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F06-114/8

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2713

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
10124	MEMO	PURNELL TO MATLOCK RE MARK PALMER TELECON OF MARCH 6 <i>R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8</i>	1	3/6/1986	B1
10125	MEMO	PURNELL TO MATLOCK RE NSDD 75 AND NIXON ARTICLE <i>R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8</i>	1	ND	B1
10126	MEMO	COBB TO MATLOCK RE NSDD-75 <i>R 3/16/2011 F2006-114/8</i>	1	ND	B1
10127	MEMO	COBB TO MATLOCK RE REVISION OF NSDD-75 <i>R 3/16/2011 F2006-114/8</i>	4	3/10/1986	B1
10137	LIST	MEETING PARTICIPANTS	1	ND	B6
10138	LIST	SAME TEXT AS DOC #10137	1	ND	B6
10128	PAPER	PUBLIC DIPLOMACY STRATEGY 1986 REAGAN-GORBACHEV SUMMIT <i>R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8</i>	7	ND	B1
10129	PAPER	GORBACHEV <i>R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8</i>	5	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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10130	PAPER	THE IMPACT OF THE OCTOBER 1986 U.S. EXPULSION OF SOVIET OFFICIALS PAR 1/15/2008 F06-114/8	21	11/21/1986	B1
10131	MEMO	MATLOCK TO ERMATH RE ODDS AND ENDS R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8	2	12/31/1986	B1
10135	CABLE	081440Z JUL 87 R 2/25/2008 NLRRF06-114/8	2	7/8/1987	B1
10132	MEMO	CARLUCCI TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE ECONOMIC ISSUES IN THE THATCHER VISIT R 3/16/2011 F2006-114/8	2	ND	B1
10133	MEMO	CARLUCCI TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE MRS. THATCHER'S VIEW OF GORBACHEV-- (WEEKEND READING) R 3/16/2011 F2006-114/8	2	ND	B1
10136	CABLE	012310Z APR 87 R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8	3	4/1/1987	B1
10134	MEMO	CARLUCCI TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE PRIME MINISTER THATCHER'S MIDDLE EAST AGENDA R 3/16/2011 F2006-114/8	3	ND	B1

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

March 6, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR JACK F. MATLOCK

FROM: JON PURNELL *JP*
SUBJECT: Mark Palmer Telcon of March 6

Mark Palmer called this afternoon to touch base before leaving town. He asked me to leave four messages with you.

1. He and Roz Ridgway have one additional name to suggest as a possible successor for your position here: Ed Djerejian. They point out that he has Moscow experience and is already well known at the White House. Mark said he thinks Ed would like the job.

2. FBI Director Webster made an "unhelpful" comment to Leahy and Huddleston in which he suggested that recent cuts in the Soviet ceiling at SMUN are meaningless because the new Soviet consulate in New York will boost numbers once again. State has complained loudly to the FBI, since all of the ground work on the SMUN ceiling was carefully vetted with them. Webster apparently led Leahy & Huddleston to believe that the consulate will completely nullify SMUN cuts, which is not the case. Should this come up over here, Palmer would appreciate your pointing out that this was a carefully prepared inter-agency effort which will not be wiped out by the opening of the new consulate.

3. Palmer said he and Ridgway have briefed the Secretary to the effect that Dobrynin's promotion to the Secretariat is a plus for us insofar as it indicates U.S.-Soviet relations remain a high priority agenda item for the Soviets and Dobrynin clearly understands our views and priorities. It may be negative insofar as Dobrynin is a shrewd figure who can be expected to be a formidable opponent.

4. Palmer said recent White House statements about the summit have not been helpful. Indications from Moscow (Hartman Korniyenko conversation) and his own meeting with Sokolov (Sokolov officially protested the President's Sperling breakfast comment to him) suggest the Soviets see the statements as an effort to pressure them at a time when they are preoccupied with other matters - the Congress. At the same time, Palmer suggested that in the West such statements make us look like we are going begging to the Soviets for a meeting. He solicited your support in trying to put a cap on any further summit comments.

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NLRR F06-114/8#10124

BY LOI NARA DATE 9/30/08

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~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR JACK F. MATLOCK

FROM: JON PURNELL *J.P.*
SUBJECT: NSDD 75 and the Nixon Article

I see some key differences between the Nixon article and the NSDD.

Under the themes of "new realism" and "mutual respect" Nixon emphasizes the immutable nature of Soviet society and our differences with it. Our governments can "never be friends" and Gorbachev will not risk his position of power by trying to change the Soviet system. Nixon suggests relatively modest diplomatic goals: "to resolve differences where possible and where that is impossible, to develop rules of engagement for living with our differences...."

The NSDD, on the other hand, stresses the possibility for changing the fundamental nature of the rivalry. It states as its main objectives to "contain" and over time "reverse" Soviet expansionism and promote a process of change in the Soviet Union "toward a more pluralistic political and economic system." It speaks of encouraging Soviet allies "to distance themselves from Moscow in foreign policy and to move toward democratization domestically." Nixon, by contrast, specifically rejects containment as no longer adequate to deal with a Soviet Union which has "broken out of the Iron Curtain."

The NSDD does not treat the developing world outside the context of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry and emphasizes questions of security assistance. There is no real treatment of Nixon's idea that we must tell the third world "not just what we are against but what we are for."

Interestingly, Nixon's piece makes no reference to dealing with Soviet human rights abuses.

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BY LOS NARA DATE 9/30/08

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UNLOCKING THE DOOR

RICHARD NIXON

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There is a double lock on the door to real peace in the world. The United States has one key; the Soviet Union has the other. Without both, peace cannot be preserved.

Forty years ago, the United States had a monopoly on the atomic bomb. In his Iron Curtain speech, Winston Churchill observed, "No one in any country has slept less well in their beds because the knowledge and the method and the raw materials to apply it are at present largely retained in American hands. I do not believe we should all have slept so soundly had the positions been reversed and if some Communist or neo-fascist state monopolized for the time being these dread agencies."

When Mr. Churchill made this statement 40 years ago this week, the United States had just nine atomic bombs. The Soviet Union had none. Today, the United States and the Soviet Union each have more than 10,000 nuclear warheads on their intercontinental weapons, the smallest of which is 10 times as powerful as the bomb which destroyed Hiroshima. To continue the nuclear arms race is insane. That is why Ronald Reagan, a strong and popular American president, and Mikhail Gorbachev, the new strong leader of the Soviet Union, hold the fate of the world in their hands as they try to stop the buildup and start the build-down of nuclear weapons.

But reducing the number of nuclear weapons does not necessarily reduce the danger of war. Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping made this point in his recent interview in *Time* magazine when asked to comment on the proposal for the Soviet Union and the U.S. to cut their nuclear arsenals by 50 percent. When each has the power to destroy the world 10 times over, he said, reducing the number so they would then have the power to destroy the world only five times over is not by itself reassuring.

It is not the existence of arms but their use that leads to war. That is why progress in reducing political differences which could lead to the use of arms must go forward with arms control if peace is to be preserved.

Let us examine the political differences between the Soviet Union and the United States as Mr. Churchill would have — with the bark off.

More cultural exchanges can be useful, but they will not affect the policies of the tough-minded men in the Kremlin one iota.

Our differences are not due to personalities. The much-reported fact that Mr. Gorbachev has a good education, a firm handshake, a good sense of humor, a melodious voice, and a wife who wears designer clothes is interesting but is no more

cies will be than the fact that Nikita Khrushchev, according to critics who underestimated him, was poorly educated, drank too much, wore ill-fitting clothes, and spoke bad Russian.

Sound policy is the first casualty when style is stressed over substance. What we must recognize is that anyone who claws his way to the top in the jungle of the Soviet hierarchy is bound to be a strong leader, a dedicated Communist, and a formidable adversary.

Mr. Gorbachev is a product of the system. He will try to make it run better, but he will not risk his power by changing it. In foreign policy, he will be tough in keeping what he has inherited. He will continue to have the long-range goal of extending Communist power. But his most urgent short-term goal is to get the Soviet economy moving again, because without a strong economy he cannot have a strong foreign policy. His immediate need, therefore, is to reduce tensions with the United States and the West. How should we react?

The policy of containment is no longer adequate because the Soviet Union has broken out of the Iron Curtain.

But the word has lost its meaning.

What is needed in our relations with the Soviet Union is not a new spirit or a new atmosphere but a new realism.

Any relationship with the Soviet Union which has a chance to survive must be built upon eight indispensable pillars of peace.

1. Our policy should be based not on the soft illusion of mutual affection, but the hard reality of mutual respect. Russians and Americans can be friends. But the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union can never be friends; yet we cannot afford to be enemies.

As Mr. Gorbachev pointedly observed in his Geneva press conference, the Russians are not simpletons. The Russian people are a great people. The Soviet Union is a military superpower. The Soviet government, therefore, deserves our respect. But respect does not mean affection.

Most pundits in Geneva asked the wrong question — did President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev like each other? The far more important question is did they respect each other. Affection between allies is useful. Respect between adversaries is indispensable.

WASH. TIMES: 3-7-86

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The greatest danger of war today is not that either of the superpowers would start a war that would risk suicide but that war would come from miscalculation. That is why re-establishing the practice of regular summits is so important. If two leaders know each other, they may not like each other, but their knowing each other reduces the chance that either will misjudge the other and underestimate the other's will to resist where his vital interests are threatened.

2. We should honestly recognize our differences and not try to gloss them over. We don't like their system. They don't like ours. We have profound differences, some of which will never be settled. We have one major common interest — to avoid war over our differences.

3. We will not seek to impose our system on them, and we will resist their efforts to impose their system on us or our allies.

4. [REDACTED]

5. We will support our friends in the Third World just as they support theirs. We will meet them halfway to defuse Third World conflicts in areas where our interests collide in such a way that they could draw us into war.

6. We are geopolitical adversaries, but we should recognize that we have a common enemy — international terrorism.

7. We welcome increased trade with the Soviet Union, but we will not engage in trade that would subsidize our own destruction.

8. The time has come for an era of new realism in U.S.-Soviet relations. The old concepts of containment and detente are no longer viable. We should break new ground by combining competition and coexistence.

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We should compete with each other economically and ideologically on both sides of the Iron Curtain. We should cooperate with each other in trying to prevent that competition from escalating into armed conflict.

Whether the eight pillars of peace will stand or fall depends on the strength, will, and leadership of the United States. This requires action on three fronts.

It is essential that we keep our economy strong, sound, productive, and free. Without a strong economy, we cannot afford the military expenditures we need for our defense and for bargaining in the arms-reduction negotiations. Without a strong economy, we cannot have a strong foreign policy. Without a strong economy, we cannot provide an example of how freedom works in the ideological battle in the world.

We must restore the bipartisan foreign policy which began after Mr. Churchill's Iron Curtain speech and which was one of the casualties of the Vietnam War. This will be a long struggle. Mikhail Gorbachev is 56 years old. He could live long enough to deal with five American presidents. Let us make sure that he will never be in a position to delay negotiations that could contribute to peace with one president in the hope that he could get a better deal from the next one.

Above all, we need a clear, positive vision of America's role and goal in the world. I have visited most of the countries of the world in the past 40 years. Three billion people in the world have per-capita incomes of less than \$600. Most of them live under governments that could not possibly meet the minimum standards for democracy we insisted upon for the Philippines. They are searching for a way out of the misery and poverty which plague their lives. Which way they turn will affect our future as well as theirs.

It is not enough to be against the Communist way because it would make things worse. Let us help them find a new way that will make things better. Let us tell them not just what we are against but what we are for. Let us make clear that we would be concerned about their plight even if there were no Communist threat.

Let our legacy be not just that we saved the world from communism, but that we helped make the world safe for freedom.

What would Mr. Churchill's message be if he were addressing you today? Listen to his words:

"The United States stands at this time at the pinnacle of world power. It is a solemn moment for the American democracy. For with primacy in power is also joined an awe-inspiring accountability for the future."

"The Stone Age may return on the gleaming wings of science, and what might shower immeasurable material blessings on mankind may bring about its total destruction."

"Our fortunes are still in our hands. We have the power to save the future."

Let this generation of Americans be remembered not for presiding over the twilight of an old civilization, but for helping to usher in the dawn of a new era in which the bloody 20th century was followed by a peaceful 21st century — an era in which people everywhere had a chance to enjoy the blessings of freedom, justice, and progress which have made America such a good and great country.

JACK:

-- Attached is a copy of NSDD-75 (protect) and Nixon's article.
(Not sure why it printed out so poorly) *I'm getting a clean copy.*

-- I've been thinking about this for some time and believe that NSDD-75 is not repairable. Many problems--was written in time of Brezhnev succession, not consolidation by Gorbachev; out of date; lacks definitive implementation; too narrowly-based, etc.

-- Pursuant to your instructions I am preparing now some thoughts on JMP's tasking to think about "updating NSDD-75 and bringing it more in line with our current approach", but I think it will mean a drastic overhaul if not new document.

-- In the interim, thought you might like to have copies of ~~each~~
the NSDD and Nixon article.

--Ty

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By *snk* NARA, Date *7/27/02*

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NLRR FOI-114/8#10126
BY *RW* NARA DATE *3/16/11*

6
NON-LOG

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SECRET/SENSITIVE

March 10, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR JACK MATLOCK

FROM: TYRUS W. COBB *Tw*

SUBJECT: Revision of NSDD-75

As I noted to you in my brief note Friday, I believe that NSDD-75 is inappropriate to the present state of U.S.-Soviet relations and where we wish to go. Attached at Tab I are further comments on the NSDD, considered in light of President Nixon's article in the Washington Times, "Unlocking the Door." Also attached is a clean copy of the NSDD.

Attachment
As stated

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NLRR F06-114/8 #10127
BY RW NARA DATE 3/16/11

7

Comments on NSDD-75, "U.S. Relations With the USSR"

BACKGROUND: NSDD-75, "U.S. Relations with the USSR," was published in January 1983. The supporting documentation, NSSD 11-82, was completed the previous Fall. Thus the assumptions and policy recommendations are now over 3½ years old. President Reagan was impressed with President Nixon's March 7 Washington Times article, "Unlocking the Door," outlining the basic requirements for a policy of new realism in our dealings with the Soviet Union. Nixon argued that neither containment nor detente are appropriate policies; what is needed is a "new realism" build on "eight pillars."

-- Nixon posits that our policy should not be based on "mutual affection," but "mutual respect," stating "respect between adversaries is indispensable." Arguing that the primary risk of nuclear war today is from miscalculation, the establishment of the practice of regular summits is crucial -- know each other will reduce the change of misjudging each other. Stressing that we have profound differences, Nixon underlines that we have, however, an overriding interest -- to avoid war, therefore we should, where possible, develop rules for engagement for living with our differences.

-- We should not seek to impose our system on them and we will resist their efforts to do so. We should not seek strategic superiority, but do what is necessary to prevent the Soviets from achieving it. While we will meet them half way to defuse Third World conflicts, we will support our friends as they support theirs.

-- While we are geo political adversaries, we have a common enemy -- international terrorism. We welcome increase trade, but will not subsidize trade that is inimical to our interest. Finally, we should combine competition and co-existence, competing economically and ideologically, but strive to prevent it from escalating to armed conflict.

-- In support of these eight pillars, Nixon argues that we must do certain things: keep our economy strong, productive and free; restore bipartisan foreign policy; have a clear, positive vision of America's role and goal in the world. In particular in the Third World, it is not enough to be "against communism" -- we should assist the search for a way out of misery and poverty. He concludes that we should hope for an era in which people everywhere have a chance to enjoy the blessing of freedom, justice and progress.

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NLRR FOL-114/8#10127a

BY RW 3/16/11

NSDD-75: This directive posits three major objectives: (1) contain and over time reverse Soviet expansionism, both in terms of regional activities and in the overall military balance; (2) promote positive change within the USSR toward more pluralistic system to reduce the power of the privileged ruling elite; and (3) engage the USSR in negotiations to reach agreements which enhance U.S. interests.

-- The NSDD directive that in implementation of the NSDD the U.S. must convey clearly to Moscow that unacceptable behavior would incur costs that outweigh any gains and that restraint would bring benefits to the USSR. However, it is not clear just what is unacceptable behavior, nor does it spell out what are the benefits that the USSR would perceive flowing from alternative behavior patterns.

-- On military strategy the NSDD does not eschew military superiority, but does state that we will seek to prevent the Soviets from achieving that capability.

-- On the economic front, the NSDD directs that we seek to insure that East-West economic relations do not facilitate a Soviet buildup or subsidize the Soviet economy. The NSDD delineates specifics on developing an Allied understanding of the strategic implications of East-West trade, a topic that was high on the national security agenda at the time the directive was written.

-- The NSDD explicitly directs that we undertake measures to strengthen our instruments of political action and mandates that U.S. policy have an ideological thrust which clearly affirms the superiority of Western values.

-- In the Third World the U.S. is directed to support effectively those nations willing to resist Soviet pressures. U.S. policy should include efforts to resolve regional crises and include a mix of economic assistance/private sector initiatives.

-- Attention is also given to exploitation of weaknesses within the Soviet Empire designed to loosen Moscow's hold on these regions. The U.S. policy should also seek to encourage democratic movements in countries aligned with the USSR.

-- Attention is paid to the possibility of a summit and to the role of U.S.-Soviet cooperative exchanges. U.S. is directed to not yield to pressures to "take the first step," but to remain ready to improve U.S.-Soviet relations.

COMMENTS: The NSDD and supporting documents are clearly out of date. The directive was conceived and written over three years ago and suffers from three primary weaknesses: (1) it deals with a Soviet Union ruled by a gerontocracy and in the throes of an extended succession crisis. Obviously, Gorbachev's consolidation of power demands a reassessment of Soviet political capabilities;

(2) the document was written at a time when the dominant mind set here still assumed that the "correlation of forces" were moving contrary to U.S. interests. Since that time we have witnessed a remarkable economic upturn, reinvigoration of our relations with the Allies, the emergence of a popular and dynamic President; a sustained commitment to a military modernization program; and (3) there is an absence of implementing strategies/documents that would specify how the policy precepts would be carried out.

-- Many of the Nixon precepts are absent: regularized meetings, rules of engagement, not to seek military superiority, cooperation against international terrorism, and development of a bipartisan policy toward the USSR. Nixon also focus heavily on the Third World. While we have done considerable thinking, and taken certain steps to implement what is called the "Reagan doctrine", this strategy is obviously absent from NSDD-75.

-- Arms control negotiating objectives are stated only in the most general terms (some may argue that this NSDD is not the appropriate place to delineate our arms control strategy.) Further, no attention is given to what President Nixon argued should be a major objective -- reducing the risk of a nuclear conflict through miscalculation.

SUMMARY: Given the President's interest in the Nixon article, and the current state of U.S.-Soviet relations it would seem advisable to initiate another NSSD that would lead to the publication of a more comprehensive U.S. strategy for dealing with the USSR.

See
Note 5

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VIA LDX 11

7157

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

October 2, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Policy Support Group (U)

Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Jack F. Matlock, will chair a Policy Support Group (PSG) similar to the Arms Control Support Group with a mandate to review interagency efforts concerning our policy on bilateral, regional and human rights issues in the Soviet-U.S. relationship, and to prepare for the meeting between the President and General Secretary Gorbachev. The group will be composed of representatives from concerned agencies at the Assistant Secretary level. The initial meeting will be held at 2:00 p.m., Friday, October 3, in the Old Executive Office Building, Room 208. In preparation for that meeting State should prepare a 3-page memorandum reviewing the status of non-arms control issues, highlighting policy questions to be addressed prior to the Reykjavik meeting. (C)



Rodney B. McDaniel
Executive Secretary

cc: COL James Lemon
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1987
By smf NARA, Date 7/27/02

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

7157

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ACTION

October 2, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. MCDANIEL

FROM: TYRUS W. COBB *TC*
SUBJECT: The Status of Non-Arms Issues

At Tab I is a memorandum from you to State and Defense informing them of the creation of the Matlock-chaired Policy Support Group which will oversee non-arms control issues in the run-up to the Reykjavik preparatory meeting and the Washington Summit. Your memo also tasks State to prepare by 2:00 p.m., October 3, a 3-page summary for the President's use on the status of bilateral, regional and human rights issues in the Soviet-American relationship.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign and forward the attached memorandum to State and Defense.

Approve *LMF*

Disapprove _____

LM
Jack Matlock concurs.

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to State and Defense

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By *SM* NARA, Date 7/29/02

WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

C

05 OCT 2 P5:55

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MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION _____ PAGES one

FROM RODNEY B. MCDANIEL 456-2224 _____
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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION POLICY SUPPORT GROUP

NSC LOG# 7157

<u>TO (AGENCY)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO:</u>	<u>DEPT/ROOM NO.</u>	<u>EXTENSION</u>
STATE	NICHOLAS PLATT	EXEC SEC	
DOD	JAMES LEMON	EXEC SEC	

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REMARKS _____

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By snf NARA, Date 7/29/02

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

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By amf NARA, Date 7/29/02

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
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THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY GA257, Forrestal Bldg				
DIRECTOR, AID Room 5942, Dept. of State				
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Dept. of Justice, Room 5119				
DIRECTOR, OSTP Room 360, OEOB				
DIRECTOR, USIA 400 C Street, S.W.				
THE SECRETARY OF INTERIOR 18th & E. Street NW				
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE Independence & 14th SW				
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE Room 209 Winder Bldg 17 & F St NW				
THE DIRECTOR, FEMA 500 C Street,				
DIRECTOR, DMSPA Room 3E813, Pentagon				

DATE, TIME & SIGN THIS RECEIPT & RETURN TO: BT MERCHANT, SITUATION ROOM, WHITE HOUSE

Page 1 of Pages



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

POLICY SUPPORT GROUP

1. Purpose of Meeting
2. Status of Issues (draw on State Draft)
 - Regional
 - Human Rights
 - Bilateral
3. President's approach to non-arms control issues
 - When to introduce
 - Which specific issues
4. Specific proposals
 - Regional conflict
 - 1. Afghanistan
 - 2. Angola
 - 3. Nicaragua?

→ Iran/Iraq }
- Micronesia
- Korea
 - Human Rights
 - 1. Proposals?
 - 2. Lists?
 - Bilateral
- Spying/UN
5. Contingency points
 - What Soviets may propose
 - Fusion
 - Space
 - Other
6. Mechanics
 - Advance consultations
 - Review what papers are due and by whom?
 - Additional papers needed for President's use?
 - Briefing Book and Talking Points, problems?

- Trade/Econ Rels -

See Note 4

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DECLASSIFIED

NLRR Feb-114/8#10128

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BY WJ NARA DATE 9/30/08

1986 REAGAN-GORBACHEV SUMMIT

Public Diplomacy Strategy

Regardless of the date ultimately set for the President's meeting with Gorbachev in the United States, the approach to the issues in our public diplomacy should build on the success achieved at the Geneva Summit. The fundamental themes should be the same, to stress the steadiness of our policy. Of course, appropriate adjustments of detail must be made to take account of developments, possible shifts in the Soviet position, and the line taken by Soviet spokesmen.

Overall Goals

To position the President in the public eye so that he retains the initiative in guiding the U.S.-Soviet relationship and is protected from public pressure to make unwise or premature concessions.

To use the meeting to exert maximum pressure on the Soviet leadership to move toward resolution of important problems in an acceptable manner.

To strengthen the President's leadership in the United States and as the preeminent leader of our Alliances.

U.S. Objectives

Our public diplomacy should foster the following basic perceptions:

1. Summitry is part of a process. The Geneva Summit established a framework for dialogue. The meetings in the United States continue that dialogue at the highest level.

-- The dialogue is necessary to manage an adversarial relationship.

-- If it is burdened by perceived requirements to reach agreements, a regular dialogue at the highest level will become impossible and it will be difficult to achieve good, balanced agreements.

-- We of course aim for the maximum possible agreement at all times, but summit meetings should not be judged by the degree of agreement reached since the objective is to manage our rivalry in a peaceful manner.

2. We must deal with the full agenda; no single area can be treated in isolation. The agenda is not a policy choice but is inherent in the relationship itself. In real life, the areas are interrelated. The four areas of this agenda are:

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a. Reducing and eventually eliminating the use and threat of force in resolving international disputes. The use of force to serve national ends threatens the peace and makes reduction of arms more difficult.

b. Reducing and eventually eliminating weapons of mass destruction. Nuclear, chemical and -- if they still exist --bacteriological weapons are the weapons potentially most destructive of human life. We must move rapidly to reduce nuclear weapons and ban chemical weapons, with effective verification. Our goal is to eliminate all weapons of mass destruction from the arsenals of all countries, but we recognize that nuclear weapons cannot be eliminated entirely until conventional weapons are at lower levels and large countries refrain from using force to achieve national goals.

c. Building trust and a more cooperative working relationship. High levels of suspicion, fed by isolation, threaten the peace and make it much more difficult to solve practical problems. A better working relationship requires the following:

- Strict compliance with all agreements.
- More contact between the peoples of both countries and better information flow through the media in both.
- Frank discussion of our differences, coupled with a readiness to solve practical problems fairly.
- Strict reciprocity of benefit in all arrangements.

d. Encouraging respect for human rights. Governments which respect the rights of their own citizens to speak their minds, to travel and to depart their country if they wish are less likely to follow aggressive policies than those which attempt to control every aspect of their citizen's lives. Human rights is, therefore, not merely a humanitarian issue; it is also a peace issue.

3. The United States has made practical proposals in all these areas. We place no arbitrary or mechanical linkages between different areas, but recognize that progress in one facilitates progress in the others and, conversely, problems in one can block real progress in the others. This is simply a fact of life, not a policy determination. U.S. proposals include:

a. To reduce use and threat of force: The President's proposal at the UNGA in October, 1985. We are pursuing this initiative with the Soviets in diplomatic contacts and in a series of regular consultations on regional issues, and with the

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parties in the affected areas.

b. To reduce and eliminate weapons of mass destruction:

-- Proposal at NST talks for 50% reduction in nuclear weapons.

-- President's February, 1986, proposal for elimination, over three years, of all LRINF systems.

-- U.S. proposal to discuss and eventually negotiate means whereby strategic defense systems, should they prove feasible, can be introduced in a cooperative manner to facilitate the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons.

-- U.S. draft treaty at Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to ban all chemical weapons, with strict verification.

-- U.S. and Allied proposal in MBFR for initial reductions of conventional forces in Central Europe and agreement on verification measures which would subsequently permit reductions to a common and much lower ceiling.

c. To enhance confidence:

-- U.S. proposals for eliminating violations of treaty and political commitments.

-- U.S. and Allied proposals at the Stockholm CDE for measures to build confidence by providing for greater openness in military movements and deployments.

-- President's initiative for massive increase in people-to-people contacts and reciprocal access to media.

-- U.S. proposals for increased cooperation in many areas, including peaceful use of space, medical research, environmental research and other scientific areas.

d. To protect human rights: U.S. has made clear that development of bilateral U.S.-Soviet relations will depend importantly on Soviet compliance of the political obligations it assumed in the Helsinki Final Act.

4. We need to reduce Soviet suspicions. While the fundamental issues between the U.S. and USSR are real, they are exacerbated by Soviet misunderstanding of the United States. Mr. Gorbachev, who has never visited the U.S., seems to be the victim

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of numerous misperceptions of U.S. life and U.S. policy. Therefore, one important aim of the 1986 Summit is to show Gorbachev the U.S. so that he can see for himself that the propaganda cliches he has accepted are questionable. This could lead eventually to a more realistic posture on his part.

5. The U.S.-Soviet Rivalry Will Not Disappear. The vast difference in our political systems means that we will be rivals for the foreseeable future. The challenge is to manage this rivalry in a peaceful fashion. The U.S. follows a steady policy based on realism, strength and dialogue. We are prepared to solve problems in a fair and practical fashion, without the expectation that the Soviet system will change or the Soviet Union will eventually act as an Ally. We can have a peaceful world even if our systems and ideologies compete.

Soviet Public Objectives

We can expect Moscow to stress the following themes in its propaganda:

1. The central issue in the U.S.-Soviet relationship is arms control; all others are secondary.

2. Another Summit meeting would be meaningless unless agreement can be reached in some important area of arms control.

3. The Soviet Union is sincere in wanting a world without nuclear weapons, but U.S. policies -- particularly SDI -- block progress.

4. SDI is inconsistent with nuclear weapons reduction.

5. While the President may be sincere in his expressed desire to reduce nuclear weapons and create a non-threatening strategic defense, he is unable to control some of the members of his Administration who are bent on achieving military superiority over the Soviet Union and developing a first-strike capability behind the cover of SDI.

6. The U.S., not the USSR, is guilty of using military force to intervene in other countries.

7. Pressure on "human rights" is both hypocritical -- since the U.S. is plagued by racism, inequality and poverty -- and also represents unwarranted interference in Soviet internal affairs. It is not acceptable as an issue in U.S.-Soviet relations or as a subject for negotiation.

8. The Soviet Union has a vigorous new leadership which wants peace and cooperation. The U.S., dominated by its "military-industrial complex," only pays lip service to relaxing tensions and uses "dialogue" to lull its public.

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9. It is up to the U.S. to change its policies in order to make a more peaceful world possible.

These propaganda themes will likely be accompanied by a show of resisting U.S. pressure for restraint in the Third World which, however, stop short of inviting an direct confrontation. Arms supplies to Nicaragua, Libya and Angola, for example, may be stepped up. Although some further dissidents may be released, this will be done while proclaiming that human rights is not an issue. Strident propaganda to "prove" that the U.S. is following militaristic policies and is covertly involved all over the world will continue.

Countering Soviet Propaganda

The best counter to Soviet propaganda will be a combination of exposing the facts about Soviet actions and policies and a vigorous presentation of U.S. policies. Criticisms of Soviet actions and policies are most effective when they do not appear strident or examples of knee-jerk negativism, but reasoned objections to dangerous policies. Whenever possible, critiques of Soviet actions, proposals and policies should be accompanied by an explanation of what the U.S. proposes to deal with the issue.

The following points should be made in preempting and responding to Soviet arguments:

-- The President is realistic about the nature of the Soviet system, but is serious, firm and patient in his desire to solve concrete problems. Our proposals are designed to get at those real problems which are amenable to solution; they are subject to the give-and-take of negotiation so long as our basic principles are preserved.

-- In contrast, the Soviets are still trying to achieve the public perception of relaxation without addressing the causes of tension. There is still too much of "what's mine is mine and what's yours is negotiable" in their approach.

-- The Soviets seem to desire a world in which the West is psychologically and physically disarmed, while the Soviet leadership is free to use its military force to expand wherever it chooses and to intimidate others. They also wish to establish as a principle the regime's right to conduct whatever repression it considers expedient toward its own citizens and those in countries under its domination.

-- This is not a prescription for a peaceful world, or one in which democratic values can be preserved. Therefore, it cannot lead to improved relations with the United States.

-- If the new Soviet leadership is genuinely interested in reducing tensions and creating a less threatening world in the

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future, it will have to address the underlying causes of U.S.-Soviet tension and work with us to solve as many of the concrete issues as we can.

-- Summit meetings are important in providing an opportunity to discuss these issues at the highest level, and to work on ways to solve them. They are not a "favor" to either side and must not be subject to preconditions.

-- Whatever policies the Soviets follow, there will be peace between us, so long as the U.S. maintains its strength and deterrent capacity. However, we would like more than that. If this is also the Soviet desire, they will find us willing to address outstanding issues fairly and realistically.

Some "Don'ts"

Some arguments, even if factually true, should be avoided because the Soviets can use them either publicly or privately to call into question U.S. seriousness or to put us at a tactical disadvantage in negotiations. For these reasons, statements along the following lines should be avoided when one is either speaking on the record or on background when the speaker can be quoted as an Administration official:

1. "Gorbachev was forced to come to Geneva."

(Instead: "The President has restored the balance of power, and this permits negotiations on a fair and constructive basis.")

2. "We made our latest proposal to put Gorbachev on the spot."

(Note: Suggests we are not substantively serious; also personalizes the issue, which should be discussed on its merits.)

3. "The Soviets will never... [pull out of Afghanistan... respect human rights...open up their society...etc]."

(Note: Whatever our objective analysis, our public stance should be that these things are possible if the Soviet leaders should desire. Otherwise, we diminish pressure on the Soviets to move in the right direction and make our own policies seem unrealistic. Of course, we also should not predict that these things will happen.)

4. "The Soviet P.R. effort is a threat."

(Note: Ultimately, the effectiveness of Soviet propaganda will depend on changes in Soviet policy and actions, particularly if we do our job in making clear to the public what

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the facts are. We therefore should not indicate any nervousness or defensiveness. It is far better to welcome the apparent Soviet interest in influencing Western opinion and express the hope that it will lead to a review of those policies which have damaged the Soviet image abroad.)

5. "We were surprised by the latest Soviet proposal."

(Note: We should never be surprised by Soviet tactical maneuvering or highly publicized announcements of "new" proposals. To suggest that we are surprised implies that we are not prepared to deal promptly with them -- which is not the case. It is preferable tactically -- and factually more accurate -- to say, "This is part of the familiar Soviet pattern of making periodic announcements of policies claimed to be new. Nevertheless, we will give it a close look and if we find positive elements we will follow up at the negotiating table.")

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→ Priority

- While it is uncertain whether or not a Summit will be held this year, I suspect you are still doing some prior planning for one.
- You may be interested in this NSDD, which outlined a procedural organization for preparing for the Summit.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 21, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM R. GRAHAM

Director

Office of Science and Technology Policy

SUBJECT: Meeting with Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev (C)

Attached is a copy of National Security Decision Directive 244 which was approved by the President for his Meeting with Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev. NSDDs fall within a special accountability requirement of the NSC. (C)

Rodney B. McDaniel
Executive Secretary

Attachment
NSDD 244

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

CONFIDENTIAL

SYSTEM II
90602

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 3, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

SUBJECT: Meetings with Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev (C)

The President has approved the attached National Security Decision Directive on Meetings with Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev. (C)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

John M. Poindexter

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED

Authority & Telley, NSC under provisions of EO 12358
BY Amf, NARA, Date 7/29/02 5/17/91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~SYSTEM II
90602THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 3, 1986

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 244SUBJECT: Meetings with Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev ~~(C)~~

In order to prepare for my meetings with General Secretary Gorbachev, it is important to set out clearly the plan for coordinating the preparation by the White House in conjunction with the Secretary of State and other U.S. government agencies.

~~(C)~~

Senior Level:

The Senior Planning Group, co-chaired by Chief of Staff Donald T. Regan and National Security Adviser John M. Poindexter shall be the senior coordinating body for the preparation of the meetings. This group shall receive regular reports on preparation for the meetings and shall convene the White House Working Group as necessary to review planning. ~~(C)~~

NSC/White House Level:

The White House Working Group co-chaired by Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Alton G. Keel and Assistant to the President W. Dennis Thomas shall be responsible for the coordination between the White House staff and the National Security Council for planning and preparation. Its membership, selected by the co-chairmen, shall consist of senior White House and NSC officers with direct responsibilities for preparations for the Summit. ~~(C)~~

Interagency Level:

The Senior Policy Committee (SPC) chaired by Dr. Alton Keel, shall be responsible for policy initiatives concerning the Summit, except in the area of arms control negotiations. ~~(C)~~

The Arms Control Support Group (ACSG) shall be chaired by Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Robert E. Linhard and shall be responsible for interagency coordination and policy development of arms control policy positions in preparation for the Summit. The Arms Control Support Group shall meet as appropriate on issues relating to the meeting preparations. ~~(C)~~

Add key milestones

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Authority *S. Telley, NSC 5/17/91 under provisions of*
BY *smf*, NARA, Date *7/29/02* *EO 12358*

* The Policy Support Group (PSG) chaired by Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Jack F. Matlock shall be responsible for interagency coordination of policy issues in support of the efforts of the SPC. The Policy Support Group shall meet as appropriate on issues relating to meeting preparations. ~~(C)~~

The Operations Coordinating Committee (OCC) shall be co-chaired by NSC Director for Soviet and European Affairs Tyrus Cobb and NSC Deputy Executive Secretary (Coordination) Franklin L. Lavin. The OCC shall be responsible for the day-to-day coordination for preparation for the meetings and for providing guidance to and feedback from concerned White House offices. ~~(C)~~

This definition of responsibilities is in support of the consideration of all those issues under negotiation with the Soviet Union, issues which will continue to be staffed in the normal interagency process, including meetings of the National Security Council as appropriate. ~~(C)~~

Ronald Reagan

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WH Senior
Planning Group
CH: Regan & Poindexter
*
*
*

WH Working
Group
CH: Keel/Thomas
*
*
*

Policy
Support
Group
CH: Matlock

Senior
Policy Committee
CH: Keel

Operations
Committee
CH: Cobb/Lavin

Arms Control
Support
Group
CH: Linhard_

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See Note 2

DECLASSIFIED

GORBACHEV

NLRR F06-114/8#10129

BY WJ NARA DATE 9/30/08

I believe Gorbachev is a highly intelligent leader totally dedicated to traditional Soviet goals. He will be a formidable negotiator and will try to make Soviet foreign and military policy more effective.

He is (as are all Soviet General Secretaries) dependent on the Soviet-Communist hierarchy and will be out to prove to them his strength and dedication to Soviet traditional goals.

If he really seeks an arms control agreement, it will only be because he wants to reduce the burden of defense spending that is stagnating the Soviet economy. This could contribute to his opposition to our SDI. He doesn't want to face the cost of competing with us. But another major reason is because the USSR's military planning differs from ours. We generalize and plan in a kind of defensive pattern -- how must we be able to cope with various contingencies worldwide. On the other hand, [our recent PFIAB study makes it plain the Soviets are planning a war.] They would like to win [without it and their chances of doing that depend on] ^{By} being so ^{MUCH} ^{BETTER} prepared we could be faced with a surrender or die ultimatum. Thus any new move on our part, such as SDI forces them to revamp, and change their plan at great cost.

He doesn't want to undertake any new adventures but will be stubborn and tough about holding what he has. His major goal will continue to be weaning our European friends away from us. That means making us look like the threat to peace while he appears to be a reasonable man of peace out to reduce tensions between us.

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But if he has to make a choice, then he will opt for demonstrating to his own hierarchy that he is a strong leader.

In the world of P.R. we are faced with two domestic elements. One argues that no agreement with the Soviets is worth the time, trouble or paper it's written on so we should dig in our heels and say "nyet" to any concession. On the other side are those so hungry for an agreement of any kind that they would advise major concessions because a successful Summit requires that.

My own view is that any agreement must be in the long-term interest of the United States. ^{g-mr allies} We'll sign no other kind. In a way, the Summit will be viewed generally as a success because we've met, shaken hands and been civil to each other. It can also be a success if we fail to arrive at an arms agreement because I stubbornly held out for what I believed was right for our country.

[What are some of their needs and priorities? Well, I believe they hunger for some trade and technology transfers. There is no question but that we have a tremendous advantage on that front. [Now I know some on our side don't like linking trade to political conduct; they believe peaceful trade is worthwhile all on it's own.] Well, I happen to think that trade is for us a major bargaining chip. We shouldn't give it away. But how about just hanging back until we get some of the things we want instead of giving consideration up front to what they want?]

On another important subject for discussion and even negotiation, I'm sorry we are somewhat publicly on record about human rights. Front page stories that we are banging away at them on their human rights abuses will get us some cheers from the bleachers but it won't help those who are being abused. Indeed, it could wind up hurting them.

Let me quote a remark by Richard Nixon, talking about the 1972 Summit. He had been importuned by Jewish leaders before going to Moscow that he should get agreement on liberalizing Jewish immigration before making any agreements on trade, arms control or whatever. Here are his own words; "I did not follow this advice. After we had reached agreement on arms control and trade and other items they wanted, I took Brezhnev aside and told him that in order to get Congressional approval for those agreements which required it, it would be very helpful if he could act positively on the Jewish emigration front. An indication of the success of this policy is that in 1968, the year before I took office, only 600 Jews were allowed to emigrate. In 1972 after our Summit meeting, the number rose to 35,000. In 1973, the Jackson-Vanik Amendment was passed which made Jewish emigration a public condition for most favored nations treatment. That year, the number of Jews allowed to emigrate was cut in half and today the number is down to a trickle." Then he added a line pertinent to our upcoming Summit. He expressed optimism that I might accomplish what he did in 1972, but only if I didn't force Gorbachev to eat crow and embarrass him publicly. We must always remember our main goal and his need to show his strength to the Soviet gang back in the Kremlin. Let's not limit the area where he can do that to those things that have to do with aggression outside the Soviet Union.

To those who believe Arms Control must be the goal as an end in itself with no connection to regional issues, let us ask if Salt I in 1972 wasn't possible because the year before tensions in Central Europe were eased by the Berlin agreement? Conversely did Salt II fail of ratification on it's own or did the invasion of Afghanistan have something to do with it?

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They should be told in the coming meeting that Congressional approval on trade or arms control or whatever else they want will be difficult if not impossible to get if they continue to support their clients in Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Latin America.

Those who think the Summit can be made to look successful if we get agreements on cultural exchanges, the consulate we want, fishing and trade matters are dealing with window dressing. Yes they can be useful but they must be viewed as just trimming for the main events which are the security issues like arms control, the regional areas of conflict and the prevalent suspicion and hostility between us. Indeed those trimmings could be harmful when used by some as evidence that all our concerns about national security were no longer pertinent. The target of their self-generated euphoria would, of course, be defense spending. So let me add here; another of our goals probably stated to Gorbachev in private should be that failure to come to a solid, verifiable arms reduction agreement will leave no alternative except an arms race and there is no way that we will allow them to win such a race.

Let us agree this is the first of meetings to follow. That in itself will give an aura of success. We will have set up a process to avoid war in settling our differences in the future. Maybe we should settle on early 1987 as the next meeting time and maybe we should discuss offering that it be in Moscow. He can come back here in 1988.

With regard to a communique that is more language than substance -- a frank statement of where we agreed and where we disagree -- is something for us to discuss. But let there be no talk of winners and losers. Even if we think we won, to say so would set us back in view of their inherent inferiority complex.

And so we take leave of historic Geneva and I get the hell out of there and head for the ranch.

Happy Thanksgiving Comrades!

~~SECRET-WNINTEL-ORCON~~

THE IMPACT OF THE OCTOBER 1986
U.S. EXPULSION OF SOVIET OFFICIALS

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] IN WASHINGTON AND

SAN FRANCISCO

NOVEMBER 21, 1986

This study is classified "~~SECRET-WNINTEL-ORCON~~" in its entirety.

Prepared by CI-3A Unit

~~SECRET-WNINTEL-ORCON~~

Classified by: 965
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLS F06-114/8#10130
By LOT, NARA, Date 1/15/08

~~SECRET-NOINTTEL-ORCON~~

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On October 21, 1986, the United States Government ordered the expulsion of 55 Soviet officials from Soviet diplomatic establishments in Washington, D.C. and San Francisco. Five of these officials were declared persona non grata (PNG) in direct retaliation for the initial expulsion of five American diplomats in Moscow and Leningrad. Soviet representatives, however, will be permitted to assume these vacated positions. The remaining 50 officials were expelled as the result of the administration's decision to achieve parity with the established Soviet ceiling of 251 U.S. officials permitted in the USSR. [REDACTED]

[illegible]~~SECRET-WNINTEL-ORCON~~

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET-WHINTEL-ORCON~~

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SAN FRANCISCO

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~~SECRET-NINETY-ORON~~

WASHINGTON, D. C.

[illegible]

SAN FRANCISCO

[illegible]

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OBSERVATIONS

[illegible]

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RECOMMENDATIONS

[illegible]

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(S) That a stringent but flexible visa policy be employed with regard to the issue of visas to Soviets

A policy of selective visa denial would pertain to Soviet applicants meeting any of the following criteria:


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- Soviets publicly expelled from any country worldwide.

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~~SECRET-WNINTEL-ORCON~~

SOVIETS PNG'D FROM WASHINGTON AND
SAN FRANCISCO ON OCTOBER 21, 1986



TOTAL: 5

~~SECRET-WNINTEL-ORCON~~

**SOVIETS EXPELLED FROM
WASHINGTON ON OCTOBER 21, 1986**

~~SECRET-WNINTEL-ORCON~~

~~SECRET-WNINTEL-ORCON~~

 OF SOVIETS PNG'D
AND EXPELLED FROM WASHINGTON AND
SAN FRANCISCO ON OCTOBER 21, 1986

Total:

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Redacted	Redacted	Redacted	Redacted	Redacted

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DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FOI-114/8 #10131

BY 105 NARA DATE 9/30/08

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December 31, 1986

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR FRITZ ERMARTH

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Odds and Ends

Following are miscellaneous notes of matters that came to mind as I cleared out by in-box and tried to bring some rationale to the files. They are in no particular logical order.

1. NSDD 75: Some time ago Poindexter asked me to take a look at NSDD-75 to see if it should not be revised. The President was particularly impressed by an article Nixon wrote about a year ago, and John wondered if we might not work some of its themes into a revised NSDD.

This never got done. NSDD-75 is a bit out of date, and if you want to set forth the Administration's objectives for the remainder of this Administration, a revision might be one way to do it.

In any event, you should be aware that the President is very much influenced by Nixon's advice, and in general favors his approach in dealing with the Soviets. (So far as I have been able to detect, this attitude does not extend to Kissinger's views, except to the degree they coincide with Nixon's.)

2. Paper entitled "GORBACHEV":

This is a revealing, but highly sensitive paper. It was dictated by the President last year a few weeks before the Geneva meeting (the corrections are also his). It provides excellent insight into his thinking re summitry and dealing with the Soviets. ✓

(It should not be marked in any way to identify it, but Frank might be interested. Bud slipped it to me last year.)

3. NSDD on Soviet Nationalities:

We worked this interagency, and then McFarlane sat on it and never approved it.

In view of the Alma Ata riots, we should take another look at the desirability of having an NSDD on the subject.

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In my view, the most useful result in the long term would be to provide for more expertise within the USG, meaning more slots for analysts and others who are familiar with the non-Russian languages and cultures. This can probably come about only with a strong White House lead, since USG agencies will not build up and maintain a cadre of specialists unless they are ordered to.

4. 1986 Summit: Public Diplomacy Strategy

Some papers done early in the year, reflecting our thinking at that time. (The "Don'ts" were compiled on the basis of damaging statements carried in the press and attributed to Administration officials.)

5. Policy Support Group: This was formed when we thought we might be headed into a full Summit, with an eye to coordinating policy in the non-arms-control areas. Carlucci presumably has the option of continuing it (with you in charge), or organizing things in a different way. There was also an antecedent NSDD setting up the position.

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DTG: 081540Z JUL 87

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8517

SECRET

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER THATCHER

*** START OF TEXT ***

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QUOTE ~~SECRET~~ STATE 208517

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL PTER UK SY

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER THATCHER

1. ~~8~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE EMBASSY SHOULD DELIVER THE LETTER BELOW FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRIME MINISTER THATCHER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. A SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW BY POUCH.

3. TEXT OF LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER THATCHER

BEGIN TEXT

JULY 7, 1987

DEAR MARGARET:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR JUNE 26 LETTER. FIRST, LET ME SAY THAT I WAS DISMAYED THAT MY LETTER TO ASSAD AND THE PLAN TO SEND A SPECIAL ENVOY TO DAMASCUS WERE LEAKED TO THE NEWS MEDIA HERE. I REGRET THAT NEWS OF THE LETTER AND ENVOY CAUSED PROBLEMS FOR YOU BEFORE THE EC MEETING. I AM PLEASED TO SEE THAT WE HAVE REACHED AN AGREED ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE RECENT MOVES BY

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BY CL NARA DATE 2/25/08

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***** TOP SECRET CODEWORD *****

PRESIDENT ASSAD AGAINST THE ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION.
ALSO, WE ARE, I BELIEVE, IN COMPLETE AGREEMENT THAT ANY
APPROACH TOWARDS SYRIA SHOULD BE CAUTIOUS, DELIBERATE
AND STEP-BY-STEP.

WE SEE VALUE IN PRESSURING ASSAD TO TAKE ADDITIONAL
ACTION AGAINST ABU NIDAL AND TO ABANDON HIS SUPPORT OF
TERRORISTS. BESIDES ABU NIDAL THERE ARE ADDITIONAL
AREAS WHERE WE THINK ASSAD SHOULD BE WILLING TO TAKE
MEASURES, E.G. AGAINST HIZBOLLAH AND IN CONTROLLING
BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT. ASSAD HAS THE MEANS TO
TAKE ADDITIONAL STEPS AND WE WILL PRESS HIM TO DO SO,
MAKING IT CLEAR THAT A FUNDAMENTAL IMPROVEMENT IN OUR
BILATERAL RELATIONS WILL DEPEND ON HIS TAKING CONCRETE
ACTION.

THE ACTION HE TOOK AGAINST ABU NIDAL WAS THE FIRST
STEP. SYRIA CAN ALSO CONTRIBUTE MUCH TO RESTORING
ORDER IN LEBANON, TO MAKING A VIABLE PEACE PROCESS
POSSIBLE, AND TO AFFECTING THE SHAPE OF THE IRAN-IRAQ
WAR BY DISTANCING ITSELF FROM IRAN. WITHOUT ILLUSIONS
OR A FALSE SET OF EXPECTATIONS, WE'RE PREPARED TO TEST
ASSAD.

WE WILL CONTINUE TO CONSULT CLOSELY WITH YOU ON ASSAD'S
RESPONSES AND ON USEFUL NEXT STEPS FOLLOWING GENERAL
WALTERS' VISIT. PLEASE BE ASSURED THAT GENERAL WALTERS
WILL FOLLOW THE DELIBERATE, STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH THAT
YOU AND I ADVOCATE.

I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU AND DISCUSSING THE RESULTS
OF OUR APPROACH TO SYRIA IN MORE DEPTH LATER THIS MONTH.
SINCERELY,

RON

END TEXT. SHULTZ UNQUOTE SHULTZ

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SECTION: 01 OF 01

** END OF TEXT **

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D C 20506

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July 9, 1987

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR GRANT S. GREEN, JR.

FROM: NELSON C. LEDSKY *NCL*

SUBJECT: The President's Weekend Reading

Attached are three separate short pieces which go with the arms control material sent to you by Bob Linhard. All four pieces are intended for the President's weekend reading in preparation for Prime Minister Thatcher's visit to Washington next week. The material attached consists of memos on:

- Economic Issues in the Thatcher Visit
- Mrs. Thatcher's View of Gorbachev
- Mrs. Thatcher's Middle East Agenda

These items can be sent separately or combined with Linhard's memo.

Attachments

Tab I Economic Issues
Tab II Gorbachev
 Tab A Telegram
Tab III Middle East

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By LOI NARA, Date 2/28/05

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: FRANK C. CARLUCCI

SUBJECT: Economic Issues in the Thatcher Visit

This memorandum provides background on economic issues that Prime Minister Thatcher is likely to raise during her upcoming visit.

Trade Protectionism

Mrs. Thatcher's advisors remain concerned about the Administration's will and political capacity to resist the protectionist trade legislation currently before Congress. Despite your assurances at the Summit, there remains confusion stemming from seemingly contradictory Administration pronouncements: on the one hand "working with the Congress" to promote free and fair trade, and on the other "vetoing" protectionist legislation. There is concern that the political process may force the Administration to swallow a strongly protectionist package in the name of free and fair trade. Mrs. Thatcher also might ask what she can do to help convince the Congress and the American people that the protectionists are on the wrong track.

I recommend that you tell Mrs. Thatcher unequivocally that you fully intend to veto any legislation which contains protectionist provisions. By that we mean anything which constricts trade, restricts Presidential authority or discretion in trade cases, discourages investment, violates international agreements, invites "mirror" retaliatory legislation by our trading partners, or which destroys the prospects for progress in the Uruguay Round. If Congress wishes to improve the efficiency of or clarify existing trade laws, we will be supportive. In fact, with your 1987 State of the Union message, you sent up a package of trade law improvements as part of the competitiveness program. But if that package becomes laden with protectionist amendments, you will veto. And unfortunately that appears to be the direction in which Congress is headed. We will be better able to measure that as the House-Senate conference approaches in early September.

On the matter of Mrs. Thatcher's offer of assistance, she will of course be sensitive to the political dangers involved in her speaking out on a U.S. domestic issue of some contention: charges

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of meddling or of complicity with the Administration. She may, however, be able to get her (and our) message across by speaking out on the real and present danger of lighting a protectionist match at this moment in history. She might also be encouraged to allude to the U.S. budget deficit as the primary cause of the trade imbalance and applaud your efforts to mount the bully pulpit on this question.

Agricultural Trade

Fats and Oils Tax. Thanks to the firm opposition of Mrs. Thatcher and Chancellor Kohl, a confrontation with the European Community has been averted over the proposed tax on fats and oils. This has left the EC with a continuing budget crisis caused by a deficit on agricultural payments estimated at \$4.7 billion in 1987. The crisis has been temporarily papered over through a series of disguised loans from member states. You will want to thank Mrs. Thatcher for her strong support against the tax and to encourage her to keep up the fight against the EC agricultural system.

Reform. Mrs. Thatcher has been a vocal ally in your efforts to build a political commitment to agricultural reform among the major trading nations. The U.S. proposal to eliminate distortions in the agricultural market by the year 2000 has been received in Europe with skepticism. You will want to encourage Mrs. Thatcher's continued efforts to persuade her EC colleagues that reform can and must be achieved.

Macroeconomic Issues

As noted above, Mrs. Thatcher and her advisors feel strongly, as do leaders of other summit countries, that the U.S. budget deficit drives its trade deficit. We do not disagree, as you noted in your speech following the Venice Summit. However, Mrs. Thatcher's advisors would like her to go further and push for higher taxes to reduce the budget deficit. While agreeing with her on the linkage between the budget and trade deficits, it is important that you stick to the approach of reducing budget expenditures as outlined in your July 3 Economic Bill of Rights speech, e.g., balanced budget amendment, line-item veto, and super majority votes for tax increases.

Prepared by:
Stephen I. Danzansky
Stephen P. Farrar

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: FRANK C. CARCUCCI

SUBJECT: Mrs. Thatcher's View of Gorbachev --
(Weekend Reading)

Prime Minister Thatcher has developed a somewhat paradoxical view of Gorbachev. She has written you about it on her return from a highly successful Moscow visit (see Tab A) and has aired it in press interviews. Given her intense interest in Soviet internal developments and their possible meaning for East-West relations, she will probably address them during her visit here next week.

On one hand, Mrs. Thatcher sees Gorbachev as sincerely aiming to revitalize Soviet society through reforms, that his efforts are politically courageous, and that they deserve encouragement from the West. Underlying this view is a conviction, which you share, that a truly more productive and prosperous USSR has to be a more liberal and decentralized system, which could be a more congenial neighbor in world affairs.

On the other hand, the Prime Minister sees Gorbachev as a very skillful and even dangerous challenger of the West. He is, in her eyes, a convinced communist, not a democrat of any stripe. He is ignorant and naive about the West, despite his more sophisticated demeanor; and he needs to be told bluntly where our values and goals differ from his. Very perceptively, she also notes in Gorbachev a certain naivete about his own system and his plans for reform. Because he is a convinced communist, he cannot really see the ultimate source of his system's ills in statism, collectivism, and party dictatorship. Nor can he invent a complete plan for reform; he must move step by step, by trial and error. His politics may be bold, even courageous; but he has no choice.

Mrs. Thatcher also notes that efforts at internal reform have, so far, not been accompanied by more than tactical reform in Soviet foreign policy. A striking case in point: The Soviet leaders who proclaim "new thinking" on foreign policy (such as Aleksandr Yakovlev, the new Politburo member and ideological mentor of Gorbachev) are also the authors of vicious anti-US disinformation, such as US government manufacture of AIDS.

Mrs. Thatcher's positive views on Gorbachev are no cause for quarrel. She asserts them in part for domestic reasons, in part because she has been greatly impressed by Gorbachev personally. But they raise two policy problems. First, by granting him the

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reputation of a true reformer, she helps make Gorbachev the media darling, especially in Europe, that she herself finds dangerous. Gorbachev may be or may become a real reformer, but he hasn't really earned this label fully. He has not yet moved beyond words, plans, and general decrees except in cultural/media liberalization, which is reversible. It would be well if Western publics heard more of the skepticism about his actual prospects for success that dominate the views of experienced Soviet watchers and, for that matter, most Soviet citizens.

Second, the Prime Minister's admonition that we encourage Gorbachev in his reform effort begs the question: How do we operationalize this without giving him dangerous, gratuitous, or at least premature concessions on security, human rights, or economic/technology issues? My answer would be as follows:

We give no concessions unless warranted by our own interests.

We safeguard the vitality of our own values and strengths. Throughout Russian history, the values and strengths of the West have been the primary source of any kind of reform in that country.

We make sure that our values are broadcast (literally by radio and all other means) into Soviet society so pressures for reform come from below.

We deny Moscow success in imposing control over other countries and challenge that control where it now exists, so that Kremlin rulers cannot use imperialism as a means to security and place in the world.

Finally, we can make clear that we applaud real reform in the USSR, reform that is truly liberalizing, democratizing, and conducive to the rule of law. We do not oppose it because we fear such reform would make the USSR stronger. Rather we believe true reform would make the USSR a better neighbor.

I doubt Prime Minister Thatcher would differ with any of this. And it is in fact what we are trying to do.

Attachment

Tab A Mrs. Thatcher's letter

Prepared by:
Fritz W. Ermarth

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BY LOT NARA DATE 9/30/08

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MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

DEAR RON,

I HAVE JUST GOT BACK FROM MY VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION AND WANT TO LET YOU KNOW STRAIGHTAWAY HOW IT WENT. GEOFFREY HOWE WILL BE GIVING GEORGE SHULTZ A DETAILED ACCOUNT NEXT WEEK. I FOUND MR. GORBACHEV IN VERY VIGOROUS AND ROBUST FORM. ALTHOUGH IT IS ALWAYS DIFFICULT TO TELL IN THE SOVIET SYSTEM, HE GAVE EVERY APPEARANCE OF BEING FULLY IN CHARGE, WITHOUT ANY NEED TO CONSULT HIS COLLEAGUES. HE SPOKE WITH THE UTMOST CONFIDENCE AND ASSURANCE. IT WAS NOTICEABLE HOW RYZHKOV DEFERRED TO HIM. DESPITE SOME CONTROVERSY OVER HIS REFORM AND RESTRUCTURING PLANS, I WOULD SAY THAT HE IS VERY FIRMLY IN THE SADDLE.

I WAS VERY STRUCK BY THE PROMINENT ROLE WHICH MRS. GORBACHEV PLAYED IN THE VISIT. BOTH OF THEM WENT TO GREAT LENGTHS TO BE GOOD HOSTS. WE ENDED WITH A VERY INFORMAL SUPPER PARTY ATTENDED ONLY BY MR AND MRS RYZHKOV AT WHICH WE TALKED VERY FREELY. GORBACHEV IS DETERMINED TO PRESS AHEAD WITH HIS PLANS FOR INTERNAL REFORM. HE APPEARS TO REALISE THAT IT WILL TAKE TIME TO GET RESULTS IN THE ECONOMY: HE SPOKE OF 5-7 YEARS BEING NEEDED. HE TALKS ABOUT HIS AIMS WITH ALMOST MESSIANIC FERVOUR. AT OUR PRIVATE SUPPER HE SPECULATED FREELY ABOUT SUCH LONG-TERM IDEAS AS PAYING PEOPLE MORE AND THEN CHARGING THEM SOMETHING FOR SERVICES LIKE HEALTH AND EDUCATION. HE TALKS ABOUT THE NEED FOR INCENTIVES. HE CLEARLY RECOGNISES WHAT A POOR STATE THE SOVIET ECONOMY IS IN. BUT SOME OF HIS IDEAS APPEAR SIMPLISTIC. ONE CANNOT YET SEE QUITE HOW THEY WILL DELIVER INCREASING PROSPERITY ON THE SCALE HE WANTS AND NEEDS. I DOUBT THAT HE IS READY TO TAKE THE SORT OF STEPS NEEDED FOR REALLY FUNDAMENTAL REFORM. EVEN SO, I AM FIRMLY CONVINCED THAT IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO ENCOURAGE HIM, ESPECIALLY IN HIS ENDEAVOURS TO CREATE A MUCH MORE OPEN SOCIETY. MY TALKS WITH GORBACHEV LASTED SOME 12 HOURS. HE HIMSELF DESCRIBED THEM AS HAVING BEEN SOMEWHAT TURBULENT BUT HAVING GREAT CLARITY. WHAT STRUCK ME MOST WAS THAT, HOWEVER SOPHISTICATED GORBACHEV AND HIS SENIOR COLLEAGUES MAY BE BY COMPARISON WITH PREVIOUS GENERATIONS OF SOVIET LEADERS, THEY STILL HARBOUR AN EXTRAORDINARY DEGREE OF MISCONCEPTION AND MISINFORMATION ABOUT WESTERN LIFE AND VALUES. IF EVER I HAD ANY DOUBTS WHETHER GORBACHEV IS A TRUE BELIEVER IN THE COMMUNIST SYSTEM, MY TALKS WITH HIM DISPELLED THEM. I TRIED TO SHOW HIM A LESS DISTORTED VIEW OF INTERNATIONAL REALITIES, SPELLING OUT WITH COMPLETE CANDOUR THE REASONS FOR THE WEST'S APPREHENSIONS ABOUT SOVIET POLICIES AND INTENTIONS.

TOLD HIM THAT WHILE WE WELCOMED HIS COMMITMENT TO INTERNAL REFORM, WE STILL AWAITED SIGNS OF CHANGE IN SOVIET EXTERNAL POLICIES. HE DID AT LEAST CLAIM THAT THE AIM OF EXTENDING COMMUNIST DOMINATION THROUGHOUT THE WORLD WAS ONLY A SCIENTIFIC CONCEPT OF NO PRACTICAL RELEVANCE TO SOVIET POLICIES. IN ARMS CONTROL I ENDURED A LONG LAMENT ABOUT HOW THE WEST

RESPONDED TO SOVIET INITIATIVES BY CREATING NEW LINKAGES AND CONDITIONS. BUT I BELIEVE THAT I WAS ABLE TO MOVE HIM TOWARDS ACCEPTANCE IN PRACTICE OF THE STEP BY STEP APPROACH WHICH WE AGREED AT CAMP DAVID LAST YEAR. HE IS KEEN TO COMPLETE AN INF AGREEMENT AND ACCEPTS THAT IT MUST INCLUDE CONSTRAINTS ON SHORTER-RANGE SYSTEMS, ALTHOUGH HE IS NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT A WESTERN RIGHT TO MATCH SOVIET LEVELS (WHICH I SAID WAS A KEY POINT). HE ALSO OBJECTS TO THE PLANS TO DOWNGRADE PERSHING IIS TO PERSHING IS. HE PROFESSED WILLINGNESS TO WITHDRAW THE SS22S AND SS23S FROM EUROPE AND DESTROY THEM IN FRONT OF THE TELEVISION CAMERAS. HE ACCEPTS THAT THERE SHOULD BE IMMEDIATE FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS ON SHORT-RANGE WEAPONS, BUT INSISTS THAT THESE SHOULD INCLUDE U S FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS, INCLUDING THE DUAL-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT. I REMINDED HIM THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD FAR MORE AIRCRAFT IN THIS CATEGORY. HIS AIM IS PATENTLY THE DENUCLEARISATION OF EUROPE. I LEFT HIM IN NO DOUBT THAT I WOULD NEVER ACCEPT THIS.

THESE ARE POINTS WHICH YOUR NEGOTIATIONS WILL HAVE TO PURSUE IN GENEVA. BUT HE SEEMS GENUINELY ANXIOUS TO HAVE AN AGREEMENT WHICH HE CAN PRESENT AS A CONCRETE ACHIEVEMENT FOR HIS NEW APPROACH. I WOULD THINK THAT THERE IS A PRETTY REASONABLE PROSPECT OF GETTING SUCH AN AGREEMENT WHICH MEETS OUR REQUIREMENTS BY THE END OF THIS YEAR.

HE ALSO SEEMS READY TO MAKE PROGRESS TOWARDS AGREEMENT ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS, ALTHOUGH I REALISE THAT THIS MAY IN PART BE TACTICAL BECAUSE OF SOVIET FEARS THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL RESUME PRODUCTION OF SUCH WEAPONS. BUT HE WAS VERY MUCH TOUGHER ON THE LINK BETWEEN START AND SDI. I PUT TO HIM MY IDEAS ON GREATER PREDICTABILITY. HE DESCRIBED THEM AS AN INTERESTING, PRACTICAL PROPOSAL BUT GAVE NO SIGN OF FLEXIBILITY. ALTHOUGH HE SUBSCRIBES TO THE NEED FOR EARLY NEGOTIATIONS TO REDUCE CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS HE TRIES TO DENY THAT THERE IS AN IMBALANCE IN THE SOVIET UNIONS FAVOUR. THIS DOES NOT AUGUR WELL FOR SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS.

I DETECTED LITTLE SIGN OF NEW THINKING ON AFGHANISTAN. HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES ARE CLEARLY MUCH EXERCISED ABOUT THE PROBLEM AND ARE THRASHING AROUND LOOKING FOR A WAY OUT. BUT THEY ARE STILL NOT READY TO ACCEPT THAT THE PRESENT REGIME IS NOT AN ADEQUATE BASIS FOR POLITICAL RECONCILIATION.

HE OBJECTED STRONGLY TO MY RAISING HUMAN RIGHTS, BUT NEVERTHELESS GAVE SOME QUITE USEFUL ASSURANCES ABOUT THE TREATMENT OF INDIVIDUAL CASES. MY FEELING IS THAT WE SHALL SEE SOME PROGRESS, ALBEIT SLOW, ON THIS FRONT. THE VISIT WAS VERY WELL WORTHWHILE ON AT LEAST THREE COUNTS:

- GORBACHEV NEEDS TO BE TOLD IN PLAIN, UNVARNISHED TERMS WHAT THE WESTERN VIEWPOINT IS. AND HE WAS. IT WAS INTERESTING THAT HE DID NOT ALLOW MY FRANKNESS TO AFFECT OUR PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP. I WAS ALSO ABLE TO GET OUR POINT OF VIEW ACROSS TO A MUCH WIDER AUDIENCE ON SOVIET TELEVISION. I WAS INTERVIEWED FOR SOME 50 MINUTES AND EVERY WORD WAS TRANSMITTED, EVEN THOUGH I MADE SOME VERY EXPLICIT COMMENTS ABOUT THE SOVIET SYSTEM AND THEIR POLICIES.

- WE HAVE AN INTEREST IN SUPPORTING HIS REFORM POLICIES, EVEN IF THEIR RESULTS ARE MODEST. AS SAKHAROV HAS SAID, AN OPEN SOCIETY IS SAFER FOR ITS NEIGHBOURS. WE SHOULD PUSH GORBACHEV TO RECOGNISE THAT.

- THE RESPONSE OF THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE WAS REMARKABLE ON MY WALKABOUTS IN MOSCOW, ZAGORSK AND TBILISI. THERE IS CLEARLY A DEEP LONGING FOR CONTACT WITH THE WEST. WE SHOULD TAKE EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLOIT GLASNOST TO MAKE OURSELVES AND OUR SOCIETIES BETTER KNOWN TO THEM.

HOPE THAT YOU WILL HOLD THIS INFORMATION CLOSELY. I LOOK FORWARD TO DISCUSSING THESE MATTERS MORE FULLY WITH YOU WHEN WE NEXT MEET.

WARM REGARDS,
YOURS, MARGARET.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: FRANK C. CARLUCCI

SUBJECT: Prime Minister Thatcher's Middle East Agenda

During her July 17 visit to Washington, Mrs. Thatcher is likely to raise three key Middle East issues: the Persian Gulf, the Arab-Israeli peace-seeking process, and Syria. We should add Afghanistan to the agenda.

Persian Gulf

Mrs. Thatcher is fully supportive of prompt, effective U.N. Security Council action. She also firmly backs U.S. reflagging. At the same time, she hopes to avoid an escalation of tensions with Iran and an expansion of the shipping war. As one method of doing so, Mrs. Thatcher suggests that Iraq at least temporarily stop or reduce attacks on Iranian shipping.

Our strategy in the Gulf -- which combines very active diplomacy with security commitments to our friends -- addresses Mrs. Thatcher's concerns. We expect passage of a UNSC cease-fire/withdrawal resolution early next week, before Mrs. Thatcher's arrival in Washington. But we need strong help from the British, other Venice allies, and the Arab League to push the USSR and the PRC on a second resolution mandating an arms embargo against any party which refuses to comply with the first, and to ensure an active diplomatic role by the Secretary General.

Once the initial resolution is passed, we envisage a fixed period of 30-45 days in which the Secretary General would negotiate with the belligerents, report back to the Council on compliance, and try to obtain tacit agreement from the parties in selected areas of activity which could possibly diminish hostilities over time. In the short term, we will seek to persuade Iraq to respect the Security Council's call for a cease-fire, at least for the fixed period between passage of the first resolution and the SYG's report on compliance. Although Iraq may be reluctant to do so unilaterally, this would put the onus more clearly on Iran as the intransigent party in the war. It would also reduce tensions and risks in the Gulf as we begin to protect Kuwaiti-owned vessels -- a process which should begin shortly after Mrs. Thatcher's departure from Washington.

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Peace-Seeking Process

Mrs. Thatcher promised Israeli Foreign Minister Peres last month that she would press in Washington for stronger and more visible U.S. support for an international conference. She is likely to make a similar commitment when she meets with King Hussein early next week.

We continue to explore actively whether such a conference can be constructed in a way that would produce face-to-face negotiations between the parties and a lasting peace settlement. Like Mrs. Thatcher, we remain skeptical about Soviet intentions. Assistant Secretary Murphy pressed a Soviet delegation this week for specific answers on key points of our international conference concept. Dick Walters did the same with Syria. Murphy also talked with Mubarak and urged him to seek out Shamir rather than deal exclusively with Peres.

Mrs. Thatcher shares with Hussein and Peres the view that stronger endorsement by us of their proposal is the key to Israeli acceptance. They apparently fail to recognize the need for at least acquiescence from Shamir and the importance of showing him and other critics that the Soviets and Syrians can be brought to accept our concept of the conference. Peres' handling of the proposal to date has been of political benefit to the Likud and detrimental to the peace process. We need to discuss with Mrs. Thatcher new approaches which would have a chance of winning Shamir's interest.

Syria

Mrs. Thatcher understands why the President sent Dick Walters to Damascus, and we will brief her fully on the generally positive results of his discussions. However, she will press for more specific evidence of Syria's effort to dissociate itself from terrorism -- e.g., dismissal of Syrian officials implicated in the Hindawi affair, closure of Abu Nidal camps in Lebanon, and expulsion of other terrorist groups from Syria -- before Britain will agree to steps to end Syria's isolation. She recognizes that our initiative and growing EC pressure may lead to a relaxation of restrictions on Damascus, but she will try to ensure that this process unfolds gradually and is linked to real improvements in Syrian behavior.

While we share many of Mrs. Thatcher's concerns, we do not believe that policy toward Syria should be viewed solely through the prism of terrorism. Nor do we have the special domestic

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political problem which the Hindawi case poses for the UK. Given Assad's movement on some (not all) important terrorist issues, we have begun to test Syrian behavior on a range of other issues -- Lebanon (including Hizbollah), the peace-seeking process, the Persian Gulf -- while moving carefully and gradually toward an improvement in relations. The next step for us would be return of our Ambassador, provided we remain satisfied with movement by Syria. Mrs. Thatcher will raise this point and may also raise the issue of sanctions (where a UK oil company has replaced a U.S. company forced to leave Syria).

Afghanistan

Mrs. Thatcher shares our views on this issue and has raised it personally, strongly with Gorbachev. We need to discuss with her the need for greater EC activity to support Pakistan and the Resistance (in non-lethal ways) and to increase political pressure upon the USSR. It is likely that the current phase of heavy fighting will be followed sometime in the fall by a period where the Soviets will again at least pretend to explore new ideas for a political settlement. The West should be ready.

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