

# Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections

---

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

---

**Collection:** Matlock, Jack F.: Files  
**Folder Title:** Navy – USSR  
**Box:** 29

---

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: [reagan.library@nara.gov](mailto:reagan.library@nara.gov)

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>



# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

**Withdrawer**

JET 5/12/2005

**File Folder** USSR-NAVY

**FOIA**

F06-114/8

**Box Number** 29

YARHI-MILO

2901

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
10263	CABLE	120225Z FEB 81	2	2/12/1981	B1
10262	CABLE	130955Z MAR 81 <b>D 11/24/2011 F2006-114/8</b>	2	3/13/1981	B1
10286	PAPER	POLITICO-MILITARY ANALYSIS USSR <b>PAR 10/3/2008 F06-114/8</b>	2	3/13/1981	B1 B3
10287	MAP	SOVIET NAVY ANCHORAGES <b>R 10/3/2008 F06-114/8</b>	1	ND	B1
10288	CABLE	201543Z MAR 81 <b>R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8</b>	1	3/20/1981	B1
10264	CABLE	232100Z MAR 81 <b>D 11/24/2011 F2006-114/8</b>	2	3/23/1981	B1
10265	PAPER	SOVIET NAVAL AVIATION IMPROVEMENTS	1	3/25/1981	B1 B3
10266	PAPER	BREZHNEV PROPOSAL TO LIMIT NEW BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBS <b>PAR 3/16/2011 F2006-114/8</b>	2	ND	B1 B3
10267	PAPER	MAJOR SOVIET NAVY EXERCISE IN APRIL <b>D 3/16/2011 F2006-114/8</b>	1	4/3/1981	B1 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.



# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

**Withdrawer**

JET 5/12/2005

**File Folder** USSR-NAVY

**FOIA**

F06-114/8

**Box Number** 29

YARHI-MILO

2901

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
10289	CABLE	031213Z APR 81 <b>R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8</b>	1	4/3/1981	B1
10268	CABLE	032150Z APR 81	1	4/3/1981	B1
10269	CABLE	051030Z APR 81 <b>D 11/24/2011 F2006-114/8</b>	2	4/5/1981	B1
10290	CABLE	060835Z APR 81 <b>R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8</b>	1	4/6/1981	B1
10291	CABLE	060835Z APR 81 <b>R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8</b>	1	4/6/1981	B1
10270	CABLE	071750Z APR 81	1	4/7/1981	B1
10271	CABLE	090328Z APR 81 <b>D 11/24/2011 F2006-114/8</b>	1	4/9/1981	B1
10292	MEMO	BREMER TO ALLEN RE U.S.-SOVIET NAVY TO NAVY INCIDENTS-AT-SEA TALKS <b>R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8</b>	1	4/17/1981	B1
10272	MEMO	SHOEMAKER TO ALLEN RE US-SOVIET NAVY TALKS <b>R 3/16/2011 F2006-114/8</b>	1	4/21/1981	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.



# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

**Withdrawer**

JET 5/12/2005

**File Folder** USSR-NAVY

**FOIA**

F06-114/8

**Box Number** 29

YARHI-MILO

2901

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions	
10273	MEMO	ALLEN TO BREMER RE US-SOVIET NAVY TO NAVY INCIDENTS AT SEA TALKS <b>R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8</b>	1	ND	B1	
10293	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #10292 <b>R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8</b>	1	4/17/1981	B1	
10274	PAPER	SOVIET NAVY IN MEDITERRANEAN: AN UPDATE	1	5/6/1981	B1	B3
10275	CABLE	150107Z MAY 81	2	5/15/1981	B1	
10276	CABLE	200038Z MAY 81	1	5/20/1981	B1	
10277	PAPER	CHARACTERISTICS OF THE KIROV NUCLEAR-POWERED GUIDED MISSILE CRUISER <b>PAR 3/16/2011 F2006-114/8</b>	3	6/1/1981	B1	B3
10278	PAPER	NEW SOVIET CRUISERS AND DESTROYERS FOR THE 1980'S	1	ND	B1	B3
10279	PAPER	VIETNAM: SOVIET NAVAL COOPERATION CONTINUES	1	10/28/1981	B1	B3
10294	PAPER	POLITICO MILITARY ANALYSES SOVIETS AND US ANTI-SUB WARFARE CAPABILITIES	2	12/4/1981	B1	

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.



# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

**Withdrawer**

JET 5/12/2005

**File Folder** USSR-NAVY

**FOIA**

F06-114/8

**Box Number** 29

YARHI-MILO

2901

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
10280	MEMO	REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT OF ARTICLE BY ADMIRAL CHERNAVIN	1	3/30/1982	B1
10281	PAPER	USSR	1	3/30/1982	B1 B3
10282	PAPER	USSR: INDIAN OCEAN FACILITIES	1	4/19/1982	B1 B3
10283	CABLE	120617Z JAN 83	1	1/12/1983	B1
10284	PAPER	USSR-WESTERN EUROPE: BALTIC SUB PROPOSAL <b>PAR 3/16/2011 F2006-114/8</b>	1	3/10/1983	B1 B3
10285	CABLE	101511Z JUL 84	6	7/10/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.



--Vietnam Gets More Anti-Submarine Warfare Helicopters (SECRET):  
A consignment of 16 Ka-25 anti-submarine warfare helicopters was recently delivered to Vietnam, joining at least 12 which Moscow had provided in 1979 and 1980. In Soviet service, Ka-25s are normally found aboard helicopter carriers and warships of destroyer size and larger; Vietnam, however, has no combatant ships equipped with a helicopter landing pad, and there are no indications that the USSR will supply any. It may be that the helicopters are intended to be shore-based to protect the approaches to vital ports from the Chinese submarine fleet, the world's third largest.

--New Military Airbase in Southern Angola (SECRET/NOFORN): A new runway, aircraft hangarages and other support facilities are being built at Sa Da Bandeira Airfield in southern Angola, only 120 miles north of the Namibian border. It is one of three jet-capable airfields in southern Angola, and the construction suggests that Angola intends to develop it into a major base for its Soviet-supplied MiG-21 jet interceptors.

--Soviets Continue Delivering Missile Patrol Boats (SECRET):  
North Yemen recently received its first OSA-II class missile patrol boat, Ethiopia its third, and Vietnam its seventh and eighth.


Prepared by: INR/PMA - T. Williams, J. Peterson, M. Miller  
x28858 x28858 x20233

Approved by: INR/CA - P. H. Stoddard



~~SECRET~~

# SOVIET NAVY ANCHORAGES



DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

NLRR F06-114/8 #10287

BY 105 NARA DATE 10/3/08



ITEM RETURNED

TO NSC

SECRETARIAT

IN APRIL 1987

Log # 507

TCS 3091/81

March 81

CP 2 014



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Department of State

SOVIET NAVY  
INCOMING  
TELEGRAM 9

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 03930 201556Z  
ACTION ACDA-12

4436

MOSCOW 03930 201556Z

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 INR-10 EUR-12 SS-15 OIC-02 CIAE-00  
H-01 IO-14 NSC-05 NSAE-00 MC-02 L-03 CSCE-04  
ACDE-00 TRSE-00 PM-09 PA-01 OMB-01 SP-02 SPRS-02  
/096 W

-----062202 211347Z /40

R 201543Z MAR 81  
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1097  
INFO SECDEF WASHDC  
DIA WASHDC  
CNO WASHDC  
USICA WASHDC  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY ROME  
AMCONSUL Leningrad  
USMISSION USNATO  
USDEL MBFR VIENNA  
USNMR SHAPE BE  
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN  
CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA  
COMNAVINTCOM WASHDC  
USLOSACLANT NORFOLK VA

TRIDENT I AND SS-NX-20 MISSILES. THE TRIDENT SSBN  
CONSTITUTES MODERNIZATION OF THE AGING POSEIDON  
FLEET AND IS GENERATIONALLY CLOSER TO THE SOVIET DELTA  
SERIES; THE TRIDENT I MISSILE IS THE FIRST U.S.  
LONG-RANGE SLBM, AND DIRECTLY COMPARABLE TO THE  
SOVIET SS-N-18 SLBM DEPLOYED ON THE DELTA-III SSBN.  
END COMMENT.  
MATLOCK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MOSCOW 03930

MILITARY ADDRESSEES ALSO FOR POLAD/INTAFF

DIA FOR DB-1C3 CNO FOR OP-02, OP-06 AND OP-09

E.O. 12065: GDS 3/20/87 (MATLOCK, JACK F.) OR-M  
TAGS: PARM, MUNC, SOPN, UR, US, SALT  
SUBJECT: TRUD INTERVIEWS ADMIRAL SYSOYEV ON  
- BREZHNEV'S TRIDENT-TYPHOON PROPOSAL  
1. (C) ADMIRAL V.S. SYSOYEV, HEAD OF THE SOVIET  
NAVAL ACADEMY, IN AN INTERVIEW IN THE MARCH 20  
ISSUE OF THE SOVIET TRADE UNION DAILY "TRUD"  
EMPHASIZES THE PURPORTEDLY BALANCED NATURE OF  
BREZHNEV'S PROPOSAL TO RESTRICT DEPLOYMENT OF  
THE TRIDENT AND TYPHOON SSBN'S AND SLBM'S.  
SYSOYEV GIVES A DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE TRIDENT  
PROGRAM, CHARACTERIZING THE TRIDENT I MISSILE AS A  
FIRST-STRIKE COUNTERFORCE WEAPON BY VIRTUE OF ITS  
HIGH ACCURACY. SYSOYEV CLAIMS THAT THE SOVIET  
TYPHOON SSBN/SLBM SYSTEM WAS A DIRECT RESPONSE TO THE  
U.S. TRIDENT PROGRAM, AND WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN  
DEVELOPED IN THE ABSENCE OF THE TRIDENT. HE SAYS  
THE U.S. SPURNED BREZHNEV'S ORIGINAL APRIL 1976  
OFFER TO LIMIT NEW SSBN'S BECAUSE OF ITS DESIRE TO  
BE "NUCLEAR POWER NUMBER ONE." ON THE CHARACTERISTICS  
OF THE TYPHOON, SYSOYEV SAYS ONLY THAT "AS A  
MILITARY MAN I CAN SAY THAT IT IS IN NO WAY  
INFERIOR TO THE AMERICAN (SYSTEM)."

2. (C) COMMENT: THE SOVIET PEACE OFFENSIVE HAS  
THUS FAR FOCUSED MOST HEAVILY ON BREZHNEV'S PROPOSED  
TNF MORATORIUM AND, TO A SOMEWHAT LESSER DEGREE,  
ON HIS OFFER TO BROADEN THE COVERAGE OF EUROPEAN  
CBM'S. THE SYSOYEV INTERVIEW SUGGESTS THAT WE CAN  
EXPECT THE TRIDENT-TYPHOON PROPOSAL TO RECEIVE MORE  
ATTENTION, IN ORDER TO SHOW THAT MOSCOW IS WILLING  
TO "GO BEYOND" THE TERMS OF SALT II IN RENEWED  
STRATEGIC ARMS NEGOTIATIONS. IF THIS PROVES TO BE  
THE CASE, WE SHOULD MAKE CLEAR ON THE PUBLIC RECORD  
THAT THE BREZHNEV PROPOSAL IS BLATANTLY ONE-SIDED  
IN PAIRING THE TWO SUBMARINES, AND IN EQUATING THE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/8# 10288

BY LOT NARA DATE 9/30/08

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



EOB525

\*\*\*\*\*~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~\*\*\*\*\*E COPY

IN

OP IMMED  
DE RUEHC #4987 0940014  
O 032256Z APR 81  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 6577

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ 4/10/01 CAS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 084987

E.O. 12065: N/A

TAGS: PEPR, IN, UR

SUBJECT: SOVIET NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN  
REF: (A) STATE 19471; (B) NEW DELHI 6983

1. WE HAVE COME UP WITH FOLLOWING INFORMATION IN RESPONSE TO NYT BUREAU CHIEF KAUFMAN'S QUESTIONS IN REF B. IN ADDITION, YOU MIGHT FIND USEFUL UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION IN REF A, FROM WHICH OUR MATERIAL BELOW WAS DRAWN IN PART.

2. YOU MAY PASS ON TO KAUFMAN THE FOLLOWING: THERE ARE A VARIETY OF POSSIBLE WAYS TO MEASURE NAVAL STRENGTH. IT DEPENDS ON WHEN AND WHAT YOU ARE COUNTING. WE SURPASSED THE SOVIETS IN COMBATANT SHIP DAYS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA IN 1980, ALTHOUGH TOTAL SHIP DAYS FOR THE SOVIET AND US NAVAL PRESENCE WAS ABOUT THE SAME IN 1980. THROUGH 1978 THE US NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN CONSISTED OF THE THREE SHIPS OF COMIDEASTFOR. FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS THROUGH 1978 THERE WERE VISITS TO THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA OF US CARRIER TASK GROUPS, AT WHICH TIMES OUR NAVAL POWER IN THE AREA WAS SIGNIFICANTLY AUGMENTED AND THEREFORE GREATER THAN THE SOVIET NAVAL PRESENCE. SINCE 1979, FOLLOWING THE TURMOIL IN IRAN AND THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN, THE US HAS MAINTAINED TWO CARRIER BATTLE

GROUPS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA CONSISTING OF APPROXIMATELY 16 COMBATANTS.

IN MARCH 1981 THE SOVIETS HAD APPROXIMATELY 25-30 SHIPS.

\*\*\*\*\*

SIT:

EOB: SEA, EURE, NEA

WHSR COMMENTS:

PAGE 01

SECSTATE WASHDC 4987

DTG: 032256Z APR 81

PSN: 010337

TOR: 094/0017Z

CSN: HCE876

\*\*\*\*\*~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~\*\*\*\*\*E COPY



14  
\*\*\*\*\*CONFIDENTIAL\*\*\*\*\* COPY

COMBATANT AND SUPPORT, IN THE INDIAN OCEAN. THIS IS ABOUT THE SAME NUMBER THE SOVIETS HAVE HAD THERE ON AVERAGE IN MARCH FOR THE PREVIOUS THREE YEARS. THESE FIGURES CHANGE AS SHIPS ENTER AND LEAVE THE AREA, BUT DO NOT INDICATE TO US THAT THERE IS ANY SIGNIFICANT CHANGE THAT WOULD SUPPORT ALLEGATION MADE TO KAUFMAN THAT SOVIET NAVAL STRENGTH IN THE INDIAN OCEAN HAS DECLINED IN RECENT MONTHS. FIGURES FOR US NAVAL PRESENCE SIMILARLY CHANGE FROM TIME TO TIME. CURRENT FIGURES FOR THE US IN THE INDIAN OCEAN: 15 COMBATANT AND 14 SUPPORT SHIPS.

3. DRAWING ON REF A, YOU SHOULD EXPAND THE DISCUSSION TO NOTE THAT ALTHOUGH THE US CURRENTLY HAS A LARGER NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN, OUR FAVORABLE NAVAL BALANCE IS OVERSHADOWED BY THE OVERWHELMING SOVIET GROUND AND AIR PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN AND THE SOUTHERN REGION OF THE USSR. HAIG  
BT

\*\*\*\*\*CONFIDENTIAL\*\*\*\*\* COPY



SOVIET NAVY

EOB884

\*\*\*\*\*C O N F I D E N T I A L\*\*\*\*\*E COPY

IN

18'

OP IMMED

UTS8673

DE RUSBAE #6983 0931213

O 031213Z APR 81

FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7976

C O N F I D E N T I A L NEW DELHI 06983

E.O. 12065: GDS 4/3/87 (LEVIN, HERBERT) OR-P

TAGS: PEPR, IN, UR

SUBJECT: SOVIET NAVAL PRESENCE IN INDIAN OCEAN

1. (U) ENTIRE TEXT.

2. NEW DELHI NEW YORK TIMES BUREAU CHIEF MICHAEL KAUFMAN HAS JUST RETURNED FROM TRIP THROUGH INDIAN OCEAN COUNTRIES. HE HAS ASKED US FOR RESPONSES TO FOLLOWING QUESTIONS TO BE USED ON UNATTRIBUTED BASIS IN HIS ARTICLES NOW IN PREPARATION

- (A) WHEN DID U.S. NAVAL STRENGTH IN INDIAN OCEAN SURPASS SOVIETS? (KAUFMAN THOUGHT ANSWER WAS NOVEMBER, 1980.) LATEST STATISTICS?
- (B) IS THERE ANY TRUTH TO ALLEGATION MADE TO KAUFMAN BY SOVIET EMBOFFS THAT SOVIET NAVAL STRENGTH IN INDIAN OCEAN HAS BEEN DECLINING "IN RECENT MONTHS"?
- SOVIETS ADD THAT THIS IS IN ACCORD WITH BREZHNEV'S XXVI CPSU ADVOCACY OF SEEKING POLITICAL RATHER THAN MILITARY SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS OF THE REGION.

3. ACTION REQUESTED.

WE NEED IMMEDIATE RESPONSE TODAY IF WE ARE TO CONTRIBUTE TO KAUFMAN'S HANDLING OF THESE QUESTIONS IN HIS ARTICLE.

BLOOD

BT

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/8#18289

BY L05 NARA DATE 9/30/08

\*\*\*\*\*

SIT:

EOB:

WHSR COMMENTS:

PAGE 01 OF 01 NEW DELHI 6983

DTG:031213Z APR 81

PSN:009418

TOR: 093/1250Z

CSN:HCE499

\*\*\*\*\*C O N F I D E N T I A L\*\*\*\*\*E COPY



SOVIET NAVY

~~Top Secret~~

15

## Brezhnev's Proposal To Limit New Ballistic Missile Submarines

In his speech at the 26th Party Congress in February, President Brezhnev proposed limiting the deployment of new types of US and Soviet ballistic missile submarines and banning the modernization of existing missiles and the development of follow-on missiles for these submarines. The proposal probably has two objectives: to show that the Soviets are willing to discuss strategic arms limits, whereas the United States is stalling; and to reduce the impact of projected US advances in this field. It apparently would require both countries to drop programs to place improved missiles on their newest submarines in the late 1980s.

According to the speech, the Soviets are willing to agree on limiting the deployment of new US submarines of the Ohio class and similar ones in the USSR. The speech cited the Soviet Typhoon system as analogous to the Ohio class with the Trident missile. It also referred to an earlier Soviet offer to ban the two systems.

### Earlier Proposals

As early as 1973, Soviet proposals for SALT II contained an article prohibiting the development, testing, and deployment of new generations of submarines armed with ballistic missiles. This ban was first mentioned by Brezhnev during talks with President Ford at Vladivostok in 1974. Brezhnev reiterated the proposal to a group of US Senators in Moscow in July 1975. He also mentioned the offer in public speeches during 1975.

The lack of US interest in the offer apparently led the Soviets to take a different approach in SALT II negotiations, where they tried only to limit, rather than ban, the new submarine systems. Their first concrete proposal following the November 1974 Vladivostok Accord came in February 1975 when they tabled an article limiting the number of launchers on submarines of new types to 240. This limit would have allowed the

United States to build 10 Ohio-class submarines with 24 launchers each and the Soviets to have 12 Typhoon submarines with 20 launchers each. The United States did not accept the proposal, and the Soviets withdrew it in December 1975.

In 1977 the Soviets proposed a ban, with one exemption for each side, on new types of missiles for submarines. (This proposal was modeled on a provision in the SALT II Treaty that allows each country to develop, test, and deploy only one new type of ICBM.) The Soviet aim was to prevent the United States from developing a new missile to replace the Trident C4 while permitting the USSR to go ahead with its improvement plans for the 1980s.

The United States wished to exempt the Trident C4 missile, intended for the new Ohio-class and some older submarines, and was willing to exempt the Soviet SS-N-18 SLBM, now carried on D-III-class submarines. The Soviets, however, stated that the SS-N-18 was already deployed and that the exemption should apply to a newer missile for the Typhoon submarine. They claimed that the newer missile,

was in the same stage of development as the Trident C4. The two sides could not agree on which systems would be exempted, and the provision was withdrawn in 1978. As a result, the SALT II Treaty contains no limit on new types of SLBMs and restricts the number of SLBM launchers only as part of the aggregate force.

### Programs Affected by the Current Proposal

Both the Ohio- and Typhoon-class submarines are expected to begin sea trials this year. The US Trident C4 missile, however, is already operational on some Poseidon submarines.

~~Top Secret~~

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR FOI-114/8#102160

BY RW NARA DATE 3/16/11



~~Top Secret~~

16

Both countries already are developing new or modified missiles for later deployment on these submarines. The United States is considering two options for a new missile. [redacted]

Brezhnev's speech departs from Soviet statements late 1980 indicating that the USSR would be will respond to US initiatives on strategic arms control would not introduce any of its own. His proposal suggests that in any future negotiations the Soviets explore new approaches as well as old issues that feel were not satisfactorily resolved. Brezhnev's expressed a desire to continue appropriate talks on strategic arms while preserving positive steps already achieved [redacted]

#### *Implications*

Brezhnev's recent proposal is carefully formulated to suit Soviet concerns. The proposal is phrased to define the Soviets' Typhoon class and its [redacted] missile as part of the force and not subject to the ban. Moreover, the new proposal, which would ban only those modernized missiles for the Ohio- and Typhoon-class submarines, would allow the Soviets to proceed with the planned replacement of [redacted]

By banning both modernized and follow-on missiles for the new submarines, the Soviets would be forestalling all US plans to replace the current Trident C4. [redacted]

The Soviets probably are aware of the basic goals of the US program to replace the Trident C4 and are apprehensive that a new US SLBM will be sufficiently accurate to destroy their land-based missile silos. Increased missile range also would enlarge US submarine patrol areas and complicate Soviet antisubmarine warfare efforts. The Soviets already have submarine-launched missiles capable of reaching the United States from seas near the USSR. [redacted]

~~Top Secret~~



~~SECRET~~  
Department of State

MBFR 12  
INCOMING  
TELEGRAM 22

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00145 061145Z  
ACTION ACDA-12

3346

MBFR V 00145 061145Z

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 INR-10 EUR-12 SS-15 OIC-02 CIAE-00  
ICA-11 H-01 IO-14 NSC-05 NSAE-00 L-03 CSCE-04  
TRSE-00 PM-09 PA-01 OMB-01 SP-02 SPRS-02 /105 W  
-----105741 061149Z /21

P R 060835Z APR 81  
FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6565  
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY  
INFO USMISSION USNATO  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
USCINCEUR GER  
USNMR SHAPE BEL

~~SECRET~~ MBFR 0145

E.O. 12065: RDS1, 3/30/91 (DEAN, JONATHAN) OR -M  
TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR  
SUBJECT: MBFR: ALLIED BILATERALS WITH THE EAST

1. ~~(S - ENTIRE TEXT)~~

2. SUMMARY: WE ARE SUMMARIZING BELOW EASTERN REPS COMMENTS, AS REPORTED BY ALLIED REPS IN THE MARCH 30 AD HOC GROUP MEETING. MOST OF THEM DEAL WITH THE EASTERN SUGGESTION OF MARCH 24, THAT THE WEST SHOULD PRESENT ITS DATA ON EASTERN FORCES AND ALLOW THE EAST TO CORRECT THE WESTERN FIGURES. END SUMMARY.

3. NETHERLANDS REP REPORTED THAT GDR REP TOLD HIM ON MARCH 25 THAT THE EASTERN SUGGESTION OF MARCH 24 WAS NOTHING NEW, BUT ONLY A DEVELOPMENT OF THE PREVIOUS EASTERN POSITION THAT THE WEST SHOULD EXPLAIN ITS COUNTING METHODS. ASKED ABOUT FORMAT, THE GDR REP SAID THAT THE WEST SHOULD FURNISH THE EAST A COMPLETE LIST OF EASTERN UNITS WHICH THE WEST HAD COUNTED TOGETHER WITH THEIR STRENGTHS. GDR REP CONCEDED THAT THIS WOULD BE A LONG PROCESS AND SAID THAT IT PROBABLY COULD NOT BE COMPLETED WITHIN THE TIME FRAME OF A PHASE I AGREEMENT. NETHERLANDS REP SAID THERE COULD BE NO PHASE I AGREEMENT WITHOUT AGREED DATA.

4. NETHERLANDS REP ALSO REPORTED A CONVERSATION OF NETHERLANDS DEPREP WITH GDR DEPREP AND POLISH MILREP ON MARCH 26, BOTH OF WHOM SAID THAT TARASOV'S COMMENTS ON MARCH 24 WERE QUOTE A SERIOUS NEW EFFORT UNQUOTE. GDR DEPREP ECHOED GDR REP'S REMARK TO NETHERLANDS REP AND OFFERED NO ADDITIONAL DETAILS OF THE PLAN, CLAIMING THAT HE HAD NOT YET SEEN THE FULL TEXT OF THE RECORD OF THE INFORMAL SESSION OF TWO DAYS PREVIOUS. HE MADE THE SAME POINT AS GDR REP, THAT THE PROCESS WOULD BE A LONG ONE. AS FOR FORMAT, GDR DEPREP SAID THE WEST SHOULD START BY PRESENTING ITS DATA ON SOVIET MANPOWER. POLISH MILREP CONFIRMED THERE WOULD BE A COMPARISON OF FIGURES IN NUMERICAL TERMS.

5. ITALIAN DEPREP REPORTED A MARCH 26 CONVERSATION WITH SOVIET DEPREP KUTOVOY. THE LATTER SAID THAT BEFORE THE EAST COULD PRESENT A FULL PICTURE OF THE PROCEDURE WHICH THE EAST HAD IN MIND, THE WEST MUST FIRST ACCEPT THE IDEA IN PRINCIPLE. KUTOVOY SAID THE EAST WOULD NEED DETAILED WESTERN NUMERICAL DATA ON SOVIET UNITS, AND THEN, WHERE THESE FIGURES DIFFERED FROM THE EASTERN FIGURES, THE EAST WOULD GIVE A NUMERICAL CORRECTION.

6. BELGIAN REP REPORTED A MARCH 26 CONVERSATION WITH

SOVIET REP TARASOV AND A MARCH 27 CONVERSATION WITH SOVIET DEPREP, BOTH OF WHOM MADE ESSENTIALLY THE FOLLOWING POINTS: THE WEST SHOULD PROVIDE THE EAST WITH A FULL LIST OF THE UNITS AND SUBUNITS WHICH IT HAD COUNTED AND THEIR NUMERICAL STRENGTH. THE EAST WOULD THEN INDICATE FOR EACH UNIT EITHER THAT THAT UNIT DID NOT EXIST OR SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN COUNTED OR THAT THE DATA WAS CORRECT OR THAT THE WESTERN FIGURE WAS INCORRECT AND, IF INCORRECT, BY HOW MUCH. TARASOV SAID THE EAST WOULD PROVIDE AN ANSWER ON ALL UNITS BUT ONLY SERIATIM, THAT IS, THEY WOULD DISCUSS AND AGREE ONE CASE AT A TIME. BELGIAN REP TOLD THE AD HOC GROUP THAT HE HAD INFERRED THAT THE EAST, SEEING THAT THE WEST MIGHT HAVE SOME INTEREST IN THIS SUGGESTION, WAS TAKING UP A NEGOTIATING POSITION, INCLUDING SOME POINTS ON WHICH IT PROBABLY WOULD NOT INSIST. IN BELGIAN REP'S OPINION, THE CASE BY CASE PROCEDURE WAS ONE SUCH POINT.

7. ANOTHER EASTERN QUOTE SMOKE SCREEN UNQUOTE, ACCORDING TO BELGIAN REP, WAS THE POINT, WHICH TARASOV HAD REPEATED, THAT THE EAST WOULD HAVE TO BE CONVINCED THAT THE WEST WAS GIVING ITS QUOTE REAL UNQUOTE FIGURES.

TARASOV COMPLAINED THAT THE WEST HAD AT ONE POINT REVISED ITS FIGURES ON CONSCRIPTS IN POLISH TERRITORIAL FORCES JUST AT A POINT WHERE THE EAST HAD BEEN ABOUT TO AGREE TO THEM. BELGIAN REP ASKED TARASOV HOW LONG IT MIGHT BE EXPECTED THE EAST WOULD TAKE TO DECIDE WHETHER THE WEST'S FIGURES WERE THE REAL ONES. AFTER SOME PRESSING, TARASOV CONCEDED THAT REALISTICALLY IT COULD BE A MATTER OF A FEW DAYS.

8. UK REP REPORTED THAT SOVIET MILREP HAD TOLD HIM ON MARCH 26 THAT THE IDEA OF PRESENTING WESTERN FIGURES FOR COMPARISON HAD ORIGINATED WITH THE SOVIET DELEGATION.

9. US REP OBSERVED THAT IN CONNECTION WITH TARASOV'S POINT ABOUT QUOTE REAL UNQUOTE WESTERN FIGURES, IN A CONVERSATION WITH HIM ON THE MARGIN OF THE MARCH 24 INFORMAL SESSION, TARASOV HAD AGAIN INTER ALIA ACCUSED THE WEST OF KEEPING TWO SETS OF BOOKS. US REP AGREED WITH BELGIAN REP THAT THIS POINT WAS RAISED PROBABLY FOR BARGAINING PURPOSES.

10. ALSO IN THE MARCH 30 AD HOC GROUP MEETING, FRG REP SUMMARIZED THE CONVERSATION HE HAD HAD WITH POLISH REP ON MARCH 26, WHICH THE DELEGATION HAS ALREADY REPORTED (MBFR 0131). DEAN

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FD6-114/8#10290  
BY LOT NARA DATE 9/30/08

~~SECRET~~



# SECRET Department of State

INCOMING  
TELEGRAM

23

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00145 061005Z  
ACTION ACDA-12

3177

MBFR V 00145 061005Z

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 INR-10 EUR-12 SS-15 OIC-02 CIAE-00  
ICA-11 H-01 IO-14 NSC-05 NSAE-00 L-03 CSCE-04  
TRSE-00 PM-09 PA-01 OMB-01 SP-02 SPRS-02 /105 W  
-----104762 061049Z /15

P R 060835Z APR 81  
FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6565  
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY  
INFO USMISSION USNATO  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
USCINCEUR GER  
USNMR SHAPE BEL

S E C R E T MBFR 0145

1. ~~ENTIRE~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: WE ARE SUMMARIZING BELOW EASTERN REPS COMMENTS, AS REPORTED BY ALLIED REPS IN THE MARCH 30 AD HOC GROUP MEETING. MOST OF THEM DEAL WITH THE EASTERN SUGGESTION OF MARCH 24, THAT THE WEST SHOULD PRESENT ITS DATA ON EASTERN FORCES AND ALLOW THE EAST TO CORRECT THE WESTERN FIGURES. END SUMMARY.

3. NETHERLANDS REP REPORTED THAT GDR REP TOLD HIM ON MARCH 25 THAT THE EASTERN SUGGESTION OF MARCH 24 WAS NOTHING NEW, BUT ONLY A DEVELOPMENT OF THE PREVIOUS EASTERN POSITION THAT THE WEST SHOULD EXPLAIN ITS COUNTING METHODS. ASKED ABOUT FORMAT, THE GDR REP SAID THAT THE WEST SHOULD FURNISH THE EAST A COMPLETE LIST OF EASTERN UNITS WHICH THE WEST HAD COUNTED TOGETHER WITH THEIR STRENGTHS. GDR REP CONCEDED THAT THIS WOULD BE A LONG PROCESS AND SAID THAT IT PROBABLY COULD NOT BE COMPLETED WITHIN THE TIME FRAME OF A PHASE I AGREEMENT. NETHERLANDS REP SAID THERE COULD BE NO PHASE I AGREEMENT WITHOUT AGREED DATA.

4. NETHERLANDS REP ALSO REPORTED A CONVERSATION OF NETHERLANDS DEPREP WITH GDR DEPREP AND POLISH MILREP ON MARCH 26, BOTH OF WHOM SAID THAT TARASOV'S COMMENTS ON MARCH 24 WERE QUOTE A SERIOUS NEW EFFORT UNQUOTE. GDR DEPREP ECHOED GDR REP'S REMARK TO NETHERLANDS REP AND OFFERED NO ADDITIONAL DETAILS OF THE PLAN, CLAIMING THAT HE HAD NOT YET SEEN THE FULL TEXT OF THE RECORD OF THE INFORMAL SESSION OF TWO DAYS PREVIOUS. HE MADE THE SAME POINT AS GDR REP, THAT THE PROCESS WOULD BE A LONG ONE. AS FOR FORMAT, GDR DEPREP SAID THE WEST SHOULD START BY PRESENTING ITS DATA ON SOVIET MANPOWER. POLISH MILREP CONFIRMED THERE WOULD BE A COMPARISON OF FIGURES IN NUMERICAL TERMS.

5. ITALIAN DEPREP REPORTED A MARCH 26 CONVERSATION WITH SOVIET DEPREP KUTOVOY. THE LATTER SAID THAT BEFORE THE EAST COULD PRESENT A FULL PICTURE OF THE PROCEDURE WHICH THE EAST HAD IN MIND, THE WEST MUST FIRST ACCEPT THE IDEA IN PRINCIPLE. KUTOVOY SAID THE EAST WOULD NEED DETAILED WESTERN NUMERICAL DATA ON SOVIET UNITS, AND THEN, WHERE THESE FIGURES DIFFERED FROM THE EASTERN FIGURES, THE EAST WOULD GIVE A NUMERICAL CORRECTION.

6. BELGIAN REP REPORTED A MARCH 26 CONVERSATION WITH SOVIET REP TARASOV AND A MARCH 27 CONVERSATION WITH SOVIET DEPREP, BOTH OF WHOM MADE ESSENTIALLY THE FOLLOWING POINTS: THE WEST SHOULD PROVIDE THE EAST WITH A FULL LIST OF THE UNITS AND SUBUNITS WHICH IT

HAD COUNTED AND THEIR NUMERICAL STRENGTH. THE EAST WOULD THEN INDICATE FOR EACH UNIT EITHER THAT THAT UNIT DID NOT EXIST OR SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN COUNTED OR THAT THE DATA WAS CORRECT OR THAT THE WESTERN FIGURE WAS INCORRECT AND, IF INCORRECT, BY HOW MUCH. TARASOV SAID THE EAST WOULD PROVIDE AN ANSWER ON ALL UNITS BUT ONLY SEPARATELY, THAT IS, THEY WOULD DISCUSS AND AGREE ONE CASE AT A TIME. BELGIAN REP TOLD THE AD HOC GROUP THAT HE HAD INFERRED THAT THE EAST, SEEING THAT THE WEST MIGHT HAVE SOME INTEREST IN THIS SUGGESTION, WAS TAKING UP A NEGOTIATING POSITION, INCLUDING SOME POINTS ON WHICH IT PROBABLY WOULD NOT INSIST. IN BELGIAN REP'S OPINION, THE CASE BY CASE PROCEDURE WAS ONE SUCH POINT.

7. ANOTHER EASTERN QUOTE SMOKESCREEN UNQUOTE, ACCORDING TO BELGIAN REP, WAS THE POINT, WHICH TARASOV HAD REPEATED, THAT THE EAST WOULD HAVE TO BE CONVINCED THAT THE WEST WAS GIVING ITS QUOTE REAL UNQUOTE FIGURES.

TARASOV COMPLAINED THAT THE WEST HAD AT ONE POINT REVISED ITS FIGURES ON CONSCRIPTS IN POLISH TERRITORIAL FORCES JUST AT A POINT WHERE THE EAST HAD BEEN ABOUT TO AGREE TO THEM. BELGIAN REP ASKED TARASOV HOW LONG IT MIGHT BE EXPECTED THE EAST WOULD TAKE TO DECIDE WHETHER THE WEST'S FIGURES WERE THE REAL ONES. AFTER SOME PRESSING, TARASOV CONCEDED THAT REALISTICALLY IT COULD BE A MATTER OF A FEW DAYS.

8. UK REP REPORTED THAT SOVIET MILREP HAD TOLD HIM ON MARCH 26 THAT THE IDEA OF PRESENTING WESTERN FIGURES FOR COMPARISON HAD ORIGINATED WITH THE SOVIET DELEGATION. 9. US REP OBSERVED THAT IN CONNECTION WITH TARASOV'S POINT ABOUT QUOTE REAL UNQUOTE WESTERN FIGURES, IN A CONVERSATION WITH HIM ON THE MARGIN OF THE MARCH 24 INFORMAL SESSION, TARASOV HAD AGAIN INTER ALIA ACCUSED THE WEST OF KEEPING TWO SETS OF BOOKS. US REP AGREED WITH BELGIAN REP THAT THIS POINT WAS RAISED PROBABLY FOR BARGAINING PURPOSES.

10. ALSO IN THE MARCH 30 AD HOC GROUP MEETING, FRG REP SUMMARIZED THE CONVERSATION HE HAD HAD WITH POLISH REP ON MARCH 26, WHICH THE DELEGATION HAS ALREADY REPORTED (MBFR 0131). DEAN

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR Feb-114/8#10291

BY hst NARA DATE 9/30/08

SECRET





DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

S/S 8112327

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SOVIET  
NAVY

26

April 17, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: U.S.-Soviet Navy to Navy Incidents-at-Sea  
Talks

(C) This is to advise you that the Department has concurred in a DOD proposal to invite the Soviet Union to Washington in mid-May for the annual Navy to Navy Incidents-at-Sea Review Talks.

(C) Annual Review talks are mandated by the 1972 Incidents-at-Sea Agreement and they have been held, without fail, each year whatever the climate of U.S.-Soviet relations. The talks alternate between capitals; this year it is the U.S. Navy's turn to host the Review.

(C) The Department believes the Incidents-at-Sea Agreement is in our interest and it has strong support within DOD. It has dramatically reduced the number of dangerous ship-related incidents and it provides a useful channel for the rapid airing of problems affecting the two navies.

(C) Last year we decided to participate in the talks despite Afghanistan, but we reduced the length of the meeting from ten to five days and eliminated the usual trip, a goodwill tour of key U.S. cities and points of interest. We intend to impose the same conditions this year as well.

L. Paul Bremer III  
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RDS-3 4/16/91

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/8#10292  
BY 121 NARA DATE 9/30/08



## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

21 April 1981

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN  
THROUGH: ROBERT SCHWEITZER *RS*  
FROM: CHRIS SHOEMAKER *CS*  
SUBJECT: US-Soviet Navy Talks

*CS* *filed*  
*2* *Per*  
**SUSPENSE**

State has sent a memorandum to you (Tab A) outlining our plans for the next round of the US-Soviet Navy-to-Navy Incidents at Sea Talks. These talks have been held annually for the past eight years and have been generally productive in serving their rather limited purposes. State has proposed that the restrictions we imposed last year (i.e., reduction in the length of the talks to five days and elimination of some of the amenities) be continued this year.

Dennis Blair has followed these talks throughout their history and attended one of the sessions. He urges that we proceed because "the talks are the single standing channel of communication between the U.S. and Soviet navies." They clear up misunderstandings arising from contacts between our ships and aircraft throughout the world. Dennis also notes that both navies generally follow the Incidents-at-Sea Agreement. Significantly, he observes that "the Soviets value these talks more highly than we -- they are a membership badge in the superpower navy club." From his own experience, Dennis says that the talks are short, businesslike, and non-ideological; it would be a mistake to cancel them.

Because of the rather limited scope of these talks and the desirability of maintaining some form of public contact with the Soviets, we should proceed with the talks as the State Department and DoD suggest.

Recommendation

That you sign the memorandum to Mr. Bremer at Tab I.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Approve\_\_\_\_\_  
Disapprove

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR F06-114/8 #10272  
BY *RW* NARA DATE *3/16/4*







THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR L. PAUL BREMER III

Executive Secretary, Department of State

SUBJECT: US-Soviet Navy-to-Navy Incidents at Sea Talks

Thank you for your memorandum of April 17 reporting on plans for the annual talks with the Soviet Navy. I agree that we should proceed with the talks this year, with the restricted format you propose.

Richard V. Allen  
Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Review 4-16-91  
Deriv. Cl. by S/S

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR F06-114/8#10273  
BY L05 NARA DATE 9/30/08









DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

S/S 8112327  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

31

April 17, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: U.S.-Soviet Navy to Navy Incidents-at-Sea  
Talks

(C) This is to advise you that the Department has concurred in a DOD proposal to invite the Soviet Union to Washington in mid-May for the annual Navy to Navy Incidents-at-Sea Review Talks.

(C) Annual Review talks are mandated by the 1972 Incidents-at-Sea Agreement and they have been held, without fail, each year whatever the climate of U.S.-Soviet relations. The talks alternate between capitals; this year it is the U.S. Navy's turn to host the Review.

(U) The Department believes the Incidents-at-Sea Agreement is in our interest and it has strong support within DOD. It has dramatically reduced the number of dangerous ship-related incidents and it provides a useful channel for the rapid airing of problems affecting the two navies.

(C) Last year we decided to participate in the talks despite Afghanistan, but we reduced the length of the meeting from ten to five days and eliminated the usual trip, a goodwill tour of key U.S. cities and points of interest. We intend to impose the same conditions this year as well.

L. Paul Bremer III  
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RDS-3 4/16/91

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/8 #10293

BY WJ NARA DATE 9/30/08





National  
Foreign  
Assessment  
Center

~~Secret~~

SOVI

NAVY

36

FOIA(b)(1), (5)

# Characteristics of the Kirov Nuclear-Powered Guided-Missile Cruiser

An Intelligence Assessment

*Overview*

*Information available as of 1 June 1981  
has been used in the preparation of this report.*

This report was prepared by [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] of the Office of  
Scientific and Weapons Research, [REDACTED] of  
the Office of Strategic Research and [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] of the Office of Imagery Analysis. This  
report was coordinated with the Offices of  
Strategic Research and Imagery Analysis and with  
the National Intelligence Officers for General  
Purpose Forces and Strategic Programs. Comments  
and queries are welcome and should be directed to  
OSWR, [REDACTED]

~~Secret~~

SW 81-10058  
June 1981

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR FOL-114/8 #10277

BY RW NARA DATE 3/16/11



## Characteristics of the Kirov Nuclear-Powered Guided-Missile Cruiser

### Overview

The USSR's first nuclear-powered surface warship, the Kirov guided-missile cruiser, carries an array of weapons that makes it one of the most powerfully armed surface warships in the world (figure 1). It completed sea trials in the Baltic in summer 1980. A second ship of the class recently has been launched and may become operational in 1983 or 1984.

Equipped with a variety of weapons systems and an extensive communications suite, the Kirov is a multipurpose ship. Among its major wartime roles probably would be participation in Soviet efforts to establish control of ocean areas such as the Norwegian Sea. Such control would be sought primarily as a means of protecting Soviet territory and Soviet nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine patrol areas. Kirov-class ships probably also will be used in peacetime "naval presence" operations in areas such as the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean.

The Kirov displaces 23,000 to 24,000 metric tons and has an estimated maximum speed of 32 to 33 knots. We believe it has excellent seakeeping capabilities.

The propulsion system probably is composed of twin nuclear reactors and probably has a fuel-oil-fired superheater for boost power. The superheater is a source of potential vulnerability because heat from the exhaust stack increases the chance of detection by antiship weapons using an infrared seeker. The nuclear propulsion plant gives the Kirov class the capability to remain at sea for extended periods of time. Even if the fuel for the superheater were exhausted, ships of this class would still be able to make an estimated 29 knots using only the nuclear plant.

The Kirov is the first surface ship to carry the SS-NX-19 antiship cruise missile system. The SS-NX-19 has demonstrated an effective range of about 500 kilometers (km). The Kirov also carries the SA-N-4 and the new SA-NX-6 missile systems (the latter is the naval version of the land-based SA-10). The combination of the SA-NX-6 and SA-N-4 systems and Gatling guns provides a defense against aircraft from the ship outward to a maximum range of 100 km and probably from target altitudes of about 15 to 30 meters to more than 27 km. The Kirov, therefore, is the first Soviet warship that can effectively defend a task force against aircraft. We believe that the air defense system will have difficulties defending the ship against small,



low-flying targets such as the Harpoon antiship missile. However, the second ship of the class will have a new weapon system. This may be an anti-air weapon to replace the SA-N-4. If so, it may be intended to provide improved defense against antiship missiles. [REDACTED]

The Kirov also has been designed for sustained operations under wartime conditions. It carries 20 SS-NX-19 missiles, each in its own launcher. It carries up to 96 SA-NX-6 missiles in 12 launchers and 40 SA-N-4 missiles in two launchers. The Kirov also carries the first reloadable SS-N-14 antisubmarine cruise missile launcher. The ship has two reloadable launch tubes, having a reload capacity for up to 20 SS-N-14 missiles, more than twice the number of this missile carried by other Soviet warships. [REDACTED]

The Kirov has two new sonar systems. One is a large variable depth towed sonar, the other is a large bow-mounted sonar. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Like other Soviet warships, the Kirov probably would have difficulty in detecting hostile submarines before they begin an attack. [REDACTED]

The Kirov has an extensive electronics suite for command, control, and communications; for electronic countermeasures (ECM); and for electronic support measures (ESM). This suite is similar to that of the Kiev-class guided-missile vertical takeoff and landing aircraft carriers and indicates that the Kirov-class ships will have a major command, control, and communications role in providing operational and tactical control in naval operations. The ESM/ECM suite on the Kirov is similar to those on other Soviet naval ships and does not appear to improve significantly its ESM/ECM capabilities over those of other Soviet surface combatants. [REDACTED]



N022

RW

# SOVIET MISSILE

BY FRED S. HOFFMAN

WASHINGTON (AP) -- THE SOVIET UNION APPEARS READY TO START FLIGHT TESTING AN ADVANCED NAVAL CRUISE MISSILE FOR DEPLOYMENT ON SURFACE WARSHIPS AND SUBMARINES, U.S. INTELLIGENCE SOURCES REPORT.

THE SOVIET NAVY ALREADY IS AHEAD OF THE U.S. NAVY IN CRUISE MISSILES CAPABLE OF HITTING ENEMY WARSHIPS HUNDREDS OF MILES AWAY. THE U.S. NAVY HAS YET TO DEPLOY MISSILES WITH THAT KIND OF RANGE ON ITS FIGHTING VESSELS.

THE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES, WHO DECLINED TO BE IDENTIFIED, SAID IN RECENT INTERVIEWS THERE ARE INDICATIONS THE SOVIETS ARE GETTING READY FOR A NEW FLIGHT SERIES, PROBABLY STARTING THIS FALL AT A NAVAL MISSILE TEST CENTER.

THIS CENTER WAS USED FOR LAND-BASED FLIGHT TESTS OF THE 300-MILE RANGE SSN-12 CRUISE MISSILE, NOW RATED ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT WEAPONS IN THE SOVIET FLEET.

AMERICAN ANALYSTS SAID THEY BELIEVE THE NEW MISSILE WILL BE A REPLACEMENT FOR THE SSN-12, WHICH HAS BEEN OPERATIONAL FOR ABOUT SEVEN YEARS. AFTER THE TESTS ARE UNDER WAY, THE EXPERTS SAY THEY EXPECT TO BE ABLE TO LEARN THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NEW MISSILE.

ACCORDING TO NAVAL SPECIALISTS, THE ADVANCED CRUISE MISSILE MAY BE INTENDED FOR DEPLOYMENT ON A NEW CLASS OF HEAVY CRUISER, ON THE KIEV-CLASS AIRCRAFT CARRIER AND ABOARD SOVIET NUCLEAR-POWERED ECHO II SUBMARINES.

THE 5,000-TON ECHO SUB HAS BEEN DESCRIBED IN A U.S. NAVAL INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENT AS "ONE OF THE PRIMARY ANTI-CARRIER THREATS."

IN A REPORT ON SOVIET NAVAL POWER, THE U.S. NAVY'S NAVAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICE SAID THAT "CRUISE MISSILE SUBMARINES AND MISSILE-ARMED BOMBERS FORM THE GREATEST THREAT TO ALLIED NAVAL FORCES" ON THE HIGH SEAS.

"THIS IS ESPECIALLY SO WHEN WITHIN RANGE OF SOVIET AIR BASES WHERE THE SOVIETS CAN LAUNCH COORDINATED ATTACKS USING NOT ONLY RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT TO PROVIDE TARGET DATA FOR SUBMARINE LAUNCHED MISSILES, BUT ALSO THEIR EXTENSIVE FORCE OF NAVAL AND AIR FORCE MISSILE EQUIPPED BOMBERS," THE U.S. NAVAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT SAID.

AP-WX-08-16-82 1024EDT

✓ sov. navy



BY FRED S. HOFFMAN

WASHINGTON (AP) -- THE SOVIET UNION HAS LOBBED FOUR LONG-RANGE MISSILES INTO TARGET AREAS THOUSANDS OF MILES APART IN A MAJOR TEST OF ITS MOST ADVANCED SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPON, U.S. INTELLIGENCE SOURCES SAID MONDAY.

FILE SOV.

NAVY

47

THEY SAID TWO SSNX-20 MISSILES WERE FIRED FROM A SOVIET SUBMARINE IN THE FAR NORTH WHITE SEA TO THE KAMCHATKA PENINSULA WHILE TWO OTHER MISSILES REACHED THE MID-PACIFIC.

THE LATEST TEST FIRINGS OF THE 5,000-MILE-RANGE MISSILES CAME OVER THE WEEKEND, SAID THE SOURCES, WHO ASKED TO REMAIN ANONYMOUS.

OFFICIALS RATED THE SOVIET TESTS AS SUCCESSFUL.

THE MISSILES THAT LANDED IN THE PACIFIC WERE SAID TO HAVE CARRIED FOUR WARHEADS EACH, LESS THAN A FULL LOAD. THERE WAS NO FIRM WORD ON THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS ON THE MISSILES AIMED AT KAMCHATKA.

THE SOVIETS ANNOUNCED LAST THURSDAY THAT THEY PLANNED TO TEST WHAT THEY CALL "BOOSTER ROCKETS" IN THE PACIFIC OCEAN WARNED SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT TO STAY CLEAR OF THE DANGER AREAS FROM DEC. 12 TO DEC. 22.

THE SOVIETS LAST PUT THE SSNX-20 THROUGH SIMILAR PACES TWO MONTHS AGO, AND THE NEW TESTS INDICATED TO U.S. ANALYSTS THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS ON TRACK TOWARD DEPLOYMENT OF THIS WEAPON, POSSIBLY LATE NEXT YEAR.

THE SSNX-20 IS BELIEVED DESIGNED TO CARRY UP TO 12 NUCLEAR WARHEADS. ACCORDING TO U.S. SPECIALISTS, THE NEW WEAPON -- WITH A LONGER REACH AND MORE WARHEADS THAN ANY PREVIOUS SOVIET SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED MISSILE -- PROBABLY WILL BE PLACED IN THE NEW TYPHOON SUBMARINE, A GIANT 25,000-TON VESSEL EQUIPPED WITH 20 MISSILE-FIRING TUBES.

THE SSNX-20 WILL HAVE A LONGER REACH THAN THE NEWEST U.S. SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED MISSILE, THE 4,500-MILE RANGE TRIDENT. THE TRIDENT MISSILES, EACH OF WHICH CARRY EIGHT NUCLEAR WARHEADS, WERE DEVELOPED TO ARM THIS COUNTRY'S UNDERSEA MAMMOTH, THE 18,700-TON TRIDENT SUBS THAT WILL BE ABLE TO FIRE 24 MISSILES EACH.

SOME TRIDENT MISSILES ALREADY HAVE BEEN DEPLOYED IN OLDER POSEIDON SUBMARINES, REPLACING EARLIER-GENERATION WEAPONS THE UNITED STATES HAS HAD IN COMBAT READINESS FOR YEARS.

THE SSNX-20 TESTS LAST WEEKEND FOLLOWS WORD THAT THE SOVIETS RECENTLY TEST-LAUNCHED A NEW LAND-BASED INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE.

ADMINISTRATION SOURCES HAVE SAID THE ICBM TEST IN LATE OCTOBER FAILED. THE NEW ICBM IS ONE OF THE LATEST GENERATION MISSILES WHICH PRESIDENT REAGAN REFERRED TO RECENTLY IN APPEALING FOR A SENATE REVERSAL OF A HOUSE VOTE WHICH DENIED NEARLY \$1 BILLION TO START PRODUCING THE MX MISSILE, THIS COUNTRY'S FIRST ENTIRELY NEW LAND-BASED ICBM IN ABOUT 20 YEARS.

AP-WX-12-13-82 1909EST



~~Top Secret~~SOV. NAVY  
49

## USSR - WESTERN EUROPE: Baltic Submarine Proposal

The USSR has offered to withdraw its [redacted] ballistic missile submarines in the Baltic Sea as part of a Nordic nuclear-free zone. [redacted]

Soviet General Chervov, an arms control spokesman for the General Staff, made the offer in a television interview aired in Sweden on Monday. In [redacted] the Soviets stationed [redacted] nuclear-armed but diesel-powered G-IIIs, which were exempted from SALT I, in the Baltic to improve the coverage of their SS-N-5 missiles against Western Europe. The G-IIIs have drawn criticism in West European media. [redacted]

Comment: Although the proposal was raised outside the INF context, it parallels Soviet offers to withdraw or destroy some SS-20s in the European theater and is meant to demonstrate flexibility on the arms issue. [redacted]

[redacted]

A Nordic nuclear-weapons-free zone is a standard theme in Soviet approaches to the Scandinavian countries and Finland, but Chervov's proposal is the first specific offer under this concept. [redacted]

The proposal does not include any Soviet restrictions on the transport of nuclear weapons or on the basing of nuclear systems within Soviet territory. [redacted]

[redacted]

The SS-N-5 missiles are outdated, and the Soviets may already intend to retire the G-II submarine. [redacted]

[redacted]

The Soviets presumably hope the proposal will help mollify Scandinavian unhappiness over Soviet submarine violations of the Swedish coast, and over Soviet military preparations in general. TASS last weekend attacked Norwegian Prime Minister Willoch, who, it claimed, told Finnish journalists recently that the Soviet buildup has increased tension in northern Europe and that Moscow could not be trusted to abide by any treaty that created a nuclear-weapons-free zone. [redacted]

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR 606-114/84#10284

2

~~Top Secret~~

10 March 1983

BY RW NARA DATE 3/16/11



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Sov. NAVY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
SECRETARIAT

50

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 2428 DTG: 172227Z APR 84 PSN: 048835  
EOB324 AN002364 TOR: 109/0106Z CSN: HCE227

DISTRIBUTION: STEI-01 DOBR-01 KRAM-01 LEVN-01 ROBN-01 LENC-01  
MAT-01 /007 A1

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:  
SIT: VP  
EOB:

OP IMMEDIATE /PRIORITY  
DE RUEHC #2428 1090047  
O P 172227Z APR 84 ZEX  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 0000

INFO ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS PRIORITY  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0000  
EUROPEAN POLAD COLLECTIVE  
USDEL MBFR VIENNA PRIORITY 0000

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CXS 7/29/02

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL~~ USE STATE 112428

GENEVA FOR USDC AND VICE PRESIDENT'S PARTY  
E.O. 12356 N/A  
TAGS: PARM, UR, US, UN  
SUBJECT: SOVIET NAVAL ARMS CONTROL PROPOSAL

REF: MOSCOW 4663

1. (U) REFTEL CONTAINS EMBASSY MOSCOW'S SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF THE SOVIET NAVAL ARMS CONTROL PROPOSAL CONTAINED IN GROMYKO'S LETTER TO UNSYG PEREZ DE CUELLAR. PARA 3 PROVIDES TEXT OF GROMYKO'S LETTER, AS CARRIED BY TASS APRIL 16, AS REQUESTED BY VICE PRESIDENT'S PARTY. THE FOLLOWING IS PRESS GUIDANCE PREPARED FOR THE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN'S CONTINGENCY USE APRIL 17.

2. (U) BEGIN PRESS GUIDANCE:

Q: WHAT IS THE U.S. REACTION TO THE SOVIET NAVAL ARMS CONTROL PROPOSAL CONTAINED IN GROMYKO'S LETTER TO UN SECRETARY GENERAL PEREZ DE CUELLAR, PUBLISHED IN THE SOVIET PRESS ON APRIL 15? IS THE U.S. PREPARED TO DISCUSS THIS PROPOSAL IN THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT?

A:  
-- AS THE PRESIDENT HAS STATED ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS, THE U.S. IS DEDICATED TO THE NEGOTIATION OF PRACTICAL,

MEANINGFUL AND EQUITABLE MEASURES THAT CAN BOTH REDUCE THE LEVELS OF DESTABILIZING ARMAMENTS IN THE WORLD TODAY AND DIMINISH TENSIONS AND THE RISKS OF CONFLICT. WE WILL, OF COURSE, STUDY ANY SERIOUS SOVIET PROPOSAL IN THAT LIGHT.

-- WE WOULD QUESTION, HOWEVER, WHETHER MR. GROMYKO'S LATEST SUGGESTIONS ON VARIOUS NAVAL RESTRICTIONS, AS WE UNDERSTAND THEM, WOULD IN FACT MAKE AN EQUITABLE OR MEANINGFUL CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE AND STABILITY. MANY OF HIS PROPOSALS ARE EITHER IMPRACTICAL OR CLEARLY ONE-SIDED, PLACING FAR HEAVIER RESTRICTIONS ON THE NAVAL FORCES OF THE U.S. AND OTHER WESTERN NATIONS DEPENDENT UPON THE SEA THAN ON THOSE OF THE SOVIET UNION,

ESSENTIALLY A CONTINENTAL POWER.

-- WE FIND IT IRONIC THE SOVIET UNION IS NOW VOICING CONCERN OVER THE BUILD-UP OF NAVAL POWER WHEN -- MORE THAN ANY OTHER NATION'S FLEET -- IT HAS BEEN THE SOVIET NAVY THAT HAS EXPERIENCED OVER THE PAST FIFTEEN YEARS A DRAMATIC AND RAPID EXPANSION IN THE NUMBERS AND TYPES OF ITS SHIPS AND WEAPONRY. PUBLICATION OF THE SOVIET NAVAL PROPOSALS AT THIS TIME WOULD SEEM TO BE AN ATTEMPT TO DIVERT ATTENTION FROM THE CONTINUED SOVIET UNWILLINGNESS TO RETURN TO THE START AND INF NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA.

END PRESS GUIDANCE

3. BEGIN TEXT OF GROMYKO LETTER:

MOSCOW APRIL 14 TASS -- ANDREY GROMYKO, FIRST DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR, HAS SENT A LETTER ON QUESTIONS OF LIMITING NAVAL ACTIVITIES AND NAVAL ARMAMENTS TO U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL JAVIER PEREZ DE CUELLAR.

IT SAID: "DEAR MR. SECRETARY-GENERAL,

- "THIS LETTER, SENT IN RESPONSE TO YOUR QUERIES IN CONNECTION WITH RESOLUTIONS 38/188F AND 38/188G, SETS FORTH THE SOVIET UNION'S CONSIDERATIONS ON QUESTIONS OF LIMITING NAVAL ACTIVITIES AND NAVAL ARMAMENTS.

- "1. - THE SOVIET UNION SEES IT AS THE PRIORITY TASK OF ITS FOREIGN POLICY TO PREVENT NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE AND SECURE A REAL, RADICAL CHANGE FOR THE BETTER IN THE DANGEROUS DEVELOPMENT OF WORLD EVENTS. OVER RECENT TIME IT HAS PUT FORWARD A SERIES OF MAJOR INITIATIVES DIRECTED

AT ACHIEVING THIS GOAL.

- "SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE AMONG THEM BELONGS TO THE SOVIET UNION'S PROPOSAL ON THE NORMS TO WHICH RELATIONS BETWEEN THE NUCLEAR POWERS WOULD BE SUBORDINATED. THE ATTAINMENT OF AGREEMENT TO JOINTLY RECOGNIZE SUCH NORMS AND MAKE THEM MANDATORY WOULD MEET THE INTERESTS OF NOT ONLY THESE POWERS BUT ALSO ALL STATES IN THE WORLD. WHAT IS MEANT ALSO ARE THE DECLARATION CONDEMNING NUCLEAR WAR, ADOPTED AT THE 38TH SESSION OF THE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON THE BASIS OF THE USSR'S DRAFT, AND THE SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR FREEZING NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS AND PREVENTING THE ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE, WHICH ALSO HAVE WON APPROVAL IN THE UNITED NATIONS.

- "EFFECTIVE PRACTICAL STEPS TO REDUCE ARMAMENTS, FIRST OF ALL NUCLEAR ARMS -- THIS IS WHAT IS NEEDED NOW TO DELIVER MANKIND FROM THE MILITARY THREAT AND AMELIORATE THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION.

- "2. AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO AVERTING WAR COULD BE MADE BY CURBING THE ARMS RACE ON THE EXPANSES OF THE OCEANS AND SEAS.

- "THE CONTINUED BUILD-UP OF THE NAVIES AND ESCALATION OF THEIR ACTIVITIES ARE FRAUGHT WITH A DISRUPTION OF STABILITY ON A GLOBAL SCALE AND WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF INDIVIDUAL REGIONS AND ARE LEADING TO THE DIVERSION OF SUBSTANTIAL RESOURCES FROM CONSTRUCTIVE PURPOSES. THIS TREND HAS AN ADVERSE EFFECT ON THE SAFETY OF PEACEFUL NAVIGATION AND ON THE STUDY AND TAPPING OF MARINE RESOURCES, WHOSE SIGNIFICANCE TO MANKIND IS STEADILY GROWING.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



51

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
SECRETARIAT

PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 2428

DTG: 172227Z APR 84 PSN: 048835

- "CASES WHERE SOME POWERS MAKE DIRECT USE OF THEIR NAVAL FORCES TO BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON SOVEREIGN STATES, ESPECIALLY DEVELOPING ONES, INTERFERE IN THEIR INTERNAL AFFAIRS, STAGE ACTS OF ARMED AGGRESSION AND INTERVENTION AND PRESERVE THE REMAINS OF THE COLONIAL SYSTEM, ARE BECOMING MORE FREQUENT.
- "3. AS IS KNOWN, THE USSR HAS, EITHER ON ITS OWN OR JOINTLY WITH OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, PROPOSED REACHING AGREEMENT ON A WHOLE NUMBER OF SPECIFIC MEASURES CONCERNING MUTUAL LIMITATIONS OF NAVAL ACTIVITIES AND LIMITATIONS AND REDUCTIONS OF NAVAL ARMAMENTS AS WELL AS CORRESPONDING CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES BOTH IN GENERAL AND AS APPLIED TO INDIVIDUAL REGIONS SUCH AS THE INDIAN OCEAN, THE ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC OCEANS, THE MEDITERRANEAN OR THE PERSIAN GULF. THESE PROPOSALS HOLD GOOD.
- "THE SOVIET UNION HAS ACTIVELY PRESSED FOR THE ELABORATION OF MEASURES TO CONTAIN THE NAVAL ARMAMENTS RACE BOTH ON A BILATERAL BASIS, IN PARTICULAR WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF SOVIET-AMERICAN TALKS ON LIMITING AND SUBSEQUENTLY REDUCING MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN, AND IN THE CONTEXT OF LIMITING AND REDUCING STRATEGIC ARMAMENTS.
- "4. BUT, OWING TO THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES AND A NUMBER OF ITS ALLIES, THERE IS STILL NO HEADWAY IN THE RESOLUTION OF THE PACKAGE OF QUESTIONS CONNECTED WITH LIMITING THE NAVAL ARMAMENTS RACE.
- "FACTS INDICATE THAT, IN A BID TO GAIN ACROSS-THE-BOARD MILITARY SUPERIORITY AND THE CAPABILITY TO MAKE MASSIVE USE OF FORCE EVEN IN REMOTEST REGIONS, THE UNITED STATES HAS LAUNCHED ANOTHER ROUND OF THE NAVAL ARMAMENTS RACE. NEW SHIPS, EQUIPPED WITH THE LATEST IN WEAPONRY, ARE BEING LAID DOWN AND COMMISSIONED, AND OLD ONES TAKEN OUT OF MOTHBALLS AND RE-EQUIPPED WITH SIMILAR SYSTEMS. U.S. PERMANENT NAVAL PRESENCE IN VARIOUS OCEANS AND SEAS IS BEING INCREASED, AND THE BASE INFRASTRUCTURE SUPPORTING IT EXTENDED.
- "5. THE USSR HAS RECEIVED WITH SATISFACTION THE 38TH U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY SESSION'S CALL FOR THE START OF TALKS ON LIMITING NAVAL ACTIVITIES, LIMITING AND REDUCING NAVAL ARMAMENTS AND SPREADING CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES TO THE OCEANS AND SEAS, ESPECIALLY THOSE REGIONS WHERE THE BUSIEST SEA LANES PASS OR THE RISK OF OUTBREAK OF CONFLICT SITUATIONS IS THE HIGHEST. ON ITS PART, IT IS PREPARED TO TAKE PART IN SUCH TALKS.
- "AS AN URGENT MEASURE, IT COULD BE POSSIBLE TO COME TO TERMS, FOR EXAMPLE, ON NON-EXPANDING THE NAVAL ACTIVITIES OF STATES IN THE AREAS OF CONFLICTS OR TENSIONS.
- "IT IS EXPEDIENT FURTHER TO LOOK FOR SOLUTIONS WHICH WOULD REMOVE THE SITUATION WHERE NAVAL FLEETS ON MAJOR POWERS CRUISE FOR A LONG TIME FAR AWAY FROM THEIR SHORES. SUCH STEPS AS THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE SHIPS CARRYING NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM CERTAIN OCEAN AND SEA AREAS, AND THE FIXING OF LIMITS ON THE PRESENCE IN THEM OF SHIPS OF DIFFERENT TYPES, ALSO APPEAR USEFUL.
- "THE USSR COULD ALSO GO FURTHER TOWARDS A DIRECT AND EFFECTIVE LIMITATION OF NAVAL ARMAMENTS. MEASURES IN THIS FIELD COULD INCLUDE, FOR INSTANCE, A LIMIT ON THE

NUMBER OF NAVAL SHIPS OF MAIN TYPES. THE IMPOSITION OF LIMITATIONS ON ANTI-SUBMARINE FORCES AND SYSTEMS, AS WELL AS MEASURES WITH REGARD TO NAVAL BASES IN FOREIGN TERRITORIES, OUGHT TO BE DISCUSSED SIMULTANEOUSLY.

- "IN THE FUTURE THE QUESTION OF REDUCING ON A BALANCED BASIS THE NUMBER OF SHIPS MAKING UP THE REGULAR NAVIES OF MAJOR POWERS COULD ALSO BE CONSIDERED. SPECIAL ATTENTION THEN OUGHT TO BE PAID TO SUCH WARSHIPS AS AIRCRAFT CARRIERS, WHICH ARE OF AN ESPECIALLY DESTABILIZING NATURE AND USED TO DEMONSTRATE FORCE AND EXERT PRESSURE ON INDEPENDENT STATES.
- "COORDINATING AND ENFORCING CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES TO HELP PREVENT CONFLICT SITUATIONS AND ENHANCE THE SECURITY OF SEA COMMUNICATIONS COULD ALSO BE OF MAJOR POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE.
- "OF COURSE, ALL CORRESPONDING MEASURES SHOULD BE WORKED OUT AND APPLIED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF NO-DAMAGE TO ANYBODY'S SECURITY, WITH DUE ACCOUNT FOR ALL THE FACTORS THAT DETERMINE THE ALIGNMENT OF FORCES ON THE HIGH SEAS AND OTHER DIRECTIONS IN THE LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS WHICH AFFECT NAVAL FORCES IN THIS OR THAT WAY.
- "FULL USE SHOULD BE MADE OF THE POSSIBILITIES OF A REGIONAL APPROACH TO LIMITING NAVAL ACTIVITIES AND NAVAL ARMAMENTS.
- "DURING THE TALKS THE SOVIET UNION IS PREPARED TO EXAMINE ALSO CORRESPONDING MEASURES TO INSURE THE STATES' MUTUAL CONFIDENCE THAT THE ASSUMED COMMITMENTS WILL BE HONORED.
- "6. IN THE SOVIET UNION'S OPINION, THE TALKS ON LIMITING NAVAL ACTIVITIES AND NAVAL ARMAMENTS SHOULD INVOLVE ALL MAJOR NAVAL POWERS AND OTHER INTERESTED STATES. FROM THIS STANDPOINT THE POSSIBILITY COULD BE EXAMINED OF HOLDING THEM WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT. THE SOVIET UNION, HOWEVER, IS PREPARED TO CONSIDER ALSO THE POSSIBILITY OF HOLDING SEPARATE MULTILATERAL TALKS ON THIS COMPLEX OF QUESTIONS. IT ALSO PROCEEDS FROM THE CONVICTION THAT THE HOLDING OF MULTILATERAL TALKS ON LIMITING NAVAL ACTIVITIES AND NAVAL ARMAMENTS SHOULD NOT SERVE AS AN OBSTACLE TO EXAMINING THESE QUESTION AT TALKS BETWEEN

NUCLEAR POWERS.

- "7. AS TO THE STUDY, ENVISIONED BY THE 38TH U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY SESSION'S RESOLUTION, OF THE NAVAL ARMAMENTS RACE, IT SHOULD, IN THE SOVIET UNION'S OPINION, NOT ONLY REVEAL THE DANGEROUS CHARACTER OF THIS RACE AND ITS NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE, SECURITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, BUT ALSO FACILITATE THE ATTAINMENT OF CONCRETE ACCORDS. THE VALUE OF THE STUDY WOULD BE IMPAIRED IF IT WAS REDUCED TO COLLECTING DATA ABOUT NAVAL ARMAMENTS AND DESCRIBING THEIR TECHNICAL DETAILS AND METHODS OF COMPARING NAVAL FORCES, ETC. LIKEWISE, THE STUDY SHOULD NOT SERVE AS A PRETEXT FOR DELAYING THE START OF PRACTICAL TALKS OR REPLACE THEM.

- /SIGNED/A. GROMYKO

- FIRST DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR."

END TEXT

SHULTZ

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~