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JET 5/9/2005

File Folder USSR-EXPSURE OF US PERSONNEL TO NPRD

FOIA

F06-114/7

Box Number 25

YARHI-MILO

2516

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
9817	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO LINHARD RE CHRONOLOGIES OF US AND SOVIET INITIATIVES IN INF [1 - 1] R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7	1	ND	B1
9818	MEMO	US INITIATIVES IN INF [3 - 9] R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7	7	ND	B1
9819	CABLE	291437Z AUG 85 [14 - 15] R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7	2	8/29/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

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File - Ann Cont

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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INFORMATION

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INF

NLRR F06-114/7 #9817

BY CN NARADATE 7/7/08

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: BOB LINHARD

SUBJECT: Chronologies of US and Soviet Initiatives in INF

In October, 1983, ACDA provided us with a set of chronologies that it had developed documenting US initiatives in both the START and INF negotiations. The documents were initially developed to help prepare Ken Adelman for testimony on the hill. They were provided to us for information. After a review of their initial product, we felt that they could serve a wider purpose and tasked ACDA to to add corresponding Soviet initiatives and fully coordinate the product within the community.

The attached are resulting chronologies of US and Soviet initiatives taken in the INF negotiations. We have yet to see the chronologies on the START negotiations.

These chronologies should serve as very useful reference documents. Once we receive the corresponding START chronologies we will:

- forward them for your review;
- review the entire package for consistency,
- and evaluate what further use we should make of these and whether we should task ACDA to develop unclassified versions of the full set of products.

Recommendation

That you scan the attached to familiarize yourself with this product.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Concurrence: R.Lehman, Kraemer, Matlock

Info copies: Sims, C.Lehman, Fortier, Raymond, deGraffenreid

Attachment:

INF Chronologies ~~(S)~~

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Declassify on: OADR.

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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
WASHINGTON


OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

January 17, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Chronologies of US And SOVIET Initiatives in INF

Per your memo dated October 21, the attached chronology of US initiatives has been updated and a chronology of Soviet initiatives has been developed. Both papers have received interagency concurrence.



William B. Staples
Executive Secretary

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

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US INITIATIVES IN INF

US Initiative

Soviet Response

1. Agreed Data Base: December 4, 1981, Nitze informally suggests an agreed data base will be necessary to set a starting point for reductions. Negative: December 8, 1981, Kvitsinskiy states negotiations could become "enmeshed" in data like MBFR.
2. Zero Proposal: December 11, 1981, Nitze formally presents the concrete elements of the US "zero-zero" proposal. Negative: December 15, 1981, Soviet side rejects as one-sided and biased.
3. Draft Treaty: February 2, 1982, US Delegation tables draft zero Treaty text. Negative: March 9, 1982, following informal criticism Kvitsinskiy formally states that US draft Treaty is not a basis for an acceptable agreement.
4. Walk in the Woods: June 1982, Nitze initiates private discussion with Kvitsinskiy to develop a package meeting each side's fundamental concerns. Nitze and Kvitsinskiy agree to submit package to their governments for consideration. Negative: September 29, 1982, Kvitsinskiy states package rejected in Moscow and presents Nitze with five principles for agreement.
5. Data Working Group: June 7, 1982, Nitze suggests the establishment of working group on data. Positive: Kvitsinskiy agrees. First Working Group meeting convened June 16, 1982.
6. Treaty Text Working Group: June 24, 1982, Nitze proposes establishment of working group to discuss selected articles of sides' respective draft treaties with aim of arriving at agreed language were possible. Positive: July 1, 1982, Kvitsinskiy agrees. Treaty Text Working Group first meets on July 6.

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7. Missile Destruction Procedures: October 28, 1982, Nitze tables general procedures necessary to assure verification of missile destruction.

Initially Negative: November 18, 1982, Kvitsinskiy states that verification is secondary and must follow resolution of main issues, and that specific measures bear the imprint of the inequitable US approach. (Subsequently, sides agree to discuss destruction. See No. 17)
8. CBMs: Nov. 23, 1982, US formally proposes agreement on advance notification of INF ballistic missile test launches.

Negative: Nov. 23, 1982, Kvitsinskiy rejects US proposal on the basis it would imply acceptance of P-II deployments.
9. Working Group on Verification: February 1, 1983, Nitze proposes working group to negotiate destruction procedures.

Negative: February 1, 1983, Kvitsinskiy sees "no need" for such a working group until agreement is reached on central issues.
10. CBMs: February 1, 1983, Nitze tables draft text of a Treaty on advance notification of LRINF ballistic missile launches and proposes formation of working group.

Negative: March 17, 1983, Kvitsinskiy states CBMs cannot be considered in isolation; CBMs must be combined with progress on the central issues.
11. Criteria for an Agreement: February 3, 1983, Nitze sets forth President's five criteria by which US will evaluate Soviet proposals.

Negative: March 24, 1983, following informal criticism Kvitsinskiy formally rejects US criteria as reflective of "zero-zero" position. Insists on four Soviet "prerequisites" for an agreement.
12. Interim Agreement: March 29, 1983, US proposes Interim Agreement which calls for reduced, equal levels of US and Soviet LRINF missile warheads on a global basis.

Negative: May 19, 1983, When negotiations resume following recess, Kvitsinskiy rejects the interim solution because it entails U.S. deployments and no compensation for third-country systems.

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13. Starting Date for Round V: March 28, 1983, Nitze proposes that the sides begin Round V in mid-May (i.e. May 17) rather than early June. Positive: March 29, 1983, Kvitsinskiy accepts early starting date.
14. Interim Proposal Treaty: May 19, 1983, Delegation tables draft Treaty based on proposal for Interim Agreement. Negative: July 12, 1983, following informal criticism Kvitsinskiy formally rejects as the "stillborn twin brother" of the Zero Treaty.
15. Specific Warhead Limits: June 16, 1983 Nitze proposes, within 0 and 572 constraints, LRINF missile warhead numbers, in increments of 50, between 50 and 450. Negative: July 12, 1983 Kvitsinskiy says any numerical combination in an "interim solution" is unacceptable.
16. Reciprocal Collateral Constraints: June 16, 1983, US Delegation suggests that it will consider collateral constraints on shorter range INF missiles. US tables revised Treaty language on July 12, 1983 which applies collateral constraints to US Pershing I missile systems. Negative: July 11, 1983, Kvitsinskiy asserts peripheral questions must wait until central issues are resolved.
17. Destruction Working Group: Sept. 13, 1983, Nitze urges formation of working group to discuss destruction measures without prejudice to composition of arms. Positive: Sept. 22, 1983, Delegations agree that the reformed Data Experts/Destruction Working Group can discuss destruction procedures.
18. New Proposals: Sept. 22, 1983, Nitze introduces new US proposals elaborating on interim agreement proposal, with respect to: limits on land-based LRINF aircraft, US LRINF missile levels in Europe, and P-II/GLCM mix at reduced levels. Negative: October 5, 1983, Kvitsinskiy affirms Andropov's Sept. 29 statement as authoritative and says that US proposals are neither a basis for productive work nor a solution to the problem as a whole.

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19. New Meeting Formats: Sept. 27, 1983 Nitze suggests less formal Heads of Delegation or limited attendance plenaries to complement existing procedures/and permit informal explorations of new proposals. Negative: October 3, 1983 Soviet Delegation turns down proposal; sees "no useful purpose" in such a meeting.
20. 420 Warhead Proposal: November 15, 1983, Nitze proposes equal global ceilings of 420 warheads within context of the interim agreement, matching Soviet-suggested numbers for SS-20s opposite NATO. Negative: November 17, 1983 Kvitsinskiy states that putting a proposal within the framework of an unacceptable approach is not the way to an accord.
21. Round VI Resumption October 17, 1983: Executive Secretary proposes brief holiday break beginning December 15 and continuation of round in January. Negative: November 23, 1983 Kvitsinskiy declares round "discontinued" without date for resumption.

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SOVIET INITIATIVES IN INF

Soviet Initiatives

1. Joint Moratorium Proposal:
December 1, 1981, Kvitsinskiy tabled text of joint statement on a moratorium as proposed publicly by Brezhnev.
2. Reductions Proposal: December 15, 1981, Kvitsinskiy proposes reductions of NATO and USSR medium-range systems to 600 by 1985 and 300 by 1990; calls for UK and French systems to be included.
3. Draft Statement of Intentions: February 4, 1982, Kvitsinskiy tables text of draft agreement that embodies the moratorium and reduction proposals above.
4. Unilateral Moratorium: March 16, 1982, Brezhnev announces a unilateral moratorium on the deployment of medium-range nuclear armaments in the European part of the USSR. States intention to unilaterally reduce a certain number of its medium-range missiles. Publicly reaffirmed on May 18, 1982 by Brezhnev and presented in Geneva on May 20, 1982.
5. Draft Treaty: May 25, 1982, Soviet Delegation tables draft treaty, which embodies, with minor modifications, reduction scheme in Statement of Intentions.
6. Variant of Reduction Proposal: October 21, 1982, Kvitsinskiy proposes that US reduce its "medium-range" systems to zero; Soviet Union would retain "medium-range" forces equal to UK/FR.

US Responses

Negative: December 15, 1981, Nitze states proposal would perpetuate imbalance and would assure a unilateral Soviet advantage.

Non-Committal: December 15, 1981, Nitze assures Kvitsinskiy that both the Delegation and Washington will give proposal careful consideration.

Negative: March 9, 1982, Nitze states that proposal would perpetuate inequalities, denying US right to deploy missiles and permitting Soviet Union to produce and deploy additional systems.

Negative: April 6, 1982 SCG Chairman Burt notes that SS-20 construction continues in Western USSR and elsewhere; moratorium does not resolve Soviet superiority in land-based INF missiles.

Negative: May 27, 1982, Nitze points out that draft treaty continues to result in an unequal outcome.

Negative: October 21, 1982, Nitze states that proposal would guarantee Soviet superiority, preclude US deployments, and remove from Europe all US dual-capable aircraft.

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7. Sublimits for Missiles and Aircraft: November 10, 1982, Kvitsinskiy proposes an unspecified subceiling on medium-range missiles. January 27, 1983 Kvitsinskiy clarifies proposal by linking missile launcher subceiling to level of UK/FR launchers.¹
- Positive and Negative: January 27, 1983, Nitze notes that proposal recognizes the need to focus on LRINF missiles as a first priority. February 8, 1983 Nitze concludes Soviet adjustment leaves its basic position substantially unchanged and is inadequate basis for an effective agreement.
8. Warhead Limits: May 17, 1983, Kvitsinskiy suggests that Soviets are prepared to accept limits on warheads on INF systems. Willing to agree to equality in warheads and launchers in Europe, while taking into consideration UK/FR systems.²
- Positive and Negative: June 30, 1983, Nitze states that Soviet concept of warheads as unit of account is consistent with US view, but notes that Soviet approach is basically unchanged.
9. Modified Line of Withdrawal: June 7, 1983, Kvitsinskiy offers to adjust 80° withdrawal line in consideration of US argument that areas of NATO Europe would be within range of SS-20s in Asia.
- Negative: June 23, 1983, Nitze states that revision is insufficient as it does not affect a single SS-20 base; moreover, because of the range, mobility, and transportability of the SS-20, limits should be global.
10. Starting Date for Round VI: June 15, 1983, Kvitsinskiy proposes that the next round begin in early September (i.e. September 5) rather than mid-September.
- Positive: June 16, 1983 U.S. accepts early resumption of negotiations.
11. CBM Proposal: June 21, 1983 Kvitsinskiy tables new article to Soviet draft treaty incorporating CBMs. Calls for prior notification of MRBM launches extending beyond national borders, multiple MRBM launches within ZRL, and takeoffs of a significant number of medium-range airplanes within ZRL.
- Positive: June 21, 1983 Glitman notes that this is a step in the right direction.

1. Proposal publicly announced by Andropov on December 21, 1982
2. Publicly announced by Andropov on May 3, 1983

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12. Missile Destruction: September 6, 1983 and clarified on September 15, Kvitsinskiy presents Soviet proposal to liquidate excess "medium-range" missiles in Europe rather than withdraw them.³

Positive and Negative: ~~Negative~~ September 20, 1983 Nitze comments that the Soviet proposal addresses the US concerns on the disposition of missiles associated with excess launchers; notes, however, absence of missile inventory limits, and that new missiles could continue to be produced for deployments in ZRL or in eastern USSR.

13. Proposal on Geoscope, Aircraft and Missile Limits: October 27, 1983, Kvitsinskiy presents Andropov proposal to freeze SS-20 levels in Asia following entry into force of an agreement on Europe, to establish equal levels of "medium-range" aircraft for USSR and NATO and reduce Soviet SS-20 launchers to 140 (equal to Soviet count of UK/FR warheads).⁴

Positive and Negative: November 9, 1983, Nitze states the modification contains some positive elements regarding geoscope and treatment of aircraft, although problems remain in both areas. However, Soviet position remains unchanged on barring U.S. deployments while maintaining Soviet superiority and on treatment of third-country systems.

14. Suggestion for Equal Reductions: November 13, 1983 Kvitsinskiy suggests that if US proposes equal reductions of 572 warheads in Europe, leaving the Soviets with approximately 120 missiles in Europe, USSR could accept.

Negative: November 19, 1983, Nitze rejects suggestion on the basis of barring U.S. deployments and perpetuating a Soviet monopoly. Notes with interest indication of Soviet willingness to drop explicit demand for compensation for third country forces.

-
3. Publicly announced by Andropov on August 27, 1983
4. Presented publicly by Andropov October 27, 1983

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~~J. Matlock~~
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 26, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY ⁷⁷

SUBJECT: Presidential Letter to Embassy Moscow

State has forwarded a draft Presidential letter (Tab A) to the U.S. staff at Embassy Moscow and the Consulate General Leningrad. Specifically, the letter praises our Embassy personnel for having reacted with admirable calm to the news of their exposure to chemical tracking agents. At Tab I is a memo from you to the President which forwards the draft letter for his signature.

Speechwriters have cleared the text.

^{gm} Matlock, ^(not available) Sestanovich and Small concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum for the President

Tab A Presidential Letter

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Letter to Embassy Moscow and Consulate General
Leningrad Staff

Issue

Letter to Embassy Moscow and Consulate General Leningrad staff regarding their exposure to chemical tracking agents.

Facts

On August 21, 1985, we issued a demarche to the Soviets which strongly protests their increasing use of potentially dangerous chemical compounds to track our diplomatic and other personnel in the USSR. The Embassy personnel have been briefed and continue to be handling the situation responsibly. A team of scientists from the National Institute of Health and the Environmental Protection Agency is on its way to Moscow to determine the extent of exposure by conducting on-site tests.

Discussion

At Tab A is a letter from you to Charge d'Affaires Dick Combs, which expresses your personal concern for the well-being of our personnel in Moscow and Leningrad. Speechwriters have cleared the text.

Recommendation

OK

No

That you sign the letter to the staff of the American Embassy Moscow and Consulate General Leningrad.

Attachments:

Tab A Letter to Embassy Moscow and Consulate General
Leningrad

Prepared by:
Paula Dobriansky

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Dick:

I know that the last few days have been trying ones for all of the staff in Moscow and Leningrad. I simply want to let everyone there know through you that you are not alone.

George Shultz has kept me informed about how splendidly our people in Moscow and Leningrad are coping with the disturbing news of your exposure to tracking chemicals. I cannot say I was surprised. I have seen all of you respond with equal professionalism and dedication to too many crises and challenges over the past few years for that. Your response to this one simply reaffirms my conviction that you -- and your families -- are among the best the Foreign Service, and our country, has to offer. We are terribly proud of you.

I know how anxious everyone must be in the face of so many unanswered questions. While I am encouraged by preliminary indications that any risk to which people may have been exposed is small, I have made it clear that I want these questions answered as soon as possible. As you have been informed, a highly qualified team will be in Moscow this week to begin the process. In addition, every effort will be made back here to wring as much information as we can out of the data already available. I promise that your staff will be kept fully informed as work proceeds. I need not tell you that there will be serious consequences if we determine that the Soviets have not terminated this abhorrent practice.

As we deal with this problem, I know I can count on you, Art Hartman, and your staff to continue to do the job you do so well. The months ahead may hold major opportunities for the development of our relations with the Soviet Union. The insights your people can contribute from the unique perspective of Moscow and Leningrad will be more critical than ever if we are to take full advantage of them.

Dick, let me ask you in closing to convey to all the members of the American community in the USSR that you are in our thoughts at this difficult time. Don't hesitate to let us know back here if there is anything we can do to make your task easier.

Sincerely,

Mr. Richard A. Combs, Jr.
Charge d'Affaires a.i.
American Embassy Moscow
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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PAGE 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 1969 DTG: 291437Z AUG 85 PSN: 049493
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*Ambr
M. K. K.*

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BY CU NARADATE 7/7/08

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE MOSCOW 11969

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DEPT PASS USIA WASHDC

E. O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: UR, US, PREL
SUBJECT: BRIEFING OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY BY
MEDICAL TEAM

REF: (A) MOSCOW 11625; (B) MOSCOW 11556;
-- (C) STATE 258597

1. TWO BRIEFINGS OF THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY WERE HELD AT SPASO HOUSE DURING THE MORNING OF AUGUST 29 BY THE MEDICAL SURVEY TEAM. THE CHARGE INTRODUCED THE TEAM AND STRESSED THAT THE BRIEFINGS WERE FOR THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY AND WERE NOT RPT NOT PRESS BRIEFINGS. EACH OF THE BRIEFINGS, LASTING A LITTLE MORE THAN 30 MINUTES, BEGAN WITH INTRODUCTION OF THE TEAM MEMBERS, A DESCRIPTION OF WHAT THE TEAM HOPED TO ACCOMPLISH, AND THE ROLE EACH WOULD PLAY IN THE TEAM'S WORK. IT WAS STRESSED THAT PARTICIPATION IN THE SURVEY WAS STRICTLY VOLUNTARY.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT

PAGE 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 1969

DTG: 291437Z AUG 85 PSN: 049493

ON THE OTHER HAND, ANYONE WHO WISHED IT COULD ASK TO BE SURVEYED AND EVERY ATTEMPT WILL BE MADE TO ACCOMMODATE SUCH REQUESTS. PARTICIPATION BY NON-EMBASSY PERSONNEL WOULD HAVE TO BE ON AN "OFF THE RECORD BASIS," THAT IS, SUCH PARTICIPATION COULD NOT BE THE SUBJECT OF NEWS REPORTS.

2. QUESTIONS DURING THE FIRST BRIEFING, AT WHICH ONLY EMBASSY PERSONNEL WERE PRESENT, CONCENTRATED ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE SURVEY AND THE NATURE OF THE POPULATION TO BE SURVEYED. CONCERN WAS ALSO EXPRESSED REGARDING POSSIBLE EFFECTS NPPD MIGHT HAVE ON EARLY PREGNANCY. DURING THE SECOND SESSION, ATTENDED BY JOURNALISTS, BUSINESSMEN AND EMBASSY EMPLOYEES THAT HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO ATTEND THE EARLIER BRIEFING, THE QUESTIONING FOCUSED ON THE NATURE OF NPPD ITSELF. SOME OF THESE QUESTIONS WERE HYPOTHETICAL AND APPEARED DESIGNED TO IDENTIFY JUST WHAT IS KNOWN ABOUT THE HEALTH EFFECTS OF THE CHEMICAL.

3. THE TEAM MEMBERS RESPONDED TO ALL QUESTIONS FULLY AND CAREFULLY. THE MISSION CONSIDERS THE BRIEFINGS USEFUL IN EXPLAINING THE ROLE OF THE VISITING TEAM TO THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY AND IN INSURING THE COMMUNITY'S COOPERATION IN THE SURVEY. COMBS
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