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Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 5/10/2005

File Folder IMPORTANT HISTORY PRE-1987 [MATERIAL LEFT FOR FRITZ ERMATH] 2/4

FOIA

F06-114/8

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2712

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
10110	MEMO	COBB TO MCFARLANE RE PRESIDENT'S LUNCH WITH SOVIETOLOGISTS THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 7, 1985--12:00 R 3/16/2011 F2006-114/8	1	11/5/1985	B1
10111	MEMO	MCFARLANE RE LUNCHEON WITH SOVIETOLOGISTS R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8	2	ND	B1
10112	PAPER	SOVIET STRATEGY AND STRATEGIC THINKING PAR 3/16/2011 F2006-114/8	8	ND	B3
10114	MEMO	MCFARLANE RE MEETING MEETING WITH SOVIET ANALYSTS PAR 3/16/2011 F2006-114/8	2	11/12/1985	B3
10115	MEMO	PARTICIPANTS LIST FOR MEETING WITH SOVIET ANALYSTS PAR 3/16/2011 F2006-114/8	1	ND	B3
10116	MEMO	MATLOCK/COBB TO MCFARLANE RE BRIEFING MEMO FOR PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH SOVIET ANALYSTS--- WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 13, 1985 R 3/16/2011 F2006-114/8	2	11/12/1985	B1

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
10117	MEMO	COBB/MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE TALKING POINTS FOR SHEVARDNADZE NSC MEETING, FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 20, 1985 R 3/16/2011 F2006-114/8	4	9/19/1985	B1
10118	MEMO	COBB/MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE NSC MEETING ON REGIONAL/BILATERAL ISSUES, WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 13, 1985---1:00 PM R 3/16/2011 F2006-114/8	4	11/11/1985	B1
10119	MEMO	MATLOCK/COBB TO MCFARLANE RE NSC MEETIN ON GENEVA, NOVEMBER 15, 1985 R 3/16/2011 F2006-114/8	1	11/14/1985	B1
10120	MEMO	MATLOCK/COBB TO MCFARLANE RE TALKING POINTS FOR NSC MEETING ON REGIONAL/BILATERAL ISSUES--- WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 13, 1985 R 3/16/2011 F2006-114/8	4	11/12/1985	B1
10121	MEMO	MATLOCK/COBB TO MCFARLANE RE BRIEFING MEMO FOR PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH SOVIET ANALYSTS- WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 13, 1985 R 3/16/2011 F2006-114/8	1	11/12/1985	B1
10122	MEMO	MCFARLANE RE MEETING WITH SOVIET ANALYSTS NOVEMBER 13, 1985 PAR 3/16/2011 F2006-114/8	4	ND	B3

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
10123	LETTER	DRAFT TO MATLOCK RE RUN-UP TO GENEVA R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8 DOCUMENT PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233	3	ND	B1

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Fritz Ermarth —

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(See Note re NSDD -
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Authority D. Vantassel, NSC (F94-1102) 8/16/74
BY Amf, NARA, Date 7/24/02

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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January 17, 1983

National Security Decision
Directive Number 75

U.S. RELATIONS WITH THE USSR (S)

U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union will consist of three elements: external resistance to Soviet imperialism; internal pressure on the USSR to weaken the sources of Soviet imperialism; and negotiations to eliminate, on the basis of strict reciprocity, outstanding disagreements. Specifically, U.S. tasks are:

1. To contain and over time reverse Soviet expansionism by competing effectively on a sustained basis with the Soviet Union in all international arenas -- particularly in the overall military balance and in geographical regions of priority concern to the United States. This will remain the primary focus of U.S. policy toward the USSR.
2. To promote, within the narrow limits available to us, the process of change in the Soviet Union toward a more pluralistic political and economic system in which the power of the privileged ruling elite is gradually reduced. The U.S. recognizes that Soviet aggressiveness has deep roots in the internal system, and that relations with the USSR should therefore take into account whether or not they help to strengthen this system and its capacity to engage in aggression.
3. To engage the Soviet Union in negotiations to attempt to reach agreements which protect and enhance U.S. interests and which are consistent with the principle of strict reciprocity and mutual interest. This is important when the Soviet Union is in the midst of a process of political succession. (S)

In order to implement this threefold strategy, the U.S. must convey clearly to Moscow that unacceptable behavior will incur costs that would outweigh any gains. At the same time, the U.S. must make clear to the Soviets that genuine restraint in their behavior would create the possibility of an East-West relationship that might bring important benefits for the Soviet Union. It is particularly important that this message be conveyed clearly during the succession period, since this may be a particularly opportune time for external forces to affect the policies of Brezhnev's successors. (S)

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Shaping the Soviet Environment: Arenas of Engagement

Implementation of U.S. policy must focus on shaping the environment in which Soviet decisions are made both in a wide variety of functional and geopolitical arenas and in the U.S.-Soviet bilateral relationship. (S)

A. Functional

1. Military Strategy: The U.S. must modernize its military forces -- both nuclear and conventional -- so that Soviet leaders perceive that the U.S. is determined never to accept a second place or a deteriorating military posture. Soviet calculations of possible war outcomes under any contingency must always result in outcomes so unfavorable to the USSR that there would be no incentive for Soviet leaders to initiate an attack. The future strength of U.S. military capabilities must be assured. U.S. military technology advances must be exploited, while controls over transfer of military related/dual-use technology, products, and services must be tightened. (S)

In Europe, the Soviets must be faced with a reinvigorated NATO. In the Far East we must ensure that the Soviets cannot count on a secure flank in a global war. Worldwide, U.S. general purpose forces must be strong and flexible enough to affect Soviet calculations in a wide variety of contingencies. In the Third World, Moscow must know that areas of interest to the U.S. cannot be attacked or threatened without risk of serious U.S. military countermeasures. (S)

2. Economic Policy: U.S. policy on economic relations with the USSR must serve strategic and foreign policy goals as well as economic interests. In this context, U.S. objectives are:

- Above all, to ensure that East-West economic relations do not facilitate the Soviet military buildup. This requires prevention of the transfer of technology and equipment that would make a substantial contribution directly or indirectly to Soviet military power.
- To avoid subsidizing the Soviet economy or unduly easing the burden of Soviet resource allocation decisions, so as not to dilute pressures for structural change in the Soviet system.
- To seek to minimize the potential for Soviet exercise of reverse leverage on Western countries based on trade, energy supply, and financial relationships.
- To permit mutual beneficial trade -- without Western subsidization or the creation of Western dependence -- with the USSR in non-strategic areas, such as grains. (S)

The U.S. must exercise strong leadership with its Allies and others to develop a common understanding of the strategic implications of East-West trade, building upon the agreement announced November 13, 1982 (see NSDD 66). This approach should involve efforts to reach agreements with the Allies on specific measures, such as: (a) no incremental deliveries of Soviet gas beyond the amounts contracted for from the first strand of the Siberian pipeline; (b) the addition of critical technologies and equipment to the COCOM list, the harmonization of national licensing procedures for COCOM, and the substantial improvement of the coordination and effectiveness of international enforcement efforts; (c) controls on advanced technology and equipment beyond the expanded COCOM list, including equipment in the oil and gas sector; (d) further restraints on officially-backed credits such as higher down payments, shortened maturities and an established framework to monitor this process; and (e) the strengthening of the role of the OECD and NATO in East-West trade analysis and policy. (S)

In the longer term, if Soviet behavior should worsen, e.g., an invasion of Poland, we would need to consider extreme measures. Should Soviet behavior improve, carefully calibrated positive economic signals, including a broadening of government-to-government economic contacts, could be considered as a means of demonstrating to the Soviets the benefits that real restraint in their conduct might bring. Such steps could not, however, alter the basic direction of U.S. policy. (S)

3. Political Action: U.S. policy must have an ideological thrust which clearly affirms the superiority of U.S. and Western values of individual dignity and freedom, a free press, free trade unions, free enterprise, and political democracy over the repressive features of Soviet Communism. We need to review and significantly strengthen U.S. instruments of political action including: (a) The President's London initiative to support democratic forces; (b) USG efforts to highlight Soviet human rights violations; and (c) U.S. radio broadcasting policy. The U.S. should:

- Expose at all available fora the double standards employed by the Soviet Union in dealing with difficulties within its own domain and the outside ("capitalist") world (e.g., treatment of labor, policies toward ethnic minorities, use of chemical weapons, etc.).
- Prevent the Soviet propaganda machine from seizing the semantic high-ground in the battle of ideas through the appropriation of such terms as "peace." (S)

B. Geopolitical

1. The Industrial Democracies: An effective response to the Soviet challenge requires close partnership among the industrial democracies, including stronger and more effective collective defense arrangements. The U.S. must provide strong leadership

and conduct effective consultations to build consensus and cushion the impact of intra-alliance disagreements. While Allied support of U.S. overall strategy is essential, the U.S. may on occasion be forced to act to protect vital interests without Allied support and even in the face of Allied opposition; even in this event, however, U.S. should consult to the maximum extent possible with its Allies. ~~(S)~~

2. The Third World: The U.S. must rebuild the credibility of its commitment to resist Soviet encroachment on U.S. interests and those of its Allies and friends, and to support effectively those Third World states that are willing to resist Soviet pressures or oppose Soviet initiatives hostile to the United States, or are special targets of Soviet policy. The U.S. effort in the Third World must involve an important role for security assistance and foreign military sales, as well as readiness to use U.S. military forces where necessary to protect vital interests and support endangered Allies and friends. U.S. policy must also involve diplomatic initiatives to promote resolution of regional crises vulnerable to Soviet exploitation, and an appropriate mixture of economic assistance programs and private sector initiatives for Third World countries. ~~(S)~~

3. The Soviet Empire: There are a number of important weaknesses and vulnerabilities within the Soviet empire which the U.S. should exploit. U.S. policies should seek wherever possible to encourage Soviet allies to distance themselves from Moscow in foreign policy and to move toward democratization domestically. ~~(S)~~

- (a) Eastern Europe: The primary U.S. objective in Eastern Europe is to loosen Moscow's hold on the region while promoting the cause of human rights in individual East European countries. The U.S. can advance this objective by carefully discriminating in favor of countries that show relative independence from the USSR in their foreign policy, or show a greater degree of internal liberalization. U.S. policies must also make clear that East European countries which reverse movements of liberalization, or drift away from an independent stance in foreign policy, will incur significant costs in their relations with the U.S. ~~(S)~~
- (b) Afghanistan: The U.S. objective is to keep maximum pressure on Moscow for withdrawal and to ensure that the Soviets' political, military, and other costs remain high while the occupation continues. ~~(S)~~
- (c) Cuba: The U.S. must take strong countermeasures to affect the political/military impact of Soviet arms deliveries to Cuba. The U.S. must also provide economic and military assistance to states in Central America and the Caribbean Basin threatened by Cuban destabilizing activities. Finally, the U.S. will seek to reduce the Cuban presence and influence in southern Africa by energetic leadership of the diplomatic effort to achieve a Cuban withdrawal from Angola, or failing that, by increasing the costs of Cuba's role in southern Africa. ~~(S)~~

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- (d) Soviet Third World Alliances: U.S. policy will seek to limit the destabilizing activities of Soviet Third World allies and clients. It is a further objective to weaken and, where possible; undermine the existing links between them and the Soviet Union. U.S. policy will include active efforts to encourage democratic movements and forces to bring about political change inside these countries. ~~(S)~~

4. China: China continues to support U.S. efforts to strengthen the world's defenses against Soviet expansionism. The U.S. should over time seek to achieve enhanced strategic cooperation and policy coordination with China, and to reduce the possibility of a Sino-Soviet rapprochement. The U.S. will continue to pursue a policy of substantially liberalized technology transfer and sale of military equipment to China on a case-by-case basis within the parameters of the policy approved by the President in 1981, and defined further in 1982. ~~(S)~~

5. Yugoslavia: It is U.S. policy to support the independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia's current difficulties in paying its foreign debts have increased its vulnerability to Soviet pressures. The Yugoslav government, well aware of this vulnerability, would like to reduce its trade dependence on the Soviet Union. It is in our interest to prevent any deterioration in Yugoslavia's economic situation that might weaken its resolve to withstand Soviet pressure. ~~(S)~~

C. Bilateral Relationships

1. Arms Control: The U.S. will enter into arms control negotiations when they serve U.S. national security objectives. At the same time, U.S. policy recognizes that arms control agreements are not an end in themselves but are, in combination with U.S. and Allied efforts to maintain the military balance, an important means for enhancing national security and global stability. The U.S. should make clear to the Allies as well as to the USSR that U.S. ability to reach satisfactory results in arms control negotiations will inevitably be influenced by the international situation, the overall state of U.S.-Soviet relations, and the difficulties in defining areas of mutual agreement with an adversary which often seeks unilateral gains. U.S. arms control proposals will be consistent with necessary force modernization plans and will seek to achieve balanced, significant, and verifiable reductions to equal levels of comparable armaments. ~~(S)~~

2. Official Dialogue: The U.S. should insist that Moscow address the full range of U.S. concerns about Soviet internal behavior and human rights violations, and should continue to resist Soviet efforts to return to a U.S.-Soviet agenda focused primarily on arms control. U.S.-Soviet diplomatic contacts on regional issues can serve U.S. interests if they are used to keep pressure on Moscow for responsible behavior. Such contacts can

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also be useful in driving home to Moscow that the costs of irresponsibility are high, and that the U.S. is prepared to work for pragmatic solutions of regional problems if Moscow is willing seriously to address U.S. concerns. At the same time, such contacts must be handled with care to avoid offering the Soviet Union a role in regional questions it would not otherwise secure. (S)

A continuing dialogue with the Soviets at Foreign Minister level facilitates necessary diplomatic communication with the Soviet leadership and helps to maintain Allied understanding and support for U.S. approach to East-West relations. A summit between President Reagan and his Soviet counterpart might promise similarly beneficial results. At the same time, unless it were carefully handled a summit could be seen as registering an improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations without the changes in Soviet behavior which we have insisted upon. It could therefore generate unrealizable expectations and further stimulate unilateral Allied initiatives toward Moscow. (S)

A summit would not necessarily involve signature of major new U.S.-Soviet agreements. Any summit meeting should achieve the maximum possible positive impact with U.S. Allies and the American public, while making clear to both audiences that improvement in Soviet-American relations depends on changes in Soviet conduct. A summit without such changes must not be understood to signal such improvement. (S)

3. U.S.-Soviet Cooperative Exchanges: The role of U.S.-Soviet cultural, educational, scientific and other cooperative exchanges should be seen in light of the U.S. intention to maintain a strong ideological component in relations with Moscow. The U.S. should not further dismantle the framework of exchanges; indeed those exchanges which could advance the U.S. objective of promoting positive evolutionary change within the Soviet system should be expanded. At the same time, the U.S. will insist on full reciprocity and encourage its Allies to do so as well. This recognizes that unless the U.S. has an effective official framework for handling exchanges, the Soviets will make separate arrangements with private U.S. sponsors, while denying reciprocal access to the Soviet Union. U.S. policy on exchanges must also take into account the necessity to prevent transfer of sensitive U.S. technology to the Soviet Union. (S)

Priorities in the U.S. Approach: Maximizing Restraining Leverage over Soviet Behavior

The interrelated tasks of containing and reversing Soviet expansion and promoting evolutionary change within the Soviet Union itself cannot be accomplished quickly. The coming 5-10 years will be a period of considerable uncertainty in which the Soviets may test U.S. resolve by continuing the kind of aggressive international behavior which the U.S. finds unacceptable. (S)

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The uncertainties will be exacerbated by the fact that the Soviet Union will be engaged in the unpredictable process of political succession to Brezhnev. The U.S. will not seek to adjust its policies to the Soviet internal conflict, but rather try to create incentives (positive and negative) for the new leadership to adopt policies less detrimental to U.S. interests. The U.S. will remain ready for improved U.S.-Soviet relations if the Soviet Union makes significant changes in policies of concern to it; the burden for any further deterioration in relations must fall squarely on Moscow. The U.S. must not yield to pressures to "take the first step." (S)

The existing and projected gap between finite U.S. resources and the level of capabilities needed to implement U.S. strategy makes it essential that the U.S.: (1) establish firm priorities for the use of limited U.S. resources where they will have the greatest restraining impact on the Soviet Union; and (2) mobilize the resources of Allies and friends which are willing to join the U.S. in containing the expansion of Soviet power. (S)

Underlying the full range of U.S. and Western policies must be a strong military capable of action across the entire spectrum of potential conflicts and guided by a well conceived political and military strategy. The heart of U.S. military strategy is to deter attack by the USSR and its allies against the U.S., its Allies, or other important countries, and to defeat such an attack should deterrence fail. Although unilateral U.S. efforts must lead the way in rebuilding Western military strength to counter the Soviet threat, the protection of Western interests will require increased U.S. cooperation with Allied and other states and greater utilization of their resources. This military strategy will be combined with a political strategy attaching high priority to the following objectives:

- Sustaining steady, long-term growth in U.S. defense spending and capabilities -- both nuclear and conventional. This is the most important way of conveying to the Soviets U.S. resolve and political staying-power.
- Creating a long-term Western consensus for dealing with the Soviet Union. This will require that the U.S. exercise strong leadership in developing policies to deal with the multifaceted Soviet threat to Western interests. It will require that the U.S. take Allied concerns into account, and also that U.S. Allies take into equal account U.S. concerns. In this connection, and in addition to pushing Allies to spend more on defense, the U.S. must make a serious effort to negotiate arms control agreements consistent with U.S. military strategy and necessary force modernization plans, and should seek to achieve balanced, significant and verifiable reductions to equal levels of comparable armaments. The U.S. must also develop, together with the Allies, a unified Western approach to East-West economic relations, implementing the agreement announced on November 13, 1982.

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- Maintenance of a strategic relationship with China, and efforts to minimize opportunities for a Sino-Soviet rapprochement.
- Building and sustaining a major ideological/political offensive which, together with other efforts, will be designed to bring about evolutionary change of the Soviet system. This must be a long-term and sophisticated program, given the nature of the Soviet system.
- Effective opposition to Moscow's efforts to consolidate its position in Afghanistan. This will require that the U.S. continue efforts to promote Soviet withdrawal in the context of a negotiated settlement of the conflict. At the same time, the U.S. must keep pressure on Moscow for withdrawal and ensure that Soviet costs on the ground are high.
- Blocking the expansion of Soviet influence in the critical Middle East and Southwest Asia regions. This will require both continued efforts to seek a political solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict and to bolster U.S. relations with moderate states in the region, and a sustained U.S. defense commitment to deter Soviet military encroachments.
- Maintenance of international pressure on Moscow to permit a relaxation of the current repression in Poland and a longer-term increase in diversity and independence throughout Eastern Europe. This will require that the U.S. continue to impose costs on the Soviet Union for its behavior in Poland. It will also require that the U.S. maintain a U.S. policy of differentiation among East European countries.
- Neutralization and reduction of the threat to U.S. national security interests posed by the Soviet-Cuban relationship. This will require that the U.S. use a variety of instruments, including diplomatic efforts and U.S. security and economic assistance. The U.S. must also retain the option of using of its military forces to protect vital U.S. security interests against threats which may arise from the Soviet-Cuban connection. (S)

Articulating the U.S. Approach: Sustaining Public and Congressional Support

The policy outlined above is one for the long haul. It is unlikely to yield a rapid breakthrough in bilateral relations with the Soviet Union. In the absence of dramatic near-term victories in the U.S. effort to moderate Soviet behavior, pressure is likely to mount for change in U.S. policy. There will be appeals from important segments of domestic opinion for a more "normal" U.S.-Soviet relationship, particularly in a period of political transition in Moscow. (S)

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It is therefore essential that the American people understand and support U.S. policy. This will require that official U.S. statements and actions avoid generating unrealizable expectations for near-term progress in U.S.-Soviet relations. At the same time, the U.S. must demonstrate credibly that its policy is not a blueprint for an open-ended, sterile confrontation with Moscow, but a serious search for a stable and constructive long-term basis for U.S.-Soviet relations. (S)

Paul Ryan

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE

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THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE

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THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

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THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE

nsdd075:

UNITED NATIONS

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CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

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DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

nsdd075:

SUBJECT: NSDD 75 on "U.S. Relations with the USSR" (S)

nsdd075:

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The President has approved National Security Decision Directive on "U.S. Relations with the USSR". A copy is attached for your information. This is a sensitive document; distribution should be made only on a need-to-know basis.

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FOR THE PRESIDENT:

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William P. Clark

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Attachment

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NSDD-75

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NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION

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DIRECTIVE NUMBER 75

nsdd075:

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January 17, 1983

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U.S. RELATIONS WITH THE USSR (S)

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Authority D. Van Tassel, NSC (F94-1102) 7/14/94
BY SAF, NARA, Date 7/24/02

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nsdd075: that might bring important benefits for the Soviet Union. It is
nsdd075: particularly important that this message be conveyed clearly
nsdd075: during the succession period, since this may be a particularly
nsdd075: opportune time for external forces to affect the policies of
nsdd075: Brezhnev's successors. (S)

nsdd075: ~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

nsdd075: ~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

nsdd075: Shaping the Soviet Environment: Arenas of Engagement

nsdd075: Implementation of U.S. policy must focus on shaping the
nsdd075: environment in which Soviet decisions are made both in a wide
nsdd075: variety of functional and geopolitical arenas and in the
nsdd075: U.S.-Soviet bilateral relationship. (S)

nsdd075: A. Functional

nsdd075: 1. Military Strategy: The U.S. must modernize its military
nsdd075: forces -- both nuclear and conventional -- so that Soviet leaders
nsdd075: perceive that the U.S. is determined never to accept a second
nsdd075: place or a deteriorating military posture. Soviet calculations of
nsdd075: possible war outcomes under any contingency must always result in
nsdd075: outcomes so unfavorable to the USSR that there would be no
nsdd075: incentive for Soviet leaders to initiate an attack. The future
nsdd075: strength of U.S. military capabilities must be assured. U.S.
nsdd075: military technology advances must be exploited, while controls
nsdd075: over transfer of military related/dual-use technology, products,
nsdd075: and services must be tightened. (S)

nsdd075: In Europe, the Soviets must be faced with a reinvigorated NATO. In

much

nsdd075: the Far East we must ensure that the Soviets cannot count on a
nsdd075: secure flank in a global war. Worldwide, U.S. general purpose
nsdd075: forces must be strong and flexible enough to affect Soviet
nsdd075: calculations in a wide variety of contingencies. In the Third
nsdd075: World Moscow must know that areas of interest to the U.S. cannot
nsdd075: be attacked or threatened without risk of serious U.S. military
nsdd075: countermeasures. (S)

nsdd075: 2. Economic Policy: U.S. policy on economic relations with the
nsdd075: USSR must serve strategic and foreign policy goals as well as -
nsdd075: economic interests. In this context, U.S. objectives are:

nsdd075: -- Above all, to ensure that East-West economic
nsdd075: relations do not facilitate the Soviet military buildup. This
nsdd075: requires prevention of the transfer of technology and equipment
nsdd075: that would make a substantial contribution directly or indirectly
nsdd075: to Soviet military power.

nsdd075: -- To avoid subsidizing the Soviet economy or unduly
nsdd075: easing the burden of Soviet resource allocation decisions, so as
nsdd075: not to dilute pressures for structural change in the Soviet
nsdd075: system.

nsdd075: --
nsdd075: To seek to minimize the potential for Soviet exercise of

nsdd075: leverage on Western countries based on trade, energy supply, and
nsdd075: financial relationships.

nsdd075: --
nsdd075: To permit mutual beneficial trade -- without Western
nsdd075: subsidization or the creation of Western dependence -- with the
nsdd075: USSR in non-strategic areas, such as grains.

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nsdd075: ~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

nsdd075: The U.S. must exercise strong leadership with its Allies and
nsdd075: others to
nsdd075: develop a common understanding of the strategic implications of
nsdd075: East-West trade, building upon the agreement announced November
nsdd075: 13, 1952 (see NSDD 66). This approach should involve efforts to
nsdd075: reach agreements with the Allies on specific measures, such as:
nsdd075: (a) no incremental deliveries of Soviet gas beyond the amounts
nsdd075: contracted for from the first strand of the Siberian pipeline; (b)
nsdd075: the addition of critical technologies and equipment to the COCOM
nsdd075: list, the harmonization of national licensing procedures for
nsdd075: COCOM, and the substantial improvement of the coordination and
nsdd075: effectiveness of international enforcement efforts; (c) controls
nsdd075: on advanced technology and equipment beyond the expanded COCOM
nsdd075: list, including equipment in the oil and gas sector; (d) further
nsdd075: restraints on officially-backed credits such as higher down
nsdd075: payments, shortened maturities and an established framework to
nsdd075: monitor this process; and (e).the strengthening of the role of the
nsdd075: OECD and NATO in East-West trade analysis and policy. (S)

nsdd075: In the longer term, if Soviet behavior should worsen, e.g., an
nsdd075: invasion of Poland, we would need to consider extreme measures.
nsdd075: Should Soviet behavior improve, carefully calibrated positive
nsdd075: economic signals, including a broadening of

nsdd075: government-to-government economic contacts, could be considered as
 nsdd075: a means of demonstrating to the Soviets the benefits that real
 nsdd075: restraint in their conduct. might bring. Such steps could not,
 nsdd075: however, alter the basic direction of U.S. policy. ~~(S)~~

nsdd075: 3. Political Action: U.S. policy must have an ideological
 nsdd075: thrust which clearly affirms the superiority of U.S. and Western
 nsdd075: values of individual dignity and freedom, a free press, free trade
 nsdd075: unions, free enterprise, and political democracy over the
 nsdd075: repressive features of Soviet Communism. We need to review and
 nsdd075: significantly strengthen U.S. instruments of political action
 nsdd075: including: (a) The President's London initiative to support
 nsdd075: democratic forces; (b) USG efforts to highlight Soviet human
 nsdd075: rights violations; and (c) U.S. radio broadcasting policy. The
 nsdd075: U.S. should:

nsdd075: -- Expose at all available fora the double standards employed
 nsdd075: by the Soviet Union in dealing with difficulties within its own
 nsdd075: domain and the outside ("capitalist") world (e.g., treatment of
 nsdd075: labor, policies toward ethnic minorities, use of chemical weapons,
 nsdd075: etc.).

nsdd075: -- Prevent the Soviet propaganda machine from seizing the
 nsdd075: semantic high-ground in the battle of ideas through the
 nsdd075: appropriation of such terms as "peace." ~~(S)~~

nsdd075: B. Geopolitical

nsdd075: 1. The Industrial Democracies: An effective response to the
 nsdd075: Soviet challenge requires close partnership among the industrial
 nsdd075: democracies, including stronger and more effective collective
 nsdd075: defense arrangements. The U.S. must provide strong leadership

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nsdd075: and conduct effective consultations to build consensus and cushion
 nsdd075: the impact of intra-alliance disagreements. While Allied support
 nsdd075: of U.S. overall strategy is essential, the U.S. may on occasion be
 nsdd075: forced to act to protect vital interests without Allied support
 nsdd075: and even in the face of Allied opposition; even in this event,
 nsdd075: however, U.S. should consult to the maximum extent possible with
 nsdd075: its Allies. ~~(S)~~

nsdd075: 2. The Third World: The U.S. must rebuild the credibility of
 nsdd075: its commitment to resist Soviet encroachment on U.S. interests and
 nsdd075: those of its Allies and friends, and to support effectively those
 nsdd075: Third World states that are willing to resist Soviet pressures or
 nsdd075: oppose Soviet initiative hostile to the United States, or are
 nsdd075: special targets of Soviet policy. The U.S. effort in the Third
 nsdd075: World must involve an important role for security assistance and
 nsdd075: foreign military sales, as well as readiness to use U.S. military
 nsdd075: forces where necessary to protect vital interests and support
 nsdd075: endangered Allies and friends. U.S. policy must also involve
 nsdd075: diplomatic initiatives to promote resolution of regional crises
 nsdd075: vulnerable to Soviet exploitation, and an appropriate mixture of
 nsdd075: economic assistance programs and private sector initiatives for
 nsdd075: Third World countries. ~~(S)~~

nsdd075:

nsdd075: 3. The Soviet Empire: There are a number of important
nsdd075: weaknesses and vulnerabilities within the Soviet empire which the
nsdd075: U.S. should exploit. U.S. policies should seek wherever possible
nsdd075: to encourage Soviet allies to distance themselves from Moscow in
nsdd075: foreign policy and to move toward democratization domestically.
nsdd075: (S)

nsdd075: (a) Eastern Europe: The primary U.S. objective in East
r Europe
nsdd075: is to loosen Moscow's hold on the region while promoting the cause
nsdd075: of human rights in individual East European countries. The U.S.
nsdd075: can advance this objective by carefully discriminating in favor of
nsdd075: countries that show relative independence from the USSR in their
nsdd075: foreign policy, or show a greater degree of internal
nsdd075: liberalization. U.S. policies must also make clear that East
nsdd075: European countries which reverse movements of liberalization, or
nsdd075: drift away from an independent stance in foreign policy, will
nsdd075: incur significant costs in their relations with the U.S. (S)

nsdd075: (b) Afghanistan: The U.S. objective is to keep maximum
p on Moscow for withdrawal and to ensure that the Soviets'
nsdd075: political, military, and other costs remain high while the
nsdd075: occupation continues. (S)

nsdd075: (c) Cuba: The U.S. must take strong countermeasures to
a
nsdd075: the political/military impact of Soviet arms deliveries to Cuba.
nsdd075: The U.S. must also provide economic and military assistance to
nsdd075: states in Central America and the Caribbean Basin threatened by
nsdd075: Cuban destabilizing activities. Finally, the U.S. will seek to
nsdd075: reduce the Cuban presence and influence in southern Africa by
nsdd075: energetic leadership of the diplomatic effort to achieve a Cuban
nsdd075: withdrawal from Angola, or failing that, by increasing the costs
nsdd075: of Cuba's role in southern Africa. (S)

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nsdd075: (d)
nsdd075: Soviet Third World Alliances: U.S. policy will seek to
1 prevent,
nsdd075: destabilizing activities of Soviet Third World allies and clients.
nsdd075: It is a further objective to weaken and, where possible, undermine
nsdd075: the existing links between them and the Soviet Union. U.S. policy
nsdd075: will include active efforts to encourage democratic movements and
nsdd075: forces to bring about political change inside these countries.
nsdd075: (S)

nsdd075: 4. China: China continues to support U.S. efforts to strengthen
nsdd075: the world's defenses against Soviet expansionism. The U.S. should
nsdd075: over time seek to achieve enhanced strategic cooperation and
nsdd075: policy coordination with China, and to reduce the possibility of a
nsdd075: Sino-Soviet rapprochement. The U.S. will continue to pursue a
nsdd075: policy of substantially liberalized technology transfer and sale
nsdd075: of military equipment to China on a case-by-case basis within the
nsdd075: parameters of the policy approved by the President in 1981, and
nsdd075: defined further in 1982. (S)

nsdd075: 5. Yugoslavia: It is U.S. policy to support the independence,
nsdd075: territorial integrity and national unity of Yugoslavia.

nsdd075: Yugoslavia's current difficulties in paying its foreign debts have
nsdd075: increased its vulnerability to Soviet pressures. The Yugoslav
nsdd075: government, well aware of this vulnerability, would like to reduce
nsdd075: its trade dependence on the Soviet Union. It is in our interest
nsdd075: to prevent any deterioration in Yugoslavia's economic situation
nsdd075: that might weaken its resolve to withstand Soviet pressure. ~~(S)~~

nsdd075: C. Bilateral Relationships

nsdd075: 1. Arms Control: The U.S. will enter into arms control
nsdd075: negotiations when they serve U.S. national security objectives.
nsdd075: At the same time, U.S. policy recognizes that arms control
nsdd075: agreements are not an end in themselves but are, in combination
nsdd075: with U.S. and Allied efforts to maintain the military balance, an
nsdd075: important means for enhancing national security and global
nsdd075: stability. The U.S. should make clear to the Allies as well as to
nsdd075: the USSR that U.S. ability to reach satisfactory results in arms
nsdd075: control negotiations will inevitably be influenced by the
nsdd075: international situation, the overall state of U.S.-Soviet
nsdd075: relations, and the difficulties in defining areas of mutual
nsdd075: agreement with an adversary which often seeks unilateral gains.
nsdd075: U.S. arms control proposals will be consistent with necessary
nsdd075: force modernization plans and will seek to achieve balanced,
nsdd075: significant, and verifiable
nsdd075: reductions to equal levels of comparable armaments. ~~(S)~~

nsdd075: 2. Official Dialogue: The U.S. should insist that Moscow address
nsdd075: the full range of U.S. concerns about Soviet internal behavior and
nsdd075: human rights violations, and should continue to resist Soviet
nsdd075: efforts to return to a U.S.-Soviet agenda focused primarily on
nsdd075: arms control. U.S.-Soviet diplomatic contact on regional issues
nsdd075: can serve U.S. interests if they are used to keep pressure on
nsdd075: Moscow for responsible behavior. Such contacts can

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nsdd075: also be useful in driving home to Moscow that the costs of
nsdd075: irresponsibility are high, and that the U.S. is prepared to work
nsdd075: for pragmatic solutions of regional problems if Moscow is willing
nsdd075: seriously to address U.S. concerns. At the same time, such
nsdd075: contacts must be handled with care to avoid offering the Soviet
nsdd075: Union a role in regional questions it would not otherwise secure.
nsdd075: ~~(S)~~

nsdd075: A continuing dialogue with the Soviets at Foreign Minister level
nsdd075: facilitates necessary diplomatic communication with the Soviet
nsdd075: leadership and helps to maintain Allied understanding and support
nsdd075: for U.S. approach to East-West relations. A summit between
nsdd075: President Reagan and his Soviet counterpart might promise
nsdd075: similarly beneficial results. At the same time, unless it were
nsdd075: carefully handled a summit could be seen as registering an
nsdd075: improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations without the changes in Soviet
nsdd075: behavior which we have insisted upon. It could therefore generate
nsdd075: unrealizable expectations and further stimulate unilateral Allied
nsdd075: initiatives toward Moscow. ~~(S)~~

nsdd075: A summit would not necessarily involve signature of major new
nsdd075: U.S.-Soviet agreements. Any summit meeting should achieve the

nsdd075: maximum possible positive impact with U.S. Allies and the American
nsdd075: public, while making clear to both audiences that improvement in
nsdd075: Soviet-American relations depends on changes in Soviet conduct. A
nsdd075: summit without such changes must not be understood to signal such
nsdd075: improvement. ~~(S)~~

nsdd075: 3. U.S.-Soviet Cooperative Exchanges: The role of U.S.-Soviet
nsdd075: cultural, educational, scientific and other cooperative exchanges
nsdd075: should be seen in light of the U.S. intention to maintain a strong
nsdd075: ideological component in relations with Moscow. The U.S. should
nsdd075: not further dismantle the framework of exchanges; indeed those
nsdd075: exchanges which could advance the U.S. objective of promoting
nsdd075: positive evolutionary change within the Soviet system should be
nsdd075: expanded. At the same time, the U.S. will insist on full
nsdd075: reciprocity and encourage its Allies to do so as well. This
nsdd075: recognizes that unless the U.S. has an effective official
nsdd075: framework for handling exchanges, the Soviets will make separate
nsdd075: arrangements with private U.S. sponsors, while denying reciprocal
nsdd075: access to the Soviet Union. U.S. policy on exchanges must also
nsdd075: take into account the necessity to prevent transfer of sensitive
nsdd075: U.S. technology to the Soviet Union. ~~(S)~~

nsdd075: Priorities in the U.S. Approach: Maximizing Restraining Leverage
nsdd075: over Soviet Behavior

nsdd075: The interrelated tasks of containing and reversing Soviet
nsdd075: expansion and promoting evolutionary change within the Soviet
nsdd075: Union itself cannot be accomplished quickly. The coming 5-10
nsdd075: years will be a period of considerable uncertainty in which the
nsdd075: Soviets may test U.S. resolve by continuing the kind of aggressive
nsdd075: international behavior which the U.S. finds unacceptable. (S)

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nsdd075: The uncertainties will be exacerbated by the fact that the Soviet
nsdd075: Union will be engaged in the unpredictable process of political
nsdd075: succession to Brezhnev. The U.S. will not seek to adjust its
nsdd075: policies to the Soviet internal conflict, but rather try to create
nsdd075: incentives (positive and negative) for the new leadership to adopt
nsdd075: policies less detrimental to U.S. interests. The U.S. will remain
nsdd075: ready for improved U.S.-Soviet relations if the Soviet Union makes
nsdd075: significant changes in policies of concern to it; the burden for
nsdd075: any further deterioration in relations must fall squarely on
nsdd075: Moscow. The U.S. must not yield to pressures to "take the first
nsdd075: step." ~~(S)~~

nsdd075: The existing and projected gap between finite U.S. resources and
nsdd075: the level of capabilities needed to implement U.S. strategy makes
nsdd075: it essential that the U.S.: (1) establish firm priorities for the
nsdd075: use of limited U.S. resources where they will have the greatest
nsdd075: restraining impact on the Soviet Union; and (2) mobilize the
nsdd075: resources of Allies and friends which are willing to join the U.S.
nsdd075: in containing the expansion of Soviet power. ~~(S)~~

nsdd075: Underlying the full range of U.S. and Western policies must be a
nsdd075: strong military capable of action across the entire spectrum of
nsdd075: potential conflicts and guided by a well conceived political and

nsdd075: military strategy. The heart of U.S. military strategy is to
nsdd075: deter attack by the USSR and its allies against the U.S., its
nsdd075: Allies, or other important countries, and to defeat such an attack
nsdd075: should deterrence fail. Although unilateral U.S. efforts must
nsdd075: lead the way in rebuilding Western military strength to counter
nsdd075: the Soviet threat, the protection of Western interests will
nsdd075: require increased U.S. cooperation with Allied and other states
nsdd075: and greater utilization of their resources. This military
nsdd075: strategy will be combined with a political strategy attaching high
nsdd075: priority to the following objectives:

nsdd075: --
nsdd075: Sustaining steady, long-term growth in U.S. defense spend
nsdd075: capabilities -- both nuclear and conventional. This is the most
nsdd075: important way of conveying to the Soviets U.S. resolve and
nsdd075: political staying power.

nsdd075: --
nsdd075: Creating a long-term Western consensus for dealing with
t
nsdd075: Soviet Union. This will require that the U.S. exercise strong
nsdd075: leadership in developing policies to deal with the multifaceted
nsdd075: Soviet threat to Western interests. It will require that the U.S.
nsdd075: Allies take into equal account U.S. concerns. In this connection,
nsdd075: and in addition to pushing Allies to spend more on defense, the
nsdd075: U.S. must make a serious effort to negotiate arms control
nsdd075: agreements consistent with U.S. military strategy and necessary
nsdd075: force modernization plans, and should seek to achieve balanced,
nsdd075: significant and verifiable reductions to equal levels of comparable
nsdd075: armaments. The U.S. must also develop, together with the Allies,
nsdd075: a unified Western approach to East-West economic relations,
nsdd075: implementing the agreement announced on November 13, 1982.

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nsdd075: --
nsdd075: Maintenance of a strategic relationship with China, and
e
nsdd075: to minimize opportunities for a Sino-Soviet rapprochement.

nsdd075: --
nsdd075: Building and sustaining a major ideological/political of
f
nsdd075: which, together with other efforts, will be designed to bring
nsdd075: about evolutionary change of the Soviet system. This must be a
nsdd075: long-term and sophisticated program, given the nature of the
nsdd075: Soviet system.

nsdd075: --
nsdd075: Effective opposition to Moscow's efforts to consolidate
i
nsdd075: position in Afghanistan. This will require that the U.S. continue
nsdd075: efforts to promote Soviet withdrawal in the context of a
nsdd075: negotiated settlement of the conflict. At the same time, the U.S.
nsdd075: must keep pressure on Moscow for withdrawal and ensure that
nsdd075: Soviet costs on the ground are high.

nsdd075: --
nsdd075: Blocking the expansion of Soviet influence in the critic
a
nsdd075: East and Southwest Asia regions. This will require both continued
nsdd075: efforts to seek a political solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict

nsdd075: and to holster U.S. relations with moderate states in the region,
nsdd075: and a sustained U.S. defense commitment to deter Soviet military
nsdd075: encroachments.
nsdd075:
nsdd075: -- Maintenance of international pressure on Moscow to
p
nsdd075: a relaxation of the current repression in Poland and a longer-term
nsdd075: increase in diversity and independence throughout Eastern Europe.
nsdd075: This will require that the U.S. continue to impose costs on the
nsdd075: Soviet Union for its behavior in Poland. It will also require
nsdd075: that the U.S. maintain a U.S. policy of differentiation among East
nsdd075: European countries.
nsdd075:
nsdd075: -- Neutralization and reduction of the threat to U.S.
nsdd075: national security interests posed by the Soviet-Cuban
nsdd075: relationship. This will require that the U.S. use a variety of
nsdd075: instruments, including diplomatic efforts and U.S. security and
nsdd075: economic assistance. The U.S. must also retain the option of
nsdd075: using of its military forces to protect vital U.S. security
nsdd075: interests against threats which may arise from the SovietCuban
nsdd075: connection. (S)
nsdd075:
nsdd075: Articulating the U.S. Approach: Sustaining Public and
nsdd075: Congressional
nsdd075:
nsdd075: The policy outlined above is one for the long haul. It is
nsdd075: unlikely to yield a rapid breakthrough in bilateral relations with
nsdd075: the Soviet Union. In the absence of dramatic near-term victories
nsdd075: in the U.S. effort to moderate Soviet behavior, pressure is likely
nsdd075: to mount for change in U.S. policy. There will be appeals from
nsdd075: important segments of domestic opinion for a more "normal"
nsdd075: U.S.-Soviet relationship, particularly in a period of political
nsdd075: transition in Moscow. (S)
nsdd075:
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nsdd075:
nsdd075: ~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~
nsdd075:
nsdd075: It is therefore essential that the American people understand and
nsdd075: support U.S. policy. This will require that official U.S.
nsdd075: statements and actions avoid generating unrealizable expectations
nsdd075: for near-term progress in U.S.-Soviet relations. At the same
nsdd075: time, the U.S. must demonstrate credibly that its policy is not a
nsdd075: blueprint for an open-ended, sterile confrontation with Moscow,
nsdd075: but a serious search for a stable and constructive long-term basis
nsdd075: for U.S.-Soviet relations. (S)
nsdd075: RONALD REAGAN
nsdd075:
nsdd075: ~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~
nsdd075:
nsdd075:
nsdd075:

Fritz:

21

- I've assembled several papers we put together in the run-up to Geneva. Believe that process -- and the ~~auto~~ meeting -- went pretty well.
- You may want to review/peruse in preparation for another Summit

- Ty

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

8931

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

November 5, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: TYRUS W. COBB *TWC*

SUBJECT: President's Luncheon with Sovietologists --
Thursday, November 7, 1985 -- 12:00 Noon

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President on his Thursday luncheon with eminent Sovietologists. Your memorandum provides bio information on the six participants, reviews the primary topics of discussion, and outlines general subject areas that might usefully be covered.

We anticipate that you would begin the session with a brief comment on the participants' background and field of expertise and a summary of key topics to be addressed. I will forward a separate memorandum, suggesting talking points you may wish to use in guiding the luncheon discussion. The agenda calls for a rather formal sequencing of topics, but we fully expect that with a group as expert and confident as this, the discussion will become informal and lively early on.

Jack Matlock
Jack Matlock, Peter Sommer *P. Sommer* and Johnathan Miller *J. Miller* concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign and forward the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I	Memorandum for the President
Tab A	Proposed Agenda

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/8 #10110

BY RW NARA DATE 3/16/11

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONLUNCHEON WITH SOVIETOLOGISTS

DATE: November 7, 1985
LOCATION: Cabinet Room
TIME: 12:00 Noon-1:00 p.m.

FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE

I. PURPOSE

To review policy considerations in our long-term relationship with the Soviet Union and to analyze Gorbachev's domestic and foreign policy agenda with six leading specialists on the USSR.

II. BACKGROUND

Gorbachev's accession to power and your reversal of the adverse strategic trends of the 1970s create conditions which show some promise for the establishment of an improved Soviet-American relationship. This working luncheon with six eminent specialists on the Soviet Union is designed to offer you some fresh insights and critiques from experts outside the U.S. Government in preparation for your Geneva meetings.

At the outset, I will briefly introduce the six experts and review the key topics to be addressed. We have structured the session so that each participant can offer unique insights in his or her area of expertise. However, given the lively mix of specialists assembled, I believe the session will quickly become more informal and spontaneous.

III. PARTICIPANTS

William Hyland: Former Deputy to Henry Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft; past Head of State Department Intelligence; currently, Editor of Foreign Affairs. Participated in four previous summits. Leading expert on international security affairs and Soviet-American relations.

James Billington: Currently Director of the prestigious Wilson Center in Washington. Noted historian of Russian culture and ideology. While serving at CIA in the mid-1950s, wrote analyses for Eisenhower's 1955 summit.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-714/8 #1011

BY LOS NARA DATE 9/30/08

Arnold Horelick: Former National Intelligence Officer for the USSR; currently, Director of Soviet Studies at the Rand Corporation. One of our top experts on arms control issues and Soviet national security policy.

Nina Tumarkin: Professor of History at Wellesley; her particular expertise is Soviet domestic policy. Recently wrote a book entitled Lenin Lives, an inquiry into the Soviet use of ideology as a quasi-religious ritual to legitimize their power.

Adam Ulam: Leading historian of Soviet foreign policy. Professor of History and International Relations at Harvard University. Has argued that the American public must develop a combination of sophistication and patience in order to enable policymakers to combine tenacity of purpose with flexibility of tactics in dealing with the USSR.

Richard Pipes: Your former NSC expert on Soviet affairs; now back at Harvard. Leading authority on Russian history -- his Russia Under the Old Regime is the standard work in the field. Currently serving on your PFIAB and writing extensively on Soviet-American relations.

Complete participants list will be provided separately.

IV. PRESS PLAN

White House photographer only. Picture to be released.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

I will introduce the six Sovietologists and briefly review the primary issue areas to be addressed. Lunch will be served. If appropriate, I will make concluding remarks.

Prepared by:
Tyrus W. Cobb

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

PRESIDENT'S LUNCHEON WITH SOVIETOLOGISTS

Thursday, November 7, 1985
Cabinet Room
12:00 noon - 1:00 p.m.

Agenda

- I. Introduction.....Robert C. McFarlane
(5 minutes)
- II. Perspectives and Discussion (50 minutes)
- Trends in Soviet-American
 Relations..... Arnold Horelick
- Toward a New Strategic
 Relationship?..... William Hyland
- Gorbachev's Policy Choices..... Adam Ulam
- Soviet Society: Expectations
 and Mood..... Nina Tumarkin
- American Influence on Soviet
 Foreign Policy..... James Billington
- Directions for American Policy.....Richard Pipes
- III. Conclusion Robert C. McFarlane
(5 minutes)

SECRET [REDACTED]

Ermanth
input 26

SOVIET STRATEGY AND STRATEGIC THINKING

Underlying all the destructive weapons and forces are ideas about strategy. From the mid-1960s well into the 1970s, many influential Americans believed -- despite persuasive evidence to the contrary from Soviet military writings and agent sources such as Colonel Penkovsky -- that Soviet strategic thinking had to be very much like our own. In our familiar American tendency to attribute our own views and values to other peoples and their leaders, we tended to believe that, because we and the Soviets both faced the awesome problem of nuclear weapons, and we were both basically sensible people^s, we had to think about the management of this problem in roughly the same way. Maybe the Soviets weren't quite as sophisticated as we with all our think tanks and academic journals, but they would more or less follow our lead in strategic thinking.

Today, while this mistaken "mirror imaging" of our views on the Soviets persists in some circles, we know a lot better. The manner and size of the Soviet strategic and other force buildups of the last twenty years showed that the Soviets thought differently than we about strategy and military^{power}, including nuclear power. Study of the Soviet buildup, of Soviet military exercises and command structures, of their military writings (including very sensitive documents collected clandestinely) has taught us a great deal about Soviet strategy and military thinking. It underscores some important differences from our own.

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BY RW NARA DATE 3/16/11

This shouldn't have been surprising to us. After all, the Soviets are coming ✓
from a different place in geography, in history, and in political culture.
Although now a global military superpower, at least in nuclear terms, Soviet
Russia remains a continental superpower and, like Tsarist Russia, places a
high store on dominating its continental periphery. The influence of history
and political culture is often misunderstood as follows: Having been
frequently invaded by Europeans and Asiatics over the centuries, Russians are
seen as pathologically insecure; hence ~~the~~ they feel the need for massive
military power. There is some truth in this, but the essence is different.
First of all, growing from a small principality in Muscovy, Russia has spent
much more time invading and conquering than being invaded and conquered. The
Russian state was built by the autocratic princes of Moscow, not by the
merchants of the more westward-looking cities, such as Novgorod. For this
reason, Kremlin rulers have from Medieval times to the present seen their
security, indeed the legitimacy of their rule, to rest upon as much control
over people, their own and those around them, as they could get. These
attitudes toward political power have also shaped Russian and Soviet thinking
about strategy and military power.

Americans tend to think of military power as an unpleasant but necessary means
of preserving live-and-let-live conditions in a sometimes dangerous world.
The Soviets think of military power as a means of preserving and expanding
their authority. This makes their strategy both very defensive and very
offensive at the same time.

The structure, or architecture, of their strategy and their overall military forces displays this quality. The basic aims of Soviet military power in war, and also in peace, are to assure the survival of the political system at home and to enhance the projection of its power in the surrounding world. Hence the Soviets have been engaged in strategic, ~~defense~~, air, civil, and ABM defense, from the beginning of the nuclear era. We had strategic defenses in the 1950's, but gave them up in the 1960's, in favor of the deterrent "balance of terror" concept based on nuclear offensive forces. The second basic mission of Soviet military strength is to project power into the surrounding regions of Eurasia, especially Europe, but also in East Asia and southward toward the Middle East and Persian Gulf. Hence the enormous land combat forces, with their accompanying air and nuclear power, far more than they would need to retain control of East Europe or to deter attacks. By contrast, the US and NATO have seen our general purpose forces as a heavy trip wire to release the nuclear deterrent or as ^a means of dealing with very limited contingencies outside of Europe.

The Soviets see their long-range nuclear offensive forces as a deterrent, as we have. But to a much greater extent, they have also regarded these forces as long-range artillery support for backing up the other two primary missions of their forces: strategic defense of the homeland, through counterforce attacks on US nuclear forces and their command and control; and dominance of the Eurasian periphery, through attacks on nearby enemy forces and their bases.

In their thinking about nuclear weapons and nuclear war, the Soviets have never made the distinction between deterrence and warfighting capabilities that have been characteristic of US thinking. Nor have they discarded the notion of victory in nuclear war despite the assertion of Soviet leaders that nuclear war should not ~~be~~ occur (which they believe) and cannot be won (which they do not believe).

Even when, in the 1950's and early 1960's, they had too little nuclear force to implement their view, the Soviets developed and held to the notion that real deterrent power had to be real warfighting power as well. This is because they believed that they had not only to deter attacks on them, but as far as they could, to encourage acceptance of their aims around the world short of a major war. This required nuclear warfighting strength. Moreover, they believed that nuclear war could actually occur, and, if it did, it would have to be fought for rational political and military aims, despite the awesome destructiveness of nuclear weapons. This is why they have developed a comprehensive array of counterforce nuclear weapons, such as the SS-18 against our silos and SS-20s against Eurasian military targets, and homeland defenses, including civil defense.

Soviet political and military leaders appreciate full well that any large nuclear war would be horribly destructive for their country and potentially lethal for their system. This has not, however, nullified their belief in the possibility of victory in nuclear war. For one thing, the ideology on which

their system rests prevents that belief from being discarded. For them to really believe that the handiwork of humans, such as nuclear weapons, could write the end to Soviet and even human history would mean that Marx and Lenin were wrong in a fundamental respect. More important, however, the Soviets have never believed that nuclear war, even a very large scale war, was likely to take the form of a mindless exchange of massive attacks on cities. Rather they have tended to believe that a major nuclear war would involve attacks of varying intensity and timing on a wide range of military targets, after which one side or the other would quit or collapse, but societies as such could survive, especially if they provided for active and civil defense.

Over the years they have built up offensive and defensive capabilities for this kind of nuclear war. Moreover, as their capabilities have grown, their concept of a major war between the superpowers has evolved as has their concept of victory. This evolution continues, and we are trying to track it in their military exercises and literature. What appears to be happening is a growing Soviet belief that their powerful nuclear forces along with their general purpose forces can enforce a different kind of victory, by deterring US use of nuclear weapons at least on a large scale, while general purpose forces, supported if necessary by the required nuclear strikes, can conquer Europe and perhaps other regions nearby. The US would have to accept the result rather than be destroyed in a massive exchange. But the US would be reduced to a secondary power, while the USSR would emerge preeminent.

The key to this kind of thinking lies in the combination of all Soviet forces: strategic nuclear, general purpose, and homeland defense. The Soviets do not separate them into distinct categories quite the way we do. In combination, they could allow victory in a large scale, general, but still not absolutely allout nuclear conflict. The Soviets do not see this outcome as certain, by any means; but it is a possibility that the design of their forces and strategies can make more probable if it ever comes to a war.

In the meantime, the Soviets believe that this overall force combination, along with increasing ability to project power at a distance, e.g., into the Third World, enhances the image of the USSR as a superpower and enhances their "persuasiveness" (i.e., ability to intimidate) vis-a-vis neighboring countries. Power projection into the Third World, which includes military deliveries, insurgency and counterinsurgency operations, as well as military bases and forces, has become a fourth pillar of the Soviet strategic architecture, along with strategic defense, Eurasian dominance, and long-range nuclear strike.

From another perspective one can say that Soviet strategy has been designed over the past forty years to defeat American strategy in war and also in peacetime power politics. Historically, the US has relied on long-range nuclear sanctions plus relatively weaker forward forces to protect its exposed allies near the USSR. The USSR has built forces to dominate over the regions where US allies are located while also negating the credibility of US

long-range nuclear guarantees. Desiring to avoid any war or major test of strength, the Soviets have hoped that this combination would gradually demoralize the US and its allies in peacetime, leading to the erosion of our security commitments, the collapse of our alliances and the replacement of the US by the USSR as the predominant world power.

In the late 1970s, the Soviets developed a detectable confidence that trends in the "correlation of forces", by which they mean political as well as military forces, ^{were} ~~was~~ moving in a direction favorable to this prognosis. In the 1980s, however, the US and its allies have been more determined to resist ^{esse} ~~this~~ trend, undermining Soviet confidence that this is the way things will go. On the contrary, they now see factors that could -- not necessarily will -- turn these trends around.

From a strictly military point of view, the most worrisome new factors, other than the increase of US defense efforts and renewed commitment to global security, lie in the combination of SDI and the new non-nuclear technologies for conventional defense the US is pursuing. All sources of information indicate how concerned the Soviets are about SDI. Interestingly, Soviet marshals write even more eloquently about their concern over the new conventional defense technologies. Together they challenge the primacy of the twin darlings of Soviet military power: the long-range ballistic missile and the tank. If the US and NATO actually develop and deploy such capabilities, they will undermine the offensive pillars of the Soviet strategic

architecture. The USSR may be no less secure in the strictly military sense, as a result, but it will be less capable of casting an intimidating shadow over its neighbors. This is why Soviet propaganda, diplomacy, and arms control policy are trying to stop SDI and other US defense programs, and, more generally, to encourage the US to return to the behavior and strategic doctrines we exhibited in the 1970s, which the Soviets found quite comfortable. Because Soviet superpower status rests so heavily on offensive military power combinations, the loss of this edge, so the Kremlin fears, will negate Soviet superpower status and ultimately undermine the legitimacy of Kremlin rule itself.

In the end, the challenge of the USSR to Western security and values stems more from the nature of its system than from the content of its strategies and military thought. If the rulers of the Soviet Union could somehow be brought to relent in their determination to control everybody they can reach, at home and abroad, their marshals and generals -- who are intelligent and rational men -- could readily come up with military strategies and force postures which would allow the USSR to be a secure and constructive participant in the world community. For that to happen, however, they have to be shown that the strategies they have followed patiently for thirty years will not work.

*Received by
Fritz Ermath,
CIA*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The President has approved

Cobb

9127

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

NOV 12 PM 2 19

November 12, 1985

MEETING WITH SOVIET ANALYSTS

DATE: November 13, 1985
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: 2:45 pm to 3:30 pm
FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *DFM for*

I. PURPOSE

To provide you with the intelligence community's assessment of Soviet politico-military strategy, Gorbachev's objectives for his meeting with you, and domestic stresses impacting on Soviet decision-making.

II. BACKGROUND

In preparation for your meetings with the General Secretary, the intelligence community has undertaken an extensive series of analyses of the internal and foreign situation confronting Gorbachev. Bill Casey has asked to bring in three of his top Sovietologists to present you with their key judgments on those factors most likely to influence Gorbachev as he prepares for his meeting with you. He will then call on:

- Robert Gates: Bill's Deputy Director for Intelligence at the CIA and former NSC Senior Staffer under Kissinger. Bob will begin the discussion with a brief overview of the intelligence community's analysis of Gorbachev's objectives in his meeting with you.
- Fritz Ermarth: National Intelligence Officer for the Soviet Union and former NSC Senior Staffer under Zbig Brzezinski. Fritz will present his assessment of major trends in Soviet politico-military strategy.
- [REDACTED] One of the best analysts on Soviet domestic policy in the Central Intelligence Agency. [REDACTED] will discuss the internal Soviet situation, focusing on domestic stresses facing Gorbachev, and how these factors may influence his foreign and defense policies.

III. PARTICIPANTS

Attached at Tab A.

cc Vice President
Don Regan

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IV. PRESS PLAN

Photo op at beginning of session.

v. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

I will briefly lay out the purpose of this session, and turn it over to Bill Casey and his analysts. Following their presentations, the Sovietologists will be prepared to respond to your questions. If appropriate, I will make concluding remarks.

Attachments

Tab A - Participants List

Prepared by:
Tyrus W. Cobb

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

A

PARTICIPANTS LIST FOR MEETING WITH SOVIET ANALYSTS

Wednesday, November 13, 1985
(Time to be determined)

The President

The Vice President

Donald T. Regan

Robert C. McFarlane

William J. Casey, DCI

Robert Gates, Deputy Director, CIA

Fritz Ermarth, NIO For Soviet Affairs, CIA

[REDACTED] Soviet Analyst, CIA

Jack F. Matlock

Tyrus W. Cobb (notetaker)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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ACTION

SIGNED

November 12, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK/TYRUS W. COBB

SUBJECT: Briefing Memo for President's Meeting with
Soviet Analysts -- Wednesday, November 13, 1985

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President, providing background for his Wednesday meeting with the Soviet Analysts from CIA. Your memo gives brief bio information on the analysts, and outlines areas expected to be covered in the session.

RECOMMENDATION

1. That you review and forward the memo to the President at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

2. That you review your suggested talking points for the meeting at Tab II.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Jwd for Bob Linnard and *Kd* Ken deGraffenreid concur.

Attachments

Tab I	Memo to the President
	Tab A - Participants List
Tab II	Your Suggested Talking Points

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TALKING POINTS

- Mr. President, at Bill's suggestion, we have brought three of the intelligence community's top specialists on Soviet Affairs in today to provide you with the key judgments from a series of analyses we have undertaken to assess Soviet politico-military strategy and domestic concerns facing Gorbachev.
- Bill will introduce his analysts and the topics they will cover.

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BY RW NARA DATE 3/16/11

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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Add-on #2

~~SECRET~~

September 19, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: TYRUS W. COBB/JACK F. MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Your Talking Points for Shevardnadze NSC Meeting,
Friday, September 20, 1985 -- 11:00 a.m.

Attached at Tab A are suggested talking points for your use for the Shevardnadze NSC meeting tomorrow. As we had discussed you would begin this session with an introduction highlighting to the President that this session is intended to serve as a strategic overview of our broad policy toward the Soviet Union and to examine the major issues on your bilateral, regional and human rights agenda. In addition, we recommend that you review for the President our public diplomacy strategy and highlight the key events between now and November 18 that present opportunities for us to convey our position convincingly to the American and Allied publics -- and to the Soviet leadership. You might then turn to Secretary Shultz who will follow with a review of the key Soviet-American issues in the three areas and delineate our objectives for the meeting with Gorbachev. Bill Casey is prepared to follow with a five minute presentation on Soviet objectives, followed by Cap who will treat Soviet defense concerns generally.

The Agenda for the NSC meeting is at Tab B.

Ron Lehman, Bob Linhard and Johnathan Miller concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you review the suggested talking points at Tab A.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab A Suggested Talking Points

Tab B Proposed Agenda

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BY RW NARA DATE 3/16/11

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TALKING POINTS FOR SHEVARDNADZE NSC MEETING

- Mr. President, this NSC meeting should serve as a forum to provide you with a strategic overview of the broad direction we hope to pursue in dealing with the Soviet leadership over the next two months. We will also review the major issues on our bilateral, human rights, and regional agendas. We would prefer to hold off any analysis of arms control issues until next week.

- Before I turn to George I would like to briefly review our public diplomacy approach to the Geneva meeting and the key events around which our strategy will be focused.

- Five public diplomacy milestones will generate the most media and public interest. We will reinforce with briefings, backgrounders and public statements.
 1. George's September 24 speech to the UNGA.
 2. His meeting the following day with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and the Soviet FM's own speech to the UN.
 3. Your meeting here with Shevardnadze on September 27.
 4. Gorbachev's October 2-5 visit to France.
 5. Your speech to the UNGA and that of Soviet President Andrei Gromyko if he comes to New York.

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BY RW

DATE 3/16/11

- Believe that Gorbachev will trigger a new round of media interest when he visits France. Judgment is that his novelty value is wearing off. He has failed to convince European publics that his many proposals are more than old Soviet propaganda in new packaging. You will be giving a written interview to a French newspaper, Le Figaro, to get your own views before that same audience.
- We will stress that our Agenda for the meeting includes arms control, but goes much farther in an attempt to engage the Soviets on the many other sources of tension between us, including Human Rights, Afghanistan and their expansionist policies. We want, in other words, to discuss the sources of tension between us as well as the symptoms of it.
- We will want to demonstrate the Soviets' responsibility for Geneva results. Will stress that we want to make the meeting a success but we have no illusions. We are neither naive nor negative in our approach.
- Finally, Mr. President, your own role will include, in addition to your UNGA speech and your November press conference -- a series of press lunches with influential newsmen, a number of television and radio interviews for both foreign and domestic media, and a speech to the world via Worldnet. We hope to organize a well-publicized meeting with congressional leaders shortly before your departure.

- Mr. President, George Shultz will now provide a review of the major Soviet-American issues in the three areas and delineate our key objectives for the meeting with Shevardnadze and, later, with Gorbachev.

- Bill Casey will now provide his perspective on Soviet expectations and objectives for these meetings.

- Cap will now present another perspective, focusing on key security concerns.

- I would like now to open this session to general discussion, Mr. President, to focus not only on the key issues in the areas we have discussed, but to stimulate our thinking with respect to our overall approach toward the Soviet Union.

- Mr. President, this concludes your briefing.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

Friday, September 20, 1985
11:00 a.m. - 12:00 Noon
Cabinet Room

AGENDA

- I. Introduction.....Robert C. McFarlane
(5 minutes)
- II. Objectives for Geneva Meetings
and Perspectives of the
Shevardnadze Meeting.....Secretary Shultz
(10 minutes)
- III. Intelligence Review on Soviet
Expectations.....William P. Casey
(5 minutes)
- IV. Defense Perspective.....Secretary Weinberger
(5 minutes)
- V. Discussion.....All Participants
(30 minutes)
- VI. Conclusion.....Robert C. McFarlane
(5 minutes)

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By smf NARA, Date 7/24/02

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 12, 1985

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Soviet Quotations

In a recent meeting the President asked his staff to try to verify several quotes attributed to Soviet leaders. Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President advising him which quotations were successfully traced.

Speechwriters' research contacted Albert Weeks, author of the book from which the quotes were taken, and was given the references at Tab A. We forwarded this information to the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, which attempted to verify each of the specific citations. State's detailed findings are at Tab II.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I informing him which quotations could be verified.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Ty Cobb, Walt Raymond, and Judyt Mandel concur.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Original list of quotations with references from
Albert Weeks
Tab II State Department findings

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By *smf* NARA, Date *7/24/02*~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONACTION~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Soviet Quotations

Issue

Whether to review the attached quotations attributed to Soviet leaders.

Facts

You asked your staff to try to verify the authenticity of the quotations attached at Tab A.

Discussion


Of the sixteen quotations cited at Tab A, we have been able to verify five: numbers 2, 3, 10, 14, and 15. The others were either found to be inaccurate or were not found at all.

RecommendationOKNo

That you review the quotations cited above as accurate.

Attachment:

Tab A List of quotations

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QUOTES AND SOURCES

1. Andropov: "Marxism-Leninism is the textbook for achieving Socialist world revolution and the building of a new society in every country of the world."

Source: Yuri Andropov, Izbranniye Rechi i Stat'i, Politizdat, Moscow, 1979, p. 73.

2. Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky; Chief Soviet General Staff 1952-1961; "In the present era, the struggle for peace and for gaining time presumes, above all, the steady strengthening of the military might of the Soviet Union and of the entire Socialist camp."

Source: Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky, Military Strategy, 1st and 2nd eds, translated by Harriet F. Scott, Crane, Russak & Company, Inc., N.Y., 1975, pp. 185 and 431.

3. Leonid Brezhnev 1970: "We seek to paralyze the forces of imperialism in Europe and to smash their aggressive plans. This means not only to contract the radius of activity of imperialism, but to inflict on it such defeat that it will be felt everywhere throughout the world."

Source: Leonid I. Brezhnev, op. cit. supra, Vol. 2, p. 9.

4. Leonid Brezhnev: "...detente, in fact, creates favorable conditions for the struggle between the two systems [and for altering the correlation of forces in favor of Socialism.]"

Source: Leonid I. Brezhnev, Leninskim Kursom (Leninist Course), Politizdat, Moscow, 1976, p. 485. The phrase in brackets should have been bracketed originally to indicate a different Soviet source: Radio Moscow lecture by S. S. Vishnevsky, August 29, 1973. Moreover, the most extended discussion by Brezhnev of the "detente-creates-favorable-conditions" for global class struggle and a Soviet victory in it can be found in Brezhnev's political report to the 25th Party Congress, February-March 1976.

5. Leonid Brezhnev; Prague, 1973: "Trust us comrades, for by 1985, as a consequence of what we are achieving by means of detente, we will have achieved most of our objectives in Western Europe... a decisive shift in the correlation of forces will be such that by 1985, we will be able to exert our will whenever we need to."

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Source: William Beecher (from British intelligence), The Boston Globe, Feb. 11, 1977, quoted in Brian Crozier, Strategy of Survival, Arlington House Publishers, New Rochelle, N.Y., 1978, p. 76. There is a dispute among specialists as to the authenticity of this quote. Yet authentication has come from other sources than Mr. Beecher or Mr. Crozier: e.g., Gen. Jan Sejna, We Will Bury You, Sidgwick & Jackson, London, p. 112, has a similar quote from Brezhnev that Gen. Sejna heard directly from the Soviet leader when the former was on a high-level visit to Moscow in 1966. Brezhnev is supposed to have made the observation quoted by Beecher at a secret Pact leaders' meeting in Prague in 1973.

6. S. S. Lototsky, "...the armed forces, the population, the whole Soviet nation, must be prepared for the eventuality of nuclear rocket war."

Source: Soviet Army; Progress Publishers; Moscow 1971; p. 332.

7. Marshal A. A. Grechko; Soviet Minister of Defense 1967-1976; 1974: "Any war waged by the imperialists on the USSR or other Socialist states will be unjust and reactionary. When waged by the USSR or other Socialist states against imperialism, any war is just and progressive, for it would be the continuation of revolutionary policy."

Source: Marshal A. A. Grechko, The Armed Forces of the Soviet State, Soviet Military Thought No. 12 (USAF trans.), pp. 100ff.

8. Marshal A. A. Grechko: "No compromise is possible between the Communist and bourgeois ideologies, and conflict between the two is inevitable."

Source: close approximation: In A. S. Milovidov, et al., The Philosophical Heritage of V. I. Lenin and Problems of Contemporary War, Voenizdat, Moscow, 1972, p. 216.

9. Boris N. Ponomarev; Communist Party Secretary: "Violence in itself is not an evil. It depends on what it's purpose is. In the hands of Socialists, it is a progressive force."

Source: B. N. Ponomarev, Real Socialism and Its International Significance, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1979, pp. 14-15.

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10. Andrei Gromyko, 1978: "Detente in no way, however, means the freezing of the objective processes of historical development. In no way does it eliminate the existence of class antagonisms within capitalist states, between the people's interests and those of world imperialism, and between the two social systems, nor does it reduce the ideological confrontation."

Source: A. A. Gromyko, Vo Imya Torzhestva Leninskoi Vneshnei Politiki Izbranniye Rechi i Stat'i (In the Name of the Triumph of Leninist Foreign Policy Selected Speeches and Articles), Politizdat, Moscow, 1978, p. 472.

11. Premier Alexei Kosygin, 1978: "Russia and its allies will control the high seas, space, and most of the world's landmass by the early 1980's."

Source: Premier Alexei Kosygin to Imelda Marcos of the Philippines, quoted in Newsweek, July 24, 1978.

12. Marshal N. V. Ogarkov; Chief of the Soviet General Staff; 1979: "The Soviet Union has military superiority over the U.S. Henceforth, the United States will be threatened. It had better get used to it."

Source: Marshal N. V. Ogarkov, to visiting U.S. Congressmen in 1979, quoted by Dr. Alvin J. Rubinstein, Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II, Winthrop Publishers, Cambridge, 1981, p. 166. In personal conversation with Rubinstein, Dr. Weeks was told that several Congressmen heard this remark and that it was reported in the U.S. press.

13. General Major A. S. Molovidov, 1980, to Dr. Y. A. Zhdanov in "Questions of Philosophy," a Soviet Journal, October 1980: "Marxist-Leninists decisively reject the assertions of certain bourgeois theoreticians who consider nuclear missile war unjust from any point of view."

Secondary Source: War and Peace: Soviet Russia Speaks. Edited by Albert L. Weeks and William C. Bodie, 1983; National Strategy Information Center, Inc., 111 East 58th Street, New York, N.Y. 10022, p. 14.

14. Pravda, 1955: "We cannot be intimidated by fables that in the event of a new world war, civilization will perish."

Source: Pravda, Mar. 27, 1955.

15. Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky: "Under conditions where nuclear rockets are used... that side which manages during the first days of the war to penetrate more deeply into enemy territory naturally acquires the capability for more effectively using the results of its nuclear attacks and disrupting the mobilization of the enemy. This is especially important with respect to European theatres of operations with the relatively small operative depth."

Source: Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky, Military Strategy, 1st and 2nd eds, trans. by Harriet F. Scott, Crane, Russak & Company, Inc., N.Y., 1975, p. 312.

16. "On the Communist side, nuclear war will be lawful and just -- the natural right and sacred duty of progressive mankind to destroy imperialism. It will resolve not specific limited political interests, but a crucial historical problem, one that affects the fate of all mankind."

Source: B. A. Byely, et al., eds, Marxism-Leninism on War and Army, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1972 (based on Russian 5th ed of 1968), p. 45.

1. The source could not be located.

2. We did not find the quote in the Garthoff's first edition of the book. We telephoned the editor of the Harriet F. Scott, Crane, Russak & Company, Inc. edition of the book who confirmed the inclusion of the quote in their third edition on page 185. O.K. } 

3. The citation is located in Leninskii Kursom, volume 2, in Russian. O.K.

4. The first ~~source was located~~ but the ~~citation was not present~~. The passage in Brezhnev's political report to the 25th Party Congress, February-March 1976, that is most likely the one referred to reads: "Detente does not in the slightest way abolish, and cannot abolish or change the laws of the class struggle."

5. The citation appears in the secondary source Strategy on Survival.

~~This frequently cited quotation has never been authenticated. Soviet media have denied the quotation~~ whenever it has been used.

6. The source could not be located.

7. ~~The source was located and the citation was not present.~~

8. ~~The source was located and the citation was not present.~~

9. The source could not be located.

10. The source was located and the citation was present. O.K.

11. The source was located and the citation was present. However, it is not a direct quotation of Kosygin but is what ~~Mrs. Imela Marcos~~ is reported as stating what Kosygin said. It would not have been likely that Kosygin said it in these terms.

12. The 1985 edition of the source was located but the ~~citation is incorrect~~. The citation in the 1985 edition of Dr. Rubenstein's book is not a direct quotation. It reads:

"Ogarkov reiterated that the USSR was not seeking nuclear superiority and noted that the United States did not seem reconciled to the Soviet Union's attainment of nuclear parity, but instead yearned for the old days of its former nuclear superiority, which, he added, was a thing of the past, as the United States would have to learn to accept."

13. The citation is ~~unsubstantiated because it cites itself~~ as a secondary source and fails to give a primary source.

14. The citation was found in "Current Digest of the Soviet Press" in English. The citation was in the Pravda source in its correct form. O.K.

15. Garthoff's first edition of the source was located and the citation was ~~essentially correct~~; Garthoff's edition has a slightly different translation than the quote on your list. OK.

16. The source was located. The ~~first sentence~~ of the citation is ~~out of context and inaccurate~~. The second sentence is essentially correct and in context. The full paragraph from which the first sentence is taken reads:

"The social, class content of nuclear missile war and its aims will be determined by politics. The new world war will be, on one side, the continuation, weapon and instrument of criminal imperialist policies being implemented with nuclear missiles. On the other side, it will be the lawful and just counteraction to aggression, the natural right and sacred duty of progressive mankind to destroy imperialism, its bitterest enemy, the source of destructive wars."

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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ACTION

November 11, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: TYRUS W. COBB / JACK F. MATLOCK

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting on Regional/Bilateral Issues,
Wednesday, November 13, 1985 -- 1:00 p.m.

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President providing background on the NSC meeting scheduled for November 13, 1985, at 1:00 p.m. in the Cabinet Room. The memorandum includes a proposed agenda at Tab A. The list of participants and the talking points for your use will be provided in a separate package.

Per your instruction, this NSC meeting is designed to serve as a final review of the major issues between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in the bilateral, regional and human rights areas. We would anticipate that you would begin this session with an introduction highlighting to the President that the focus of this session will be on bilateral, human rights and regional issues in our relationship with the Soviet Union. You might then turn to Secretary Shultz, who will follow with a review of the key Soviet-American issues in these areas and delineate our objectives for the meetings with Gorbachev.

Recommendation

That you sign and forward the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Proposed Agenda
Tab B List of Participants

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NLRR FD6-114/8 #10118

BY RW NARA DATE 3/16/11

~~SECRET~~

MEETING WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

DATE: November 13, 1985
LOCATION: Cabinet Room
TIME: 1:00 p.m. - 2:00 p.m.

FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE

I. PURPOSE

To review bilateral and regional issues for your Geneva meeting with General-Secretary Gorbachev.

II. BACKGROUND

Today's session will focus on the bilateral, regional and human rights issues between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. We will hold the remaining arms control issues for a future session.

-- Regional Issues

While public attention has focused on the arms control aspects of our relationship, the Soviet use of force outside Soviet borders lies at the root of our problems. We are particularly concerned with the Soviet tendency to employ military force, directly or through surrogates, in their conduct of foreign policy. In the 1970s our efforts to develop an understanding with the U.S.S.R. was severely impaired by Moscow's unrelenting pursuit of unilateral advantage. Your proposal in your UNGA Address was directed at this problem.

We will look to our own strength, as well as closer cooperation with our Allies and friends, to defend our interests. We will make it clear to Gorbachev that we will continue to pursue such policy as necessary--in Central America, the Middle East, Africa or elsewhere. Further, we will not foreswear the right the lend assistance to democratic elements when they appeal to us to resist aggression. At the same time we are seeking to expand our dialogue with the Soviet Union on regional issues. As you know, this year we have had discussions on the Middle East, Southern Africa, Afghanistan and Asia.

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BY RW NARA DATE 3/16/11

-- Bilateral Issues

It may be possible to complete several negotiations on issues such as exchanges and consulates in time for our November meeting. If the Soviets are not forthcoming on these issues, we are prepared to continue our discussions in the future. The important thing is to get agreements which can stand up to the test of time and are firmly grounded on each side's interests.

In addition to the negotiations on an exchanges agreement, resumption of air service and opening consulates in Kiev and New York, you proposed to Shevardnadze that we undertake a series of more ambitious projects. The Soviets have indicated that they will respond favorably to some of these, and have proposed that we co-sponsor a major international project to build a prototype thermo-nuclear power plant.

-- Human Rights

The Human Rights situation in the Soviet Union has, if anything, deteriorated since Gorbachev took power. However, there have been recent indications that the Soviets may be prepared to move on some of the outstanding cases. We understand, for example, that Mrs. Bonner-Sakharov has been given permission to leave the Soviet Union for medical treatment.

We want to emphasize to Gorbachev that we consider human rights an integral part of our relationship and an area where the Soviets can do much to improve relations at a low cost to themselves. Some of these points are best made privately with Soviet interlocutors, to give them the opportunity to adjust their practices without being seen as backing down under U.S. pressure.

III. PARTICIPANTS

Attached at Tab B.

IV. PRESS PLAN

Photo opportunity in the Cabinet room prior to the meeting.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

I will introduce the subject highlighting the main issues, followed by George, who will provide a review of the key Soviet-American bilateral and regional issues. Following a 40-minute discussion, I will make some concluding remarks.

Prepared by:
Tyrus W. Cobb/Jack Matlock

Attachment

Tab A Agenda
Tab B List of Participants

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

Wednesday, November 13, 1985

1:00 p.m. - 2:00 p.m.

Cabinet Room

AGENDA

I. Introduction	Robert C. McFarlane (5 minutes)
II. Regional/Bilateral Issues	Secretary Shultz (10 minutes)
III. Discussion	All Participants (40 minutes)
IV. Conclusion	Robert C. McFarlane (5 minutes)

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By Smf NARA, Date 7/24/02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

National Security Council Meeting
November 13, 1985, 1:00 p.m.-2:00 p.m., Cabinet Room

SUBJECT: National Security Meeting -- Regional/Bilateral Issues

PARTICIPANTS:

The President
The Vice President
Secretary of State Shultz
Secretary of Treasury Baker
Secretary of Defense Weinberger
Attorney General Edwin Meese
Mr. Donald T. Regan
Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
Dr. Alton Keel, OMB
Director William J. Casey, CIA
Admiral William J. Crowe, CJCS
Mr. David L. Chew
Mr. Craig L. Fuller
Admiral John M. Poindexter
Ambassador Jack F. Matlock
Dr. Tyrus C. Cobb

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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ACTION

November 14, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. McFLOCK/TYRUS W. COBB

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting on Geneva, November 15, 1985,
11:00 a.m., in Cabinet Room

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President, providing background for the NSC meeting tomorrow. Your suggested talking points are at Tab II.

Per your direction, this meeting will focus on providing the President with a complete review of his schedule in Geneva. Secretary Shultz will discuss the various events, briefing sessions and meetings with the Soviets, to include which subjects will be addressed at which session.

We are somewhat concerned that a specific time has not yet been dedicated to discussing Gorbachev's tactics at the table with the President. Of the group going to Geneva, only you, Secretary Shultz, Ambassador Hartman and Jack have been exposed to him directly. We believe the President's preparation will be more effective if there is some time set aside for a relaxed discussion in a very small group of Gorbachev's debating style and the most effective ways to counter it. While it is easy to find counters to the sort of argumentation Gorbachev is likely to make, some approaches are more productive than others, and we believe the President should have the benefit of a discussion of these points.

Bob Linhard and Johnathan Miller concur.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That you review and forward the memo to the President at Tab I.
Approve _____ Disapprove _____
2. That you review your suggested talking points for the meeting at Tab II.
Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Participants List
Tab B Agenda
Tab II Suggested Talking Points

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NLRR FOI-11418#10119

BY RW NARA DATE 3/16/11

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

DATE: November 15, 1985
LOCATION: Cabinet Room
TIME: 11:00 am - 12:00 noon
FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE

I. PURPOSE

To provide you with a final review of your schedule in Geneva, including an overview of the events, briefing sessions and meetings with the Soviets.

II. BACKGROUND

This will be our final NSC meeting prior to our departure for Geneva. Secretary Shultz will use this opportunity to provide you with a walk-through on the schedule of events for Geneva, and with an overview of the subjects that will be addressed at each of your meetings. In addition, this session affords the opportunity to your closest advisors to provide you with any last-minute thoughts on key issues likely to arise from Geneva.

III. PARTICIPANTS

Attached at Tab A.

IV. PRESS PLAN

Photo opportunity at beginning of session.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

I will briefly lay out the purpose of this session and turn it over to George. Following his overview of the events in Geneva, we will open the session to general discussion. If appropriate, I will make concluding remarks.

Attachment

Tab A	Participants List
Tab B	Agenda

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By smf NARA, Date 7/24/02

Prepared by:
Tyrus W. Cobb

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PARTICIPANTS LIST FOR NSC MEETING

Friday, November 15, 1985
11:00 a.m. - 12:00 noon

The President
The Vice President
Secretary Baker
Attorney General Meese
Donald T. Regan
Robert C. McFarlane

In addition, Principals plus one from the following agencies:

Department of State
Department of Defense
Central Intelligence Agency
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Office of Management and Budget

United States Information Agency

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NSC MEETING

Friday, November 15, 1985
11:00 a.m. - 12:00 Noon
Situation Room

AGENDA

- I. Introduction Robert C. McFarlane
(5 minutes)
- II. Review of Schedule and Meetings. . . . Secretary Shultz
(15 minutes)
- III. General Discussion All Participants
(35 minutes)
- IV. Conclusion Robert C. McFarlane
(5 minutes)

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By SMJ NARA, Date 1/24/02

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TALKING POINTS

- Mr. President, this meeting provides an opportunity to conduct a final review of the various events, briefing sessions and meetings with the Soviets you will have in Geneva. George will take us on a walk through your schedule, and then we will open this meeting up to general discussion. George.
- Mr. President, I would like to open this session to general discussion now.
- This concludes our overview meeting.

TALKING POINTS

- Mr. President, this meeting provides an opportunity to conduct a final review of the various events, briefing sessions and meetings with the Soviets you will have in Geneva. George will take us on a walk through your schedule, and then we will open this meeting up to general discussion. George.
- Mr. President, I would like to open this session to general discussion now.
- This concludes our overview meeting.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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ACTION

November 12, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. ^{*Mr. Joe*} ~~MATLOCK~~ / ^{*Mr. Cobb*} TYRUS W. COBB

SUBJECT: Your Talking Points for NSC Meeting on Regional/
Bilateral Issues -- Wednesday, November 13,
1985 -- 1:00 p.m.

Attached at Tab A are suggested talking points for your use for the NSC meeting tomorrow on bilateral, regional and human rights issues. This session is designed to serve as a final review of those agenda items, with particular focus on how we might expect Gorbachev to respond to our initiatives and proposals.

We would anticipate that you would introduce this session by pointing out to the President that this meeting provides us an opportunity for a final assessment of our approach on these three issue areas for the President's meetings in Geneva. Secretary Shultz, in his remarks, will note that the Soviets will want to keep the stress on arms control, particularly SDI, but have indicated that they are prepared to look at the "full agenda." The Secretary will point out that the initial Soviet response to the President's regional initiatives has not been encouraging. George will further add that the Soviets have not come up with any better ideas, so we will want to put the burden on Gorbachev in Geneva to develop better solutions. The Soviets may wish to refocus the discussion back on the 1972 "Basic Principles" agreement, which we would prefer to avoid except to make the case that they have systematically violated it.

On the human rights agenda, the Secretary will stress that the President's approach -- addressing these concerns quietly and in private -- shows the most promise for progress. The Secretary will also review the status of various bilateral agreements under discussion with the Soviets. He will probably point out that prospects for the exchanges agreement seem good, depending on our position regarding TV appearances. The North Pacific Air Safety Accord is 50-50, the Consular Agreement is being held up by Soviet insistence on tying it to the Civil Air Accord, and, finally, he will indicate that the fusion cooperation proposal should be ready for announcement. In addition, Embassy Moscow has just reported a Soviet response to the President's initiatives for greater contacts and communication. We will be reviewing these this evening and will provide supplementary material on them tomorrow morning.

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NLRR FD6-114/8 #10120

BY RW NARA DATE 3/16/11

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We have encouraged State to press the Secretary to make this session one in which the President will actively participate as he might in Geneva in responding to Gorbachev's likely counters. Such a focus will enable us to ensure that this session does not become yet another review of the issues we have addressed in depth already.

RECOMMENDATION

That you review the suggested talking points at Tab A.

Approve ____

Disapprove ____

Attachments

Tab A - Suggested Talking Points

Tab B - Agenda

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TALKING POINTS FOR REGIONAL/BILATERAL NSC MEETING

- Mr. President, this NSC meeting will serve as a forum for a final review of the bilateral, regional and human rights issues prior to your meetings with General Secretary Gorbachev.
- As you know, the Soviets have not reacted with great enthusiasm to your ambitious proposal for solving regional disputes. At the same time, they have not provided us any better solutions for solving these issues. Although they have been reluctant to place human rights issues on the agenda, there are some small signs of possible "give." Although Gorbachev would prefer to keep the focus of your meetings on arms control, particularly SDI, they have informed us that they will be prepared to discuss the full agenda of issues in Geneva, and their delegation reflects this.
- So far, we have had the greatest success -- though it is, of course, limited -- in eliciting proposals for expanded contacts and cooperation - the fourth area of our agenda. Several of these ideas could be announced in Geneva.

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BY RW NARA 3/16/11

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- George will now take us through the items on our agenda in these three issue areas. To the extent possible, Mr. President, we will try to focus on Gorbachev's likely reaction to your initiatives and how you might best respond to his replies.
- I would like to open this session now to general discussion.
- Mr. President, this concludes your briefing.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

Wednesday, November 13, 1985

1:00 p.m. - 2:00 p.m.

Cabinet Room

AGENDA

- | | |
|-------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| I. Introduction | Robert C. McFarlane
(5 minutes) |
| II. Regional/Bilateral Issues | Secretary Shultz
(10 minutes) |
| III. Discussion | All Participants
(40 minutes) |
| IV. Conclusion | Robert C. McFarlane
(5 minutes) |

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White House G:

August 28, 1997

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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ACTION

November 12, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

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JACK F. MATLOCK/TYRUS W. COBB *mc*

SUBJECT:

Briefing Memo for President's Meeting with
Soviet Analysts -- Wednesday, November 13, 1985

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President, providing background for his Wednesday meeting with the Soviet Analysts from CIA. Your memo gives brief bio information on the analysts, and outlines areas expected to be covered in the session.

RECOMMENDATION

1. That you review and forward the memo to the President at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

2. That you review your suggested talking points for the meeting at Tab II.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Jwd
Bob Linnard and Ken deGraffenreid concur. *Kd*

Attachments

Tab I

Memo to the President

Tab A - Participants List

Tab II

Your Suggested Talking Points

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NLRR F06-114/8 #70121

BY RW NARA DATE 3/16/11

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEETING WITH SOVIET ANALYSTS

DATE: November 13, 1985
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: (To be determined)
FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

I. PURPOSE

To provide you with the intelligence community's assessment of Soviet politico-military strategy, Gorbachev's objectives for his meeting with you, and domestic stresses impacting on Soviet decision-making.

II. BACKGROUND

In preparation for your meetings with the General Secretary, the intelligence community has undertaken an extensive series of analyses of the internal and foreign situation confronting Gorbachev. Bill Casey has asked to bring in three of his top Sovietologists to present you with their key judgments on those factors most likely to influence Gorbachev as he prepares for his meeting with you. He will then call on:

- Robert Gates: Bill's Deputy Director for Intelligence at the CIA and former NSC Senior Staffer under Kissinger. Bob will begin the discussion with a brief overview of the intelligence community's analysis of Gorbachev's objectives in his meeting with you.
- Fritz Ermarth: National Intelligence Officer for the Soviet Union and former NSC Senior Staffer under Zbig Brzezinski. Fritz will present his assessment of major trends in Soviet politico-military strategy.
- [REDACTED] One of the best analysts on Soviet domestic policy in the Central Intelligence Agency. [REDACTED] will discuss the internal Soviet situation, focusing on domestic stresses facing Gorbachev, and how these factors may influence his foreign and defense policies.

III. PARTICIPANTS

Attached at Tab A.

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NLRR FOIA-114/8 #10122
BY RW NARA DATE 3/16/11

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IV. PRESS PLAN

Photo op at beginning of session.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

I will briefly lay out the purpose of this session, and turn it over to Bill Casey and his analysts. Following their presentations, the Sovietologists will be prepared to respond to your questions. If appropriate, I will make concluding remarks.

Attachments

Tab A - Participants List

Prepared by:
Tyrus W. Cobb

PARTICIPANTS LIST FOR MEETING WITH SOVIET ANALYSTS

Wednesday, November 13, 1985
(Time to be determined)

The President

The Vice President

Donald T. Regan

Robert C. McFarlane

William J. Casey, DCI

Robert Gates, Deputy Director, CIA

Fritz Ermarth, NIO For Soviet Affairs, CIA

██████████ Soviet Analyst, CIA

Jack F. Matlock

Tyrus W. Cobb (notetaker)

FOIA(b)(3)

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NLRR F06-114/s #10122a
BY RW NARA DATE 3/16/11

TALKING POINTS

- Mr. President, at Bill's suggestion, we have brought three of the intelligence community's top specialists on Soviet Affairs in today to provide you with the key judgments from a series of analyses we have undertaken to assess Soviet politico-military strategy and domestic concerns facing Gorbachev.

- Bill will introduce his analysts and the topics they will cover.

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NLRR FO6-114/8# 10123

BY ~~LOT~~ NARA DATE 9/30/08

JACK:

Having just returned from leave I have had a chance to reflect a bit on the run-up to Geneva. Frankly I am very concerned about the public image that is being created which portrays (perhaps overstating the case) a Soviet Union moving purposely towards peace contrasted against a U.S.A. either stumbling indecisively toward the Summit or, worst, coherently following a plan designed to "poison the atmosphere."

I think there are three major areas we are stressing. First, substantive preparations for the actual conduct of the meetings themselves. You seem to have that well in hand and it would appear we are doing rather well. Secondly, the logistic preparations (ambiance, site selection, arrival dates, RR's Swiss activities, etc.) under Bill Henkel's direction also appear to be moving forward nicely.

Odnako, the third area -- the public impression we are trying to create -- I do not think we are doing well at all. Here I believe we are trying to influence three distinct audiences: The domestic US, international (particularly European) and Soviet (especially leadership).

- I think the impression that has been created to date is that the Soviets are winning this propaganda/public diplomacy competition. At Tab I I have listed a series of past and forthcoming events which taken together would support the conception that the US is attempting to poison the atmosphere while the Soviets are increasingly portrayed as reasonable and striving for peace.
- A recent State Department analysis concluded that American moves are being widely interpreted in Europe as "tending to create an atmosphere more conducive to confrontation than a search for accommodation." Decisions such as the ASAT test are interpreted by center and left circles as "deliberately provocative." Soviet initiatives are largely seen as substantively weak and propaganda-oriented, but ironically seem to be creating a more positive public perception.

At the second Tab I have listed a series of upcoming opportunities that we should seize upon in order to reverse this image. To do that we need to have three or four major themes that we want stressed in every one of these undertakings (as opposed to 15 or more minor themes that tend to get dissipated in the public's mind). As a high priority we need to have State develop (as we generally do for Presidential trips) a "themes paper" that we will be using as a basis. We then need to look at all of the Administration's activities, particularly in the arms control and weapons production area to gauge the impact these will have on our public perception strategy. In sum, we need urgently a public diplomacy strategy, but more than that we really need a Mike Deaver type high level image creation campaign.

TWC

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EVENTS

U.S.

1. ASAT Test (4 Sep)
2. Announcement of creation of "Space Command"
3. U.S. rejection of Soviet Nuc Test Moratorium, U.S. "counter-offer" not understood.
4. Compliance Report Due (Sept; Nov)
5. Spy Dust Allegation
6. Alaska Sea Trials Begin (18 Sep)
7. MBFR Talks (will highlight U.S. "Failure" to respond to Soviet proposals; probable FRG-UK Joint proposal we may "reject"
8. Australian FM here (Nuc Free Zones?)

Soviet

1. Shevardnadze talk to U.N. (will stress militarization of space; the Space Command, ASAT)
2. Nuclear Test Moratorium
3. INF Moratorium (Will probably be extended)
4. Nonproliferation: Offered two reactors to be under IAEA
5. Gorbachev visit to Paris (includes 3 meetings with Mitterrand; extensive public appearances
6. Dutch Decision Soviets could be under 378

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Opportunities

1. Probable visit of Qadhafi to Moscow (Sep)
2. U.S.-Japanese-Soviet Pacific Air Safety Meeting
3. Codel visits to Moscow (Udall; Markey, etc.)
4. Gonzalez in U.S.
5. SEC Pierce in Moscow
6. Oct 15 - CSCE Cultural Forum
7. VP Visit to China
8. Possible Soviet Port Call to Nicaragua.

DRAFT

~~SECRET~~

Jack:

Here are some comments/recommendations on the speech.

I have been brief. I understand that very few changes will be permitted now, since the Pres has basically approved it; so, I will be focusing on the most important. Also, I understand that the President, as in most speeches, doesn't want much negative.

I have Affixed some changes directly onto the attached draft. Numbers in parentheses refer to draft.

(1) FIRST: I had a long-standing lunch date with Al Myer today, which I kept. The speech came up -- he asking what I thought. Frankly, I told him, I thought it drifted too far toward "understanding," not enough on realism. Secondly, I told him that this speech, unlike others the President has given (re: Grenada) has as its principal target foreign and domestic elites (not Joe 6-pack in Des Moines). It must be a sophisticated, realistic address. Otherwise, it will not be taken seriously in the Kremlin, by the broad mass of educated European opinion and certainly not by the opinion-molders in this country. I think Don Fortier makes the same point. I don't think I convinced him, but it may help as having laid down a marker if you pursue it.

(2) Recommend reinclusion of language from Matlock draft, p. 1, para 2 as modified below:

The establishment of a durable and stable world peace depends greatly on the American relationship with the Soviet Union. Not because either the United States or the Soviet Union can bring peace to everyone, but because the world cannot be at peace unless there is a sober and realistic Soviet-American relation. It is an awesome and sobering fact that, for the first time in the history of mankind, two nations have the might, not only to destroy each other, but

(2)
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to destroy mankind itself. Neither of our nations can have a higher interest than making sure that this does not, indeed, cannot, happen.

(3) Page 2, after first para:

Looking back over the 1970's it was apparent that America had fallen into a state of neglect of its defenses and had become reluctant to continue to hold the mantle of responsibility as the leader of the Western Alliance system. But the rapid expansion and modernization of the Soviet military establishment continued apace and Moscow's global activities became much more pronounced and destabilizing. The USSR devoted twice as much of their GNP to defense in this period than did the United States and began to provide armaments to foreign countries in a massive manner. From Angola to Afghanistan, from El Salvador to Kampuchea, the Soviets or their proxies have used force or intimidation to interfere in the affairs of other nations.

(4) P. 2, last para. Delete, replace with:

"And that is not the end of the tale. On the other side we have witnessed a decline in the prospects of the Soviet Empire. Soviet armed forces are sent into combat, but in every instance since World War II it has been against another Maxist regime. Domestic cohesion has been strained as that society struggles to produce sufficient food to feed its people, to cope with massive problems of alcoholism or to provide the people with what we consider in the West to be the basic necessities of a prosperous existence. So it is no wonder that the Soviets are frustrated -- and are showing it in their shrill propaganda.

(3)
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Recently we have heard some very strident rhetoric from the Kremlin, anger that has caused some observers to speak of heightened uncertainty and an increased danger of conflict.

However, despite our public differences and occasional exchanges of sharp rhetoric, I believe that our relationship with the USSR is on the firmest ground it has been on in many years. In fact, there is probably less danger of confrontation today than at any time in the past. This is attributable ^{primarily} to an admirable degree of prudence and restraint that both superpowers have exhibited. Certainly in the first three years of this Administration we have witnessed nothing akin to the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Mid-East escalation of 1973, the Soviet invasion of 1979, and certainly no level of tensions such as existed in the days of the Cold War. At no time over the course of the past three years has either the United States or the Soviet Union placed its armed forces on alert, nor have there been any flashpoints that threatened to escalate to armed conflict.

If one looks beyond the rhetoric this fact stands out clearly: deterrence is being restored and it is making the world a safer place; safer because ^{there} is less danger that the Soviet leadership will underestimate our strength or resolve.

(5) Add to para 3, p.3, after "...staunchest friends."

We threatened no one even when we were the world's only atomic power and we pose no challenge to global stability today.

(6) Substitute for para 3 (last), p. 3, and first para., p. 4.

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America's character has not changed. Our strength and vision of progress provide the basis for stability and meaningful negotiations. From this foundation we can proceed toward the attainment of a stable and realistic relationship with the USSR. Deterrence is...(pick up para 2, p.4)

(7) P.6, Before para 4, place:

Cooperation and understanding are especially important to arms control. In recent years, we have been disturbed by mounting evidence that the Soviet Union has breached important elements of several arms control agreements. It has also established a pattern of taking advantage of any imprecision or ambiguity in agreements. Such actions jeopardize the arms control process.

I will soon submit to the Congress a report on these Soviet activities which it requested from me. I will of course see to it that our modernization program takes Soviet behavior into account so that we will not be at a disadvantage. But I will also continue our discussions with the Soviet government on activities which undermine agreements. I believe it is in our mutual interest to remove impediments to arms control, ^{a process} which offers us the means of improving the security of both our countries and the opportunity to create a safer world.

(8) P. 7, after first para, add:

I have been forthright in explaining my view of the Soviet system and of Soviet policies. This should come as no surprise to the Soviet leaders, who have never been reticent in expressing their view of us. But this doesn't mean we can't deal with each other.

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We don't walk away from the negotiating table because the Soviets call us "imperialist aggressors," or because they cling to the fantasy of the triumph of communism over democracy. The fact that neither of us likes the other's system is no reason to refuse to talk. In fact, in this nuclear age, it makes it all the more imperative for us to maintain a productive and continuous dialogue.

(9) P. 8, after first full para.

I must confess that I was very disappointed not only with the Soviet walkout on the intermediate ~~range~~ missile talks, but with their refusal to agree to the setting of starting dates for the next round of the MBFR and START negotiations.

I have been following the progress of all of these discussions and still feel that agreements can be achieved if both sides commit themselves to negotiate earnestly and in good faith. In particular, while I would not go so far as to say that an agreement is in sight, ^{at the START talks} I believe that we have travelled much further toward a common position than is generally recognized. Our proposals there have called for deep reductions in ballistic missile warheads and would impose reductions and limitations on both the US and the USSR. We have shifted our position there significantly to take into account major Soviet concerns in an effort to narrow our differences, particularly in accommodating their demands for a higher ceiling on deployed ballistic missiles. Further, in response to their expressions that our positions imposed too many constraints on their ICBMs, we

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indicated our willingness to explore alternative ways of limiting the size and destructive power of ballistic missile forces. Finally, in response to Soviet concerns over our bombers and air-launched cruise missiles we have stated that we would agree to numbers well below those which would have been allowed by SALT II.

In a unique bipartisan effort we have introduced a "build-down concept" designed to ensure reductions and channel modernization onto more stabilizing directions. This concept would require our two nations to scrap two old warheads for every new warhead deployed on the more destabilizing MIRVed ICBMs.

I was pleased that the Soviets did take two positive steps recently, tacitly agreeing to reduce the throw-weight of their missiles and to establish a working group to discuss confidence-building measures. These moves on both sides indicate that we are within striking distance of achieving a negotiated limitation and reduction on our strategic arsenals. We need to return immediately to the START discussions and pursue the progress that we have achieved.

(10) P. 11, first full para: Replace with:

"Our two countries share with all mankind the dream of eliminating the risk of nuclear conflict. It is not an impossible dream, because the reduction of the possibility that nuclear war should erupt is in both of our interests. The challenge to both of us is clear and calls out for the best of intentions. No one can predict how the Soviet leaders will react

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to this opportunity, but I do not feel that this is an impossible dream, because these steps are so much in the interest of both our nations.

We should remember that our two countries share much in common -- indeed, we fought alongside one another in World War II and, I should underscore this fact, our two nations have never fought each other. There is no reason we ever should. Today while our relationship is certain to be characterized by disagreements and a conflict in ideals and goals, we share common enemies -- hunger, disease, and above all, war.

More than 20 years ago President Kennedy laid out an approach to dealing with the USSR that is as realistic, and at the same time, optimistic, today as it was in 1963. As the President indicated:

"So, let us not be blind to our differences -- but let us also direct attention to our common interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved. And if we cannot end now our differences, at least we can help make the world safe for diversity. For, in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal."

End speech.

(11) Eliminate speech at this point.