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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 5/10/2005

File Folder SOVIET UNION-GRAIN EMBARGO EE 4/4 [1982-1984]

FOIA

F06-114/8

Box Number 27

YARHI-MILO

2709

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
10077	MEMO	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE SOVIET SHIPPING TO PICK UP GRAIN R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8	1	2/27/1984	B1
10078	E-MAIL	E-MAIL PROFS POINDEXTER TO LEVINE RE SOVIET SHIPPING TO PICK UP GRAIN R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8	1	2/24/1984	B1
10080	E-MAIL	E-MAIL PROFS POINDEXTER TO MATLOCK RE MORE ON CORN GROWERS R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8	1	2/24/1984	B1
10079	MEMO	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE MORE ON CORN GROWERS R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8	1	2/27/1984	B1
10087	CABLE	KAL INCIDENT PAR 3/16/2011 F2006-114/8	14	7/19/1984	B2 B3
10081	MEMO	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE SOVIET GRAIN PURCHASES	1	8/3/1984	B1
10082	MEMO	LARGE SOVIET PURCHASE OF U.S. GRAIN PUZZLE OFFICIALS R 3/16/2011 F2006-114/8	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
10083	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE FBI REPORT ON SOVIET PLAN TO CANCEL LONG TERM GRAIN AGREEMENT <i>R 3/16/2011 F2006-114/8</i>	2	9/7/1984	B1
10084	LETTER	MCFARLANE TO WEBSTER RE U.S.-USSR LONG TERM GRAIN AGREEMENT <i>R 1/15/2008 F06-114/8</i>	1	ND	B1
10085	LETTER	WEBSTER TO MCFARLANE RE U.S./USSR GRAIN AGREEMENT <i>R 1/15/2008 F06-114/8</i>	1	8/29/1984	B1
10086	MEMO	SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO INFLUENCE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION THROUGH POSSIBLE CANCELLATION OF U.S./USSR GRAIN AGREEMENT <i>PAR 1/15/2008 F06-114/8</i>	2	8/29/1984	B1

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3.2: WHAT WERE THE RESULTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE KAL INCIDENT?

THE MOST AUTHORITATIVE ACCOUNT OF THE ENTIRE INCIDENT IS CONTAINED IN THE REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION (ICAO) WHICH WAS ISSUED IN MARCH 1984. AFTER AN EXHAUSTIVE INVESTIGATION BY AN INTERNATIONAL TEAM OF IMPARTIAL EXPERTS, ICAO FOUND, INTER ALIA, THAT:

-- THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT KAL 007 WAS ON AN INTELLIGENCE MISSION;

-- THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE PILOT OF KAL 007 EVER KNEW HE WAS OFF COURSE OR THAT HE WAS EVER AWARE OF ANY SOVIET EFFORTS TO WARN HIS AIRCRAFT;

-- THE SOVIET UNION DID NOT MAKE "EXHAUSTIVE EFFORTS" TO IDENTIFY THE AIRCRAFT THROUGH IN-FLIGHT VISUAL OBSERVATIONS;

-- THERE WAS NO METHOD FOR U.S. AND JAPANESE CONTROLLERS INDEPENDENTLY TO DETERMINE THE AIRCRAFT'S POSITION;

-- THE AIRCRAFT WAS SHOT DOWN BY AT LEAST ONE OF TWO AIR-TO-AIR MISSILES FIRED FROM A SOVIET INTERCEPTOR, WHOSE PILOT HAD BEEN DIRECTED BY HIS GROUND COMMAND AND CONTROL UNIT TO "TERMINATE THE FLIGHT OF" THE AIRCRAFT;

-- THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT KOREAN AIR LINES INTENTIONALLY SHORT CUT ROUTE RED 20 TO ACHIEVE FUEL OR TIME SAVINGS.

THE ICAO REPORT POSTULATES THAT A FLIGHT CREW NAVIGATIONAL ERROR WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR KAL 007'S DEVIATION FROM ITS INTENDED FLIGHT ROUTE ALONG R-20. ACCORDING TO THE REPORT, EITHER THE HOLDING OF A CONSTANT MAGNETIC HEADING OF 246 DEGREES, OR AN UNDETECTED ERROR OF 10 DEGREES EAST IN LONGITUDE ENTERED INTO THE ON-BOARD INERTIAL NAVIGATION SYSTEM WHILE THE PLANE WAS ON THE GROUND IN ANCHORAGE, WOULD HAVE PRODUCED A FLIGHT PATH TO THE AREA OF KAL 007'S DESTRUCTION BY A SOVIET FIGHTER.

THE U.S., JAPANESE AND SOUTH KOREAN GOVERNMENTS COOPERATED FULLY WITH THE ICAO INVESTIGATION. THE SOVIET UNION REFUSED TO RECEIVE THE INVESTIGATION TEAM AND REPEATEDLY IGNORED REQUESTS OF THE TEAM TO MAKE AVAILABLE THE TECHNICAL EVIDENCE TO SUBSTANTIATE ITS VERSION OF THE TRAGEDY. MOREOVER, THE SOVIETS HARASSED U.S. AND

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JAPANESE SHIPS THAT WERE ENGAGED IN RECOVERY OPERATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS, APPARENTLY IN THE BELIEF THAT ANY WRECKAGE RECOVERY WOULD FURTHER DAMAGE THEIR CLAIMS OF INNOCENCE. ON THE BASIS OF THE ICAO REPORT, THE ICAO COUNCIL IN MARCH VOTED OVERWHELMINGLY TO CONDEMN THE USE OF ARMED FORCE AGAINST KAL 007, WHICH RESULTED IN THE DESTRUCTION OF THE AIRLINER AND THE TRAGIC LOSS OF 269 LIVES. THIS RESOLUTION REFLECTED THE CONSENSUS OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY, WITH WHICH THE U.S. FULLY AGREED.

4. Q. COULD YOU STATE EXACTLY WHAT HAPPENED THE NIGHT KAL WAS SHOT DOWN?

A. AT 1300 GMT, AUGUST 31, A KOREAN AIR LINE BOEING 747 ENROUTE FROM NEW YORK TO SEOUL, KOREA DEPARTED ANCHORAGE, ALASKA WITH 269 PASSENGERS AND CREW ON BOARD. DURING THE FIRST 165 MILES OF ITS FLIGHT IT WAS UNDER US AIR TRAFFIC RADAR CONTROL. THEREAFTER, ANCHORAGE RELIED ON POSITION REPORTS, RADIOED IN BY KAL, IN ORDER TO FOLLOW THE AIRCRAFT'S PROGRESS. THESE POSITION REPORTS FROM KAL 007 CONTINUED TO INDICATE THAT THE AIRLINER'S PILOT THOUGHT HE WAS PROCEEDING PROPERLY ON COURSE. AFTER CHECKING IN AT BETHEL, ALASKA, THE KAL PILOT MADE POSITION REPORTS INDICATING HE WAS FOLLOWING FLIGHT ROUTE R-20, THE NORTHERNMOST INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AIR ROUTE TO EAST ASIA.

AT TIMES KAL RELAYED REPORTS ON ITS POSITION THROUGH KAL 015, A FLIGHT THAT HAD DEPARTED ANCHORAGE 15-20 MINUTES AFTER KAL 007. FOR INSTANCE, WHILE KAL MADE DIRECT RADIO CONTACT WITH ANCHORAGE AT 14:44 IN ORDER TO REPORT ITS POSITION AS OVER NABIE {A NAME FOR A SET OF GEOGRAPHICAL COORDINATES USED AS AN AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL CHECKPOINT ALONG ROUTE R-20}, AT 15:58, KAL 015 RELAYED KAL 007'S POSITION REPORT TO ANCHORAGE. AT 16:12, THE ANCHORAGE INTERNATIONAL FLIGHT SERVICE STATION {IFSS} CALLED TOKYO CENTER AND ADVISED THAT BOTH FLIGHTS, KAL 007 AND KAL 015, WERE BEING TRANSFERRED TO TOKYO'S CONTROL. AT 16:23, KAL 007 CALLED ANCHORAGE IFSS FOR ITS FINAL RADIO CHECK WITH FAA AUTHORITIES: FROM THESE RADIO CHECKS, KAL 007 APPEARED TO BE RIGHT ON TRACK.

IN ACTUALITY, AS DETERMINED BY THE INVESTIGATING TEAM OF THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION, THE KOREAN AIRLINER WAS INCREASINGLY NORTH OF ITS CORRECT COURSE. BY 16:00, THE AIRCRAFT HAD BEEN PICKED UP BY SOVIET MILITARY RADAR AND APPROXIMATELY 40 MINUTES LATER BEGAN TO CROSS THE KAMCHATKA PENINSULA--ALMOST 200 MILES NORTH OF ITS EXPECTED COURSE. THERE, THREE SOVIET SU-15 FIGHTERS SCRAMBLED IN RESPONSE TO THE AIRCRAFT. AS THE

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AIRLINER CROSSED THE COAST LEAVING KAMCHATKA, HOWEVER, THE CLOSEST FIGHTER WAS STILL MORE THAN 25 NAUTICAL MILES BEHIND. THIS WAS OBVIOUSLY MUCH TOO FAR AWAY FOR IT TO HAVE FIRED WARNING SHOTS, ROCKED ITS WINGS, OR TAKEN OTHER PROPER ACTIONS IN AN EFFORT TO SIGNAL THE KOREAN AIRLINER TO CHANGE COURSE OR LAND. REFLECTING THE INADEQUACY OF THE SOVIET RESPONSE, THE KAL 007 PILOT'S RADIO CONTACTS WITH TOKYO AND ANCHORAGE INDICATED THAT HE WAS NEVER AWARE OF THE SOVIET FIGHTERS' PRESENCE.

AS KAL 007 REPORTED ITS POSITION AT 17:08 GMT OVER NIPPI CHECKPOINT, ANOTHER REPORTING POINT ALONG THE R-2D ROUTE, IT WAS ACTUALLY RE-ENTERING INTERNATIONAL AIRSPACE OVER THE SEA OF OKHOTSK. THE SOVIET MILITARY CONTINUED TO FOLLOW ITS PROGRESS. THE KOREAN AIRLINER NOW ESTIMATED IT WOULD REACH NOKKA CHECKPOINT, THE NEXT REPORTING POINT, AT 18:26 GMT -- IRONICALLY, THE PRECISE TIME THAT THE SOVIET SHOOTDOWN OF THE AIRLINER OCCURRED.

AT 1800 GMT, THREE SOVIET FIGHTERS FROM BASES ON SAKHALIN REACTED TO THE AIRLINER'S APPROACH FROM OVER THE SEA OF OKHOTSK. TWO OF THESE WERE SU-15S, THE OTHER A MIG-23. THE FIRST SU-15 AND THE MIG-23 WERE DIRECTED INTO POSITIONS BEHIND THE KOREAN AIRLINER. AT 18:05 GMT, THE SU-15 PILOT WHO EVENTUALLY WOULD SHOOTDOWN THE KOREAN AIRLINER REPORTED, "I SEE IT" AND ASSUMED A POSITION WELL BEHIND THE AIRCRAFT AND ABOUT 1,000 TO 2,000 METERS BELOW. HE THEN PURSUED THE AIRLINER FOR MORE THAN 20 MINUTES BEFORE THE MISSILES WERE ACTUALLY FIRED.

AT 18:10 GMT, THE SOVIET PILOT REPORTED SEEING THE TARGET'S BLINKING {STROBE} LIGHT, AND BY 18:12 SEEING THE TARGET BOTH VISUALLY {IT APPEARS THAT "VISUALLY" APPLIED TO IDENTIFICATION OF THE BLINKING LIGHT} AND ON HIS RADAR. AT 18:13 GMT, THE SU-15 PILOT HAD ACHIEVED RADAR LOCK-ON AND REPORTED THAT THE TARGET WAS NOT RESPONDING TO IFF INTERROGATION. SOVIET IFF {"IDENTIFICATION FRIEND OR FOE"} IS A CODED RADIO SIGNAL TO WHICH PLANES OF SOVIET ALLIES--AND ONLY SOVIET ALLIES--MAKE AN IDENTIFIABLE RESPONSE. WESTERN AIRCRAFT, SUCH AS KAL 007, CANNOT RECEIVE OR RESPOND TO THE IFF SIGNAL.

AT 18:15 GMT, KAL 007 REQUESTED PERMISSION FROM TOKYO TO CLIMB TO A HIGHER ALTITUDE--A ROUTINE PROCEDURE TO CONSERVE FUEL. AT 18:16 GMT, KAL 007 ENTERED SAKHALIN AIRSPACE. AT 18:19 GMT, AS THE SU-15 PILOT WAS CLOSING ON THE TARGET, HE SAID "THEY DO NOT SEE ME." UNKNOWNLY CONFIRMING THIS STATEMENT, THE KAL PILOT, WHO WAS AGAIN IN CONTACT WITH TOKYO AT 18:20 WHEN AIR CONTROLLERS

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APPROVED THE NEW ALTITUDE, MADE NO MENTION OF ANY UNUSUAL ACTIVITY. KAL 007 AT THIS POINT WAS DIRECTLY OVER SAKHALIN ISLAND, AND HEADED IN A SOUTHWESTERLY DIRECTION.

AT 18:20, THE SOVIET PILOT REPORTED FIRING CANNON BURSTS AT THE AIRLINER. IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THESE WERE INTENDED TO HIT KAL 007 OR WERE SIMPLY TO WARN IT. ANOTHER CHECK IN BY KAL 007 TO TOKYO JUST THREE MINUTES LATER MENTIONED NOTHING ABOUT ANOTHER AIRCRAFT OR ABOUT CANNON FIRE. THE SU-15 SEEMS NOT TO HAVE BEEN IN THE CUSTOMARY POSITION--FLYING PARALLEL TO THE PLANE BEING INTERCEPTED--TO FIRE A WARNING SHOT WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN VISIBLE.

AT 18:23, THE SOVIET PILOT REPORTED TO HIS GROUND CONTROLLER THAT HE WOULD NOW "TRY ROCKETS." (THE WORD RAKETA IS USED IN RUSSIAN TO REFER BOTH TO ROCKETS AND MISSILES; IN THIS CASE THE REFERENCE IS TO THE TWO AIR-TO-AIR MISSILES CARRIED BY THE SU-15.) AT 18:25 GMT, THE SOVIET PILOT REPORTED THAT HE WAS EIGHT KILOMETERS FROM THE TARGET AND CLOSING IN.

AT 18:26 GMT, AS KAL 007 WAS EXITING OR HAD EXITED SOVIET AIRSPACE, THE SOVIET SU-15 PILOT REPORTED, "I HAVE EXECUTED THE LAUNCH. THE TARGET IS DESTROYED. I AM BREAKING OFF THE ATTACK."

AT 18:27 GMT, TOKYO CONTROL AT NARITA RECEIVED A FINAL WEAK RADIO CALL FROM KAL 007 WHICH INCLUDED THE PASSAGE: "...PUTER. ALL ENGINE. RAPID DECOMPRESSION. ONE-ZERO-ONE DELTA." THE KAL 007 PILOT UNDERSTOOD HE WAS LOSING CABIN PRESSURE AND APPARENTLY WAS REPORTING ENGINE FAILURE. IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THE PILOT REALIZED THAT KAL 007 HAD BEEN HIT WITH MISSILES. DESPITE REPEATED ATTEMPTS BY TOKYO TO REESTABLISH CONTACT, NO ANSWER WAS EVER RECEIVED.

IN RETROSPECT, IT APPEARS THAT RATHER THAN ESCORT THE KOREAN AIRLINER OUT OF SOVIET AIRSPACE, THE SOVIETS WERE ANXIOUS THAT THE ATTACK BE CARRIED OUT SWIFTLY LEST THE PLANE ESCAPE. NEVER, IN THE TWO AND A HALF HOURS THAT THE SOVIETS TRACKED THE KAL, WAS THERE EVER AN ADEQUATE ATTEMPT TO ACTUALLY IDENTIFY OR WARN THE TARGET WHICH WAS BEING PURSUED:

--DESPITE SOVIET CLAIMS THAT ATTEMPTS WERE MADE TO FORCE THE KOREAN AIRLINER TO LAND OVER KAMCHATKA, THE SOVIET FIGHTERS THERE NEVER GOT CLOSE ENOUGH FOR THE KAL PILOT

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TO HAVE SEEN ANY WARNING SHOTS OR ROCKING OF THE FIGHTERS' WINGS.

--WHILE THE SOVIETS CLAIM TO HAVE USED THE INTERNATIONAL DISTRESS FREQUENCY OF 121.5 MEGACYCLES TO WARN THE KOREAN AIRCRAFT, THERE IS NO INDICATION IN THE TRANSCRIPTS OF THE PILOT'S CONVERSATION WITH NARITA THAT KAL 007 EVER PICKED UP SUCH A SIGNAL. HAD SUCH A SIGNAL INDEED BEEN SENT, JAPANESE CIVILIAN AND MILITARY MONITORS, AS WELL AS OTHER AIRLINERS IN THE VICINITY SUCH AS KAL 015, WOULD ALSO HAVE BEEN ABLE TO PICK IT UP -- NONE DID.

--THE CANNON SHOTS WHICH WERE FIRED AT KAL 007 OVER SAKHALIN ARE THE ONLY POSSIBLE SOVIET ACTIONS WHICH COULD BE CONSTRUED AS A "WARNING." AS ALREADY NOTED, HOWEVER, THE SOVIET PILOT WAS NOT IN THE PROPER POSITION TO FIRE SUCH WARNING SHOTS, AND THE ACTION, IF INTENDED AS A WARNING, WAS DEMONSTRABLY INEFFECTIVE. KAL'S RADIO CONTACTS WITH TOKYO GIVE NO EVIDENCE THE PILOT KNEW ANYTHING WAS WRONG UNTIL AFTER THE MISSILE ATTACK AT 18:26 GMT.

AS ONE FINAL NOTE, IT IS NOT CLEAR THAT IF THE USSR HAD PROPERLY IDENTIFIED THE AIRCRAFT AS A CIVILIAN AIRLINER THAT ITS ACTIONS WOULD HAVE BEEN ANY DIFFERENT. IN 1978, WHEN A KOREAN AIR LINES 707 STRAYED OVER SOVIET TERRITORY NEAR MURMANSK, THE INTERCEPTING SOVIET FIGHTER PILOT POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED THE INTRUDER AS A CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT AND WAS ORDERED TO SHOOT IT DOWN ANYWAY.

5. Q. HOW THEN WOULD YOU RESPOND TO NUMEROUS STORIES WHICH HAVE APPEARED IN THE WAKE OF THE KAL INCIDENT ALLEGING THAT KAL 007 WAS ACTUALLY PART OF AN INTRICATE AND BIZARRE US PLOT TO SPY ON THE USSR?

A. SUCH CHARGES WERE ORGINALLY PUT FORTH BY THE USSR AS PART OF ITS CAMPAIGN TO AVOID RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE INCIDENT AND COVER UP THE MAJOR EMBARRASSMENT IT HAD SUFFERED AS A RESULT OF ITS ACTION. THESE CHARGES HAVE SINCE TAKEN ON A LIFE OF THEIR OWN, GROWING EVER MORE COMPLEX OVER TIME.

THE SOVIET UNION REFUSED TO ADMIT THAT IT HAD SHOT DOWN KAL 007 FOR SIX DAYS AFTER THE ATTACK. DURING THESE FIRST SIX DAYS, HOWEVER, THE SOVIET MEDIA BEGAN A MASSIVE DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGN DESIGNED TO BLAME THE U.S. FOR THE DISASTER AND LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR THEIR EVENTUAL EXPLANATION OF WHY THEY HAD ATTACKED THE KOREAN PLANE. THIS APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN AN EFFORT TO EXONERATE THE SOVIET MILITARY FROM BLAME FOR ITS TRAGIC ACTION, TO TURN

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THE KAL INCIDENT INTO SOLELY A BILATERAL US-SOVIET ISSUE AND TO REDIRECT BLAME TOWARD THE U.S. FOR HAVING ALLEGEDLY ORDERED A "SPY FLIGHT."

THE FIRST VERSION OF THE SPY CHARGES WAS ENUMERATED ON SEPTEMBER 9 BY SOVIET MARSHAL OGARKOV. HE CLAIMED THAT GIVEN THE BEHAVIOR OF THE KOREAN AIRLINER--ITS ROUTE, PROXIMITY TO SOVIET MILITARY INSTALLATIONS, ALLEGED INTERACTION WITH A US RC-135 RECONNAISSANCE PLAN, AND THE KAL PILOT'S UNRESPONSIVENESS TO PURPORTED SOVIET WARNINGS--IT MUST HAVE BEEN ON A SPY FLIGHT. HE PRODUCED NO CONCRETE EVIDENCE BUT HAD MAPS AND OTHER PROPS PURPORTING TO SUPPORT THE SOVIET POSITION. ELEVEN DAYS LATER, THIS STORY WAS FURTHER EXPANDED BY MARSHAL OF AVIATION KIRSANOV, WHO CLAIMED THAT THE KAL FLIGHT WAS COORDINATED WITH AT LEAST FIVE US INTELLIGENCE PLATFORMS, INCLUDING A US "SPY SATELLITE." THESE CHARGES HAVE SINCE BEEN PICKED UP BY SEVERAL WESTERN JOURNALISTS WHO ADDED THEIR OWN TWISTS TO THE STORY: THAT THE US SPACE SHUTTLE WAS INVOLVED, THAT US "ZIONISTS" WERE RESPONSIBLE, AND THAT THERE HAS BEEN A "CONSPIRACY OF SILENCE" ABOUT THE INCIDENT SINCE LAST FALL.

THE US GOVERNMENT HAS DEALT WITH THESE ASSERTIONS, WHICH SEEM TO GROW MORE AND MORE FANTASTIC, MANY TIMES IN THE PAST:

--THE US DOES NOT USE CIVILIAN AIRLINERS FOR ANY INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES.

--THE KAL 007 WAS NOT INVOLVED IN ANY US INTELLIGENCE MISSION. THE ONLY US RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT TO BE WITHIN 400 MILES OF THE KOREAN AIRLINER DURING ITS ENTIRE FLIGHT WAS AN RC-135 WHICH HAD NO CONTACT WITH THE KAL 007.

--THE SOVIET UNION NEVER MADE AN ADEQUATE EFFORT TO IDENTIFY OR WARN THE AIRCRAFT. THE KAL DID NOT BECOME AWARE OF ITS SITUATION UNTIL {UNDERLINE} AFTER {END UNDERLINE} IT HAD ALREADY BEEN SHOT.

BY SENSATIONALIZING THE EVENTS SURROUNDING THE SHOOTDOWN, THE AUTHORS APPEAR PRIMARILY MOTIVATED BY PROMOTING SALES OF THEIR ARTICLES AND, IN THE CASE OF THE USSR, OBFUSCATING THE FACTS SO AS TO DEFLECT THE PUBLIC'S ATTENTION AWAY FROM THE SOVIET ROLE IN THE SHOOTDOWN. THE USSR POSITION ON THE SHOOTDOWN HAS BEEN PARTICULARLY SELF-SERVING. WE WOULD NOTE THAT IN 1973, WHEN ISRAEL HAD SHOT DOWN A LIBYAN PASSENGER AIRLINER, THE USSR TOOK

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THE POSITION THAT CIVILIAN PLANES WERE INVIOATE, EVEN IF THEY WANDERED INTO A WAR ZONE.

THE BEST RESPONSE TO THESE CHARGES IS TO LOOK AGAIN AT WHAT EXACTLY DID HAPPEN THAT NIGHT. THE ESSENCE OF THE STORY IS QUITE SIMPLE: A CIVILIAN AIRLINER STRAYED OFF-COURSE AS OCCASIONALLY HAPPENS, WENT OVER SOVIET TERRITORY THUS INADVERTANTLY VIOLATING SOVIET AIRSPACE, AND SOVIET AUTHORITIES CONSEQUENTLY SHOT IT DOWN AS IT WAS DEPARTING SOVIET AIRSPACE WITHOUT EVER MAKING A POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF THE AIRCRAFT DESPITE NUMEROUS OPPORTUNITIES, AND WITHOUT TAKING ANY EFFECTIVE STEPS TO SIGNAL THE PLANE.

B. Q: IF YOU HAD ALL THIS INFORMATION ON THE SHOOTDOWN, WHY COULDN'T YOU HAVE PREVENTED THE DISASTER?

THE U.S. FIRST BECAME AWARE OF THE KOREAN AIRLINER'S SITUATION ONLY AFTER IT HAD BEEN SHOT DOWN. THE COMPREHENSIVE PICTURE WE NOW HAVE WAS NOT AVAILABLE ON AN IMMEDIATE, "REAL-TIME" BASIS.

AIRLINERS, SUCH AS KAL 007, ON PACIFIC AIR ROUTE R-20 ARE BEYOND AIR TRAFFIC RADAR CONTACT FROM THE TIME THEY HAVE FLOWN 165 MILES BEYOND ANCHORAGE UNTIL THEY ARE WITHIN A COMPARABLE DISTANCE FROM TOKYO'S NARITA AIRPORT IN JAPAN. IN GENERAL THE NAVIGATION OF AN AIRLINER IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE AIRCRAFT CREW, NOT GROUND CONTROL. UNFORTUNATELY, THE SOVIET UNION HAS CONSISTENTLY REFUSED INTERNATIONAL REQUESTS TO INSTALL NAVIGATION AIDS IN THE NORTH PACIFIC TO ASSIST CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT.

THE KOREAN AIRLINER WAS ALSO OUT OF RANGE OF U.S. MILITARY RADAR WHICH DOES NOT TRACK CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT IN ANY CASE. U.S. AIR DEFENSE RADARS HAVE A RANGE SIMILAR TO THAT OF CIVILIAN RADARS -- ABOUT 150-200 MILES. THESE RADARS ARE PRIMARILY DIRECTED AT INCOMING OR INCOUNTRY FLIGHTS, WHICH MUST BE IDENTIFIED. OUTBOUND, CIVIL TRANSOCEANIC FLIGHTS ALSO APPEAR ON U.S. MILITARY RADAR SCREENS IF THEIR ROUTE COMES WITHIN RADAR RANGE. HOWEVER, UNLESS OPERATORS HAD BEEN SPECIALLY ALERTED TO A PARTICULAR FLIGHT, AN OUTBOUND PASSENGER AIRCRAFT, SUCH AS KAL 007, WOULD NOT BE TRACKED.

THE U.S. LARGE PHASED ARRAY RADAR SYSTEM AT SHEMYA IN THE ALEUTIAN ISLANDS DOES NOT HAVE SEARCH AND TRACKING CAPABILITIES AND WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ABLE TO MONITOR KAL 007'S FLIGHT.

aircraft ~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

JAPANESE MILITARY RADAR DETECTED AN UNIDENTIFIED AIRCRAFT CROSSING SAKHALIN BUT HAD NO WAY OF KNOWING IT WAS THE KOREAN AIRLINER. BECAUSE KAL 007 HAD REPORTED THAT IT WAS ON COURSE THROUGHOUT ITS FLIGHT, AND SINCE IT WAS IN NORMAL RADIO CONTACT, THERE WAS NO REASON FOR JAPANESE OR AMERICAN AIR CONTROLLERS TO BELIEVE ANYTHING WAS AMISS.

7. Q: WHAT ABOUT SOVIET ALLEGATIONS THAT KAL RENDEZVOUSED WITH A U.S. RC-135?

A. THERE WAS NO COMMUNICATION OR CONTACT OF ANY KIND BETWEEN THE KAL AND THE RC-135. ON THE DAY OF THE INCIDENT, A U.S. RC-135 WAS ON A ROUTINE FLIGHT PATTERN BETWEEN ALASKA AND THE SOVIET KAMCHATKA PENINSULA. THE CLOSEST THE TWO AIRCRAFT EVER CAME TO EACH OTHER WAS APPROXIMATELY 75 NAUTICAL MILES, HOWEVER, AND THE TWO PLANES NEVER FLEW TOGETHER. THEY WERE NOT CLOSE ENOUGH TO CAUSE A CONVERGENCE OF THE TWO BLIPS ON THE SOVIET RADAR TRACKING SCREEN, AS THE USSR ALLEGES. THE RC-135 WAS NEVER AWARE THAT THE KAL WAS IN THE AREA, NOR SHOULD IT HAVE KNOWN. BY THE TIME KAL 007 WAS INTERCEPTED OVER SAKHALIN, THE RC-135 HAD BEEN ON THE GROUND FOR ABOUT AN HOUR, OVER 1,200 MILES AWAY. IT WAS THE ONLY U.S. RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT TO BE WITHIN 400 MILES OF THE KOREAN AIRLINER DURING KAL 007'S ENTIRE FLIGHT.

THE UNITED STATES CONDUCTS, AND THE SOVIET UNION IS FAMILIAR WITH, ROUTINE PEACETIME MISSIONS USING RC-135S IN INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED AIRSPACE OFF THE KAMCHATKA PENINSULA.

THE RC-135 IS AN UNARMED RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT DESIGNED FROM A MODIFIED BOEING 707 AIRFRAME. THE PURPOSE OF THESE FLIGHTS IS PRIMARILY TO MONITOR SOVIET COMPLIANCE WITH PROVISIONS OF STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS. THE SOVIETS ARE WELL ACQUAINTED WITH THE USUAL FLIGHT PATTERNS AND CAN READILY IDENTIFY THESE MISSIONS.

8. Q: WAS KAL 007 OVERFLYING SOVIET TERRITORY FOR ANY U.S. INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES?

A: ABSOLUTELY NOT. THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT USE CIVILIAN AIRLINERS FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES.

9. Q: WAS KAL 007 WORKING IN COORDINATION WITH A U.S. INTELLIGENCE SATELLITE OR THE SPACE SHUTTLE WHICH WAS THEN IN ORBIT?

A: NO, KAL 007 WAS NOT INVOLVED IN ANY U.S. INTELLIGENCE MISSION. THE U.S. HAS MANY SATELLITES IN ORBIT AND

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AT ANY GIVEN TIME SEVERAL OF THEM ARE OVER OR NEAR INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AIR TRAFFIC ROUTES. INDEED, THE SAME APPLIES TO SOVIET SATELLITES. BUT THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY NO COORDINATION OR COMMUNICATION WITH ANY SATELLITE OR WITH THE SPACE SHUTTLE.

9. Q: WHAT ABOUT SOVIET CHARGES AND SUPPORTING MAPS THAT THE KAL WAS COORDINATED WITH ADDITIONAL U.S. INTELLIGENCE UNITS, INCLUDING TWO RC-135'S, P-3 ORIONS, AN E-3A AWACS, AND A U.S. FRIGATE?

A: MOSCOW'S ALLEGATIONS ON THIS SCORE HAVE BEEN NEITHER CONSISTENT NOR BACKED UP BY ANYTHING OTHER THAN A SERIES OF VAGUE AND CHANGING MAPS. INDEED, THE EVOLUTION OF THE SOVIET CHARGES ACTUALLY RESULTS IN OUTRIGHT CONTRADICTIONS. FOR INSTANCE, CHIEF OF STAFF MARSHALL OGARKOV, IN HIS AUTHORITATIVE PRESS CONFERENCE ON THE INCIDENT NINE DAYS AFTER THE EVENT, NEVER CHARGED THAT THERE WERE "ADDITIONAL" INTELLIGENCE UNITS IN THE AREA. HIS WALL MAP DID NOT REFER TO ANY U.S. PLANES EXCEPT FOR THE RC-135 WHICH THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAD ALREADY ACKNOWLEDGED WAS OFF THE KAMCHATKA PENINSULA. ELEVEN DAYS LATER, MARSHALL OF AVIATION KIRSANOV ANNOUNCED THAT "ADDITIONAL FACTS" HAD BEEN UNCOVERED AND ASSERTED THAT THE KAL WAS COORDINATED WITH A "FERRET-D" SATELLITE, THAT ANOTHER RC-135 WAS OPERATING ALONG THE KURILE ISLANDS, THAT TWO P-3 "ORION" PLANES -- U.S. NAVY ANTI-SUBMARINE AIRCRAFT -- WERE OVER THE SEA OF OKHOTSK AND SEA OF JAPAN RESPECTIVELY, THAT AN E-3A AWACS PLANE WAS "SOMEWHERE" IN THE AREA, AND THAT A U.S. FRIGATE WAS ON DUTY NEAR VLADIVOSTOK. TO SUPPORT HIS CHARGES A NEW MAP WAS PRODUCED WHICH DEPICTED THE COORDINATION BETWEEN THESE UNITS AND THE KAL. THE CHART DID NOT SHOW WHERE THE ALLEGED E-3A AWACS WAS SUPPOSED TO BE OPERATING AND GAVE THE WRONG LOCATION FOR THE RC-135 OPERATING EAST OF KAMCHATKA. LATER VERSIONS OF BOTH OGARKOV'S ORIGINAL MAP AND KIRSANOV'S ACCOMPANYING CHART WERE PREPARED FOR THE ICAO REPORT. NOW, HOWEVER, ANOTHER P-3 WAS ADDED IN THE NORTH BERING SEA, THE RC-135 WHICH WAS PREVIOUSLY DEPICTED AS NORTH OF THE KURILE ISLANDS WAS NOW SHOWN AS OPERATING OFF THE WESTERN COAST OF JAPAN, AND THE AWACS CHARGE WAS DROPPED ALTOGETHER. REFLECTING THE HAZY NATURE OF THE CHARGES, THE SOVIET REPORT SUBMITTED TO ICAO AND INCLUDED AS AN ANNEX TO ICAO'S FINAL REPORT, CHARGES ONLY THAT "A NUMBER OF OTHER U.S. INTELLIGENCE UNITS WERE IN THE AREA."

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THE FACTS ARE THESE: IN ADDITION TO THE KC-135 REFERRED TO IN AN EARLIER QUESTION, THERE WAS A P-3 AIRBORNE FROM 31 AUGUST 1940 GMT TO 2115 GMT OPERATING OVER INTERNATIONAL WATERS NORTH OF 40 DEGREES NORTH. THIS AIRCRAFT NEVER CAME CLOSER THAN 400 NAUTICAL MILES TO KAL 007 AND HAD NO CONNECTION OR COMMUNICATION WITH IT. THERE WERE NO OTHER RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT AIRBORNE NORTH OF 40 DEGREES NORTH LATITUDE IN THE NORTH PACIFIC REGION DURING THE PERIOD IN QUESTION. SOVIET MAPS DEPICTING SUCH AIRCRAFT ARE SIMPLY WRONG.

10. Q: HOW DO YOU RESPOND TO SOVIET CHARGES THAT KAL 007 WAS "ACTING LIKE A SPY PLANE" AND TAKING EVASIVE MANEUVERS?

A: IN THE TRANSCRIPT OF THE CONVERSATION OF KAL 007 WITH THE TOKYO AIR CONTROLLER, THE KOREAN PILOT, ACTING ON THE MISTAKEN ASSUMPTION HE WAS STILL ON COURSE ON ROUTE R-20, REQUESTED AND RECEIVED PERMISSION TO MAKE A NORMAL CHANGE IN ALTITUDE. THE KOREAN PILOT SUBSEQUENTLY RADIOED BACK THAT HE HAD MADE THE CHANGE. THE SOVIET SU-15 ALMOST PASSED ITS QUARRY WHEN KAL 007 SLOWED AS IT CLIMBED TO A HIGHER ALTITUDE. IT IS CLEAR FROM THE CONTROLLERS' TAPE THAT THIS WAS NOT AN EVASIVE MANEUVER, BUT A ROUTINE CHANGE IN ALTITUDE TO CONSERVE FUEL.

11. Q: DID THE KAL 007 DEPART LATE FROM ANCHORAGE?

A: ACCORDING TO THE ICAO REPORT, KAL 007 DEPARTED ANCHORAGE AT 1300 GMT OR 4:00 A.M. LOCAL TIME. ACCORDING TO THE SCHEDULED FLIGHT PLAN, IT SHOULD HAVE DEPARTED AT 3:20 LOCAL TIME. THE DELAYED DEPARTURE WAS DUE TO WIND FACTORS WHICH, IF THE AIRLINER HAD LEFT ON SCHEDULE, WOULD HAVE PUT KAL INTO SEOUL BEFORE ITS SCHEDULED ARRIVAL AT 6:00 A.M. SEOUL TIME. THIS IS A NORMAL PROCEDURE. LANDINGS AT THE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT ARE RESTRICTED BETWEEN 12-MIDNIGHT AND 6 A.M. BECAUSE THERE ARE NO IMMIGRATION OR CUSTOMS SERVICES AVAILABLE DURING THIS TIME.

12. Q: WAS KAL 007 FLYING WITHOUT LIGHTS?

A: THE SOVIET ASSERTION THAT KAL 007 WAS FLYING WITHOUT LIGHTS IS DIRECTLY CONTRADICTED BY THE RECORDED STATEMENTS OF THEIR OWN PILOT. AT HIS SEPTEMBER 9 PRESS CONFERENCE, MARSHAL OGARKOV SOUGHT TO EXPLAIN AWAY THIS ISSUE BY ALLEGING THAT A SOVIET PILOT SAW THE LIGHTS OF ANOTHER SOVIET PLANE REACTING IN THE AREA. FROM THE CONVERSATIONS OF THE PILOTS OVER SAKHALIN, IT IS

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ABSOLUTELY CLEAR THAT THE LIGHTS REFERRED TO WERE THOSE OF KAL 007 VIEWED BY SOVIET PILOT 805 WHO FIRED THE MISSILES. AT 18:21 GMT, HE SAID, "THE TARGET'S (STROBED) LIGHT IS BLINKING. I HAVE ALREADY APPROACHED THE TARGET TO A DISTANCE OF ABOUT TWO KILOMETERS."

13. Q: WAS THE "BLACK BOX" EVER FOUND?

A: DESPITE THE EXTENSIVE SEARCH CARRIED OUT BY THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN, WE NEVER FOUND THE BLACK BOX. WE HAD INVITED AN ICAO REPRESENTATIVE TO TAKE POSSESSION OF THE BLACK BOX SHOULD IT BE FOUND. HE WAS THERE. THE BOX WAS NOT. WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE THAT THE SOVIET UNION FOUND THE BLACK BOX EITHER. HAD THEY FOUND IT, AND HAD THE DATA IT CONTAINED SUPPORTED THEIR VIEW OF EVENTS LEADING TO THE KAL SHOOTDOWN, THEY WOULD HAVE PUBLICIZED SUCH INFORMATION.

14. Q: WHY DIDN'T THE U.S. CONDUCT ITS OWN INVESTIGATION OF THE SHOOTDOWN? IS THE U.S. CONCEALING SOMETHING?

A: THE SHOOTDOWN OF KAL 007 WAS AN OFFENSE AGAINST THE SAFETY OF INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION. IT REQUIRED ACTION BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, NOT UNILATERALLY BY THE U.S. THE U.S. COOPERATED FULLY WITH OTHER STATES AND WITH ICAO'S EXHAUSTIVE INVESTIGATION OF THE INCIDENT. THE U.S. TURNED OVER ALL RELEVANT MATERIALS TO THE INVESTIGATION TEAM AND U.S. CIVIL AVIATION PERSONNEL WERE INTERVIEWED. ICAO OBSERVERS ACCOMPANIED THE US-JAPANESE SEARCH AND RESCUE EFFORT TO FIND THE WRECKAGE OF THE PLANE AND THE "BLACK BOX." ON BOTH OCCASIONS WHEN THE SOVIETS TURNED OVER DEBRIS TO THE U.S. AND JAPAN ON SAKHALIN ISLAND, ICAO OBSERVERS WERE PRESENT ON THE SHIP TO INSPECT IT.

THE U.S. HAS BEEN CANDID AND OPEN IN ITS DISCUSSION OF THE KAL INCIDENT. WE HAVE MADE UNPRECEDENTED RELEASES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION, INCLUDING THE TRANSCRIPTS OF THE SOVIET PILOT'S CONVERSATION WITH GROUND CONTROL. OUR OPEN APPROACH ON THE KAL INCIDENT STANDS IN SHARP CONTRAST WITH THE SOVIET UNWILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE WITH ICAO OR PROVIDE ANY EVIDENCE FOR ITS CASE, AND WITH ITS FLAGRANT AND CONTINUING EFFORT TO COVER UP THE FACTS ABOUT THE INCIDENT THROUGH A STEADY FLOW OF INNUENDO AND DISINFORMATION.

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OC/T: PLEASE ADD ADDITIONAL CLEARANCES:

NSA: [REDACTED]

INR: RBAFAZ

CIA: [REDACTED]

JCS: DENGLUND

FOIA(b)(2),(3)

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

February 27, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*
SUBJECT: Soviet Shipping to Pick up Grain

Regarding your note to Richard Levine of Feb. 24, my understanding that the requirement that Soviet ships apply 14 days in advance before entering U.S. ports (without assurance that permission will be granted) is the result of our allowing the Maritime agreement with the Soviets expire.

The 14-day request requirement is standard in the absence of a bilateral agreement. From 1972 until (I believe) 1982, we had a Maritime Agreement with the Soviets which gave them the right to enter 40 specified U.S. ports (established on the basis of reciprocity, with regard to Defense sensitivity) on four days advance notice. This agreement provided for shipment of a third of the grain trade in U.S. bottoms (with the Soviets picking up the tab for the differential cost) and a third in Soviet bottoms. So long as we had excess ships available for the trade, it was advantageous to us, since it in effect forced the Soviets to subsidize our merchant marine.

My understanding is that we did not renew the agreement when it last expired, in part because of Poland, and in part because we no longer had the excess tonnage to use in this trade.

Unless and until there is an economic benefit to us from such an agreement, I would strongly advise against one. The Soviets derive substantial benefits, since the four-day notice rule can be used to enter the market for carriage to third countries, and they pick up considerable hard currency in this trade. (Under the 14-day request rule, they are not able to assure shippers in advance that their ships will be allowed to pick up a scheduled cargo in a particular port.)

cc: Levine, Fortier, Robinson

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 806-114/8# 10077BY 605 NARA DATE 9/30/08

MSG FROM: NSJMP --CPUA TO: Richard Levine
To: Richard Levine

+02/24/84 10:30:07

-- ~~SECRET~~ --

NOTE FROM: JOHN POINDEXTER

SUBJECT: Soviet Shipping to Pick Up Grain

This morning the VP met with American corn growers who had met earlier with an official at the Soviet Embassy. The growers report that the mood this year was much more upbeat than the mood displayed last year by the same man. They discussed various things that could be done to improve agricultural relations. The Soviet raised the issue of reducing the 14 day waiting period to clear Soviet ships into US ports. The Soviets consider this discriminatory. What are the facts?

copy to: Matlock, Fortier, Robinson

cc: NSRMK --CPUA BOB KIMMITT

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/8-#10078

BY LOI NARA DATE 9/30/08

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

February 27, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JS*

SUBJECT: More on Corn Growers

Regarding your memo of Feb. 24, I see no objection to an invitation to the Soviet Minister of Agriculture to visit the U.S. I'm not sure this will do much for sales, but it would look good domestically this year. It could also be used to revive some projects which are of broader interest to us, such as 4-H sponsored exchanges of young people. I'll check out with State and get back to you.

On the matter of the Soviet agricultural counselor's travel, this is purely a matter of reciprocity. We let him travel so long as our agricultural attaches have no problems. But they often do have problems, and their travel is crucial to obtaining accurate crop forecasts. (The data they obtain on the spot is correlated with data obtained by other means, and fed into a computer modeling program; without the on-the-spot data, the predictions are much less accurate.) Because of the importance of our predictions of the Soviet crop for markets here, I do not believe we should relent on our insistence on reciprocity.

cc: Bob Kimmitt

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-714/8# 10079

BY HOJ NARA DATE 9/30/08~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

MSG FROM: NSJMP --CPUA
To: Jack Matlock

TO: Jack Matlock

+02/24/84 10:35:19

-- ~~SECRET~~ --

NOTE FROM: JOHN POINDEXTER

SUBJECT: More on Corn Growers

The VP also reports that the Soviet suggested that we invite the Soviet Agricultural Minister to the US to help increase grain sales. Check out this idea. The Soviet also suggested that we allow the agriculture counselor to travel to the farming areas of this country. The growers correctly pointed out that the problem there is reciprocity. The Soviet said maybe they could do something about that.

cc: NSRMK --CPUA BOB KIMMITT

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/8#10080
BY h2I NARA DATE 9/30/08

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Jack,
This will bring
you up-to-date on
KAL public handling.

Steve

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

August 9, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT B. SIMS

FROM: STEVEN E. STEINER *Steve*
SUBJECT: Public Handling of KAL Anniversary

The following is a readout on the meeting at State which I attended yesterday afternoon.

Actions Taken: Romberg called NBC to tell them that we believe it was inappropriate to give so much attention to the coming article in The Nation. He also provided to NBC copies of the exchange of letters between the article's author and the Department. These items are at Tab I for you. The text of the NBC interview with the author is at Tab II.

On July 21, State sent a detailed cable to all posts providing background and guidance on this issue. The Soviet Desk at State is now working on a version of this for a possible ~~copy~~ *op-ed* piece and a version for a possible public handout. The cable is at Tab III.

The issue did not come up at State's Noon Briefing, ~~at State~~. It is felt there that correspondents based at State are "tired" of the story.

Possibilities for Future Action: ABC plans to cover this issue on its 20-20 Program on August 30. Rick Burt will appear on this. It is my understanding that this has been already cleared with the White House. I stressed to people at the meeting the need for prior White House clearance, i.e., through you, on any national media appearances -- particularly on an issue as sensitive as this.

We are also looking at other possible actions as we approach the anniversary:

- Getting other spokesmen on TV;
- An ~~op-ed~~ *op-ed* piece;
- A volunteer ~~statement~~ *statement*, presumably from State, on September 1;
- Backgrounding selected U.S., and possibly foreign, correspondents prior to the anniversary;

-- Providing a handout to the press giving a detailed account of the incident, or alternatively, letting one or two selected correspondents read and take notes from such an account. (It seems clear, however, that no new information can be declassified.)

-- Encouraging some private persons to appear on national media in support of our case -- ^{Eggenberger} was cited as someone who could be particularly helpful.

Three concerns were noted. First, people who deal with the media on this issue should know the issue thoroughly and should be very careful not to undermine our credibility by going beyond the evidence which has been released. Second, we should be careful not to create media events which will simply give more play to articles such as Pearson's. Third, we have to take care to avoid complicating the pending case being brought in court by KAL survivors; apparently there is some kind of a "muzzle" order from Justice in this regard -- State is seeking clarification from its lawyers and Justice.

It was generally agreed at the meeting that the best approach for dealing with the media would involve making the following points: (1) the facts are clear, they have been put on the record, and confirmed in the ICAO reporting; (2) clearly, some of the attacks being made now seem to have some connection to the very widespread Soviet disinformation campaign in regard to this and other issues, such as arms control, the Olympics, etc; (3) Aeroflot itself has been farther off course at times and has not been shot down.

Planning for Your Meeting: I noted that you would have a small interagency meeting on Monday morning and asked that State prepare for us an informal paper providing a status report on media problems we are facing and recommendations for how to deal with them in the context of the coming anniversary. State agreed to do this, and the Soviet Desk is taking the lead. They hope to have something to us informally in advance of your meeting.

Could you please advise as to whom you plan to invite to the meeting? Gil Robinson asked that he be included. Also, the Deputy Director of the Soviet Desk, Lynn Pascoe, would like to be included; he has been very instrumental from the start in our handling of this issue. Pascoe also suggested that for your meeting, ~~he~~ ^{he} ~~as~~ a possible spokesman, ~~you~~ you may wish to include Don Segner of FAA, who he said is an authoritative spokesman competent on the technical aspects of the issue. Also, could you please advise as to time and place of the meeting?

Attachments

Pearson-Niles Exchange of Letters

Text of Today interview, August 8, 84

State Cable of July 21, 84
Press Guidance of August 8, 84 regarding Pearson interview

cc: Walt Raymond
Jack Matlock

9
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Bob,

The State reply
apparently was not
received in time
to be used in the
article. Actually,
Pearson didn't give
them much advance
notice.

Steve



4 United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

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August 3, 1984

Mr. David E. Pearson
Department of Sociology
Yale University
P.O. Box 1965
New Haven, CT 06520

Dear Mr. Pearson:

I am writing in reply to your letters of July 24 to Secretary Shultz and Assistant Secretary Burt in which you asked several questions regarding the Soviet shootdown of KAL 007.

As you know, the shootdown of KAL 007 was thoroughly investigated by the International Civil Aviation Organization in Montreal. We are sending you a copy of that report, which we hope you will find useful. Officials of this Department are also willing to meet with you to provide background information if you wish. Such a meeting can be arranged by calling the Office of Soviet Union Affairs at (202) 632-3738.

The paragraphs below are keyed to the questions in your letter:

1. The RC-135 was never closer to KAL 007 than 75 nautical miles.

2. No U.S. military radars or early warning systems track outbound civilian airliners. None of them monitored the flight of KAL 007 nor was it their mission to do so.

3. The first indication the U.S. government had that KAL 007 was off course, or that there was any problem connected with the flight, was when Japanese civil air authorities instituted emergency procedures aimed at determining the whereabouts of the plane after losing contact with KAL 007 at 1827 GMT, when, as it tragically turned out, it was shot down. These procedures included checks with the Japanese Self-Defense Force, which maintains radar and other facilities in the northern part of the Japanese islands. Japanese aircraft and naval vessels mounted a search mission along the programmed flight path of KAL 007. They were soon joined by units of the U.S. Navy's Seventh Fleet and the 5th U.S. Air Force, based in Japan.

4. a) The U.S. government never had and does not now possess communications from Soviet ground control stations to the Soviet pilots who scrambled to intercept KAL 007.

b) The Soviet pilots' communications with Soviet ground control and those of communications between KAL 007 and Tokyo Narita air traffic control were given to us by the Japanese government and released with their permission. This is the "Japanese material" to which you refer.

5. You are reading implications into our points that are simply not there. The fact is that the first indication that any U.S. government agency had that KAL 007 was off course was after it had been shot down and Japanese civil air authorities had instituted emergency procedures.

6. KAL 007 was not involved in any way whatsoever in any U.S. intelligence mission.

7. See response to question # 3.

I hope this information will be of use to you.

Sincerely,

Thomas M.T. Niles
Acting Assistant Secretary
for European Affairs

PEARSON

LETTER

8421590

3

24 July 1984

Mr. George Shultz
Secretary of State

Dear Mr. Shultz:

The White House suggested I direct the following questions to the Department of State for comment. I am about to publish an extensive article on the downing of Korean Air Lines Flight 007 in The Nation magazine, and it is appropriate to give the Department of State the opportunity to respond to several of the key points raised in the article.

1. On 4 September 1983, the White House issued a statement regarding the USAF RC-135 Elint aircraft which was in the vicinity of KAL 007 on the night of 31 August-1 September of last year. This was published in the Department of State Bulletin, October 1983, Vol. 83, No. 2079, p. 6. In part the statement read, and I quote,

The closest point of approach (for RC-135 and KAL 007) was approximately 75 nautical miles, while the U.S. aircraft was in its mission orbit.

I find this statement incomplete since, of course, the "mission orbit" of an RC-135 is a very specific flight path. What the statement leaves open is the possibility that the two aircraft passed closer than 75 nautical miles while the U.S. aircraft was outside of its mission orbit.

I would like to inquire, Mr. Shultz, did the RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft (that was operating in the Bering Sea off the northeast coast of Kamchatka Peninsula north of the Commander Islands on the night of 31 August-1 September 1983, and that passed close to KAL Flight 007 during the time period 1530-1630 GMT on August 31) ever come, at any time, closer than 75 nautical miles to the Korean airliner?

2. It was reported in the New York Times on 2 September that the State Department was not notified that KAL 007 was off course until Wednesday night, August 31, between 10:00 and 10:30 p.m. EDT. Since the State Department would have received information through its Office of External Research, and since External Research monitors the WWMCCS system, the delay indicates that WWMCCS was not fully operational at the time of the incident. Since the State Department's own testimony suggests a WWMCCS failure of many hours, so long a delay clearly indicates one of the most serious failures of the system in history.

Mr. Shultz, were any of the WWMCCS main computers (at any location in the Far East, the Pacific, or CONUS) down, disconnected, or otherwise inoperative during 24 hour period surrounding the downing of KAL 007 in such a way that the Department of State did not receive information through WWMCCS for any length of time?

3. Regarding when President Reagan was informed of the incident, State Department statements have consistently referred only to what the State Department

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Mr. George Shultz
24 July 1984
(continued, p. 2):

did and when it did it. Of course, the President does not rely exclusively on State nor on WWMCCS for timely information. Since many of the intelligence assets in Alaska, the Pacific, and the Far East use NSA channels for transmissions to the NCA, these too must be considered in determining when the President and Secretary of Defense were informed.

DIN/DSSCS surely operated more efficiently than WWMCCS, providing the Department of Defense and the White House, among other recipients, with far timelier information than has publicly been acknowledged. To contend that no agency or individual in the U.S. government, intelligence services or military services knew of KAL 007's deviation from course until hours after its downing is to argue that the most serious failure in early warning and C³I in history occurred that night, surely an important point if true.

My question, Mr. Shultz, is what was the earliest time that the President and the Secretary of Defense received information regarding any aspect of the flight of KAL 007 from any individual or agency of the government, intelligence services, or military services?

4. On 7 September 1983, the White House released a statement that, contrary to numerous authoritative reports (for instance in the New York Times, the Washington Post, and from the Japanese Broadcasting Corporation) the United States "did not have any tapes of radio transmissions from Soviet ground control stations to the pilots of the Soviet fighter planes involved in the downing of KAL 007."

Several points in this statement are confusing. This statement is very specific, referring only to a limited set of communications and only to tapes, not to other forms of recording, data storage, or transcripts. To whom the general term "United States" refers is also not made clear. My questions are as follows:

a) Does any agency of the U.S. government, the intelligence services, or military services have in its possession the transmissions of Soviet ground control stations to Soviet pilots who scrambled to intercept KAL 007 over Sakhalin Island on tape, printed material, on disk, or on any other form of recording or data storage?

b) The Washington Post reported on 31 December 1983 that Japanese radars and signals intelligence equipment tie into the U.S. system, making Japanese interceptions of Soviet transmissions available to the U.S. military and intelligence services. Why hasn't the Japanese material been made available?

5. In a public statement, you said that the United States was not aware that the Korean airliner was in jeopardy until it was shot down. This is confusing, since this is not a denial that U.S. agencies were aware of the deviant course of Flight 007, only

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Mr. George Shultz
24 July 1984
(Continued, p. 3):

that it was not believed that the airliner would be shot down. As before, this statement also does not specify to whom the very general term "United States" refers.

Would you comment, please, as to the earliest time that any governmental agency, military service, or intelligence service knew of Flight 007's deviation from course?

6. The State Department has consistently claimed that KAL 007 was not on an intelligence-gathering mission. This is confusing, since it is very likely that the Korean jetliner would not be used for the actual gathering of information. Other sea, land, or air-based intercept platforms would do the gathering, as indeed they did.


My question, sir, is this: Was Flight 007 intentionally sent or permitted to enter Soviet territory by any U.S. government official or agency, or by any official or agencies of any other government acting on instructions of U.S. officials or agencies?

7. What was the earliest moment that National Security Adviser Clark received information regarding KAL 007 from any governmental, military, or intelligence source?

Anticipating that your busy schedule does not permit a written response to these questions, I will have Ms. Katrina vanden Heuvel from The Nation call your office in the near future in the hope of receiving your answers. Should you care to contact Ms. vanden Heuvel, the address is c/o The Nation, 72 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10011, telephone 212-242-8400.

I would like to thank you in advance, Mr. Shultz, for your assistance in this very serious matter. I am confident that your reputation for support of democratic process and your sense of public responsibility will argue towards an honest and complete discussion of the questions raised in this correspondence. With your help, the remaining mysteries surrounding the tragic downing of Korean Air Lines Flight 007 may be explained, and the issue finally laid to rest.

Yours Sincerely,



David E. Pearson
Department of Sociology
Yale University
P.O. Box 1965
New Haven, CT 06520

2 15
INTERVIEW WITH DAVID PEARSON - A DOCTORAL CANDIDATE IN
SOCIOLOGY AT YALE WHO WROTE AN ARTICLE TO BE PUBLISHED NEXT
WEEK BY THE NATION ON KAL

GUMBEL: ESSENTIALLY WHAT'S WRONG WITH THE U.S. POSITION ON KAL 007?

PEARSON: I THINK WHAT WE SEE AS WE READ THE U.S. ACCOUNT OF THE INCIDENT IS SELECTIVE PROVISION OF EVIDENCE AND OMISSION OF CRITICAL EVIDENCE WHICH COULD ESTABLISH ON ALL FRONTS THE NATURE OF THE ROLE OF U.S. AGENCIES, THE ROLE OF THE U.S. AIRCRAFT WHICH WE KNOW WAS FLYING IN THE AREA AS KOREAN AIRLINES FLEW TOWARDS SOVIET TERRITORY, AND I THINK THE NATURE OF WHAT CAN ONLY BE CALLED THE KOREAN AIRLINES COVER-UP SUBSEQUENT TO THE INCIDENT.

GUMBEL: SO RIGHT UP FRONT LET'S ESTABLISH WHAT ARE YOU CHARGING U.S. OFFICIALS WITH, A COVER-UP AND WHAT ELSE?

PEARSON: WELL I THINK A COVER-UP IS A STRONG TERM. I THINK WHAT WE SEE AGAIN ARE CERTAIN INFORMATION WHICH COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE WITHOUT SACRIFICING ANY LEGITIMATE NATIONAL SECURITY NEEDS HAS BEEN WITHHELD FROM PUBLIC SCRUTINY.

GUMBEL: WHY ISN'T IT POSSIBLE THAT KAL FLIGHT 007 WAS OFF COURSE? WHY WON'T YOU BUY THAT?

PEARSON: I THINK THE AIR NAVIGATION COMMISSION SUMMED THAT UP VERY SUCCINCTLY IN THEIR ADDENDUM TO THE ICAO REPORT, THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION REPORT. AND THEY SAID THAT ALL OF THE SCENARIOS, THE POSSIBLE DEVIATION FROM COURSE ACCORDING TO A, FOR EXAMPLE, TAKING A GREAT CIRCLE ROUTE, THE INCORRECT SETTING OF MAGNETIC HEADING, AND SO ON. THAT ALL OF THESE COULD NOT EXPLAIN THE COURSE ACTUALLY FLOWN BY THE JETLINER.

GUMBEL: WE HAVE A MAP AVAILABLE THAT SHOWS WHAT WAS THE INTENDED COURSE AND THE COURSE THAT WAS ACTUALLY FLOWN. IS IT NOT POSSIBLE THAT THE READINGS WERE OFF WITHIN THE COCKPIT, THAT THIS WAS JUST PILOT ERROR?

- 2 -

PEARSON: NO, THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY OF THAT.

GUMBEL: WHY NOT?

PEARSON: AND THE REASON BECAUSE RECONSTRUCTIONS BY THE AIR NAVIGATION COMMISSION SHOWED THAT IN EVERY INSTANCE THOSE SCENARIOS COULD NOT ACCOUNT FOR THE FLIGHT PATH SHOWN TO DESCRIBE PRECISELY WHY IT WOULD BE A VERY TECHNICAL DISCUSSION AND I THINK WE JUST HAVE TO TURN BACK TO THE ORIGINAL REPORTS.

GUMBEL: YOU HAVE ALSO CONTENDED THAT U.S. OFFICIALS KNEW ALONG THAT THE PLANE WAS LOST. HOW CAN YOU BE SO CERTAIN OF THAT?

PEARSON: ALL RIGHT, THERE ARE THREE IMPORTANT POINTS TO MAKE HERE. THE ONLY POSSIBILITIES ARE THE FOLLOWING: I) THAT THERE WAS NO KNOWLEDGE AT ALL BY U.S. OFFICIALS AND THIS MEANS AN EXTRAORDINARY WEALTH OF INTELLIGENCE AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT, HARDWARE, AND PERSONNEL IN THE AREA SOMEHOW DIDN'T SEE A 747 STRAYING MILES AND MILES OFFCOURSE.

GUMBEL: BUT THAT'S POSSIBLE?

PEARSON: IN FACT IT'S NOT POSSIBLE UNLESS WE'RE TO ADMIT THE LARGEST SINGLE FAILURE IN COMMUNICATIONS COMMAND CONTROL IN INTELLIGENCE AND EARLY WARNING IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES.

GUMBEL: O.K., SO YOU'RE SAYING THE RADAR FACILITIES WERE IN PLACE SO THAT U.S. OFFICIALS HAD TO KNOW THE PLANE WAS OFFCOURSE?

PEARSON: NOT ONLY RADAR FACILITIES BUT ALSO SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE FACILITIES AT SHAMIA [SP?] ISLANDS IN THE ALEUTIANS, ON MAINLAND ALASKA, AND ON THE NORTHERN JAPANESE ISLAND OF HOKKAIDO.

GUMBEL: WE NOTED A LITTLE BIT EARLIER IN THE REPORT THAT JANE WAS TALKING ABOUT THAT AN RC 135, A U.S. RECONNAISSANCE PLANE, WAS IN THE AREA. WHAT ROLE DO YOU CLAIM IT PLAYED WITH 007?

PEARSON: WELL, THE EVIDENCE SUGGESTS THAT KOREAN AIRLINES FLIGHT 007 MADE A SLIGHT COURSE CHANGE WHEN IT WAS IN PROXIMITY TO THE RC 135. I THINK THAT IS INDEED SUGGESTIVE. AND ALSO THE U.S. STATEMENTS REGARDING THE RC 135 HAVE BEEN INCOMPLETE TO BE KIND. I THINK AN EXAMPLE OF THAT WOULD BE THE U.S. STATEMENT, AND I QUOTE WAS, "THE CLOSEST APPROACH OF THE TWO AIRCRAFT WAS 75 NAUTICAL MILES WHILE THE U.S. AIRCRAFT WAS IN ITS MISSION ORBIT." A MISSION ORBIT IS A VERY SPECIFIC FLIGHT PATH AND WHAT THAT LEAVES OPEN IS A POSSIBILITY THAT THE AIRLINER CAME MUCH CLOSER TO THE U.S. AIRCRAFT WHILE IT WAS OUTSIDE OF ITS MISSION ORBIT.

GUMBEL: SO WHAT IS IT YOU'RE SUGGESTING? WHY EVEN ASSUMING THAT U.S. OFFICIALS KNEW THE PLANE WAS OFFCOURSE, WHY WOULD THEY LET IT STAY OFFCOURSE? WHAT DID THEY HAVE TO GAIN?

PEARSON: THAT BRINGS US TO OUR TWO OTHER POSSIBILITIES. THE FIRST ONE WOULD BE LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OF U.S. AGENCIES. I THINK THAT IS NOT A CREDIBLE EXPLANATION. THE SECOND ONE IS THAT U.S. MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICES WERE COLLECTING THAT INFORMATION AND SIMPLY DIDN'T MAKE IT AVAILABLE TO THE CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES.

GUMBEL: BUT AGAIN, WHAT DID THEY HAVE TO GAIN BY ALLOWING THE SOVIET AND THIS AIRLINER TO CONTINUE TO STRAY OVER SOVIET AIRSPACE?

PEARSON: THE BEST RESPONSE TO THAT IS PRECISELY WHAT OCCURRED. ONE OF THE LARGEST INTELLIGENCE COUPS IN HISTORY OCCURRED THAT NIGHT.

GUMBEL: WHAT KIND OF AN INTELLIGENCE COUP?

PEARSON: BY THAT I MEAN, U.S. SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE AND RADAR EQUIPMENT MONITORED THE SOVIETS TURNING ON VIRTUALLY EVERY PIECE OF ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT IN THE FAR EAST. THEY MONITORED COMMUNICATIONS PATTERNS FOR THE KEMCHECK [SP?] PENINSULA OVER SAKHALIN ISLAND, BETWEEN THOSE TWO LOCATIONS, AND BETWEEN THOSE LOCATIONS AND REGIONAL COMMAND CENTERS, AND BETWEEN THOSE LOCATIONS AND MOSCOW.

18

-4-

GUMBEL: ONE PENTAGON OFFICIAL REACTING TO YOUR ARTICLE HAS CALLED IT ABSOLUTELY ABSURD AND IN THE PAST WHEN CHARGES HAVE COME UP LIKE THIS CASPAR WEINBERGER HAS SAID THOSE WHO ARE SAYING SUCH THINGS HAVE BOUGHT THE TOTAL SOVIET PACKAGE OF LIES.

PEARSON: I THINK WHAT WE NEED TO DO AT THAT POINT IS TO CALL FOR CERTAIN EVIDENCE THAT IS AVAILABLE TO THE UNITED STATES WHICH COULD ESTABLISH WITHOUT ANY DOUBT THE NATURE OF THE ROLE OF THE RC 135 AND THE ACTIVE AND ONGOING KNOWLEDGE OF U.S. AGENCIES OF THE FLIGHT OF 007.

GUMBEL: BUT THEY WOULD CERTAINLY COMPROMISE ITS NATIONAL SECURITY BY RELEASING THAT INFORMATION?

PEARSON: IN EVERY INSTANCE, THE U.S. HAS MADE PUBLIC INFORMATION WHICH ALREADY PROVIDES IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN KNOWLEDGE OF OUR CAPABILITIES. THE SELECTIVE WITHHOLDING OF FURTHER INFORMATION ON THAT BASIS SIMPLY IS NOT A SOUND ARGUMENT.

GUMBEL: LET'S FACE FACTS. YOU'RE A DOCTORAL CANDIDATE, YOU HAVE NO GOVERNMENT EXPERIENCE, YOU'RE NOT AN INSIDER IN NATIONAL SECURITY. WHY SHOULD ANYONE GIVE A GREAT DEAL OF CREDENCE TO THIS?

PEARSON: WELL, I THINK THE BEST ARGUMENT FOR THAT IS WITH THE INFORMATION IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN IS IT POSSIBLE TO UNDERSTAND LARGER EVENTS WITH A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF DEDICATION, AND WITH A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF INSIGHT? AND I THINK FOR ALL OF US WITHIN THE COUNTRY, IF WE CAN'T HAVE SUFFICIENT INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO US TO BE ABLE TO ASCERTAIN THE NATURE OF LARGE PUBLIC EVENTS, THEN I THINK WE'RE INDEED IN SAD STRAITS.

22

(4)

PRESS GUIDANCE KAL 007

Q. What about Pearson's charge that KAL was an intelligence coup?

A. This is categorically incorrect. The KAL flight was a civilian flight. It was not a spy flight. It was not sent or ordered to penetrate Soviet airspace for intelligence purposes nor was there any effort to capitalize on its misfortune.

Q. What about Pearson's charge that the US somehow covered up events surrounding the shootdown of KAL-007?

A. The shootdown was an incident of international concern. The appropriate response, therefore, was to let the international community conduct the investigation. The ICAO did just that and issued a report last December 30. The ICAO report concluded that there is no evidence that KAL 007 was on an intelligence mission. Further, it stated that there is no evidence that the pilot of KAL 007 ever knew he was off course or that he was aware of any Soviet efforts to warn his aircraft.

Q. What about the charge that the US should have been aware the plane was off course?

A. No U.S. military radars or early warning systems track outbound civilian airliners. None of them monitored the flight of KAL 007 nor was it their mission to do so. The responsibility for the safe navigation of civilian flights lies solely with the aircraft commander.

Q. When was the US first aware that KAL 007 had been shot down?

A. The first indication the U.S. government had that KAL 007 was off course, or that there was any problem connected with the flight, was when Japanese civil air authorities instituted emergency procedures aimed at determining the whereabouts of the plane after losing contact with KAL 007 at 1827 GMT, when, as it tragically turned out, it had been shot down.

Q. What about the RC-135?

A. The RC-135 was never closer to KAL 007 than 75 nautical miles. Moreover, it had been sitting on the ground in Alaska for about an hour when the KAL was being intercepted over Sakhalin Island.

drafted: EUR/SOV/ECON: TRMaertens *TM*
0000b x23071 00/00/84

cleared: EUR/SOV: BLPascoe
EUR: RMPalmer
PM: Capt. TMiller } *by TM*

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Message:

This is from the NY Times.
State is months behind
printing agreements.

From: Martha Brown

35
File: US-USSR-
~~long~~ Grain Agreement
Grain

12TH STORY of Level 2 printed in FULL format.

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August 26, 1983, Friday, Late City Final Edition

SECTION: Section D; Page 4, Column 1; Financial Desk

LENGTH: 859 words

HEADLINE: TEXT OF AMERICAN-SOVIET AGREEMENT

DATELINE: MOSCOW, Aug. 25

BODY:

Following is the text of the American-Soviet grain agreement signed today by Agriculture Secretary John R. Block of the United States and Foreign Trade Minister Nikolai S. Patolichev of the Soviet Union:

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, recalling the "basic principles of relations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" of May 29, 1972, and other relevant agreements between them, desiring to strengthen long-term cooperation between the two countries on the basis of mutual benefit and equality, mindful of the importance which the production of food, particularly grain, has for the peoples of both countries, recognizing the need to stabilize trade in grain between the two countries and affirming their conviction that cooperation in the field of trade will contribute to overall improvement of relations between the two countries, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Government of the U.S.A. and the Government of the U.S.S.R. hereby enter into an Agreement for the purchase and sale of wheat and corn for supply to the U.S.S.R. To this end, during the period that this Agreement is in force, except as otherwise agreed by the Parties, the Soviet foreign trade organizations shall purchase from private commercial sources, for shipment in each 12-month period beginning Oct. 1, 1983, nine million metric tons of wheat and corn grown in the U.S.A. In doing so, the Soviet foreign trade organizations, if interested, may purchase, on account of the said quantity, soybeans and/or soybean meal produced in the U.S.A., in the proportion of one ton of soybeans and/or soybean meal for two tons of grain. In any case, the minimum annual quantities of wheat and corn shall be no less than four million metric tons each.

The Soviet foreign trade organizations may increase the nine million metric ton quantity above without consultations by as much as three million metric tons of wheat and/or corn for shipment in each 12-month period beginning Oct. 1, 1983.

The Government of the U.S.A. shall employ its good offices to facilitate and encourage such sales by private commercial sources.

Purchases/sales of commodities under this Agreement will be made at the market price prevailing for these products at the time of purchase/sale and in accordance with normal commercial terms.

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ARTICLE II

During the term of this Agreement, except as otherwise agreed by the Parties, the Government of the U.S.A. shall not exercise any discretionary authority available to it under United States law to control exports of commodities purchased for supply to the U.S.S.R. in accordance with Article I.

ARTICLE III

In carrying out their obligations under this Agreement, the Soviet foreign trade organizations shall endeavor to space their purchases in the U.S.A. and shipments to the U.S.S.R. as evenly as possible over each 12- month period.

ARTICLE IV

The Government of the U.S.S.R. shall assure that, except as the Parties may otherwise agree, all commodities grown in the U.S.A. and purchased by Soviet foreign trade organizations under this Agreement shall be supplied for consumption in the U.S.S.R.

ARTICLE V

Whenever the Government of the U.S.S.R. wishes the Soviet foreign trade organizations to be able to purchase more wheat or corn grown in the U.S.A. than the amounts specified in Article I, it shall notify the Government of the U.S.A.

Whenever the Government of the U.S.A. wishes private commercial sources to be able to sell to the U.S.S.R. more wheat or corn grown in the U.S.A. than the amounts specified in Article I, it shall notify the Government of the U.S.S.R.

In both instances, the parties will consult as soon as possible in order to reach agreement on possible quantities of grain to be supplied to the U.S.S.R. prior to purchase/sale or conclusion of contracts for the purchase/sale of grain in amounts above those specified in Article I.

ARTICLE VI

The Government of the U.S.A. is prepared to use its good offices, as appropriate and within the laws in force in the U.S.A., to be of assistance on questions of the appropriate quality of the grain to be supplied from the U.S.A. to the U.S.S.R.

ARTICLE VII

It is understood that the shipment of commodities from the U.S.A. to the U.S.S.R. under this Agreement shall be in accord with the provisions of the American-Soviet Agreement on Maritime Matters which is in force during the period of shipments hereunder.

ARTICLE VIII

The Parties shall hold consultations concerning the implementation of this Agreement and related matters at intervals of six months and at any other time at the request of either Party.

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ARTICLE IX

This Agreement shall enter into force on execution and shall remain in force until Sept. 30, 1988, unless extended by the Parties for a mutually agreed period.

Done at Moscow this 25th of August, 1983, in duplicate, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

TYPE: TEXT

SUBJECT: GRAIN; INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND WORLD MARKET

NAME: BLOCK, JOHN R (SEC); PATOLICHEV, NIKOLAI S (MIN)

GEOGRAPHIC: UNITED STATES (1983 PART 1); UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

11TH STORY of Level 2 printed in FULL format.

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August 26, 1983, Friday, Late City Final Edition

SECTION: Section A; Page 1, Column 6; Financial Desk

LENGTH: 1084 words

HEADLINE: GRAIN PACT SIGNED; U.S. ASSURES SOVIET OF STEADY SUPPLY

DATELINE: MOSCOW, Aug. 25

BODY:

The United States and the Soviet Union signed a new five-year grain agreement here today that gives the Russians a new guarantee that supplies from America will not be interrupted.

It was the first major bilateral pact that the two nations had negotiated since the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979.

The United States Secretary of Agriculture, John R. Block, told Soviet officials at the signing ceremony that it was "a very, very important occasion." Later he described the pact at a news conference as "an early building block in the effort to build a more stable and constructive relationship" between the two nations.

3 1/2 Years After Carter's Action

The ceremony, held at the Foreign Ministry, came three and a half years after President Carter restricted grain sales to the Russians after their intervention in Afghanistan.

Today Mr. Block disavowed that response, describing it as a "distasteful chapter" that he said had forced the Soviet Union to turn to other suppliers and had hurt American farmers.

Mr. Block took pains to assure his hosts that the United States would be a more reliable supplier of grain in the future.

The text of the new pact was made public as it was signed. It contains the commitment by the United States not to interrupt the flow of grain purchased by the Russians during the five-year term of the agreement unless both sides agree.

Pact Runs to Sept. 30, 1988

The new agreement, which takes effect Oct. 1 and runs to Sept. 30, 1988, replaces the original grain pact that was signed in 1975 and was extended twice, for a year each time. The outline of the pacts is almost identical, except for the commitment not to impose an embargo, a feature that the Russians had demanded before negotiations were concluded in Vienna last month.

Under the new pact, the Kremlin undertakes to buy a minimum of 9 million tons a year and a maximum of 12 million tons, an increase over the limits of 6

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million to 8 million tons set in the earlier agreement.

As before, Soviet buyers will have to notify Washington if they wish to purchase larger amounts. The United States insisted on that stipulation after heavy Soviet buying of American grain in 1973 drove up domestic prices in the United States.

Mr. Block, who grows corn on his own farm in Illinois, adopted an apologetic tone in referring to the Carter grain curb during his news conference at the United States commercial office here. And he congratulated Soviet officials, as well as their American counterparts, for putting what he called 'an emphatic end' to it.

An 'Ambitious New Course'

'The Soviet side also deserves credit,' he said. 'It has not been easy for either side to bring an end to one chapter and embark on this ambitious new course.'

The trip here by the Agriculture Secretary followed by a few days another step by the Reagan Administration to ease trade relations between the two nations. The earlier step was the lifting of controls on the sale of pipe-laying equipment that were first imposed by President Carter in 1978 in response to the jailing of two Soviet dissidents, Anatoly B. Shcharansky and Aleksandr Ginzburg. The controls were later intensified by the Reagan Administration.

At today's news conference, Mr. Block emphasized the importance that Washington attaches to the growth of American-Soviet trade. Although he noted at one point that high-technology sales were a special matter, he said that in general 'formalized trading agreements with the Soviet Union are in the best interests of the United States' as well as of the Russians.

Reputation for Dependability

In particular, he stressed America's eagerness to re-establish its reputation as a 'dependable supplier' of grain, which has accounted for the bulk of United States exports to the Soviet Union in the past. 'We want not only to be a good supplier - we want to be the best supplier for the U.S.S.R.,' Mr. Block said. The official who signed for the Russians, Foreign Trade Minister Nikolai S. Patolichev, offered no comments to match Mr. Block's positive remarks.

The Secretary estimated that the new agreement would be worth \$10 billion to American farmers at current prices - and more if the Kremlin goes beyond the maximum volume specified in the pact, as it often did under the old agreement.

However, he said that the United States should view the new agreement as an opportunity to move from being 'a residual to more of a primary supplier,' not as a signal that it could readily regain the overwhelming market share that it enjoyed before the Carter restrictions.

Mr. Block said it was 'not realistic' to think that American farmers could again achieve the 70 percent market share they held before the Afghanistan intervention because the Russians had diversified their grain purchases while Washington's restrictions were in effect, in 1980-81, signing agreements for

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major annual purchases from Argentina, Canada and other grain-producing nations.

In the 12-month period ended June 30, buying from the United States accounted for only 6 million tons of grain, barely 17 percent of the Russians' worldwide purchases of 35 million tons.

Administration's Position

'We forced them into the arms of other suppliers, and I think it's reasonable to expect that they will continue to buy from those suppliers,' Mr. Block said, adding, 'I think we're going to have to work our way back.'

In reply to questions, the Agriculture Secretary denied that there was any inconsistency in the Reagan Administration's position of pushing for larger grain sales while urging Western European nations to lengthen the list of high-technology items that are withheld from the Soviet market. He said that selling sensitive equipment was a separate issue and that the Western Europeans, themselves major food suppliers to the Russians, accepted that.

Mr. Block presented the new grain pact as a measure of potential political significance, as well as a turning point in commercial relations. He implied that there had been agreement on this point during a one-hour meeting that he had after the signing ceremony with Geidar A. Aliyev, a member of the ruling Politburo.

'We acknowledged that there are areas of tension, centers of concern to both the United States and the Soviet Union, but we made a special note that we've solved one problem, and that's a good sign,' Mr. Block said. 'But there's much more to be done.'

CORRECTION-DATE: August 29, 1983, Monday, Late City Final Edition

CORRECTION: EDITORS' NOTE

Under this heading, The Times amplifies articles or rectifies what the editors consider significant lapses of fairness, balance or perspective. Corrections, also on this page, continue to deal with factual errors.

A Moscow dispatch last Friday on page 1 said that a new grain agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union contained new guarantees that the United States would not interrupt grain sales during the five-year life of the agreement.

The article left the impression that the guarantee was explicit in the agreement. In fact, the guarantee primarily arises from the exclusion in the new agreement of a 'short-supply' provision that was contained in an earlier agreement.

Under that clause, Washington had the right to embargo shipments if stocks in this country fell below 225 million tons. There was no reference to short supplies in the new agreement.

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In addition, United States law now prevents an Administration from applying a new trade embargo to an existing government-to-government contract.

GRAPHIC: photo of John R. Block

SUBJECT: Terms not available

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Jack Matlock,
Could this mean
they are getting
ready to abrogate
the agreement?

R928R A1111)LIYCBYLRYP
BC-GRAIN
LARGE SOVIET PURCHASES OF U.S. GRAIN PUZZLE OFFICIALS
BY JANIE GABBETT

WASHINGTON, AUG 2, REUTER - A SOVIET GRAIN-BUYING SPREE IN THE UNITED STATES HAS PUZZLED GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE ANALYSTS AND SPURRED THEORIES THE SOVIET CROP MAY BE FALLING BELOW U.S. GOVERNMENT FORECASTS.

IN THE PAST MONTH, THE SOVIET UNION HAS BOUGHT NEARLY 2.3 MILLION TONS OF U.S. WHEAT, MOSTLY FOR SHIPMENT BY THE END OF SEPTEMBER, AND NEARLY 4.5 MILLION TONS OF CORN, LARGELY FOR SHIPMENT AFTER OCTOBER 1, 1984.

ONE GOVERNMENT ANALYST SAID IT WAS UNUSUALLY EARLY FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO BUY SO MUCH U.S. CORN, AS IT NORMALLY WAITS UNTIL IT HAS A GOOD IDEA OF THE SIZE OF ITS OWN CROP AND THE U.S. CROP.

SOME ANALYSTS SAY THE EARLY BUYING CONFIRMS THEIR BELIEF THAT THE 1984 SOVIET GRAIN CROP IS BELOW THE 190 MILLION TONS CURRENTLY FORECAST BY THE U.S. AGRICULTURAL DEPARTMENT.

AGRICULTURE DEPARTMENT AND PRIVATE ANALYSTS HAVE VARIED IN THEIR ASSESSMENTS OF SPORADIC HOT, DRY CONDITIONS IN SOME SOVIET GRAIN AREAS, COUPLED WITH DRENCHING RAINS IN OTHERS.

SOME PRIVATE ANALYSTS HAVE ADJUSTED THEIR FORECASTS AS LOW AS 170 TO 180 MILLION TONS, COMPARED TO THE SOVIET GOAL OF 240 MILLION TONS. THEY SAID THE RECENT BUYING BEARS THIS OUT.

AGRICULTURE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS, HOWEVER, ARE MORE CAUTIOUS ABOUT THE ACTUAL CROP SIZE AND RELATE THE RECENT BUYING TO RECORD LIVESTOCK NUMBERS, A POOR FORAGE CROP AND QUALITY PROBLEMS WITH THIS YEAR'S SOVIET WHEAT HARVEST.

BOTH GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE ANALYSTS ALSO POINT TO POSSIBLE GRAIN STOCK REBUILDING IN THE USSR, FOLLOWING SEVERAL POOR HARVESTS IN RECENT YEARS.

ONE GOVERNMENT ANALYST SAID A MID-JULY RADIO MOSCOW REPORT PUT LAST YEAR'S SOVIET CROP AT 190 MILLION TONS, FIVE MILLION TONS BELOW THE U.S. ESTIMATE AND BELOW INDICATIONS IN A MARCH 2 SPEECH BY COMMUNIST PARTY CHIEF KONSTANTIN CHERNENKO.

ONE GOVERNMENT ANALYST SAID THE EARLY SOVIET GRAIN BUYING COULD BE REPLACING ARGENTINE GRAIN PURCHASES TYPICAL OF THIS TIME IN RECENT YEARS, AS A SLIGHTLY SHORT CROP THERE MAY HAVE DECREASED SUPPLIES FOR EXPORT.

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BY RW NARA DATE 3/16/11

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SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS: ATTACHED:

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By amf NARA, Date 7/24/02

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46
Grain

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

September 7, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MC FARLANE

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *JS*

SUBJECT:

FBI Report on Soviet Plan to Cancel Long-Term Grain Agreement

Judge Webster has forwarded to you a report regarding alleged Soviet plans to cancel the Long-Term Grain Agreement in late September or October.

Without more information about the source and the rank and position of his Soviet subsources, it is difficult to evaluate the report. Its substance, however, seems highly improbable, for the following reasons:

-- The Soviets have a large stake in keeping their trade agreements as insulated from political ups and downs as possible. To cancel a government-to-government agreement for essentially political reasons would do them great damage in other areas. (They of course often have political motivations in negotiating, concluding and renewing trade agreements, but once entered into, they are normally scrupulous in carrying them out.)

-- The Soviet grain harvest this year is so bad that they could not be sure to cover all their needs elsewhere. The current wave of purchases is for delivery, for the most part, after October. Cancellation of the LTA would, in effect, represent a gamble that the President would not be able to embargo shipments of grain contracted under the agreement. Although this is a gamble they might win, it is unlikely the Soviets would wish to run any risk at all on this score.

-- I cannot dismiss the suspicion that the Soviet subsources were engaged in a calculated disinformation effort. After all, if the Soviets are able to make us jittery on this score, they might reason that it would affect policy decisions in other areas. This possibility requires more analysis than the incoming report provides.

Despite these observations, the prospect is a sufficiently serious event that we should make further efforts to determine

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BY RW NARA DATE 3/16/11

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-2-

the reliability of the report. Therefore, I recommend that you request the FBI to supply, through System IV controls, more information on the nature of the sources and subsources, and an assessment of the possibility that the ultimate Soviet sources may have been engaged in deliberate disinformation. Judge Webster might also be requested to provide the report to the CIA for its analysis.

Roger Robinson, ^{in JEM} Doug McMinn and Ken deGraffenreid concur; Lenczowski and Sestanovich are ^{unavailable} unavailable.

Recommendation:

That you sign the attached memorandum to Judge Webster.

Approve ____

Disapprove ____

Attachments:

Tab I - Letter to Judge Webster

Tab II - Letter from Judge Webster of August 29, 1984, with enclosed report

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/ORCON/WNINTEL~~

Dear Bill:

Thank you for your letter of August 29, 1984, which forwarded a follow-up report on Soviet consideration of a plan to cancel the U.S.-USSR Long Term Grain Agreement.

Such a step by the Soviet Union would be a major event requiring extensive contingency planning on our part to deal with it. Therefore, it seems essential that we give the report as serious and thorough consideration as possible. It would be helpful, therefore, if the Bureau could provide the report to the CIA for consideration by its specialists.

Additionally, it would be helpful to me if the Bureau could provide more information about the nature of its source and of the Soviet subsources. I do not need names, of course, but a more precise description of the manner the information was obtained and the position of the Soviet subsources would be most helpful.

Finally, I would appreciate the Bureau's assessment of the possibility that the Soviet subsources were engaged in deliberate disinformation. One can conjecture that the Soviet authorities might see some advantage in convincing us that they are considering such a step, even if in fact they are not. Is this possible in this case?

Sincerely,

Robert C. McFarlane

The Honorable William H. Webster
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20535

~~SECRET/ORCON/WNINTEL~~

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BY LOJ NARA, DATE 1/15/05



U.S. Department of Justice

6676

Federal Bureau of Investigation

~~SECRET-WNINTEL~~

Office of the Director

Washington, D.C. 20535

August 29, 1984

BY LIAISON

Honorable Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Bud:

Enclosed is a follow-up report on the current status of Soviet consideration of an attempt to influence the presidential election through cancellation of the U.S./USSR grain agreement. We are continuing to follow this matter, and we will keep you informed should we receive additional information. This information is also being furnished under separate cover to the Director of Central Intelligence, William J. Casey.

Sincerely,

William H. Webster
Director

Enclosure

~~SECRET-WNINTEL~~

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BY LDT, NARA, DATE 1/15/08



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

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Office of the Director

Washington, D.C. 20535

August 29, 1984

BY LIAISON

SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO INFLUENCE
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION THROUGH POSSIBLE
CANCELLATION OF U.S./USSR GRAIN AGREEMENT

[illegible]

~~SECRET-ORCON-WNINTEL~~

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NLS FOG-114/8 #10086

By LOT, NARA, Date 1/15/08

File:
US-USSR - Grain
Jacks
Matthews

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

September 11, 1984

REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT
IN MEETING WITH MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

The Cabinet Room

3:05 P.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Well, listen, I'm very happy to welcome all of you back. And I'm looking forward to discussing some important farm issues with you.

But first, let me share some news with you for America's farm community. Consistent with the long-term agreement on grain sales that we've decided, and the Department of Agriculture is notifying the Soviet Union that the Soviets can increase by 10 million metric tons their purchase of wheat and/or corn for shipment during the second year of the agreement. And the ceiling for the second year of agreement is being raised to \$22 million metric tons. And I've said many times, our philosophy is against the unfair and the wrong-headed policies of grain embargos and we're going to continue to do everything we can to strengthen markets for America's farmers. They're the most productive people, I think, on the face of the earth. So, I just thought that you'd like to have that news. (Applause.)

END

3:06 P.M. EDT

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

September 11, 1984

U.S./Soviet Grain Trade

FACT SHEET

President Reagan announced today that the United States will make additional quantities of grain available to the Soviet Union for the second year of the new Long Term Grain Agreement (LTA) which was signed August 25, 1983. Accordingly, the United States Department of Agriculture notified the Soviet Union it can increase purchases of wheat and/or corn by 10 million metric tons (MMT) for shipment during the second year. This raises the maximum level for the second year to 22 MMT.

Since the new LTA was signed on August 25, 1983, the Soviet Union has purchased 14 MMT of corn (6.6 MMT during the first year) and over 9 MMT of wheat (7.8 MMT during the first year). They have also purchased 416,200 metric tons of soybeans, all during the first year of the agreement.

Chronological Background:

- o September 1975 The U.S. began to negotiate a long-term grain agreement (LTA) with the Soviets.
- o October 20, 1975 A 5-year agreement was signed, calling for the USSR to purchase a minimum 6 MMT of U.S. grain annually, split in near equal shares between wheat and corn. An extra 2 MMT in any combination could be purchased without government to government consultations.
- o 1979 U.S. grain exports to the USSR reached a record 15.2 MMT.
- o January 1980 President Carter imposed an embargo on sales of U.S. agricultural products to the USSR.
- o April 24, 1981 President Reagan lifted the embargo.
- o August 5, 1981 The LTA, to expire on September 30, 1981, was extended one year. Also, the U.S. offered an additional 15 MMT more than the 8 MMT "committed" for that year.
- o March 22, 1982 President Reagan reaffirmed that agricultural exports would not be restricted because of rising domestic prices, nor would they be used as an instrument of foreign policy except in extreme cases when national security is involved and then only as part of more comprehensive trade action.
- o August 1982 The U.S.-USSR LTA was extended for another year.
- o April 22, 1983 President Reagan announced that the U.S. had proposed to the Soviet Union the negotiation of a new LTA.
- o May 16, 1983 The Soviet Union officially accepted President Reagan's proposal to negotiate a new LTA.

o August 25, 1983

The U.S. and USSR signed a new 5-year agreement calling for minimum annual trade of 9 MMT. The Soviets must buy at least 4 MMT of wheat and 4MMT of corn annually, while the remaining 1 MMT can be satisfied by any combination of wheat, corn, soybeans, or soybean meal. If the Soviets choose to apply soybeans or soybean meal to the minimum, each ton of soybeans/meal counts as 2 MMT of grain. The Soviets may also buy up to 3 MMT of additional wheat or corn without consultation.

o January 25, 1984

During consultations with the Soviet Union in London, the U.S. told the USSR they could purchase an additional 10 MMT of grain for the first year of the new LTA.

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