHEV R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7	1	ND	B1
9530	CABLE	141506Z JUN 85 R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7	2	6/14/1985	B1
9525	REPORT	SOVIET DISSENT AND ITS REPRESSION SINCE THE 1975 HELSINKI ACCORDS PAR 5/7/2013 F2006-114/7	27	ND	B1 B3

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File USSR
Dissidence

BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH - ANALYSIS - JANUARY 29, 1985

1. USSR: OFFICIAL ANTI-SEMITISM GROWS

Virtually all observers of Soviet life report a steady increase in officially instigated anti-Semitism during recent months. More and more frequently it is appearing openly, without the usual euphemism of "anti-Zionism." The suppression of Jewish culture continues in full force, causing activists to seek help abroad to moderate the anti-Semitic campaign.

* * *

Open anti-Semitism. The most virulent anti-Semitism usually surfaces where it is least likely to be exposed to foreigners. For example, a recent literary evening in a Moscow theater featured anti-Semitic poetry. The provincial press and the minor publications feature crudely anti-Semitic stereotypes, and, by singling out specific individuals, expose them to intimidation and sometimes violence. (Simultaneously, the central Soviet media which reach foreign audiences depict Yiddish life as thriving, with Jews living so well that they have no wish to emigrate.)

Arrests of Hebrew Teachers Continue. The arrest of Dan Shapiro on January 22 brought the number of arrested Hebrew teachers to seven. Aleksandr Kholmyanskiy is up for trial shortly on charges of owning a pistol (allegedly found during a search of his apartment). Others have been convicted on trumped up charges in trials where spectators in the court shouted anti-Semitic obscenities. Iosif Berenshteyn was sentenced to four years for resisting the police; his witnesses were prevented from appearing in court. He subsequently lost an eye during a savage beating in his prison cell. Yuliy Edelshteyn received three years after the police claimed they found narcotics in his apartment.

Emigration was under 900 in 1984 (it fell from 1,314 in 1983 and a high of 51,320 in 1979). Authorities first tightened up procedures and standards for family reunification (the only recognized grounds for emigration), then rejected or refused to accept applications, claiming that all who wished to leave had already done so.

Outlook. There is no clear indication yet that an improved climate in US-Soviet relations would have a positive effect on Soviet emigration policy. Recent visitors to Moscow have received mixed--and possibly deliberately misleading signals--on this point. The visit of Edgar Bronfman of the World Jewish Congress to Moscow in March will permit a qualified observer to probe Soviet intentions.

Historically, Soviet policy has been more flexible regarding emigration than on dissent or other human rights issues. The momentum of the present campaign, however, will be difficult to reverse.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

BY
C/ NARADATE
7/7/68
NLR 106-114/7 #9526

015 7/15/02

JPRS-UPS-85-010-I
6 March 1985

EMIGRE PRESS

File Dissidence

USSR INVALIDS' APPEAL REVEALS DEPLORABLE CONDITIONS

Paris RUSSKAYA MYSL' in Russian 27 Dec 84 p 7

/Article by Yuriy Kiselev: "Appeal to all Unions of War Veterans and Camp Prisoners, to Societies of Invalids in Western Countries and to Associations of Pacifists"

/Text/ The establishment of an unofficial group for the protection of invalids' rights in the Soviet Union was announced on 25 October 1978. It includes Yuriy Kiselev, Valeriy Fefelov, Ol'ga Zaytseva, Fayzula Khusainov and others. The newly formed group set as its goal to tell the world about the tragic situation of invalids in the country of "victorious socialism." The group published a number of materials, among which there are documents on the poverty and absence of rights among war invalids, certificates on terrible concentration camps for imprisoned invalids and reports on the humiliation and torment to which invalids are subjected in Soviet hospitals. Furthermore, the group made appeals to various international organizations concerned with the protection of invalids' rights and asked them for help and support. Repressions on the part of the Soviet authorities were quick to follow. One of the founders of this group, artist Yuriy Kiselev, a legless invalid, was beaten cruelly and his house in Koktebel was destroyed. The group's voluntary aids were dragged to the KGB /Committee for State Security/ and the militia, where they were threatened with repressions and arrest, some were put in mental hospitals and many were beaten unmercifully. Valeriy Fefelov and Ol'ga Zaytseva were forced to leave the Soviet Union and became the group's foreign representatives in the West. Nevertheless, despite all the repressions, the group for the protection of invalids' rights continues to work. Today we publish one of its latest documents, which Valeriy Fefelov, the group's foreign representative, received from the Soviet Union.

On behalf of the organizing group I appeal to you to protect the rights of invalids in the USSR. We are four people. Two were forced to go to the West owing to the threat of arrest and became our foreign representatives.

The third was silenced, his relatives who helped him, a paralyzed invalid of group I, having been intimidated. He had no way out. Another person took his place.

Here is a brief account of the invalids' situation in the USSR. Soviet invalids spend their whole time on household trivia--repair of wheelchairs, their transportation (if it is available), homemade articles, because they are unable to buy furniture, search for cheap products and things and so forth and so on. They are always inquisitive, being especially interested in the life of invalids in other countries--their standard of living, rights, benefits, range of activities and so forth. However, nowhere can they get truthful information.

They would like to live a full life, to have suitable work and wages, to rest and travel, to see other countries and to participate in public life, including in the pacifist movement (in marches for peace together with healthy people). This is always possible for citizens of capitalist countries, but for the countries of the socialist camp this remains only a dream. It never happened that healthy people were together with invalids at a demonstration.

In our country invalids have always been and continue to be hidden from curious eyes. No one needs them. They are a burden to the state and sometimes people are not ashamed to say this openly. No wonder that our mass information media hides the seamy sides of the "heroic spirit" of war and labor and does not show invalids with an obvious mutilation (in the USSR there are no misfortunes). It is pointless for Soviet citizens to ponder over the cause-and-effect relationship of these mutilations. The nation is taught cruelty toward the weak, sick and invalids, who will never be of use. Therefore, the authorities ignore the most urgent vital needs of invalids and prohibit the organization of their society. Such societies organized by the invalids themselves were broken up in the USSR several times as "antistate," conflicting with the interests and goals of the CPSU leadership.

I said that invalids are hidden in the USSR. I shall explain how: In contrast to capitalist countries in our country public transportation, like residential and public buildings, streets and street crossings, is not adapted to the needs of invalids. Apparently, the wide assortment of mechanical aids independently servicing invalids, which have long been manufactured in civilized countries, are not manufactured especially in the USSR. There are only ugly and fragile wheelchairs of two or three sizes for children and adults. Special transport facilities for invalids--motorized wheelchairs and "Zaporozhye vehicles"--are unreliable and can break down at any moment. Moreover, there are never spare parts for transport facilities for invalids on the free market. One has to order them and wait several months. All this is too expensive for most invalids, whose number in the USSR is certainly much bigger than in any other country. The human material is the foundation for communism. Invalids are the products of the 5-year war fought with bodies (6.5 million Germans died, while more than 20 million Soviet citizens perished). In addition to this, one can imagine how many invalids are the result of the establishment of communist concentration camps in the USSR and of the firm first place in the world in alcoholism.

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

does not have them now. Aleksandr Vorona was put in a special mental hospital for the same reasons. (He is now in a special mental hospital in Dnepropetrovsk). Vladimir Gershuni--an invalid-veteran of Stalin's camps, prisons and post-Stalinist mental hospitals--also sympathized with us and the pacifist movement. For his humanist activity he was again, for the n'th time, put in a special mental hospital in Alma-Ata, where it is extremely dangerous, in his completely undermined state of health, for him to be and we are afraid that they will not let him survive this time.

The separateness of Soviet invalids and the lack of opportunity for most of them for ordinary contacts with each other--this is the most terrible thing. Our authorities are interested precisely in this. Therefore, I ask you: Come to the USSR. Every new face is a holiday for them. I also ask you: Take up the cause of V. V. Pervushin, A. Vorona, V. Gershuni and other prisoners of conscience guiltlessly languishing now in Soviet torture chambers.

We offer you our apartments. Live with us and find out how we live. These live contacts will help both us and you. Perhaps together we will succeed in conducting a peace march on the streets of Moscow.

Yuriy Kiselev

Address: USSR, Moscow, D-308
prospekt marshala Zhukova,
d. 16. krp. 1, kv. 45.

11439
CSO: 1830/213

END

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Dissidents 5

2465

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 26, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI JL

SUBJECT: Shevchenko's New Book

Attached at Tab A are two items in which I think you and the President may be interested: a) a review of Soviet defector Arkady Shevchenko's new book, Breaking with Moscow, by Heritage Foundation scholar Juliana Pilon; and b) an interview Dr. Pilon conducted with Shevchenko.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I forwarding the attachments to the President.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Book review by Dr. Juliana Pilon, Breaking with Moscow, and interview with author Arkady N. Shevchenko

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CAS NARA, Date 7/13/02

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

2465

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
SUBJECT: Shevchenko's New Book

The appearance of Soviet defector Arkady Shevchenko's new book, Breaking with Moscow, has stimulated a great deal of commentary, some of which is misleading. For example, Time magazine's excerpts of the book were chosen so selectively, in a way that distorted the main message of the book, that Shevchenko felt compelled to protest to Time's editors. Under these circumstances, I thought you might want to see the attached review of his book which is accompanied by an interview with Shevchenko by the reviewer, Heritage Foundation scholar, Dr. Juliana Pilon.

Attachment:

Tab A Book review and interview

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CAS NARA, Date 7/15/02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

Los Angeles Times

THE BOOK REVIEW


SUNDAY, MARCH 10, 1985

Arkady Nikolayevich Shevchenko is the highest-ranking Soviet official ever to have defected to the United States. Born in the Ukraine in 1930, Shevchenko holds a doctorate from the Moscow Institute of International Relations. He was a protégé of Andrei A. Gromyko and from 1970 to 1973, as a member of Gromyko's staff, came to know the workings of the Soviet system from the inside and from the top. In 1973, Shevchenko was named undersecretary of the United Nations, a major position in the U.N. civil service, reporting to then Secretary General Kurt Waldheim. Shevchenko's decision to defect came just two years later, in 1975; but rather than accept him immediately as a defector, the United States asked him to remain in his U.N. position and gather information for the United States. When the Soviet Union became aware of this deception in 1978, Shevchenko completed his defection.

This tale has been told by now on CBS "60 Minutes"; in articles and reviews in the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal, Newsweek and the Los Angeles Times; and in Time magazine's lengthy excerpts from Shevchenko's newly published book. Reviewers and commentators have been consis-

tently impressed by Shevchenko's detailed knowledge of the Soviet bureaucracy and fascinated by his portraits of Soviet officials, most notably of Gromyko. Several, however, have objected that Shevchenko's account of his defection itself leaves a strange echo of words left unsaid. On the face of it, one should expect that a recent agent of the CIA, who is even now not a United States citizen, might pass over certain matters in discreet silence. But those who squint at Shevchenko's account also make a tacit assumption that the differences between the Soviet and the American system do not in and of themselves constitute grounds for defection. The Russian defector on this reading is required to lecture the Americans about their own country.

The review and interview that follow are the work of a philosopher who has herself left the East for the West and who has written about the differences between them in a book entitled "Notes From the Other Side of Night." Whatever the wisdom of listening for what Arkady Shevchenko has failed to say, there is also, clearly, good reason to listen to what he has said.



Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev



Andrei Andreyevich Gromyko

Breaking With Moscow

by Arkady N. Shevchenko (Knopf: \$18.95; 378 pp.)

"Breaking With Moscow" will probably not have the impact of Alexander Solzhenitsyn's "The Gulag Archipelago." But despite its deceptive lack of pathos, Arkady N. Shevchenko's memoir deals with the same subject matter as Solzhenitsyn's: the anatomy of evil or, more precisely, after Hannah Arendt, "the banality of evil."

The subject of Shevchenko's inquiry are quintessential bureaucrats. Of various abilities, temperaments and tastes, they are nonetheless all suffused with a common commitment to the ultimate triumph of communism. The mass murder of flesh and spirit to which their commitment leads is mentioned only in passing in Shevchenko's book. Solzheni-

Reviewed by Juliana Geran Pilon

tsyn, in other words, is presupposed. And yet as a kind of second installment, Shevchenko's testimony is no less chilling: He portrays a Soviet ruling class armed with the justificatory mechanism of a powerful ideology and engaged in a sophisticated, spectacularly effective assault on the West and its ideal of individual liberty.

"Breaking With Moscow" is, in one sense, a misnomer, for the author explicitly denies having broken with the city of his youth, the home of the Tretyakov Gallery and the Novodevichii Convent. The title is accurate, however, as it refers to the unbridgeable gulf between the leaders of the Soviet state and the people whom they claim to lead; between the engineers of this evil and those who suffer it, perhaps forever.

The architects of Soviet state terror are not only sane, they are often eminently intelligent. Above all, they have a quasi-religious depth of purpose. Andrei Gromyko, Anatoly Dobrynin, Nikita Khrushchev, Leonid Brezhnev, Oleg Troyanovsky may have had different approaches to their ultimate goal, but their commitment itself has been univocal. Writes Shevchenko:

Soviet leaders and ideologists have never tried to hide the fact that their policy then and now adheres to the conclusions Lenin had articulated soon after the 1917 Revolution in Russia. Lenin's slogan 'Who will win?'—a cry of determination to wage 'a life-and-death struggle between capitalism and communism'—continues as the unchallenged bottom line.

At times, tactical consideration may require the appearance of abandoning

ideology. Thus, Shevchenko relates that Andrei Gromyko once advised a group of Soviet diplomats to pretend in their talks with Americans a lack of strong commitment to Marxist dogmas. But *pretend* is the key word: At no time is the significance of that philosophy seriously in doubt either for Gromyko or for his colleagues.

Not that a man of Gromyko's manifest talents could ever subscribe simply-mindedly to the precepts of Marxism-Leninism. There is no doubt that, in varying degrees, the members of the *nomenklatura*, the Soviet elite, are subtle and even profoundly cynical. Yet, Shevchenko demonstrates convincingly that their commitment to their quasi-religion is real and continuing. The Western predilection to distinguish by temperament the "hawks" from the "doves" of the Politburo, therefore, entirely misses the point. Shevchenko charitably calls this distinction a "fable," making it clear that slowly but irrevocably he came to realize "how irrelevant individual traits are to the collective behavior of the Soviet rul-

ers." The same theoretical system that gives their deeds an aura of meaning imprisons them in an iron jacket of lies and fear and sets them inexorably against the rules of conscience, human kindness and tolerance.

But if Shevchenko's book is largely devoted to exploring precisely those individual traits, does his study not, by implication, become irrelevant? That, too, is to miss the point. For the personalities he describes are, after all, our partners in the chess game of global survival, and their idiosyncracies are required knowledge. If ideology determines the strategy, idiosyncrasy can nonetheless determine the tactics. And the tactics are, on occasion, rather splendid.

Moscow's use of the United Nations is the case most in point. The Soviets accurately assess the U.N. as a mostly powerless, in many ways irrelevant institution. Yet, they also appreciate its excellent potential as both the most valued espionage base in the West, certainly in the United States, and as a propaganda forum that can serve the interests of the Soviet Union. Indeed, it was at the U.N. while he

was undersecretary general, that Shevchenko became disillusioned with the tactics and goals of his government and began laying plans for his eventual defection.

The decision to defect ripened slowly over the years, but there were some crucial landmarks. First came the realization that Khrushchev would not bring a human face to Soviet-style communism. Then followed the knowledge, after the 1975 Helsinki Accords, that Soviet leaders "would violate elementary human rights no matter what they might sign, and that the Soviet system itself was intrinsically antithetical to such rights." Perhaps the most important knowledge, however, was self-knowledge, the most common cause of all political



Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev

defections. It was Shevchenko's acknowledgement to himself of basic, long-denied needs: to breathe freely, to stop lying, not to be afraid, not to be a partner in evil.

It was this last revelation that left him with no choice but to defect. He is uncomfortable with that word, whose Latin root, anachronistically enough, means "to desert, to fail," but a better word does not come easily to hand. Shevchenko's wife was prevented from joining him in the West, drugged, taken back to Moscow, and later declared a "suicide." What kind of personality, what order of courage is required to run such a risk? The reader will not be able to answer that question after reading this book. But that inability is not necessarily Shevchenko's fault. There probably are no answers. Arkady N. Shevchenko was required to break with banality in more senses than one when he opted for freedom, freedom at any cost.

Pilon, a native of Romania, is senior policy analyst at the Heritage Foundation in Washington, D.C.



GLOGAU STUDIO

Arkady N. Shevchenko

An Interview With Arkady N. Shevchenko

Juliana G. Pilon: What would you say is the main message of "Breaking With Moscow"?

Arkady N. Shevchenko: Its main purpose, really, is to make Americans understand what the Soviets are: They are Communists, above all. Americans must realize that in dealing with the Soviets, they are dealing with people who are devoted to the system of Marxism-Leninism. Of course the *nomenklatura*, the privileged class, is self-interested, jealous of its privileges. At the same time, however,

it is also deeply ideological.

Pilon: You also indicate in your book that these people do not subscribe to a simplistic version of Marxism-Leninism.

Shevchenko: Indeed. As a matter of fact, many among the elite think very much like me: This might come as a surprise to some conservatives. They have doubts about what they are doing, but they are still part of the system. And they are still

committed to its ideology.

Pilon: Your book is factual, non-polemical, almost non-ideological. But in a sense, it is clearly set against the background of Solzhenitsyn's "GULAG Archipelago." After all, you are describing the authors of that archipelago.

Shevchenko: Yes. Solzhenitsyn opened the eyes of the West, especially Europe, to the real nature of the Soviet system. Solzhenitsyn did what he could do in his time and did it very well. My book really presupposes knowledge and understanding of the atrocities he uncovered.

Pilon: Your book then takes us to the next level in analyzing "the anatomy of evil," in a sense.

Shevchenko: My book describes personalities, some of the highest level personalities in the Soviet Union. This had never been done before. The West must understand this aspect of the Soviet Union. But ultimately, I am afraid, it doesn't.

Pilon: Some commentators have understood you to be a proponent of "detente" who sees shades of gray in the Soviet leadership. They have taken your description of Andrei Gromyko, for example, as being less "hard line" than some have assumed, and, therefore, that you are offering some hope of understanding with the U.S.S.R.

Shevchenko: Gromyko, it must be made absolutely clear, is devoted to the Soviet system until the last drop of his blood. This is the crux of the matter. I don't know why I have been misunderstood. I think some commentators have taken portions of my book out of context and twisted them, even changed my words.

Pilon: You do say in your book that there are areas of mutual interest between the United States and the U.S.S.R.

Shevchenko: Yes, on the issue of non-proliferation for example, there is some common ground. But on some crucial areas—notably on human rights—there can never be an understanding. I also say in my book that the fundamental long-range aspiration of the U.S.S.R. is the idea of expanding Soviet power to the point of world domination. Whether through ideology, diplomacy, force or economics, Moscow believes that eventually it will be supreme—not necessarily in this century but certainly in the next.

Pilon: Is this just a continuation of historical Russian imperialist design?

Shevchenko: I really don't think so. It is not so simple. The Soviet Union is involved in a deeply ideological effort, pursued in a sophisticated manner by sophisticated, shrewd men.

Pilon: Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick has said that her experiences at the U.N. have only reinforced her high opinion of Soviet diplomacy.

Shevchenko: I absolutely agree. You know, Jeane Kirkpatrick is a friend. She really does understand the Soviets. Yes, it

is very important not to underestimate the enemy. We have to know them. We must have respect for them, for they are indeed very highly skilled—at the U.N. and in other contexts.

Pilon: Your revelations about the U.N. are fascinating. You document in great detail the Soviets' complete disregard of the impartial nature of

the U.N. Secretariat.

Shevchenko: Sure. The Soviets use the U.N. as a forum for propaganda, and a major center of espionage. But I think that Brian Urquhart and others who feel that I am attacking the concept of an international civil service are simply wrong. I just think that the Soviet Union is defying that concept.


Pilon: Do you think that former U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim handled adequately the termination of your position at the U.N. after you decided to defect?

Shevchenko: I think he should have been much more forceful. But Waldheim was primarily interested in his own future, not in upholding the principles of the international civil service.

Pilon: Finally, what is your main admonition against misunderstanding the main message of your book?

Shevchenko: Read it all, to the end. The book is very nuanced. It does not conform neatly to prior conceptions and prejudices. The main thrust of the book, however, should be quite clear from an honest reading. The U.S. cannot afford to forget the ideological impetus of the Soviet leaders and their ultimate objective to win the struggle with capitalist nations.

THE BOOK REVIEW/LOS ANGELES TIMES



ROOM/ALTA

Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov

Paula Dobriansky —

As far as we are aware, — 10
Shcharanskiy was not raised at
JCC. You might ask Jack
Matlock if he was raised on
the margins.

Susan Wagner
EUR/sov 632-8720



SHCHARANSKIY
Resident

BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

CONFIDENTIAL

S/S

TO: The Secretary

FROM: EUR - John H. Kelly, Acting
NEA - Richard W. Murphy

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Avital Shcharanskiy, Friday,
May 10, 3:30 p.m.

I. BACKGROUND

o Anatoliy Shcharanskiy sentenced July 14, 1978 to 13 years incarceration for "treason, espionage, and anti-Soviet propaganda"

o Actual basis for arrest and conviction: his role as active spokesman for Soviet Jewish community and founding member of Moscow Helsinki Monitoring group

o Shcharanskiy still in labor camp near Perm

-- Family permitted extended visit (overdue) in January 85 in connection with Geneva talks BUT in April family told no more visits in 1985 (entitled to two more under Soviet law)

-- Family appeal for clemency rejected by Supreme Soviet late February because of "seriousness of crime"

-- No letters received by family since late February -- family fears Shcharanskiy may keep his threat to go on hunger strike if regular correspondence not allowed

II. PREVIOUS MEETINGS

o Mrs. Shcharanskiy met with you in October 1982 and in Israel in July 1983

o This year she has met with Mike Armacost three times and with other Department officials, including Rick Burt (during Geneva talks in January), Warren Zimmermann, Elliott Abrams, Mark Palmer, and Charlie Hill

o Ambassador Hartman recently met with Shcharanskiy's mother, Ida Mil'grom; Embassy meets often with brother, Leonid

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DECL:OADR

NLRR FC6-114/7 #9527

BY CAL NARA DATE 6/25/09

Have since received letter, in which Shcharanskiy said he would provide "only facts" + that family he would write only once every 2 weeks and receive no family visits.

These conditions have led family to believe he is in the labor camp prison.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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III. WHAT SHE WANTS

- o To update you on her husband's situation
- o USG to appeal to USSR for immediate release, which family claims Gorbachev could do by decree since Shcharanskiy has served more than half sentence
- o Support for Soviet amnesty of political prisoners, particularly Jewish political prisoners, in connection with 40th anniversary of end of WWII
- o Support for Kemp-Moynihan call for US-Soviet talks exclusively on Jewish emigration and US to push Soviets to allow 400,000 Jews to emigrate over 4 years
- o Reassurance that case will continue to be raised, including at your meeting with Gromyko in May
- o Points to Make
 - We continue to raise your husband's case with the Soviets in many fora (bilateral and CSCE) and urge Soviets to consider early release.
 - We are concerned that the family has received no letters from your husband since late February and disturbed that camp authorities recently told his mother that no more visits would be permitted in 1985; as we have in the past, we will urge the Soviets on every possible occasion to permit regular correspondence and family visits, as provided by Soviet law.
 - Soviets know that we will not be satisfied with anything short of your husband's release from imprisonment and emigration from the Soviet Union.

Attachment: Setting and Participants

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SETTING

Ever since her husband's conviction in 1978, Avital Shcharanskiy has campaigned tirelessly on his behalf. As part of that campaign, she seeks regular contact at high levels of the US Government. She met with the President and Vice-President in 1981, met with Secretary Haig twice and has met with you twice -- in Washington in October 1982 and Jerusalem in July 1983.

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The Secretary
Ambassador Lewis
Assistant Secretary Murphy
Assistant Secretary Kalb
Mr. Hill
Benjamin Tua, Embassy Political Officer (notetaker)

Israel

Avital Shcharanskiy
Avraham Maoz
Naomi Levenston

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Drafted: EUR/SOV/SOBI: SMWagner *KL for*
05/02/85 X8720 #1404n
Cleared: EUR/SOV/SOBI: JSchumaker
EUR/SOV: BLPascoe
EUR: RMPalmer *KL for*
NEA: RHPelletreau
NEA/IAI: PWilcox

FILE DISSEMINATED

NSC/S PROFILE

UNCLASSIFIED

ID 8503855

RECEIVED 13 MAY 85 17

TO MCFARLANE

FROM PLATT, N

DOCDATE 13 MAY 85

URGENT

KEYWORDS: HUMAN RIGHTS

PUBLIC STATEMENTS

SAKHAROV, ANDREI

SUBJECT: OBSERVANCE OF NATL SAKHAROV DAY ON 21 MAY

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR KIMMITT

DUE: 14 MAY 85 STATUS S FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

RAYMOND

DOBRIANSKY

SESTANOVICH

LENCZOWSKI

STEINER

SMALL

KIMMITT

PEARSON

LEHMAN, C

COMMENTS *** CY OF REMARKS FWDED TO SIMS OFC ***

REF# 8514442

LOG 8502368

NSCIFID

(HW)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
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DISPATCH	W/ATTCH	FILE	(C)
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May 13, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Observance of National Andrei Sakharov Day

In 1983 the President signed a proclamation designating May 21 as National Andrei Sakharov Day. To observe it this year, the Andrei Sakharov Institute and the Jefferson Educational Foundation are sponsoring a conference on the "Interrelationship Between Freedom, Peace and Democracy" dedicated to Dr. Sakharov.

We believe that there should be an appropriate White House observance of this event. We understand that the Vice President may agree to receive at the White House on May 15 a group attending the conference, including relatives of the Sakharovs. In response to Walt Raymond's May 10 request, this transmits suggested remarks for use by the Vice President which could serve as the official Administration statement in honor of Andrei Sakharov Day (Tab A).

Alternatively, if the Vice President does not meet with a representative group attending the conference, we recommend that the White House issue a statement in honor of National Andrei Sakharov Day. This would be an appropriate way for the Administration to observe the occasion and would be consistent with the President's 1983 proclamation. A draft statement for this purpose is at Tab B.

Nicholas M. Brown
for Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

- Tab 1) Suggested Remarks
- Tab 2) Draft White House Statement

Drafted:EUR/SOV/SOBI:SLysyshyn

5/11/85 #1519n 5670

Cleared:EUR/SOV/SOBI:JFSchumaker

EUR/SOV:BLPascoe

HA:GMatthews

EUR:RHaass

EUR:EKelly

P:WCourtney

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUGGESTED REMARKS FOR NATIONAL ANDREI SAKHAROV DAY

I am very pleased to join with you in the observance of National Andrei Sakharov Day. Two years ago, when President Reagan signed the proclamation designating May 21 as a day to honor Dr. Sakharov, the President described him as a man of uncommon courage and decency. Recalling that Dr. Sakharov's Nobel Peace Prize cited him as the "spokesman for the conscience of mankind", the President said that we who value freedom and human dignity must do all in our power to prevent him from being silenced. That remains our goal today.

Those of us here recognize his courageous work to protect human rights. As we gather today to honor him and to rededicate ourselves to the values of peace, freedom and justice that he represents, we do so with solemn awareness that for more than one year, Dr. Sakharov and his wife, Yelenna Bonner, have been cut off from all direct contact with family and friends in the West. A year ago this month Dr. Sakharov embarked on a hunger strike to protest the refusal of Soviet authorities to permit his wife to travel abroad for urgently needed medical treatment. Since then, this brave couple has been isolated from their family, friends and the rest of the world. Mrs. Bonner herself has been tried on trumped up charges and sentenced to internal exile.

Soviet authorities have turned a deaf ear to the outpouring of international outrage over the treatment of one of its most distinguished citizens and his courageous wife, who is herself a decorated veteran of World War II. Thus, although he is honored throughout the world as a scientist, humanitarian, and peacemaker, Dr. Sakharov is treated like a criminal in his own country. In their treatment of Dr. Sakharov, the Soviets reveal for all the world to see the true nature of their system.

In recognizing the courage and ideals of Dr. Sakharov, let us also remember the many thousands of his countrymen who also suffer the denial of basic human rights. Today the human rights situation in the Soviet Union remains bleak. An estimated 10,000 political prisoners are currently incarcerated in Soviet prisons, labor camps and psychiatric institutions. Soviet authorities have succeeded in eliminating the main stream of human rights activism -- the Helsinki Monitors movement. Anatoliy Shcharanskiy, Yuriy Orlov and other monitors are now serving long terms of imprisonment or exile. Religious groups now form a major target of persecution. Baptists, Catholics, Ukrainian Uniates, Pentecostalists and other groups have also be subjected to arbitrary arrest and systematic harassment. The crackdown on Hebrew teachers and Jewish cultural activists which began in July 1984 continues. Jewish emigration last year reached a 10-year low.

In October 1977, in an appeal to the Parliaments of all Helsinki-signatory states, Dr. Sakharov wrote:

We are living through a period of history in which decisive support of the principles of freedom of conscience, an open society, and the rights of man is an absolute necessity. The alternative is surrender to totalitarianism, the loss of all precious freedom, and political, economic and moral degradation. The West, its political and moral leaders, its free and decent peoples, must not allow this.

In exiling him to Gor'kiy five years ago, the Soviet Government attempted to silence Dr. Sakharov and remove him from international attention. However, this effort has failed and will continue to fail. Heeding his charge to us, we who have gathered today in his honor -- and all those observing Andrei Sakharov day around the world who share his ideals and have drawn inspiration from his courage -- have the obligation to carry his message and redouble our efforts in pursuit of world peace and respect for human rights. We must act on his behalf, ensuring that his message of hope and freedom will not be silenced. And despite the efforts of those who seek to break his spirit, I believe that word of your efforts on his behalf and your work in support of his goals will make its

way back to Gor'kiy and provide a measure of support and hope to the Sakharovs.

We have made clear to the leaders of the Soviet Union that we want good relations. We recognize that the survival of civilization requires that we find ways to work together. However, we believe that along with progress toward a safer world, there must be greater respect for human rights. Our request to the Soviets has been simple and straightforward: that the Soviet Union live up to the obligations it has freely assumed under international covenants -- in particular, its commitments under the Helsinki accords. As Dr. Sakharov urged, we and the other western democracies are continuing to pursue this issue with the Soviet Union and the other CSCE participants at the Human Rights Experts Meeting (HREM) currently taking place in Ottawa.

Today we renew our call to the new Soviet leadership to respond to international concern, to end the isolation of Dr. Sakharov and his wife and to permit his wife to travel abroad for needed medical care. Let all who share his values, both governments and individuals, continue to press the Soviets for information about the Sakharovs and for an end to Soviet persecution of these distinguished citizens.

For Dr. Sakharov, on the occasion of his sixty-fourth birthday, our message should be one of hope and perserverence. Taking strength from his example, and from his faith in the human spirit, we will not be discouraged. Today our thoughts and prayers are with him and his wife.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SUGGESTED DRAFT STATEMENT

Two years ago President Reagan signed the proclamation designating May 21 as National Andrei Sakharov Day. Recalling that Dr. Sakharov's Nobel Peace Prize cited him as the "spokesman for the conscience of mankind", the President said that we who value freedom and human dignity must do all in our power to prevent him from being silenced.

As we honor him today and rededicate ourselves to the values of peace, freedom and justice that he represents, we do so with solemn awareness that for more than one year, Dr. Sakharov and his brave wife, Yelenna Bonner, have been cut off from all direct contact with family or friends in the West. A year ago this month Dr. Sakharov embarked on a hunger strike to protest the refusal of Soviet authorities to permit his wife, Yelena Bonner, to travel abroad for urgently needed medical treatment. Soviet authorities have turned a deaf ear to the outpouring of international outrage over the treatment of one of its most distinguished citizens and his courageous wife, who is a decorated veteran of World War II.

In recognizing the courage and ideals of Dr. Sakharov, let us also remember the many thousands of his countrymen who also suffer the denial of basic human rights. Today the human

rights situation in the Soviet Union remains bleak. Soviet authorities have succeeded in eliminating the main stream of human rights activism -- the Helsinki Monitors movement. Anatoliy Shcharanskiy, Yuriy Orlov and other monitors are now serving long terms of imprisonment or exile. Religious groups now form a major target of persecution. Baptists, Catholics, Ukrainian Uniates, Pentecostalists and other groups have also been subjected to arrest and harassment. The crackdown on Hebrew teachers and Jewish cultural activists which began in July 1984 continues. Jewish emigration last year reached a 10-year low.

In exiling him to Gor'kiy, the Soviet Government attempts to silence Dr. Sakharov and remove him from international attention, but their efforts will ultimately fail. Americans and others around the world who share his ideals and have drawn inspiration from his courage have the obligation to carry his message and redouble our efforts in pursuit of world peace and respect for human rights. We must act on his behalf, ensuring that his message of hope and freedom will never be silenced.

Today we renew our call to the new Soviet leadership to end the isolation of Dr. Sakharov and his wife and permit his wife to travel abroad for needed medical care. Let all who share his values, both governments and individuals, continue to press the Soviets for information about the Sakharovs and for an end to Soviet persecution of two of its most distinguished citizens.

> 9001 Discreet 26

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 13, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR STEVE STEINER
PAULA DOBRIANSKY
KARNA SMALL
TY COBB

FROM: WALT RAYMOND/ELISE NEIL *Elise*
SUBJECT: Statement in Honor of Andrei Sakharov Day

The proposal that the Vice President speak to a group of youth leaders in honor of Andrei Sakharov Day, which now appears to be May 21, has been turned down by O/VP. We therefore are asking your clearance/comments of the State draft statement which would be released on Andrei Sakharov Day. Please get these to Elise ASAP (X5000). Thank you.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SUGGESTED DRAFT STATEMENT

Two years ago President Reagan signed the proclamation designating May 21 as National Andrei Sakharov Day. Recalling that Dr. Sakharov's Nobel Peace Prize cited him as the "spokesman for the conscience of mankind", the President said that we who value freedom and human dignity must do all in our power to prevent him from being silenced.

As we honor him today and rededicate ourselves to the values of peace, freedom and justice that he represents, we do so with solemn awareness that for more than one year, Dr. Sakharov and his brave wife, Yelenna Bonner, have been cut off from all direct contact with family or friends in the West. A year ago this month Dr. Sakharov embarked on a hunger strike to protest the refusal of Soviet authorities to permit his wife, Yelena Bonner, to travel abroad for urgently needed medical treatment. Soviet authorities have turned a deaf ear to the outpouring of international outrage over the treatment of one of its most distinguished citizens and his courageous wife, who is a decorated veteran of World War II.

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In exiling him to Gor'kiy, the Soviet Government attempts to silence Dr. Sakharov and remove him from international attention, but their efforts will ultimately fail. Americans and others around the world who share his ideals and have drawn inspiration from his courage have the obligation to carry his message and redouble our efforts in pursuit of world peace and respect for human rights. We must act on his behalf, ensuring that his message of hope and freedom will never be silenced.

Today we renew our call to the new Soviet leadership to end the isolation of Dr. Sakharov and his wife and permit his wife to travel abroad for needed medical care. Let all who share his values, both governments and individuals, continue to press the Soviets for information about the Sakharovs and for an end to Soviet persecution of two of its most distinguished citizens.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

3885

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~INFORMATION~~

7 Only addition -
Pentecostals will be
discussed at Ottawa
Herm.

May 14, 1985
(1) State should come in
w/ a memo on this -
How did Embassy
Moscow decide.

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: TYRUS W. COBB *TWC*

SUBJECT: Pentecostal Attempt to Enter Embassy Moscow

Attached at Tab A, per your request, is a memorandum summarizing the facts concerned with the Pentecostalist attempt to enter our Embassy in Moscow.

TWC gov
Paula Dobriansky concurs.

Attachment

Tab A - Memorandum on Pentecostal Attempt to Enter Embassy

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR FOI-114/7 #9520
BY *CU* NARADATE 7/7/08

Attempt by Soviet Pentecostalist to Seek Asylum
in American Embassy in Moscow

On May 13, four Soviet Pentecostals from the far Eastern village of Chuguevka attempted to force their way past Soviet militia into the Embassy. Three were beaten and taken away, but the fourth gained entry. He requested USG assistance for his Pentecostal brethren who have been seeking emigration to the FRG. He also requested political asylum to draw attention to their plight.

- Three of the Pentecostalists were beaten by militia at the door and taken away. The fourth, Iogann Vins, gained entry. Embassy officers stressed that it would not be possible to grant political asylum, but that the Embassy would endeavor to assist him in his desire to emigrate by taking the matter up with Soviet authorities. Embassy officers explained to Vins that he would not be able to remain in the Embassy.
- Our past experience has demonstrated that Soviet authorities will not allow these individuals to leave the country from the U.S. Embassy. A group of Pentecostalists who had previously gained access to the Embassy were finally released after four years, and were ultimately permitted to emigrate only after a personal appeal from the President to Ambassador Dobrynin.
- Past experience has also indicated that Soviet authorities deal more leniently with those individuals who leave the Embassy as early as possible. On this basis, the Embassy persuaded Vins to leave in an Embassy car. He was dropped off near a metro station, but was seized by several plain-clothes security men. Embassy officers were kept at a distance from the police vehicle by a phalanx of security police.

The incident raises a difficult problem for the United States. Last year, several East Germans sought asylum in American Embassies in East Europe. After a difficult series of negotiations, some of the Germans were permitted to emigrate to West Germany. We have sought to discourage individuals from entering our Embassies in such cases since we have limited facilities to take care of them and, in the case of the Soviet Union, virtually no ability to secure their emigration.

Dissidents / ink a k.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

May 15, 1985

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

Two years ago I signed the proclamation designating May 21 as National Andrei Sakharov Day. Recalling that Dr. Sakharov's Nobel Peace Prize cited him as a "spokesman for the conscience of mankind," I said that we who value freedom and human dignity must do all in our power to prevent him from being silenced.

As we honor Dr. Sakharov today and rededicate ourselves to the values of peace, freedom and justice that he represents, we do so with solemn awareness that for more than one year, he and his brave wife, Yelenna Bonner, have been cut off from all direct contact with family or friends in the West. A year ago this month Dr. Sakharov embarked on a hunger strike to protest the refusal of Soviet authorities to permit his wife to travel abroad for urgently needed medical treatment. Soviet authorities have turned a deaf ear to the outpouring of international outrage over the treatment of one of the Soviet Union's most distinguished citizens and of his courageous wife, who is a decorated veteran of World War II.

In recognizing the courage and ideals that Dr. Sakharov embodies, let us also remember the many thousands of his countrymen who likewise suffer the denial of basic human rights. Today the human rights situation in the Soviet Union remains bleak. Soviet authorities have succeeded in eliminating the main vehicle for human rights activism -- the Helsinki Monitors movement. Anatoliy Shcharanskiy, Yuriy Orlov and other monitors are now serving long terms of imprisonment or exile. Religious groups have become a major target of persecution, and Baptists, Catholics, Ukrainian Uniates, Pentecostalists and other groups have been subjected to arrest and harassment. The crackdown on Hebrew teachers and Jewish cultural activists which began in July 1984 continues. Jewish emigration last year reached a ten-year low.

In exiling Dr. Sakharov to Gor'kiy, the Soviet Government has attempted to silence and remove him from international attention, but their efforts will ultimately fail. Americans and others around the world who have drawn inspiration from his courage understand their obligation to carry his message to all and to redouble their efforts in pursuit of world peace and respect for

-more-

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DECLASSIFIEDCONFIDENTIALNLRR F06-114/7 #9521

May 24, 1985

BY CL NARA DATE 6/25/09LenchowSKIACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI *KL*

SUBJECT: Hunger Strike of Yuri Balovlenkov

As I mentioned to you at yesterday's ODSM, I saw Yuri Balovlenkov when I was in Moscow. It was on the 42nd day of his hunger strike to be reunited with his wife and children in Baltimore. I originally had the understanding that Vice President Bush had intervened with the Soviets to help him out. As it turns out, this intervention took place during his first hunger strike three years ago, when Balovlenkov was promised an exit visa but then denied one after he stopped his hunger strike.

Now it has been 62 days, and although Secretary Shultz may have mentioned his name to Gromyko among other human rights cases, I feel that we can do more. I feel a personal obligation here since I tried to persuade him to stop on the grounds that he should not give up hope that we could mobilize a high-level intervention on his behalf.

What aggravates this situation is that the Soviets will not even let his wife get through to him over the phone to try to persuade him to stop. Since the Soviet authorities have not intervened as yet to force feed him, the probability grows each day that he will suffer permanent damage to both mind and body.

I would hope the President could send a message to Gorbachev requesting that something be done to save this poor man. At Tab I is a memo from you to the President asking that he sign the message (Tab A) that Ambassador Hartman could pass to Gorbachev. At Tab B are a plea and protest note signed by Balovlenkov himself.

Jack Matlock concurs. *John* *Though I think we should do everything we can to solve the Balovlenkov tragedy, I am not sure a direct message from the President is the best way. Hartman is very close to the situation, and perhaps he should be queried first as to whether he would consider a Presidential message helpful.*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve

Disapprove

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on: OADR

John - Shultz made a personal intervention yesterday in writing I think through in it's see what if any thing it produces. Bue

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

Attachments:

Tab I	Memorandum to the President
Tab A	Proposed message to Balovlenkov
Tab B	Letter and Appeal signed by Balovlenkov

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

4211

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE

SUBJECT: Hunger Strike of Yuri Balovlenkov

Yuri Balovlenkov is on the 62nd day of a hunger strike in Moscow to try to be reunited with his wife and two small daughters in Baltimore. Three years ago he tried the same thing, and after 42 days he was promised an exit visa, so he stopped. But the Soviet authorities broke their promise.

What makes the current situation worse is that the Soviets will not even let his wife, Elena, get through to him over the phone to try to persuade him to stop. And since they have not intervened as yet to force feed him, each passing day brings the greater likelihood that he will suffer permanent damage to his mind and body.

A member of my staff visited him two weeks ago along with two of our Embassy officers and brought back Yuri's "Appeal to All People of Good Will" and his protest letter which are at Tab B. They symbolize the desperation faced by so many people within the Soviet system.

At Tab A is a message from you to Gorbachev asking him to do something to save this poor man.

RECOMMENDATIONOK No

— — That you authorize Ambassador Hartman to pass the message at Tab A to General Secretary Gorbachev.

Prepared by:
John Lenczowski

Attachments:

Tab A Proposed message
Tab B Plea and Letter from Yuri Balovlenko

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR

NLRR F06-11417 #9522
BY CW NARA DATE 6/25/09

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

The plight of Yuri Balovlenkov has recently come to my attention. It is my understanding that as of May 24, he has been on a hunger strike for 62 days to try to be reunited with his wife and two small children here in Baltimore. Because his wife and children are American citizens this is a case which must concern us here in the United States.

I am writing to appeal to you to resolve this case and others which also involve reuniting divided families. It is painful to me to see the suffering of Yuri Balovlenkov. It is a suffering that should not have to happen. As you may know, our Embassy personnel have tried to persuade him to stop and have argued with him that he should have the same hope of being reunited with his wife, Elena, as we have in being able to resolve the differences between our two countries. Only weeks earlier, our Embassy people did succeed in persuading Tamara Tretyakova to stop her hunger strike on its 42^d day. But it was only through offering her the hope that her dreams would come true. Unfortunately, the efforts of Yuri's wife to persuade him to stop have been in vain. Moscow telephone operators will not let her even talk to her husband.

What will happen if Yuri dies, or suffers permanent damage to his mind or body? Will it make any difference? In America, we have a saying that "One person can make a difference." I believe that the suffering and death of this poor man will touch the hearts of the American people. I hope this kind of tragedy does not have to happen.

Sincerely,

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED

NLRR F06-114/7#9528

BY CI NARA DATE 7/7/08

His Excellency
Mikhail Gorbachev
General Secretary of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
The Kremlin
Moscow

AN APPEAL TO ALL PEOPLE OF GOOD WILL


A graduate of Moscow's Bauman Technological Institute, I, Yuri Balovlenkov, a citizen of the US SR, have been for six years unable to join my American wife and our two daughters in the United States.

Soon after I married Elena Kuzmenko, a staff nurse at the Baltimore City Hospital, in Maryland, I began applying to Soviet authorities for a permission to emigrate. To this day my repeated requests are regularly rejected.

Driven to desperation, I began on May 10, 1982, an indefinite hunger strike in protest against this situation. On the 42rd day, I was summoned to the Moscow Visa Department of the Interior Ministry where an official informed me that I would be allowed to leave the country within a few days. Several days later, however, my formal application for a visa was again turned down. Moreover, a press conference was arranged by the visa department at which attending Soviet and foreign newsmen were told that the official who had promised me an exit visa had acted without the proper authorization. Subsequently, top officers of the department assured my wife (during her visit to Moscow), my mother (who had joined me in my hunger strike), and myself that an exit visa would be given me in January 1985, upon the expiration of my so-called security clearance. Today this deadline is over, too.

Despite all the trials and continuing harassment, my wife and I are still full of resolve to achieve our goal, something that we still believe we are entitled to. Our drama may seem insignificant when compared with the many suffering inflicted on mankind in these trying times of ours. But the obvious fact that it may be resolved with a minimal display of goodwill and respect for the most elementary human right, a family's right to live together in a country of its choice, makes our situation all the desperate.

I appeal to all people of goodwill for help and support for my family's six-year-old struggle for re-unification.



Elena Balovlenkov
17 S. Conkling St.
Balto. Md. 21224
USA

Yuri Balovlenkov
21, 10 Smolenskaya ulitsa
Moscow, 121099
USSR

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

I, Yuri Balovlenkov, who have been separated from my wife, a citizen of the U.S., and our two small children, am announcing a PROTEST HUNGER STRIKE, beginning March 25th, 1985.

I am protesting against the fact that for more than six years I have been denied the right to a family, a right guaranteed by the Constitution of the USSR.

I am protesting against the arrogance and hypocrisy of those bureaucrats with whom, in the course of these six years, I have had to deal.

I am protesting against the fact that twice within this period officials of the Interior Ministry promised to grant me permission to join my family, and twice--in July 1982 and January 1985--deceived me.

I am protesting against the impossibility of appeal through the legal system of this country, against the obvious and irrefutable infringements of the law, infringements to and of which I have for six years been both witness and victim. During time all without exception of my complaints against the Interior Ministry officials registered with the procurator's, other government, higher party and soviet offices have been consistently referred back to that very ministry.

I am protesting against the numerous attempts made to force me to abandon the struggle for my right to a family; against the threats of court action on the basis of fabricated charges; against the forcing of my acquaintances to put pressure on me; against the surveillance and detainment on false pretexts.

I am protesting against the fact that I, a citizen of the USSR, have been surrounded by a wall of indifference on the part of the powers that be who, by their action or lack of it, have stripped me of hope for equality before the law, in the triumph of same law, in the humanitarianism of the existing policy concerning the reuniting of divided families.

In this situation, I am forced to resort to the only means of protest open to me--a hunger strike.

2I, No. 10 Smolenskaya ul., Moscow, 121099, USSR.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Dobriansky 37
4131 FUE
Disidents

~~SECRET~~

May 30, 1985

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY *PD*

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Mrs. Shcharansky

RCM HAS SEEN

You will be meeting with Mrs. Avital Shcharansky on Friday, May 31 at 1:00 p.m. She will be accompanied by Mr. Avi Maoz and Ms. Naomi Levinston.

Background: Anatoliy Shcharansky, sentenced on July 14, 1978 to 13 years incarceration for "treason, espionage, and anti-Soviet propaganda," is being held in a labor camp near Perm. In January 1985, his family visited him; in April, they were told by Soviet officials no more visits would be permitted this year. [Note: They are entitled to two more under Soviet law.] The family has also received only one letter from Shcharansky since late February. In this letter, he said he could provide "only facts" -- "he could write once every two weeks and receive no family visits."

Discussion: In the meeting, Mrs. Shcharansky will probably:

- Give you an update on her husband's circumstances.
- Ask you for a read-out on Secretary Shultz's discussions with Gromyko about her husband's situation.
- Request that we appeal to the Soviets for immediate release. (The family claims Gorbachev could do this by decree since Shcharansky has served more than half his sentence.)
- Seek support for the Kemp-Moynihan proposal for U.S.-Soviet talks exclusively on Jewish emigration, with the goal of securing the emigration of 400,000 Jews over four years.
- Ask whether Secretary Baldrige, during his visit to Moscow, was able to raise her husband's case. (It was not raised specifically, but the broad issue of our human rights concerns was addressed.)
- Query you on the status of the proposed exchange. (I have been told by Mark Palmer that we have heard nothing new from our intermediary, but that we will continue to pursue this approach.)

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

NLRR *fol-114/7-9523*

DATE *7/7/08* NARA CAS

Talking Points:

- Be assured that we will continue to raise your husband's case with the Soviets in many fora (bilateral and CSCE) and urge them to consider early release.
- We are concerned that your family has been told no more visits would be permitted in 1985 and that they have received only one letter from your husband since February. We will continue to urge the Soviets to permit regular correspondence and family visits, as provided by Soviet law.
- We will not be satisfied with anything short of your husband's release from imprisonment and emigration from the Soviet Union.

Jack ^{gm} Matlock concurs.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

4478

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

DOBRIANSKY

~~SECRET~~

June 4, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY *PD*

SUBJECT: Proposed Presidential Letter re: Shcharansky

Per your note of May 31 (Tab I), I recommend against sending a Presidential letter on Anatoliy Shcharansky's behalf, at this time. His case was recently raised by Secretary Shultz during discussions with Foreign Minister Gromyko. We are also engaged in a number of ongoing efforts to secure Shcharansky's release (i.e., prisoner exchange). Moreover, the current state of U.S.-Soviet relations does not augur well for such an effort. We would be in a better position to appeal on Shcharansky's behalf once the prospects for a summit have been clarified.

In light of these factors, I recommend that I inform Avital Shcharansky this week that we have decided against sending the letter now.

for
Jack Matlock and State (Mark Palmer) concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That we do not send the proposed Presidential letter regarding Mr. Shcharansky at this time.

Approve *RC 11* Disapprove _____

Attachment:

Tab I Proposed text.

*relayed to Paula 9:30 - 6-5**KZ*~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/7 #9524BY *CL* NARA DATE 6/25/09

Mr. General Secretary,

It is our responsibility as leaders of nations whose relations effect the peace and security of the entire planet to make every effort to ensure that progress is made in improving and deepening those relations. The continued imprisonment of Anatoly Shcharansky remains an obstacle to further progress in bilatleral relations. I am confident that you will personally take those steps necessary to effect Mr. Shcharansky's speedy release.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MAY 31 P 3: 52

To Paula M
& Jack M
for recom-
mendation on 6/4.
by Tues
Thy
Zud

DECLASSIFIED/RE/ASE

NLRR 606714/7 #9529

BY CI NARA DATE 7/7/68

YURI BALQVLENKOV

A graduate of Moscow's Bauman Technological Institute, I met my wife, Elena Kuzmenko, a staff nurse at the Baltimore City Hospital in Maryland, USA, in May 1977, during her visit to Moscow. In late November, that year we applied for permission to marry; however, Elena's visa expired less than a month before our scheduled wedding, and she was forced to return to the US.

Her next five applications, for different types of visas--as a tourist, as a personal guest of an American diplomat resident in Moscow, as a counsellor at the US Embassy's children's day camp outside Moscow--were summarily rejected. In September 1978, she flew to Helsinki and joined a two-day tourist group to visit Lenin-grad (no visa required).

Once back in the United States, she got a Canadian postal box address and, using her American passport, applied for a tourist visa from there. She returned to Moscow at the end of October on a seven-day visa, six weeks pregnant at the time. At the Registry we were told that our old marriage application was no longer valid, and the minimum waiting period on a new application would be thirty days. Once again she had to leave.

At this point, the world press took an interest in our case, and subsequently the Soviet officials were obliged to grant Elena another visa. We were finally married on December 5, 1978.

In early 1979, I applied for permission to join my wife in the US, was refused within two months, and my wife lost the child.

At the end of that year, Elena was able to come back to Moscow on another tourist visa. In the summer of 1980, our daughter Katerina was born.

Driven to desperation by repeated refusals at the visa department, I began a protest hunger strike in May 1982. On the 43rd day of my protest, I was informed that an exit visa would be granted me within a few days. But before I had a chance to recuperate from extreme exhaustion, my formal application for a visa had again been turned down. Subsequently, however, the officials of the Interior Ministry in charge of visa issuing assured me, my wife and even my mother, who had also held a solidarity hunger strike for a month, that I would be allowed to leave the country in January 1985.

Disseminated

MEMORANDUM

4587

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 12, 1985

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: NICHOLAS S. KLISSAS *Nick*

SUBJECT: Mr. Abe Stolar's Letter to the President

Marshall Breger sent you a memo on June 5 requesting guidance on a letter to the President from Abe Stolar. Mr. Stolar, an American citizen, and his family have been trying to emigrate from the Soviet Union.

I have contacted Breger's office and they agreed that it would be appropriate for State to draft a letter for White House signature. NSC Secretariat is sending the package to State for draft reply. I am also requesting from State a fact sheet on the Stolar case for Marshall Breger's reference.

Paula Dobriansky concurs.

Attachment

Tab I Incoming memo with background papers

4577

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 5, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT KIMMITT
DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

FROM: Marshall Breger 
Special Assistant to the President
for Public Liaison

The enclosed letter from Abe Stolar, an American citizen resident for many years in the Soviet Union (who wishes to leave with his family), was passed on to me from the American Embassy in Moscow. How, if at all, should it be handled?

Stolars plight has received considerable publicity in this country.

Enclosure

Moscow, April 25, 1985

President Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President,

I have written to you before on various occasions. I congratulated you on November 12 on your re-election. This time I am making an outright desperate appeal for greatly needed help.

I am an American held captive in the Soviet Union with my family for ten years. The U.S. Embassy in Moscow and the State Department are acquainted with my case.

I was born in Chicago, but when I came to Russia in 1931 at the age of 19, I was made a Soviet citizen without my knowledge or consent. In 1975 my Russian-born wife, minor son, and I received permission to emigrate to Israel. At the plane on our way out, our exit visas were rescinded. For the last ten years, we have been doing everything in our power to get out. Our exit visas were issued in exchange for our citizenship, so that we are now not Soviets, but Americans exclusively. The exit visas registered us as stateless.

Two and a half years ago, our son married a Soviet girl, Julia Triasunova, so that our family now consists of four members. The Soviets refuse to recognize our American citizenship, and in violation of their own strict laws deny us the Soviet documents essential for merely being in the USSR, let alone working, studying, or marrying. Accordingly, the marriage bureau refuses to register the marriage. But it was performed by a rabbi, and thus, the whole world recognizes the marriage, but not the Soviet Union.

Finally, after ten years of fighting for permission to leave this country, three members of my family were given permission, but not our daughter-in-law. The Soviets are making an all-out effort to break up my family.

Our freedom effort has reached the most acute stage in these last ten years. It has greatly deteriorated our health. My wife is 67 and I am 73. If only my wife and I leave Russia, it is certain that we will never see our son again. If he leaves with us, he will never see his wife again.

Something really drastic must be done to finally secure the release of my whole family of four. Is it too much to hope you will be able to use your hotline to the Kremlin or any other strong measure to get my whole family of four out of Russia?

With sincere, deep gratitude for anything you will undertake to save my family,

Sincerely, hopefully yours,

Abel Stolar

ABEL STOLAR

U.S. Passport No. L3-86053

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NLRR EOB 7/14/77 #9530

BY CN NARA DATE 7/7/88~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ OTTAWA 04547

EXDIS - STOCKHOLM FOR USDEL CDE

FROM USDEL HREM

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, CSCE, UR
SUBJ: LIST OF 24 INDIVIDUALS SEEKING TO EMIGRATE
REF: SCHMIDT-HAND/DAVIDSON TELECON OF JUNE 61. ~~C~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. U.S. ALTERNATE DELEGATE ON JUNE 12 PRESENTED LIST OF 24 INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE SEEKING TO EMIGRATE FROM THE USSR, TOGETHER WITH THEIR FAMILIES, TO SOVIET DEPUTY REPRESENTATIVE, SERGEI KONDRACHEV. US ALT REP EXPLAINED THAT ON BASIS OF HIS EXPERIENCE AS CONSULAR OFFICER IN MOSCOW, NONE OF THESE CASES SHOULD PRESENT ANY SIGNIFICANT OBSTACLES TO ISSUANCE OF EXIT VISAS. MOST OF THEM WERE OLD AND AILING, WHILE OTHERS WERE WIVES OR HUSBANDS OF AMERICAN CITIZENS. KONDRACHEV ASKED WHY WE WERE TAKING MATTER UP HERE AT HREM RATHER THAN BILATERALLY IN EMBASSIES AND ALT REP REPEATED HIS INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT THAT THESE SPECIFIC CASES HAD BEEN BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE U.S. HREM DELEGATION BY RELATIVES IN THE UNITED STATES. HE ASSUMED THAT THEIR NAMES WOULD ALSO APPEAR ON THE LONGER LISTS WHICH U.S. REPS HAD PASSED TO SOVIET OFFICIALS IN OTHER CHANNELS.

3. KONDRACHEV READ CAREFULLY THROUGH THE LIST, OBSERVING IN PASSING THAT HE WAS SURPRISED TO SEE THE NAME OF ABE STOLAR ON IT. THE STOLAR CASE HAD BEEN RESOLVED FAVORABLY AND HE THOUGHT THAT U.S. OFFICIALS HAD ALREADY BEEN INFORMED ABOUT THAT. AS FOR THE OTHER NAMES, HE STATED THAT A NUMBER OF THE CASES WERE UNDER ACTIVE REVIEW AND THAT HE EXPECTED FAVORABLE ACTION ON SEVERAL OF THEM VERY SOON, PERHAPS EVEN BEFORE THE END OF THE HREM (JUNE 17). AT THIS POINT, KONDRACHEV NOTED THAT HE COULD NOT ACCEPT

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT

PAGE 02 OF 02 OTTAWA 4847

DTG: 141506Z JUN 85 PSN: 067411

THE LIST PRESENTED TO HIM AS HIS INSTRUCTIONS DID NOT PERMIT HIM TO DO SO.

4. US ALT REP EMPHASIZED AGAIN THAT ALL 24 CASES WERE ENTIRELY NON-POLITICAL & THEIR EXIT SHOULD NOT PRESENT GREAT DIFFICULTIES AS FAR AS SOVIET AUTHORITIES WERE CONCERNED. THERE WERE ALSO OTHER, MORE FAMOUS CASES IN WHICH THE U. S. WAS INTERESTED, SUCH AS DR. SAKHAROV AND MRS. BONNER. KONDRACHEV WAVED THIS ASIDE WITH THE COMMENT THAT THEY ARE IN A DIFFERENT CATEGORY AS WE KNEW.

5. COPIES OF LIST BEING POUCHED DEPARTMENT (EUR/SOV) AND EMBASSIES MOSCOW AND TEL AVIV. SCHIFTER.
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Directorate of
Intelligence

~~Secret~~

File
0912
~~mullock~~

Soviet Dissent and Its Repression Since the 1975 Helsinki Accords

An Intelligence Assessment

FOIA(b)(1)

FOIA(b)(3)

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NLRRF06-114/7 #9525

BY KRL NARA DATE 5/7/13

~~Secret~~

SOV 85-10130X
July 1985

Copy 011





Directorate of
Intelligence

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49

Soviet Dissent and Its Repression Since the 1975 Helsinki Accords

An Intelligence Assessment

This paper was prepared by [redacted]
Office of Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
Domestic Policy Division, SOVA, [redacted]
[redacted]

~~Secret~~

SOV 85-10130X
July 1985

Soviet Dissent and Its Repression Since the 1975 Helsinki Accords

Key Judgments

*Information available
as of 15 June 1985
was used in this report.*

Since signing the 1975 Helsinki Accords, Moscow has intensified its repression of Soviet citizens. The increase in repression occurred in large part in response to the upsurge in dissent that Moscow's signing of the Accords inspired. In addition, it probably was intended as a firm rebuff to what the Soviets perceived as US efforts to intervene directly in their internal affairs by making the easing of Soviet restrictions on human rights a condition for improved bilateral relations.

The Soviet regime was slow to crack down on the post-Helsinki spread of dissent. Shortly after the publication of the Accords in *Pravda* in August 1975, Moscow dissidents—ignoring KGB warnings to desist—began to organize a group to monitor Soviet adherence to them. By early 1977, dissidents in Lithuania, the Ukraine, and Georgia as well as in Moscow had established a network of Helsinki monitoring groups. The KGB allowed the members of this “human rights movement” to meet freely with Western supporters and even hold press conferences with foreign newsmen. Older, underground dissident groups, for the most part nationalist and religious in focus, also stepped up their activities in anticipation of receiving greater international attention and support. Dissident scientist Andrey Sakharov even appealed in writing to US President Jimmy Carter to champion the cause of Soviet human rights activists—and received a personal letter from the President promising to do so.

In early 1977, the Soviet authorities, increasingly aware of the extent of their dissident problem and Washington's willingness to press the human rights issue, cracked down hard on the Helsinki monitors, arresting such leading dissidents as Aleksandr Ginzburg, Mykola Rudenko, Yuriy Orlov, and Anatoliy Shcharanskiy. Aside from verbal attacks, however, the regime did not move against Sakharov, the most prominent Soviet dissident, and Jewish emigration was allowed to increase in 1978 and 1979. This mixed response may well have been designed to keep Western critics off balance and thereby allow for positive movement on bilateral issues of arms control and trade.

In 1980, in the wake of the Western condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent virtual suspension of superpower dialogue, Moscow dropped any pretense of concern with foreign criticism of its human rights record. Sakharov was exiled from Moscow and placed under house arrest, Jewish emigration was cut by half, and the Soviet security organs were allowed to move even more freely against dissident activists.

Under its chairman, Yuriy Andropov, the KGB refined existing techniques of repression and developed new, more sophisticated measures to manage the dissident problem:

- Many of the most prominent dissidents were allowed or forced to emigrate.
- Others were arrested on criminal rather than political charges or confined in psychiatric hospitals.
- Induction of would-be Jewish emigrants into the military enabled the authorities to cite reasons of "state security" to deny permission to leave the USSR.
- The criminal code was revised to simplify the antidissident effort.
- Intimidation of Western journalists was stepped up in an effort to stop their reporting about the dissidents' lot.

By these and other measures, open human rights activity and nationalist dissent have been effectively repressed. Unofficial religious activity is currently the most vigorous form of dissent, but it, too, has been hard hit. Emigration has ceased to be a practical option for Jews and other minority peoples. Despite a recent small increase in the number of Jews permitted to leave the USSR, Soviet officials have indicated that they consider the era of large-scale emigration to be over.

To encourage dialogue with the West on longstanding issues of concern, General Secretary Gorbachev may make some minor concessions on human rights. His past and recent statements suggest, however, that no significant easing of restrictions on dissent is likely. Such actions could give his critics an issue on which to fault his performance and alienate even longtime supporters.

Although the "human rights" movement with its reliance on overt dissent has little prospect of recovery under current conditions, religious and nationalist dissidence, because it is so diffuse and difficult to control, is likely to reemerge. Religious believers have displayed an unusual willingness to take great risks in their efforts to worship according to their conscience. They also have developed an extensive clandestine network of activists and supporters from which to recruit replacements for arrested leaders. Nationalist dissidents have displayed similar tenacity, and regime actions on issues such as the regional allocation of resources and educational policy could spark nationalist tensions that, in turn, could stimulate nationalist dissent.



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Soviet Dissent and Its Repression Since the 1975 Helsinki Accords

The Ascent of the Human Rights Movement

The signing of the 1975 Helsinki Accords¹ by the Soviet Government gave new life to a moribund dissident movement.² Following the publication of the full text of the Accords in *Pravda*, discussion of relevant clauses on human rights, self-determination, and the free flow of people and information became widespread within intellectual circles, according to an emigre dissident (see inset for human rights provisions of the Accords). In May 1976, this ferment resulted in the formation of the Public Group for Monitoring Implementation of the Helsinki Accords in Moscow. Subsequently, branches were formed in Lithuania and the Ukraine (November 1976), Georgia (January 1977), and Armenia (April 1977).

The upsurge in dissent was subsequently fueled by the international support that it aroused. In the United States, in particular, support for Soviet human rights activists came to enjoy a higher official priority than in the past. According to US Embassy reports, Washington's open advocacy of the dissidents' cause was viewed by some Soviet human rights activists as a potential shield against persecution.

To judge from their public statements and actions, the Soviet activists monitoring the Helsinki Accords perceived themselves as apolitical defenders of the rights of citizens rather than as critics of the state. Citing the Accords and the other human rights declarations signed by the Soviet Government, they carried out their work in an open manner, signing names to documents, meeting freely with Western supporters, and even holding press conferences with foreign newsmen. Under the leadership of Yuriy Orlov, the Moscow Helsinki group brought together veterans of the

¹ The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), attended by 33 European nations plus the United States and Canada, was held in Helsinki in 1975 and addressed a wide range of security, economic, and humanitarian issues. Followup conferences were held in Belgrade in 1978-79 and Madrid in 1980-83.

² For the purposes of this paper, dissent and dissidence will mean deliberate activity by an individual or group that is designed to protest the policies of a given regime and bring about change in those policies. This definition does not encompass spontaneous mass activities such as riots or worker strikes.

Human Rights Provisions of the August 1975 Helsinki Accords

The participating states will:

Respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or belief for all....

Promote and encourage the effective exercise of civil, political, economic, social, cultural, and other rights and freedoms....

Ensure that all peoples have the right to pursue their political, economic, social, and cultural development.

Facilitate freer movement and contacts among persons and institutions....

Allow persons to enter or leave their territory temporarily to visit members of their families.

Deal in a positive and humanitarian spirit with applications of persons who wish to be reunited with their families....

Examine favorably requests from persons who have decided to marry a citizen from another participating state.

Facilitate freer and wider dissemination of information, encourage cooperation in the exchange of information with other countries, and improve the conditions under which journalists exercise their profession....



Figure 1. Moscow human rights supporters, 1977

dissident community such as Aleksandr Ginzburg, Ludmilla Alekseyeva, Petr Grigorenko, and Yelena Bonner, who provided continuity for the group and valuable guidance to the younger, inexperienced activists. Anatoliy Shcharanskiy served as liaison between the Helsinki group and the Jewish emigration movement. Other group members included Aleksandr Podrabinek and Irina Grivnina, the founders of the Psychiatric Abuses Watch Group. Andrey Sakharov did not officially belong to the group but used his protected position and status as a member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences to support its activities and publicize regime measures against its members.

The activism of the Helsinki movement encouraged established dissident groups and led to the formation of new ones. According to Soviet dissident contacts of our Embassy in Moscow, the dissident aid organization, the Solzhenitsyn Fund, was able to bolster its widespread network of activists to provide assistance to dissidents around the country. Also, an unofficial trade union, SMOT, was formed to defend workers in disputes with official bodies and to push for better worker representation by official trade unions.

In this environment of accelerated dissident activity, samizdat materials (protest literature written and disseminated illegally by individuals or groups) proliferated. Following the example of the most important samizdat journal, the *Chronicle of Current Events*, these publications reported the arrests and trials of

political prisoners and persecution of religious believers and ethnic minorities. Some groups concentrated their publishing efforts on subjects that Soviet dissidents had generally neglected in the past. The tiny Group for the Defense of the Rights of Invalids produced a large volume of samizdat that exposed Soviet discriminatory practices toward the handicapped. A small group of Leningrad women produced two feminist journals, *Zhenshchina i Rossiya* (Women and Russia) and *Maria*, that criticized the inability of the regime to correct the injustices from which Soviet women suffer.

The human rights movement enjoyed and indeed depended on a large foreign support network. Foreigners—newsmen, official visitors, and even tourists—channeled samizdat reports out of the country. This information was used to confront official Soviet representatives at international meetings. Western radio-broadcasts into the Soviet Union used this same material as part of their efforts to serve as a communications channel between dissident groups throughout the country and to provide an alternative to the official version of events for nondissident citizens,

Foreign supporters were also able to render vital material aid to dissidents who were often unemployed with families to support.

The Spillover Effect

The signing of the Helsinki Accords also gave new life to nationalist and religious dissent and the Jewish emigration movement. These sources of dissent long predated the rise of the human rights movement, but their leaders evidently believed that their groups could benefit from the increased international attention to the plight of Soviet dissidents that had been aroused by the activities of the Helsinki monitors. (See the appendixes for a more extensive discussion of nationalist and religious dissent and the Jewish emigration movement.)

The Moscow-based human rights activity had a significant impact on nationalist dissidents in the Ukraine and the Baltic republics. The Ukrainian and

Lithuanian Helsinki groups were populated by veteran nationalist activists who used the Accords as a vehicle to promote local objectives. [] the Lithuanian group also agreed to represent Estonian and Latvian interests at the request of leading activists of those republics. []

In the Baltic republics in 1977, nationalist dissidents not directly affiliated with the Helsinki groups formed an organization of their own—the Supreme Committee of the National Movement of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—that imitated the tactics of the human rights activists. []

[] the Supreme Committee was formed to coordinate the activities of dissidents who intended to work within the system to obtain the rights promised to minority nationalities by the Soviet constitution. []

Religious dissidents also were able to capitalize on the publicity and foreign support generated by the human rights activists to gain international attention for their cause. [] their efforts to attract such publicity also won them many Soviet supporters who were impressed by the boldness of the nonconformists in contrast to the subservience of officially regulated church groups. []

An early example of post-Helsinki activism by religious dissidents came in December 1976 when Russian Orthodox priest Gleb Yakunin and several associates formed the Christian Committee for the Defense of Believers' Rights to report official persecution of believers. A similar group was formed in Lithuania in December 1978 by the Lithuanian priest Alfonsas Svarinskas. Later, some Ukrainian Uniate Catholics, led by activist priest Josef Terelya, formed the Initiative Group for the Defense of Believers' Rights to coordinate the activities of Uniates attempting to win legal status for their church. []

Pentecostals and other fundamentalist Protestant groups have also sought to take advantage of the international attention focused on Soviet dissent in the Helsinki era. In November 1980, according to dissident and Embassy sources, 30,000 Pentecostals staged a five-day hunger strike to bring their situation to the attention of participants at the Madrid CSCE meeting. []

The Jewish emigration movement had been perhaps the most active and well-organized branch of Soviet dissent in the few years before the signing of the Helsinki Accords. The new Helsinki-inspired human rights groups made a conscious effort to draw upon the expertise and enthusiasm of the Jewish movement, designating Anatoliy Shcharanskiy to serve as liaison with its leadership and recruiting Jewish refuseniks (Jews denied permission to emigrate) as Helsinki monitors. The well-established Jewish movement had less reason than weaker dissident groups to imitate the Helsinki monitors, but its members apparently believed that they could benefit from the increased international attention to Soviet dissidents that the activity of the Helsinki groups fueled. []

Soviet Reaction to Increased Dissent

The Soviet regime, which historically had reacted to incipient dissident activity with swift and harsh repression, was slow to crack down on the spread of dissent that its signing of the Helsinki Accords inspired (see inset). Moscow dissident Yuriy Orlov reported [] that in the winter of 1975-76 the KGB was aware of his efforts to organize a Helsinki monitoring group and warned him not to do so. However, from May 1976, when Orlov's Moscow group was formally established, until early 1977, he and his associates were able to conduct their activities in an open fashion. By November similar groups had been openly established in Lithuania and the Ukraine, and by year's end religious dissidents—picking up on the tactics of the Helsinki monitors—were becoming more open in their dissent. []

There are several possible explanations for the initial tolerance of the spread of overt dissent. With the dissident movement all but dormant at the time the Accords were signed, the leadership may have felt there would be no significant reaction to them. The authorities may also have been playing a cat-and-mouse game, allowing the dissidents to organize to make it easier to pounce upon them all at once. The Soviets may also have deferred their crackdown out of concern for its potential impact on their relations with Washington during a presidential election year. In

Early Dissident Actions and Soviet and Western Reactions

1975	August	CSCE Accords signed in Helsinki; published in Pravda.		Ethnic Germans demonstrate for emigration permission in Red Square.
	Fall and winter	Widespread discussion of Accords reportedly occurs among Soviet intellectuals; Yuriy Orlov and other Moscow-based dissidents begin organizing overt groups to monitor Soviet adherence.	April	Anatoliy Shcharanskiy arrested.
1976	May	Yuriy Orlov and others found Moscow Helsinki monitoring group.	June	President Carter criticizes Soviet human rights abuses in report to Congress on CSCE implementation.
	November	Mykola Rudenko founds Ukrainian Helsinki monitoring group. Lithuanian Helsinki monitoring group founded. Both groups imitate the overt activities of the Moscow monitoring group.		US correspondent held in Lefortovo prison for three days for allegedly receiving secret information; allowed to depart USSR after release.
	December	Vladimir Bukovskiy exchanged for Chilean Communist Party leader Luis Corvalan. Orthodox priest Gleb Yakunin founds Christian Committee for the Defense of Believers' Rights.	July	Podrabinek's expose of Soviet psychiatric abuse, "Punitive Medicine," arrives in West.
1977	January	Aleksandr Podrabinek founds Psychiatric Abuse Watch Group; Andrey Sakharov sends letter to President Carter urging him to defend Soviet dissidents.	August	Supreme Committee of National Movement of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania founded.
		Georgian Helsinki monitoring group founded.	September	Sixth World Psychiatric Congress condemns Soviet abuse of psychiatry for political purposes.
	February	Aleksandr Ginzburg, head of Solzhenitsyn Fund, arrested. US correspondent ordered to leave the USSR (first expulsion since 1970).		KGB Chairman Andropov delivers speech asserting that the USSR has only a small number of dissidents, that they must be punished in accordance with Soviet laws, and that "efforts to interfere in Soviet internal affairs" conflict with detente and the Helsinki Accords.
		President Carter sends letter to Sakharov reaffirming support for human rights.	October	Belgrade CSCE Review conference opens.
		Mykola Rudenko arrested.	November	Baptist activist Petr Vins arrested.
		US State Department statement in defense of Ginzburg.	December	Vladimir Klebanov announces formation of Association of Free Trade Unions of Workers.
		Yuriy Orlov arrested.		
	March	President Carter receives Bukovskiy.		

any event, throughout 1976, despite unprecedented overt dissent, the Soviet security organs limited their antidissident actions to low-level warnings and harassment. []

By early 1977, however, it was probably clear to the Soviet authorities that growing numbers of their citizens were perceiving Moscow's well-publicized signing of the Helsinki Accords as an indication that it would condone overt dissent. The regime's problem was exacerbated by the US decision to give public support to Soviet dissidents—a decision highlighted by President Carter's exchange of letters with Sakharov. In a series of actions clearly designed to signal that both dissent itself and foreign involvement in Soviet internal affairs had reached the limits of their tolerance, the authorities moved decisively against the human rights movement by arresting Ginzburg, Rudenko, Orlov, and Shcharanskiy. Other arrests were made as the year progressed, and a number of prominent dissidents were allowed or forced to emigrate. When these initial measures failed to bring dissident activity under control, the regime accelerated repression. A methodical pattern of arrests and trials, often accompanied by scurrilous propaganda, continued through 1978 and 1979. Moscow Helsinki group members, as well as prominent refuseniks and religious and nationalist leaders, were imprisoned. []

At the same time, the regime took no direct action against Sakharov, the Soviet Union's most prominent dissident, and Jewish emigration was allowed to increase. This mixed response may have been an attempt to keep Western critics off balance and allow for continued superpower dialogue on issues of Soviet interest while sending a clear repressive signal to the Soviet populace. []

After the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, however, Moscow dropped any pretense that it was concerned about foreign reaction. Probably perceiving that it had little to lose, the leadership allowed the security organs to move even more freely against activists and accelerate its rate of arrests. Most notably, in January 1980, Sakharov—who had condemned the Afghan invasion—was exiled to the city

of Gorkiy and placed under house arrest without being charged or tried for a specific crime.³ []

By late 1980, [] morale in the human rights community was low, and activists were seriously questioning the wisdom of their open approach, which allowed the authorities to identify them so easily. By mid-1981, no new members were coming forward, and the few remaining dissidents were not asking for volunteers because it meant inevitable arrest for the new activists. By the end of 1981, the human rights movement had been effectively crushed:

- The four republic Helsinki groups were defunct, and the Moscow group had only three semiactive members.
- The Helsinki auxiliary groups—Psychiatric Abuses Watch Group and the Christian Committee for the Defense of Believers' Rights—were inactive.
- Several dissident journals, including the *Chronicle of Current Events*, had been forced to cease publication. []

The other variants of dissent were severely affected by repression as well:

- In 1980 the Soviets cut Jewish emigration by over 50 percent, issuing only 20,340 visas. The downward spiral has continued, and last year's total of only 896 was the lowest since 1970.
- Dmitriy Dudko, a leading Russian Orthodox dissident, was forced to recant his views in a televised appearance in 1980 and subsequently withdrew from dissident activity.
- A fledgling cooperative group formed by activists from all three Baltic republics was crushed by arrests and forced emigration of members. []

There were several reasons for the human rights movement's inability to withstand the intensified crackdown. In addition to the strength of its adversary—the KGB—the movement also suffered from internal problems including the absence of a vigorous,

³ For an account of Sakharov's hunger strike last summer, see DI typescript memorandum SOVA M-10164 []²⁵ September 1984, *The Sakharov Case: A Soviet Saga*. []

charismatic leader of international renown, lack of organization and dispersal of resources, and what proved to be an increasingly naive belief that foreign support would provide protection from regime repression. []

The Role of the KGB

The KGB has the primary responsibility for quelling domestic dissent. More than in earlier periods, however, the KGB has had to deal with leadership concerns over its international image. In response, under the leadership of its chairman, Yuriy Andropov, the KGB refined existing techniques and developed new, more sophisticated methods of repression, deemphasizing simple thuggery and making greater use of administrative and judicial means of containing dissent. The KGB's goal was both to get the dissidents off the streets and to keep them off the pages of the international press. []

Emigration and Exile. Many of the most prominent and effective dissident intellectuals and refuseniks were allowed or forced to emigrate. In our view, this tactic was designed to limit adverse Western reaction to the antidissident crackdown. Arresting such dissidents would have been the simplest means of stopping their activities. In prison, however, well-known dissidents might well have become rallying points for Western critics of Soviet human rights policy. Exile and emigration, moreover, were as effective as arrest in depriving the dissident community of its best known and most respected leaders. The KGB also used emigration as a carrot and stick—granting it as a reward for refuseniks (and sometimes non-Jewish dissidents) who kept quiet, while denying it to those who sought publicity for their cause. Examples include Lev Kopelev and Vasilii Aksenov, prominent intellectuals, who were allowed to go abroad in 1981 only to have their citizenship revoked later; Georgiy Vladimov, noted author and head of the Moscow chapter of Amnesty International; and peace activist Sergey Batovrin, who chose emigration over the threatened alternative of imprisonment. []

Arrest on Criminal Charges. Another technique employed by the KGB has been to arrest some dissidents on criminal charges rather than the more typical political charges, such as anti-Soviet behavior. This approach reinforces domestic propaganda that paints

dissidents as criminal renegades. Additionally, if the activist is unknown in the West, his plight may not come to the attention of concerned parties as it might if he were charged with a political crime. To support the criminal charge, the KGB recruits a victim and witnesses to the alleged crime, or plants false evidence during a search. In 1981, for example, refusenik Stanislav Zubko was sentenced to four years in labor camp for possession of a pistol and narcotics that, [] the KGB had planted in his unattended apartment. []

Rearrest. [] many of their colleagues, already in prison or internal exile, have been rearrested on trumped-up political or criminal charges and given another labor camp sentence before their initial term was completed. This approach keeps dissidents out of action and demoralizes their friends and associates. It befell numerous Helsinki monitors who otherwise would have been released almost simultaneously and who might have brought about a resurgence of human rights activity. Vladimir Skvirskiy, a SMOT activist, was arrested in 1978 for theft, rearrested in 1980 or 1981 on the same charge, and sentenced to one and a half years in labor camp. He was arrested a third time, for anti-Soviet slander, and sentenced in February 1983 to three years in labor camp. []

Confinement in Psychiatric Hospitals. The practice of sentencing dissidents to psychiatric hospitals has been a favorite KGB technique because the prisoner can be confined indefinitely without being charged. The late Aleksey Nikitin, for example, spent almost 11 years in psychiatric hospitals for defending workers' rights in the Ukraine. Although the technique had been common as early as the 1960s, it became more widespread in the years after the signing of the Helsinki Accords. International criticism of this practice led to the release of some victims (see inset), but in 1981 Amnesty International estimated that up to 1,000 persons were confined in psychiatric hospitals for political reasons. []

Inducting Dissidents. Drafting dissidents into the military is a technique that has been especially effective against Jews and Pentecostals wishing to

***A Successful Criticism of
Soviet Human Rights Abuses***

A rare example of human rights activity having an effect on Soviet behavior was the work of the Psychiatric Abuse Watch Group, established in 1977. Founding member Aleksandr Podrabinek, a medical technician, compiled a report documenting numerous cases of wrongful incarceration of political prisoners in psychiatric hospitals. Podrabinek's report was smuggled to the West and was instrumental in the World Psychiatric Association's (WPA) 1977 denunciation of Soviet practices and sparked anew the Western psychiatric community's debate over the possibility of forcing Soviet compliance with world standards in the field of psychiatry. The debate reached such a pitch that in early 1983 the Soviets withdrew from the WPA rather than be subjected to a minute examination of their methods and probable expulsion. Of the 22 victims of psychiatric abuse documented in Podrabinek's report, 14 were later released.

emigrate, because it delays emigration and enables the regime to cite reasons of "state security" to deny applicants permission to leave the USSR. Draftees who refuse to take the oath of loyalty are often court-martialed for pacifism or brutally assaulted by fellow conscripts to force them to denounce their religious beliefs. Young men who refuse to report for military service are arrested for draft evasion. In May 1980, four Baptist recruits were pressured by military authorities to take the oath of loyalty or face long prison sentences. One of the recruits had two brothers who had served prison terms for failure to take the oath. In August 1984, refusenik Aleksandr Yakir was sentenced to two years in labor camp for draft evasion, according to Embassy reporting.

Making the Crime Fit the Punishment. The practice of fine-tuning the criminal code to simplify the work of the KGB is not new in the Soviet Union. In 1966 Andrey Sinyavskiy and Yuliy Daniel were tried for violation of Article 70, which forbids "agitation or propaganda carried on for the purpose of subverting . . . the Soviet regime." The defendants asserted they had not intended to weaken the Soviet state by

sending their literary works abroad for publication. Seven months after the conviction of Sinyavskiy and Daniel, Article 190-1, which prohibits anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda but does not require proof of subversive intent, was added to the criminal code.

In the short period from September 1983 to January 1984, a number of additions and revisions were made to the Soviet legal code that broadened the criteria for determining a political crime and defining evidence in political cases. These changes gave authorities greater control over political prisoners. The change potentially most detrimental to dissidents was the addition of Article 188-3, which states that a prisoner who is accused of "malicious disobedience" of camp authorities and confined to "cell-type accommodations" as a result may be sentenced to another three years in camp. This law simplifies the resentencing of prisoners by replacing a criminal procedure with an administrative one more easily controlled by camp officials. Under Article 188-3, the camp director need only interpret some action of a prisoner as "malicious disobedience," recruit a member of his staff as a witness, and proceed with the trial. Thus, political prisoners who attempt to continue their dissident activities while in labor camp by smuggling out reports of camp conditions and maltreatment of prisoners, staging hunger strikes, or circulating samizdat are automatically vulnerable to further prosecution.

The regime also revised Article 70 of the criminal code, which deals with anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda, to prohibit "actions perpetrated with the use of financial means or other material valuables received from foreign organizations or individuals." This clause applies to a wide range of dissidents—refuseniks, religious believers, and members of dissident aid groups such as the Solzhenitsyn Fund—who receive vital financial and material aid from foreigners.

* This refers to temporary detention in the prison, located in every labor camp, for even the smallest infraction of camp regulations.

A revision of Article 77-1—on activities that disrupt the work of corrective labor institutions—added a clause that states that prisoners who “organize criminal group actions” or who “terrorize” fellow inmates will be punished by a sentence of three to eight years. This clause could be stretched to cover anything from a hunger strike by several political prisoners to a large-scale camp riot. Also at risk are religious believers who often evangelize fellow prisoners—activity that the regime has in the past labeled “terrorizing.”

[]

A final change in the criminal code relevant to dissidents was the revision of Article 198-2—on willful abandonment of a residence by a person under administrative supervision to avoid supervision. Dissidents sometimes try to evade capture by going underground or traveling to another region. Now, any such attempt at evasion is punishable by one to three years of deprivation of freedom in addition to other political or criminal charges. []

Cutting Off Foreign Support. The Soviet authorities accompanied the crackdown on dissent with an effort to curtail dissidents’ contacts with their Western supporters. During the heyday of the human rights movement in 1976 and early 1977 many Western journalists in Moscow had close ties to the dissident community. The correspondents were well placed to report each act of official repression, with US journalists being the most aggressive. The regime responded with warnings in the press accusing some journalists of criminal activity and espionage, and one US journalist was expelled. When these warnings did not dampen the correspondents’ zeal, the authorities detained a US journalist in June 1977 for three days of interrogation in Lefortovo Prison in connection with the Shcharanskiy case. Although the Soviets gave the strong impression that he would stand trial, they apparently decided they had made their point and allowed the journalist to leave the country. []

Since 1977, the Kremlin has kept pressure on foreigners with occasional reminders that they can be held accountable for their actions while in the Soviet Union:

- In 1978, two US newsmen were summoned to appear in a Moscow courtroom on slander charges stemming from their coverage of nationalist disturbances in the Transcaucasus.

- In 1982, members of an official Canadian Jewish Congress delegation were beaten and robbed by unidentified assailants when they attempted to visit a Leningrad refusenik.
- In February through April 1984, at least 16 US and West European refusenik supporters, in the USSR on tourist visas, were expelled for “pro-Zionist activities.”
- In July 1984, two US Embassy officers were forcibly detained during a routine contact with a member of the Solzhenitsyn Fund. []

Moscow also has suspended some communications services and disrupted others to hinder dissident links with foreigners, prevent Soviet citizens from being exposed to foreign influences, and keep information embarrassing to the regime from getting to foreign audiences. In 1980, the number of telephone lines to the West was drastically cut, and direct dial service was suspended because of “technical difficulties.” Soon thereafter, increased Soviet interference with the international mails disrupted postal deliveries in both directions. A few halfhearted attempts have been made to interrupt Finnish television reception in Estonia, but these have been unsuccessful. []

Western Reaction to Soviet Human Rights Policies

The West European approach to Soviet human rights in the bilateral context is generally low key. The West Germans have been the most persistent in their efforts on behalf of ethnic Germans wishing to emigrate from the USSR, and West German leaders consistently raise the issue with the Soviets, even though they invariably receive a sharp rebuff. More representative of the type of “individualized” approach favored by West Europeans is the customary representation made on behalf of one or several specific cases. Many European heads of state have at one time or another indicated their support for Orlov, Shcharanskiy, and other selected individuals in official discussions with Soviet leaders. For example, the situation of Andrey Sakharov last summer prompted West German Chancellor Kohl, British Foreign Secretary Howe, and French President Mitterrand to make strong declarations in support of Sakharov during their 1984 visits



Figure 2. Sakharov walking with doctor and psychiatrist at a Gorkiy hospital after his hunger strike, summer 1984.

to Moscow. By confining their comments to specific cases, West European leaders seek to demonstrate their regard for human rights and support for the US position while minimizing damage to their ties to the USSR.

CSCE. The United States and Western Europe have also raised the issue of Soviet violations of human rights at the followup conferences to Helsinki, but such actions have not led the Soviets to comply with the human rights provisions. At the 1978 Belgrade CSCE Review, for example, Western governments insisted on a complete review of Moscow's lack of compliance with the 1975 Accords, but the Soviet side refused to allow any discussion of human rights. The result, in the words of the Belgrade concluding document, was that: "different views were expressed as to the degree of implementation of the Final Act . . . consensus was not reached on a number of proposals submitted to the meeting." The CSCE process, nonetheless, was preserved by scheduling the 1980 Madrid followup conference.

The troubled three-year Madrid conference eventually yielded positive, if symbolic, results on human rights, but only after considerable friction. Moscow

was on the defensive going into the meeting because of its military presence in Afghanistan. Its position deteriorated further after the imposition of martial law in Poland in December 1980. Western recrimination on these two points resulted in a nine-month adjournment. After the session reconvened, the Western side cited numerous Soviet human rights violations and listed 65 individual dissidents who were victims of Soviet violations. The West called for inclusion in the final act of provisions for religious freedom, the right to form free trade unions, and improved working conditions for foreign journalists. The West also pressed for a followup meeting on human contacts (later scheduled for April 1986) and a meeting of human rights experts (held in May and June 1985).

Moscow, in pursuit of a Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE), apparently felt that a certain amount of Western tongue lashing could be tolerated if an agreement on CDE could be obtained. The Soviets did not take the criticism meekly, however, but charged the United States with trying to bring about the failure of the conference. Moscow ultimately accepted the human rights provisions and the two followup conferences on human contacts. But, in his speech at the concluding session, Foreign Minister Gromyko declared that interference in the internal affairs of socialist countries was "hopeless" and that the Final Act does not authorize anyone to act as "umpire" on human rights questions.

The symbolic victory scored by the West at Madrid will probably have little practical significance. Moscow almost certainly will not comply with any of the provisions concerning religious freedom and trade unions. And, in the light of Soviet behavior at Belgrade and Madrid, the probability of meaningful dialogue occurring at the followup conference on human contacts is slight. To defuse Western comment immediately before the conference, the Soviets could make some cosmetic concessions such as releasing several prominent dissidents or resolving several longstanding family reunification cases. But at the meeting the Soviets are likely to adopt the same type of

stubborn, uncompromising stance that they took at Belgrade and block any worthwhile discussion on human rights. []

Prospects for Future Dissent

There is little reason to believe that the current regime will be more responsive to human rights issues than past regimes. General Secretary Gorbachev, in his few public statements on the issue, has taken the standard Soviet line that human rights is an internal matter not subject to foreign meddling. During a visit to Canada in May 1983, for example, he maintained that existing Soviet legislation guaranteed equitable treatment of requests by Soviet Jews to emigrate. During his visit to Great Britain last December, Gorbachev's temper flared in response to a British official's question on human rights. Gorbachev's response was curt: "You govern your society and leave us to govern ours." []

While strengthening his grip on power, moreover, Gorbachev is not likely to ease restrictions in the sensitive area of human rights. Such actions might give his critics an issue on which to fault his performance and could alienate even longstanding supporters uncomfortable with any moves that might appear to justify Western criticism of the Soviet system. At the same time, with dissent at its lowest ebb in a decade, Gorbachev probably is under little pressure to adopt additional repressive measures. []

Gorbachev and his colleagues may make some concessions in the human rights area to give the impression of an openness to an expanded dialogue on issues such as arms control and trade—which have been linked in Western eyes to Soviet performance on human rights. Indeed, there is some evidence that, early this year, Moscow may have manipulated Jewish emigration for this purpose. Emigration increased slightly over the same period last year with most of the increase representing longtime Moscow refuseniks. This increase was widely publicized in the West, and, according to US Embassy officers, some members of the refusenik community also seem more optimistic now than at any time in recent years. Still, the repression of religious activists is continuing unabated, and labor camp conditions for imprisoned activists are worsening. []

Another move that Gorbachev might make to improve Moscow's image in the area of human rights would be the release of several high-visibility dissidents, possibly even Orlov or Shcharanskiy. Such a step, whether tightly negotiated or a unilateral gesture, would probably reap immense public relations gains with little real cost to Moscow. []

The regime is likely, however, to stonewall any explicit attempt to link human rights with arms control or trade as has been done in the past. Their experiences with the Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson amendments and the three acrimonious CSCE conferences have put the Soviets on guard against letting what they view as an internal national security matter become entangled in foreign policy issues and forums they may not be able to control. Moreover, the leadership may believe there is a good chance that US attempts to use substantive levers rather than public opinion to force Soviet compliance would not be supported by the NATO allies. The West Europeans are willing to condemn Moscow with rhetoric but shy away from economic sanctions, as was demonstrated when the United States tried to impose such sanctions against the USSR at the height of the Polish and Afghan crises. []

With no significant easing of repression in sight, the prospects for a revival of dissent in the near term are generally dim. Yet, because the strength of the different dissident groups and the impact of the regime's repressive measures on them have varied, some variants of dissent are more likely than others to re-emerge. []

The wholesale depletion of the ranks of open dissenters in the Helsinki groups almost certainly has persuaded dissidents of the necessity of underground operation, and precluded the reemergence of the "human rights" movement. Early on, members of the Ukrainian Helsinki group realized the cost of their overt activity and began to turn toward clandestine operation, according to Embassy reporting. The return to underground dissent probably will be accompanied by an increase in samizdat production. Though

currently at a low level, samizdat is the logical vent for dissident views that cannot be openly expressed by other means during periods of harsh repression. []

The future seems particularly grim for Jewish emigration and dissent. Despite the recent small increase in the rate of emigration, Moscow's apparent decision to end large-scale emigration probably is not likely to be reversed. The regime has expended considerable effort over the last several years in getting the emigration-refusenik problem under control and appears unwilling to undo all its hard work for possibly fleeting bilateral gains. Moreover, the domestic consequences of allowing some minorities to leave the country while denying that right to others also works against a renewal of large-scale emigration. As the virtual cessation of emigration continues over time, the futility of seeking exit permission will discourage all but the most desperate Jews from even applying. Meanwhile, the unauthorized practice of Jewish cultural customs, such as teaching the Hebrew language, will continue to be prohibited. []

Religion and religious dissent, however, because they are so diffuse, will continue to be difficult for the regime to control. Believers in the past have shown that they are deeply committed and willing to take risks to be able to worship according to their conscience. Dissident religious leaders have been able to instill a significant degree of militancy and activism in their followers; attesting to this is the willingness of believers to endure daily official harassment and, increasingly, to risk arrest. This is especially true of Catholics and the Protestant sects that have engaged in wide-ranging dissident activity on a mass scale for many years. They have developed an extensive clandestine network of activists and supporters as well as some support among registered, nondissident believers. [] It is this pool of nondissident believers that will provide replacements for those who are arrested. Russian Orthodox dissent, which is less well organized and has a less active base of support, probably will continue in samizdat channels as it has in the past. []

Religion's grassroots support is difficult for the regime to tackle. The failure of the previous antireligion efforts through propaganda, harassment, and the arrest of dissident leaders is reflected by the fact that

the regime has recently resorted to arresting local church leaders. At the same time, however, the light sentences meted out to local leaders reflect the regime's awareness that severe sentences are not always suitable for this particular problem. Although increased persecution will probably lead some unofficial congregations to register with the state and some individual believers may turn away from religious observance, in the past such tactics merely led to more underground religious activity. []

Nationalist dissent also enjoys an underlying strength that makes its recovery likely. Though subdued now, Ukrainian, Baltic, Georgian, and Armenian nationalism is never far below the surface. Economic constraints, unfavorable changes in nationality policies, or inept handling of local problems by Russian authorities could easily spark nationalist tensions among the populace. This tension might, in turn, stimulate dissident nationalism and even spark occasional outbursts of violence, as it has in the past. But, because republic security officials can be more relentless and severe than their Moscow counterparts, the likely method of operation for nationalists would be underground activity, including circulation of samizdat. []

Appendix A

Soviet Nationalist and Religious Dissent in the Helsinki Era

Although less well publicized in the West than the activity of the Helsinki monitors, Soviet nationalist and religious dissent has deeper historical roots. It also touches upon issues with potentially broader appeal than those of concern to the intelligentsia-dominated Helsinki monitors in Moscow. As a result, it probably has been and still is viewed as more threatening by the Soviet authorities. []

Nationalist Dissent

Latent nationalism exists in virtually every republic in the USSR, but the formation of dissident groups and the publication of samizdat are not as widespread. During the period under review in this study, such activity was largely confined to the Baltic states and the Ukraine. Nationalist activity in Georgia and Armenia was channeled into the Helsinki forum, and in Azerbaijan and the Central Asian republics Islam has been more important than national consciousness in shaping dissent. []

In the Baltic Republics. Estonia has a strong tradition of nationalism that affects all segments of society, and, in the Helsinki era, samizdat has been an important outlet for Estonian nationalist dissent. Samizdat journals have published numerous open letters to republic, national, and foreign leaders on topics ranging from reports of arrests to the detrimental effect of oil-shale exploration on the Estonian environment. Mart Niklus, perhaps Estonia's most prominent nationalist, was involved in many of these publishing activities as well as in efforts to coordinate dissident activities throughout the Baltic republics, until his arrest in January 1981. After Niklus's arrest, several samizdat journals were able to continue operation. [] a major crackdown by the regime in 1983 and 1984 resulted in the arrest of several key dissident leaders and the curtailment of samizdat publishing. []

In Lithuania, nationalism has been as widespread as in Estonia and, at times, more violent. In October 1977, for example, armed force was required to disperse two nationalist demonstrations by Lithuanian

youths following Lithuanian-Russian sporting events. The Lithuanian national movement, however, apparently suffers from a lack of leadership and coordination. Over the last decade, []

[] a number of groups have been formed with aims ranging from greater Lithuanian autonomy to total separation from the USSR; these groups, however, have quickly collapsed under KGB pressure and have been unable to give direction to popular hostility toward the Soviet regime. []

An unusually frank official acknowledgment of nationalist activity came in a 1982 speech by republic Second Secretary Nikolay Dybenko to the Lithuanian Komsomol Central Committee. Dybenko described a nationalist group formed in 1981 by a Komsomol member at a Telsiai high school that made public anonymous anti-Soviet letters before being discovered and disbanded in February 1982. According to Dybenko, similar groups had also been discovered in Kaunas, Vilnius, and several other towns. []

Even more so than in Estonia, samizdat has been an important force in Lithuanian nationalist dissent. The most important journal (other than the *Chronicle of the Lithuanian Catholic Church*, discussed below) has been *Ausra* (The Dawn), established in 1975 to defend and preserve Lithuanian culture. Other relatively long-lived journals, such as *Perspektyvos* (Perspectives) and *Alma Mater*, like *Ausra*, have as their central theme the pursuit of an independent Lithuania. []

Latvia is the most Russified of the Baltic republics and the most tolerant of things Russian and Soviet. As a result, the vital grassroots sentiment that feeds national dissent in the other Baltics is lacking, and the Soviet authorities have been able to move against dissent with little need to worry about antagonizing the population. []

Despite this lack of popular support, some Latvian nationalists have continued to struggle for independence. In June 1981, Juris Bumeisters and Dalnis Lismanis were tried on a charge of treason for their participation in the Social Democratic Party of Latvia, [redacted]. This underground party had contacts with supporters in Sweden and demanded Latvian independence from the USSR. Bumeisters was sentenced to 15 years in a labor camp plus 10 years of internal exile, and Lismanis was sentenced to 10 years in a labor camp. More recently, concurrent with the 1983-84 crackdown on Estonian dissent, the authorities carried out a similar campaign in Latvia that, [redacted] resulted in several convictions of members of the underground "Movement for the Independence of Latvia." [redacted]

An important development in Baltic national dissent has been the trend toward cooperative efforts by activists of all three nationalities. Because the modern histories of the three republics are similar, dissidents have seized upon the idea of combining forces to present a unified front to their common adversary. Early advocates of this approach were Lithuanian Viktoras Petkus, Estonian Mart Niklus, and Latvian Ints Calitis. Private discussions among such like-minded individuals led in 1977 to the founding of the Supreme Committee of the National Movement of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. [redacted]

[redacted] the committee was formed to coordinate the activities of Baltic nationalists who intended to work within the system to obtain the rights provided by the Soviet constitution to minority nationalities. The authorities, however, were quick to realize the inherent possibilities in such an alliance and moved immediately to crush the group. The three principles—Niklus, Calitis, and Petkus—are now serving long labor camp sentences. Similar cooperative activities—an earlier group and numerous samizdat efforts—have likewise met with quick reprisals. [redacted]

In the Ukraine. The Ukrainian nationalist movement has long been comprised of two distinct groups. In the western Ukraine, which did not fall under Soviet control until 1939, the main objective of the largely clandestine dissent is Ukrainian independence. The illegal but still functional Uniate Church, the repository of much Ukrainian nationalist feeling, has its

strongest following in this area. In the eastern part of the republic, which is more Russified, nationalist dissent is oriented toward cultural preservation and has attracted the support of well-known figures from the local intelligentsia. These dissidents stress the importance of defending the Ukrainian language, history, and culture from Russian encroachment. Although much of this activity is also clandestine, the public prominence of some participants and their greater access to the media have given them more publicity both at home and abroad than the West Ukrainian dissidents. [redacted]

The formation of the Ukrainian Helsinki group was an important step in the recovery of the Ukrainian nationalist movement, which had suffered from intensified repression after Ukrainian First Secretary Petr Shelest—a Politburo member—was ousted for nationalist offenses in 1972. The rapid destruction of the group, however, further aggravated the bleak situation of Ukrainian national dissent by removing yet another layer of activists. [redacted]

Ukrainian nationalist dissent has since been confined to scattered activity by individuals and an occasional short-lived group. In August 1981, for example, Nikolay Krainik was sentenced to seven years in labor camp and three years of internal exile for founding the "Ukrainian National Front," a group that allegedly had 40 members, had published several samizdat documents, and had advocated Ukrainian independence. [redacted]

Ukrainian nationalist samizdat production has been erratic, following the ups and downs of the movement as a whole. The *Ukrainskiy Vestnik* (Ukrainian Herald), a journal similar to the *Chronicle of Current Events*, catalogued the progress of Russification and chauvinistic behavior by state officials toward Ukrainians until three members of its staff were sentenced to labor camp in December 1980. Thereafter, the journal apparently ceased publication. At present, there is little Ukrainian nationalist samizdat. [redacted]

In Georgia and Armenia. National feeling in the Caucasus, particularly in Georgia and Armenia, runs

high but has only rarely led to mainstream dissident activity. Several factors have accounted for this:

- Local authorities generally give their compatriots greater freedom of action than other national minorities are allowed and are more tolerant of "free enterprise" and corruption than in other republics.
- Georgians have taken to the streets in spontaneous mass demonstrations to wrest concessions from the republic leadership. Since 1978, there have been at least eight large-scale nationalist demonstrations in Georgia that the regime has responded to with conciliatory measures that hindered the spread of organized dissent.
- Armenians are traditionally more pro-Soviet than other national minorities because of their historic fear of Turkish aggression.
- Disillusioned Armenians, like the Jews, have had the option of emigrating from the Soviet Union, although that avenue has been severely constricted since 1980.

As a result of these constraining factors, the few dissident groups that have been formed have been small, ineffective, and nonthreatening to the regime.

[]

In Azerbaijan and Central Asia. To judge from Soviet statistics on education, family size, and intermarriage among national groups, the native people of Azerbaijan and Central Asia remain culturally and socially resistant to assimilation with the European population of the USSR. For reasons ranging from the ethnic diversity of the local populace to their frequent lack of historical experience as independent nation states, nationalism in Central Asia and Azerbaijan has not been a problem for the Soviet authorities. Soviet media indicate, however, that, despite regime efforts, Islam continues to have a strong influence on the way of life in these areas, and, in the aftermath of the revolution in Iran and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the Soviet leadership apparently views the persistence of an Islamic consciousness as a source of potential problems. Numerous public statements by Soviet leaders demonstrate anxiety on this score. In

December 1980, for example, in an address to republic KGB officers, then Azerbaijan First Secretary Geydar Aliyev emphasized the need for tighter security measures on the Soviet-Iranian border, presumably to prevent Iranian Islamic fundamentalists from propagandizing in the USSR. Aliyev's speech followed a tough statement by the republic KGB head warning that US intelligence services would attempt to use the situations in Iran and Afghanistan to influence Soviet Muslims. []

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, particularly in its early stages, appears to have aroused some resentment among Central Asians. According to Embassy reporting, riots took place at a Tashkent induction center, and spontaneous demonstrations against the intervention also occurred at the military commissariats in Issyk and Chilik, Kazakhstan. There also have been scattered reports that Soviet Central Asian reservists refused to fire on their Muslim brothers in Afghanistan and, on occasion, deserted to the other side.

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Despite the potentially disruptive influence of Islamic fundamentalism and the Afghan invasion, no widespread political or nationalist dissent among Central Asians is evident today. In contrast to the situation in the European USSR, there have been far fewer reports of dissident activity in Central Asia and Azerbaijan. Nonetheless, in 1980 a Soviet dissident told US Embassy officers he was in contact with "nationally motivated groups" in Kazakhstan, and a samizdat publication, *Sharqiy Turkistan Arazi* (The Voice of Eastern Turkistan), reportedly was circulating in Central Asia as of 1981. []

In light of the inferior political and economic status of the Asiatic populace relative to the Slavic majority, Central Asia and Azerbaijan are potential trouble spots for the Soviet regime. A small native intelligentsia elite has emerged in each republic. These elites are seeking a greater participatory role in both republic and national-level policymaking, which their Soviet overlords may not be willing to relinquish. Issues such as demographic distribution, resource allocation,

How Many Believers?

Reliable statistics on religious participation in the Soviet Union are difficult to come by. Official Soviet estimates of the number of Russian Orthodox believers fall in the range of 30-50 million. Some Western observers believe, however, that the figure is much higher. The Catholic Church claims more than 2 million adherents in Lithuania, or two-thirds of the republic's population. There are also several million Catholics of the illegal Eastern Orthodox (Uniate) rite in the Ukraine. Of the Protestant sects, Baptists are the most numerous with at least 535,000 officially registered members. Exiled Baptist minister Georgiy Vins, however, maintains that almost half of all Baptist congregations are unregistered. An official Soviet source says there are about 33,000 officially registered Pentecostals, but Western estimates place the number in the range of 200,000 to 500,000. There are 45-50 million cultural Muslims in the Soviet Union, most of whom reside in Central Asia and Azerbaijan. There are about 2 million Soviet Jews.

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and the "yellowing" of the Soviet military could cause friction between Moscow and the Central Asians. At this time, however, Moscow remains firmly in control.

[]

Religious Dissent

Despite the best efforts of successive Soviet regimes, organized religion has not ceased to exist in the USSR. Over the years, antireligion campaigns and purges have taken a heavy toll with massive arrests of clergy, destruction of thousands of religious buildings, confiscation of property, and the enactment of laws restricting religious activity. Religion has survived, however, and in the Brezhnev era, when the regime slowed the pace of the antireligion campaign, religious activity and membership seem to have stabilized.

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The Russian Orthodox Church. The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) occupies a unique position in both Soviet domestic and foreign policy. At home it has the largest number of adherents of any religious group and is part of the dominant Russian culture. As under

the czars, however, the church organization is closely controlled by the state and is used to serve regime interests. This subservience limits its influence. In the foreign policy sphere, ROC spokesmen are important hucksters for Soviet propaganda initiatives such as the peace program. In return, the regime occasionally makes concessions to the church, such as the June 1983 return of the ancient Danilovskiy monastery. Such accommodation, however, reduces ROC credibility and prestige, and some evidence indicates that believers and recent converts sometimes switch to another denomination because they are offended by ROC "collaboration" with the state. []

Most ROC dissent stems from protests against the church's willing acquiescence to regime control. Religious critics of the ROC in the 1970s built on the legacy of earlier Orthodox dissenters such as the prolific samizdat essayist Anatoliy Levitin-Krasnov. The most prominent critics were Fathers Gleb Yakunin and Dmitriy Dudko. Yakunin authored a series of reports detailing specific shortcomings of the ROC. One of these papers was an appeal to a World Council of Churches (WCC) assembly that provoked the first discussion of Soviet religious persecution by that organization. Dudko preached sermons openly condemning the spiritual emptiness of Soviet life and accusing the ROC hierarchy of passivity in the face of increasing government repression. According to dissidents, as word of Dudko's frank commentary spread, hundreds of believers and intellectuals flocked to his small church just outside Moscow. Dudko and his supporters wanted to free the ROC from state domination and bring about a religious revival in the Soviet Union. []

Predictably, the authorities moved to repress the two priests and their followers. Yakunin was arrested and in August 1980 sentenced to five years in labor camp and five years of internal exile. In a televised appearance in June 1980, Dudko recanted his views and confessed to anti-Soviet activity. Dudko's recantation was a severe blow to ROC nonconformists and to the dissident community in general. At a time when the morale of dissidents reportedly was already very low,

the public humiliation of a respected activist seemed to point up the futility of any type of dissident activity. []

At present, Orthodox dissent is all but inactive. The Christian Committee for the Defense of Believers' Rights sent a message to the WCC's 1983 conference stating that it was not defunct but merely waiting for more favorable conditions to continue its activity. Last fall, an Orthodox priest, Aleksandr Pivovarov, was sentenced to three and a half years in labor camp, becoming the latest casualty in the dismantling of a dissident ring that had disseminated Bibles and other religious literature. []

Catholic Dissent. The election of a Polish cardinal to the papacy in 1979 was an inspirational event for Catholics in the Soviet Union as well as for those in Poland. Although activist Catholics in the USSR have sometimes taken exception to John Paul's decisions,³ according to US Embassy sources, Pope John Paul II is viewed by Soviet Catholics as a strong ally. This perception was almost certainly reinforced by the Pope's ability to negotiate successfully with the Kremlin on church affairs. For example, in 1982 Bishop Vincentas Sladkevichus, who had been in exile since 1958, was appointed Apostolic Administrator of the diocese of Kaunas in the Lithuanian SSR. []

The Lithuanian Catholic Church (LCC) is the strongest and most vigorous religious body in the Soviet Union, enjoys the support of all segments of the population, and has a dissident history that predates the Helsinki Accords. Although most Catholic dissent in Lithuania is nonviolent, on occasion spontaneous violent incidents do occur. In 1972, a series of religious-nationalist demonstrations occurred after the self-immolation of a student in Kaunas. []

[] the incident sparked two days of rioting in Kaunas and several months of youth unrest, including 10 other immolations, throughout the republic. The same year also witnessed the appearance of the first issue of the

³ The 1983 appointment of an aged and ailing Latvian priest as the only Cardinal representing Catholics in the Soviet Union was viewed by the Lithuanian samizdat journal, *Chronicle of the Lithuanian Catholic Church*, as a favorable gesture toward "the passive and capitulationist stance of the Catholic Church of Latvia" and an attempt to ignore "the sacrifices, stubborn struggle, and resolute stance" of Lithuanian Catholics. []



Figure 3. Catholic religious pilgrimage to Hill of Crosses near Siauliai, Lithuania, 1979 []

Chronicle of the Lithuanian Catholic Church, a journal that has sought to promote greater unity among priests and laymen and strengthen their willingness to stand up to the authorities. []

In the Helsinki era, another important force in Lithuanian Catholic dissent has been the Catholic Committee for the Defense of Believers' Rights, founded in November 1978. The Catholic Committee, headed by Father Alfonsas Svarinskas, has used samizdat to criticize Soviet discriminatory laws and practices. Its first major statement, signed by Bishop Sladkevichus and over 500 Lithuanian priests, was a condemnation of the official "Regulations on Religious Association," which, among other things, require a committee of nonmembers to oversee the activities of every congregation. Until January 1983, the group was untouched by arrests, probably because most of its members were priests. In that year, however, Svarinskas was arrested—the first time since 1971 that a Lithuanian priest had encountered such treatment. After Svarinskas's confinement in a labor camp, another member priest was sentenced to labor camp and several other members were persuaded to resign from the committee. The current status of the Committee is unknown. []

In the Ukraine, the Uniate Church, outlawed in 1946, still claims several million adherents who are also zealously nationalistic. The majority of practicing Uniates, preferring the safety of a nonconfrontational

stand, have accepted forcible integration into the Russian Orthodox Church. A smaller group of Uniates, however, has a semisecret independent church organization with about 350 priests. []

[] This group of Uniates has long petitioned the Soviet authorities to legalize their church. Although failing to secure legalization, the Uniates still attempt to worship according to their conscience, usually in secret services that leave them vulnerable to prosecution. The Lithuanian *Chronicle* reports that, in October 1981, two Lvov priests were found guilty of conducting illegal church services and sentenced to five years in labor camp, three years of internal exile, and confiscation of property. []

Baptists and Pentecostals. To judge from reports that have been smuggled abroad, the unofficial (unregistered) Protestant sects—especially the Baptists and Pentecostals—have attracted large numbers of rural, factory, and white-collar workers throughout the country in the past 10 years. In their efforts to avoid state regulation and protest their treatment at the hands of the Soviet authorities, unregistered Baptists and Pentecostals have formed action groups and established several important samizdat publications and printing shops. []

Baptists have produced the lion's share of all religious samizdat. The Church Council of Evangelical Christians and Baptists (CCECB) and its offshoot, the Council of Prisoners' Relatives (CPR), have continuously published three journals for almost 20 years. *Bratski Listok* (Fraternal Leaflet) is the "official" journal of the CCECB and sets forth its policy toward the official Baptist Church and the state. In addition, unregistered Baptists produce *Vestnik Istiny* (Herald of Truth), which exposes official persecution against believers and publishes some inspirational-theological pieces. The CPR produces a bulletin that includes regularly updated lists of religious prisoners. These journals are published by the Khristianin publishing house (see inset). []

Aside from petitions and letters to international human rights and church groups, there has been little Pentecostal samizdat. Pentecostals have instead concentrated on securing emigration permission from the regime. Though basically unsuccessful—fewer than a

dozen Pentecostal families have been given exit permission—the Pentecostal emigration movement has been publicized in dramatic ways. In mid-1983, two Pentecostal families were allowed to emigrate after seven members lived in the US Embassy for five years. []

The regime's response to such activities has been an increased attempt to control unregistered Protestant congregations through a renewed emphasis on registration with the official watchdog agency, the Council for Religious Affairs (CRA). In a Soviet press article last year, for example, former CRA Chairman Vladimir Kuroyedov outlined the benefits of registration while criticizing local officials for "restricting the rights of believers." Less benignly, the authorities have lately been singling out for repression the leaders of unregistered congregations who are otherwise exemplary citizens. Last August, Yevgeniy Goula, deacon of a small Pentecostal congregation near Moscow and a popular leader who counseled moderation in dealings with the government, advising against emigration, and described by acquaintances as a "model citizen," was arrested for conducting unauthorized religious services. Goula, the sole support of a family of 10, received a suspended sentence. If believers do not register with the state, however, the authorities probably will become tougher. []

The removal of CRA Chairman Kuroyedov last November may foreshadow a further intensification of the regime's antireligion efforts. []

[] Kuroyedov's removal resulted from his inability to curb youth interest in religion. His replacement, Konstantin Kharchev, who has experience in youth affairs, is said to be a man with especially strong antireligious views. Since entering office, Kharchev reportedly has assumed personal responsibility for the ROC and has taken an extensive tour of ROC dioceses in preparation for personnel changes at the diocesan level. He has also made a similar tour of registered Baptist Churches. []

Khristianin Publishing House

The Baptist publishing house, Khristianin, was established in the mid-1960s by Georgiy Vins and CCECB Chairman Gennadiy Kryuchkov. In June 1972, the CCECB sent an open letter to former Premier Kosygin informing him of the existence of Khristianin, explaining that for several years they had requested Bibles and other literature and that when their requests were denied they decided to produce the publications themselves. Khristianin printing shops, as widespread as Baptists themselves, are built and operated by networks of believers, usually in their own homes. Vins estimates that Khristianin has produced about 500,000 religious books, including samizdat journals, Bibles, hymnals, and theological works. [redacted] some registered Baptist Churches help support the Khristianin effort. [redacted]

The printing shops have been the object of numerous raids by the security organs. In February 1982, for example, in Tokmak, Kirgizia, six operators were arrested and 600 newly printed Bibles were confiscated. In what may have been a coordinated action, massive searches were also carried out in Tashkent and Vostochno-Kazakhstan oblast. Although KGB pressure on Khristianin has been intense, Baptists have proven extremely determined and resilient in their efforts to continue their publishing work. [redacted]




Figure 4. Homemade Khristianin printing press built and operated by unregistered Baptist believers. [redacted]

Islam. It is clear from the official Soviet press that in many areas of Central Asia and Azerbaijan there has been a revival of interest in the religious aspects of Islam in the past few years. Underground seminaries are educating unofficial mullahs who teach Islam to children in unofficial mosques. Soviet authorities have repeatedly criticized these practices in the media, calling them the "antisocial activity of religious extremists," and have intensified the teaching of atheism in schools. This relatively mild reaction suggests that although the revival is widespread it is not a mass phenomenon. [redacted]

In addition, the Soviet press suggests that there has been a minor resurgence of membership in secret Sufi brotherhoods, particularly in the North Caucasus. Such clandestine brotherhoods, which combine religious fanaticism and nationalism, led the great Muslim revolts against the early Soviet regime. [redacted]

there is widespread but diffuse anti-Soviet sentiment among Muslims that occasionally erupts in violent but easily containable incidents. To date, however, well-organized dissident activity by Muslims has not surfaced. [redacted]

Appendix B

Jewish Emigration and Dissent


The Jewish emigration movement was perhaps the most active and well-organized branch of Soviet dissent in the few years before the signing of the Helsinki Accords. As a result, the new Helsinki-inspired human rights groups made a conscious effort to draw upon the expertise and enthusiasm of the Jewish movement. Anatoliy Shcharanskiy, as previously noted, served as liaison between the two groups, and a number of Jewish refuseniks were Helsinki monitors. Predictably, these activists were among the earliest targets of the KGB's crackdown—Shcharanskiy, for example, was arrested in 1977.

Emigration. While arresting prominent Jewish dissidents and cracking down on other forms of dissent in 1977 and 1978, the regime allowed the rate of Jewish emigration to rise dramatically. By 1979, the rate had reached an alltime high of 50,460 visas issued. The reasons for the increase during a period of repression are unclear. The Soviets may have been attempting to sway the US SALT II ratification process. Moscow was also pushing for increased trade with the United States, and easing emigration may have been intended to forestall problems with US policymakers who had earlier linked trade and emigration through the Jackson-Vanik amendment. Or, more simply, the regime may have been clearing out the backlog of applications before cutting emigration.

In any event, in 1980 the Soviets reduced the emigration flow. Only 20,340 visas were issued in 1980, and since then emigration has practically stopped. The 1984 total was only 896, the lowest since 1970. Legitimate family reunification has essentially become the only reason accepted for exit permission, and most of those approvals are for Jews with relatives in Israel rather than the United States.

There is considerable evidence to suggest that Moscow made a decision in late 1979 or 1980 to dispense with emigration, including that of Armenians and ethnic Germans, as well as that of Jews. The 1980 high of 6,109 Armenians receiving exit permission was reduced to 88 by 1984. German emigration fell from 6,947 visas issued in 1979 to only 910 in 1984 (see chart).

Figure 5
USSR: Emigration, 1973-84



^a 1981 Armenian emigration rate is an estimate.

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Statements by Soviet emigration officials and political figures indicate that these cutbacks reflected formal policy decisions. In 1982, Soviet emigration officials began telling applicants that "Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union has come to an end." In 1983, apparently to publicize this decision, the authorities established the Anti-Zionist Committee of the Soviet Public. Soviet officials also began implying to foreign governments that emigration had ended, even as a "gesture." In April 1983, Soviet CSCE delegate Sergey Kondrashev said that an increase in Jewish emigration was unlikely because past Soviet experience with such gestures had been unsatisfactory. In his January 1983 visit to Bonn, Foreign Minister

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Gromyko reportedly told German officials that, because so many ethnic Germans had already emigrated, the downward trend in emigration was "natural." He repeated this line to Chancellor Kohl, who visited Moscow last February. []

The across-the-board cut has been achieved by a series of bureaucratic measures designed to complicate the already cumbersome emigration process. Although family reunification remains a valid reason for seeking to emigrate, the concept of "family" has been gradually narrowed to include only spouses, children, and "perhaps" parents. The authorities have refused to honor invitations to emigrate from relatives abroad from former Soviet Jews living in the United States. Their justification has been that such Jews had achieved emigration under false pretenses and "forfeited" the right to invite relatives to join them. []

The existence of a large number of refuseniks—possibly as many as several thousand—as well as thousands of Germans still awaiting exit permission refutes the claim that all who wish to emigrate have done so. Potential emigrants nonetheless probably have been discouraged from risking their economic security, peace of mind, and possibly their freedom for a highly problematical chance at emigration. An informal Embassy Moscow poll of Armenians and Jews bound for the United States in late 1983 revealed that only 8 percent had relatives who were also seeking exit permission, compared with 20 percent in a similar 1982 poll. Thus, the proclamation that emigration has ended may become a self-fulfilling prophecy. []

Refuseniks. In addition to moving against Jewish emigration, the Soviet regime has intensified its repression of Jewish refuseniks within the USSR. To judge from the accounts of Soviet Jews, however, this repression often had unintended consequences. Jews who actively maintain ties with foreign supporters and those who attempt to foster a sense of Jewish cultural pride and group identity are harshly repressed. These activities nurture a sense of Jewish uniqueness and pride and keep emigration hopes alive, thus precluding assimilation. []

In 1982, authorities began to warn refuseniks who had been able to maintain ties to Western supporters to cease all contact with foreigners. According to reliable US Embassy contacts, refuseniks who ignored the warning have been visited by the KGB, had their homes searched and belongings confiscated, and sometimes have been taken away to spend a day or two in jail. This routine may be repeated several times until the authorities are satisfied that the refusenik is sufficiently intimidated. Occasionally, the authorities try the opposite tactic and promise some refuseniks emigration permission if they voluntarily "keep quiet." Aleksandr Lerner, a leading figure of the Leningrad refusenik community, for example, withdrew from action for over a year after the KGB made such a promise to him. The KGB, however, reneged on its promise. []

The regime's attitude toward refuseniks who attempt to perpetuate feelings of ethnic consciousness and group identity has gradually hardened over the past three or four years. An early victim was Viktor Brailovskiy, who had hosted the Sunday Scientific Seminar, a forum—sometimes attended by foreign scientists—that enabled refusenik scientists who had been dismissed from their jobs to keep current with scientific advances. In November 1980, Brailovskiy was arrested and in June 1981 he was sentenced to five years of internal exile. More recently, Iosif Begun was given the maximum sentence of seven years in labor camp and five years of internal exile for giving Hebrew lessons and lectures on Jewish history and culture. Begun's severe sentence reflects the tougher stand that has evolved toward refuseniks. []