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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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**File Folder** GORBACHEV SPEECHES 1985 2/3

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*Gorbachev -  
Speeches*

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SECRETARIAT

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 2997 DTG: 112020Z MAR 85 PSN: 040353  
EOB526 AN003283 TOR: 070/2106Z CSN: HCE541

TO CLAIM THE GENERAL SECRETARYSHIP, HE SEEMS TO BE IN  
NO RUSH TO PLACE HIS OWN STAMP ON THE COURSE OF SOVIET  
POLICY. END SUMMARY.

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3. DESPITE THE UNPARALLELED SPEED WITH WHICH GORBACHEV  
WAS ELECTED GENERAL SECRETARY, HIS MAIDEN SPEECH AT THE  
MARCH 11 EXTRAORDINARY PLENUM DID NOT REVEAL A RUSH TO  
PLACE HIS OWN STAMP ON SOVIET DOMESTIC OR FOREIGN  
POLICY. INDEED, THE SPEECH -- AT LEAST AS READ OUT BY  
A SOVIET T.V. ANNOUNCER -- WAS LARGELY AN UNINSPIRING  
RECITATION OF FAMILIAR PARTY POSITIONS AND SLOGANS.

OP IMMED  
UTS6202  
DE RUEHMO #2997/01 0702028  
O 112020Z MAR 85  
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4. GORBACHEV'S COMMENTS ON DOMESTIC POLICY HUGGED THE  
MIDDLE GROUND AND REPRESENTED AN AFFIRMATION OF CONTINUITY  
RATHER THAN A PREVIEW OF FRESH INITIATIVES. HE IMPARTED  
LITTLE SENSE OF URGENCY, AND, UNLIKE HIS MENTOR ANDROPOV  
IN NOVEMBER 1982, ISSUED NO CALL TO ARMS TO REVITALIZE  
THE ECONOMY. GORBACHEV PLEDGED FEALTY TO THE PRINCIPLES  
OF A PLANNED ECONOMY AND SOCIALIST PROPERTY WHILE AT  
THE SAME TIME CALLING FOR A BROADENING OF THE RIGHTS AND  
INDEPENDENCE OF ENTERPRISES. WHILE STRESSING THE  
LONG-TIME GOAL OF "PERFECTING THE ECONOMIC MECHANISM,"  
GORBACHEV PUT FORWARD NO NEW PROPOSALS IN THIS AREA,  
NOR DID HE CALL FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF FRESH IDEAS.

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8072

5. WHILE GORBACHEV HARKED BACK TO THE POLICY LINE  
ESTABLISHED UNDER ANDROPOV AND CHERNENKO, HE DID NOT  
OTHERWISE WRAP HIMSELF IN THE MANTLE OF ANDROPOV. FOR  
EXAMPLE, HE TOUCHED ON THE NEED FOR DISCIPLINE AND ORDER  
WITHOUT EMPHASIZING THIS, NOR DID HE EXHIBIT THE SENSE OF  
IMPATIENCE WHICH ANDROPOV SOUNDED FROM THE OUTSET OF  
HIS TENURE. GORBACHEV'S CAUTION HERE NO DOUBT REFLECTS

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HIS RECOGNITION THAT HIS LEEWAY WILL BE CIRCUMSCRIBED BY  
THE IMPERATIVES OF CONSENSUS DECISION-MAKING. GORBACHEV  
MADE CLEAR THAT HE ACCEPTED THE COLLECTIVE NATURE OF THE  
LEADERSHIP IN HIS CONCLUDING REMARKS, NOTING THAT HE  
COUNTED ON THE "SUPPORT AND HELP" OF THE POLITBURO AND  
SECRETARIAT AS WELL AS THE ENTIRE CENTRAL COMMITTEE.

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 02997

6. IN FURTHER COMMENTS ON DOMESTIC POLICY, GORBACHEV  
EXHIBITED THE POPULIST LEANINGS THAT CHERNENKO HAD  
CULTIVATED. CALLING FOR THE CONTINUED GROWTH IN SOCIALIST  
SELF-MANAGEMENT, HE CITED THE CONTRIBUTIONS WHICH SHOULD  
BE MADE BY VARIOUS PUBLIC ENTITIES SUCH AS COUNCILS  
(SOVIETS), LABOR COLLECTIVES, AND UNIONS. CALLING FOR  
GREATER "PUBLICITY" ON THE PART OF THE PARTY, HE INDI-  
CATED THAT THE CITIZENRY COULD BE EXPECTED TO BECOME  
MORE INVOLVED IN NATIONAL TASKS IF THEY WERE BETTER  
BT

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, UR  
SUBJECT: GORBACHEV'S SPEECH AT EXTRAORDINARY CC  
CPSU PLENUM

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: IN HIS MAIDEN SPEECH AS GENERAL SECRETARY,  
GORBACHEV STRESSED CONTINUITY AND CONSISTENCY IN BOTH  
DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY AND GAVE NO HINT OF BOLD  
NEW DEPARTURES TO COME. HE REVIEWED STANDARD LEADERSHIP  
POSITIONS ON THE ECONOMY, WITHOUT IMPARTING ANY SENSE OF  
URGENCY OR HIGHLIGHTING THE NEED FOR INCREASED DISCI-  
PLINE AS HIS MENTOR ANDROPOV HAD DONE. HIS REFERENCES  
TO EXPANSION OF SOCIALIST SELF-MANAGEMENT ECHOED  
CHERNENKO. IN THE SPHERE OF FOREIGN POLICY, GORBACHEV  
STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF STRENGTHENING COOPERATION  
AMONG SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, AND CALLED FOR IMPROVEMENT  
OF RELATIONS WITH CHINA. HIS REMARKS ON THE FORTH-  
COMING GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS WERE BROADLY CONSISTENT WITH  
PRIOR SOVIET RHETORIC, INCLUDING ENDORSEMENT OF A FREEZE  
ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AN END TO FURTHER MISSILE DEPLOYMENT,  
AND CESSATION OF DEVELOPMENT OF NEW TYPES OF WEAPONS.  
WHILE GORBACHEV HAS MOVED WITH EXTRAORDINARY RAPIDITY

*amb  
mat*

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BY *cu* NARADATE 7/7/08

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PGOV; PREL, UR  
SUBJECT: GORBACHEV'S SPEECH AT EXTRAORDINARY CC

INFORMED. GORBACHEV ALSO TOOK CARE TO EMPHASIZE THAT POPULAR WELFARE WILL REMAIN A PARAMOUNT GOAL.

7. GORBACHEV'S BRIEF REMARKS ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS WERE RELATIVELY POSITIVE IN TONE, AVOIDING DIRECT CRITICISM OF THE U.S. OR ANY OTHER COUNTRY. THE NEW GENERAL SECRETARY BEGAN IN STANDARD FASHION BY STRESSING THE IMPORTANCE OF STRENGTHENED COOPERATION AMONG SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. HE SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD "DO EVERYTHING THAT DEPENDED ON IT" TO ACHIEVE THIS OBJECTIVE, THUS PERHAPS IMPLICITLY UNDERSCORING THAT OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES WOULD HAVE TO FOLLOW SUIT. IN PERHAPS THE MOST STRIKING ELEMENT OF HIS SPEECH INVOLVING ANOTHER COUNTRY, GORBACHEV CALLED FOR IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND SUGGESTED THAT THIS WAS "FULLY POSSIBLE". THIS FORMULATION WAS SIMILAR TO THAT EMPLOYED BY CHERNENKO IN HIS RSFSR SUPREME SOVIET ELECTION SPEECH, WHILE, IN HIS OWN ELECTION SPEECH, GORBACHEV IGNORED CHINA. THE NEW GENERAL SECRETARY'S PERFUNCTORY REMARKS ON THE THIRD WORLD OFFERED NOTHING MORE THAN THE

USUAL SOVIET ASSURANCES OF SYMPATHY FOR ITS "FRIENDS AND PARTNERS."

8. ON RELATIONS WITH THE CAPITALIST WORLD, GORBACHEV EXHIBITED NOSTALGIA FOR DETENTE AND REITERATED THE STANDARD SOVIET READINESS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH CAPITALIST COUNTRIES ON THE BASIS OF EQUALITY AND NON-INTERFERENCE IN EACH OTHER'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

9. IN SPECIFIC REMARKS ON THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS, GORBACHEV REFERRED TO, BUT DID NOT DWELL ON, THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR. HIS REMARKS ON THE TALKS WERE BROADLY CONSISTENT WITH PREVIOUS SOVIET RHETORIC IN THEIR CALL FOR AN END TO THE ARMS RACE ON EARTH AND THE PREVENTION OF ONE IN SPACE. HE DENIED ANY SOVIET DESIRE FOR UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE OVER THE UNITED STATES OR NATO, AND CALLED FOR A BALANCED AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD LEAD TO THE COMPLETE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IN A POSSIBLE FORSHADOWING OF SOVIET POSITIONS AT GENEVA, GORBACHEV SPECIFICALLY ENDORSED A FREEZE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AN END TO THE DEPLOYMENT OF ADDITIONAL MISSILES, AND A STOP TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW TYPES OF WEAPONS, INCLUDING SPACE WEAPONS. HE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE UNITED STATES, WHICH HE TERMED "OUR PARTNER," SHARED THESE GOALS. IN WHAT WE REGARD AS A STANDARD COMMENT ON DEFENSE, GORBACHEV PLEDGED THAT THE PARTY WOULD PROVIDE THE ARMED FORCES WITH "ALL THAT THEY NEED". THE SOVIET UNION, HE STATED WITHOUT ELABORATION, MUST MAINTAIN THE ABILITY TO SHOW ANY AGGRESSOR THAT HE WOULD SUFFER A DEVASTATING RETALIATORY BLOW SHOULD HE ATTACK.

10. SOVIET MEDIA REPORTS OF THE EXTRAORDINARY PLENUM

REVEALED THAT FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO HAD NOMINATED GORBACHEV FOR GENERAL SECRETARY. HIS CHOICE FOR THIS ROLE WAS IN ALL LIKELIHOOD AN EFFORT BY GORBACHEV TO BRIDGE THE GENERATION GAP AS WELL AS A SIGN OF RECOGNITION ON HIS PART OF THE AUTHORITY WHICH GROMYKO WIELDS WITHIN THE LEADERSHIP. THERE WAS NO INDICATION WHO HAD CLOSED THE PLENUM. THIRTEEN MONTHS AGO, IT WILL BE RECALLED, THE INITIAL ACCOUNT OF THE PLENUM WHICH ELECTED CHERNENKO FAILED TO NOTE THIS DETAIL, BUT A SUBSEQUENT ACCOUNT IN PAMPHLET FORM REVEALED THAT IT WAS GORBACHEV WHO CLOSED THE PLENUM. THIS IN EFFECT FLAGGED HIS NEW ROLE AS "SECOND SECRETARY". WE WILL BE LOOKING FOR SIMILAR EVIDENCE IN COMING DAYS THAT MAY INDICATE  
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PAGE 01  
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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 MOSCOW 02997

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, UR  
SUBJECT: GORBACHEV'S SPEECH AT EXTRAORDINARY CC

WHETHER ROMANOV HAS BEEN DESIGNATED "SECOND SECRETARY"  
OR WHETHER THIS "POST" REMAINS VACANT PENDING FUTURE  
HIGH-LEVEL APPOINTMENTS.  
HARTMAN  
BT

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4  
*F: Gorbachev*

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E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: ECON, PGOV, PINR, UR  
SUBJECT: GORBACHEV AS "ECONOMIC REFORMER" -- THE THEME  
AND THE HOPES ARE BACK

REF: MOSCOW 02997

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: A SOVIET ECONOMIST, COMMENTING ON GORBACHEV'S MARCH 11 SPEECH BEFORE IT APPEARED IN PRINT, HAS GIVEN US AN UPBREATHING PICTURE OF GORBACHEV AS A STRONG LEADER, DETERMINED TO CARRY THROUGH SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES IN THE SOVIET ECONOMIC SYSTEM. OUR SOURCE SEES HIM AS FIRMLY IN COMMAND OF THE POLITBURO AND THE PARTY ON ECONOMIC POLICY, BUT AS LACKING SUFFICIENT SUPPORTERS IN THE GOVERNMENT TO BRING ABOUT RAPID CHANGE. WITHOUT

*Bureaucratic inertia and turf protection will be major obstacles to change*

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DTG: 121603Z MAR 85 PSN: 042379

RULING OUT THE FAINT POSSIBILITY OF A SPRING PLENUM TO MAKE PERSONNEL CHANGES, OUR SOURCE EXPECTS GORBACHEV TO CONSOLIDATE HIS CONTROL OVER PEOPLE AND POLICY IN PREPARING FOR THE PARTY CONGRESS. IMPLEMENTATION OF GORBACHEV'S ECONOMIC IDEAS WILL TAKE TIME AND A "STRUGGLE," BUT OUR SOURCE CLEARLY EXPECTS THAT GORBACHEV WILL BE FASTER AND MORE EFFECTIVE THAN BREZHNEV. WHILE THIS VIEW PORTRAYS GORBACHEV IN A FAVORABLE LIGHT FOR U.S. CONSUMPTION, AND REMINDS US OF THE BILLING GIVEN TO ANDROPOV, IT ALSO REFLECTS SINCERE HOPES OF MANY SOVIET ECONOMISTS FOR A MORE DYNAMIC LEADERSHIP AND A CHANCE TO INTRODUCE A PROCESS OF ECONOMIC POLICY CHANGES THEY CONSIDER LONG OVERDUE. IN THE PRESENT CONTEXT, THEY WOULD WELCOME EVEN A MODEST AMOUNT OF ECONOMIC POLICY INNOVATION AND IMPLEMENTATION. EVEN THAT WILL BE HARD FOR GORBACHEV TO DELIVER. END SUMMARY.

3. IN THE COURSE OF A LENGTHY DINNER ON MARCH 11, A SOVIET ECONOMIST GAVE ECON COUNSELOR HIS ANALYSIS OF THE GORBACHEV SPEECH (JUST READ OVER THE RADIO), LIBERALLY REINFORCED WITH HIS OWN IMPRESSIONS OF GORBACHEV. OUR SOURCE WAS CLEARLY ELATED BY THE QUICK PROMOTION OF GORBACHEV TO THE GENERAL SECRETARYSHIP (ALSO JUST ANNOUNCED). HE STATED FLATLY THAT THIS GAVE THE SOVIET UNION THE CHANCE TO COME TO GRIPS WITH FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS IN THE ECONOMY THAT HAD NOT BEEN GIVEN THE ATTENTION AND EFFORT THEY DESERVED FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS. IN HIS COMMENTARY THE ECONOMIST REFERRED TO A NUMBER OF FEATURES OF GORBACHEV'S RISE TO POWER THAT HE HAS MENTIONED IN PAST CONVERSATIONS -- HIS SUPERIOR EDUCATION, HIS PARTY BACKGROUND, AND HIS EFFECTIVENESS IN EXPERIMENTING WITH, AND IMPROVING, THE ECONOMY OF STAVROPOL. BUT THIS TIME HE ALSO PICTURED GORBACHEV AS

A MAN WITH STRONG LEADERSHIP QUALITIES, IDEAS OF HIS OWN, AND WELL-PLACED SUPPORTERS AT HIGH LEVELS IN THE PARTY.

*which is how we got the job*

GORBACHEV'S SPEECH AND ECONOMIC POLICY GOALS

4. UNLIKE OUR INITIAL INTERPRETATION (REF A), OUR SOURCE SAW GORBACHEV'S SPEECH AS LAYING DOWN, AS THE FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS, THE NEED TO INCREASE LABOR PRODUCTIVITY. OUR SOURCE JUDGED GORBACHEV TO BE MAKING A FIRM COMMITMENT TO CHANGE IN THE SOVIET ECONOMIC MECHANISM, AND HE EMPHASIZED THE FOLLOWING POINTS:  
BT



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E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: ECON, PGOV, PINR, UR  
SUBJECT: GORBACHEV AS "ECONOMIC REFORMER" -- THE THEME

- 
- A. CONTINUITY WITH THE POLICIES LAID DOWN BY ANDROPOV, NOT JUST CHERNENKO.
- 
- B. IMPROVEMENTS IN THE ECONOMIC MECHANISM. OUR SOURCE PICKED OUT GORBACHEV'S REFERENCE TO INCREASING THE INDEPENDENCE OF ENTERPRISES AS A KEY ELEMENT. THIS WOULD INVOLVE INCREASING THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF ENTERPRISES NOT MERELY IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE SENSE, BUT ALSO MAKING THEM RESPOND TO ECONOMIC STIMULI. OUR SOURCE STOPPED SHORT OF SAYING THAT THERE WOULD BE GENUINE MARKET PRESSURES, NOR DID HE SAY THERE WOULD BE SYSTEMIC REFORMS, BUT HE CLEARLY HOPED THE CHANGES WOULD MOVE IN THE DIRECTION OF USING MARKET FORCES.
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- C. INCREASING SOCIALIST DEMOCRACY. ASKED WHETHER THIS REFERRED TO INCREASING THE AUTHORITY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT COUNCILS (SOVIETS), OUR SOURCE SAID NO. HE CLAIMED GORBACHEV WAS INTERESTED IN "DEMOCRACY" IN THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM. OUR SOURCE INTERPRETED THIS AS REFERRING TO WORKERS' BRIGADES, BECAUSE BRIGADES WOULD DECIDE FOR THEMSELVES HOW WORK AND PROFITS WOULD BE DIVIDED WITHIN THE BRIGADE. HE REFERRED TO GORBACHEV'S EXPERIMENTS WITH AGRICULTURAL BRIGADES IN STAVROPOL WHEN HE WAS FIRST SECRETARY THERE. OUR SOURCE SAID NOTHING ABOUT THE CONCEPT OF ENTERPRISE LABOR COLLECTIVES.

- D. A "COMPLEX" APPROACH TO MANAGING THE ECONOMY. OUR SOURCE THOUGHT GORBACHEV WOULD STRENGTHEN THE TENDENCY, ALREADY PRESENT IN PROGRAMS TO THE YEAR 2000, TO GROUP MAJOR SECTORS OF THE ECONOMY -- SUCH AS THE FUEL AND ENERGY COMPLEX, OR THE CONSUMER COMPLEX (WHICH WOULD COMBINE AGRICULTURE, FOOD INDUSTRY, AND LIGHT INDUSTRY). COMMENT: WE FIND NO TRACE OF THIS IN GORBACHEV'S SPEECH, AND THUS ASSUME OUR SOURCE WAS DRAWING ON OTHER INFORMATION. END COMMENT.

- GORBACHEV'S SUPPORT AND OPPOSITION  
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5. POLITBURO. ASKED WHETHER THE OTHER POLITBURO MEMBERS WOULD AGREE TO SUBSTANTIAL ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT CHANGES, AFTER THEY HAD SO OFTEN APPROVED DECREES LACKING ANY SUCH CONTENT, OUR SOURCE SAID HE FORESAW LITTLE OPPOSITION. AFTER SOME DEBATE, OUR SOURCE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT TIKHONOV, HEAD OF THE GOVERNMENT, WAS NOT SUPPORTIVE, AND PERHAPS GRISHIN, THE MOSCOW PARTY BOSS, WAS NOT EITHER. BUT HIS COMMENTS ON OTHER KEY PARTY FIGURES WERE OPTIMISTIC.

- A. THE REPUBLIC FIRST SECRETARIES IN THE POLITBURO REPRESENT THEIR AREA, AND THEN IMPLEMENT POLITBURO DECISIONS, BUT DO NOT MAKE NATIONAL POLICY. OUR SOURCE SAW VOROTNIKOV (RSFSR) AS AN EXCEPTION, AND PERHAPS SHCHERBITSKIY, BUT THE LATTER ONLY BECAUSE OF THE UKRAINE'S RELATIVE SIZE.

- B. VOROTNIKOV HAS BEEN GORBACHEV'S "MOST ACTIVE ECONOMIC POLICY SUPPORTER." HE HAD BEEN RECALLED FROM "EXILE" AS AMBASSADOR TO CUBA BY ANDROPOV AND GIVEN  
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E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
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BOTH POLITBURO RANK AND THE MOST IMPORTANT REPUBLIC.  
HE WOULD BE AN EXCELLENT CANDIDATE TO REPLACE TIKHONOV,  
OUR SOURCE SAID.

- C. DOLGIKH (HEAVY INDUSTRY) WOULD SUPPORT GORBACHEV,  
AS WOULD THE "EXPERIENCED" SECRETARY KAPITONOV IN LIGHT  
INDUSTRY.

- D. ALIYEV, FLEXIBLE AS EVER, WOULD SERVE GORBACHEV  
AS ENTHUSIASTICALLY AS HE HAD BREZHNEV, ANDROPOV AND  
CHERNENKO.

- E. GROMYKO HAD NOMINATED GORBACHEV TO BE GENERAL  
SECRETARY. OUR SOURCE CONCLUDED THAT GROMYKO WOULD NOT  
OPPOSE GORBACHEV ON DOMESTIC ISSUES, BUT WOULD CONTINUE

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TO MANAGE FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS. ASKED HOW LONG GROMYKO HAD BEEN MANAGING THE LATTER, OUR SOURCE SAID IT WAS HIS FUNCTION IN THE POLITBURO, LONG PREDATING HIS PROMOTION TO DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER. (COMMENT. WE SEE LITTLE EVIDENCE OF GROMYKO'S HAND IN FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY, EXCEPT WHERE IT IS USED TO SUPPORT MAJOR FOREIGN POLITICAL POLICIES -- FOR EXAMPLE IN RELATIONS WITH OTHER COMMUNIST COUNTRIES. THE RELATIVELY UNCHANGING SOVIET ECONOMIC POLICY TOWARD THE WEST MAY REFLECT LACK OF POLITBURO ATTENTION AS MUCH AS GROMYKO'S OWN VIEWS. END COMMENT).

*Gromyko will probably play a lead role for some time - will have to become better acquainted with the situation.*

- F. ROMANOV WILL PROBABLY WANT TO BE "SECOND SECRETARY," AND THUS FIND IT IN HIS OWN INTEREST NOT TO CHALLENGE GORBACHEV.

- G. RYZHKOV, ANDROPOV-APPOINTED CENTRAL COMMITTEE SECRETARY OF THE ECONOMIC DEPARTMENT, WOULD BE BACK IN BUSINESS UNDER GORBACHEV. OUR SOURCE VAGUELY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE HAD BEEN REPORTS IN EARLY 1983 THAT RYZHKOV HAD BEEN CHARGED WITH DESIGNING BROAD CHANGES IN THE ECONOMIC MECHANISM. HE AGREED THAT NONE HAD EMERGED, SAYING THAT RYZHKOV REALLY WAS NOT ABLE TO PROCEED UNDER CHERNENKO.

6. GORBACHEV WOULD HAVE A LOT OF SUPPORT FROM LOCAL PARTY CHIEFS, WHO WOULD LIKE TO SEE MORE DYNAMISM. GORBACHEV HAS BEEN RUNNING THE PARTY AS SECOND SECRETARY UNDER CHERNENKO, AND WAS NOW IN AN EVEN STRONGER POSITION TO DEMAND LOYALTY FROM THE NEW PEOPLE WHO WOULD BE BROUGHT INTO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE BY THE NEXT CONGRESS. (COMMENT: OLD MEMBERS WILL ALSO FIND IT ATTRACTIVE TO SHOW THEIR SUPPORT FOR A GENERAL SECRETARY WHO IS WIDELY EXPECTED TO BE IN CHARGE FOR A LONG TIME. END COMMENT.)

*which is why some of them probably opposed Gorbachev's appointment*

7. OUR SOURCE REAFFIRMED HIS VIEW THAT A REGULAR PLENUM WITH A THEME WOULD NOT BE HELD THIS SPRING; SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY WOULD IN ANYCASE BE IMPOSSIBLE BECAUSE IT WOULD PREEMPT THE PARTY CONGRESS. BUT, NOTING THAT A DECADES-LONG PRECEDENT OF HOLDING A PLENUM TO APPROVE THE ANNUAL STATE PLAN AND BUDGET HAD BEEN BROKEN LAST FALL, HE SAID HE COULD NOT COMPLETELY EXCLUDE A PLENUM TO APPOINT NEW PERSONNEL. ON BALANCE HE THOUGHT THERE WOULD BE NO ADDITIONS TO THE POLITBURO BEFORE THE BT

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CONGRESS.

8. GORBACHEV WOULD FIND FAR LESS SUPPORT IN THE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, OUR SOURCE SAID, AND THIS WOULD BE THE MAIN OBSTACLE TO IMPLEMENTING NEW IDEAS FOR ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT. COULD CHANGES BE MADE IN THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS BEFORE THE CONGRESS? OUR SOURCE WAS UNCERTAIN, BUT THOUGHT THE PREPARATIONS FOR THE CONGRESS WOULD TAKE PRIORITY. IT WOULD BE A LONG "STRUGGLE" TO IMPLEMENT CHANGES. ASKED WHETHER IT WOULD TAKE GORBACHEV AS LONG TO TAKE COMMAND AS IT HAD BREZHNEV, OUR SOURCE SAID THE TWO SITUATIONS WERE NOT COMPARABLE. BREZHNEV WAS ALMOST UNKNOWN WHEN KRUSHCHEV WAS REMOVED, AND HE WAS NOT AS STRONG A LEADER. OUR SOURCE CLEARLY BELIEVED -- AND HOPED -- THAT IN THE END GORBACHEV WOULD BE MORE

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SUCCESSFUL THAN BREZHNEV IN ECONOMIC POLICY INNOVATION.

EMBASSY COMMENTS  
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9. SOURCE'S PERSPECTIVE. IN PAST MEETINGS, THIS SOURCE MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE ADMIRED GORBACHEV AND CONSIDERED HIM THE POLITBURO MEMBER MOST LIKELY TO MAKE PROGRESS IN DEALING WITH SOVIET ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. THIS UPBAT ANALYSIS, ON THE DAY OF GORBACHEV'S PROMOTION, CLEARLY REFLECTS HIS OWN HOPES AND THOSE OF OTHER SOVIET ECONOMISTS LOOKING FOR POLICY CHANGES. HE PROBABLY FELT FREE TO COMMENT ON POLITBURO PERSONALITIES NOW THAT HE COULD PORTRAY GORBACHEV TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AS A FAVORABLE CONTRAST WITH HIS PREDECESSORS. (FOR EXAMPLE, HE HAS SUPPORTED ANDROPOV'S ECONOMIC POLICIES, BUT IN RECENT WEEKS HE HAS CRITICIZED ANDROPOV FOR HIS KGB BACKGROUND, SAYING HE AND OTHERS HAD FEARED THE POSSIBILITY OF A RETURN TO STALIN-LIKE PURGES.)

10. THE SPEECH. OBVIOUSLY OUR SOURCE WAS READING A GREAT DEAL INTO GORBACHEV'S SPEECH, AND OVERLOOKING PHRASES THAT TEND TO GIVE IT A MORE CONSERVATIVE BALANCE. GORBACHEV'S FIRST OBLIGATION, IN SPEAKING AS A NEW GENERAL SECRETARY, WAS TO REASSURE THE SOVIET UNION ON THE STABILITY AND CONTINUITY OF FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICY. THAT BEING SAID, HE PUT THE WELL-WORN PHRASES ON THE NECESSITY FOR CHANGES IN THE ECONOMIC MECHANISM UP FRONT IN THE SPEECH. THEY ARE ALSO MORE CREDIBLE COMING FROM GORBACHEV THAN FROM HIS PREDECESSOR. FINALLY, ALTHOUGH NOT A ROUSING CALL TO ACTION, NEAR THE END OF THE SPEECH GORBACHEV DOES MENTION THE SETBACKS TO THE ECONOMY FROM THE WINTER WEATHER, AND SAYS IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO MAKE UP FOR LOST TIME THIS YEAR IN ORDER TO START THE 1986-90 PLAN PROPERLY. WE EXPECT TO HEAR MUCH MORE ON THIS SUBJECT.

11. OUR SOURCE'S OPTIMISM ON ECONOMIC CHANGE SHOULD BE SEEN IN A MODERN SOVIET CONTEXT: HE DOES NOT MEAN STUNNING NEW PROGRAMS OR RAPIDLY FORCED MANAGEMENT REFORMS. EVEN A GRADUAL INCREASE IN THE RATE OF ECONOMIC POLICY CHANGE WOULD BE GRATIFYING TO MANY SOVIET ECONOMISTS,  
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WHO HAVE SEEN MOST PAST EFFORTS AT IMPROVEMENT  
BOGGED DOWN IN THE MASSIVE SOVIET BUREAUCRACY.  
THE CHALLENGE TO GORBACHEV WILL BE TO DELIVER  
EVEN SMALL DOSES OF INNOVATION.    END COMMENT.  
HARTMAN  
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13  
for-Speeches

## USSR-U.S.-West Europe

### Gorbachev Endorses Summit, Announces INF Moratorium

*Mikhail Gorbachev has taken center stage in Moscow's ongoing effort to demonstrate its peaceful intentions to the West. In a Pravda interview the new general secretary called for an improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations and endorsed the idea of a summit meeting with President Reagan. At the same time, he strongly criticized U.S. arms programs, especially the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), and announced a moratorium on Soviet missile deployments in Europe that seemed intended to encourage West European opposition to NATO INF deployments.*

Gorbachev's 8 April interview in *Pravda*, his most extensive statement on foreign policy since becoming general secretary, was devoted entirely to East-West relations and arms control and served to project the new Soviet leader as an activist in a global pursuit of peace. Gorbachev emphasized the urgency of international "dialogue" and "cooperation" aimed at finding "realistic solutions" to current world problems and the arms race. He suggested that such efforts should not be limited to the United States and the Soviet Union alone, but should involve "all states, big and small alike." As he had done in his RSFSR Supreme Soviet election speech in February, Gorbachev made a point of reminding his audience that Soviet diplomacy should not be determined by looking at the world solely through the "prism" of U.S.-Soviet relations. "We realize the importance of other countries in international affairs," he said, and "take this into account in assessing the general situation in the world."

**U.S.-Soviet Relations** His call for global dialogue notwithstanding, Gorbachev gave primary emphasis in his interview to relations with the United States. In line with Soviet statements since the U.S.-Soviet agreement on arms control talks in January, he continued to mix criticism of U.S. policies with expressions of hope for improved bilateral ties. While stating that "some things have given grounds for hope," he said that there are still a "great number of things that inspire anxiety" and keep relations "tense." He identified U.S. arms policies as the most serious obstacle

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to improved relations, accusing the United States of seeking to achieve "superior force that would subordinate the rest of the world" to its will and calling the SDI a "real and awful danger to our planet."

At the same time, Gorbachev went to unusual lengths to emphasize the possibilities for reducing tension between the world's two largest powers. Refuting those in the United States who he said consider "confrontation" to be "virtually a natural state," Gorbachev maintained that confrontation is an "anomaly" in U.S.-Soviet relations and that "there is nothing inevitable about its continuation." He added that an improvement in ties was "not only extremely necessary, but possible." He reemphasized this theme on 10 April in meeting with a delegation from the U.S. House of Representatives. According to the official TASS report of the meeting, Gorbachev told the congressmen, "the difference in social systems, in the ideology of our countries, is no cause for curtailing relations, much less for kindling hatred."

**Summit Prospects** Although making no specific commitment, Gorbachev used the *Pravda* interview to signal publicly his openness to the idea of meeting with President Reagan. When asked by *Pravda* to assess the "prospects" for a summit, Gorbachev replied that the issue had been "touched upon" in correspondence with the President and that both sides had expressed a "positive attitude" toward the idea. In an unusual statement that seemed to underscore the importance Moscow is attaching to summitry, Gorbachev said, "I am convinced that a serious impetus must be given to Soviet-American relations at a high political level." The "timing and venue" of a summit, he stated, have yet to be decided.

Gorbachev's unqualified endorsement of the idea of a U.S.-Soviet summit breaks with Soviet leadership practice over the past two years and returns Moscow to the position it took during the first year of the Reagan Administration. In his report to the 26th CPSU Congress in February 1981, Brezhnev had expressed an unqualified desire for a meeting with the new U.S. President. By the end of the year, however, Brezhnev was insisting that "appropriate preparations" were necessary first. In early 1983, Andropov expressed even greater skepticism on summitry, accusing the Reagan Administration of using the issue to play a "propaganda game." In June 1983, Foreign Minister Gromyko said that a summit meeting would require "proper preconditions," including a "certain degree of mutual understanding on major issues" and a "desire" on both sides for a "breakthrough" in relations.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See the *Trends* of 22 June 1983, pages 1-2.

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The Kremlin generally adhered to Gromyko's formulation until Gorbachev's interview. In his last statement on the possibility of a summit, during a 19 November interview with NBC, Chernenko openly expressed doubt that the "necessary conditions" had been met. Only when "there is confidence that a summit meeting could yield success and positive results" would it be possible to "set a date for holding such a meeting," he said.

There have been mixed signals since Chernenko's death on Moscow's attitude toward a summit meeting. After Gorbachev met with Vice President Bush following Chernenko's funeral last month, Soviet media took the unusual step of publicizing the Vice President's remarks to reporters that a summit meeting would be "useful." Some midlevel spokesmen, however, continued to set preconditions for a summit. In a 7 April Moscow television program, broadcast the same day that TASS released the text of Gorbachev's *Pravda* interview, *Literaturnaya Gazeta* political observer Fedor Burlatskiy said the Soviet "leadership" has a "positive attitude" toward a summit, provided that it was "properly prepared and able to give its seal of approval to an agreement worked out by the time the meeting takes place." Since 7 April, Soviet media have not been observed to discuss any preconditions for a U.S.-Soviet summit.

**Moratorium  
Announcement** Gorbachev's public announcement that the Soviet Union is "imposing a moratorium on the deployment of its medium-range missiles and is suspending the implementation of other countermeasures in Europe" until November appeared calculated to influence West European opinion on East-West arms issues. This renewed focus on INF also suggests that Moscow has decided once again to press its case against INF in tandem with its attacks on SDI, which since late 1984 has received much greater attention in Soviet leadership statements.

Moscow's unilateral moratorium goes beyond what the USSR is reported to have proposed at the Geneva talks themselves. According to a 29 March Brussels dispatch from the East German news agency ADN, which quoted "well-informed sources," Moscow has submitted proposals at Geneva for a freeze on strategic, space, and intermediate-range weapons, including a call for a *mutual* halt to U.S. INF deployments and Soviet "countermeasures" for the duration of the talks.

**Focus on the  
Netherlands**

In his early pronouncements as general secretary, Gorbachev has given a strong emphasis to cultivating West European opponents of U.S. military policies and thereby applying indirect pressure on the U.S. negotiating position in Geneva. His two previous significant foreign affairs statements since mid-March were remarks on 22 March to a Socialist International disarmament delegation visiting Moscow and a 28 March letter to a West German peace group.<sup>2</sup> His announcement in the *Pravda* interview of a Soviet moratorium adds further to that emphasis on European issues and seems aimed specifically at increasing doubts in the Netherlands about the advisability of proceeding with cruise missile deployments:

- The prospective November cutoff date for the moratorium coincides with the deadline for the Dutch parliament's scheduled vote on INF deployments and appears aimed at affecting the Dutch decision. Gorbachev said that Moscow's actions regarding an INF moratorium after November would depend on whether the West followed the Soviet example and stopped INF deployments in Europe.
- The timing of Gorbachev's moratorium announcement, two days before the arrival of Dutch Foreign Minister Van Den Broek in Moscow on an official visit, suggested a special effort to influence the Netherlands.
- Moscow's treatment of Foreign Minister Gromyko's talks with the Dutch foreign minister on 10 April also indicated the USSR's interest in encouraging opposition to INF deployments in the Netherlands. According to the TASS report on Gromyko's "frank and businesslike" talks with Van Den Broek, Gromyko called on the Dutch to adopt a "sensible, well-weighed approach" to the "signal which has just come from Moscow" and he advised the Dutch to "weigh the consequences" of a decision to proceed with cruise missile deployments in November. The TASS report also described Gromyko as linking any agreement on strategic and medium-range weapons to an agreement proscribing the "militarization of space," suggesting that the Soviet side was prepared to resist recent Dutch calls for a separate settlement of the INF issue at Geneva.

<sup>2</sup> For a more detailed discussion of Gorbachev's earlier pronouncements on East-West issues since he became general secretary, see the *Trends* of 3 April 1985, pages 1-3.

## China-U.S.

### Beijing Publicizes Qualifications on U.S. Port Calls

*Beijing for the first time has publicly specified the nature of pending calls by U.S. Navy ships at Chinese ports and qualified the type of vessels that will be permitted to enter.*

Xinhua on 10 April cited Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang on the eve of his departure for Australia and New Zealand telling a group of journalists from the two countries that a planned port call by U.S. Navy ships at Shanghai would be "an unofficial visit" by "conventional ships." According to Xinhua, Hu said "no firm date" has been fixed for the port call. Since Navy Secretary Lehman's visit to China last August, PRC media consistently have referred to port calls by U.S. Navy ships as still under consideration.

Western news media accounts of Hu's comments report that he also said Washington has agreed to a Chinese request not to send nuclear-armed ships on port calls to China. Xinhua's account of Hu's remarks omitted this assertion.

Hu's description of the port call as "unofficial" is consistent with longstanding Chinese efforts to play down their military contacts with Washington. Beijing characterized a visit by an Australian vessel in September 1981 as "official," and did not qualify a September 1984 port call by Australian ships in any way. Hu's specification that the U.S. ships be "conventional" puts China's attitude toward such calls in line with its public record of sympathy with Wellington's recent ban on port calls by U.S. nuclear vessels and with public opposition to such visits in Japan. Its stance in this regard was highlighted in January when Beijing media applauded Wellington's decision to prohibit port calls by U.S. nuclear-powered or -armed vessels. (U/FOUO)

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**Background**

The unilateral INF moratorium announced by Gorbachev follows by approximately three years a similar gesture by Brezhnev. In a March 1982 speech, the former Soviet leader declared that the USSR would halt replacement of older SS-4 and SS-5 missiles with SS-20's, and he stated that Moscow would proceed to reduce its European missile arsenal by a "certain number" barring any further aggravation of the international situation. Brezhnev said at that time that the Soviet moratorium would stand until an INF agreement was reached or until NATO began "practical preparations" to deploy Pershing II and cruise missiles. Following the beginning of NATO's INF deployments in the fall of 1983, Brezhnev's successor, Yuriy Andropov, announced in a *Pravda* interview on 25 November that the USSR was responding to the NATO deployments by abrogating its moratorium on the deployment of medium-range missiles in the "European part" of the USSR and "accelerating" work connected with the deployment of Soviet "operational-tactical" missiles in East Germany and Czechoslovakia. (U/FOUO)

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*File G. Speeder 19*

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 05335

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, UR

SUBJECT: PLENUM SPEECH: GORBACHEV PULLS NO PUNCHES  
ON FOREIGN POLICY

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY: IN HIS FIRST FULL-SCALE POLICY REVIEW AS GENERAL SECRETARY, GORBACHEV STRESSED FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DELIVERING A HARD-HITTING CRITIQUE OF US POLICY. HE LENT HIS AUTHORITY TO CHARGES THAT THE US HAS VIOLATED THE TERMS OF THE JANUARY 8 GENEVA AGREEMENT AND HINTED THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS COULD BE JEOPARDIZED IF THE US DOES NOT NEGOTIATE IN GOOD FAITH. BY COMPARING NICARAGUA WITH GRENADA, GORBACHEV AUTHORITATIVELY UNDERScoreD MOSCOW'S CONDEMNATION OF US POLICY IN CENTRAL AMERICA. ON CHINA, GORBACHEV APPEARED TO INVITE A FURTHER IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS BY IDENTIFYING CHINA AS "SOCIALIST" AND BY DROPPING THE EMPHASIS ON RECIPROCITY THAT HAD CHARACTERIZED HIS PREVIOUS STATEMENTS ON SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS. BY EXPLICITLY LINKING HIS MARCH 13 MEETING WITH EAST EUROPEAN LEADERS TO THE IMPENDING EXTENSION OF THE WARSAW PACT, GORBACHEV ASSERTED HIS CLAIM TO LEADERSHIP OF A UNITED SOCIALIST COMMONWEALTH. EACH OF THESE MAJOR THEMES APPEARS CALCULATED TO SERVE A TACTICAL PURPOSE. BUT TAKEN TOGETHER, THEY SIGNAL A RHETORICAL OFFENSIVE TO PLACE THE ONUS ON THE US TO PREPARE THE WAY FOR A SUCCESSFUL GORBACHEV-REAGAN MEETING LATER THIS YEAR.

3. GORBACHEV'S MAJOR ANNOUNCEMENT IN THE DOMESTIC SPHERE WAS THE FEBRUARY 25, 1986, DATE FOR THE CONVOCA-TION OF THE TWENTY-SEVENTH PARTY CONGRESS. LITTLE CONCRETE INFORMATION WAS PROVIDED ABOUT THE FUTURE COURSE OF POLICY GUIDELINES ALTHOUGH EXACTING STANDARDS AND A MORE VIGOROUS CADRES POLICY WERE HIGHLIGHTED. GORBACHEV'S REMARKS ON THE ECONOMY STRESSED THE NEED FOR CHANGE BUT DID NOT LAY OUT IN DETAIL THE MEANS TO ACHIEVE BROADLY DEFINED GOALS. END SUMMARY.

4. BASED ON THE TASS EXCERPTS AVAILABLE TO US AT

PRESENT, GORBACHEV CHOSE TO PLACE UNUSUAL EMPHASIS ON FOREIGN POLICY IN HIS FIRST FULL-SCALE POLICY REVIEW AS GENERAL SECRETARY. WITH AN EYE ON THE JUST COMPLETED INITIAL ROUND OF THE NST TALKS, GORBACHEV DELIVERED A HARD-HITTING INDICTMENT OF US POSITIONS AT GENEVA. PERHAPS IN AN EFFORT TO COUNTER US CLAIMS OF LIMITED PROGRESS IN THE INITIAL ROUND, GORBACHEV AUTHORITATIVELY REITERATED SOVIET MEDIA CHARGES THAT THE US HAS "VIOLATED" THE "JANUARY 8 GENEVA AGREEMENT ON THE SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES OF THE TALKS. AS IF TO UNDERScore THE DANGERS OF ALLEGED US REFUSAL TO DISCUSS SPACE WEAPONS, GORBACHEV RECALLED THE DECEMBER 1983 COLLAPSE OF THE START AND INF TALKS. IN SUM, GORBACHEV WANTED TO LEAVE NO DOUBT IN THE MINDS OF HIS AUDIENCE AT HOME AND ABROAD THAT MOSCOW IS DISSATISFIED WITH THE CONTENT OF THE CURRENT ARMS CONTROL DIALOGUE WITH THE US. FROM GORBACHEV'S PERSPECTIVE, CLARITY ON THIS POINT DOUBT-LESS TOOK ON SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE AS WARSAW PACT LEADERS PREPARE TO GATHER FOR THEIR FIRST SUMMIT SINCE THE GENEVA TALKS BEGAN.

5. WITH THE US DEBATE ON AID TO THE CONTRAS REACHING A DECISIVE STAGE, GORBACHEV WAS SIMILARLY BLUNT ABOUT MOSCOW'S CONCERNS IN CENTRAL AMERICA. NICARAGUA WAS THE ONLY THIRD WORLD ISSUE SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSED BY THE GENERAL SECRETARY, AND HIS COMPARISON WITH GRENADA SEEMS CALCULATED TO HEIGHTEN THE SENSE OF IMPENDING CRISIS IN THE REGION. AT THE SAME TIME, GORBACHEV'S COMMENTS, LIKE LOWER LEVEL EXPRESSIONS OF SOVIET CONCERN, PROVIDE NO NEW COMMITMENTS OF SOVIET RESOURCES TO THE SANDINISTAS.

6. GORBACHEV'S POSITIVE FORMULATION ON CHINA MAY ALSO HAVE BEEN GEARED TO TACTICAL CONCERNS. WITH THE SIXTH ROUND OF SINO-SOVIET POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS HAVING JUST CLOSED ON SOMETHING OF A SOUR NOTE, THE GENERAL SECRETARY MAY HAVE THOUGHT IT WISE TO PROVIDE A FRESH SIGNAL OF INTEREST AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL IN IMPROVEMENT OF SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS. GORBACHEV'S INCLUSION OF CHINA AMONG "SOCIALIST" COUNTRIES WITH WHICH MOSCOW WOULD LIKE TO COOPERATE IS, TO OUR RECOLLECTION, THE FIRST SUCH REFERENCE BY A GENERAL SECRETARY SINCE BREZHNEV. THIS FORMULATION WAS DOUBTLESS CHOSEN TO GIVE A FRESH BOOST TO THE POSITIVE SINO-SOVIET ATMOS-PHERICS WHICH FOLLOWED GORBACHEV'S ACCESSION. IN ADDITION, GORBACHEV PASSED UP THE OPPORTUNITY TO REITERATE THAT IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS MUST BE BASED ON "RECIPROCITY," EVEN THOUGH ALIYEV HAD USED THIS BT

*Ambo*  
*Walt Galt*

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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 05335

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PREL, PGOV, UR SUBJECT: PLENUM SPEECH: GORBACHEV PULLS NO PUNCHES

FORMULA IN HIS LENIN DAY SPEECH THE DAY BEFORE. IN SUM, GORBACHEV HAS MOVED TO SMOOTH ANY FEATHERS WHICH MAY HAVE BEEN RUFFLED IN BEIJING BY THE REPORTEDLY FRANK EXCHANGES DURING THE SIXTH ROUND, WHILE SETTING THE STAGE FOR YAO YILIN'S VISIT TO MOSCOW LATER THIS YEAR.

7. A MAJOR FACTOR IN GORBACHEV'S DECISION TO STRESS FOREIGN POLICY WAS DOUBTLESS THE NEED FOR AN AUTHORITATIVE TOUR D'HORIZON ON THE EVE OF THE WARSAW PACT SUMMIT. BY LINKING HIS MARCH 13 MEETING WITH EAST EUROPEAN LEADERS TO A "UNANIMOUS" DECISION ON THE NECESSITY TO EXTEND THE PACT, GORBACHEV APPEARED TO ASSERT HIS PERSONAL CLAIM TO LEADERSHIP OF A UNITED SOCIALIST COMMONWEALTH. AT THE SAME TIME, BY REFERRING SPECIFICALLY TO THE RESULTS OF THE 1984 CEMA SUMMIT, GORBACHEV APPEARED TO REASSURE HIS EAST EUROPEAN LEADERS THAT CONTINUITY WOULD BE THE HALLMARK OF THE NEW GENERAL SECRETARY'S APPROACH TO EASTERN EUROPE.

8. IN SUM, EACH OF THE MAJOR THEMES STRUCK BY GORBACHEV MAY BE SEEN AS ROOTED IN EXISTING POLICY AND GEARED TO IMMEDIATE TACTICAL CONCERNS. BUT BY OPENING HIS INCUMBENCY AS GENERAL SECRETARY WITH A HARD-HITTING AND RELATIVELY DETAILED STATEMENT ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, GORBACHEV SIGNALLED THAT HE INTENDS TO TAKE THE RHETORICAL OFFENSIVE. IN PARTICULAR, GORBACHEV SOUGHT TO PLACE THE ONUS SQUARELY ON THE US TO TAKE THE STEPS NEEDED TO PREPARE THE WAY FOR A SUCCESSFUL GORGACHEV-REAGAN MEETING LATER THIS YEAR.

INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND THE ECONOMY

9. OTHER THAN ANNOUNCING THE FEBRUARY 25, 1986, OPENING OF THE TWENTY-SEVENTH PARTY CONGRESS, GORBACHEV PROVIDED LITTLE CONCRETE INFORMATION ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE CONGRESS AGENDA SINCE THE DRAFTS OF THE CONGRESS DOCUMENTS WILL NOT BE FORTHCOMING UNTIL THE NEXT CC

PLENUM SCHEDULED FOR JUNE. WHILE THE TASS SUMMARY DEVOTED LITTLE SPACE TO GORBACHEV'S REMARKS ON DOMESTIC POLITICAL ISSUES, THERE WAS NO DOUBT BUT THAT DISCIPLINE REMAINS A KEY CONCERN AND KGB CHAIRMAN CHEBRIKOV'S ELEVATION TO THE FULL RANKS OF THE POLITBURO SHOULD GIVE ADDED CLOUT TO THE CAMPAIGN FOR INCREASED ORDER.

10. GORBACHEV'S INJUNCTIONS ON THE NEED FOR GREATER CONSCIENTIOUSNESS AND DISCIPLINE AT WORK, HOWEVER, WERE BALANCED BY MORE POSITIVE ELEMENTS SUCH AS CONCERN FOR CONSUMER WELFARE AND GREATER POPULAR PARTICIPATION IN NATIONAL LIFE. TOUCHING BRIEFLY ON CADRES POLICY, GORBACHEV HINTED THAT BROAD CHANGES IN THE RANKS MAY BE FORTHCOMING. WHILE EXPERIENCE IS VALUED, HE SAID, THERE WILL BE NO STAGNATION IN THE MOVEMENT OF CADRES. GORBACHEV'S ADMONITION THAT EXACTING STANDARDS MUST BE SET FOR CADRES MAY VERY WELL BE GIVEN SHARPER TEETH IN THE REVISED PARTY BY-LAWS WHICH WILL BE FORMALIZED AT THE PARTY CONGRESS.

11. GORBACHEV'S REMARKS ON THE ECONOMY, AS SUMMARIZED BY TASS, EMPHASIZED THE NEED FOR CHANGE IN THE ECONOMY BUT CONTAINED ONLY HINTS OF SPECIFIC ACTIONS WHICH MIGHT BE FORTHCOMING. HE STRESSED THE STANDARD POINTS OF PROMOTING "INTENSIVE" GROWTH, RAISING PRODUCTIVITY TO WORLD LEVELS, SPEEDING THE INTRODUCTION OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES, AND STRENGTHENING DISCIPLINE. HE APPEARED TO GIVE EXTRA EMPHASIS TO THE NEED TO MOVE "BOLDLY" TO EXPAND ENTERPRISE RIGHTS BUT DID NOT ELABORATE, EXCEPT TO CALL FOR A REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF PLAN INDICATORS AND AN INCREASE IN THE ROLE OF NORMS. ONE POSSIBLE NEW ELEMENT WAS HIS CALL FOR "RESHAPING STRUCTURAL AND INVESTMENT POLICIES."

12. IN BRIEF COMMENTS ON THE 12TH FIVE YEAR PLAN, HE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MACHINEBUILDING SECTOR AND REEQUIPPING EXISTING FACTORIES. ON TWO KEY LONG-TERM ECONOMIC PROGRAMS, HE CITED THE NEED TO "SUPPLEMENT" THE FOOD PROGRAM WITH NEW MEASURES AND NOTED THAT THE LONG-TERM CONSUMER GOODS AND SERVICES PROGRAM WILL BE "ENDORSED" SOON. IN SUM, GORBACHEV'S SPEECH APPEARED TO REINFORCE THE IMAGE OF A GENERAL SECRETARY WHO WOULD LIKE TO REINVIGORATE THE SOVIET ECONOMY, BUT IT STILL LEAVES MANY UNANSWERED QUESTIONS ABOUT HOW HE WILL DO SO. KAMMAN BT

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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 WARSAW 4260

E.O. 12356: N/A  
TAGS: UR, WTO, XH, PARM, US, PREL, PL  
SUBJECT: TEXT OF GORBACHEV'S ADDRESS AT WARSAW PACT SUMMIT

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV'S ADDRESS AT THE WARSAW PACT SUMMIT AS CARRIED IN ENGLISH BY THE OFFICIAL POLISH NEWS AGENCY PAP. WE NOTE THAT THE TEXT DIFFERS IN SOME RESPECTS FROM THE POLISH-LANGUAGE VERSION CARRIED IN THE OFFICIAL POLISH PRESS. EMBASSY MOSCOW MAY WISH TO COMPARE THIS VERSION WITH THE ORIGINAL RUSSIAN TEXT, UNDOUBTEDLY PUBLISHED THERE.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR COMRADE JARUZELSKI,  
DEAR COMRADES AND FRIENDS,  
LET ME, ON BEHALF OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION AND ALL THE MEMBERS OF THIS MEETING, EXPRESS FIRST OF ALL CORDIAL RECOGNITION TO THE LEADERS OF THE POLISH UNITED WORKERS' PARTY AND THE POLISH STATE FOR A HOSPITABLE RECEPTION. WE ALSO ADDRESS BROTHERLY GREETINGS TO THE RESIDENTS OF HEROIC AND BEAUTIFUL WARSAW, TO ALL THE WORKING PEOPLE OF OF PEOPLE'S POLAND, AS WELL AS WISHES FOR SUCCESS IN BUILDING SOCIALISM.

3. HERE, IN WARSAW, IN THE CITY WHICH GAVE ITS NAME TO OUR ALLIANCE, AN ACT OF HISTORICAL IMPORTANCE HAS BEEN MADE TODAY. EXTENDED HAS BEEN THE TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, COOPERATION AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE, CONCLUDED 30 YEARS AGO. IT HAS BEEN EXTENDED, AS IT WAS PUT BY COMRADE JARUZELSKI, IN THE CONVICTION THAT OUR ALLIANCE IS VITALLY INDISPENSABLE TO ALL OF ITS MEMBERS AND TO STRENGTHENING THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF NATIONS.

4. VLADIMIR ILYICH LENIN EMPHASIZED: A REVOLUTION SHOULD BE ABLE TO DEFEND ITSELF. IN THE FORM OF THE WARSAW TREATY THE PEOPLES OF OUR COUNTRIES HAVE AN UNFAILING DEFENDER OF REVOLUTIONARY GAINS. WHAT DID THE WARSAW TREATY GIVE US ALL? IT GAVE THE POSSIBILITY FOR PEACEFUL AND CREATIVE WORK. IT SECURED IN AN UNFAILING WAY THE INVIOALABILITY OF

BORDERS, AND PUT A CHECK TO THE SCHEMINGS OF THE NEWLY-COOKED DESTROYERS OF SOCIALISM, OF CONTENDERS TO RULE THE WORLD.

5. HISTORY HAS KNOWN NO OTHER ALLIANCE LIKE OURS IN WHICH RELATIONS ARE BASED ON FULL EQUALITY AND FRIENDLY MUTUAL ASSISTANCE OF SOVEREIGN STATES, AN ALLIANCE WHICH IN THE FULL SENSE OF THE WORD IS AN ALLIANCE OF NATIONS, AN ALLIANCE WHICH THREATENS NOBODY AND COMPLETELY SERVES TO DEFEND PEACE. WE SHAPE RELATIONS WITH COUNTRIES OF A DIFFERENT SOCIAL SYSTEM ON THE BASIS OF PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE - THE ONLY REASONABLE FOUNDATION, PARTICULARLY SO IN THE NUCLEAR ERA.

6. GRAND INITIATIVE BY OUR COUNTRIES, AIMED AT CONSOLIDATION OF PEACE IN EUROPE AND DETENTE, GO TOGETHER WITH THE WARSAW TREATY. THIS MEETING HAS RE-AFFIRMED THE COMMON READINESS TO COLLECTIVELY LOOK FOR WAYS OF HEADING OFF THE DANGER OF WAR AND TO ENLARGE INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION. WE COME OUT IN FAVOUR OF LESSENING THE SHARPNESS OF CONFRONTATION OF THE TWO MILITARY-POLITICAL ALLIANCES. THIS WOULD CONFORM TO THE INTERESTS OF ALL NATIONS OF THE WORLD  
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OFFENSIVE SPACE WEAPONS AND TO DESTROY THE EXISTING ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEMS. SIMULTANEOUSLY, WE PROPOSE TO AGREE ON A RADICAL REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR STOCKPILES AND HEAD FOR THE COMPLETE LIQUIDATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN GENERAL.

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12. IN OUR VIEW, SO SIMPLE AND NATURAL A STEP TO BE TAKEN AS A NUCLEAR POTENTIALS FREEZE ON BOTH SIDES IS POSSIBLE. WE ARE BEING ANSWERED: ACCEPTANCE OF IT WOULD MEAN A CONSOLIDATION OF THE SOVIET MILITARY EDGE. BUT FIRST, WE DON NOT HOLD SUCH AN EDGE. MORE THAN ONCE HAVE WE PROVED THIS BY MEANS OF NUMERICAL DATA WHICH WASHINGTON WAS NEVER ABLE TO DENY. SECOND, WHO SAID THAT WE WANT TO STOP AT THE FREEZE? CONTRARY TO THAT, WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE IT FOLLOWED BY A RADICAL REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS.

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13. WE PROPOSED ALREADY TO BOTH SIDES A REDUCTION OF THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMAMENTS BY A QUARTER FOR THE START, BUT WE WOULD NOT OBJECT TO A MAJOR REDUCTION ON RECIPROCAL BASIS, ALL OF THAT IS POSSIBLE, IF THE ARMS RACE DOES NOT START IN OUTER SPACE, IF OUTER SPACE REMAINS BEING AN AREA OF PEACE.

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14. THE SOVIET UNION, THE WARSAW TREATY STATES DO NOT SEEK AN EDGE EITHER ON EARTH, OR IN OUTER SPACE. WE DO NOT ASPIRE NONETHELESS, WE WILL NOT ALLOW TO UPSET THE MILITARY-STRATEGIC PARITY. THIS IS THE COMMON AND UNSHAKABLE STANCE OF THE WARSAW TREATY MEMBERS.

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15. IF PREPARATIONS FOR STAR WARS CONTINUE, WE WILL HAVE NO OTHER CHOICE BUT TO UNDERTAKE COUNTER-MEASURES, OBVIOUSLY INCLUDING INTENSIFICATION AND IMPROVEMENT OF OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS.

7. IT WAS NOT THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER SOCIALIST STATES WHICH INITIATED THE SPLIT OF EUROPE, THE SPLIT OF THE POST-WAR WORLD. THAT HAD BEEN DONE BY THE FOUNDERS OF NATO, AND OUR ALLIANCE CAME INTO BEING ONLY 6 YEARS LATER. SINCE THEN, MORE THAN ONCE HAVE WE EXPRESSED READINESS TO DISSOLVE THE WARSAW TREATY, IF NATO SHOULD AGREE TO RESPOND IN KIND. THIS PRINCIPLED STAND CONTINUES TO BE FULLY VALID. UNFORTUNATELY, THE OPPOSITE SIDE DID NOT HAVE SUCH AN INTENTION, NOR DOES IT HAVE ONE. ON THE CONTRARY, WE WITNESS NEW AGGRESSIVE DOCTRINES, AND FORCEFULLY ENHANCED ARE BOTH NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS. THIS COMPELS US TO THINK TODAY OF FURTHER STRENGTHENING THE ORGANIZATION OF THE WARSAW TREATY.

16. THE RECENTLY COMPLETED 1ST ROUND OF THE SOVIET-AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMAMENTS PROVED THAT THEY PROCEED WITH DIFFICULTY. IT IS OBVIOUS THAT SUCCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS IS ONLY POSSIBLE ON CONDITION OF ADHERENCE TO THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY, ADHERENCE TO THE AGREEMENT ON THE ULTIMATE GOAL OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND ON THE RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUES IN QUESTION IN THEIR INTERRELATIONSHIP.  
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8. MANKIND HAS BEEN PUT BEFORE THE ALTERNATIVE: WILL IT BE POSSIBLE TO CORRECT THE DISADVANTAGEOUS COURSE OF EVENTS OR WILL THE THREAT OF A NUCLEAR WAR BE GROWING? SUCH A DANGER MULTIPLIES FOLLOWING THE U.S. MILITARY PLANS IN OUTER SPACE. WHATEVER IS SAID OR TAKEN AT A JUSTIFICATION BY THEIR AUTHORS, THE ESSENCE OF THESE PLANS IS CLEAR: OBTAINING NUCLEAR FIRST-STRIKE CAPABILITIES AND ABILITY TO USE THEM WITHOUT PUNISHMENT.

9. AS THE U.S. AND NATO CATEGORICALLY REFUSE TO FOLLOW THE USSR'S EXAMPLE AND COMMIT THEMSELVES NOT TO BE THE FIRST TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THEIR INTENTIONS ASSUME AN ALL THE MORE DANGEROUS CHARACTER.

10. BUILDING STAR WARS WEAPONS IS ONLY BEGINNING, BUT THIS ALREADY SHAKES THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD, LEADING TO DESTABILIZATION OF THE ENTIRE SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND TO POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONFRONTATION STILL MORE ACUTE THAN NOWADAYS. THAT SHOULD NOT BE FORGOTTEN BOTH BY THE INITIATORS OF THE AFORE-SAID PROVOCATIVE VENTURES AND BY THOSE WHOM THEY URGE TO TAKE PART IN THEM.

11. OUR APPROACH IS BASICALLY DIFFERENT: NOT TO TURN OUTER SPACE INTO A NEW SOURCE OF MILITARY DANGERS, NOT TO BUILD



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17. AS IT HAS ALREADY BEEN ANNOUNCED, THE SOVIET UNION UNILATERALLY STOPPED THE DEPLOYMENT OF INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF OTHER COUNTER-MEASURES IN EUROPE. THE MORATORIUM TOOK EFFECT ON APRIL 7. AND THAT MOVE WAS PROPERLY ASSESSED BY THE WORLD PUBLIC OPINION, AND ALSO BY NUMEROUS, SOUND-THINKING AMERICAN AND WEST EUROPEAN POLITICIANS. WE HAVE THE RIGHT TO EXPECT WASHINGTON AND CAPITALS OF OTHER NATO STATES TO PRESENT A MORE SERIOUS AND THOROUGH ATTITUDE WHILE ASSESSING OUR INITIATIVE, AND TO DISPLAY RESTRAINT, ON THEIR PART WITH REGARD TO THE DEPLOYMENT OF AMERICAN MISSILES IN WESTERN EUROPE. AFTER ALL, RECIPROCITY IN THIS FIELD WOULD HELP PUT THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS ONTO THE TRACK OF PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS, AND WOULD ALSO PLAY ITS PART WHEN IT COMES TO SETTLING MORE COMPLICATED PROBLEMS.

18. THE WARSAW TREATY HAS NOW BEEN OPERATING FOR NEARLY ONE-THIRD OF A CENTURY -- THROUGHOUT THAT PERIOD OF TIME IT HAS BEEN ACTING AS THE INITIATOR OF CONSTRUCTIVE IDEAS, AIMED AT DETENTE AND ARMS LIMITATION, AND AT THE DEVELOPMENT OF ALL-EUROPEAN COOPERATION. ITS GROWING WEIGHT IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS HAS A POSITIVE IMPACT ON THE CLIMATE IN THE WORLD IN GENERAL. THIS COMES AS A RESULT OF COLLECTIVE EFFORT AND CONTRIBUTION BY EACH OF THE BROTHERLY STATES.

19. COMRADES, ON THE EVE OF THE 40TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE GREAT VICTORY OVER FASCISM, AGAIN WE RECALL THE OATH THE VICTORS TOOK ON THE GRAVES AND RUINS OF WORLD WAR TWO: WAR NEVER AGAIN, WE REMEMBER THAT. WE REMEMBER THE LESSONS OF WAR. THESE INCLUDE ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT: NAMELY, THE EXAMPLE OF COOPERATION BETWEEN THE POWERS OF THE ANTI-NAZI COALITION. TODAY WE APPEAL TO ALL COUNTRIES OF EUROPE AND OTHER CONTINENTS TO GO BEYOND DIVERGENCES AND TO BECOME PARTNERS IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE NEW DANGER, THREATENING THE HUMAN RACE AS A WHOLE -- THE DANGER OF NUCLEAR ANNIHILATION.

20. EXTENDING THE WARSAW TREATY, WE AGAIN EXPRESS OUR UNSHAKABLE CONVICTION THAT JOINT EFFORTS CAN AND MUST PREVENT A

WAR. SUCH IS THE WILL OF THE NATIONS OF OUR STATES. THIS IS THE AIM OF THE POLICY PURSUED BY OUR PARTIES AND GOVERNMENTS AND OF THE ENTIRE ACTIVITY BY THE DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE OF SOCIALIST STATES.

21. TO THE FURTHER COOPERATION OF OUR PARTIES AND STATES, CONSOLIDATION OF THEIR UNITY AND COHESION IN TUNE WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF MARXISM-LENINISM AND SOCIALIST INTERNATIONALISM. LONG LIVE THE BROTHERLY ALLIANCE OF SOCIALIST STATES -- THE WARSAW TREATY.  
TO PEOPLE'S, SOCIALIST POLAND, TO THE HEALTH OF COMRADE WOJCIECH JARUZELSKI AND MEMBERS OF THE POLISH LEADERSHIP AND ALL PARTICIPANTS IN OUR MEETING.  
TO LASTING PEACE ALL OVER THE WORLD.  
END TEXT.  
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GORBACHEV SPEECH TO CPSU PLENUM VIEWED

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[Text] CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev stated today on the conclusion of the first round of the Soviet-American negotiations that the USSR continues to be ready for mutually acceptable arms reduction agreements. This statement is contained in a speech to the CPSU Central Committee Plenum, which today in Moscow scheduled the next CPSU congress. Here is a report from Moscow by our correspondent Christian Neef:

[Neef] Almost 5 years to the day from the last party congress, the 27th CPSU Congress will meet on 25 Friday 1986. This is the focal point of the decision made by the CPSU Central Committee members here in Moscow today. As expected, this plenum represents the beginning of a 10-month preparatory and, above all, electoral period for the party, which has important new documents to discuss at its next party congress: the new edition of the CPSU program, which has already been under discussion for some time, and changes in the CPSU rules and basic guidelines for the economic and social development of the USSR up to 1990 and up to the year 2000.

It was obvious that the detailed speech delivered today in the plenum by Mikhail Gorbachev would primarily be dedicated to internal policy, namely the preparatory period for the party congress. Nonetheless, many passages deal with international issues. Gorbachev himself said that the complicated international situation and the increased tension oblige us to also attach primary importance in the future to foreign policy questions.

His statements on this are an appeal to direct international relations, 40 years after the end of the war, into a channel of normal cooperation and to contain all danger of war. Gorbachev principally stressed the importance of still closer cooperation between the socialist countries in all areas. We agree, he said in his speech, that the Warsaw Pact will continue, as long as the NATO bloc exists, to play an important role in defending socialism and will have to serve as an instrument for consolidating international security. The USSR will also purposely expand relations with the other socialist countries, the general secretary said, here also naming the PRC; the latest round of political consultations between the USSR and PRC ended here in Moscow only last weekend.

Gorbachev's observations on the capitalist countries were also a clear commitment to dialogue and cooperation. We are in favor of developing normal and equal relations, he told the members of the Central Committee; disputed issues and conflicts must be solved by political means. Gorbachev pointed here once again to the significance of those interstate agreements from the era of detente and referred to them as an example of international relations based on equality and equal security. In this he included the Helsinki Final Act. In view of the forthcoming 10th CSCE anniversary it could well be useful, Gorbachev said, to proclaim anew the will to overcome tension and develop peaceful cooperation.

Naturally, in his speech today Mikhail Gorbachev again addressed in detail Soviet-American relations and reaffirmed his country's readiness to improve them for mutual advantage and with respect for the legitimate interests of each side. The general secretary contrasted this, however, with the U.S. attitude in Geneva. The first round of the Soviet-American negotiations, which ended today, already shown that Washington is not setting a course directed at reaching an accord with the USSR. As proof, Gorbachev named, among other things, the United States' refusal to discuss preventing an arms race in space along with the issue of reducing nuclear weapons, which is a clear violation of the bilateral agreement reached in January.



# Analysis Note

26

26 April 1985  
FB M 85-10017

*File  
Gorbachev  
speeches*

## Gorbachev Hits U.S. Stance at Geneva in Plenum Speech

*In his 23 April report to the CPSU Central Committee plenum, General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev criticized U.S. foreign and arms control policy more sharply than in any of his previous statements since becoming the top Soviet leader. At the same time, he reaffirmed Moscow's commitment to promoting East-West detente and its readiness to improve relations with Washington and seek mutually acceptable arms control agreements. His mixture of criticism of the United States and advocacy of detente seemed intended both to assure the party that Soviet interests will be guarded and to defend the Soviet rationale for continued dialogue with the Reagan Administration.*

In his most important policy speech since the extraordinary Central Committee plenum that elected him general secretary, Gorbachev toughened his depiction of U.S. policy, leveling a number of attacks explicitly against the United States:

- For the first time, he directly accused Washington of violating the U.S.-Soviet accord reached in January on the linking of space, strategic, and intermediate-range nuclear weapons issues at the Geneva talks. He cited alleged U.S. refusal to discuss the question of preventing "the spread of the arms race into space" as the prime indicator of U.S. violation of the January accord.
- He charged that the United States is not seeking an accord at the Geneva talks. Maintaining that the first round of the talks "provides grounds for saying that Washington is not holding to a course directed at accord with the Soviet Union," he averred that the Administration's "haste" in rejecting Soviet proposals demonstrated U.S. "unwillingness to steer" negotiations toward "reasonable results."

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*CAS 7/18/02*

- Elaborating on themes he articulated in his 23 March meeting with representatives of the Socialist International and in his 8 April Pravda interview, Gorbachev placed primary responsibility on "U.S. ruling circles" for creating an "alarming and dangerous" international situation. He accused Washington of "sabotaging" disarmament and of "trampling on" the interests of other countries, the traditions of international relations, and existing treaties and agreements.

In his critique of U.S. policy, Gorbachev appeared to reflect concern that the Geneva talks might be used to damage Soviet interests and as a justification for funding U.S. weapons programs. He warned that Moscow would not encourage a course that indulges in the "hypocrisy" and public deceit of combining an arms race and disarmament talks, and he underlined his point with a cryptic reference to the last round of negotiations that were aborted by a Soviet walkout in 1983: "We would not want a repetition of the sorry experience of the previous talks." Gorbachev had raised similar concerns in his 28 March reply to German peace activists, charging that statements from "high-ranking U.S. representatives" had created the impression that they "need talks as a screen" for carrying through their military programs.

Despite these sharp words about U.S. policy, however, Gorbachev continued to emphasize both the necessity for improved U.S.-Soviet relations and the persistence of Soviet efforts to that end. In language similar to his 8 April Pravda interview, the Soviet leader declared that confrontation was not a "fatal inevitability" between the Soviet Union and the United States. Rather, he asserted, the "most rational" course is for both sides to seek to "smooth relations" and "build a bridge of cooperation." In regard to the Geneva talks, moreover, he pledged that the Soviet Union would "work persistently for concrete, mutually acceptable agreements," and he asserted that the Soviet Union stood ready to reach such accords.

#### Soviet Tactics

Gorbachev's defense of Soviet positions and criticism of Washington is consistent with Moscow's current tactical approach to relations with the United States. In statements calculated to affect world opinion, Gorbachev has taken the lead in seeking to promote opposition to U.S. policies, especially among U.S. allies, by encouraging doubts about

Washington's willingness to seek compromise solutions while insisting that Moscow is being flexible at the talks.<sup>1</sup> The same approach was taken in the annual 22 April Lenin Day address delivered by CPSU Politburo member Geydar Aliyev. While claiming that Moscow was "unswervingly" pursuing a policy of dialogue and cooperation with all states, Aliyev also used strong language in accusing "aggressive circles, first and foremost in the United States," of exacerbating the international situation, "pushing mankind toward the edge of the abyss," and elevating "state terrorism" to the status of official policy.  
(U/FOUO)

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<sup>1</sup>For more detailed discussion of Gorbachev's earlier efforts to intensify public pressures on the Administration's arms control posture in Geneva, see the Trends of 3 April 1985, pages 1-3, and of 10 April 1985, pages 1-5.

# Analysis Report

File  
Gorbachev  
speeches

Gorbachev Takes Charge at CPSU Plenum

**FBIS**

Foreign Broadcast Information Service

CAS 7/14/82

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## Gorbachev Takes Charge at CPSU Plenum

*The CPSU Central Committee plenum on 23 April provided an impressive demonstration of the political strength of new General Secretary Gorbachev. He brought his closest associates in the Secretariat into full Politburo membership and used his plenum speech to lay out an economic program that challenges the ministerial bureaucracy and promises a shift of power to the local level. He also called for a shakeup of party officials at all levels in preparation for the next party congress—scheduled by the plenum for February 1986. In his remarks on foreign policy, Gorbachev was sharply critical of U.S. arms control policies, but affirmed Moscow's readiness to improve relations with Washington.*

### Leadership Changes

The personnel changes enacted at the plenum greatly strengthened Gorbachev's voting support in the Politburo and altered the power relationships in the Secretariat, putting the general secretary in an excellent position to influence the composition of the party congress and the new Central Committee it will elect. The additions made to the Politburo were the most extensive since 1973. Three leaders who gained their current positions under Andropov were elected as full members of the Politburo: Cadres Secretary Yegor Ligachev, 65; economics Secretary Nikolay Ryzhkov, 56; and KGB chief Viktor Chebrikov, 62. In addition, Defense Minister Sergey Sokolov, 74, was made a candidate member of the Politburo, and RSFSR Agriculture Minister V. P. Nikonov, 56, was brought into the Secretariat.

The large number of vacancies in the Politburo gave Gorbachev an unusual opportunity to put his stamp on the composition of the leadership. The new promotions restore the size of the Politburo to 13 members—its minimum membership from 1971 until Andropov's death. Under Chernenko no new members were added to the Politburo to replace Andropov or Defense Minister Ustinov, who died in 1984.

Gorbachev showed considerable strength by winning the promotion of his allies Ligachev and Ryzhkov—the most junior members of the Secretariat—to full Politburo membership. The feat was all the more impressive because

neither had been a candidate member—a break with practice since 1973 when Foreign Minister Gromyko and Defense Minister Grechko were brought directly into the Politburo.

Ryzhkov and Ligachev have been closely associated with Gorbachev. Both worked directly under him in the Secretariat and have voiced views similar to his on economic issues. Since Gorbachev became party leader they have become more prominent, most notably at the late March session of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, where they played roles normally reserved for Politburo members.

The promotion of Ligachev and Ryzhkov should result in a new distribution of responsibilities among the senior secretaries. Ligachev is likely to continue to supervise cadres, but may be given additional responsibilities such as ideology—a key portfolio previously held by Chernenko and Gorbachev. Ligachev has some previous experience in ideology, having served briefly as a deputy head of the CPSU Propaganda Department for the RSFSR from 1961 to 1962 and again in 1965. That he will play a specially important role in the Gorbachev regime was suggested by his strikingly high status in the first post-plenum lineup. On May Day he stood seventh—after Gorbachev, Tikhonov, Gromyko, Grishin, Romanov, and Solomentsev, but ahead of Aliyev and Vorotnikov, who had become Politburo members earlier. Chebrikov and Ryzhkov, on the other hand, stood last, as new members should.

The role of the other new senior secretary, Ryzhkov, is somewhat clearer. He will most likely be the senior secretary for industrial affairs, jumping ahead of longtime industry Secretary Vladimir Dolgikh, 60, who is only a candidate Politburo member. His promotion would also appear to dilute the authority of the only other secretary who is also a full member of the Politburo, Grigoriy Romanov, who has played a role in industrial management. If Romanov is not given new responsibilities—such as ideology—his role could be reduced to overseeing security matters and defense industries.

The addition of Nikonov to the Secretariat—presumably to become secretary for agriculture—appears to have been a move by Gorbachev to turn his own portfolio over to a favorite while ignoring higher level candidates. Nikonov, who was far down the line among qualified agricultural officials, had prospered earlier under Gorbachev's tenure as agriculture secretary: In August 1979 he left his post as first secretary of tiny Mari oblast to become



*Viktor Nikonov, new  
CPSU secretary.*

USSR deputy agriculture minister, and in January 1983 he became agriculture minister for the whole RSFSR. It is unclear whether Nikonov, as a junior secretary, will work under the supervision of Ligachev, who has been overseeing agriculture in recent weeks, or directly under Gorbachev.

The relationship of Chebrikov and Sokolov to Gorbachev is less clear. Like Ligachev and Ryzhkov, however, Chebrikov was an Andropov appointee and may also be a Gorbachev ally. Sokolov's advancement only to candidate membership in the Politburo suggests that he carries little political weight in the leadership. Since Ligachev and Ryzhkov were advanced directly to full Politburo membership, a similar move could have been made for Sokolov, giving him equal status to the head of the KGB and that held by the late Defense Minister Ustinov.

## **Economic Program**

Gorbachev's report to the plenum focused mainly on economic policy and called for immediate and concrete changes in planning and administration to improve economic performance—which he called “the main issue now.” The thrust of his statements was that the central ministerial bureaucracy must be changed and its powers reduced in order to stimulate local initiative and creativity and boost productivity. He sharply criticized past inaction on economic problems, stating that the need for better management methods had not been recognized early enough and there had been “no persistence” in working out and adopting “major measures” to improve the economy.

Gorbachev laid out a number of specific proposals for improving economic performance:

- **Restructure ministerial work.** The general secretary called for “restructuring the work of the upper echelons” of economic administration, implying the need for reorganizing ministries or at least reducing their powers and changing their methods of operation. He stated that some administrative units that have turned into “obstacles” to progress must be eliminated and the state apparatus simplified, and he criticized heads of some ministries for maintaining “old approaches.” He indicated that some ministerial prerogatives should be reduced. For example, he urged limitation of central organs’

practice of issuing "instructions" interpreting party and state decrees, because, he said, these instructions are sometimes used "capriciously" to constrain enterprises.

- **Change planning procedures.** Implying that planning is hampering growth, he argued that it must be changed into an "active lever" for boosting production. To this end, he insisted that the number of plan indicators sent down to enterprises must be reduced and that incentives must play a bigger role.
- **Expand local rights.** He advocated expansion of the rights of plants and also of local government organs in managing economic matters. Local organs, he declared, should have "full responsibility" for questions in their jurisdiction and should not buck local problems to the center.
- **Increase priority for machine building.** He called for sharply accelerating the replacement of old equipment and the development of new technology in order to spur economic growth. He also insisted that the next five-year plan must increase the rate of growth of machine building by 50 to 100 percent.
- **Reorganize agricultural organs.** Gorbachev indicated that he intends to strengthen the agroindustrial organs created by the May 1982 CPSU plenum by expanding their authority over more agricultural and agriculture-related agencies. Declaring that the management of the agroindustrial complex "needs further improvement," he called for measures to "make it possible to manage, plan, and finance the agroindustrial complex as a single entity at all levels."

Gorbachev's proposals are limited in scope, but they are fairly concrete and will provoke resistance since they encroach on the powers and prerogatives of the entrenched central bureaucracy. Gorbachev's intention to frontally assault the bureaucracy was clear in his first major domestic policy statement after becoming general secretary—at a special gathering of managers of plants and associations on 8 April—when he invited local managers to criticize the existing system.<sup>1</sup> He endorsed the managers' criticism of higher organs and their proposals for decentralizing powers in both his closing speech at the conference and at the plenum. His plenum speech also repeatedly cited sentiments expressed at the conference, which, he claimed, had "convinced" him that action is needed to improve management and reduce excessive regulation from above.

<sup>1</sup> Gorbachev's 8 April speech is discussed in the FBIS *Trends* of 17 April 1985, pages 19-22.



*Gorbachev visits Moscow factory. (Soviet television, 17 April 1985)*

The Gorbachev regime is conveying the impression that the general secretary's proposals have strong backing at the top levels of the party. As if to underscore the clout behind his program, Gorbachev asserted in his plenum speech that the Politburo had "unanimously" concluded that action is needed. Politburo support for Gorbachev on this issue also was suggested in a 22 April Lenin Day speech by First Deputy Premier Aliyev, the top government economic administrator below Premier Tikhonov. Aliyev argued for reorganization of the work of the central economic ministries and agencies, for more "flexible combination of centralism and autonomy" in economic management, and for greater reliance on economic levers. Prior to the plenum, *Pravda* on 19 April reported that the Politburo, in response to the 8 April conference, had ordered Gosplan and other agencies to work out measures to implement the managers' proposals, especially on reducing the number of planning indicators sent down to plants.

Before the plenum speech, Gorbachev had already demonstrated his determination to make changes by taking action in the sphere directly under his control—the Central Committee apparat—where he removed two Central

Committee economic supervisors. The longtime heads of the Central Committee construction and machine building departments were both replaced just before Gorbachev sharply criticized these two sectors in his plenum speech. The head of the Construction Department since 1969, 65-year-old Ivan Dmitriyev, was transferred to RSFSR deputy premier in late March, and *Pravda* on 20 April reported that Boris Yeltsin, 54, had been released as Sverdlovsk first secretary to become head of the department. On 19 April *Pravda* reported that 71-year-old Vasilii Frolov, head of the Machine Building Department since 1958, was retiring.

The new construction head appears to share Gorbachev's disdain for the Moscow bureaucracy. Yeltsin's articles in the central press have sometimes expressed local leaders' frustration at the inefficiency and lack of coordination of central ministries. For example, in a July 1983 *Kommunist* article, he complained that construction ministries were so uncoordinated in managing the crucial gas pipeline that his local obkom had to step in and exercise "leadership over the work of all these state organs" to get tasks accomplished. Shortly before his new appointment, in a 7 April television interview, he criticized local managers who turn to central organs for help instead of resolving problems locally.

### **Renovation of Party Leadership**

Gorbachev has clearly signaled his impatience to change things not only in the economic sphere but also throughout the party apparatus. By calling the plenum only weeks after taking office and setting the date for the next party congress, he initiated a process that could considerably change the character of the party. Toward this end, he used his plenum speech to demand an acceleration in the renovation of party leadership at all levels.

The long lead time for the congress, which is set to open on 25 February 1986, may have been determined in part in order to allow adequate discussion of the new party program that the congress will adopt. According to the *Pravda* version of his plenum speech, Gorbachev announced that the program would be presented to a future plenum and then released for broad public debate. The date for the October 1961 congress, which adopted the previous program, was set the previous January and a draft of the program was released in July. Under Brezhnev, congresses were announced from three to eight months in advance.

The schedule will also provide a considerable time for the party election campaign, which Gorbachev indicated will be used to reshape the party leadership. He stated that the "leading party organs" elected at local conferences and congresses will need to be "replenished with fresh forces" and called upon high-level officials to play a "direct role" in election meetings, even at low levels, in order to ensure a critical review of leaders and to fully address any shortcomings.

Gorbachev went much further in stressing the need for a critical review of party personnel during the elections than Brezhnev had in an equivalent speech to the June 1980 plenum that scheduled the 26th Congress. Brezhnev had balanced his call for a review of the party's "omissions and shortcomings" with instructions to consider also "what is positive" in its work. The same contrast is evident in the resolutions on the congresses adopted by the two plenums. This year, the resolution concluded with a lengthy section directing that the election meetings make a "profound and comprehensive" examination of the party's work, discuss "in detail" questions of party management, and take a "self-critical approach" in evaluating party organs. In 1980, the equivalent resolution provided no comparable guidelines for the election meetings.

Gorbachev called for faster replacement of ineffective leaders and more aggressive advancement of new, younger officials. He acknowledged the need to ensure the "correct combination of experienced and young workers," but he leaned in the direction of youth, saying that there must be no "stagnation" in advancing cadres and that the party must promote women and young workers "with greater boldness." He criticized older officials who are lax in implementing new policies and tolerate shortcomings.



*First woman president of the Ukraine—Valentina Shevchenko—elected 27 March 1985.*

Since Gorbachev became general secretary, increased attention has been given to a new personnel policy, adopted in October 1984, that calls for higher leadership standards and replacement of those who fail to meet them.<sup>2</sup> Aliyev's Lenin Day speech also emphasized the need for increasing the pace of personnel changes. He indicated that the party must

<sup>2</sup> For a more extensive discussion of personnel policies see the FBIS *Trends* of 10 April 1985, pages 12-15.

“decisively get rid” of ineffective leaders and “be bolder in advancing young people.” In contrast to Gorbachev and to the balanced formula used under Chernenko, Aliyev failed to mention any need to balance promotions with retention of experienced workers.

Gorbachev coupled his call for faster personnel changes with a demand for increased discipline. He said that “we will not tolerate” an attitude of “mutual forgiveness” where managers overlook “indiscipline in workers” and workers in turn ignore managerial “blunders.” He made it clear that enforcement of discipline should extend to the party, stating that “not a single party organization, not a single worker” should be exempt.

### **Foreign Policy**

In his report to the plenum Gorbachev criticized U.S. foreign and arms control policy more sharply than in any of his previous statements since becoming the top Soviet leader. At the same time, he reaffirmed Moscow’s commitment to promoting East-West detente and its readiness to improve relations with Washington and seek mutually acceptable arms control agreements. His mixture of criticism of the United States and advocacy of detente seemed intended both to assure the party that Soviet interests will be guarded and to defend the Soviet rationale for continued dialogue with the Reagan Administration.

Gorbachev toughened his depiction of U.S. policy, leveling a number of attacks explicitly against the United States:

- For the first time, he directly accused Washington of violating the U.S.-Soviet accord reached in January on the linking of space, strategic, and intermediate-range nuclear weapons issues at the Geneva talks. He cited alleged U.S. refusal to discuss the question of preventing “the spread of the arms race into space” as the prime indicator of U.S. violation of the January accord.
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- Elaborating on themes he articulated in his 23 March meeting with representatives of the Socialist International and in his 8 April *Pravda* interview, Gorbachev placed primary responsibility on "U.S. ruling circles" for creating an "alarming and dangerous" international situation. He accused Washington of "sabotaging" disarmament and of "trampling on" the interests of other countries, the traditions of international relations, and existing treaties and agreements.

In his critique of U.S. policy, Gorbachev appeared to reflect concern that the Geneva talks might be used to damage Soviet interests and as a justification for funding U.S. weapons programs. He warned that Moscow would not encourage a course that indulges in the "hypocrisy" and public deceit of combining an arms race and disarmament talks, and he underlined his point with a cryptic reference to the last round of negotiations that were aborted by a Soviet walkout in 1983: "We would not want a repetition of the sorry experience of the previous talks." Gorbachev had raised similar concerns in his 28 March reply to German peace activists, charging that statements from "high-ranking U.S. representatives" had created the impression that they "need talks as a screen" for carrying through their military programs.

Despite these sharp words about U.S. policy, however, Gorbachev continued to emphasize both the necessity for improved U.S.-Soviet relations and the persistence of Soviet efforts to that end. In language similar to his 8 April *Pravda* interview, the Soviet leader declared that confrontation was not a "fatal inevitability" between the Soviet Union and the United States. Rather, he asserted, the "most rational" course is for both sides to seek to "smooth relations" and "build a bridge of cooperation." In regard to the Geneva talks, moreover, he pledged that the Soviet Union would "work persistently for concrete, mutually acceptable agreements," and he asserted that the Soviet Union stood ready to reach such accords.

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<sup>3</sup> For more detailed discussion of Gorbachev's earlier efforts to intensify public pressures on the Administration's arms control posture in Geneva, see the FBIS *Trends* of 3 April 1985, pages 1-3, and 10 April 1985, pages 1-5.

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address delivered by CPSU Politburo member Geydar Aliyev. While claiming that Moscow was "unswervingly" pursuing a policy of dialogue and cooperation with all states, Aliyev also used strong language in accusing "aggressive circles, first and foremost in the United States," of exacerbating the international situation, "pushing mankind toward the edge of the abyss," and elevating "state terrorism" to the status of official policy.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

*File  
Gorbachev 42  
Spencer*

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 06014

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, UR, US  
SUBJECT: GORBACHEV EXCORIATES US MILITARISM, REVANCHISM,  
--            MUNICH IN V-E DAY SPEECH

1. ~~(C~~ - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY: AT A MAY 8 KREMLIN CEREMONY, GORBACHEV DELIVERED A "VICTORY DAY" SPEECH CONTAINING SHARP CRITICISM OF THE US AND OTHER WARTIME ALLIES. THE CEREMONY WAS PUNCTUATED BY DRAMATIC GESTURES, INCLUDING PRAISE BY GORBACHEV FOR THE WARTIME ROLE OF STALIN (WHICH ELICITED AN ENTHUSIASTIC AUDIENCE REACTION). GORBACHEV MENTIONED, BUT DENIGRATED, THE ALLIED WARTIME

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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 04 MOSCOW 6014

DTG: 081527Z MAY 85 PSN: 076203

ROLE AND DELIVERED A SCATHING ATTACK ON WESTERN FAILURE TO FACE UP TO THE NAZI THREAT IN THE 1930S. ON THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, GORBACHEV EXCORIATED US "IMPERIALISM" AND "MILITARISM," AS WELL AS AMERICAN "STATE TERRORISM" AGAINST NICARAGUA AND "UNDECLARED WAR" AGAINST AFGHANISTAN. HIS CRITICISM OF GERMAN REVANCHISM CONTAINED -- IN A REFERENCE TO "SS CUTTHROATS" -- AN IMPLICIT ALLUSION TO THE BITBURG VISIT. WHILE ALLUDING FAVORABLY TO PAST EPISODES OF US-SOVIET COOPERATION, GORBACHEV SAID VIRTUALLY NOTHING ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF CONSTRUCTIVE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION, MENTIONING GENEVA ONLY IN PASSING. GORBACHEV'S STRIDENCY IS CONSISTENT WITH HIS EFFORT SINCE THE PLENUM SPEECH TO PRESSURE THE US FOR THE SHIFTS NECESSARY FOR A SUCCESSFUL SUMMIT. IT MAY ALSO REFLECT THE HOPE THAT PLAYING ON THE SPECTRE OF A FOREIGN THREAT WILL MOTIVATE THE SOVIET PEOPLE TO TACKLE GORBACHEV'S DOMESTIC AGENDA AS THE WARTIME CRISIS MOTIVATED THE 1941-1945 GENERATION. END SUMMARY.

HOW THE WAR WAS WON  
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3. THE KREMLIN CEREMONY BEGAN WITH A DRAMATIC GESTURE CALCULATED FOR MAXIMUM APPEAL TO THE BERIBBONED VETERANS IN THE AUDIENCE -- THE POSTING BY A MILITARY HONOR GUARD OF THE SOVIET FLAG RAISED OVER THE REICHSTAG IN 1945. TAKING A CUE FROM THIS EYE-CATCHING GESTURE, GORBACHEV LAUNCHED INTO A LENGTHY STEMWINDER ON THE SACRIFICES OF THE SOVIET PEOPLE AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE VICTORY WON BY THE RED ARMY. AS IF TO PUT HIS PERSONAL STAMP ON THE PROCEEDINGS, GORBACHEV DREW A SPONTANEOUS OVATION FROM THE AUDIENCE WITH A DRAMATIC REFERENCE TO THE LEADING ROLE OF STALIN. ALTHOUGH HIS SPEECH WAS INTERRUPTED BY POLITE AUDIENCE APPLAUSE ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS, THIS WAS THE ONLY INSTANCE IN WHICH THE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DTG: 081527Z MAY 85 PSN: 076203

GENERAL SECRETARY WAS FORCED TO RESUME HIS SPEECH OVER CONTINUING APPLAUSE FROM THE FLOOR. WHILE GORBACHEV WENT ON TO PRAISE THE CONTRIBUTION TO VICTORY MADE BY ALL SECTORS OF SOVIET SOCIETY, HE LEFT LITTLE DOUBT OF HIS CONVICTION THAT THE PARTY WAS THE ARCHITECT OF VICTORY.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DTG: 081527Z MAY 85 PSN: 076203

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DE RUEHMO #6014/02 1281539  
Z 081527Z MAY 85 ZFF4  
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TO AMEMBASSY LISBON FLASH 1957  
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0218

INFO MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 06014

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, UR, US  
SUBJECT: GORBACHEV EXCORIATES US MILITARISM, REVANCHISM,

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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DTG: 081527Z MAY 85 PSN: 076206

COMMENT  
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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DTG: 081527Z MAY 85 PSN: 076206

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AS HE DID WITH SPEAKER O'NEILL, OF THE NEW SOVIET MAN:  
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TOR: 128/1553Z

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DE RUEHMO #6014/03 1281540  
Z 081527Z MAY 85 ZFF4  
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO AMEMBASSY LISBON FLASH 1958  
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0219

INFO MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 MOSCOW 06014

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, UR, US  
SUBJECT: GORBACHEV EXCORIATES US MILITARISM, REVANCHISM,

TRUTH, BUT NOT WHAT WE WOULD CONSIDER TO BE HISTORY  
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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

*Folder  
Gorbachev  
Speeches 51*

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TO AMEMBASSY LISBON FLASH 1956  
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0217

INFO MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 06014.

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, UR, US  
SUBJECT: **GORBACHEV EXCORIATES US MILITARISM, REVANCHISM,**  
-- **MUNICH IN V-E DAY SPEECH**

1. ~~(C~~ ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY: AT A MAY 8 KREMLIN CEREMONY, GORBACHEV DELIVERED A "VICTORY DAY" SPEECH CONTAINING SHARP CRITICISM OF THE US AND OTHER WARTIME ALLIES. THE CEREMONY WAS PUNCTUATED BY DRAMATIC GESTURES, INCLUDING PRAISE BY GORBACHEV FOR THE WARTIME ROLE OF STALIN (WHICH ELICITED AN ENTHUSIASTIC AUDIENCE REACTION). GORBACHEV MENTIONED, BUT DENIGRATED, THE ALLIED WARTIME

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ROLE AND DELIVERED A SCATHING ATTACK ON WESTERN FAILURE TO FACE UP TO THE NAZI THREAT IN THE 1930S. ON THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, GORBACHEV EXCORIATED US "IMPERIALISM" AND "MILITARISM," AS WELL AS AMERICAN "STATE TERRORISM" AGAINST NICARAGUA AND "UNDECLARED WAR" AGAINST AFGHANISTAN. HIS CRITICISM OF GERMAN REVANCHISM CONTAINED -- IN A REFERENCE TO "SS CUTTHROATS" -- AN IMPLICIT ALLUSION TO THE BITBURG VISIT. WHILE ALLUDING FAVORABLY TO PAST EPISODES OF US-SOVIET COOPERATION, GORBACHEV SAID VIRTUALLY NOTHING ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF CONSTRUCTIVE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION, MENTIONING GENEVA ONLY IN PASSING. GORBACHEV'S STRIDENCY IS CONSISTENT WITH HIS EFFORT SINCE THE PLENUM SPEECH TO PRESSURE THE US FOR THE SHIFTS NECESSARY FOR A SUCCESSFUL SUMMIT. IT MAY ALSO REFLECT THE HOPE THAT PLAYING ON THE SPECTRE OF A FOREIGN THREAT WILL MOTIVATE THE SOVIET PEOPLE TO TACKLE GORBACHEV'S DOMESTIC AGENDA AS THE WARTIME CRISIS MOTIVATED THE 1941-1945 GENERATION. END SUMMARY.

HOW THE WAR WAS WON  
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3. THE KREMLIN CEREMONY BEGAN WITH A DRAMATIC GESTURE CALCULATED FOR MAXIMUM APPEAL TO THE BERIBBONED VETERANS IN THE AUDIENCE -- THE POSTING BY A MILITARY HONOR GUARD OF THE SOVIET FLAG RAISED OVER THE REICHSTAG IN 1945. TAKING A CUE FROM THIS EYE-CATCHING GESTURE, GORBACHEV LAUNCHED INTO A LENGTHY STEMWINDER ON THE SACRIFICES OF THE SOVIET PEOPLE AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE VICTORY WON BY THE RED ARMY. AS IF TO PUT HIS PERSONAL STAMP ON THE PROCEEDINGS, GORBACHEV DREW A SPONTANEOUS OVATION FROM THE AUDIENCE WITH A DRAMATIC REFERENCE TO THE LEADING ROLE OF STALIN. ALTHOUGH HIS SPEECH WAS INTERRUPTED BY POLITE AUDIENCE APPLAUSE ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS; THIS WAS THE ONLY INSTANCE IN WHICH THE

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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO AMEMBASSY LISBON FLASH 1957  
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0218

INFO MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 06014

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM 9

PAGE 02 OF 04 MOSCOW 6014

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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 04 MOSCOW 6014

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COMMENT  
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TO AMEMBASSY LISBON FLASH 1958  
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