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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 5/13/2005

File Folder SOVIET UNION - NUCLEAR

FOIA

F06-114/8

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YARHI-MILO

2906

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
10365	PAPER	B-1B BOMBERAND MX MISSILE	2	ND	B1
10372	CABLE	050048Z DEC 81 <i>R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8</i>	2	12/5/1981	B1
10366	CABLE	140834Z AUG 82 <i>D 11/24/2011 F2006-114/8</i>	1	8/14/1982	B1
10373	CABLE	280001Z OCT 82 <i>R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8</i>	2	10/28/1982	B1
10374	MEMO	KRAEMER TO MCFARLANE RE NUCLEAR TESTING--US RESPONSE TO SOVIET DEMARCHE	1	6/25/1985	B1
10367	PAPER	DISCUSSION PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE-- CONTENT	3	ND	B1 B3
10368	MEMO	PLATT TO MCFARLANE RE NUCLEAR TESTING	1	6/21/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
10375	PAPER	IG DECISION PAPER ON REPLY TO SOVIET TTBT DEMARCHE	3	6/19/1985	B1 B3
10376	PAPER	DRAFT REPLY TO SOVIET DEMARCHE REGARDING US NUCLEAR TEST OF APRIL 2, 1985	2	ND	B1
10377	PAPER	PROPOSED LETTER FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO GORBACHEV RE NUCLEAR TESTS	2	ND	B1
10369	MEMO	WEINBERGER/PLATT TO MCFARLANE RE U.S. REPLY TO USSR DEMARCHE ON U.S. UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TEST	1	6/21/1985	B1
10370	MEMO	LANZILLO TO KRAEMER RE JCS AMENDMENT TO INTERAGENCY REPLY TO SOVIET TTBT DEMARCHE R 5/29/2008 NLRRF06-114/8	2	6/21/1985	B1
10371	FAX COVER SHEET	KRAEMER RE JCS COMMENTS ON REPLY TO SOVIET TTBT DEMARCHE R 5/29/2008 NLRRF06-114/8	1	6/21/1985	B1
10378	CABLE	301453Z JUL 85 R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8	1	7/30/1985	B1

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

7/1/97
SOS/Nuclear
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Deck,

Here is a short paper
on the strategic decisions
we need to make. I would
appreciate any comments
you have.

Mike Pentz

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non-prolif.
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NLRR F06-114/8#10372

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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SECRET STATE 321978

EXDIS - USIAEA
E.O. 12065:GDS 12-2-87 (SCANLAN, JOHN, D.)

TAGS: PARM, TECH, ENRG, IAEA, UR

SUBJECT: NON-PROLIFERATION COOPERATION WITH THE SOVIET
UNION

REF: (A) MOSCOW 12189; (B) VIENNA 02514; (C) MOSCOW 15541

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. NON-PROLIFERATION IS ONE AREA WHERE WE HAVE A CERTAIN COMMONALITY OF INTEREST WITH THE USSR. IN THE PAST WE HAVE CONSULTED REGULARLY WITH SOVIET OFFICIALS INVOLVED IN NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY BOTH IN MOSCOW AND AT THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA) IN VIENNA. DURING BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS HELD ON THE MARGINS OF THE FEBRUARY 1981 IAEA BOARD OF GOVERNORS MEETINGS, THE SOVIETS MADE DETAILED PROPOSALS FOR STRENGTHENING NON-PROLIFERATION. THEIR PROPOSALS DEALT, INTER ALIA, WITH INCREASING ADHERENCE TO THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT), MAINTAINING ADEQUATE CONTROLS OVER NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT SUPPLIED TO NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES, AND STRENGTHENING THE IAEA (REFTEL 0).

3. THE SOVIETS LATER CRITICIZED OUR LACK OF A SPEEDY RESPONSE (REFTEL A); WE HAD IN FACT RESPONDED TO THEIR FEBRUARY SUGGESTIONS, BUT NOT IN DETAIL. WE WOULD NOW WISH AMBASSADOR HARTMAN TO MAKE AN APPROACH T; THE APPROPRIATE OFFICIAL TO UNDERLINE THE POLITICAL AS WELL AS TECHNICAL IMPORTANCE OF US-SOVIET NON-PROLIFERATION COOPERATION. THIS APPROACH COULD LEAD TO TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS LATER.

4. THE SOVIETS ARE FOR THE MOST PART STRONG SUPPORTERS OF NUCLEAR SUPPLY RESTRAINT. THE USSR HAS REJECTED THIRD WORLD DEMANDS FOR FREE INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY, AND HAS ARGUED FOR NEW MEASURES TO PREVENT MISUSE OF REPROCESSING AND OTHER SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY. THE USSR HAS ALSO SUGGESTED RECONVENING THE LONDON SUPPLIERS CLUB, IN ORDER TO EXPAND THE SUPPLIERS GUIDELINES. WHILE THE U.S. AND THE MAJOR

WESTERN SUPPLIERS ARE OPPOSED TO A FORMAL RENEWAL OF THE LONDON SUPPLIERS CLUB -- TO AVOID PROVOKING THIRD WORLD CHARGES OF DISCRIMINATION -- WE INTEND, AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME, TO WORK WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER INDUSTRIAL STATES TO TIGHTEN INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR SUPPLIER RESTRAINTS.

5. THE SOVIETS ALSO MIGHT BE HELPFUL IN STRENGTHENING THE IAEA. THE USSR CONSISTENTLY SUPPORTS IMPROVEMENTS IN THE QUALITY OF THE IAEA INSPECTION EFFORT, AND IT HAS SOUGHT THE SELECTION OF A NEUTRAL EUROPEAN DIRECTOR GENERAL WHO WOULD NOT BE OVERLY SUSCEPTIBLE TO THIRD WORLD PRESSURES. THE SOVIETS RESIST THE DEVELOPING COUNTRY DESIRE TO EMPHASIZE THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY BY THE IAEA AT THE EXPENSE OF SAFEGUARDS, SHARING INSTEAD OUR PRIMARY STRESS ON SAFEGUARDS IMPROVEMENT.

6. SOVIET AND U.S. INTERESTS DIVERGE IN SPECIFIC PROBLEM COUNTRY CASES WHERE THERE ARE CONFLICTING POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS BETWEEN US. A CASE IN POINT IS THE MIDDLE EAST, WHERE SOVIET COOPERATION WILL BE VERY IMPORTANT; TO THE SUCCESS OF OUR MIDDLE EAST NUCLEAR SUPPLIER CONSULTATIONS. THE USSR IS THE PRINCIPAL FOREIGN NUCLEAR SUPPLIER TO LIBYA. IN ANOTHER CASE, THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT BEEN FORTHCOMING IN USING POLITICAL PRESSURE ON THE INDIANS TO RESTRAIN THE GOI'S DEVELOPMENT OF A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE CAPABILITY. THE SOVIETS COULD ALSO PUT MORE PRESSURE ON CUBA TO SIGN THE TREATY OF Tlatelolco.

7. WE PLAN THAT THE AMBASSADOR'S DISCUSSIONS WILL BE FOLLOWED BY OTHER DISCUSSIONS AT THE MARGIN OF THE IAEA BOARD OF GOVERNORS MEETING IN FEBRUARY 1982. WE WOULD BE SPECIFICALLY DISCUSSING

METHODS OF STRENGTHENING THE NPT REGIME, TIGHTENING CONTROLS ON NUCLEAR EXPORTS, AND UPGRADING THE TRIGGER LIST AND DUAL USE GUIDELINES.

-- AMBASSADOR IS REQUESTED TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS WITH GROMYKO (GUIDANCE ON OTHER ISSUES TO FOLLOW):

-- "THE US AND USSR SHARE THE FUNDAMENTAL VIEW THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROLIFERATION IS NOT IN THEIR NATIONAL INTEREST. I WOULD LIKE TO EXPLORE WAYS OF STRENGTHENING OUR COOPERATION IN THIS AREA.

-- A MAJOR OBJECTIVE OF U.S. POLICY ON NON-PROLIFERATION IS TO REDUCE THE INSECURITIES THAT COULD LEAD CERTAIN COUNTRIES TO DEVELOP NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES.

-- THE USG CONTINUES ITS HISTORICAL STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY. WE ARE WILLING TO DISCUSS WITH YOU WAYS NOT ONLY OF EXPANDING NPT ADHERENCE BUT ALSO OF PREVENTING CIRCUMVENTION OF ITS PROVISIONS BY NPT MEMBERS.

-- WE ARE CONCERNED BY TWO TRENDS IN THE IAEA. FIRST, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AGENCY MAY EVENTUALLY BE THREATENED BY INCREASING POLITICIZATION AS EVIDENCED BY RECENT EFFORTS TO SUSPEND ISRAEL. SECOND, THE IAEA NEEDS CONTINUING TECHNICAL AND POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR STRENGTHENING ITS SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM, INCLUDING IMPROVEMENTS IN ITS STAFFING AND ORGANIZATION.

-- WE WELCOME YOUR IDEAS ON HOW BEST TO STRENGTHEN AND EXTEND THE IAEA SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM.

-- WE ALSO WOULD LIKE TO OBTAIN YOUR VIEWS ON WAYS

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PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 1978 DTG: 050048Z DEC 81 PSN: 038226

OF STRENGTHENING NUCLEAR SUPPLIER CONTROLS. WE BELIEVE THAT REVIVING THE LONDON NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS CLUB WOULD AROUSE ADVERSE CRITICISM FROM THIRD WORLD NATIONS, AND THUS DO NOT NOW SUPPORT, FORMALLY RECONVENING THAT GROUP. HOWEVER, WE STRONGLY SUPPORT MUTUAL RESTRAINT BY NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS PARTICULARLY IN EXPORTS TO AREAS OF TENSION, AND ENHANCED LISTS OF CONTROLLED ITEMS.

-- WE SEE THE NEED FOR SPECIAL RESTRAINTS ON NUCLEAR SUPPLY TO THE MIDDLE EAST. WE BELIEVE THAT LIBYA, DESPITE ITS NPT ADHERENCE, CONTINUES TO SEEK A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES CAPABILITY. WE EXPECT THAT THE USSR WILL MAINTAIN TIGHT RESTRICTIONS ON ITS ASSISTANCE TO THE LIBYAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM.

-- THE U.S. HAS ADOPTED A POLICY OF URGING COOPERATIVE COUNTRIES TO RETURN SPENT HEU RESEARCH REACTOR FUEL TO THE U.S. WE HOPE THAT THE USSR WOULD TAKE BACK SPENT HEU REACTOR FUEL FROM LIBYA, RATHER THAN ALLOWING SPENT FUEL TO ACCUMULATE AT TAJURA RESEARCH REACTOR.

-- THE U.S. HAS JUST RATIFIED PROTOCOL I OF THE TREATY OF TLAHELCO. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF YOU COULD CONTINUE TO TRY TO PERSUADE CUBA TO JOIN OTHER LATIN AMERICAN STATES IN ADHERING TO THIS TREATY.

-- WE LOOK FORWARD TO A CONTINUING DIALOGUE ON NON-PROLIFERATION CONCERNS AND SPECIFICALLY, TO A BILATERAL DISCUSSION DURING THE NEXT IAEA BOARD OF GOVERNORS MEETING IN FEBRUARY.

-- (IF ASKED) SOVIETS MAY BRING UP QUESTION OF NON-ADHERENCE TO NPT AND NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENTS IN ISRAEL, SOUTH AFRICA AND PAKISTAN, (SEE REFTEL A). YOU SHOULD NOTE THE CONTINUED EFFORTS OF THE US TO EXTEND SAFEGUARDS TO ALL FACILITIES IN THESE COUNTRIES, AND THE FACT THAT THE U.S. IS NOT SUPPLYING NUCLEAR ITEMS TO ANY OF THESE COUNTRIES. HAIG
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PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 2793 DTG: 280001Z OCT 82 PSN: 039613
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~~S E C R E T~~ STATE 302793

NODIS
FOR AMBASSADOR HARTMAN
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: TATT, IAEA, UR, US
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE TO THE SOVIETS ON
NON-PROLIFERATION TALKS

REFS: A) MOSCOW 12535; B) MOSCOW 12733

1. ~~(S~~ - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. FOLLOWING RECEIPT OF REF B, WE ARE NOW PREPARED TO
APPROACH THE SOVIETS ON ARRANGING BILATERAL
NON-PROLIFERATION CONSULTATIONS. YOU SHOULD PROPOSE A
MEETING OF TWO OR THREE DAYS IF NEEDED, DECEMBER 14-16,
HERE IN WASHINGTON. WE MAY NOT ACTUALLY USE ALL OF THIRD
DAY, BUT WOULD LIKE TO HAVE IT AVAILABLE IF NEEDED. THE
U. S. DELEGATION WOULD BE HEADED BY AMBASSADOR KENNEDY.
(FYI: AMBASSADOR KENNEDY'S CONFIRMATION HEARING HAS NOW
BEEN SCHEDULED FOR DECEMBER 7. END FYI.)

3. WE VERY MUCH APPRECIATE YOUR THOUGHTFUL COMMENTS ON
THE AGENDA AND FIND YOUR SUGGESTION OF A LARGE NUMBER OF
TOPICS, HANDLED IN PLENARY AND WORKING-GROUP SESSIONS,
APPEALING. THEREFORE, WE WOULD LIKE YOU TO SUGGEST THE
FOLLOWING AGENDA AND SCHEDULE TO THE SOVIETS AND GET
THEIR COMMENTS (WE MAY ADD OTHER ITEMS LATER):

PLENARY SESSION I

A. REVIEW OF U. S. NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY INCLUDING
SUCH TOPICS AS: 1) EXPORT CONTROL POLICY; 2)
NPT/TLATELOCO ADHERENCE; 3) NEW U. S. POLICY TOWARD
REPROCESSING AND PLUTONIUM USE.

B. REVIEW OF SOVIET NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY

C. IAEA REASSESSMENT

D. PUNE

B. PHYSICAL PROTECTION CONVENTION

WORKING GROUP I - MULTILATERAL ISSUES

A. INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS

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NLRR F06-114/84/10373

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 2793

DTG: 280001Z OCT 82 PSN: 039613

1. IMPROVEMENTS IN SAFEGUARDS
2. RESULTS OF U. S. VOLUNTARY OFFER
3. SOVIET PLAN FOR IMPLEMENTING VOLUNTARY OFFER

B. INTERNATIONAL PLUTONIUM STORAGE - REVIEW OF PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS

C. COMMITTEE ON ASSURANCES OF SUPPLY - REVIEW OF PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS

WORKING GROUP II - EXPORT CONTROL ISSUES

A. GENERAL EXPORT CONTROL ISSUES

B. TRIGGER LIST - CLARIFYING ITEMS ON ZANGGER LIST

C. DUAL USE - EXPORT CONTROLS ON ITEMS WHICH HAVE NUCLEAR AND NON-NUCLEAR USES.

PLENARY SESSION II

A. SUMMARY

B. AREAS OF AGREEMENT/DISAGREEMENT

C. DECISION ON FUTURE MEETING

4. OUR INITIAL IDEA IS TO TRY TO HANDLE THIS AGENDA IN TWO DAYS, DECEMBER 14-15. THE FIRST PLENARY SESSION WOULD BE THE MORNING OF THE FIRST DAY. THE WORKING GROUPS WOULD MEET SIMULTANEOUSLY IN AN AFTERNOON SESSION THE FIRST DAY AND A MORNING SESSION THE SECOND DAY. WE WOULD HAVE A FINAL PLENARY THE AFTERNOON OF THE SECOND

DAY TO SUM UP AND ASSESS AREAS OF AGREEMENT/DISAGREEMENT. A THIRD DAY, DECEMBER 16, WOULD BE AVAILABLE IF WE NEED MORE TIME.

5. WE AGREE WITH YOU THAT THE EMBASSY SHOULD HAVE A ROLE IN THESE DISCUSSIONS, AND THIS EXCHANGE OF CABLES WAS OUR INITIAL EFFORT TO INVOLVE YOU. IN ADDITION, IT WOULD SEEM DESIRABLE FOR SOMEONE FROM THE EMBASSY, PERHAPS MIKE JOYCE, TO ATTEND THE WASHINGTON CONSULTATIONS, AND WE WOULD WANT TO SEND SOMEONE FROM EUR/SOV TO ACCOMPANY THE EXPERTS TO ANY SUBSEQUENT MEETING IN MOSCOW.

6. WE WILL WAIT TO GET THE REACTION FROM YOUR DEMARCHE BEFORE PRECEDING FURTHER WITH PLANS. SHULTZ
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ANNEX A

ANNEX B



STATE

21 June 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. SVEN KRAEMER, NSC

1. (S) The Interagency paper on the reply to the Soviet TTBT demarche has been reviewed as stated in the forwarding 20 June 1985 STATE memorandum for Mr. McFarlane. The JCS positions on reciprocity and prior agreement on equipment in that paper are reaffirmed.
2. (S) The following are JCS amendments to the decision paper:
 - pg 2, following the first partial sentence at the top of the page add: "The President's 1984 UNGA offer called for an exchange of nuclear test observers. Maintaining reciprocity establishes the U.S. position for this and other verification initiatives."
 - pg 2, prior to the last sentence of first complete paragraph beginning "On the intelligence concern..." insert: "The JCS believe that inviting the Soviets to bring any equipment they deem necessary does not necessarily associate them with these principles. The Soviets could state that equipment is required to measure a test on-site, however, on-site inspection is not required for verification. They could argue that NTM alone is sufficient and that their on site yield measurement had merely confirmed this fact."
 - pg 2, add the following at the end of the first complete paragraph: "The JCS believe that if the Soviets accept the unconditional offer it is possible that subsequent discussion to work out details would reveal that there may, in fact, be restrictions on equipment the Soviets would be allowed to bring, e.g., equipment that poses intelligence risks to the U.S. Such restrictions would give the Soviets grounds for charging a "bad faith" offer."

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- pg 2, under Technical Talks:

- Delete the current parenthetical JCS position
- Add the following: "The JCS believe that reciprocity is a desirable but not necessary condition for the data exchange/site-inspection offer."

Eugene R. Lanzillo

EUGENE R. LANZILLO
Brigadier General, USA
Assitant Deputy Director,
International Negotiations

WASHFA

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Soviet TTBT Demarche PAGES 2

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ACDA	NICK CARREIRA			632-0872
②	MARTIN			

REMARKS:

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JCS J-3 FORM 6
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E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PARM, MNUG
SUBJECT: QS AND AS ON U.S. AND SOVIET NUCLEAR TESTING
INITIATIVES

PM AMB. HOLMES AND EUR AMB. RIDGWAY.

L. POSTS MAY DRAW ON THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
WHEN RESPONDING TO QUERIES ON THE U.S. AND SOVIET NUCLEAR
TESTING INITIATIVES.

2. BEGIN TEST:

Q. WAS THE U.S. INVITATION MADE IN RESPONSE TO THE
SOVIET MORATORIUM PROPOSAL?

A. NO. THE NEW U.S. INITIATIVE BUILDS UPON THE
PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL OF SEPTEMBER 1984 CALLING FOR U.S.
AND SOVIET EXPERTS TO VISIT EACH OTHER'S TEST SITES AND
DIRECTLY MEASURE NUCLEAR TESTS. THIS NEW INITIATIVE
CONSTITUTES AN UNCONDITIONAL INVITATION AND REFLECTS THE
PRESIDENT'S DESIRE TO GO THE EXTRA MILE TO TRY TO BRING
ABOUT PROGRESS IN THE NUCLEAR TESTING AREA.

Q. WHY IS THE U.S. GOING PUBLIC SO QUICKLY? IS THIS TO
COUNTER A SOVIET PROPAGANDA OFFENSIVE?

A. THE SEPTEMBER 1984 PROPOSAL IS A MATTER OF PUBLIC
RECORD. WE HAVE COMMUNICATED THIS NEW INVITATION, WHICH
BUILDS ON THE PRESIDENT'S UNGA PROPOSAL, TO THE SOVIETS
IN DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS. WE BELIEVE THIS NEW INVITATION
SHOULD EQUALLY BE A MATTER OF PUBLIC RECORD.

Q. WHY DIDN'T YOU PROPOSE THIS IN GENEVA?

A. NUCLEAR TESTING ISSUES ARE NOT PART OF THE GENEVA
NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS. THESE EXCHANGES ON NUCLEAR
TESTING HAVE GENERALLY TAKEN PLACE BILATERALLY BETWEEN
MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON.

Q. IS THE U.S. OFFER FOR THE NEXT TEST?

A. WE DID NOT SPECIFY A CERTAIN TEST IN OUR OFFER. WHAT
WE NEED IS FOR THE SOVIETS TO INDICATE TO US WHETHER THEY

ARE WILLING TO ACCEPT THE OFFER. WE CAN THEN PROCEED
WITH WORKING OUT SPECIFIC ARRANGEMENTS.

Q. HAVE WE EVER PROPOSED THAT THE SOVIETS WITNESS A U.S.
TEST?

A. NO. THIS IS AN UNPRECEDENTED OFFER.

Q. WHAT IS THE U.S. POSITION ON RATIFYING THE TTBT AND
PNET?

A. WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS IN DIPLOMATIC
CHANNELS THAT THESE TREATIES NEED TO BE IMPROVED IN TERMS
OF THEIR VERIFICATION PROVISIONS, AND WE HAVE ASKED THEM
TO HOLD DISCUSSIONS WITH US ON THIS SUBJECT. THEY HAVE
SO FAR NOT TAKEN UP OUR OFFER. OUR NEW INVITATION IS
DESIGNED TO BEGIN THE PROCESS.

Q. WHAT IS U.S. POSITION REGARDING RESUMPTION OF THE
COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN (CTB)?

A. -- A CTB CONTINUES TO BE A LONG-TERM OBJECTIVE OF
U.S. ARMS CONTROL POLICY, IN THE CONTEXT OF BROAD, DEEP,
AND VERIFIABLE ARMS REDUCTIONS, EXPANDED CONFIDENCE-
BUILDING MEASURES, MAINTENANCE OF A CREDIBLE NUCLEAR
DETERRENT, AND IMPROVED VERIFICATION CAPABILITIES. OUR
PRIORITY OBJECTIVE IS TO ACHIEVE EQUITABLE AND VERIFIABLE
ARMS REDUCTIONS IN THE CURRENT GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS ON
NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS WITH THE USSR.

-- VERIFICATION OF A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN REMAINS A
MAJOR PROBLEM. THERE ARE SERIOUS LIMITATIONS IN
DETECTING AND IDENTIFYING POTENTIALLY SIGNIFICANT LEVELS
OF CLANDESTINE TESTING. AT THE MULTILATERAL CONFERENCE
ON DISARMAMENT IN GENEVA, THE U.S. HAS SUPPORTED
INTERNATIONAL DISCUSSION OF CTB PROBLEMS, AND WE ARE
CONTINUING TO WORK TOWARD THEIR RESOLUTION.

Q. IS THE U.S. OFFER TRULY UNILATERAL OR DOES PROGRESS
REQUIRE A SIMILAR SOVIET INVITATION TO THE U.S.?

A. THIS INVITATION IS WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS. WE ARE NOT
SPECULATING ABOUT WHAT THE NEXT STEP MUST BE. OBVIOUSLY,
THERE WILL NEED TO BE SOME COOPERATION BY BOTH PARTIES IF
PROGRESS IS TO BE MADE. WE WOULD OF COURSE HOPE THAT THE
SOVIETS WILL RESPOND IN A CONSTRUCTIVE MANNER WHICH WILL
PROMOTE FURTHER PROGRESS. WHITEHEAD
BT

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, PROP, UR, US
SUBJECT: THE GORBACHEV NUCLEAR TESTING MORATORIUM

1. ~~1~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: GORBACHEV'S STATEMENT ANNOUNCING A FIVE-MONTH UNILATERAL MORATORIUM ON SOVIET NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS APPEARS TO BE A PUBLIC RELATIONS EFFORT TIMED TO COINCIDE WITH THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OBSERVANCES OF THE HELSINKI ACCORDS, THE FORTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF HIROSHIMA, AND THE UPCOMING NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY REVIEW CONFERENCE. THE ANNOUNCEMENT BUILDS ON SEVERAL EARLIER STATEMENTS PROPOSING A MULTILATERAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS TEST MORATORIUM, AND IT ADDS ANOTHER SOVIET UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT PROPOSAL TO A GROWING LIST. END SUMMARY.

GORBACHEV'S STATEMENT WAS RELEASED ON THE EVENING OF JULY 29 AND PUBLISHED IN PRAVDA ON THE 30TH. IT ANNOUNCES A UNILATERAL SOVIET MORATORIUM ON NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS FROM AUGUST 6, 1985, TO JANUARY 1, 1986. IT PROPOSES THAT THE UNITED STATES FOLLOW SUIT AND PLEDGES THAT, IF THAT WERE TO HAPPEN, THE MORATORIUM COULD BE CONTINUED.

4. THE MORATORIUM ANNOUNCEMENT COMES JUST HOURS BEFORE THE OPENING OF THE HELSINKI OBSERVANCES, A WEEK BEFORE THE HIROSHIMA ANNIVERSARY, AND A MONTH BEFORE THE NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE IN GENEVA. AT THE NPT REVIEW, THE SOVIET UNION PRESUMABLY INTENDS TO USE THE MORATORIUM AS PROOF THAT IT IS FULFILLING ITS ARTICLE VI OBLIGATION TO PURSUE NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT.

5. MOSCOW HAD FOR SEVERAL MONTHS PREPARED THE WAY FOR GORBACHEV'S ANNOUNCEMENT:

-- ON APRIL 17, THROUGH THE USSR EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON

THE PRESIDUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET, IN REPLY TO A LETTER FROM THE CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION, HAD EXPRESSED SOVIET AGREEMENT TO A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS MORATORIUM BEGINNING ON AUGUST 6 IF THE OTHER NUCLEAR POWERS ALSO CONSENTED.

-- GORBACHEV IN ESSENCE REPEATED THAT PROPOSITION IN HIS INTERVIEW WITH THE PRESS TRUST OF INDIA, PUBLISHED IN PRAVDA ON MAY 20.

-- IN EARLY JULY, IN REPLY TO ANOTHER LETTER TO GORBACHEV FROM THE CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION, AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN DELIVERED A SOVIET REPLY THAT AGAIN REPEATED THE APRIL POSITION. THAT REPLY WAS PUBLISHED IN PRAVDA ON JULY 5.

6. THE NUCLEAR TESTING MORATORIUM JOINS SEVERAL OTHER UNILATERAL GESTURES MADE OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS. THESE INCLUDE THE SIX-MONTH MORATORIUM ON MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILE AND INF COUNTERMEASURE DEPLOYMENTS ANNOUNCED BY GORBACHEV IN APRIL, THE ASAT LAUNCH MORATORIUM ANNOUNCED BY ANDROPOV IN AUGUST 1983, AND BREZHNEV'S JUNE 1982 UNILATERAL PLEDGE NOT TO BE THE FIRST TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

7. THE FORMAT USED FOR THE MORATORIUM ANNOUNCEMENT, A STATEMENT (ZAYAVLENIYE) OF THE GENERAL SECRETARY, HAS NOT BEEN USED SINCE ANDROPOV'S STATEMENTS IN SEPTEMBER AND NOVEMBER 1983, DURING THE PERIOD WHEN ANDROPOV HAD DISAPPEARED FROM PUBLIC VIEW. THE CURRENT USE OF THIS FORMAT DRAWS ATTENTION TO GORBACHEV PERSONALLY AS THE MAN IN CHARGE OF DISARMAMENT POLICY.

8. MOSCOW HAS YET TO REPORT OR COMMENT ON THE U.S.

OFFER, ANNOUNCED BY THE WHITE HOUSE ON JULY 29, TO ALLOW SOVIET OBSERVERS TO MEASURE THE YIELD OF A U.S. NUCLEAR TEST. COMBS
BT

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BY LOJ NARA DATE 9/30/05

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E.O. 12356: NA
TAGS: PARM, MNUG
SUBJECT: US AND SOVIET NUCLEAR TESTING INITIATIVES
ZFF SECRETARY ONLY INFORM CONSULS

1. UNCLASSIFIED - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. BY SEPTEL POSTS WILL RECEIVE JULY 29 WHITE HOUSE
BACKGROUNDERS REGARDING US AND SOVIET NUCLEAR TESTING
INITIATIVES. IN ADDITION TO INFORMATION PROVIDED IN
BACKGROUNDERS, DEPARTMENT REQUESTS POSTS DRAW ON FOLLOWING
TALKING POINTS WHEN DISCUSSING THE US AND SOVIET NUCLEAR
TESTING INITIATIVES WITH HOST COUNTRY MEDIA, GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS, AND PUBLIC CONTACTS.

3. BEGIN TEXT:

--THE US PROPOSAL ANNOUNCED TODAY (JULY 29) IS A VERY
PRACTICAL ONE, WHICH BUILDS ON THE PROPOSAL MADE BY THE
PRESIDENT IN HIS SEPTEMBER 24, 1984 SPEECH TO THE UNITED
NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY CALLING FOR AN EXCHANGE OF US
AND SOVIET EXPERTS TO EACH OTHER'S NUCLEAR TEST SITES TO
DIRECTLY MEASURE TEST YIELDS. OUR NEW PROPOSAL FEATURES
A SUBSTANTIAL NEW CONCRETE ELEMENT: AN UNCONDITIONAL

INVITATION TO THE SOVIET UNION FOR ITS EXPERTS TO VISIT A
US TEST SITE -- AND TO BRING THE EQUIPMENT THEY DEEM
NECESSARY -- TO DIRECTLY MEASURE THE YIELD OF A US
NUCLEAR TEST. THE OBJECTIVE OF THIS PROPOSAL IS TO TAKE
A NEEDED FIRST STEP IN BEGINNING TO IMPROVE CONFIDENCE IN
MONITORING CAPABILITY AND COMPLIANCE WITH TESTING
LIMITATIONS, ABOUT WHICH BOTH SIDES HAVE EXPRESSED
CONCERN.

--WE HAVE INDICATED TO THE SOVIETS THAT WE BELIEVE A
NUMBER OF THEIR TESTS MAY HAVE VIOLATED THE 150 KT
THRESHOLD OF THE UNRATIFIED THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY
(TTBT) AND THAT THEY HAVE VIOLATED THE LIMITED TEST BAN
TREATY (LTBT). THE SOVIETS, IN TURN, HAVE QUESTIONED A
NUMBER OF OUR TESTS. CLEARLY, CONFIDENCE NEEDS TO BE
ENHANCED SIGNIFICANTLY IN THIS AREA BEFORE FURTHER STEPS
CAN BE TAKEN.

--WE HAVE SEVERAL TIMES PREVIOUSLY OFFERED TO DISCUSS
WITH THE SOVIETS HOW WE COULD IMPROVE THE VERIFICATION
PROVISIONS OF THE TTBT AND THE PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSION
TREATY (PNET), WHICH THEY THUS FAR REJECTED. NEITHER
HAVE THEY ACCEPTED THE PRESIDENT'S UN INITIATIVE.

--THE NEW US INITIATIVE REFLECTS THE PRESIDENT'S
WILLINGNESS TO "GO THE EXTRA MILE" IN THE NUCLEAR TESTING
AREA JUST AS HE DID IN PROPOSING A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR
TRULY MUTUAL INTERIM RESTRAINTS IN REGARD TO STRATEGIC
ARMS LIMITATIONS.

--ALTHOUGH THE NEW US NUCLEAR TESTING PROPOSAL WAS MADE
WITHOUT ANY CONDITIONS, IT IS OUR HOPE THAT SUCH
PRACTICAL STEPS WILL GET A PROCESS GOING WHICH WILL
ENABLE THE TWO COUNTRIES TO ESTABLISH THE BASIS FOR
VERIFICATION OF EFFECTIVE LIMITS ON UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR
TESTING.

--THIS INITIATIVE HAS BEEN IN THE WORKS FOR MANY
MONTHS. THE PRESIDENT GAVE HIS FINAL APPROVAL THIS
WEEKEND TO GO FORWARD WITH A LETTER TO SOVIET LEADER
GORBACHEV, WHICH INCLUDED, AMONG OTHER THINGS, THIS
INVITATION TO THE SOVIETS.

--THE ACTUAL PROPOSAL WAS MADE TO THE SOVIETS AS
QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE AFTER THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION.

--IN CONTRAST, THE SOVIET MORATORIUM PROPOSAL IS
SIMILAR TO THOSE THEY HAVE MADE MANY TIMES OVER THE
YEARS. WHAT HISTORY HAS TAUGHT US IS THAT SUCH PROPOSALS

INvariably ARE SELF-SERVING, DESIGNED TO LOCK IN AREAS OF
SOVIET ADVANTAGE AND, THEREFORE, LARGELY PROPAGANDISTIC.
IN THIS SAME PATTERN, THE PRESENT SOVIET MORATORIUM
PROPOSAL IS LARGELY DESIGNED TO DIVERT ATTENTION AWAY
FROM THEIR MILITARY BUILD-UP AND THEIR FAILURE TO
NEGOTIATE EQUITABLE, VERIFIABLE AGREEMENTS PROVIDING FOR
REAL REDUCTIONS IN THE SIZE OF EXISTING NUCLEAR ARSENALS.

--THE HISTORICAL RECORD SHOWS THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE IN
THE PAST USED SUCH MORATORIA TO CONSOLIDATE THEIR
- ADVANTAGES: IN 1956-61, THEY USED THE MORATORIUM TO
CLANDESTINELY PREPARE FOR THE LARGEST SERIES OF TESTS
EVER CONDUCTED. IN THE INF AREA, TO TAKE ANOTHER
EXAMPLE, THE SOVIETS DECLARED A UNILATERAL MORATORIUM ON
LRINF DEPLOYMENTS IN OCTOBER 1983, AFTER WHICH THEY
CONTINUED TO CONSTRUCT NEW SS-20 BASES AND TO DEPLOY
ADDITIONAL MISSILES. AFTER THEIR DECLARED LRINF
MORATORIUM IN MARCH OF THIS YEAR, THE SOVIETS CONTINUED
TO DEPLOY ADDITIONAL MISSILES IN EUROPE AND ASIA.

--MOREOVER, GIVEN THE SCOPE AND SCALE OF SOVIET
MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS AND US RESTRAINT, US TESTING IS
NECESSARY TO ENSURE THE CONTINUED CREDIBILITY AND
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE US NUCLEAR DETERRENT.

--WE HAVE NOTED IN RECENT WEEKS A SIGNIFICANT
ACCELERATION IN THE NUMBER OF SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS
TESTS -- IN THE PAST WEEK ALONE WE HAVE DETECTED SEVERAL
SUCH TESTS. OBVIOUSLY, THIS WAS DESIGNED TO PUT THE
SOVIET UNION IN A POSITION NOT TO NEED TO TEST OVER THE
NEXT FIVE MONTHS AND TO BREAK OUT ON AN ACCELERATED
SCHEDULE (AS THEY DID IN 1961), IF THEY CHOOSE, WITHOUT
REAL COST TO SOVIET PROGRAMS.

--THUS, OUR EXPERIENCE OF SOVIET MORATORIUM PROPOSALS
INDICATES THAT THEY ARE NOT A SOUND OR ACCEPTABLE BASIS
FOR A GENUINE AGREEMENT ON VERIFIABLE TESTING
LIMITATIONS, NOR THAT THEY WOULD DO ANYTHING TO LIMIT THE

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COSTLY GROWTH IN NUCLEAR ARSENALS. WHITEHEAD
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