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FOIA

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YARHI-MILO

2415

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
9568	CABLE	USSR D 5/7/2013 F2006-114/7	2	1/6/1981	B1 B3
9548	PAPER	USSR: CONSUMER PRICE REVISION IN PERSPECTIVE	1	ND	B1
9549	PAPER	USSR REPUBLIC PARTIES AND "WORKERS" TO TOP POLICYMAKING BODIES R 5/7/2013 F2006-114/7	2	2/19/1981	B1
9550	PAPER	SAME TEXT AS DOC #9549 R 5/7/2013 F2006-114/7	2	2/19/1981	B1
9551	PAPER	TABLE OF CONTENTS NONALIGNED MOVEMENT; CHINA-SOUTHEAST ASIA; USSR; BRIEF; APPENDIX PAR 5/7/2013 F2006-114/7	1	2/19/1981	B3
9563	PAPER	SOVIET TRENDS: MAY 1981 R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7	12	6/15/1981	B1
9552	MEMO	FRENCH APPROACH TO US ON NEW CENTRAL BANK CREDITS; USSR: NO CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM; ISRAEL: POLLS SHOW LIKUD WIDENING LEAD OVER LABOR	1	ND	B1
9564	CABLE	171441Z AUG 81 R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7	1	8/17/1981	B1

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9569	CABLE	291512Z OCT 81 R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7	2	10/29/1981	B1
9555	CABLE	141052Z NOV 81 R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7	1	11/14/1981	B1
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9557	PAPER	BREZHNEV AT SEVENTY-FIVE	1	12/17/1981	B1
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9560	PAPER	SOVIET CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND SUPREME SOVIET MEETINGS---DOMESTIC ASPECTS <i>R 12/27/2012 M554/1</i>	2	ND	B1
9566	PAPER	PAKISTAN: SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANITAN BRINGS MIXED BLESSINGS: USSR MOSCOW ADMITS "PROBLEMS" IN SINO-SOVIET TALKS AND GROMYKO REVIEWS SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY <i>R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7</i>	1	12/27/1982	B1
9561	CABLE	281500Z DEC 82 <i>R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7</i>	3	12/28/1982	B1
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9562	MEMO	USSR: LABOR INCENTIVES <i>PAR 3/16/2011 F2006-114/7</i>	1	1/21/1983	B2

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- 7 -

U S S R

REPUBLIC PARTIES ADD "WORKERS" TO TOP POLICYMAKING BODIES

In a remarkable break with longstanding practice, the party organizations of five Soviet republics have elevated rank-and-file workers to their top policy-making bodies--the republic central committee bureaus. The appointments bear a surface resemblance at least to a democratization trend that has been taking place in the Polish communist party, and in at least two cases--both Baltic republics--the moves appear to have been directly prompted by the Polish crisis. These actions of the Soviet republic parties appear against a background of renewed propaganda efforts by Soviet publications and spokesmen to present the Soviet Union as a defender of workers' interests and to refurbish the image of Soviet trade unions in this regard.

The new appointments, which emerged from a series of otherwise routine republic party congresses and plenums in recent weeks, were clustered in two areas--the Baltic, where official concerns about potential influences from Poland have been evident for months, and the Caucasus, where the Polish virus is clearly less of a concern but where local leaders have long prided themselves on their promotion of "socialist democracy." The motivations of the five party organizations appear to have been differentiated accordingly.

In Lithuania where the leader of a painters brigade was elected to the bureau, party leaders began to show an unusual degree of solicitude toward local trade unions shortly after the crisis in neighboring Poland began. The Latvian party also appears to have taken a defensive measure to forestall any possible spillover from Poland when it elected a milling machine operator to join the ranks of its top leadership. Party leaders from the Caucasus, however, well isolated from Polish events, appear to have been pursuing longer range efforts to improve party responsiveness to public needs when they added workers to all three republic bureaus. Leaders of Georgia and Azerbaijan have long been strong advocates of broader public participation in policymaking. In his 22 January speech to the Georgian party congress, First Secretary Shevardnadze strongly emphasized this theme, declaring that improvement in economic management can be achieved only through the expansion of its "democratic basis," which necessitates a greater role for worker

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FBIS TRENDS
19 FEBRUARY 1981

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NS! || The Soviet Union's image as a defender and promoter of workers' interests has come in for new attention by Soviet spokesmen in recent months, presumably as a prophylactic campaign against the contagion from Poland. An effort to humanize the trade unions seemed evident in the new October anniversary slogan for 1980, which dropped the traditional call for trade unions to help boost production, urging them instead to work harder to improve people's "living and working conditions." Since then the press has continually stressed the idea that the trade unions' primary task is to advance the welfare of workers, as well as the theme that unions should play a greater role in managing the economy. The most authoritative statement on this subject came from Politburo member Chernenko, writing in the November KOMMUNIST, No. 17, who urged "broader" worker involvement in monitoring the work of management. This theme has also been stressed in repeated calls, such as that in an 18 November PRAVDA editorial, for trade unions to oppose more actively violations of workers' rights by "overzealous administrators."

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U S S R

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- 8 -

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RL 131/81

March 25, 1981

LOCAL TRADE-UNION CHIEF ON WORKING CONDITIONS IN DONETSK

In a recent article in the Ukrainian Party and government daily Radyans'ka Ukraina, the chairman of the Donetsk Oblast Council of Trade Unions, F. Sderzhikov, has called attention to poor working conditions in several coal mines and chemical coking plants in the Donetsk Oblast.¹ The criticism comes at a time when the plight of Ukrainian coal miners has received a great deal of attention in the Western press in connection with the revelations of Aleksei Nikitin, a former mining engineer who was arrested last December after telling Western journalists about official neglect of safety regulations and widespread corruption among management and trade-union officials in Donetsk.²

Entitled "Under Trade-Union Control," Sderzhikov's article discusses the role of trade unions in the management process, giving particular emphasis to safety standards and working conditions. It notes, for example, that a group of enterprises in Donetsk took the initiative in developing a "Five-Year Health Plan" for the Donetsk region that was subsequently approved by the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions in Moscow. The main feature of the plan, says Sderzhikov, is that "all questions concerning raising efficiency of production and improving quality are planned and solved in conjunction with questions and problems of work safety." The results, according to the trade-union chief, have been "striking." Work-related illness is said to have been reduced by 40 percent, and the work of over 1,000 coal miners has been eased.

"Nonetheless," Sderzhikov asserts, "not all trade-union and economic organizations are fully utilizing the possibilities of integrated planning." As an example, he cites the case of the Avdiivka chemical coking plant, where safety procedures have, he reports, been relegated to secondary importance. As a result, dust and gaseous fumes have increased, but the Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy "unfortunately has not drawn the appropriate conclusions."

1. F. Sderzhikov, "Pid kontrolem profspilok," Radyans'ka Ukraina, March 14, 1981.

2. See RS 48/81, "Aleksei Nikitin i dvizhenie za prava rabochikh v SSSR," March 16, 1981.

A similar situation prevails in Donetsk's coal mines:

For a variety of reasons, stationary cooling mechanisms have not been introduced at the "Trudivs'ka" mine and the "Zhovtneve" mining administration of the "Donets'kvuhillya" association. The construction of these mechanisms has been delayed at the "Zasyad'ka" mine of this association, the "Chervonyi profintern" mine of the "Ordzhonikidzevuhillya" association, and at others.

Sderzhikov also says that

the miners will have to put in a great deal of work in order to normalize thermal conditions in deep mines. Prognostications show that the number of such mines will increase unremittingly. Unfortunately, the Ministry of Coal Industry does not give adequate attention to this problem.

The question of how to maintain adequate coal production levels in the Donbass under increasingly more difficult and dangerous conditions has been a frequent topic of discussion in the Soviet Ukrainian press. The problem is by no means a local one in view of the fact that coal production in the Ukraine accounts for about one-third of the total production in the USSR. Moreover, almost 90 percent of coal production in the Ukraine is centered in the Donbass region, which is the oldest coal mining complex in the Soviet Union.³ Many of the mines in the region now run to depths of 700 to 1,000 meters, and some have even reached levels of 1,200 meters.⁴ According to Academician V. Poturayev, director of the Institute of Geotechnical Mechanics of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and head of the Dnepropetrovsk Scientific Center, over 20 percent of the coal mined in Donetsk is at a depth of over 800 meters. In time, argues Poturayev, the problem will become even more urgent. He notes that the general plan of development for the Donbass to the year 1990 calls for the majority of the refurbished and newly opened mines to be worked at depths of 1,200 to 1,600 meters. At such levels, the temperature of the seams will be over 50 degrees Celsius and of the ventilated air up to 45 degrees Celsius. "Understandably," says Poturayev, "without the creation of normal temperature conditions, the mining of coal at such depths will become impossible."⁵

The problem that is uppermost in the minds of the Donbass coal miners and that was highlighted in Nikitin's discussions with the Western correspondents is safe working conditions and the prevention of mine disasters. The Soviet press is characteristically reticent about such matters, although Poturayev notes that the number of

3. See the interview with the Ukrainian minister of coal industry, N. K. Grin'ko, in Robitnycha hazeta, February 1, 1981.

4. Rostyslav Kvyatkovs'kyi, "Dlya polehshennya pratsi shakhtariv," Visti z Ukrainy, September 18, 1980.

5. V. Poturayev, "Vazhki plasty," Radyans'ka Ukraina, January 6, 1981.

March 25, 1981

dangerous mine explosions during the last decade has tripled.⁶ What is most disconcerting is the apparent lack of interest in the problem on the part of mine officials, something that has not escaped the attention of Poturayev:

Clearly, the increasingly more complicated conditions of mining coal is a natural and normal phenomenon. But it could have been foreseen, and the required preparations could have been undertaken. Unfortunately, analyzing the situation that has now developed in the coal sector, one arrives at the conclusion that the necessary preparations for working in the new and significantly more complicated mining and geological conditions in this sector were not made.

Poturayev concludes that the crux of the matter lies not only in the gradual deepening of the mines, but also in how the problems associated with this "are approached by those who are above ground."⁷

Presumably, the recent article by Donetsk trade-union chief Sderzhikov represents one such attempt to underscore the difficulties facing coal miners in the region. One may conclude, however, that the heightened interest in the role of trade unions in the Socialist countries and in the USSR as a result of developments in Poland has contributed significantly to Soviet press coverage of problems affecting workers. This is particularly true in the Ukraine, a major industrial center bordering on Poland and an area that has produced worker dissidents such as Vladimir Klebanov, Leonid Siryi, and Nikitin. Thus, it is certainly no accident that at the recently concluded Twenty-sixth Congress of the Ukrainian Communist Party the chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Trade Unions, V. A. Sologub, unleashed one of the harshest criticisms against those who would "shatter the Soviet system from within" by "speculating on the demagogic slogans of free trade unions."⁸

--Roman Solchanyk

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Radyans'ka Ukraina, February 12, 1981.



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1769

P.D.

(U) SOVIET TRENDS: MAY 1981

Summary

(C) Brezhnev struck the statesman's pose of seeking peace through international talks in three major speeches during May, and gave only scant attention to domestic issues. But, in his Tbilisi speeches, he again pushed his food program, urged that local surplus labor be enlisted in key economic projects, and reluctantly agreed that a railway should be built directly across the Transcaucasus mountains. Georgian leader Shevardnadze defended the program of universal Russian language instruction and emphasized the strategic location of his republic. Brezhnev attended a top-level KGB meeting which probably considered the latest drive to tighten defenses against liberal political ideas seeping in from Poland. Pravda ran several articles attacking ideas now popular in Poland.

(C/NF) Food shortages have not yet been relieved by this summer's truck garden production, and numerous reports indicate that the longstanding meat shortage has been supplemented by a drop in the availability of dairy products. This is especially noticeable in the Baltics, traditionally well-supplied with butter, milk, and cheese. A Leningrad source reported that the city's wartime food reserves had dropped from an 85- to 70-day supply.

(C) The recent conviction of psychiatrist Anatoliy Koryagin leaves the last two members of the Moscow Helsinki Group's Commission on the Use of Psychiatry for Political Purposes (Working Commission on Psychiatric Abuses) in pretrial detention. Moscow's continuing use of psychiatry for political repression may result in the expulsion of the USSR from the World Psychiatric Association at its congress in 1983.

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~~(U)~~ Brezhnev's Kiev and Tbilisi Speeches

Brezhnev delivered three major speeches during May in which he concentrated on ceremonial and foreign policy matters. But at Tbilisi he pushed his food program and use of local excess labor, and agreed to a Transcaucasus railway; he also discussed economic matters at Kiev. (The third speech was at a Kremlin dinner for King Hussein of Jordan.) Brezhnev's physical performance appeared to be below the level evident during the 26th CPSU Congress in February.

Kiev. At the May 9, V-E Day ceremonies in Kiev, where Brezhnev opened a memorial complex, his speech on the wartime struggle was short but moving. His excoriation of US statements about defense buildups blended regret over the need to spend on defense with a pledge to match any American military effort. Brezhnev also addressed local leaders on economic matters at a separate meeting. There, according to a brief press account, he focused on labor productivity, industrial growth, and problems in steel and coal and, as usual, emphasized the need for thrift in using raw materials.

Brezhnev took the overnight train to and from Kiev, apparently to reduce the strain of travel. Defense Minister Ustinov accompanied him.

Tbilisi. Ustinov also accompanied Brezhnev when he flew to Tbilisi on May 21 for the Georgian 60th anniversary celebrations (apparently delayed from February because of conflict with the 26th CPSU Congress). It is not clear why Ustinov was present on this occasion; he may be appearing in public more often to dispel stories of his illness, or perhaps his presence was connected with the military parade held in Tbilisi during the festivities.

In any event, Brezhnev repeated Soviet proposals for regional international conferences on security issues in his May 22 speech at Tbilisi, and threatened countermeasures to the NATO theater nuclear force plans. He touched somewhat more extensively on local economic problems than was the case in Kiev. He praised Georgian leader Shevardnadze and compared today's situation in Georgia favorably with that under the previous leader (the disgraced V. P. Mzhavanadze, ousted in 1972). Nevertheless, Brezhnev noted that Georgia lagged in farm output, especially in meat, dairy products, and poultry, and urged the republic to boost its contribution to the national "food program," saying that all

producers must determine their maximum contribution to the food program that is now being drafted. But he fuzzed the chronic problem of producer incentives, insisting that producers must have both moral and material incentives and must use local expertise.

Reverting to a theme treated at the party congress, Brezhnev said that local excess labor must be drawn more fully into "key economic tasks" both in Georgia and outside the republic. Brezhnev repeated this point in his address to local leaders on May 24, but the press account did not elaborate on Moscow's longstanding effort to draw off excess labor from the Transcaucasus and Central Asia to projects in Siberia.*

Brezhnev appeared to be giving way to local lobbying when he reluctantly admitted that the time had come to "take up" the building of a railroad directly across the Caucasus. All estimates indicate such a project would take years and the cost would be enormous. In all likelihood, a Transcaucasus line would be a follow-on to the Baikal-Amur Mainline (BAM) project in Siberia.

In his response, Shevardnadze echoed Brezhnev on defense, but most of his speech glorified Brezhnev personally, in particular his accession to power in 1964 which ended dangerous acts of "subjectivism and voluntarism," euphemisms for Khrushchev's rule. Shevardnadze spoke only briefly, apparently not to upstage Brezhnev, but his anniversary article was run in the May 21 issue of Pravda as well as in the Georgian press. In that long article, he cited Stalin in his description of the Bolshevik conquest of Georgia, lauded Brezhnev for restoring the political situation in Georgia in 1972, and defended the policy of teaching Russian to Georgians. Developing the sensitive topic of language policy, he blamed "ill-wishers and ideological enemies abroad" for spreading slanders about Russifying practices in Georgia.

Shevardnadze's Pravda article ignored a point he raised in his brief speech of May 22--Georgia's strategic military position. He had then declaimed that Georgia, like the other Transcaucasian

* A Pravda article of May 19 by A. Kolesnichenko introduced important qualifiers to Brezhnev's description of the problem. Kolesnichenko said that there is a need to enlist the considerable manpower reserves of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus in the public economy of those regions. He stressed that what is needed are new jobs compatible with the local way of life and with vocational skill potentials, and which at the same time increase the social and territorial mobility of labor.

republics, "will always be a reliable bastion on the southern border of the motherland." Even more specific language appeared in his May 15 speech in Batumi for the 60th anniversary of the Adzhar ASSR, when he underscored Adzhariya's proximity to Turkey: "We cannot underestimate the fact that dozens of military bases of the aggressive NATO bloc are located in Turkey. Everyone knows perfectly well in whose direction the weapons deployed at these bases are trained."

~~(U)~~ KGB Steps Up Vigilance Efforts

Brezhnev attended an unusual national conference of top-ranking KGB officials May 25-26 in Moscow which probably considered ways of tightening social discipline and preventing the spread of liberal political ideas from Poland. Nothing was reported in Pravda on the substance of KGB chief Yuriy Andropov's report, but an article in the April issue of Molodoy Kommunist by KGB deputy chief V. M. Chebrikov probably covered the range of KGB concerns. Chebrikov's target audience was Soviet youth, and the article bore the stamp of seasonal vigilance propaganda with all the usual exhortation on nationalism, religion, espionage, the regrets of Soviet emigrants over leaving the USSR, and the efforts of Westerners to disseminate subversive literature.

Chebrikov opened the article with an attack on the efforts of Western intelligence and propaganda services to inflame generational conflict between Soviet youth and their elders and blamed the "conservatism of senior cadres" for blocking the "democratization, liberalization, and humanizing" of socialism. However, he then accused the enemy of spreading among youth ideas about the need for "political pluralism" and for "competing" social forces as a means to overcome difficulties and mistakes--highly unusual topics for seasonal vigilance propaganda. Chebrikov undoubtedly was referring to the political ferment now underway in Poland.

Soviet Psychiatric Abuses Continue

~~(U)~~ The trial and conviction of Anatoliy Koryagin on June 5 highlighted Moscow's continuing use of psychiatry as an instrument of political repression. It also increased the probability that the World Psychiatric Association will censure and possibly expel the USSR from membership.

~~(U)~~ Koryagin, a psychiatrist who served as a consultant to the unofficial Working Commission on Psychiatric Abuses, was arrested in February 1981, shortly after he told Western correspondents that he had examined a human rights activist who was being held in a special psychiatric hospital and found him to be psychologically healthy. A court in Kharkov sentenced Koryagin to seven years of labor camp and five years of internal exile on charges of anti-Soviet agitation. He was the first

Soviet psychiatrist known to be arrested and tried on political charges for his diagnoses since 1972, when Dr. Semyon Gluzman questioned the official diagnosis of dissident Army General Petr Grigorenko as a schizophrenic.

(U) Between February 1980 and February 1981, Soviet authorities arrested all six members of the Working Commission. Three (Leonard Ternovskiy, Vyacheslav Bakhmin, and Aleksandr Podrabinek) are serving terms in labor camps; two others (Feliks Serebrov and Irini Grivnina) are awaiting trial; Koryagin's predecessor as psychiatric consultant to the Working Commission was forced to emigrate.

(C) In a display of bad timing by the authorities, the 7th All-Union Congress of Neuropathologists and Psychiatrists met in Moscow in late May (the week before Koryagin's trial). Participants included not only delegations representing all Soviet republics, but also 5-member delegations from the USSR Internal Affairs Ministry and the KGB. Moreover, a paper presented at the Congress by Dr. Zoya Serebryakova, the chief psychiatrist of the USSR Ministry of Health, provided data that 1.2 percent of the patients hospitalized for psychiatric reasons in Moscow were there because of "visits to state offices to present unfounded complaints and slanderous statements." Serebryakova had been identified earlier by British authors Bloch and Reddaway in their recent book, Russia's Political Hospitals, as having been involved in the involuntary psychiatric hospitalization of several Soviet dissidents, including Zhores Medvedev in 1970.

(U) The fate of the Working Commission's membership, and evidence that Soviet authorities continue to subject mentally healthy religious and human rights activists to brutal regimes of "medical" treatment in psychiatric facilities, has placed the Soviet psychiatric profession on a collision course with many national psychiatric associations as well as the World Psychiatric Association (WPA). In 1977, the 6th World Congress on Psychiatry passed, over objections of the Soviet delegation, two resolutions censuring "systematic abuse of psychiatry for political purposes in the USSR" and authorizing the WPA to establish a committee to review abuses of psychiatry. To date, member societies of the WPA have brought some 20 cases of alleged Soviet abuses to the attention of the committee.

(U) In addition, the Royal College of Psychiatrists (Great Britain) has submitted a resolution to the next WPA Congress (to be held in 1983), authorizing the review committee to investigate not only cases involving psychiatric abuses but also those of individuals who are persecuted for opposing political psychiatry. In all probability, the Soviet delegation at the 1983 WPA Congress will face a resolution to expel the USSR from its membership ranks.

Should the resolution pass, the blow to Soviet prestige will be considerable, since no international scientific or professional body appears to have expelled a Soviet member society in the postwar era.

(U) In the meantime, pressures on the Soviet psychiatric profession by members of the WPA are increasing steadily. Last year, Dr. Andrey Snezhnevskiy of the notorious Serbskiy Psychiatric Institute preferred to resign his honorary membership in Great Britain's Royal College of Psychiatrists rather than defend himself against the college's formal charges. And when an international meeting of psychiatrists meets this month in Stockholm, the Soviet delegate is certain to face criticism of Soviet psychiatric practices. The newly formed International Association on the Political Use of Psychiatry, based in Paris, currently includes members from Canada, France, Holland, Switzerland, the UK, and West Germany.

Butter Joins Meat Among Rationed Foods

(C/NF) Truck gardens and farmers' markets are not yet providing relief to hard-pressed Soviet consumers, and reports of food shortages and rationing abound. A Leningrad lecturer provided a unique datum on May 10 when he told his audience that "because of the overall food situation, Leningrad's wartime reserves had dropped from 85 to 70 days."

(C) Meat rationing through a system of food packets distributed directly to workers is by now a well-established and growing system, but there are already some indications that demand exceeds the abilities of the system. One press article indirectly confirmed the existence of the system in relating how a store director short-weighted packages, earning himself almost a half million rubles and a 9-year prison term.

(C) The monthly norm for meat is one kilo or less, according to numerous accounts, and butter is now becoming scarce enough to be rationed, usually in amounts of 300-400 grams per month.

(C/NF) Although no overall figures are available, the range of cities known to be affected by shortages is impressive, including such places as Moscow, Leningrad, Petrozavodsk, Ufa, Novosibirsk, Bratsk (no meat at all), Irkutsk, Vilnyus, and Gorkiy. The situation was termed "disastrous" in cities in the north and east, but recent signs of improved food deliveries have been reported in such cities as Magnitogorsk, Vladimir, and Tula.

(C/NF) Although grumbling is widespread, reporters generally agree that the Soviet population is unlikely to do more than complain about what is a chronic problem in the USSR.

Propaganda Drive Against Reformers

(U) In their fierce resistance to the Polish idea of adapting Marxism-Leninism to new conditions, Soviet leaders and their spokesmen are putting special stress on gradualism in the pursuit of universal prosperity and social equality in a self-governing community. In the upsurge of political conservatism, unusually harsh, if still indirect, criticism has been directed also at Brezhnev's freewheeling predecessor, Khrushchev.

(C) Recently a Soviet journalist observed privately that the all-union ideological conference held in Moscow April 20-25 had been devoted to a "tightening of the ideological screws in the wake of recent events in Poland." His comment seemed borne out by the May 8 Pravda which ran an extensive theoretical defense of internal policy guidelines in tandem with a TASS dispatch from Warsaw reporting Polish United Workers' Party criticism of Solidarity's April program for radical domestic reform.

(U) The Vadim Pechenev article in Pravda, "Conception of Developed Socialism in the CPSU's Strategy and Tactics," deplored "the now quite modish attempts to counter real socialism with various types of subjectivist 'ideal models' of a society which has never existed anywhere but which is passed off as 'genuinely socialist.'" (Pechenev was identified in 1976 as a consultant of the CPSU Central Committee's Propaganda Department; earlier he was an editor of the international communist journal, Problems of Peace and Socialism.)

(U) Pechenev argued instead for the party machine's dominance over other institutions by identifying the working class as a repository of party values which make it deserving of a leading status in Soviet society. He warned against "exaggerating the importance of the intelligentsia" and "idealizing the social-moral foundations of rural life" but offset his advocacy of party concern for worker moods with a demand that the party firmly guide the workers, rather than tag along behind them.

(U) Pechenev also echoed Suslov's attack on egalitarian attitudes made at the April ideological meeting. He sneered at wage "levelling" and asserted that social inequalities could not be made to disappear in the near future. Those who criticized gradualism were left open to the charge of "rushing forward" in setting national tasks or issuing "slogans" for which conditions are not ripe, according to Pechenev.

(U) Pravda in the course of the month continued to hit at reform communists by reprinting materials authored by East European loyalists:

- Czechoslovak poet Ridkj assailed those would-be "improvers" of socialism who were depicting adherence to Marxist-Leninist principles as dogmatism and stagnation (May 1);
- Bulgarian Party Secretary Mikhailov alleged that "revisionists" were serving the enemies of socialism (May 13);
- Czechoslovak Party head Husak urged "uncompromising struggle against any displays of revisionism and opportunism" (May 14).

And Pravda's announcement of the award of a Karl Marx medal in social science to Soviet philosopher Fedoseyev on May 5 included praise of his works that defended "the purity of Marxist-Leninist theory" and battled with "various displays of revisionism."

(U) The lead editorial of the May issue of the party journal Kommunist was equally on the defensive against foreign influences in Soviet political thinking.

The editorial:

- castigated "false followers of socialism who attempt to eat away the monistic scientific conception of the socialist order with the acid of ideological-political 'pluralism'";
- called for a "class" approach in evaluating "one or another socialist teaching" and lamented the fact that phrases such as "proletarian philosophy," "political economy of the proletariat," and "proletarian socialism" are "with each day less frequently encountered in our scientific vocabulary";
- condemned the slogan "freedom of criticism" advanced by "opportunists" bent on "shaking the foundation of Marxist teaching and perverting the class consciousness of the proletariat";
- reaffirmed the principle of the "leading role of the Party" and stated that attempts to combine socialism with "bourgeois, private-property-owning freedom" and to "convert socialism into a weapon for achieving every nationalist and even great-power aim" are condemned to failure.

(U) The most illustrious champion of Soviet renewal in recent times was, of course, Khrushchev, and his regime has come under

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heavy attack in the latest campaign against those craving political change. Speaking at a local anniversary rally in Tbilisi, Georgian Party boss and CPSU Politburo candidate Shevardnadze on May 22 associated the Khrushchev regime with "much suffering by our Party and people." He further linked Khrushchev's actions with "dangerous, and I would say anti-people's alien phenomena hostile to Leninism."

(U) Brezhnev was the number-one guest at the Georgian festivities, and the swipes at Khrushchev were so arranged as to make him look like a good Leninist.

Prepared by D. Graves, x29204

I. Belousovitch

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M. Cook

Approved by R. Baraz, x29194

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As the Soviets See Themselves



— Столько дней прогулял! На что жить собираешься?
— На премию...

Рисунок
В. МОЧАЛОВА

"You skipped out so many days! What will you live on?"
"On the bonus."

15
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- I -

USSR CHRONOLOGY

May 1-31, 1981

May

- 1 Moscow-based leaders reviewed civilian parade in Red Square; two aides helped Brezhnev climb mausoleum steps.
- 1-3 May Day holiday.
- 6 Literaturnaya Gazeta article by L. Mogilevich denounced Maksim Shostakovich for defecting and blamed Western "special services" as well as Radio Liberty, Voice of America, and Slava Rostropovich for the episode.

Moscow literary official Feliks Kuznetsov began two-part article on Polish events in Literaturnaya Gazeta (second part published on May 13).
- 7 Joint party-government decree outlined development goals for central area of nonblack-earth region in 1981-85 period.
- 8 V. Pechenev's Pravda article stressed policy of highly differentiated wages during the present period of "mature socialism."
- 8-9 Brezhnev and Ustinov journeyed by rail to Kiev to open a World War II memorial complex; Brezhnev gave keynote speech on May 9.
- 10 Vasiliy Aleksandrovich Dinkov promoted from Deputy Minister to Minister of USSR Gas Industry, replacing the late Sabit Orudzhev.
- 11 Vechernyaya Moskva article accused US Government of tolerating anti-Semitism; A. Krivitskiy in Pravda attacked US statements on terrorism.
- 12 Brezhnev spoke at dinner for President Sassou-Ngesso of the People's Republic of the Congo.
- 13 Brezhnev signed a Treaty of Peace and Friendship with the Congo.

MFA protested May 12 search of Aeroflot flight at Dulles Airport by US Customs agents.

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15A

May

- 15 Pravda reviewed Politburo member Chernenko's latest book.
Crew of detained Aeroflot flight gave press conference.
- 21-24 Brezhnev and Ustinov flew to Tbilisi for 60th anniversary of the republic; Brezhnev gave speech on May 22, attended parade on May 23, addressed Georgian leaders on local topics on May 24, and flew back to Moscow.
- 22 Soyuz-40 landed with Leonid Popov and Romanian D. Prunariu aboard.
- 23 T. Kolesnichenko of Pravda attacked Claire Sterling's book on terrorism.
- 25 Brezhnev gave speech at dinner for visiting King Hussein of Jordan.
- 27 Aleksey Alekseyev, head of Space Mission Control, announced a suspension of manned flights until the next step in space exploration is decided.
- 28 Baku press announced death sentences for four persons convicted of illegal production of knitwear worth \$3 million.

Izvestiya article accused US Government of condoning and even inspiring violence and harassment against Soviet and other diplomats and organizations in the US.

SOV. DOMESTIC

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MOSCOW 11502 171442Z

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P 171441Z AUG 81
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E.O. 12065: GDS 8/17/87 (MCCALL, SHERROD B.) OR-M
TAGS: PINT, UR
SUBJECT: PARTY DECREE ON CONTROL CRITICIZES "BUREAUCRATISM"

1. (C- ENTIRE TEXT).

2. FACED WITH GROWING ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, THE REGIME CONTINUES TO RELY HEAVILY ON CALLS FOR DISCIPLINE AND PARTY CONTROL AS A WAY OF OVERCOMING ITS DIFFICULTIES. PRAVDA (AUGUST 16) CARRIES A SUMMARY OF A CENTRAL COMMITTEE DECREE "ON FURTHER PERFECTION OF CONTROL AND VERIFICATION OF IMPLEMENTATION IN LIGHT OF THE DECISIONS OF THE XXVI CPSU CONGRESS." REPEATING STANDARD COMPLAINTS ABOUT THE PROCLIVITY OF PARTY AND STATE ORGANS TO SOLVE PROBLEMS BY MERELY ADOPTING "PAPER SOLUTIONS," THE DECREE, INTER ALIA, SAYS THAT:

- EXISTING RULES ON PARTY CONTROL OVER THE ACTIVITIES OF ECONOMIC MANAGERS WILL BE REVIEWED, PRESUMABLY WITH A VIEW TO STRENGTHENING THEM; IT IS ALSO EXPLICITLY STATED THAT THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE WILL CONTINUE THE PRACTICE OF "RECENT YEARS" OF CALLING "LEADERS OF VARIOUS RANKS" TO ACCOUNT;
 - IN THE STATE ECONOMIC APPARATUS THE ROLE OF MINISTERIAL COLLEGIUMS IN SECURING CONTROL AND VERIFICATION OF IMPLEMENTATION OF DECISIONS WILL BE INCREASED;
 - LOCAL SOVIETS SHOULD PAY MORE ATTENTION TO MANDATES OF THEIR ELECTORS AND ARE TO STRICTLY SEE TO THE OBSERVANCE OF SOVIET LAWS AND THE ECONOMIC PLAN;
 - SOVIET TRADE UNIONS ARE TO STRENGTHEN CONTROL FOR THE FULFILLMENT OF PROVISIONS OF COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIALIST COMPETITION.
3. WHILE THE BULK OF THE DECREE STRESSES THE THEMES OF DISCIPLINE AND CONTROL, OBEISANCE IS ALSO MADE TO THE NEED TO PAY MORE ATTENTION TO PUBLIC OPINION:
- IN PREPARING PARTY DOCUMENTS, "THE OPINIONS AND PROPOSALS OF COMMUNISTS, NON-PARTY MEMBERS, AND LETTERS OF WORKERS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED;"
 - THE MASS MEDIA ARE TO DEVOTE INCREASED ATTENTION TO QUESTIONS OF CONTROL AND VERIFICATION OF IMPLEMENTATION OF DECISIONS AS A "NECESSARY CONDITION FOR GETTING WORKERS INVOLVED IN THE

MANAGEMENT OF PRODUCTION, AND ALL AFFAIRS OF SOCIETY."

4. COMMENT: WE NOTE THAT THIS DECREE, FOCUSING MAINLY BUT BY NO MEANS EXCLUSIVELY ON THE WORK OF PARTY ORGANS, IS A PARTY DECREE RATHER THAN PARTY-STATE DECREE. THIS - IN ADDITION TO THE CONTENTS OF THE DECREE - MAY SIGNAL GREATER PARTY INVOLVEMENT IN ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT, PERHAPS AT THE EXPENSE OF THE ECONOMIC MINISTRIES. THE NEED FOR GREATER PARTY CONTROL WAS ALSO THE GRAVAMEN OF THE RECENT ARTICLE IN KOMMUNIST (NO. 11) BY A. PEL'SHE, CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE OF PARTY CONTROL UNDER THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. OBVIOUSLY DESIGNED TO LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR THE DECREE, THE PEL'SHE ARTICLE EMPHASIZED THAT "PARTY ORGANIZATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH CPSU STATUTES ARE IMPLEMENTING TO THE FULL THE RIGHT TO CONTROL ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIVITY." WHILE THIS MAY BE SOUND IDEOLOGY, IT IS DUBIOUS ECONOMICS SINCE BOTH WESTERN AND SOME SOVIET EXPERTS HAVE HELD THAT GIVING ECONOMIC MANAGERS MORE LEEWAY IS ONE OF THE KEYS TO GREATER EFFICIENCY AND PRODUCTIVITY. AS A FINAL COMMENT ON THE PROBABLE EFFECTIVENESS OF THIS LENGTHY DECREE, WE NOTE THAT TWO OF ITS PARAGRAPHS ARE DEVOTED TO COMPLAINTS ABOUT THE PROLIFERATION OF PARTY DECREES AS A MEANS OF IMPROVING ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE. END COMMENT. MATLOCK

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SOV. GENERAL
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1990

MOSCOW 11875 01 OF 04 241636Z

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-15 CIAE-00 EB-08 EA-10
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P 241614Z AUG 81
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E.O. 12065: RDS-4 8/24/91 (MATLOCK, JACK) OR-M
TAGS: ECON,PINS,PINT,SHUM,SOPN,UR,ECSM
SUBJECT: THE PUBLIC MOOD AND THE REGIME'S RESPONSE

REF: MOSCOW A-127

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT).
2. SUMMARY: AS MOSCOW'S LONG, HOT SUMMER DRAWS TO A CLOSE, PUBLIC ATTENTION IS FOCUSED (ALMOST LITERALLY) ON BREAD AND BUTTER ISSUES. PERSISTENT FOOD SHORTAGES ARE THE WORST THEY HAVE BEEN IN YEARS, AND THERE IS LITTLE RELIEF IN SIGHT. EVENTS IN POLAND CONTINUE TO DRAW MIXED REACTIONS FROM OUR SOURCES, ALTHOUGH IT IS GENERALLY BELIEVED THAT POLISH DEVELOPMENTS HAVE ONLY MARGINAL IMMEDIATE RELEVANCE TO THE SOVIET SCENE. THERE HAS BEEN A SLIGHT INCREASE IN CONCERN OVER THE MILITARY INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN, BUT PUBLIC OPINION IS NOT LIKELY TO BECOME A FACTOR IN THE REGIME'S POLICY ON THIS MISADVENTURE.

IN THE FACE OF PROBLEMS AT HOME AND ABROAD, THE REGIME'S BASIC -- AND PREDICTABLE -- RESPONSE HAS BEEN TO PUSH THE IDEOLOGICAL BUTTON, AND WE ARE NOW IN THE MIDST OF A PERIODIC UPSURGE IN THE IDEOLOGICAL AND VIGILANCE CAMPAIGNS. AT THE SAME TIME, A GROWING INTEREST ON THE PART OF SOME IN THE HIERARCHY IN PUBLIC OPINION POLLING SUGGESTS SOME AWARENESS OF THE NEED TO TUNE IN MORE PERCEPTIVELY TO PUBLIC ATTITUDES. END

SUMMARY.

FOOD SHORTAGE

3. MORE THAN IN RECENT YEARS, THE SOVIET MAN AND WOMAN ON THE STREET SEEM TO BE PREOCCUPIED WITH THE PROBLEM OF PUTTING FOOD ON THE TABLE. FOOD SHORTAGES IN MOSCOW AND IN MANY OTHER AREAS ARE THE WORST IN YEARS. A JUDGMENT WHICH EMBASSY OFFICERS AND OUR SOVIET SOURCES SHARE. WE HAVE NOTED PERSISTENT SHORTAGES OF MEAT, MILK, BUTTER, CHEESE, FRUITS,

AND VEGETABLES IN STATE STORES. EVEN SOME STAPLE ITEMS LIKE POTATOES AND CARROTS ARE GENERALLY UNAVAILABLE IN STATE OUTLETS. A GOOD SELECTION OF VEGETABLES, SOME FRUIT, AND SOME MEAT, MOSTLY CHICKEN, ARE AVAILABLE IN THE FARMERS' MARKETS, BUT HIGHER PRICES THERE DISCOURAGE MANY SHOPPERS. MOREOVER, MANY SOVIETS RESENT THAT, ESPECIALLY DURING THE SUMMER, WHEN LIVING SHOULD BE EASIER, THEY MUST PAY A STEEP PREMIUM IN THE MARKETS FOR ITEMS WHICH SHOULD BE AVAILABLE IN STATE STORES.

4. BREAD SUPPLIES ARE GENERALLY ADEQUATE, BUT DESIRABLE SPECIALITY BLACK BREADS ARE NO LONGER AVAILABLE. WE HAVE HEARD REPORTS OF AN UNPUBLISHED CENTRAL COMMITTEE DECREE REGARDING CONSERVATION OF BREAD, WHICH, ALONG WITH NUMEROUS RECENT MEDIA ARTICLES ON THIS SUBJECT AND U.S. ESTIMATES OF ANOTHER BELOW-AVERAGE SOVIET GRAIN CROP IN 1981, MAY INDICATE SOME FORM OF RATIONING OR REDUCED SUPPLIES OF BREAD IN THE NEAR FUTURE. GOSPLAN OFFICIALS RECENTLY TOLD A VISITING U.S. BANKER THAT THE SIZE OF BREAD LOAVES WOULD BE REDUCED IN THE FUTURE.

5. THE FOOD SITUATION OUTSIDE MOSCOW, ESPECIALLY TO THE NORTH AND EAST, IS REPORTEDLY WORSE. PARTICULARLY IN WESTERN SIBERIA, MEAT IS ALMOST TOTALLY UNAVAILABLE, AND DAIRY PRODUCTS APPEAR TO BE INCREASINGLY SCARCE. EVEN IN THE WESTERN RSFSR, FOOD SUPPLIES ARE BARELY ADEQUATE. ONE AMERICAN EXCHANGE IN LENINGRAD FOR HER FOURTH SUMMER TELLS US THAT THE FOOD SUPPLY THERE IS THE WORST SHE HAS SEEN. ALMOST NO MEAT AND ONLY SOME FRUITS AND

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1993

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INFO USICA WASHDC
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VEGETABLES ARE TO BE FOUND IN NOVGOROD. IN RYAZAN, THE STATE STORES ARE DISMALLY STOCKED (ONE STORE-KEEPER SAID HER STORE HAD NOT HAD POTATOES FOR TWO YEARS), BUT THE CENTRAL MARKET WAS RELATIVELY WELL STOCKED. INCHEKNOVTSIY RECENTLY INTRODUCED BREAD RATIONING LIMITS EACH SHOPPER TO TWO KILOGRAMS OF BREAD AND ONE-HALF KILOGRAM OF OTHER BAKED PRODUCTS. IN KIEV AND LVIV, ON THE OTHER HAND, FOOD SUPPLIES, PARTICULARLY VEGETABLES, SEEM PLENTIFUL. THE FOOD SUPPLY SEEMS TO BE BETTER IN THE BALTIC REPUBLICS, THE CAUCASUS, AND CENTRAL ASIA. CONGEN LENINGRAD REPORTS THAT EVEN IN TALLINN, MEAT IS INFORMALLY RATIONED, AND POTATOES ARE UNAVAILABLE IN STATE STORES, ALTHOUGH THE LATTER ARE FOR SALE IN FARMERS' MARKETS.

6. PUBLIC REACTION TO SCANTY FOOD SUPPLIES SEEMS TO BE LIMITED TO GRUMBLING BY FRUSTRATED CONSUMERS. HOWEVER, ONE THIRD-HAND REPORT HAS IT THAT A LOCAL PARTY OFFICIAL AT A RECENT, CLOSED PARTY MEETING DISCLOSED THAT, PRIOR TO THE FEBRUARY PARTY CONGRESS, LEAFLETS WITH A TYPE-FACE SIMILAR TO THAT USED BY PRAVDA WERE DISTRIBUTED IN ODESSA, KRASNODAR, SVERDLOVSK, AND TOBOLSK CALLING UPON PEOPLE TO DEMONSTRATE FOR INCREASED FOOD SUPPLIES. ON THE APPOINTED DAY, SOME INDIVIDUALS APPARENTLY DID GATHER IN THESE CITIES TO DEMONSTRATE, BUT, LACKING A LEADER, THEY MELTED AWAY.

POLAND

7. WHILE BREAD AND BUTTER ISSUES HAVE BEEN UPPER-MOST IN THE MINDS OF MOST SOVIETS, EVENTS IN POLAND HAVE STIMULATED SOME TO SPECULATE ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF POLISH DEVELOPMENTS FOR THE USSR. AS YET THERE IS NO DISCERNIBLE CONSENSUS ON POLAND AMONG OUR SOURCES, EXCEPT PERHAPS THE UNANIMOUS CERTAINTY THAT THE REGIME IS HIDING THE FULL STORY FROM THE PUBLIC. IN ANY EVENT, NONE OF THE SOURCES EXPECTS TO SEE IN THE USSR WIDESPREAD

LABOR UNREST, A SIGNIFICANT DECLINE OF THE AVAILABILITY OF FOOD OWING TO SHIPMENTS TO POLAND, OR SHARP DIVISIONS WITHIN THE PARTY LEADERSHIP ON THE POLISH QUESTION.

8. OUR SOURCES DO INDICATE, HOWEVER, A GOOD DEAL OF AMBIGUITY IN POPULAR ATTITUDES COMBINING WONDER AND GRUDGING ADMIRATION FOR THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF POLISH WORKERS WITH CONCERN FOR THE ULTIMATE OUTCOME OF THEIR "EXPERIMENT." THE MAJORITY OF WORKERS, OUR CONTACTS SAY, APPEAR TO THINK THAT THE POLES HAVE NOT BEEN WORKING HARD ENOUGH AND ARE TRADITIONALLY INEFFICIENT. WORKERS ALSO COMPLAIN OVERTHEFACT THAT THOSE WHO MUST STAND IN LINE TO OBTAIN THE NECESSITIES OF LIFE NOW MUST HELP THE POLES, WHO, AT LEAST UNTIL THE RECENT PAST, LIVED BETTER THAN SOVIET CITIZENS.

9. SOME SOVIET INTELLECTUALS HOPE THAT THE POLES WILL SUCCEED IN MAKING POLISH POLITICS MORE DEMOCRATIC BUT ARE APPREHENSIVE ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE, FEARING THAT THIS WOULD BE CITED BY THOSE OPPOSED TO REFORM OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY. ONE RUSSIAN SCHOLAR WELL-CONNECTED TO THE CULTURAL ELITE COMMENTED THAT SOVIET "LIBERALS" FEAR THAT ECONOMIC CHAOS IN POLAND WOULD SET BACK REFORM OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY BY TEN YEARS.

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1985

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10. THE KREMLIN ALSO RECENTLY HAS TAKEN MEASURES WHICH MIGHT SUGGEST GREATER CONCERN OVER THE POSSIBLE DEMONSTRATION EFFECT OF POLAND IN THE USSR. THERE HAS BEEN INCREASED EMPHASIS IN THE MEDIA ON CONSUMER AND WORKER WELFARE, MORE TOUTING OF THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE OFFICIAL TRADE UNIONS, AND STEPPED-UP IDEOLOGICAL EFFORTS DESIGNED TO COUNTER GRUMBLING OVER LACK OF FOOD AND SCARCITIES OF CONSUMER GOODS. SOME OF THESE STEPS, SUCH AS INCREASED ATTENTION TO CONSUMER PROBLEMS IN THE PRESS, BEGAN BEFORE AUGUST 1980, BUT POLISH DEVELOPMENTS HAVE INCREASED THE LEADERSHIP'S ANXIETY OVER THEM. A JEWISH REFUSENIK AND FORMER JOURNALIST RECENTLY SAID THAT POLAND IS BEING USED AS AN EXAMPLE OF HOW NOT TO DO THINGS AMONG SOVIET ECONOMISTS. INDEED, WE NOTE THAT HARD-LINE PARTY LECTURERS ARE DISSEMINATING THE LINE THAT POLAND "PROVED" THE INEFFICIENCY OF PRIVATE FARMING, THE FOLLY OF LARGE-SCALE LOANS FROM THE WEST, AND THE DANGER OF CONCESSIONS ON "MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE" SUCH AS INDEPENDENT TRADE UNIONS.

11. AFGHANISTAN

THERE HAS BEEN RELATIVELY LITTLE COMMENT AMONG OUR CONTACTS ABOUT THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN, LARGELY WE BELIEVE, BECAUSE IT IS SO WIDELY TAKEN FOR GRANTED AMONG SOVIET INTELLECTUALS THAT IT WAS A BAD MOVE. WE NOTE ON THIS SCORE THAT EVEN PARTY AND GOVERNMENT STALWARTS WHO TALK TO US ON A PRIVATE BASIS SAY LITTLE IN DEFENSE OF THE AFGHAN VENTURE AND EITHER ADMIT, OR COME VERY CLOSE TO DOING SO, THAT IT WAS A MISTAKE. AFGHANISTAN DOES, HOWEVER, CLEARLY IMPINGE ON THE THINKING OF THOSE SOVIET FAMILIES WHO HAVE RELATIVES AMONG THE SOVIET TROOPS THERE, AND THEIR CONCERN MAY WELL BE GROWING. A LETTER FROM THE WORRIED MOTHER OF A SOLDIER IN AFGHANISTAN, PRINTED RECENTLY IN KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA (ALONG WITH A LONG REPLY FROM THE NEWSPAPER EXPLAINING WHY SOVIET TROOPS HAD TO BE THERE) SUGGESTS THAT DOUBT AND APPREHENSION ARE WIDESPREAD. WE HAVE ALSO PICKED UP OCCASIONAL RUMORS ABOUT INCREASED CONSCRIPTION FOR DUTY IN

AFGHANISTAN AND STORIES ABOUT THE ARRIVAL OF MILITARY COFFINS IN VARIOUS SOVIET CITIES. WHILE THESE SIGNS OF WORRY ARE SUBDUED FOR THE MOST PART AND CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO HAVE ANY MAJOR IMPACT ON SOVIET POLICIES IN AFGHANISTAN, THEY ARE CLEARLY OF SOME CONCERN TO THE REGIME.

12. IDEOLOGY CAMPAIGN: FACED WITH PROBLEMS AT HOME AND ABROAD, THE REGIME HAS PREDICTABLY REACTED WITH AN UPSURGE IN IDEOLOGY. INAUGURATED IN APRIL AT AN ALL-UNION IDEOLOGICAL CONFERENCE AND FOLLOWED UP AT REGIONAL CONFERENCES, THE CURRENT CAMPAIGN HAS CONTINUED THROUGHOUT THE SUMMER. IT HAS STRUCK FAMILIAR THEMES: THE NEED TO COMBAT APATHY, TO "STEEL" YOUTH AGAINST FOREIGN IDEOLOGICAL BLANDISHMENTS, AND TO HEIGHTEN VIGILANCE AGAINST PUTATIVE FOREIGN THREATS. IN SOME CASES IT HAS BEEN ATTUNED TO THE NEED TO HOLD THE IDEOLOGICAL LINE IN THE FACE OF POLISH EVENTS. AUTHORITATIVE PARTY JOURNALS HAVE DENOUNCED "REVISIONISM, PLURALISM," AND NEW "MODELS" OF SOCIALISM AND ASSERTED THE LEADING ROLE OF THE PARTY. AT THE SAME TIME, PRESS ARTICLES HAVE ATTEMPTED TO DEFLATE EXCESSIVE CONSUMER EXPECTATIONS AND TO COMBAT "LEVELING" OR WAGE-EGALITARIANISM AMONG THE SOVIET POPULATION AND HAVE COUNTERPOSED SOVIET PATRIOTISM TO THE "SHOW-WINDOW ENTICEMENTS" OF THE WEST.

13. THE CAMPAIGN COINCIDES WITH EVIDENCE THAT TIGHTER SECURITY CONTROLS ARE BEING PLACED IN SOME CASES ON CONTACTS WITH FOREIGNERS. NEW SECURITY PROCEDURES FOR DEALING WITH FOREIGNERS

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HAVE REPORTEDLY BEEN INTRODUCED AT SOME
LENINGRAD CULTURAL INSTITUTIONS, WHILE A
MOSCOW SOURCE WORKING IN A HUMANITIES
INSTITUTE OF THE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES HAS TOLD
US OF NEW RESTRICTIONS ON CONTACTS BETWEEN
INSTITUTE MEMBERS AND FOREIGNERS. AT THE
SAME TIME THERE HAS BEEN A SPATE OF ARTICLES
AND SPEECHES WARNING SOVIET CITIZENS OF
THE ULTERIOR MOTIVES OF MANY FOREIGN VISITORS
TO THE USSR.

14. ALTHOUGH THE REGIME'S BASIC APPROACH TO
DEALING WITH POPULAR CONCERNS IS TO STEP UP
THE IDEOLOGICAL CAMPAIGN, THERE ARE INDICATIONS
THAT SOME IN THE HIERARCHY ARE AWARE OF THE
NEED TO COPE IN A MORE SOPHISTICATED WAY WITH
PUBLIC ATTITUDES. INCREASINGLY, SOVIET
ORGANIZATIONS ARE DISCOVERING PUBLIC OPINION
POLLS AS A DEVICE TO FIND OUT WHAT IS ON
PEOPLES' MINDS.

15. A RECENT GEORGIAN PARTY RESOLUTION, FOR
EXAMPLE, CALLED FOR GIVING EXHANCED STATUS TO
THE PARTY'S CENTER FOR "FORMATION AND PROGNOSTICATION"
OF PUBLIC OPINION. AT THE SAME TIME, THE EMBASSY
HAS BEEN ABLE TO OBTAIN A COPY OF A QUESTIONNAIRE
DEVELOPED BY THE INSTITUTE OF SOCIOLOGICAL RESEARCH
OF THE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES FOR AN EXHAUSTIVE
POLL OF PUBLIC ATTITUDES. MOST OF THE MORE THAN
ONE HUNDRED QUESTIONS PUT TO RESPONDENTS WERE
AIMED AT PROBING HOW CLOSELY THEIR VIEWS COINCIDED
WITH THE "REALITY" DEPICTED IN SOVIET MEDIA. WHILE
THE OSTENSIBLE THRUST OF THE POLL WAS TO MEASURE
THE RELEVANCE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PARTY LINE,
THE POLL, IN EFFECT, SEEMED TO BE AIMED AT GAUGING
THE RESPONDENTS' ATTITUDE TOWARD VIRTUALLY EVERY
ASPECT OF SOVIET LIFE.

16. WE ARE UNDER NO ILLUSIONS THAT THE REGIME
WOULD BE WILLING OR ABLE TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEMS
WHICH WOULD BE REVEALED BY FRANK REPLIES TO
SUCH A POLL. THAT IT IS EMPLOYING SUCH TECHNIQUES,

HOWEVER, IS AN INDICATION THAT IT IS CONCERNED
ABOUT WHAT IS REALLY ON THE PUBLIC'S MIND AND
ABOUT GETTING ITS OWN MESSAGE THROUGH. SUCH CON-
CERN OVER PUBLIC ATTITUDES AND THE RELEVANCE
OF THE PARTY LINE IS UNDOUBTEDLY ENHANCED BY
GROWING ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES, PERSISTENT
CONSUMER SHORTAGES, AND THE KNOWLEDGE THAT
NO IMPROVEMENT IS ON THE HORIZON. MATLOCK

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E.O. 12065: XDS-4 10/20/01 (ZIMMERMANN, WARREN) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, PINT, PROP, SOPN, UR
SUBJECT: SOVIET "PUBLIC OPINION" ON INTERNATIONAL
ISSUES

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: WHILE THE SOVIET PUBLIC IS MOST AGITATED OVER DOMESTIC ISSUES, PARTICULARLY FOOD AND CONSUMER GOODS AND SUPPLY PRICES, FOREIGN AFFAIRS ISSUES ARE ALSO AROUSING POPULAR INTEREST AND THERE ARE SIGNS OF GREATER ANXIETY OVER THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION. PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARDS POLAND HAVE HARDENED AND ONE SOVIET OFFICIAL HAS ACKNOWLEDGED THE BELIEF THAT THE SOVIET PUBLIC HAS BECOME "TOO CONCERNED" OVER EVENTS THERE. ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS THE PUBLIC SEEMS RELATIVELY RECEPTIVE TO REGIME PROPAGANDA AND GENERALLY REACTS "PATRIOTICALLY." AFGHANISTAN IS LESS OF AN ISSUE, ALTHOUGH THE REGIME IS REACTING TO PUBLIC CONCERN OVER DANGERS FACED BY SOVIET SOLDIERS. THERE IS, HOWEVER, EVIDENCE THAT THE REGIME PERCEIVES THAT THE "MAN-ON-THE-STREET", AT LEAST IN THE LARGE RUSSIAN URBAN AREAS, IS WONDERING WHY THE REGIME IS NOT MORE DECISIVE ON POLAND, AND THAT THERE IS A DANGER THAT "PESSIMISM" WITH THE STATE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS COULD SPREAD TO THE PARTY. THE LEADERSHIP SEEMS CAUGHT BETWEEN ITS DESIRE TO USE THE FOREIGN THREAT TO DISTRACT FROM OR RATIONALIZE ECONOMIC FAILURE, AND ITS FEAR THAT TOO MUCH PUBLIC ANXIETY COULD BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE. END SUMMARY.

3. AS WE HAVE REPORTED PREVIOUSLY THE "AVERAGE" SOVIET CITIZEN'S PRIMARY CONCERN THESE DAYS IS WITH THE SHORT SUPPLY AND HIGHER PRICE OF FOOD STUFFS AND CONSUMER GOODS. PUBLIC GRUMBLING, HOWEVER, HAS BECOME MORE AUDIBLE, AND LECTURERS ON THE ECONOMY ARE PAINTING AN INCREASINGLY GLOOMY PICTURE. THERE ARE SIGNS THAT ENCOURAGEMENT OF CRITICISM THROUGH THE "LETTERS CAMPAIGN" MAY NOT HAVE BEEN SUCH A GOOD IDEA -- WE HAVE SECOND HAND REPORTS, AS WELL AS PRESS ARTICLES, WHICH INDICATE THAT THE VARIOUS ORGANIZATIONAL RECIPIENTS OF LETTERS HAVE BEEN SO DILUGED WITH MISSIVES THAT THEY ARE UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO RESPOND TO BUT A FRACTION, CREATING YET MORE COMPLAINTS AND OUTCRIES.

4. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT PERSONAL DISCONTENT PRESENTLY SHOWS NO SIGN OF TRANSFORMING INTO SIGNIFICANT DISSENT AND THAT THE SOVIET "MAN-ON-THE-STREET" APPEARS CAPABLE OF BEARING UP UNDER ADVERSE, EVEN DETERIORATING, CIRCUMSTANCES. HOWEVER, THERE ARE SIGNS THE REGIME IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY CONCERNED OVER THE IMPACT OF THE ECONOMIC SITUATION ON PEOPLE'S ATTITUDES. THEY WELL KNOW THAT THE CURRENT POLISH CRISIS, WHILE ALL OF ITS CHARACTERISTICS MAY NOT BE RELEVANT TO THE SOVIET SCENE, STEMS FROM FAILURE ON THE ECONOMIC FRONT. REGIME ATTENTION TO PUBLIC OPINION HAS INCREASED, AS INDICATED BY CHERNENKO'S RECENT KOMMUNIST ARTICLE WHICH REITERATES WITH SOMEWHAT MORE URGENCY HIS LONG STANDING POSITION ON THE IMPORTANCE OF PUBLIC ATTITUDES, THE GEORGIAN PARTY'S ATTENTION TO OPINION RESEARCH, AND ARTICLES IN THE PRESS. WE NOTE, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT THE SEPTEMBER 25 PRAVDA ARTICLE BY R. SAFAROV ON THE IMPORTANCE OF MEASURING PUBLIC OPINION WAS A REHASH -- UPDATED WITH APPROPRIATE REFERENCES TO POLAND AND THE XXVI PARTY CONGRESS -- OF ARGUMENTS HE FIRST PRESENTED IN NOVEMBER 4, 1979 "JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGICAL RESEARCH" (SEE 1981 MOSCOW A-127). THIS, WE BELIEVE, INDICATES THAT SAFAROV'S POSITION THAT THE PARTY NEEDS TO DEVOTE MORE ATTENTION TO PUBLIC OPINION POLLING HAS ACHIEVED SOME LEGITIMACY IN PARTY CIRCLES.

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PROJECTING THE BLAME ABROAD

5. MORE AND MORE, WE ARE HEARING OF PROPAGANDA PRESENTATIONS TO GENERAL AND SELECT AUDIENCES WHICH ATTEMPT TO SHIFT THE BLAME FOR, OR FOCUS ATTENTION AWAY FROM, THE ECONOMIC SITUATION BY PROJECTING CONCERN OUTWARD, AT THE THREATENING INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND PARTICULARLY AT THE "ANTI-SOVIET" POLICY OF THE U.S. ONE SOVIET CONTACT CAME AWAY FROM A RECENT SPEECH TO A SELECT GROUP BY SOVIET MILITARY AND FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS ON THE DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL SITUATION VISIBLY SHAKEN BY THE MESSAGE -- THE ECONOMY IS BAD, BUT THE AGGRESSIVE POLICIES OF THE IMPERIALISTS ARE A PRIME CAUSE, WAR IS THREATENING, AND MORE SACRIFICES BY THE SOVIET PEOPLE WILL BE REQUIRED. ANOTHER SOURCE HAS TOLD US THAT PROPAGANDISTS HAVE BEEN GIVEN MARCHING ORDERS TO PUSH SUCH A LINE (MOSCOW 14474).

6. THE LEADERSHIP CAN COUNT ON THE FACT THAT FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES GENERALLY INSPIRE A PATRIOTIC RESPONSE. THE PERCEPTION OF THE SOVIET UNION THREATENED BY A HOSTILE WORLD IS WIDELY SHARED, PARTICULARLY IN RUSSIAN AREAS, AND THE LEADERSHIP AND PEOPLE SEEM TO BE AGREED THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS A LEGITIMATE SUPERPOWER, COEQUAL WITH THE U.S., AND DESERVES TO BE TREATED AS SUCH. WHERE THE REGIME SEEMS TO BE HAVING A PROBLEM WITH "PUBLIC OPINION" ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES IS IN ADJUSTING ATTITUDES TO NEW REALITIES. EVEN THE HIGHLY EFFECTIVE PROPAGANDA MACHINE SEEMS

MORE THAN USUALLY HARD-PRESSED TO EXPLAIN SOVIET POLICY LIMITATIONS IN AN UNSTABLE WORLD.

POLAND

7. IN GENERAL, THE SOVIET PUBLIC MOOD CONCERNING THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, TO THE EXTENT THIS EMBASSY CAN GAUGE IT, IS MORE PESSIMISTIC THAN IT HAS BEEN FOR SOME TIME. IN PARTICULAR, ATTITUDES TOWARD POLAND, HIGH ON EVERYONE'S MIND, SEEM TO HAVE HARDENED AS THE POLISH CRISIS WEARS ON AND AS THE USSR ECONOMY HAS WORSENEDED. INITIAL AMBIVALENCE HAS GIVEN WAY TO GROWING CONCERN AND DEEPER ANIMOSITIES REFLECTING TRADITIONAL RUSSIAN ANTI-POLISH SENTIMENT AND RESENTMENT OVER BEARING AN ECONOMIC BURDEN BECAUSE "THE POLES WANT TO LIVE LIKE AMERICANS BUT WORK LIKE POLES," AS ONE SOVIET PUT IT. SOME INTELLECTUALS ARE ANXIOUS THAT THE SOVIET REGIME MIGHT BE PROVOKED INTO AN INVASION, RESULTING IN INCREASED ISOLATION FROM THE WEST AND POSSIBLY INCREASED INTERNAL REPRESSION HERE. THE LESS WELL INFORMED CITIZEN SEEMS EVEN MORE NEGATIVE ABOUT THE UNGRATEFUL POLES, AND COMPARATIVELY UNCONCERNED OVER THE FALLOUT INHERENT IN SOVIET INTERVENTION. REFLECTING THE INGRAINED RUSSIAN ABHORRENCE OF ANARCHY, THE VISCERAL REACTION HERE INCREASINGLY SEEMS TO BE THAT THE POLES NEED TO BE STRAIGHTENED OUT BY THE POLISH LEADERSHIP OR, SOME WOULD ARGUE, IF NECESSARY BY MOSCOW. ONE SOVIET ACADEMICIAN NOTED TO US THAT HE HAD HEARD THIS VIEW EXPRESSED BY HIS "WORKING CLASS" WARDMATES DURING A RECENT HOSPITAL CONFINEMENT, BUT ASCRIBED IT TO THEIR "UNSOPHISTICATED" VIEW OF BOTH THE POLISH SITUATION AND THE LIMITATIONS ON SOVIET FREEDOM OF ACTION.

8. THERE ARE REASONS TO BELIEVE THAT THE REGIME GAUGES PUBLIC OPINION ON POLAND AT THIS TIME TO BE PESSIMISTIC, AND TO A CERTAIN EXTENT WORRIED OVER WHETHER THE KREMLIN CAN DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM. WE UNDERSTAND THAT WITHIN THE LAST TWO WEEKS A DECISION HAS BEEN MADE TO HAVE PROPAGANDISTS AND AGITATORS ALL OVER THE SOVIET UNION OFFERED A RETRAINING SESSION ON POLAND. ACCORDING TO THE SECOND HAND REPORTS, QUESTIONS FROM AUDIENCES BT

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EXPRESSING CONCERN OVER POLAND, OR SUGGESTING THAT "SOMETHING OUGHT TO BE DONE," HAVE PROMPTED THE REGIME TO INSURE THAT LECTURERS ASSURE LISTENERS THAT WHILE THERE ARE LIMITATIONS ON SOVIET ACTIONS, THE REGIME KNOWS WHAT IT IS DOING REGARDING POLAND. A RECENT STATEMENT BY LENINGRAD LECTURER (AND COLONEL) SOROKIN (LENINGRAD 2233) IMPLICITLY CRITICIZING LEADERSHIP POLICY ON POLAND SUGGESTS THAT THERE IS INDEED CAUSE FOR WORRY OVER PROPAGANDISTS' WILLINGNESS OR ABILITY TO GET THE LINE DOWN PAT.

9. A USA INSTITUTE OFFICIAL (BOGDANOV) ACKNOWLEDGED TO US THAT THERE IS INDEED REGIME CONCERN THAT THE PUBLIC HAS BECOME OVERLY AGITATED ON POLAND, AND THAT EFFORTS ARE NOW BEING MADE TO INSTILL MORE "REALISM" IN SOVIET ATTITUDES. REFERRING TO HIS FAVORITE THEME OF THE USUALLY UNDERRATED IMPORTANCE OF "PUBLIC OPINION" IN THE USSR, HE NOTED A WIDESPREAD BELIEF AMONG ORDINARY RUSSIANS THAT THE SOVIET UNION AS A SUPERPOWER SHOULD TAKE ACTION TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM. HE PRAISED BREZHNEV'S RESTRAINT IN OPPOSING THIS TENDENCY, ADDING THAT UNFORTUNATELY PROPAGANDA CAN OFTEN DEVELOP A LIFE OF ITS OWN EVEN IF NOT HELPFUL. IN THIS CONNECTION, HE CONCEDED DOUBTS OVER THE WISDOM OF HAVING OUTRAGED LETTERS SENT FROM SOVIET WORKERS TO THEIR POLISH BRETHREN WHICH HAD ONLY FANNED PASSIONS OVER EVENTS IN POLAND.

VIEWS OF U.S. POLICY

10. REGIME ATTEMPTS TO PORTRAY IMPERIALIST MACHINATIONS AS AT FAULT IN POLAND DO NOT SEEM AS YET TO HAVE STRUCK A RESPONSIVE CHORD WITH SOVIET CITIZENRY. HOWEVER, ATTITUDES TOWARDS U.S. POLICY AND U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS, ACKNOWLEDGED EVEN BY OFFICIALS TO BE THE MOST IMPORTANT SINGLE INTERNATIONAL ISSUE FOR THE SOVIET PUBLIC, IMPACT ON PERCEPTIONS OF VIRTUALLY ALL OTHER ISSUES, INCLUDING POLAND. WE HEARD RECENTLY FROM AN ENGINEER FROM TOMSK, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT POPULAR SYMPATHY WITH SOLIDARITY DECLINED MARKEDLY AFTER THE U.S. ERW DECISION BECAME PUBLIC.

11. GENERALLY SPEAKING, THE PUBLIC MAY BE MORE CONSCIOUSLY "PATRIOTIC" ON A NUMBER OF ISSUES AS THE REGIME HAS PLAYED UP THE ALLEGEDLY GROWING U.S. MILITARY THREAT AND THE ADMINISTRATION'S SUPPOSED ANTI-SOVIET POLICY. SOME SOVIET CONTACTS HAVE INDICATED THAT THEY SEE AMONG FELLOW CITIZENS A GREATER WILLINGNESS TO PUT UP WITH ECONOMIC HARDSHIP, AS WELL AS MORE IDENTIFICATION WITH AND APPROVAL OF SOVIET "INTERESTS", AND THEY ASCRIBE THIS TO RECENT U.S. FOREIGN POLICY MOVES AND DECISIONS AS PORTRAYED BY THE SOVIET MEDIA. OCCASIONALLY, HOWEVER, ONE HEARS INTELLECTUALS PRAISING THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION'S FOREIGN POLICY, SINCE "TOUGHNESS IS THE ONLY THING THE SOVIET LEADERS UNDERSTAND."

12. THERE ARE VARYING MANIFESTATIONS OF THE U.S. CONNECTION IN THE WORLD OUTLOOK OF THE SOVIET PEOPLE, AND AN OFFICIAL WITH THE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES (AND STAUNCH DEFENDER OF SOVIET POLICY) HAS TOLD US THAT INCREASING U.S.-PRC TIES WERE THE PRIMARY

INTERNATIONAL CONCERN OF SOVIET CITIZENS THESE DAYS. WHILE HIS STATEMENT TO US WAS DISINGENUOUS, WE HAVE HEARD OTHER SOVIETS, PARTICULARLY IN THE EAST AND CENTRAL ASIA, EXPRESS PUZZLEMENT OR ANGER OVER U.S. POLICY TOWARD CHINA. FOR AN APPARENTLY LIMITED FEW, AFGHANISTAN SEEMS TO EXEMPLIFY THE "DANGERS" TO THE SOVIET UNION OF U.S.-PRC "COLLUSION."

AFGHANISTAN

13. AFGHANISTAN, HOWEVER, IS MORE TYPICALLY EITHER VIEWED AS A FAR-OFF LAND OF MINOR INTEREST (AND FOR BT

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THAT REASON MANY SOVIETS SEEM PUZZLED OVER THE DECISION TO INTERVENE), OR A SYMBOL OF THIRD-WORLD INSTABILITY. THE OLDER GENERATION SEEMS TO HOLD MIXED VIEWS -- CONCERN, APPARENTLY GROWING (MOSCOW 13858), OVER THE FATE OF THEIR SONS AND GRANDSON'S FIGHTING THERE, COMBINED WITH GENERAL SUPPORT FOR OR AT LEAST NEUTRALITY TOWARDS, THE REGIME'S ATTEMPTS TO SET RIGHT AN UNRULY SITUATION ON THE BORDERS OF THE MOTHERLAND. INTERESTINGLY, WE HAVE SOME INDICATION THAT THE SOVIET PUBLIC BELIEVES THAT SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN IS MUCH GREATER THAN IT ACTUALLY IS. ONE CONTACT TOLD US HE WAS SURPRISED TO LEARN FROM VOA THAT THERE WERE LESS THAN 100,000 SOVIET TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN. AS SOVIETS OFTEN DO IN EVALUATING INFORMATION IN THEIR MEDIA, HE HAD INTERPRETED OFFICIAL STATEMENTS THAT THE FEW SOVIET TROOPS STATIONED IN AFGHANISTAN WERE ENGAGED IN GUARD AND GARRISON DUTY TO MEAN EXACTLY THE OPPOSITE: THAT THERE MUST BE HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF SOVIET SOLDIERS EXTENSIVELY ENGAGED IN COMBAT OPERATIONS. KNOWLEDGE THAT YOUNG SOVIETS ARE DYING THERE MAY INCREASE DISSATISFACTION OVER TIME, BUT THUS FAR THE REGIME SEEMS TO HAVE A MANAGEABLE "P.R." PROBLEM ON AFGHANISTAN.

REGIONAL VARIATIONS

14. THERE ARE OF COURSE VARIATIONS IN PEOPLES' REACTIONS TO EVENTS DEPENDING ON THEIR ETHNIC, GEOGRAPHIC OR "CLASS" IDENTIFICATION. CENTRAL ASIANS, FOR EXAMPLE, SEEM LESS INTERESTED AND

INFORMED ON EVENTS, EVEN IN NEIGHBORING LANDS. THERE APPEARS TO BE LITTLE SYMPATHY, HOWEVER, WITH ISLAMIC RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS AND ACTIVITIES TO THE SOUTH. WE HAVE NOT DETECTED ANY STRONG FEELING THAT AFGHANISTAN IS A "RUSSIAN" PROBLEM; RATHER AT LEAST SOME MEMBERS OF THE EDUCATED ELITE IN CENTRAL ASIA SEEM SUPPORTIVE OF THE REGIME'S EFFORTS TO BRING "STABILITY" TO THE REGION. THERE MAY ALSO BE A HOPE (ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NOT HEARD THIS EXPLICITLY VOICED) THAT MOSCOW'S CONCERN FOR ANARCHY IN THE WORLD OF ISLAM WILL GIVE THE CENTRAL ASIANS A LEVER FOR COAXING MORE RESOURCES FOR THEIR AREA OUT OF THE CENTRAL AUTHORITIES. IN THE BALTICS, AS WE HAVE REPORTED, THERE IS APPARENTLY MORE SYMPATHY FOR AND INTEREST IN SOLIDARITY, TEMPERED BY THE BELIEF THAT "IT COULD NEVER HAPPEN HERE." IN ESTONIA, AND POSSIBLY GEORGIA AND SOME OTHER REPUBLICS, NATIONALISM IS THE BASIS FOR OPINIONS ON DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN ISSUES. HOWEVER, MANIFESTATIONS OF NATIONALISM, INCLUDING DEMONSTRATIONS, THUS FAR SEEM INSPIRED BY OR DIRECTED PRIMARILY AT DOMESTIC RATHER THAN INTERNATIONAL ISSUES.

SPREADING PESSIMISM AND DOUBT

15. APPARENTLY OF INCREASING CONCERN TO THE REGIME IS THE EFFECT THE MASSES' OPINIONS MAY HAVE ON THE ELITE. AS A SOVIET SOCIOLOGIST RECENTLY TOLD US, "PUBLIC OPINION" IS RECOGNIZED AS IMPORTANT PARTICULARLY BECAUSE GENERALLY HELD VIEWS CAN PERMEATE THE PARTY. DESPITE THEIR IDEOLOGICAL PURITY PARTY MEMBERS ARE NOT IN A MONASTERY -- THEY CAN BE, ACCORDING TO THE SOCIOLOGIST, INFLUENCED BY VIEWS OF FRIENDS AND ACQUAINTANCES, TRAM DRIVERS AND STORE CLERKS. GENERAL CONCERN OR FEAR ARTICULATED BY THE PEOPLE, IF SUSTAINED, COULD LEAD TO DOUBTS AND PESSIMISM WITHIN THE VANGUARD.

16. THIS PERCEPTION MAY BE OVERDRAWN, BUT THERE ARE REASONS TO BELIEVE THAT IT IS SHARED IN THE HIERARCHY, AND THAT THE REGIME MAY BE REALIZING THAT THERE ARE DANGERS INHERENT IN OVERSELLING THE U.S. "THREAT." IF THE MAN ON THE STREET TENDS BT

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 05 OF 05 MOSCOW 14753

TO WONDER ABOUT THE REGIME'S HANDLING OF POLAND, THE QUESTION COULD ALSO ARISE IN SOME MINDS ABOUT THE KREMLIN'S ABILITY TO FACE THE CHALLENGE OF AN EXAGGERATEDLY-PORTRAYED HOSTILE U.S. POLICY, PARTICULARLY IN AN INCREASINGLY UNSTABLE AND UNPREDICTABLE WORLD. FOR EXAMPLE, THERE HAVE BEEN INDICATIONS THAT THE PROPAGANDA MACHINE HAS CHANGED GEARS SOMEWHAT ON ERW, SINCE ITS INITIAL PORTRAYAL CREATED MAGNIFIED FEARS AMONG SOVIET CITIZENS (MOSCOW 2160). WE ALSO NOTE THAT SOME RECENT ARTICLES IN THE PRESS, PARTICULARLY DIRECTED AT THE ELITE AND PARTY MEMBERSHIP, OFFER REASSURING WORDS AND DENY THAT THERE IS REASON FOR "PESSIMISM." LITGAZ OF OCTOBER 14, FOR EXAMPLE, CARRIED AN EXTENSIVE DIALOGUE BETWEEN ZAGLADIN AND ACADEMY OF SCIENCES MEMBER I. FROLOV, ON "GLOBAL PROBLEMS AND THE FATE OF MANKIND." AT ONE POINT, THE INTERVIEWER STATES "THE MAJORITY OF PROGNOSSES OF THE FUTURE CARRY NOT ONLY A DRAMATIC, BUT EVEN A PESSIMISTIC CHARACTER." ZAGLADIN QUICKLY RETORTS THAT PESSIMISTIC PROGNOSSES DO EXIST "IN THE WEST," BUT THAT SCIENTISTS IN THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES DO NOT (AND, BY IMPLICATION, SHOULD NOT) ADHERE TO PESSIMISTIC VIEWS. INTERESTINGLY, THE INTERLOCUTORS CONCENTRATE ON WESTERN PROGNOSSES ANYWAY, AND GENERALLY GIVE A FAIRLY SOMBER ASSESSMENT DESPITE REPETITION OF THE THEME THAT THERE IS NO CAUSE FOR PESSIMISM.

17. COMMENT: THE NEED TO DEAL WITH CREEPING PESSIMISM AND DOUBT ON BOTH FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC ISSUES HAS APPARENTLY BEEN A PRIMARY MOTIVATING FACTOR FOR THE IDEOLOGICAL CAMPAIGN INITIATED AFTER THE XXVI PARTY CONGRESS. BOTH THE INTERNATIONAL

AND INTERNAL SITUATIONS HAVE WORSENERED OVER THE PAST SIX MONTHS, AND THE LEADERSHIP COULD WELL BE WORRIED THAT PUBLIC (AND PARTY MEMBERS') PERCEPTIONS OF EVENTS COULD LEAD TO EVER-WIDENING QUESTIONING OF THE REGIME'S ABILITY AND RESOLVE TO DEAL WITH CRISES. POLAND, IN PARTICULAR, HAS BECOME AN INCREASINGLY SORE POINT WITH THE PUBLIC. MEANWHILE, THE PROPAGANDA PORTRAYAL OF THE AMERICAN "THREAT" HAS FRIGHTENED AND WORRIED THE MAN-ON-THE-STREET. THINGS MAY LOOK BLEAK FROM THE KREMLIN'S VIEWPOINT, BUT THE SITUATION COULD BECOME EVEN BLEAKER IF PUBLIC OPINION IS NOT CAREFULLY GUIDED. THE REGIME APPEARS TO BE ATTEMPTING A TRICKY BALANCING ACT -- LAYING AT LEAST PART OF THE BLAME FOR A DISMAL DOMESTIC SITUATION ON DANGERS ABROAD WHILE AT THE SAME TIME TRYING TO REIGN IN PASSIONS AND AVOID THE SPREAD OF PESSIMISM. CONFLICTING PRESENTATIONS SUGGEST UNCERTAINTIES, AND THE POSSIBILITY FOR DIVERGENCES OF OPINION WITHIN THE LEADERSHIP OVER WHICH DIRECTION TO TAKE. WITH AN INCREASINGLY DISSATISFIED AND CYNICAL PUBLIC, IN A SUCCESSION ENVIRONMENT, THE KREMLIN COULD BE UNDERSTANDABLY CONCERNED THAT PUBLIC OPINION REQUIRES MORE -- AND INCREASINGLY SENSITIVE -- HANDLING. END COMMENT.

18. FOR KABUL: MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. HARTMAN
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SOU. DOMESTIC

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TAGS: CSCE, US, UR

SUBJECT: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN THE USSR

REF: SIMON-CALDWELL TELCON

1. ~~LOW-ENTIRE~~ TEXT.

2. IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFTELCON REQUEST, THERE FOLLOW
RELEVANT EXERPTS FROM SUBJECT REPORT:

3. SUMMARY: CRIME IS A MAJOR AND INCREASING PROBLEM IN
THE SOVIET UNION. PROBABLY MORE THAN 4 MILLION SOVIET
CITIZENS ARE NOW UNDERGOING SOME FORM OF PENAL
CORRECTION, SEVERAL TIMES AS MANY AS 20 YEARS AGO. THE
MOST PREVALENT CRIMES ARE HOOLIGANISM AND THEFT OF
STATE AND PERSONAL PROPERTY. THE MURDER RATE IS CLOSE
TO THAT IN THE UNITED STATES, BUT MUCH HIGHER THAN IN
WESTERN EUROPE. IN 1976 THE USSR MURDER RATE WAS 6
MURDERS PER 100,000 PEOPLE; IN THE U.S. THE RATE WAS
8.8 PER 100,000 PEOPLE, WHILE IN MANY WEST EUROPEAN
COUNTRIES THE RATE WAS 1 MURDER PER 100,000 PEOPLE.
MURDER IS ONE OF THE FEW CRIMES FOR WHICH SPECIFIC DATA
ARE AVAILABLE. JUVENILE CRIME IS REACHING SERIOUS
PROPORTIONS. ALCOHOLISM, ENDEMIC IN SOVIET SOCIETY,

HAS REACHED EPIDEMIC PROPORTIONS AND IS BLAMED FOR MUCH
CRIME, ESPECIALLY THE VIOLENT FORMS. LEGAL PUNISHMENTS
RANGE FROM A PUBLIC EXPRESSION OF CENSURE OR A SMALL
FINE TO DEATH BY SHOOTING. PROBABLY MORE THAN 90
PERCENT OF ALL SENTENCES INVOLVE FORCED LABOR.

4. CRIME: THE DATA: THESE CONCLUSIONS ARE SUPPORTED BY
MANY SOURCES -- DIPLOMATS, BUSINESSMEN, TOURISTS,
EMIGRE ACCOUNTS PUBLISHED IN THE WEST, AND EVEN SOVIET
JOURNALS AND NEWS MEDIA. SOME OF THE MOST
COMPREHENSIVE DATA WERE PROVIDED BY A FORMER OFFICIAL
OF THE PROCURATOR'S OFFICE IN MOSCOW WHO HAS PUBLISHED
IN THE WEST WHAT APPEAR TO BE OFFICIAL RECORDS ON
CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS IN THE USSR: IN 1976, SOVIET
COURTS SENTENCED 976,090 PERSONS FOR SERIOUS CRIMES,

AND ANOTHER 1,684,335 LESSER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS
WERE HANDLED ADMINISTRATIVELY OR BY COMRADES' COURTS.
WE ESTIMATE THAT THE NUMBER OF CONVICTS UNDER
CONFINEMENT -- ONLY HALF OF THOSE SERVING SENTENCES --
TOTALLED APPROXIMATELY 2 MILLION IN 1978 (OF A TOTAL
SOVIET POPULATION OF 260 MILLION). (BY COMPARISON, THE
UNITED STATES, WITH A POPULATION OF 218 MILLION, HAD
SOME 400,000 PERSONS UNDER CONFINEMENT.)

5. USSR CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS, 1976 (SOURCE IS FORMER
OFFICIAL CITED IN PARA 4):

SERIOUS CRIMES TRIED BY PEOPLES' COURTS	NO. SENTENCED	PERCENT
HOOLIGANISM	235,215	24.1
CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS	168,013	17.2
THEFT OF STATE AND PUBLIC PROPERTY	156,451	16.0
CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL PROPERTY	151,934	15.6
MOTOR VEHICLE CRIMES	97,388	10.0
ECONOMIC CRIMES	43,653	4.5
CRIMES AGAINST ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER	38,445	3.9
MALFEASANCE IN OFFICE	37,669	3.9
CRIMES AGAINST JUSTICE	13,892	1.4
OTHER SERIOUS CRIMES	33,430	3.4
TOTAL SERIOUS CRIMES	976,090	100.0

MINOR CRIMES

HANDLED ADMINISTRATIVELY	879,265
REVIEWED BY COMRADES' COURTS	805,070
TOTAL MINOR CRIMES	1,684,335
TOTAL CRIMES	2,660,425

6. THE CRIMINAL SCENE: UNLIKE THE LARGEST CITIES IN
WESTERN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES, THE LARGEST
SOVIET CITIES -- MOSCOW, LENINGRAD, AND KIEV -- HAVE
LOWER CRIME RATES THAN THE NATIONAL AVERAGE BECAUSE
THEY ARE SHOWPLACE CITIES WHERE MOST CONVICTED
OFFENDERS ARE DENIED RESIDENCE PERMITS. IN OTHER URBAN
AREAS OF THE USSR THE CRIME RATE IS HIGHER, ESPECIALLY
IN THE MORE REMOTE CITIES AND TOWNS. JUVENILE CRIME
SEEMS TO BE INCREASING IN MANY PARTS OF THE COUNTRY.
PRESS ACCOUNTS FROM MOSCOW REPORT THAT JUVENILE GANGS
HAVE BEGUN TO CARRY AND USE WEAPONS SUCH AS KNIVES AND
ZIP GUNS, AND REPORTS FROM ELSEWHERE HAVE CITED
FIGHTING AMONG YOUTH GANGS. FEMALE DELINQUENCY ALSO IS
SHOWING A PRONOUNCED INCREASE.

7. COMMONLY COMMITTED CRIMES: HOOLIGANISM, THE MOST
COMMON CRIME IN THE SOVIET UNION, IS DEFINED IN SOVIET
LAW AS "INTENTIONAL ACTIONS CRUELY VIOLATING PUBLIC
ORDER IN A COARSE MANNER AND EXPRESSING A CLEAR
DISRESPECT TOWARDS SOCIETY." OFTEN THIS INVOLVES
BRAWLING OR MALICIOUS DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY. A
SENTENCE OF UP TO SEVEN YEARS CAN BE IMPOSED FOR ARMED
HOOLIGANISM.

8. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS -- ASSAULT, RAPE, AND MURDER
-- RANK SECOND IN FREQUENCY, ACCOUNTING FOR ABOUT 17
PERCENT OF ALL CONVICTIONS, ACCORDING TO THE FORMER

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SOVIET OFFICIAL CITED ABOVE. ANOTHER REPORT BY THE SAME SOURCE CLAIMS THAT THERE WERE 15,878 MURDERS IN THE USSR IN 1976. THIS NUMBER YIELDS A RATE OF 6 PER 100,000 PEOPLE. BECAUSE PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF HANDGUNS IS PROHIBITED IN THE SOVIET UNION, MOST MURDERS ARE COMMITTED WITH KNIVES OR HUNTING RIFLES. DEATH BY FIRING SQUAD IS IMPOSED FOR CRIMES AGAINST THE STATE, FOR HIJACKING OF AIRCRAFT, FOR RAPE UNDER ESPECIALLY AGGRAVATED CIRCUMSTANCES SUCH AS GROUP RAPE OF A MINOR, AND FOR SOME OTHER CRIMES. HOWEVER, IN RECENT YEARS THE DEATH PENALTY HAS BEEN APPLIED ALMOST ONLY FOR INTENTIONAL HOMICIDE.

9. THEFTS OF STATE PROPERTY AND OF PERSONAL PROPERTY,

THE NEXT MOST COMMON OFFENSES, EACH CONTRIBUTE ABOUT 16 PERCENT OF TOTAL CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS. STEALING IS RAMPANT IN SOVIET SOCIETY. NEARLY EVERYONE STEALS FROM THE STATE, AUTHORITIES ROUTINELY LOOK THE OTHER WAY, AND COMPARATIVELY FEW THIEVES ARE BROUGHT TO JUSTICE FOR STEALING PUBLIC PROPERTY. THE MAJORITY OF CONVICTIONS FOR THEFT OF PERSONAL PROPERTY ARE FOR BURGLARY. BECAUSE ALMOST NO SPARE AUTOMOBILE PARTS ARE AVAILABLE FOR SALE MANY MOTORISTS RESORT TO STEALING THEM OR PURCHASING THEM ON THE BLACK MARKET.

10. CRIMES ASSOCIATED WITH TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS HAVE SURGED INTO FIFTH PLACE ON THE LIST OF MOST FREQUENTLY COMMITTED CRIMES, REFLECTING THE RECENT GROWTH IN AVAILABILITY OF PRIVATE AUTOMOBILES AS WELL AS A CAVALIER ATTITUDE TOWARDS DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED. MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS HAVE BECOME COMMON IN URBAN AREAS. DRUNK DRIVERS CAUSE ONE-THIRD OF THEM AND ABOUT HALF OF ALL ACCIDENTS INVOLVING FATALITIES. IN 1978 IN THE RSFSR ALONE, NEARLY 10,000 PEOPLE DIED IN TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS CAUSED BY DRUNK DRIVERS. (THE SOVIET HIGHWAY DEATH TOLL HAS BEEN ESTIMATED IN THE RANGE OF 20,000 - 60,000 PERSONS PER YEAR, COMPARED TO 50,000 FOR THE U.S. THE TOTAL U.S. HIGHWAY VEHICLE INVENTORY IS 10 TIMES GREATER THAN THAT OF THE USSR.)

11. ECONOMIC CRIMES ARE VIEWED AS VERY SERIOUS OFFENSES IN THE SOVIET UNION. THE SOVIET UNION IS THE ONLY INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRY IN WHICH THE DEATH PENALTY MAY BE IMPOSED FOR MAJOR "WHITE COLLAR" CRIMES (FOR EXAMPLE, FRAUD, EMBEZZLEMENT, COUNTERFEITING, SPECULATION AND BRIBE-TAKING). IN 1972 ECONOMIC CRIMES WERE AT THE ROOT OF A POLITICAL UPEHAVAL IN THE GEORGIAN REPUBLIC. AFTER WIDESPREAD CORRUPTION WAS DISCOVERED THERE, THE FIRST SECRETARY OF THE GEORGIAN COMMUNIST PARTY AND HUNDREDS OF OTHER PARTY AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WERE DISMISSED FROM THEIR POSTS. IN 1980 TWO GEORGIAN MEN WERE EXECUTED AND THEIR SEVEN ACCOMPLICES SENTENCED TO LONG TERMS OF CONFINEMENT FOR LARGE SCALE EMBEZZLEMENT.

12. ALCOHOLISM: MUCH OF THE CRIME IN THE SOVIET UNION IS ATTRIBUTED BY THE SOVIES TO RAMPANT ALCOHOLISM. WHEN DETERMINING THE SERIOUSNESS OF A CRIME, DRUNKENNESS IS CONSIDERED AN AGGRAVATING FACTOR. THE MINISTER OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS HAS INDICATED THAT MORE THAN HALF OF ALL CRIMES INVOLVING BODILY HARM AND 80 PERCENT OF ALL HOMICIDES ARE COMMITTED BY PEOPLE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL. A RECENT SOVIET PUBLICATION

GOES EVEN FARTHER, MAINTAINING THAT ABOUT 90 PERCENT OF HOOLIGANISM, MURDER AND RAPE ARE COMMITTED BY DRUNKS. THE CARNAGE CAUSED BY DRUNK DRIVERS ALREADY HAS BEEN MENTIONED. SOVIET CRIMINOLOGICAL RESEARCH ON MOSCOW DURING 1976 AND 1977 REVEALED THAT ABOUT 30 PERCENT OF THE MALE WORKING CLASS ARE "CHRONIC ALCOHOLICS" REGISTERED AT PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS.

13. DRUG TRAFFICKING AND ADDICTION: THE USE OF NARCOTICS AND OTHER DRUGS ALSO IS INCREASING IN THE SOVIET UNION, ESPECIALLY AMONG JUVENILES, ALTHOUGH IT IS STILL A MINOR PROBLEM COMPARED TO THAT IN THE WEST. ONE SOURCE REPORTS THAT THERE ARE 50,000 REGISTERED DRUG USERS IN MOSCOW, BUT PRESUMABLY MANY OF THESE ARE NOT HARDCORE ADDICTS. MOST DRUG USERS LIVE IN THE CITIES OF THE EUROPEAN USSR AND CONSUME EITHER HASHISH OR MARIJUANA. THE UPWARD TREND IN THE NUMBER OF ADDICTS HAS SOVIET OFFICIALS DISTURBED, AND THE DIFFICULTY OF REFORMING DRUG ABUSERS HAS THEM CONFOUNDED.

14. A FEW YEARS AGO THE CRIMINAL CODE DID NOT EVEN MENTION DRUG TRAFFICKING AS A CRIME. NOW, PERSONS CONVICTED OF MANUFACTURING, STORING, TRANSPORTING OR SELLING ELICIT DRUGS FACE 10 YEARS OF CONFINEMENT. IF CONVICTED OF SUCH OFFENSES FOR THE SECOND TIME, THEY CAN BE SENTENCED TO 15 YEARS IN CONFINEMENT -- THE MAXIMUM SENTENCE POSSIBLE FOR ANY CRIME SHORT OF EXECUTION. DRUG ABUSERS ARE TREATED SIMILARLY TO ALCOHOLICS.

15. THE OFFENDER POPULATION: THE SOVIET OFFENDER IS MOST LIKELY TO BE A POORLY EDUCATED YOUNG MALE RESIDING IN A CITY OR TOWN. HE COMES FROM A WORKING CLASS FAMILY WITH LIMITED EARNING POWER AND OFTEN HAS DIVORCED OR ALCOHOLIC PARENTS. MORE THAN 20 PERCENT ARE "PARASITES" (PARASITISM IS DEFINED AS THE "MALICIOUS REFUSAL OF A PERSON TO TAKE A JOB AND CEASE

LEADING A PARASITIC EXISTENCE"). MANY ARE RECENT MIGRANTS TO THE CITY WHO LIVE IN CROWDED DORMITORIES WITH OTHER UNATTACHED YOUTHS. INDIVIDUALS CONVICTED THEFT OF SOCIALIST PROPERTY AND SIMILAR CRIMES ASSOCIATED WITH POSITIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY ARE, ON THE OTHER HAND, MORE LIKELY TO HAVE ABOVE-AVERAGE INCOME LEVELS AND POSITIONS IN SOCIETY. HAIG
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SOV. DOMESTIC
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ELEMENTS IN IMPROVING SOVIET ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE. WHILE THIS APPROACH MAY BE GATHERING MOMENTUM, AND WE WOULD CERTAINLY EXPECT TO SEE SOME REFERENCES TO THESE THEMES AT THE PLENUM, WE WONDER HOW MUCH WEIGHT SERIOUS THINKERS HERE CAN PLACE ON TURNING THE CLOCK BACK TO MOVE THE ECONOMY FORWARD. HARTMAN

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E.O. 12065: GDS 11/14/87 (MCCALL, SHERROD) OR-M
TAGS: PINR, PROP, UR
SUBJECT: PRE-PLENUM PRAVDA ARTICLE WORRIES ABOUT
SOCIALIST CONTRADICTIONS

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE DEPARTMENT WILL HAVE SEEN THE TASS REPORT OF ACADEMY OF SCIENCES VICE PRESIDENT AND CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER P. FEDOSEYEV'S LENGTHY NOVEMBER 13 PRAVDA EDITORIAL ENTITLED "SOCIAL OPTIMISM OF COMMUNISTS". WHILE BOTH TASS AND WESTERN MEDIA REPORTS HAVE EMPHASIZED THE AUTHOR'S DISCUSSION OF POLAND AND THE PROSPECTS FOR "COUNTERREVOLUTION" IN SOCIALIST SOCIETIES WHICH HAVE UNDERGONE EVOLUTIONARY CHANGE RATHER THAN REVOLUTIONARY UPHEAVAL, WE FOUND THE ARTICLE TO BE PRIMARILY DESIGNED TO COMBAT DOMESTIC PESSIMISM AND PASSIVITY, AND TO OFFER GUIDANCE ON HOW TO INTERPRET DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS.

3. FEDOSEYEV'S ARTICLE SEEMS SOMEWHAT AMORPHOUS AND DISORGANIZED -- PERHAPS AN INDICATION OF THE DIFFICULTY OF SIMULTANEOUSLY DESCRIBING DANGERS AND THREATS FROM WITHOUT AND WITHIN WHILE TRYING TO INSPIRE OPTIMISM. ALTERNATIVELY, THE ARTICLE MAY HAVE BEEN HEAVILY EDITED, OR DESIGNED TO "BALANCE" VARIOUS AND SOMEWHAT CONFLICTING PERSPECTIVES ON CURRENT DIFFICULTIES. IN HIS DISCUSSION OF POLAND, HE NOTED THAT THE CRISIS WAS PROCEEDED BY ECONOMIC DETERIORATION, "PHILLISTINISM", CONSUMERISM, AND IDEOLOGICAL LAXNESS -- SOVIET READERS WILL NOTE THAT THESE SINS AT ONE TIME OR ANOTHER HAVE APPEARED ON THE SOVIET SCENE AS WELL. HE LAYS CONSIDERABLE STRESS ON THE CONTINUED EXISTENCE, EVEN RENAISSANCE, IN "MATURE" SOCIALIST SOCIETY (AND NOT NECESSARILY THOSE WHICH UNDERWENT "EVOLUTION" RATHER THAN "REVOLUTION") OF REMNANTS OF THE OLD ORDER -- RELIGION, NATIONALISM, "BOURGEOIS MENTALITY" -- ALL OF WHICH RESULT, SAYS THE AUTHOR, FROM VIOLATION OF SOCIALIST ECONOMIC LAWS, LENINIST PRINCIPLES OF IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE, AND "ERRORS IN NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION". AT THE SAME TIME, FEDOSEYEV EXHORTS HIS READERS, AND ESPECIALLY SOCIAL SCIENTISTS, TO AVOID OVERSIMPLIFIED ANALYSES OF THE SITUATION AND, KEEPING IN MIND THE "INVINCIBILITY" OF THE LEADING ROLE OF THE WORKING CLASS AND ITS VANGUARD, TO PLAY A GREATER ROLE IN INSPIRING OPTIMISM. FEDOSEYEV ALSO STRESSES THAT THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN OLD AND NEW TAKES PLACE IN THE ECONOMIC SPHERE, AND HE ATTACKS CERTAIN DISPLAYS OF "LISTLESSNESS" AND OTHER WORKERS' HABITS WHICH FLY IN THE FACE OF THE NEED FOR DISCIPLINE AND CONTROL.

4. FEDOSEYEV'S MESSAGE, WHICH TRACKS WITH AND EXPANDS UPON OTHER RECENT PRE-PLENUM ARTICLES, GIVES A RATHER SOMBER CAST TO THE ATMOSPHERE, AND SUGGESTS THAT AT LEAST SOME PLENUM PARTICIPANTS WILL WANT TO FOCUS ON IDEOLOGY, DISCIPLINE AND "COMMITTEDNESS" AS KEY

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 07 Leningrad 02602

FUTURE LEADER TO POLITBURO KINGMAKER SUSLOV AS WELL, WHO WAS PRESENT IN Leningrad AT THE SEPTEMBER, 1970 MEETING AT WHICH ROMANOV WAS ELEVATED TO THE Leningrad OBKOM FIRST SECRETARYSHIP AND WITH WHOM ROMANOV MAINTAINED A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP, ACCORDING TO SEVERAL UNOFFICIAL SOVIET SOURCES.

7. ~~(S)~~ ROMANOV'S FORTUNES, UNFORTUNATELY FOR THOSE TIED TO HIS COAT TAILS, APPEAR TO HAVE SLIPPED IN RECENT YEARS. WE BEGAN IN 1978 TO HEAR PERSISTENT STORIES, SINCE CONFIRMED, ABOUT A SCANDALOUS SCENE AT ROMANOV'S DAUGHTER'S WEDDING PARTY AT THE TAURIDE PALACE WHERE EXUBERANT GUESTS BROKE UP ANTIQUE HERMITAGE CROCKERY WHICH ROMANOV HAD "BORROWED" FOR THE OCCASION. ROMANOV WAS RELIABLY REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN CALLED ON THE CARPET BY HIS ERSTWHILE PATRON SUSLOV FOR BEHAVIOR UNBECOMING A COMMUNIST--ALTHOUGH ROMANOV'S REAL SIN MAY HAVE BEEN THAT THE STORY GOT OUT TO THE WEST. A "PRAVDA" INTERVIEW WITH UZBEK PARTY CHIEF AND POLITBURO CANDIDATE RASHIDOV IN LATE 1980 FEATURED A SHARP CRITICISM OF AN UNNAMED OBKOM LEADER WHOSE DAUGHTER'S WEDDING PARTY WAS ARRANGED IN UNJUSTIFIABLY IMPERIAL STYLE BY HER FATHER--A REFERENCE MANY TOOK TO BE A HIGH-LEVEL WARNING TO ROMANOV THAT ALL IS NOT FORGIVEN. ROMANOV WAS UNMISTAKABLY PUT DOWN AT A KREMLIN AWARDS CEREMONY IN JUNE, 1981, WHEN HE HAD TO STAND BY WHILE GOSPLAN CHAIRMAN BAYBAKOV AND A SECOND, MINOR FIGURE RECEIVED PRESTIGIOUS "HERO OF SOCIALIST LABOR" AWARDS, ONLY TO RECEIVE A LESS-SIGNIFICANT "ORDER OF LENIN" MEDAL, ROMANOV'S SECOND, AFTER THEM. ROMANOV WAS CONSPICUOUSLY ILL AT EASE AT THE CEREMONY; HE IS, ALONG WITH POLITBURO NEWCOMER GORBACHEV, THE ONLY POLITBURO MEMBER WITHOUT A "HERO" MEDAL. NOR CAN Leningrad'S RECENT ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES, DISCUSSED BELOW, BE ANYTHING BUT A MINUS FOR ROMANOV'S STANDING.

8. ~~(S)~~ WE ARE STRUCK BY THE VENOM WITH WHICH OUR Leningrad UNOFFICIAL CONTACTS REFER TO ROMANOV: "A LITTLE CAESAR," "A NAPOLEON COMPLEX IN ACTION, AND I SPEAK AS A PSYCHOLOGIST," "A WOMANIZER," AND "A DRUNK" ARE SOME SAMPLES. WE HAVE NOT HAD MUCH PERSONAL CONTACT WITH ROMANOV, BUT "DRUNK" ACCURATELY DESCRIBES ROMANOV'S CONDITION AT HIS 1980 NOVEMBER 7 RECEPTION AT WHICH HE MUST HAVE KNOWN FOREIGN DIPLOMATS WOULD BE PRESENT. ROMANOV'S REPUTATION AS INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZER AND IDEOLOGICAL HARD-LINER WOULD EXPLAIN SOME OF THE NEGATIVE REACTION AMONG Leningrad INTELLIGENTSIA (MOST OF WHOM, INCIDENTALLY, EXPRESS NO SUCH PERSONAL DISTASTE FOR THE CENTRAL LEADERSHIP). EVEN TAXI DRIVERS AND HARD-LINE WORKERS WHOM WE HAVE OCCASION TO MEET DO NOT EXHIBIT THE AFFECTION FOR ROMANOV THAT MANY WILL SHOW FOR BREZHNEV ("OUR LEADER" OR "LITTLE FATHER") BUT INSTEAD POKE FUN AT THE LOCAL BOSS'S PERCEIVED PRETENTIONS AND IMPERIAL NAME. WHILE IT IS NOT NECESSARY THAT A SOVIET PARTY LEADER BE LOVED OR EVEN LIKED BY

THOSE HE RULES, SOME RESPECT WOULD SEEM IMPORTANT BUT ROMANOV'S NAME SEEMS TO INVARIABLY INSPIRE EITHER CONTEMPT OR DENUNCIATION.

9. ~~(S)~~ WHILE WE CANNOT PREDICT THE FUTURE COURSE OF ROMANOV'S CAREER, WE ARE NOT SANGUINE; ROMANOV REFLECTS HIS CITY'S STATUS IN THE SOVIET HIERARCHY AND WE DO NOT BELIEVE HE CAN SUCCEED WHERE ZINOVIEV AND KIROV FAILED. ON THE OTHER HAND, ROMANOV'S PERSONAL WEAKNESSES, WHICH WOULD SEEM TO PRECLUDE FUTURE PROMOTION, MAY PROTECT HIM IN HIS PRESENT POST. THE CENTRAL PARTY LEADERSHIP MAY WELCOME A Leningrad LEADER WHO POSES NO THREAT TO THEM THROUGH GREAT PERSONAL POPULARITY OR SUCCESS.

THE POLITICAL SCENE: ROMANOV'S CHIEF LIEUTENANTS

10. ~~(U)~~ SENIOR PARTY MEN AROUND ROMANOV ARE NOT ONLY POTENTIAL SUCCESSORS TO Leningrad'S POLITBURO SEAT BUT MAY, LIKE EARLIER Leningrad MID-LEVEL LEADERS, FIND POSITIONS IN THE CENTRAL APPARATUS. Leningrad'S PARTY ORGANIZATION SPORTS SIX CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBERS OR CANDIDATES--AS MANY AS MOSCOW'S--ALTHOUGH MOSCOW'S CC "SLATE" IS ENLARGED BY INCLUSION OF MORE "HONORED" LOCAL WORKERS THAN Leningrad'S.

11. ~~(S)~~ ROMANOV'S MOST VISIBLE LIEUTENANT IS HIS DEPUTY, OBKOM 2ND SECRETARY N. YA. SUSLOV, WHOSE PHYSICAL DOMINANCE OVER HIS DIMINUTIVE BOSS CREATES AN AMUSING INCONGRUITY WHEN THE TWO APPEAR IN PUBLIC. SUSLOV'S CAREER TOOK OFF IN LATE 1979 WHEN HE RECEIVED THE FIRST OF THREE PROMOTIONS WHICH CARRIED HIM FROM LOCAL RAION FIRST SECRETARY TO HIS PRESENT JOB--ENTITLING HIM TO A FULL CENTRAL COMMITTEE SEAT--IN LESS THAN

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A YEAR. WHILE WE HAVE NO INFORMATION ABOUT SUSLOV'S POLITICAL PREFERENCES, THE MAN IS AN OBVIOUS PARTY COMER AND KEEPS A HIGH PROFILE AROUND TOWN. HE OVERSAW THE DELICATE BUSINESS OF REMOVING TWO LENINGRAD RAION FIRST SECRETARIES, FORMER EQUALS, AT PRE-26TH CONGRESS LOCAL PARTY MEETINGS AT WHICH HE WAS PRESENT. LENINGRADERS AGREE THAT SUSLOV IS POPULAR IN MOSCOW, WHICH IS OBVIOUS, BUT ARE DIVIDED AS TO WHETHER SUSLOV IS MOSCOW'S APPOINTED WATCHDOG OVER ROMANOV OR WHETHER ROMANOV IS PROMOTING A WELL-REGARDED YOUNGER FIGURE AS A MEANS OF "BUILDING BRIDGES"--AS ONE PARTY MEMBER PUT IT--TO THE CENTER. SUSLOV IS THE OBVIOUS CANDIDATE TO REPLACE ROMANOV SHOULD THE JOB FALL VACANT.

12. ~~(C)~~ LENINGRAD GORKOM FIRST SECRETARY YU. F. SOLOV'YEV, ON THE OTHER HAND, APPEARS TO BE A STOLID PARTY WORKHORSE. WE HAVE HEARD THAT HE IS A HARDLINE EXECUTOR OF ROMANOV'S ORDERS BUT HAS NO INDEPENDENT VIEWS. FROM WHAT WE HAVE SEEN, SOLOV'YEV IS NOT A DYNAMIC SPEAKER. SOLOV'YEV WAS APPOINTED TO HIS PRESENT JOB IN 1978 TO REPLACE BORIS ARISTOV, A CAREER LENINGRAD PARTY FIGURE WHO MANY SAW AS A RIVAL TO ROMANOV; ARISTOV WAS SENT TO BE AMBASSADOR TO POLAND, A JOB THEN REGARDED AS A DEAD-END. IT IS DIFFICULT TO IMAGINE THAT ROMANOV WOULD HAVE REPLACED ARISTOV WITH A STRONG, INDEPENDENT FIGURE. ALTHOUGH THE GORKOM IS SUBORDINATE TO THE OBKOM--THE OPPOSITE OF THE SITUATION IN MOSCOW WHERE IT IS THE GORKOM FIRST SECRETARY WHO SITS ON THE POLITBURO --THE ORGANIZATIONS' FUNCTIONS OVERLAP AND THE TWO FIRST SECRETARIES WOULD SEEM TO BE NATURAL RIVALS.

13. ~~(C)~~ LEV ZAYKOV, LENINGRAD'S MAYOR, IS PROBABLY THE MOST ACCESSIBLE OF LENINGRAD'S PARTY LEADERSHIP, A FACT WHICH LEADS US TO SUSPECT THAT HE IS NOT A POLITICAL HEAVYWEIGHT. THE LENINGRAD CITY GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN RECENTLY USED AS A DUMPING GROUND FOR WASHED-OUT POLITICAL FIGURES (ALTHOUGH WE NOTE THAT KOSYGIN, IN THE LATE 1930'S, WAS BRIEFLY ITS MAYOR). ZAYKOV APPEARS TO BE A COMPETENT ADMINISTRATOR, ALTHOUGH HE KEEPS A LOW POLITICAL PROFILE.

14. ~~(C)~~ CHAIRMAN OF THE LENINGRAD OBLAST GOVERNMENT RATHIR S. BOBOVIKOV HAS RESPONSIBILITY FOR LOCAL AGRICULTURE, A THANKLESS TASK, AND HIS ORGANIZATION IS ROUTINELY ROASTED BY ROMANOV. BOBOVIKOV WAS N. YA. SUSLOV'S PREDECESSOR AS OBKOM SECOND SECRETARY BEFORE HIS TRANSFER TO THE OBLAST, AND WE HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT THE MOVE MARKED THE END OF HIS CAREER. BOBOVIKOV'S PREDECESSOR AT THE OBLAST GOVERNMENT WAS A FULL CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER; BOBOVIKOV IS ONLY A CANDIDATE.

15. ~~(C)~~ OF THE REMAINING LENINGRAD PARTY LEADERS THE MOST LIKELY COMER IS OBKOM SECRETARY ANATOLIY P. DUMACHEV, WHO OVERSEES HEAVY INDUSTRY. DUMACHEV WAS

"ELECTED" TO THE POWERLESS BUT SYMBOLIC RSFSR SUPREME SOVIET IN FEBRUARY, 1980, AND WAS MADE A MEMBER OF ITS PRESIDIUM, DUMACHEV'S FIRST OFFICE BEYOND LENINGRAD. AT THE 26TH CONGRESS DUMACHEV WAS MADE A MEMBER OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AUDITING COMMISSION, SOMETIMES A FIRST STEP TOWARD CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP.

THE POLITICAL SCENE: LENINGRAD'S DISSIDENTS

16. ~~(C)~~ ONE OF ROMANOV'S NOTABLE ACCOMPLISHMENTS, ACCORDING TO LENINGRADERS, HAS BEEN THE VIRTUAL ERADICATION OF ORGANIZED, WESTERN-ORIENTED DISSENT IN HIS CITY. INDIVIDUALS ASSOCIATED WITH THE HELSINKI MONITORING GROUPS ARE AT LARGE BUT ARE NOT NOW ACTIVE. SHOT, THE "FREE INTERPROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION OF WORKERS" FOUNDED IN THE LATE 1970'S, HAD SEVERAL LENINGRAD LEADERS--BUT NONE APPEARED TO BE AN ACTUAL WORKER; THOSE WE KNOW OF WERE EITHER MARGINAL CHARACTERS OF DUBIOUS BONA FIDES OR INTELLECTUALS WHO HAVE SINCE BEEN INTIMIDATED INTO INACTIVITY. A LENINGRAD-BASED FEMINIST MOVEMENT ORGANIZED IN THE LATE-1970'S, WHOSE PUBLICATION "WOMAN AND RUSSIA" ATTRACTED MORE ATTENTION IN THE WEST THAN IN THE USSR, WAS BROUGHT TO A HALT IN 1980 WITH THE ARREST, EXILE OR FORCED EMIGRATION OF MOST OF ITS ACTIVE MEMBERSHIP. ALTHOUGH SOME MATERIALS CONCERNING LENINGRAD EVENTS, HOSTLY ARRESTS AND INTIMIDATIONS, STILL REACH THE WORLD THROUGH THE "CHRONICLE OF CURRENT EVENTS" OR SIMILAR PUBLICATIONS, THERE HAVE BEEN NO RECENT POLITICAL ACTIONS--NO PETITIONS, LETTER-WRITING CAMPAIGNS OR PUBLIC PROTESTS. WE KNOW OF ABOUT 30 IMPRISONED LENINGRAD DISSIDENTS.

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17. (C) THE ONLY ACTIVE Leningrad SAMIZDAT POLITICAL JOURNAL WE KNOW OF IS "37", EDITED BY VIKTOR KRIVULIN, WHO SAYS HE IS PRACTICALLY THE LAST OF HIS KIND LEFT IN Leningrad. HE FEARS HE MAY BE ARRESTED AND MAY SEEK TO PUBLICIZE HIS CASE ABROAD FOR THE PROTECTION HE THINKS IT MAY GIVE HIM.

18. (C) PERHAPS IRONICALLY FOR A "WESTERN" CITY, Leningrad HAS BEEN HOME FOR RUSSIAN-NATIONALIST AND ORTHODOX RELIGIOUS DISSIDENT GROUPS. ONE, THE "ALL-RUSSIAN CHRISTIAN UNION FOR THE LIBERATION OF THE PEOPLE" LED BY IGOR OGURTSOV, WAS FAMOUS FOR ITS RIGHT-WING, RUSSIAN NATIONALIST (RATHER THAN LIBERAL) CRITICISM OF THE REGIME. IT WAS BROKEN UP IN 1967 ONLY AFTER IT HAD BEGUN TO ASSEMBLE WEAPONS FOR AN "ARMED UPRISING". THE MORE PEACEFUL "CHRISTIAN SEMINAR" LED BY PORESH AND OGORODNIKOV, EDITORS OF "OBSHCHINA," WAS BROKEN UP WITH THE 1979 ARRESTS OF BOTH MEN. RELIGIOUS-PHILOSOPHIC READING CIRCLES ARE STILL ACTIVE HERE, AND A NUMBER OF BELIEVERS AND ACTIVIST PRIESTS MAINTAIN A LOOSE COMMUNITY, BUT THEY KEEP A LOW PROFILE.

19. (C) JEWISH REFUSENIKS CANNOT FULLY BE CONSIDERED DISSIDENTS, AS THEIR GOAL IS NOT TO CHANGE THE USSR BUT TO LEAVE IT. NEVERTHELESS, REFUSENIK LEADERS RUN INTERLOCKING SEMINARS ON JEWISH HISTORY, HEBREW, AND JUDAISM TO WHICH ALL, INCLUDING NON-JEWS, WERE WELCOME. AFTER SEVERAL YEARS OF TOLERATION, Leningrad AUTHORITIES BROKE UP THE SEMINARS THIS SUMMER, AND ARRESTED ONE OF THE LEADERS, YEVGENIY LEIN, FOR "INTERFERING IN THE WORK OF THE MILITIA."

20. (C) THE REGIME'S "NEGATIVE" ACCOMPLISHMENT IN SUPPRESSING OPEN DISSIDENT ACTIVITIES AND ARRESTING MOST VISIBLE DISSIDENTS DOES NOT MEAN IT HAS SUCCEEDED IN THE "POSITIVE" TASK OF WINNING OVER OR COOPTING THE RAW MATERIAL FOR FUTURE DISSIDENTS--THE PROFESSIONAL CLASSES AND THEIR CHILDREN. AND WHILE THE "DARK MASSES"--THE HARD-HAT, HARD-LINE INDUSTRIAL WORKERS WE HEAR FROM AT ZNANIYE LECTURES AND ARGUE WITH ON THE NEVSKIY PROSPEKT--SHOW NO SYMPATHY FOR THE WESTERNIZED NOTIONS OF THE Leningrad INTELLIGENTSIA, WE HEAR THEM, AND PEOPLE FROM ALL CLASSES, EXPRESSING THEIR ANGER ON A NEW SET OF "LIVING STANDARDS" ISSUES--FOOD, HOUSING, PRICES--WHICH MAY BE THE BASIS OF NEW DISSIDENT.

THE ECONOMIC PICTURE

21. (C) IN AN ECONOMY AS CENTRALIZED AS THE SOVIET, ROMANOV AND HIS PARTY ORGANIZATION MAY NOT HAVE A GREAT DEAL OF ACCESS TO THE LEVERS OF INDUSTRIAL POWER, ESPECIALLY GIVEN THAT SO MUCH OF Leningrad'S ECONOMY RESTS ON CENTRALLY CONTROLLED DEFENSE INDUSTRY.

NEVERTHELESS, ROMANOV CULTIVATES A REPUTATION AS AN INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT SPECIALIST AND HARD-CHARGING INNOVATOR. THE EARLY AND MID-1970'S WERE GOOD YEARS FOR Leningrad. INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION GREW AT A VERY RESPECTABLE AVERAGE RATE OF 5.5 PERCENT BETWEEN 1970 AND 1976. ROMANOV FORMULATED OR BACKED A NUMBER OF NEW MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATIONAL TECHNIQUES, SOME OF WHICH WERE LATER ADOPTED AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL.

22. (C) SOME OF THESE INCLUDED ESTABLISHMENT OF LARGE INDUSTRIAL-SCIENTIFIC COMBINES (OB'YEDINENIYE); AN ORGANIZATIONAL TECHNIQUE Leningrad OFFICIALS CLAIM WAS PIONEERED HERE; REFORMS OF PLANNING INDICATORS; EXPERIMENTS WITH LONG-TERM CONTRACTS BETWEEN ENTERPRISES; THE ORGANIZATION OF THE "BRIGADE SYSTEM" OF LABOR, BY WHICH GROUPS OF WORKERS ASSUME COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR COMPLETION OF JOBS ACCORDING TO CONTRACTS WITH MANAGEMENT; AND OTHER TECHNIQUES. NONE OF THESE INNOVATIONS HAD "POLITICAL" OR "REFORMIST" IMPLICATIONS, UNLIKE SOME OF THE LIBERALIZING REFORM PROPOSALS OF THE 1960'S, BUT ROMANOV FREQUENTLY PROCLAIMED Leningrad'S INNOVATIVE SPIRIT IN THE LATE 1970'S.

23. (C) TWO Leningrad INITIATIVES OF THE 1970'S SEEMED INTENDED TO INCREASE ROMANOV'S POWER ON HIS OWN TURF. IN EARLY 1979, THE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES ESTABLISHED A Leningrad "INTERDEPARTMENTAL COORDINATING COUNCIL" WHICH, ACCORDING TO SOME LOCAL SCIENTISTS AND OUR READING OF THE PRESS, WAS ACTUALLY ESTABLISHED AT OBKOM INITIATIVE AND ACTS AS AN ARM OF THE LOCAL PARTY IN CONTROLLING LOCAL SCIENCE AND PUTTING IT TO WORK ON APPLIED, AS OPPOSED TO PURE, RESEARCH TASKS. WE

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HAVE HEARD THAT THE ACADEMY IS OPPOSED TO FURTHER
INROADS INTO CONTROL OF SCIENCE BY THE OBKOM AND THAT
THE ISSUE IS NOW STALEMATED.

24. (U) A SECOND ROMANOV INITIATIVE INVOLVES QUESTIONS
OF LOCAL AND PARTY VERSUS CENTRALIZED AND STATE
ECONOMIC PLANNING. AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 10TH
FIVE YEAR PLAN, LENINGRAD ESTABLISHED A LOCAL
ECONOMIC PLAN, CALLED THE "COMPLEX PLAN OF ECONOMIC
AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT," ORIGINALLY BILLED AS A SOCIAL-
SERVICES PLAN BUT ACTUALLY ADMINISTERED BY AN OBKOM
"STAFF" HEADED BY HEAVY INDUSTRY SPECIALIST AND OBKOM
SECRETARY DUMACHEV. THE OBKOM STAFF, AS LENINGRAD
ECONOMISTS HAVE
UNOFFICIALLY EXPLAINED, ATTEMPTS TO FUNCTION AS A
MINI-"GOSPLAN."

25. (U) WHILE WE DOUBT THAT ROMANOV CAN DO MUCH TO
DECENTRALIZE ECONOMIC DECISION-MAKING FOR LENINGRAD,
ON AT LEAST ONE OCCASION THE LENINGRAD PARTY ORGANIZA-
TION DID ESTABLISH ITS OWN ECONOMIC TARGETS--AND THEN
FAILED TO PRODUCE. IN DECEMBER, 1978, ROMANOV
PUBLICLY COMMITTED LENINGRAD TO 1979 INDUSTRIAL
PRODUCTION GROWTH OF 5.1 PERCENT--HIGHER THAN GOSPLAN'S
4.3 PERCENT GROWTH TARGET, WHICH ROMANOV CRITICIZED
AS "INSUFFICIENTLY TIGHT." IN THE END, LENINGRAD
INDUSTRIAL GROWTH CAME TO ONLY 3.6 PERCENT FOR THE
YEAR, A HIGHLY VISIBLE FAILURE.

26. (U) SINCE 1979, IN FACT, PUBLICATION OF LENINGRAD
ECONOMIC STATISTICS HAS BEEN SHARPLY CURTAILED AND THE
FEW STATISTICS THAT ARE AVAILABLE CANNOT DO ROMANOV'S
REPUTATION ANY GOOD. HALF-YEAR FIGURES FOR 1980
SHOWED INDUSTRIAL GROWTH AT 4.4 PERCENT ABOVE HALF-
YEAR 1979, BUT NO 1980 ANNUAL FIGURES WERE PUBLISHED.
THE ONLY FIGURE FOR LENINGRAD'S 1980 INDUSTRIAL
PRODUCTION THAT WE HAVE SEEN WAS ON A LOCAL BILLBOARD,
WHICH CITED IT AS "100 PERCENT" OF 1979 INDUSTRIAL
PRODUCTION, THE ONLY NO-GROWTH YEAR HERE IN OUR
MEMORY. NOT EVEN HALF-YEAR ECONOMIC STATISTICS WERE
PUBLISHED FOR 1981 AND THE SAME BILLBOARD CITED 1981
NINE-MONTH INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION AS, AGAIN, "100 PERCENT"
OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION FOR NINE MONTHS OF 1980. IF
THE BILLBOARD, STANDING 150 METERS FROM ONE OF ROMANOV'S
IN-TOWN RESIDENCES, IS TO BE CREDITED, LENINGRAD IS
IN ITS SECOND CONSECUTIVE NO-GROWTH YEAR.

27. (U) THE CAUSES OF LENINGRAD'S ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES
AS REPORTED BY THE PRESS ARE FAMILIAR TO STUDENTS
OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY: INSUFFICIENT MANPOWER, POOR
DISCIPLINE AT THE WORKPLACE, SUPPLY BOTTLENECKS, POOR
USE OF TECHNOLOGY AND ADMINISTRATIVE WEAKNESS. THE
LENINGRAD LEADER APPARENTLY DOES NOT EXPECT THESE DE-
FECTS TO BE CORRECTED SOON. IN A NOVEMBER
25 SPEECH TO AN OBKOM PLENUM ON 1982'S ECONOMIC TASKS,

ROMANOV SET NO OVERALL TARGETS FOR 1982, MADE NO
COMMITMENTS AND, IN SUMMING UP 1981'S RESULTS, SAID
ONLY THATTEN-MONTH PRODUCTION HAD "FULFILLED" ESTABLISHED
PLANS, PLANS WHICH ARE SOMETIMES "CORRECTED" TO AVOID
EMBARRASSING UNDERFULFILLMENT. ROMANOV MUSTERED NO
INSPIRED RHETORIC BUT SOUNDED ALMOST PATHETIC WHEN
HE DECLARED THAT "THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST TWO YEARS
OF THE NEW FIVE YEAR PLAN DEPEND GREATLY ON THE RESULTS
OF THE CURRENT YEAR'S WORK."
THE ISSUE OF LIVING STANDARDS

28. (U) NO SUBJECT IS LIKELY TO ELICIT A MORE HEATED
RESPONSE FROM ALENINGRADERTHAN IS THE QUESTION OF
LIVING STANDARDS, WHICH VIRTUALLY ALL AGREE HAVE BEEN
FALLING FROM THE MID-1970'S BOTH ABSOLUTELY AND IN
RELATION TO MOSCOW'S. OUR ZNANIYE LECTURE ATTENDEES
HAVE LEARNED TO ANTICIPATE WITH RELISH ANY QUESTION ABOUT
FOOD SUPPLIES, HOUSING, PRICES, OR SOCIAL SECURITY--AND
TO AWAIT THE AUDIENCE'S INEVITABLE GRUMBLES, SNICKERS,
AND OCCASIONAL CATCALLS, AND THE LECTURER'S DEFENSIVE
RESPONSE. THE BICKERING BETWEEN ZNANIYE AUDIENCES
AND LECTURERS IS ALL THE MORE INTERESTING BECAUSE
ZNANIYE AUDIENCES ARE INVARIABLY HARD-LINE ON INTER-
NATIONAL OR DOMESTIC "POLITICAL," E.G., DISSIDENT,
ISSUES. EVEN DIPLOMATIC AGENCY OFFICIALS WILL OCCASI-
ONALLY GRUMBLE ABOUT SHORTAGES AND CONSUMER PROBLEMS
AND HAVE BEGUN DIALOGUES BY REMARKING TO A CONGENOFF,
"WELL, YOU LIVE HERE TOO; YOU KNOW HOW THINGS ARE."
WHILE WE CANNOT IMAGINE RUSSIAN WORKERS STRIKING FOR
POLITICAL FREEDOM OR OVER SOME INTERNATIONAL ISSUE, WE
CAN IMAGINE DISORDERS OVER CONTINUED LIVING STANDARD
DETERIORATION. THE SITUATION CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO
IMPROVE ANY TIME SOON. WHILE MANY LIVING STANDARD

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PROBLEMS FOUND HERE ARE COMMON THROUGHOUT THE SOVIET UNION, OR THE RSFSR, SOME PROBLEMS ARE PECULIAR TO Leningrad OR HAVE A Leningrad ASPECT.

29. (C) WE HAVE REPORTED THE STEADY DETERIORATION OF Leningrad FOOD SUPPLIES, AND FOOD REMAINS A NUMBER ONE TOPIC OF CONVERSATION AMONG OUR CONTACTS. WHILE Leningrad FOOD SUPPLIES WILL PROBABLY REMAIN MUCH HIGHER THAN THOSE IN OTHER NORTHWEST RSFSR CITIES--WHOSE RESIDENTS WILL TRAVEL HERE OVERNIGHT TO PURCHASE MEAT FOR THEIR TABLE--Leningraders FIND THAT SMALL COMFORT. SOME Leningraders REGARD THE LOCAL FOOD SITUATION AS ANOTHER SIGN OF Leningrad's NEGLECT BY NATIONAL AUTHORITIES, AND OTHERS WILL BLAME ROMANOV FOR SUPPOSEDLY ALLOWING Leningrad TO BE DOWNGRADED FROM A LEVEL EQUAL TO THAT OF MOSCOW IN THE SOVIET FOOD DISTRIBUTION HIERARCHY. Leningrad OBLAST DOES NOT FEED ITSELF AND PROBABLY WILL NEVER DO SO; THE FOOD SITUATION HERE IS TIED TO NATIONAL FOOD SUPPLIES AND WILL NOT IMPROVE UNTIL THEY DO.

30. (C) UNDER ANY CONCEIVABLE LEADERSHIP PRIORITIES, Leningrad WOULD HAVE A SERIOUS HOUSING PROBLEM. THE STOCK IN THE PRE-REVOLUTIONARY PORTION OF TOWN IS OLD, SUFFERED FROM DECADES OF NEGLECT AFTER 1917 AND STILL SUFFERS FROM THE WEATHER. TREMENDOUS EFFORTS ARE REQUIRED JUST TO KEEP AHEAD OF DETERIORATION--IT IS MORE EXPENSIVE TO RESTORE AN OLD APARTMENT THAN TO BUILD A NEW ONE OF EQUAL SIZE, ACCORDING TO A Leningrad DEPUTY MAYOR--AND 47 PERCENT OF Leningraders STILL LIVE IN SUBSTANDARD "COMMUNAL" FLATS IN THESE OLD BUILDINGS, ACCORDING TO A ZNANIYE LECTURER.

31. (C) Leningrad DEVOTES ENORMOUS RESOURCES TO HOUSING, BUT CONSTRUCTION MAY BE SLIPPING FURTHER BEHIND DEMAND. FROM 1966-70 AN AVERAGE OF 3085 THOUSAND SQUARE METERS OF HOUSING SPACE WERE COMPLETED EACH YEAR; FROM 1971-75 THE ANNUAL AVERAGE DROPPED TO 2468; FROM 1976-80 THE AVERAGE ROSE TO 2800; 1981 FIGURES ARE UNAVAILABLE BUT THE 1982 PLAN CALLS FOR ONLY 2500 THOUSAND SQUARE METERS TO BE BUILT. SINCE DEMAND IS ROUGHLY 130,000 APARTMENTS PER YEAR, ACCORDING TO A ZNANIYE FIGURE, AND 3000 THOUSAND SQUARE METERS EQUALS 100,000 NEW APARTMENTS, ACCORDING TO A CITY OFFICIAL, Leningrad IS APPARENTLY NOT MAKING ANY HEADWAY IN HOUSING.

32. (C) INCREASING DEMANDS FOR SOCIAL SECURITY AND HEALTH CARE ARE MAJOR FUTURE PROBLEMS GIVEN THE SLOWLY AGING SOVIET POPULATION; IN Leningrad THE FUTURE HAS ARRIVED. Leningrad HAD ALMOST 800,000 PENSIONERS IN 1981, NEARLY 20 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION COMPARED TO THE RSFSR AVERAGE OF ABOUT 14 PERCENT. AS A RESULT OF THE OLDER POPULATION, AND DETERIORATING MEDICAL SERVICES AGGRAVATED IN PART BY THE DEMANDS OF THE OLDER

POPULATION, Leningraders ARE HAVING FEWER CHILDREN--WHICH WILL NOT IMPROVE THE DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE. THE RATE OF NATURAL POPULATION INCREASE HERE DROPPED FROM .61 PERCENT IN 1940 TO .32 PERCENT IN 1976, COMPARED TO .59 PERCENT IN THE RSFSR AS A WHOLE THE SAME YEAR. IMMIGRATION, Leningrad's TRADITIONAL SOURCE OF NEW WORKERS, CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE AT PAST LEVELS. THE Leningrad LEADERSHIP HAS DRAWN ITS OWN CONCLUSIONS AND HAS ANNOUNCED ON MANY OCCASIONS THAT Leningrad ENTERPRISES MUST NOT ONLY PLAN ON INCREASING PRODUCTION WITHOUT AN INCREASE IN WORKERS, BUT MUST PLAN ON A DECREASING WORKFORCE. THIS MAY HAVE SOME POSITIVE EFFECT ON THE HOUSING SHORTAGE, IRONICALLY.

THE CULTURAL SCENE

33. (C) CULTURE IS THE ONE FIELD IN WHICH Leningrad CAN FAIRLY MAKE A CLAIM TO NATIONAL, EVEN WORLD, STATURE. THE KIROV BALLET, THE SYMPHONY AND THE GORKIY AND KOMISSARZHEVSKAYA THEATERS ARE RIGHTLY REGARDED HERE TO BE AS GOOD AS THEIR MOSCOW EQUIVALENTS. THE HERMITAGE AND RUSSIAN MUSEUMS CERTAINLY SURPASS THEIR MOSCOW RIVALS; THE REPIN ART ACADEMY CLAIMS THAT IT DOES. FILM DIRECTORS HERE SAY THAT Leningrad's MOVIE AND DOCUMENTARY FILM OUTPUT IS SMALLER BUT AS GOOD AS MOSCOW'S.

34. (C) EVEN IN CULTURE, HOWEVER, THE TREND IS ADVERSE--DEFLECTIONS, EMIGRATION AND TRANSFERS TO MOSCOW HAVE TAKEN A TOLL. THE OPERA IN Leningrad NO LONGER COMPARES TO MOSCOW'S. Leningrad's ONCE THRIVING ART SCENE IS CLOSELY CONTROLLED BY THE FIRM HAND OF THE HARDLINE

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INCOMING
TELEGRAM

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S E C R E T SECTION 07 OF 07 LENINGRAD 02602

UGAROV, RECTOR OF THE REPIN ACADEMY, HEAD OF THE LOCAL UNION OF ARTISTS BRANCH AND REPUTED PERSONAL FRIEND OF ROMANOV. LENINGRAD'S UNOFFICIAL ARTISTS, PREVIOUSLY MORE CLOSELY TIED TO THE LIBERAL WING OF THE OFFICIAL ARTISTS NTO WHICH THEY BLENDED, HAVE BEEN BOTH FORCED INTO INCREASING ISOLATION AND RELIANCE ON WESTERN SUPPORTERS, AND DECIMATED BY EMIGRATION. EVEN THE THEATER HAS SUFFERED FROM THE HARD IDEOLOGICAL CLIMATE-- THE PAST TWO SEASONS HAVE BEEN UNREMARKABLE; THE COMEDY THEATER'S PRODUCTION OF TVARDOVSKIY'S "TYORKIN-TYORKIN"--LAST YEAR'S BOLDSUT NEW PLAY--BECAME A MINOR SCANDAL WITH THE THEATER'S YOUNG DIRECTOR FOMENKO REPORTEDLY BEING CASTIGATED.

35. (C) RECENT MONS HERE HAVE SEEN INCREASED PARTY INVOLVEMENT AND CONTROL OVER CULTURE: WARNINGS HAVE BEEN ISSUED TO INSTITUTIONS TO ESCEW FOREIGN CONTACTS, WITH SPECIAL SECURITY "FIRST SECTIONS" REPORTEDLY ESTABLISHED IN SOME MUSEUMS TO ENFORCE THE RULING; THE LIBERAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE RUSSIAN MUSEUM WAS DISMISSED IN DISGRACE UPON THE DIRECT ORDERS OF THE LOCAL PARTY LEADERSHIP FOR HIS SUPPORT OF UNOFFICIAL ARTISTS; SAMIZDAT WRITERS, STILL NUMEROUS HERE, ARE REPORTED READY TO ACCEPT A RECENTLY OFFERED KGB "DEAL" PERMITTING THEM LIMITED SOVIET PUBLICATION IN EXCHANGE FOR CESSATION OF PUBLICATION ABROAD, BECAUSE THEY FEAR THE CONSEQUENCES IF THEY REFUSE.

36. (C) THE CURRENT WAVE OF PARTY REPRESSION MAY PASS, AND LENINGRAD CULTURE MAY REGAIN THE STRONGER POSITION IT ENJOYED IN THE 1970'S. STILL, AS A REPIN ACADEMY FACULTY MEMBER PUT IT, FOR 15 YEARS EACH SUCCESSIVE WAVE OF REPRESSION HAS CUT DEEPER, AND EACH PERIOD OF THAW IN BETWEEN HAS BEEN A LITTLE LESS INTERESTING.

37. (C) NOTE: THE FOREGOING MESSAGE WAS DRAFTED ALMOST ENTIRELY BY FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICER DANIEL FRIED, WHO IS COMPLETING HIS SECOND YEAR IN LENINGRAD AND LEAVES POST DECEMBER 2. WE SUPPORT HIS OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS. SQUIRE

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~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

USSR
DOMESTIC

USSR: Labor Incentives. (U)

(C) Soviet reporting on a 19 January official trade union plenum in Moscow provides additional indications of policies the government will employ, at least in the short term, to meet the many economic difficulties facing the country.

(C/NOFORN) The range of economic problems confronting party chief Andropov includes a declining rate of increase in industrial output, low labor productivity, poor performance in the agricultural sector, dwindling hard currency reserves, and transportation bottlenecks and inefficiencies. In response, traditional exhortations to increase labor productivity and agricultural output have received considerable emphasis in Andropov's policy statements since assuming power.

(C/NOFORN) Although he has indicated there could be some limited Soviet application of ideas derived from the East European experience, short-term solutions stressing discipline and the consequences of failure rather than positive incentives are steps that can be taken most easily and are the least controversial politically. Statements coming out of the recent labor union meeting show that Soviet policy is heading in that direction. The major emphasis of statements by union officials was that well-tried disciplinary measures against shirkers and loafers are again necessary. These include withholding bonuses, leave, admission to resorts, and preferred vacation time.

COMMENT: (C/NOFORN) Various reports that Andropov favors worker incentives have fueled speculation that some reform might be introduced into the Soviet economy. However, the incentives so far announced are negative, not positive, and actually constitute a threat to cut back previously granted measures that were intended to reward workers for satisfactory production levels. Bonuses and admission to resorts have since come to be regarded by workers as routine perks, and some discontent can be expected if the threat to withhold them for inefficient productivity is rigidly applied by the regime. Moreover, these announcements in no way constitute a systematic change, but rather an attempt to wring productivity out of the workers without significant increases in capital investment and manpower, both of which are in short supply. (DECL OADR)

DIADIN 21-6A as of 2055 EST 21 Jan 83

Prepared by: [REDACTED]

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NLRR F06-1141 #9562
BY RW NARA DATE 3/16/11

24 Jan 83

Defense Intelligence Summary

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~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

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*Chernenko
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EXDIS
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, UR, SW
SUBJ: CHERNENKO SEES SWEDISH INDUSTRIALIST ON FOOD PROBLEM
REF: MOSCOW 13001

1. ~~(SECRET-ENTIRE TEXT)~~

2. SOVIET LEADER AND SUCCESSION CONTENDER KONSTANTIN CHERNENKO RECENTLY SUMMONED A VISITING SWEDISH INDUSTRIALIST AND QUESTIONED HIM ABOUT THE APPROPRIATE SIZE FOR SOVIET DAIRY AND VEGETABLE FARMS. HANS STAHL, CHAIRMAN OF ALFA-LAVAL AND OF A JOINT SWEDISH-SOVIET TRADE COMMITTEE (STRICTLY PROTECT HIM, IT WOULD BE DISASTEROUS FOR HIM AND FOR US IF THIS CONTACT WERE COMPROMISED), TOLD THE AMBASSADOR NOVEMBER 2 THAT CHERNENKO SAID SOVIET COLLECTIVE FARMS ARE TOO LARGE AND PRESSED HIM TO RECOMMEND AN APPROPRIATE SIZE FOR A DAIRY FARM. AFTER PROTESTING THAT IT DEPENDED UPON CONDITIONS AND THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM, STAHL, WHOSE FIRM HAS BEEN SEELING CREAM SEPARATORS AND OTHER DAIRY MACHINERY TO RUSSIA SINCE BEFORE THE REVOLUTION, GUESSED AT 500 COWS. CHERNENKO SAID THAT WAS TOO BIG; SOVIET COLLECTIVE FARMS WERE TOO INEFFICIENT. STAHL WONDERED IF THE SOVIET UNION WAS THINKING OF A RETURN TO THE FAMILY FARM, AND HE ASKED IF THE SOVIETS WERE GOING TO CHANGE THEIR SYSTEM. NO, SAID CHERNENKO, BUT THEY WERE GOING TO CHANGE THE STRUCTURE OF THE SYSTEM.

3. COMMENT: STAHL, WHO SAYS THAT THIS IS THE FIRST TIME IN THE 30 YEARS HE HAS BEEN VISITING THE USSR THAT A POLITICAL FIGURE HAS ASKED TO SEE HIM (HE DESCRIBED CHERNENKO AS THE SOVIET LEADER WHO TOOK CHARGE WHEN BREZHNEV WAS INDIPOSED EARLIER THIS YEAR), THINKS THE MEETING IS A SIGNAL OF MOSCOW'S WISH FOR BETTER SWEDISH-SOVIET RELATIONS. THAT IS PROBABLY WHAT SWEDES IN THE KNOW THINK, TOO, AND IT FITS WITH EMBASSY MOSCOW'S REPORT REFTEL. E DON'T KNOW WHAT ELSE CHERNENKO OR OTHER SOVIETS MAY HAVE SAID TO STAHL ON THAT SCORE. BUT CHERNENKO'S INTEREST IN OBTAINING EXPERT FOREIGN ADVICE ON SCALING DOWN THE SIZE OF MOSCOW'S AILING FOOD PRODUCTION UNITS MAY FIT WITH EMBASSY MOSCOW'S ASSESSMENTS OF CHERNENKO'S INVOLVEMENT IN AND THOUGHTS ON AGRICULTURAL REFORM, AS WELL AS HIS MANEUVERING FOR THE SUCCESSION. END COMMENT

4. STAHL, WHO WAS IN MOSCOW AROUND OCTOBER 1 WHEN ACCORDING TO TASS HE MET WITH FIRST DEPUTY PREMIER

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MESSAGE CENTER

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ARKHIPOV, ALSO SAID HE MET WITH YURIY BREZHNEV AND THAT THE SON OF THE SOVIET PRESIDENT IS UNWELL. THE YOUNGER BREZHNEV, WHO CONTINUES HIS SPECIAL CONNECTION WITH SOVIET-SWEDISH TRADE, ASKED STAHLE FOR HIS VIEWS ON WHAT IS WRONG WITH SOVIET INDUSTRY. STAHLE SAYS HE TOLD HIM THAT THE SOVIETS SKIMP ON QUALITY AND SOVIET WORKERS ARE POORLY TRAINED. ASKED ABOUT US SANCTIONS ON THE GAS PIPELINE, BREZHNEV SAID MOSCOW WOULD OBTAIN THE TECHNOLOGY ELSEWHERE AND THE EFFECT WOULD BE TO DELAY THE PROJECT BY ONE YEAR.

EXDIS
5. STAHLE IN OTHER REMARKS SAID THAT THE SOVIETS ARE EXPERIMENTING WITH A COMPOSITE AIRCRAFT WING, USING PLASTIC AND METALS, WITH IMPLICATIONS FOR FUSALAGE CONSTRUCTION AS WELL. (WITH THE SWEDES APPARENTLY HAVING DECIDED THAT THE ROCKWELL WING IS TOO EXPENSIVE FOR THE JAS, SWEDEN'S NEW GENERATION MILITARY AIRCRAFT, IT WOULD NOT BE SURPRISING FOR SOVIETS TO DANGLE AN ALTERNATIVE, - OR FOR THE SWEDES TO BE INTERESTED.)

EXDIS
6. STAHLE ALSO SAID HE WAS ALLOWED TO MAKE AN INSPECTION VISIT TO TALLIN, WHERE THE SWEDES ARE BIDDING ON A PORT MODERNIZATION PROJECT. HE FOUND CONDITIONS DEPLORABLY INEFFICIENT THERE BUT THE PROSPECTS INTERESTING ENOUGH FOR A SWEDISH BID. ON THE POLITICAL SIDE, HE FOUND ESTONIANS HE MET FELL INTO TWO CATEGORIES: THOSE WHO SAID ESTONIA WAS ORIENTED TOWARD SWEDEN AND THOSE WHO SAID NOTHING.
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BT

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 30, 1982

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM:

RICHARD PIPES *RP*

SUBJECT:

State Analysis of Soviet Internal Policies

Attached for your information (Tab I) is a State Department analysis of the results of the recent Central Committee and Supreme Soviet meetings.

Attachments:

Tab I State's memorandum of November 24, 1982

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White House Guidelines, August 23, 1997
By *[initials]* NARA, Date *7/16/02*



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 24, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Soviet Central Committee and Supreme Soviet
Meetings

We attach a recent analysis of these two meetings
prepared by the State Department.

L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Analysis

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECL: OADR

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Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By GU NARA, Date 7/16/02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: Soviet Central Committee and Supreme Soviet Meetings --
Domestic Aspects

Leadership Developments

The Central Committee met in plenary session on November 22, and three changes in the leadership were announced. As expected, Andrey Kirilenko was dropped from the Politburo, ostensibly for reasons of health. Geydar Aliyev, Azerbaijan's party chief, was named to full membership in the Politburo. Aliyev has long been considered a supporter of Konstantin Chernenko, Andropov's primary rival in the succession struggle. However, the intelligence community now believes that Aliyev's associations with Andropov may be even closer, since Aliyev was a KGB man before he gained the top Party spot in Azerbaijan in 1969. Aliyev may thus represent a compromise choice suitable to both Chernenko and Andropov supporters.

Central Committee member Nikolay Ryzhkov was named to replace Kirilenko as one of the Central Committee Secretaries. It is not known what responsibilities Ryzhkov will assume, although his background is in heavy industry. It should be noted also that 83-year-old Politburo member Arvid Pel'she did show up at the plenum, thus scotching reports he had died during Brezhnev's funeral. The total voting membership of the Politburo now stands at twelve, which is a little low, historically. If Andropov already has a working majority, keeping the Politburo small may suit his interests, at least until he can move his own men up through the ranks and into the Politburo. It may also indicate, however, that there is still disagreement within the Politburo over who to promote to bring the voting membership up to its more normal level of 13-14 persons.

At the November 23 meeting of the Supreme Soviet, Andropov was elected to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. Gromyko and Chernenko had been mentioned by many sources as possible alternatives to Andropov as the new Chairman of the Supreme Soviet. However, since neither of them is on the Presidium of that body, the odds are very strong now that Andropov will be elected to the Chairmanship on November 24. If this occurs, it will mean that Andropov will have done in the space of only a few days what it took his predecessor, Leonid Brezhnev, nearly thirteen years to accomplish: he will simultaneously hold both the head of Party and head of State positions.

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BY KML NARA DATE 12/27/12

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Economic Policy

Contrary to press accounts, we read Andropov's November 22 Plenum speech on the economy as offering only slight, though possibly revealing, shifts in nuances from recent Brezhnev pronouncements. The new Soviet leader set out an agenda of the USSR's mounting economic problems, but offered only tentative glimpses of his own preferences for dealing with them. Andropov did suggest that he will favor the stick, rather than the carrot, as an economic stimulus. He carefully refrained from promising miracles, confessing "I do not have any ready recipes for solution" of the "many tasks" facing the ailing economy. Andropov's remarks offered a rhetorical valedictory to the Brezhnev years, but shed only the dimmest of light on the nation's future path. Specifically, Andropov:

-- Admitted that the economic news was bad, "emphatically" noting that production plans had not been fulfilled over the past two years and acknowledging the looming constraints on Soviet labor, raw material and energy supplies;

-- Acknowledged the importance of material incentives, but placed more emphasis than his predecessor on the need for discipline in the economy, declaring that "shoddy work, inactivity and irresponsibility should have an immediate and unavoidable effect on the earnings, official status and moral prestige of workers;"

-- Pledged to continue Brezhnev's commitment to improving the living conditions of Soviet consumers, while distancing himself personally by referring to it as this "question which Leonid Ilich thought particularly important;" and

-- Called for more independence for Soviet industrial managers, particularly those who "boldly introduce new technology," and for importing successful managerial techniques from abroad. However, Andropov did not embrace the cause of economic reform too tightly, noting "it is necessary to act with caution here."

Following Brezhnev's practice, Andropov also included a ritual pledge to "provide the army and the navy with everything necessary." Unlike his predecessor, Andropov associated his leadership colleagues with this policy which, he averred, "the Politburo considers compulsory."

CURRENT REPORTS

December 27, 1982

1. PAKISTAN: SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN BRINGS MIXED BLESSINGS

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has created problems for Pakistan, but it has also benefitted the Zia regime domestically and internationally, according to Embassy Islamabad. Ethnic separatist movements have become quiet, and a hostile, foreign-supported regime in Kabul has helped Islamabad justify the continuation of martial law. The Afghan refugees have become a potential source of support for Zia, whose warm official welcome of them has refurbished Pakistan's human rights record. Furthermore, Pakistan enjoys increased stature in the NAM and the region, and it has reestablished military supply ties with the US.

On the negative side, security officials worry about Moscow-sponsored terrorism within Pakistan as retaliation for support of the Mujahideen. Additionally, heavily-armed Afghan guerrillas based in Pakistan could pose a serious security problem if they believed there was little chance of returning to their homeland. (CONFIDENTIAL)

2. USSR

A. Moscow Admits "Problems" in Sino-Soviet Talks

Ranking Party official Vadim Zagladin noted on Moscow TV December 25 that while a "certain progress" has been achieved in the renewed discussions, "we think it would be desirable if it were greater." Zagladin, First Deputy Chief of the International Department of the Party Central Committee, said that the problems which had arisen in the talks were not all simple "and not all of them are justified."

INR Comment: The Soviet public is being prepared for difficult, protracted negotiations whose outcome is not at all clear.
(CONFIDENTIAL)

B. Gromyko Reviews Soviet Foreign Policy

Writing in the journal Kommunist on the occasion of the Soviet Union's 60th anniversary, Gromyko said the USSR was ready to do everything it can to improve relations with China, and the USSR had taken note of China's positive response to Moscow's approach. Gromyko said the process of detente was not exhausted and it should be continued. Tensions in US-Soviet relations were not Moscow's fault, he asserted. The USSR would like to improve relations with the US, provided Washington reciprocates. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

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NLRR FOI-114/7 #9566

BY CJ NARADATE 7/7/08

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USSR -

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: SHUM, CSCE, UR, PINT

SUBJECT: SOVIET AMNESTY DECREE SHARPLY LIMITED:

- POLITICAL PRISONERS NOT INCLUDED

REF: MOSCOW 15620 (NOTAL)

1. SUMMARY: THE AMNESTY ANNOUNCED TO MARK THE 60TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE FORMATION OF THE SOVIET UNION WILL NOT INCLUDE POLITICAL PRISONERS. SPECIFICALLY EXCLUDED ARE PERSONS CONVICTED OF DEFAMING THE SOVIET STATE, PARTICIPATING IN GROUP ACTIVITIES VIOLATING SOCIAL ORDER AND VIOLATING SEPARATION OF CHURCH FROM STATE; IN OTHER WORDS, EVERYONE WE WOULD CONSIDER A POLITICAL OR RELIGIOUS

PRISONER WILL NOT BENEFIT. THE SPECIFIC EXCLUSION OF RELIGIOUS DISSENTERS IS A CHANGE FROM PREVIOUS AMNESTIES. THE AMNESTY DECREE IS VERY COMPLEX AND, JURIDICALLY SPEAKING, POORLY DRAFTED. THEREFORE, IT IS DIFFICULT TO SAY WHAT PRECISELY IS THE INTENT OF SOME OF THE CHANGES FROM PREVIOUS AMNESTY PRACTICE. HOWEVER, SOME OF OUR SOVIET CONTACTS INTERPRET THIS AMNESTY AS AN INDICATION THE NEW LEADERSHIP WILL BE TOUGHER WITH CRIMINALS. END SUMMARY.

2. (U) IZVESTIYA FOR MONDAY, DECEMBER 27, CARRIED THE FULL TEXT OF THE SUPREME SOVIET DECREE ON AMNESTY ON THE OCCASION OF THE 60TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE FORMATION OF THE SOVIET UNION. THE DECREE WAS NOT MENTIONED NOR WAS THE TEXT CARRIED IN PRAVDA FOR TUESDAY, DECEMBER 28.

3. (U) THE AMNESTY IS A COMPLICATED DOCUMENT. THE FOLLOWING PERSONS BENEFIT FROM IT:

-- WOMEN, WAR VETERANS, AND WINNERS OF STATE HONORS WHO ARE SERVING PRISON TERMS OF LESS THAN FIVE YEARS, OR OTHER SENTENCES NOT INVOLVING IMPRISONMENT, HAVE THEIR SENTENCES COMMUTED.

-- PREGNANT WOMEN, WOMEN WITH MINOR CHILDREN OR OVER 55, MEN OVER 60, AND INVALIDS OF CLASS I OR II HAVE THEIR SENTENCES COMMUTED, REGARDLESS OF LENGTH.

-- MALE MINORS SERVING TERMS LESS THAN TWO YEARS AND SOLDIERS SENT TO DISCIPLINARY BATTALIONS HAVE THEIR SENTENCES COMMUTED.

-- ALL PRISONERS WITH LESS THAN SIX MONTHS LEFT IN THEIR TERMS ARE TO BE FREED IMMEDIATELY.

-- ALL PRISONERS WITH SENTENCES OF LESS THAN THREE YEARS AND THOSE WITH SENTENCES FROM THREE TO FIVE YEARS WHO HAVE SERVED AT LEAST A YEAR ARE TO BE FREED WITH THE CONDITION THAT WORK IS COMPULSORY.

-- SENTENCES ARE CUT IN HALF FOR THE LIMITED CATEGORIES OF PERSONS LISTED ABOVE WITH SENTENCES GREATER THAN FIVE (OR TWO) YEARS, FOR PERSONS SENTENCED FOR CRIMES COMMITTED

DUE TO NEGLIGENCE, AND FOR PERSONS SENTENCED TO CORRECTIVE LABOR, WHETHER IT INCLUDES IMPRISONMENT OR NOT, AS LONG AS THEY ARE WORKING IN STATE ENTERPRISES OR CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS.

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BY CU NARA DATE 7/7/08

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AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 8354

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 8750

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 7839

AMCONSUL MUNICH 6703

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 8526

AMEMBASSY SOFIA 7843

AMEMBASSY WARSAW 9982

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-- ALL CRIMINAL CASES AND INVESTIGATIONS NOW IN PROGRESS
ARE CANCELLED, AS LONG AS THEY FIT THE CATEGORIES AND
MAXIMUM SENTENCES DESCRIBED ABOVE.

4. ~~(U)~~ THERE ARE ALSO A NUMBER OF LIMITATIONS TO THE
DECREE. THE MOST IMPORTANT ARE:

-- IT DOES NOT APPLY TO PERSONS WHO COMMITTED CRIMES WHILE
IN ACTIVE MILITARY SERVICE, PERSONS SERVING TIME IN
COLONY-SETTLEMENTS (KOLONIYA-POSELENIYA), MINORS,
FOREIGNERS OR STATELESS PERSONS.

-- IT DOES NOT COVER PERSONS CONVICTED FOR ESPECIALLY
DANGEROUS STATE CRIMES, AND ADDS SPECIFICALLY BANDITRY,
DISRUPTION OF CORRECTIVE LABOR CAMPS, SMUGGLING, MASS

DISORDERS, DRAFT REFUSAL, ILLEGAL BORDER CROSSING,
WRECKING OF TRANSPORT, COUNTERFEITING, AND CURRENCY
SPECULATION.

-- MILITARY CRIMES EXCLUDED INCLUDE MASS INSUBORDINATION,
ARMED RESISTANCE TO A COMMANDING OFFICER, BATTERY ON A
SUPERIOR OFFICER, DESERTION, DRAFTDODGING BY SELF-MUTILA-
TION, PREMEDITATED DESTRUCTION OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT,
AND DERELICTION IN GUARD DUTY.

-- RECIDIVISTS, THOSE CONVICTED BEFORE OF PREMEDITATED
CRIMES, THOSE HAVING BENEFITTED FROM A PREVIOUS AMNESTY,
AND THOSE UNDERGOING TREATMENT FOR ALCOHOLISM, DRUG
ADDICTION OR VENERAL DISEASE ARE ALL EXCLUDED FROM THE
AMNESTY.

-- THE DECREE ALSO DOES NOT APPLY TO THOSE CONVICTED OF
THE FOLLOWING CRIMES: PREMEDITATED MURDER OR BATTERY,
ASSAULT ON A POLICEMAN, RAPE, ROBBERY, THEFT OF STATE
PROPERTY ON AN ESPECIALLY LARGE SCALE, LARGE-SCALE
SPECULATION, THEFT OF FIREARMS OR EXPLOSIVES, BRIBE
TAKING, GIVING OR FACILITATION, MALICIOUS HOOLIGANISM,
AND SPECIFICALLY RSFSR CRIMINAL CODE ARTICLES 142
(SEPARATION OF CHURCH FROM STATE AND SCHOOL), 162
(FORBIDDEN TRADE OR BUSINESS), 190/1-3 (SPREADING FALSE
INFORMATION DEFAMING THE SOVIET STATE, OUTRAGE ON THE
STATE FLAG OR EMBLEM, ORGANIZING OR PARTICIPATING IN
GROUP ACTIVITIES VIOLATING SOCIAL ORDER), 207 (THREAT
OF MURDER OR BATTERY), 209 (SYSTEMATIC VAGRANCY), 210
(SUBORNING MINORS IN CRIME), 213/2 (HIJACKING), 224-224/1-
2 (NARCOTICS PREPARATION, TRADE, USE OR THEFT), 227
(ATTACK ON THE PERSONS OR RIGHTS OF CITIZENS BY MEANS OF
OBSERVANCE OF RELIGIOUS RITES), AND 228 (PORNOGRAPHY).

5. ~~(U)~~ THE LAST AMNESTY WAS ON THE OCCASION OF THE 60TH
ANNIVERSARY OF THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION AND SOON AFTER THE
ADOPTION OF THE CURRENT CONSTITUTION. THE PRESENT DECREE
DIFFERS FROM THE PREVIOUS AMNESTY IN THE FOLLOWING
RESPECTS:

-- THE OLD AMNESTY SPECIFICALLY INCLUDED THOSE SENTENCED
BT

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AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2010
AMEMBASSY ATHENS 2030
USMISSION USBERLIN 5962
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AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 1906
AMEMBASSY LISBON 1312
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG 0584
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AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 1859
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AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 8751
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 7840
AMCONSUL MUNICH 6704
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 8527
AMEMBASSY SOFIA 7844
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TO CORRECTIVE LABOR. THIS ONE DOES NOT SPECIFICALLY
INCLUDE THESE PERSONS, AND UNDER SOME OF ITS PROVISIONS
EXCLUDES A SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF THE COUNTRY'S CONVICT
LABORERS.

-- FEMALE MINORS SEEM TO HAVE BEEN ALMOST ENTIRELY
EXCLUDED, UNLESS THEY ARE COVERED BY ONE OF THE OTHER
SPECIAL CATEGORIES.

-- THE OLD AMNESTY SET THE UPPER LIMIT ON SENTENCES FROM
WHICH PRISONERS COULD BE FREED AS UNIFORMLY FIVE YEARS.
THIS DECREE REDUCES THIS IN MANY CASES TO TWO YEARS.

-- THE EXCLUSIONS OF FOREIGNERS AND THOSE CONVICTED OF
CRIMES COMMITTED DURING ACTIVE DUTY ARE ALSO NEW.

-- THE CATEGORY OF THOSE WITH SIX MONTHS OR LESS LEFT

IN THEIR SENTENCES IS NEW IN THIS AMNESTY.

-- RSFSR CRIMINAL CODE ARTICLES WHICH DID NOT APPEAR IN
1977 ARE: 142, 162, 207, 209, AND 224/2.

6. ~~(C)~~ COMMENT: THIS YEAR'S AMNESTY DECREE BASICALLY
FOLLOWS THE PATTERN OF THOSE OF 1977 AND 1972. THE
DECREE WILL PROBABLY NOT RESULT IN THE LIBERATION OF A
SIGNIFICANTLY GREATER OR LESSER NUMBER OR A DIFFERENT
CLASS OF PEOPLE THAN FIVE OR TEN YEARS AGO. IT IS
INTERESTING THAT THE MAXIMUM ELIGIBLE SENTENCE WAS
REDUCED IN A NUMBER OF CASES, AND THAT SPECIFIC REFERENCE
TO CORRECTIVE LABOR INSTITUTIONS WAS REMOVED. THIS MAY
SIGNIFY THE INTENTION OF THE NEW LEADERSHIP TO BE TOUGHER
WITH CRIMINALS; AT LEAST, SOME OF OUR SOVIET CONTACTS
READ IT THIS WAY. HOWEVER, THE DECREE IS SLOPPILY
DRAFTED IN A JURIDICAL SENSE, AND IT IS DIFFICULT TO
READ THE PRECISE INTENT OF THE AUTHORS.

7. ~~(C)~~ MOST CRUCIAL IS THAT ALL PRISONERS THAT WE WOULD
CONSIDER POLITICAL HAVE BEEN CAREFULLY EXCLUDED. ARTICLE
190 IS THE ONE GENERALLY USED IN CASES AGAINST DISSIDENTS,
AND THOSE CONVICTED UNDER IT HAVE BEEN SPECIFICALLY
EXCLUDED FROM THE LAST THREE AMNESTIES. THIS YEAR'S
DECREE GOES FARTHER, WITH THE ADDITION OF ARTICLE 142,
ADDING COVERAGE OF RELIGIOUS BELIEVERS AND DISSENTERS.
THE DECREE THUS LARGELY ENDS HOPE FOR AMNESTY OF THE
MANY HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS, REFUSEENIKS, AND RELIGIOUS
BELIEVERS JAILED OR EXILED DURING THE PAST FEW YEARS.
END COMMENT.

8. ~~(C)~~ MANY OF OUR SOVIET CONTACTS TELL US THAT THEY
EXPECT CRIME TO INCREASE SIGNIFICANTLY IN THE NEAR FUTURE,
WITH SO MANY COMMON CRIMINALS BEING SET FREE UNDER THE
AMNESTY.
HARTMAN
BT

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BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH - ANALYSIS - DECEMBER 30, 1982

1. USSR: THE HUNGARIAN MODEL AS A PATH TO ECONOMIC RECOVERY

Reports are circulating that the new Soviet leadership plans to adapt Hungarian economic modernization techniques to the Soviet economy. Andropov's earlier posting in Budapest and his continuing links to the Kadar leadership lend a certain credibility to these accounts. For the USSR, this would mean greater reliance on market forces and, presumably, greater initiative and responsibility for individual enterprises.

* * *

Politburo candidate member Demichev recently complained to the GDR Ambassador that the inefficiency of the Soviet economic system made it impossible to replace poor managers no matter how incompetent. He added that Hungary was an example of a system that worked well. Deputy Foreign Trade Minister Sushkov privately told an American banker that Andropov sees Hungary's modernization as a step in the right direction, sentiments Andropov himself expressed to Willy Brandt in late 1981. Hungarian officials have said that Andropov personally encouraged Hungary's reform plans in the 1960s and that he views Hungary as a "laboratory."

Andropov apparently retains close links to the Kadar regime. According to reliable reports, he made two visits in Budapest in the early summer of 1982. Shortly thereafter, Kadar named Sandor Rajnai, a former Hungarian senior intelligence official reportedly close to Andropov, as Ambassador to Moscow.

Given the great disparity between the two countries, Moscow will be selective in deciding which aspects of the Hungarian New Economic Mechanism (NEM) are desirable for the USSR. Soviet press discussion focuses primarily on Hungarian agricultural practices, but Soviet officials have also expressed great interest in "economic decentralization."

The debates in Moscow on improving economic efficiency by allowing enterprise managers greater independence may reflect consideration of the Hungarian experience. In the non-economic field, Andropov might also favor some of Kadar's political methods, e.g., consensus-building, more intra-party consultation, and benefits for consumers. Recent media coverage of Politburo meetings may be the first step in the direction of winning public support.

Andropov might allow greater decentralization and initiative in the economic area, but he will accept such reforms only as long as there are no challenges to the Party's political authority. Party conservatives can be expected to argue that economic reform is not controllable and, as in the case of Czechoslovakia, leads inevitably to political instability and loss of Party control. Andropov and his supporters, however, can argue that Hungary shows that this is not necessarily the case.

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