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ID Doc Type	Document Description			No of Pages		Restrictions
10216 MEMO	TRANSCRIPT OF SHOOTDOWN OF KAL 007			5	ND	B1
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10217 MEMO	TRANSCRIPT OF SHOOTDOWN OF KAL 007			6	ND	B1
	IN R	USSIAN LANGUA	GE			
	D	2/22/2008	NLRRF06-114/8			
10220 MEMO	SHULTZ TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE U.S.			4	9/1/1983	B1
	RESPONSE TO SOVIET ATTACK ON					
	KOREAN AIRLINER: CURRENT STATUS					
	AND	NEXT STEPS				
	R	9/30/2008	F06-114/8			
10218 MEMO	SOVIET DECISION MAKING			1	ND	B1
	R	9/30/2008	F06-114/8			
10219 MEMO	CLARK TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE NSPG			5	ND	B1
	MEETING: SOVIET SHOOT-DOWN OF KAL					
	AIRLINER					
	R	3/16/2011	F2006-114/8			

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LUEIVED

THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON

SECRET/SENSIFIE

September 1, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

George P. Shultz

SUBJECT:

U.S. Response to Soviet Attack on Korean Airliner: Current Status and Next Steps

As you return for Saturday's NSC meeting, I want to review for you the situation with regard to the Korean airliner and the next steps we are working on for your consideration.

The Current Situation

The Soviet attack on an unarmed civilian aircraft resulting in the deaths of two hundred sixty-nine people, including approximately thirty-five Americans, was a callous and brutal act that is certain to have far-reaching international impact. It is obvious that our own bilateral relations with the Soviet Union cannot remain unaffected by a fresh and particularly irresponsible Soviet resort to force and violence. Indeed, we have already taken some unilateral punitive steps, and we will need to consider other possibilities in the days and weeks ahead. At the same time, we must also ensure that the Soviets pay the full political costs of their actions in ways which go well beyond the US-Soviet bilateral relationship. Thus, it is essential that we work to build and sustain the broadest possible international response to this appalling act.

Twenty-four hours after the Korean aircraft was shot down there remain a number of gaps in our knowledge of the events leading up to the attack. For example, it remains unclear how the Korean flight crew could have strayed so far off course and within Soviet airspace. It is not entirely certain whether the pilots of the Soviet interceptors knew that the Korean aircraft was a civilian airliner, although some evidence suggests that they did. The extent of involvement in the incident by Soviet ground controllers and higher authorities in Moscow is also unclear. However, it is clear beyond any doubt that Soviet aircraft did move into close proximity before firing at the airliner and that the attack was carried out in disregard for the loss of life that resulted. By any recognized standards of international law and conduct, the Soviet attack must be regarded as deliberate and unjustified.

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BY LOT NARA DATE 9/30/08

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Moreover, the Soviets have sidestepped our diplomatic efforts to elicit an explanation of the incident. As you know, Larry Eagleburger called in Soviet Chargé Sokolov this morning to demand an explanation. This afternoon Sokolov telephoned Rick Burt to convey a "personal message" from Gromyko to me that acknowledges Soviet interception of the airliner but not a Soviet role in its destruction. I instructed Rick to inform Sokolov that Gromyko's response was totally inadequate and to reiterate our insistence on a satisfactory explanation of the affair. We have issued a public statement to this effect.

As you know, CINCPAC is already conducting a search and rescue mission in the area where the aircraft appears to have gone down. We plan to request access to Soviet territorial waters to facilitate this search, and to pave the way for possible salvage operations later on.

Elements of a U.S. Response

As you know, we have formed an interagency task force to examine the various aspects of the case, and to consider different responses that the U.S. and other concerned nations could take. The U.S. response must involve both steps in our bilateral relationship and a far-reaching effort to build and sustain a strong international response. We have thus far identified the following general areas for action.

A. Bilateral Steps

- 1. We have already notified the Soviets that the U.S. will not move forward with the planned extension of the bilateral agreement on cooperation in Transportation. This agreement provides for cooperation in various areas of transportation technology, including civil aviation safety and high-speed water-borne transport.
- 2. We will have to consider urgently what impact this incident should have on my planned meeting with Gromyko at Madrid. I intend to go forward with the meeting and to use it as a vehicle for conveying to the Soviets at Politburo level our strong revulsion at their actions and our determination to respond vigorously.
- 3. We are in contact with a number of prominent Americans who are planning to travel to the USSR in the near future, including Congressmen Gray, Boxer, and Solarz. We are not actively discouraging their travel, but are recommending that, if they feel they must go ahead with their trips, they convey their views on this incident to the Soviets in the strongest terms.



- 4. We are instructing our delegation to the international communications conference in Soviet Central Asia this week to spotlight this incident in what they say, and to refuse all Soviet social invitations.
- 5. We are examining a number of other options for steps across the gamut of our bilateral relations, including in the economic area. For instance, we might consider reviewing all outstanding equipment sales to the Soviet aviation industry, while pressing our allies to undertake similar steps.

B. Multilateral Initiatives

- 1. We have called for an urgent meeting of the UN Security Council and will use this forum to condemn the Soviet attack in the strongest possible terms and seek a resolution calling for a special international investigation. In particular, we intend to use the Council debate to expose Soviet efforts to evade responsibility for the attack by including in the U.S. statement verbatim excerpts from the communications of Soviet pilots who fired the missiles. We will be pressing other nations to join with us in issuing condemnatory statements both in the Council debate and outside it.
- 2. We are urgently considering steps to organize and support international action against Soviet civil aviation interests, particularly Aeroflot international operations and flights by third-country airlines to the Soviet Union. For example, we could seek immediate allied and third-country agreement to refuse to accept Aeroflot flight plans for a specified period. We would pursue actions of this kind within organizations such as the International Civil Aviation Organization, but much work will also have to be done in bilateral consultations with other nations. In this connection, we are studying ways to exploit the building condemnation of the Soviet attack by private organizations, such as the International Pilots Association.
- 3. We have looked at the possibility of bringing a case before the International Court of Justice, but this procedure would be time-consuming at best, and probably inconclusive.

C. Public Diplomacy

1. The statements already issued by you and me put us in the correct position of condeming in strongest terms the Soviet attack, while calling on them to explain it if they can. By contrast, the weak and evasive Soviet statements issued thus far will only fuel international skepticism of whatever line Moscow may ultimately adopt to "explain" its actions.

secret/sensitive

SECRET/SENSITIVE

- 2. We have already approached our European and Japanese allies to urge that they issue similar condemnatory statements. The British have already made a strong statement, and we will continue pressing others to follow suit.
- 3. We will be developing on an urgent basis a public diplomacy strategy to exploit this incident. As we implement this strategy, we must recognize that U.S. leadership will be essential. However, we will want to avoid repetition of the "Olympic Boycott" syndrome in which the U.S. role overshadowed that of other nations and private interests. Instead, the U.S. should encourage initiatives by others and adopt a supporting and facilitating role where possible and appropriate.

I believe that, taken together, these steps put us on the right track in developing the U.S. response to the Soviet attack. We will be constantly reevaluating and exploring new possibilities in the days and weeks ahead, and offering recommendations for your review.

Soviet Docision Making - Don't know level

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NLRR FO6-114/8# 10218 BY_ LOT NARA DATE 9 30 08

We anticipate that the President will make a brief statement following his meeting with Congressional leaders Sunday morning September 4.

A draft statement is needed by 3 p.m. Saturday, September 3.

In addition, a draft summary of the actions being announced by the President in fact sheet format is needed for release to the White House press corps at the time of the President's statement. That fact sheet should also be provided by 3 p.m. Saturday.

Another requirement in connection with the statment by the President may be a background briefing for the White House press corps.

(FYI, we anticipate Secretaries Eagleburger and Burt being on national television interview programs at about the time of the statement. They should have the information that the President will be announcing, and be authorized to go into detail on these programs. This will probably eliminate them as briefers at the White House. We need, therefore, a recommendation from State as to who should brief; and whether an expert on aviation safety issues like Lynn Helm should also be available at the briefing.)

A notional outline for the Presidential statement is as follows:

--Just met this morning in an unusual but necessary Sunday meeting with the bipartisan leadership of Congress on two matters of national security concern.

--With regard to the Middle East, the leadership was briefed on the current diplomatic and military situation in the region and heard from Ambassador McFarlane, whom I asked to return from Beirut for today's session.

--Our policy on Lebanon remains one of firm support for the government of Lebanon in its efforts toward national reconciliation and the extension of its authority over all of the country's territory. Commitment to the security if Israel's norther border and to the overall Middle East peace policy remains a fixture of our policy. Our Marines are in Lebanon as part of a Multinational Force to help keep the peace. They will defend themselves with vigor if attacked.

--With regard to the Korean airliner incident, Congressional leaders were provided detailed information available to the U. S. government. Will also present this at the U.N.

--We continue to call for a full accounting by the Soviets. The world is owed an explanation, and apology, and just restitution.

--After these important Congressional consultations, I am today announcing these actions:

-- Secretary Shultz to go to Madrid, why, and agenda.

--Asking Congress for a resolution expressing its sentiments about this incident.

- --Continuing arms reductions negotiations, with even greater sense of urgency.
- --Taking actions affecting US/Soviet bilateral relations as follows. (detail)
- --Seeking multilateral actions with others in the international community as follows. (detail)
- --Summary and conclusions, again calling for the Soviets to explain this action to the world, and make amends, and join willingly in initiatives that will assure the safety of international air travelers.

NOTE: State/Defense draft radio speech (attached), which was not used, has excellent rhetorical content and could be used in preparation of the presidential statement, particularly its concluding paragraph. Presidential statement should be 7-10 minutes length maximum.

Draft Presidential Radio Speech

My fellow Americans, I want to talk with you today about a subject which I know has weighed heavily on your hearts and minds in the past few days -- as it has on mine. Last Wednesday, Soviet military aircraft without warning attacked and destroyed an unarmed and defenseless commercial airliner, thus killing 269 innocent people.

This outrage came as shock to the entire civilized world, but it did not come as a surpise to this Administration or to the American people. This is only the latest in a series of Soviet atrocities around the world, from Afghanistan, to Poland, to the camps of the Soviet Gulag itself. Since we came to office, my Administration has expressed a clear and consistent view of the Soviet Union.

Because we have had no illusions about the nature of the Soviet Union or its behavior, we have put in place a policy based on realism, strength, and negotiation. The recovery of our economic, military, and spiritual strength gives us renawed confidence in America's ability to deal firmly with threats to the peace and to resist Soviet expansionism. Soviet acts of force and violence, such as this week's attack on a civilian airliner, remind us anew how critical it is that we persevere in the course we have set.

It's worth remembering that this is not the first time that Soviet trigger-happiness has threatened the safety of innocent air travellers. In 1978, Soviet aircraft intercepted another civilian airliner which had strayed off course, attacked it, damaged it, and forced it to land. On that occasion, disaster was averted. This time the innocent travellers on Korean Air Lines Flight 007 were not so lucky. The men, women, and children who died last Wednesday were as surely the victims of Soviet agression and brutality as the hundreds of thousands of Afghans who have died or been forced into exile by the Soviet invasion of their homeland.

The world cannot and will not ignore a crime of such monstrous proportion. Voices of outrage have been raised around the globe, both by officials of numerous governments and by a wide variety of private groups and individuals. Indeed it is no exaggeration to say that the entire world is demanding that the Soviet Union give a full explanation of its behavior.

In the face of this broad outpouring of international condemnation, the Soviet response has been not to explain their actions, but to cover them up. Despite overwhelming evidence

to the contrary, the Soviets continue to refuse even to acknowledge that they shot the airliner down. Instead they have resorted to fabrications of some sort of U.S. intelligence connection with the aircraft. These clumsy Soviet efforts to make the tragic events of last week into simply another in the tiresome catalogue of Soviet complaints about our policy would be laughable if they were not so callous and offensive.

This indefensible attack on innocent people is not primarily an issue between the Soviet Union and the United States. It is an international issue in which all civilized governments and peoples have a stake. Just as the concern is worldwide, so is the response. The United Nations Security Council met yesterday, with nations from across the globe expressing their outrage. The Republic of Korea, which lost more people than any other nation, put the demands of the world succinctly and well. It called on the Soviet Union to offer a full account of what happened, to apologize, to punish those directly responsible, to guarantee unimpeded access to the crash site, and to offer full compensation and credible guarantees against a recurrence of violence against civil airliners.

We believe this focus on civil aviation is appropriate. Pilots from many countries are expressing their concerns and considering their responses. Families which suffered such terrible losses are demanding that the Soviet Union meet its responsibilities. The entire international community is moving to ensure that the Soviet Union is made to understand that it cannot look the other way. It is appropriate that one of the first actions this government took was not to proceed with renewal of our bilateral transportation agreement with the Soviet Union.

Tomorrow I will be meeting with the leadership of the Congress to consider how America can best participate in this global effort. I am confident the Congress will agree that we need a strong, dignified and sustained response, one which keeps the focus where it should be -- on the Soviet Union against the world and not the Soviet Union against the United States.

We will remain the peacemakers and the peacekeepers. We will not abandon our efforts to achieve substantial reductions in nuclear arms in Geneva. We will continue to work for peace in the Middle East, Central America, and elsewhere -- despite Soviet efforts to fuel conflict. We will sustain the policies we have established; sadly reminded of the difficulty of making a nation which rules its own people through force cease using force against the rest of the world.

THE U.S. RESPONSE TO SOVIET DESTRUCTION OF THE KAL AIRLINER

The United States shares with all other nations of the civilized world a deep feeling of repugnance toward the heinous act of the Soviet Union in shooting down a Korean Airlines civil airliner, an act that resulted in the loss of 269 innocent lives.

For the U.S. the issue is one of preserving the standards of a civilized international community against this thoughtless act of violence. In cooperation with other civilized nations, the U.S. demands justice in this matter. It demands from the USSR a full account of what happened, information on the search operation, assurances that the USSR will not use destructive force against unarmed civilian aircraft in the future, and compensation for the victims of this tragedy.

In order to realize these objectives, the United States has taken or will take specific actions in the areas of international diplomacy, aviation security and safety, and bilateral relations, including the following:

The U.S. immediately told the world the shocking facts. We did so honestly, responsibly, and carefully, as we determined the facts ourselves.

We are conducting and assisting search efforts in international waters near the tragedy. We and Japan have asked the Soviets to extend the search into their territorial waters, but so far, the USSR has not agreed. We will continue to press the Soviet Union for cooperation in this effort, including immediate access to any wreckage or bodies recovered;

The U.S., along with South Korea and Japan, called an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council, where nations from across the globe already have registered their outrage in the face of disingenuous Soviet efforts to avert blame;

The U.S. will further expose the Soviet action tomorrow when Ambassador Kirkpatrick makes public the tape of the Soviet pilot discussions as they downed the Korean airliner;

The President is sending Secretary Shultz to Madrid to demand an explanation directly from Foreign Minister Gromyko;

We have notified the Soviets we will not renew our bilateral agreement for cooperation in the field of transportation;

We have told the Soviets we are suspending negotiations on several bilateral arrangements which we had under consideration;

The U.S. is working with other nations to seek reparations for all who were killed. We will put forward an omnibus U.S. claim against the Soviet Union within the next week for compensation for the loss of life and property, for the benefit of the victims' survivors.

The U.S. is conducting intensive discussions on measures to secure coordinated international actions. We want to find better means to ensure the safety of civil aviation;

We have joined with other countries to press the International Civil Aviation Organization to investigate this crime at an urgent special session of the Council;

The U.S. has reaffirmed its previous order denying the Soviet Airline -- Aeroflot -- the right to fly to the United States, and are examining whether there are steps which can be taken to end other Aeroflot activities in this country. Unless and until the Soviets satisfy the cries of humanity for justice, Aeroflot should not be accepted by the world as a normal member of the international civil air community.

Consistent with our law and policies, the U.S. will support appropriate measures by private groups who have a special interest in civil air safety to improve the security of air transport;

The U.S. will redouble its efforts with our Allies to end the flow of military and strategic items to the Soviet Union, a need now made even more pressing by this unjustifiable Soviet use of its military forces.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT:

NSPG Meeting: Soviet Shoot-Down of KAL Airliner


INTRODUCTION

The shooting down of a Korean airliner demands a serious international response. The scale of the tragedy is dramatic--surely one of the worst in civil aviation history.

The Soviets have a long history, beginning in 1946, of shooting down unarmed aircraft near their borders. Moreover, they have had a policy of electronic deception of radio air navigation aids which have lured many aircraft across their borders, only to be shot down. This is the second time they have shot down a Korean airliner. In April 1978, the Soviets shot down a Korean Boeing 707 which had inadvertently entered this airspace over the Kola Peninsula. The airliner was subsequently intercepted, identified as a KAL 707 civil airliner, and shot down. Significantly, the Soviet pilot repeatedly questioned the order to fire on a civilian airliner, and subsequently received confirmation of the command to fire. The aircraft was hit and subsequently crash-landed on a frozen lake in the Soviet Union. Because of SALT II, nothing was done by the U.S. at the time.

Some to want to view this incident in a narrow context. It is worth noting that, in addition to turbulence in Central America, Chad and Lebanon, the Soviets may now have decided to create a serious incident in Asia. This means that for the first time in a long while serious trends are unfolding in every principal theater. We have to soberly consider whether this may in fact be a deliberate message from the Soviets on the eve of the talks in Madrid: "Do business with us or we will make things infinitely worse for you in areas where it will be difficult for you to react." Given what we know about the Soviet system, it is entirely likely that the decision to attack the airliner was made at a very high level.

It is important that you focus the discussion at today's meeting on the broader ramifications of this incident. What does it say about how far the Soviets may now be prepared to go in trying to



intimidate our Asian allies - who, like the Japanese, have shown some greater willingness to take new steps for effective defense - or our European allies on the verge of INF deployments? What does it say about the growing cynicism and boldness of the current Soviet leadership? And, based on the answer to this question, what does it say about the character and possibilities for our bilateral relationship in the immediate future?

The chief dilemma over the near term is how to translate the concern of the world into meaningful actions without making it appear that we are improperly capitalizing on the tragedy itself. How to devise measures that can be sustained? How to focus the existing rage in ways that enable us to influence domestic and international reaction of others on important issues before us; e.g., Soviet supported terrorism, use of chemical biological weapons, etc.

In past cases where the Soviets have committed egregious crimes they and their apologists have attempted through disinformation and lies to turn the force away from their actions and somehow blame the U.S. or its allies. Unless we take the offensive they will try to put us on the defensive.

We need to think hard about an appropriate response. One of the things that seemed to me unfortunate about announcing a decision to go to Madrid--before all the relevant information on the incident was even at hand--is that it has possibly removed an important tool for trying to leverage an effective allied response. A collective Allied rejection of meeting with Gromyko at the CSCE should be pursued with vigor.

OBJECTIVES

Our immediate concern is to achieve some benefit from this tragic event. Your personal statement and early return have already set the tone of our concern. We must now ensure that follow on actions are directed and structured to achieve recognizable and coherent objectives. These objectives must be shared by the American people, the Congress, our major allies and reflect our status as leader of the free world. We believe that our actions in the coming days and weeks must be designed to achieve the following objectives:

- O Reverse Soviet "Peacemaker" Image and Register an Appropriate Political Protest. The indident presents us with the opportunity to reverse the false moral and political "peacemaker" perception that the Soviets have been cultivating. Their active propaganda in this regard has cast the Soviet Union as flexible, legitimate and searching for peace. This has, in turn, created severe problems in our efforts to convince the free world of their true objectives. Actions to achieve this objective should be aimed at securing domestic and international support for your programs to strengthen western security.
- o <u>Justice</u>. We must be seen as a leader (but not alone) in the international community in calling for justice. Civilized societies demand punishment and restitution as deterrents to further activity which exceed the norms of acceptable behavior. Despite numerous incidents of this kind, the soviets have never acceptably investigated, reported or identified their victims. In order to be effective the action, we take to achieve this objective should be tailored and proportional to the crime. We cannot be perceived as too harsh, too weak or ineffective in the sanctions we call for or endors.
- o Bolster the confidence of Intimidated States. What we do or fail to do in supporting the Koreans and Japanese in the days and weeks ahead will be a telling signal to friends and allies alike. We must be responsive and cooperative, without appearing excessive, particularly in the case of military support. A carefully structured security enhancement which is not perceived as "warlike" or "threatening" will enhance our international credibility.

ILLUSTRATIVE ACTIONS TO ACHIEVE OBJECTIVES

- o <u>Actions to Reverse Soviet "Peacemaker" Image and Register Political Protest.</u>
 - -- A major Presidential speech addressing the objectives and methods of Soviet grand strategy.
 - -- Review the degree to which our presence at negotiating tables with the Soviets reinforces the idea that the

Soviets are good-faith negotiators. Consider withdrawal from variour or all negotiations.

- -- Diplomatic effort to secure public statements and resolutions condemning the Soviet Union in relevant international fora.
- -- Major information campaign by USIA.
- -- Cancel the forthcoming Shultz-Gromyko meeting. Such a meeting should be boycotted until the Soviets provide an explanation for the incident, an apology and reparations.
- -- Consider closing the Soviet consulate in San Francisco; it is a center for their spy network against the U.S. electronics industry.

o Actions to secure justice.

- -- Soviets grant unimpeded Western access to crash site.
- -- Soviets publicly document to world-wide aviation bodies their procedures in the case of airliners crossing into Soviet airspace.
- -- Soviets provide specific assurances against destructive force being used again against straying airliners.
- -- Soviets document that no future incidents of electronic desception of radio air navigation signals will occur.
- -- Soviets must provide full reparations to Korea and to the families of the dead on accepted international scales.
- -- Options should be prepared concerning internationally implementable procedures to impede Aeroflot activities, world-wide, and discourage flights to the Soviet Union for a specified period of time.
- -- Review all outstanding U.S., allied and third country equipment sales to the soviet aviation industry and seek immediate agreement from as many coutnries as possible to terminate or suspend indefinitely these deliveries.

o Actions to Bolster Confidence of Intimidated States

- -- Lease or sell AWACS to Japan to help defend regional air routes.
- -- Possible acceleration of F-16 deployment in Japan.
- -- Carrier battle group deployment to the region.
- -- Discussions with allies in the area to bolster regional security arrangements.

The NSPG meeting tonight will be too brief to discuss all of these matters. This paper, however, provides you with some thoughts to guide the discussion. Most importantly, in whatever we decide to do or not to do, we should keep these objectives in mind.

The Agenda for the NSPG meeting is attached. All principals have been advised.

RECOMMENDATION

That you use the points above in discussing our options at tonight's NSPG meeting.

APPROVE	DISAPPROVE	
APPROVE	DISAPPROVE	

Attachment NSPG Agenda URGENT

LDX TO:

JOHN HUGHES, STATE PA HENRY CATTO, DEFENSE PA CHUCK WILSON, CIA

FROM:

BOB SIMS

Following the Congresisonal leadership meeting September 4 Congressman Wright made an erroneous statement to the press to the effect that the Soviet pilots on the Korean airliner shootdown tape he heard had twice referred to their target as U.S. RC-135 aircraft.

At about the same time TASS reported a Soviet official's claim that they had thought the Korean aircraft to be a U.S. "spy plane." Larry Speakes dealt with these issues in his on-the-record briefing, which I will LDX to you as soon as it is available.

Later on September 4, we confirmed on background that a U.S. RC-135 had been in international air space in the vicinity of the Korean airliner when the airliner was <u>initially detected</u> by the Soviets. The background information we provided, attributed to "White House officials" or "Administration officials," took the following approach:

A U.S. RC-135 aircraft was in the vicinity of the Korean airliner on August 31 when the airliner was initially detected by Soviet radar. Both aircraft were then in international air space, and the U.S. aircraft never entered Soviet air space. The U.S. routinely conducts unarmed RC-135 flights in international air space off the Kamchatka peninsula to monitor by national technical means Soviet compliance with the SALT treaties. The Soviets conduct similiar monitoring activities near U.S. missile testing areas. The Soviets are aware of our flights and track them routinely. They know that our aircraft do not enter their air space. The Korean aircraft's inadvertant entry into Soviet territory should have been an early and strong indication to them that the flight was not a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft.

The Soviets tracked the Korean aircraft and the U.S. aircraft separately and knew there were two aircraft in the area, so we do not think this was a case of mistaken identity. The closest point of approach of the two aircraft was approximately 75 nautical miles, while the U.S. aircraft was in its mission orbit. Later, the U.S. aircraft crossed the path taken by the Korean airliner, but by then the airliner was almost 300 miles away. Still later, as the Korean airliner strayed off course and

overflew the Kamchatka peninsula, it was initially identified by the Soviets as an RC-135 and then as an unidentified aircraft. Approximately two and a half hours after the U.S. and Korean aircraft were near each other in international air space, the Soviets shot down the Korean airliner as it was exiting (or had exited) their territory west of Sakhalin Island, some 1,000 miles from the operating area of the U.S. aircraft.

During the two and one half hours of Soviet surveillance of the Korean aircraft, the Soviets had radar images (both ground and air) of the Korean 747. The two aircraft are distinctly different in shape and size. Their fighter aircraft also had visual contact with the Korean aircraft. The SU-15 and MIG-23 aircraft pilots whose voices are on the tape obtained by the U.S. played for the Congressional leadership never refer to the Korean aircraft as an RC-135, only as "the target." They made no serious effort to identify the aircraft or They did not appear to care what it was. to warn it. Instead, they were intent on killing it. If the Soviets made a mistake in identification, which stretches the imagination, they have not said so to date. In fact, they have not to date admitted shooting down the Korean commercial aircraft with 269 people aboard. We continue to ask the Soviets for their full accounting of this incident.

The presence of a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft on a routine monitoring mission to assure Soviet compliance with treaty obligations some 1,000 miles and 2½ hours flight time from the scene of the shootdown in no way excuses or explains this act, which speaks for itself.

(Asked why the RC-135 information had not been made public earlier, we cited the fact that this information was developed as part of a detailed after-the-fact analysis of all information available to us from all sources, and our expectation that the Soviets would provide an honest accounting, which they have not yet done.)

Please pass the above information to appropriate offices so that they may prepare press guidances for on the record use at State Department, Defense Department, and White House press briefings tomorrow.

We do not expect the President to have to address the RC-135 in his television talk tonight unless the story escalates with the presentation of new information today. Mention of it is,

however, under consideration. It will undoubtedly have to be dealt with if there is a backgrounder at the White House prior to the President's speech. If the Soviets or others raise the issue in the UN Security Council session, it would seem that our responses regarding the RC-135 should be as forthcoming as possible, in keeping with our posture of asking the Soviets for a full and open accounting of their actions that relate to the shootdown.

copy to:

Judge Clark
Dave Gergen
Larry Speakes
Jack Matlock
Chris Lehman
Ken de Graffenreid
Bob Lilac

What we are doing

Bilaterally -- on our own:

- -- As REMAIN soon as we knew, we immediately told

 the KM world and told them in terms we thought would be convincing.

 Did it carefully
- -- We also informed the Soviets that we would not renew a transportation agreement with them. That agreement provides for _____.
- -- We have put a hold on the opening of new consulates in New York City and Kiev that were to be opened soon;
- -- We have also delayed talks on a new exchange agremment that would send various groups km from one country to the other.
- Aeroflot flights to the U.S. Those flights were first cut off after Afghanistan. We have told the Knix Soviets again that they we are not being renewed, and I have directed that steps be taken to make it more difficult for knaxe anyone to purchase tickets on Aeroflot whitexis here in U.S. (Note: RR is anxious to close down Aeroflot office in NY and perhaps elsewhere that are still open for business, selling tix out of Montreal, etc.)

-- Absolutely need to get in the point that this is not a controverwy between Soviets and the United States -- this is one where Soviets have offended the entire world with their behavior.

-- As you know, NSC is sending along more information about the 1978 incident (more concrete details) and about a Volga boat incident. Forfier working. I'm giving you transcript of tapes. Need to work in Atwater-type material, too, KNHK of course.

-- I argee with you that we ought we to have me some detail up front about scenario of events. One key we set of facts is that we asked them 3 times two to be able to go into area, look for preside wreckage and possible survivors. Only Sunday it did they respond -- new set several days after event -- and new then they wanted to know more precisely what we were weakers would send in. We also ought to harp on fact not only of incident but of cover-up.

- Chos. Pening

Remeter: Le still
han to line on some
plenet as Society

For our part, we shall do the following: First, disclosed

First, we will continue to press the Soviet leaders to follow the honorable course of investigating and disclosing the facts, taking corrective action, making restitution, and providing concrete assurances that such wanton acts will not be repeated. (Add on restitution)

Second, to make clear to the Soviets our deep feelings on this tragedy, we will not renew our bilateral agreement for cooperation in the field of transportation, will reaffirm our exclusion of the Soviet airline from the United States, and will suspend negotiation of several bilateral arrangements.

Third Convisional Resolution

Sthird, we will cooperate with other countries in seeking better means to insure the safety of civil aviation. One aspect of this effort should be a clear recognition that, if the Soviet leaders refuse to satisfy the cries of humanity for justice, their airline should not be accepted as a normal member of the international civil air community. And the issue is one which should draw the concerned attention of international organizations which deal with civil aviation.

Fourth, we will listen carefully to the views of private groups, both American and international, who have a special interest in civil air safety--airline pilots, passenger associations and others--so that we can work in concert with them to improve the security of air transport.

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Other points to be made along the way

- -- To this day, the Soviets have not told their own public that the plane went down mank with 269 aboard, Waxexmaky maidxkhakxkhakx much less admit their manatima responsibility on it.
- -- RRXWARK On question of culpability, W RR wants to point x out that they have never even acknowledged that they shot the plane down.
- -- Bobby Byrd makes the point that waxid West should better understand now that if the Soviets attack a defense airliner -- if their system permits that -- then it is not beyond realm of & belief that if a city is unarmed or nation is unarmed, they might permit an attack upon it. He makes this argument in & order to bolster caxse for Pershing deployment.
- -- Also need to work into bilateral actions the fact that RR is asking Congress for a joint resolution of condemnation. Should talk about need & for bipartisanship, the good consultation he has had with them.

and on our own, we also intend to continue pressing Soviets for a full explanation and an apology. Sect. Shultz leaving tomorrow for Madrid an to meet iwth Foriegn Minister Gromyko and I have directed him to make this incident the first item on the agenda. These talks will not be business as usual. Indeed, the whole purpose of the Madrid meetings of various foreign ministers is to work on a human rights, and the atrocity of this last week is one of the grossest violations of human rights in recent memory.

Note on punishment:

The Soviets face a clear choice in dealing with this tragedy. If they have any concern for innocent human life--as they repeatedly claim--they will immediately and publicly investigate the incident, explain to the world how it came about, punish those guilty of this heinous crime, cooperate in efforts to find the wreckage and recover the bodies, offer compensation to the bereaved families, and change the orders given to their military units to prevent calculated attacks on civilian aircraft, whatever the circumstances.

If, on the other hand, they refuse to face the facts publicly and instead deny them and attempt to confuse the public with fabrications, distortions and innuendo—as their controlled media and diplomatic representatives have done up to now—then they will stand exposed to the world as callous brutes who recognize no limits on the use of violence, so long as it can be used with impunity.

Not long ago, in a tragic accident, a Soviet passenger boat struck a bridge while travelling down the Volga River. Hundreds of Soviet citizens died. The Soviet Government immediately had one of its most senior officials lead an inquiry. Within a very short time the government announced its findings. Negligence was found and procedures were instituted to prevent further accidents. Certainly the Soviet Government bears a heavy responsibility for launching a similar investigation of the attack on the Korean

12 malualit

airliner. Or do they believe that a Korean, Japanese or Recomment American life is worth less than a Russian life?

But the world must not stand still and allow violence to be used against humanity without exacting a penalty and taking steps to protect itself. That is why I spent this weekend consulting with my advisers, Congressional leaders, representatives of other countries and the public regarding the steps we should take.

(Value of Convessional consultation)

For our part, this is what we are doing:

-- We immediately told the world of the shocking facts. We did so responsibly and curefully, as we determined the facts ownselves.

- We are conducting and assisting search efforts in international waters near the trajecty.

--We are continuing to press the Soviet leaders to follow the honorable course of investigating and disclosing the facts, taking corrective action, making restitution, and providing concrete assurances that such wanton acts will not be repeated. And let me say here that T believe the compensation to the relatives of the victims is a moral duty which the Soviets must assume.

--To make clear to the Soviets our deep feelings on this tragedy, we will not renew our bilateral agreement for cooperation in the field of transportation.

--We also will reaffirm our exclusion of the Soviet airline from the United States, and will suspend negotiation of several bilateral arrangements.

- --I am asking Congress to pass a joi♠nt resolution of condemnation of this Soviet crime.
- --I have instructed Secretary Shultz to make this matter the center of his meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko next week.

Some steps we can take ourselves, but the most effective ones must be in concert with other concerned nations. The issue is not one just between the Soviet Union and the United States, but between the Soviet regime and humanity.

Working in concert with other nations, we are doing the following:

First, along with Korea and Japan, we called an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council.

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Debate began Friday and many governments—Korea, Japan,

Canada, Australia, the Netherlands, Pakistan, France, China,

Televal Republic & Germany Japan,

the United Kingdom New Zealand and Zaire—Ajoined us in

withus expressing horror at the Soviet action. When He debyte

resumes on These ay - more retions will

Second, we will work with other nations to seek reparations for those who were killed. Americans made up a

large contingent on the plane, but there were also citizens on there from over a dozen other nations.

Third, we are cooperating with other countries to find better means to insure the safety of civil aviation. One aspect of this effort should be a clear recognition that, if the Soviet leaders refuse to satisfy the cries of humanity

for justice, their airline should not be accepted as a

normal member of the international civil air community. An normal member of the international civil air community. And the issue is one which should draw the concerned attention of international organizations which deal with civil aviation.

> Fourth, we are listening carefully to the views of private groups, both American and international, who have a special interest in civil air safety--airline pilots, passenger associations and others -- so that we can work in concert with them to improve the security of air transport.

Fifth, in the economic area in general, we will redouble our efforts to work with our Allies to end the flow of military and strategic items to the Soviet Union. We have already made progress in this area. We hope for more.

We will pursue these courses of action vigorously and will not flag in the effort to impress upon the Soviet leaders the just demands of the world public. That is why I have instructed Secretary Shultz to proceed with his scheduled meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko in Madrid this week. We must not let slip any opportunity to communicate our views directly to decision-makers in Moscow.

We will also continue our efforts to achieve balanced, verifiable reductions of arms, since this is most important for maintaining peace and security in the world. That is why Ambassador Nitze has returned to Geneva for the next round of negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe. Our policy of seeking to reduce the arms burden has not changed and will not change.

But the barbarous Soviet act in deliberately shooting down a defenseless airliner brings home to us once again the need to rebuild and maintain our military and economic strength, and to help our Allies and friends maintain theirs. For we must have the means to defend ourselves and maintain the peace in a world where some respect only strength. We cannot rely on the good will and civilized restraint of a power which shoots down to civilian aircraft. And without strength, we will never be able to achieve the balanced, verifiable reductions in arms which we so much desire.

Let us rededicate ourselves to achieving the goals we have pursued from the beginning of this Administration. We know our responsibilities. We know it will be hard to make a nation that rules its own people through force cease using force against the rest of the world. But that is the task before us.

The Soviets face a clear choice in dealing with this tragedy. If they have any concern for innocent human life--as they repeatedly claim--they will immediately and publicly investigate the incident, explain to the world how it came about, punish those guilty of this heinous crime, cooperate in efforts to find the wreckage and recover the bodies, offer compensation to the bereaved families, and change the orders given to their military units to prevent calculated attacks on civilian aircraft, whatever the circumstances.

If, on the other hand, they refuse to face the facts publicly and instead deny them and attempt to confuse the public with fabrications, distortions and innuendo—as their controlled media have done up to now—then they will stand exposed to the world as callous brutes who recognize no limits on the use of violence, so long as it can be used with impunity.

But the world must not stand still and allow violence to be used against humanity without exacting a penalty and taking steps to protect itself. That is why I returned to Washington this weekend to consult with my advisers, Congressional leaders, representatives of other countries and the public regarding the steps we should take. Some steps we can do ourselves, but the most effective ones must be in concert with other concerned nations. The issue is not one just between the Soviet Union and the United States, but between the Soviet regime and humanity.

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From the very moment we learned of the tragedy, we have been active.

First, we immediately told the world of the shocking facts. We did so responsibly and carefully, as we determined the facts ourselves.

Second, we supported a call for a meeting of the United Nations Security Council, which gave many nations the opportunity to express their outrage.

Third, we are conducting and assisting search efforts in international waters near the tragedy.

Fourth, we informed the Soviet Union that we will not renew the agreement to cooperate in the field of transportation. Civil aviation is one of the areas which that agreement covers and we clearly cannot cooperate with Working in concert with other nations:

- -- Along with MARKAR Korea and Japan, called emergency meeting of the Na U.N. Security Council. Debate began Friday and many nations harrant -- a name them -- have already condemned the Soviets. They KRAKIANE have offered only answers that distort the evidence. Debate will resume tomorrow in NYC.
- -- We want to work with other PRESE. nations to seek reparations for those who were killed. Soviets must pay just compensation to families. Therefree Americans made up large & contingent on plane -- over 50 U.S. citizens on board -- but there were also citizens on there from over a dozen other nations (identified so far). International Court of Justice may be forum for this (note, Ben: RR thinks reparations and aviation are two key elements of response. He is very hot on reparations).
- -- We are working with allies on ways to isolate

 Aeroflot flights. The This will be matter we will take up with

 International Civil Aviation Organization m in Montreal.
- -- In economic **xx** area, we **xx** are also working with allies on ways to **xxx** to **xxx** end flow of military and strategic items to USSR. Have already made progress on this front in past year; hope to make more now.