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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files

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File Folder: USSR-Olympics 1984 (2) *Box 90881 30*

Date: 5/30/97

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. memo (9344)	Robert McFarlane to the President re Soviet Olympic-Related Requests (3 pp.) <i>P 11/14/99 NLS F95-074 #10</i>	1/31/84	P1
2. memo (9344)	Jack Matlock to Robert McFarlane re Soviet Olympic-Related Requests (3 pp.) <i>P 11/16/99 NLS F95-074 #11</i>	1/29/84	P1
3. letter	Captain J.A. Peebles to Jack Matlock re Olympics (2 pp.)	1/27/84	P1
4. paper	Intelligence Operations of the Warsaw Pact Civilian Fleets (1 p.) <i>R F95-074 #13 7/10/01</i>	1/27/84	P1
5. memo (9344)	Richard Levine to Robert McFarlane re Los Angeles Olympics (4 pp.)	1/16/84	P1/P5
6. memo (8677)	Robert McFarlane to George Shultz re Visit of Soviet Olympic Delegation (1 p.) <i>R 11/16/99 NLS F95-074 #14</i>	12/10/83	P1
7. memo (9344)	Robert McFarlane to Michael Deaver re L.A. Olympics (2 pp.)	n.d.	P1/P5
8. cable	cable #131002Z (4 pp.) <i>R 11/16/99 NLS F95-074 #15</i>	1/13/84	P1
9. letter	duplicate of document #3 (2 pp.)	1/27/84	P1
10. paper	duplicate of document #4 (1 p.) <i>R F95-074 #17 7/10/01</i>	1/27/84	P1
11. memo (9344)	duplicate of document #5 (4 pp.)	1/16/84	P1/P5
12. memo (9344)	duplicate of document #7 (2 pp.)	n.d.	P1/P5

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files

Archivist: smf

File Folder: USSR-Olympics 1984 (2)

Date: 5/30/97

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
13. memo (8677)	duplicate of document #6 (1 p.) <i>R 11/14/99 NLSF95-074 #18</i>	12/10/83	P1
14. memo (8677)	duplicate of document #6, with notations (1 p.) <i>A 11/14/99 NLSF95-074 #19</i>	12/10/83	P1
15. memo (8677)	Richard Levine to Robert McFarlane re Visit of Soviet Olympic Delegation (2 pp.) <i>A 11/14/99 NLSF95-074 #20</i>	12/9/83	P1
16. memo (8336556)	Charles Hill to Robert McFarlane re Visit of Soviet Olympic Delegation (2 pp.) <i>A 11/16/99 NLSF95-074 #21</i>	11/30/83	P1
17. memo	Charles Hill to Robert McFarlane re Visit of Soviet Olympic Delegation (2 pp.) <i>A 11/14/99 NLSF95-074 #22</i>	n.d.	P1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
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- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

934

**National Security Council
The White House**

6 JAN 19 1981

System #

I

Package #

9344

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin	1	wn	
Bob Kimmitt	✓	K	
John Poindexter	3	J	
Wilma Hall	4		
Bud McFarlane	5		A
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			

I = Information

A = Action

R = Retain

D = Dispatch

N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by:

(Date/Time)

Bud,
I disagree with visible involv
of President with regard to Terrorism
at Olympics. I will hold judgment on:
rest until I see NSDD.

~~File~~ Olympics
~~Leure~~
~~Matlock~~

National Security Council
The White House

System # _____

Package # _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITI
Bill Martin		WFM	
Bob Kimmitt	2	K	
John Poindexter	3	X	
Wilma Hall	4		
Bud McFarlane	5	✓	A
Bob Kimmitt	6	K	
NSC Secretariat	7		N
Situation Room			

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Act

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

Deaver wants copy of Tab I ASAP

0930 Tuesday

FI - Cy has been delivered to
Mike Deaver on 8/11/81

**National Security Council
The White House**

PI2: 46

System #

I

Package #

9344

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin			
Bob Kimmitt	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>		<u>A</u>
Situation Room			

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____

Staff to Matlock for further action. Memo to President on (1) ship and (2) Aeroflot flights due today, 1/24, for discussion with President at 0930, 1/25. JMP thinks that Aeroflot decision, or at least communication of it to Sovi. should await ICAO outcome.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

January 31, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS F95-074 #10

By smf NARA, Date 11/16/99

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *RCM*
SUBJECT: Soviet Olympic-Related Requests

Issue

Whether to approve Soviet requests for Aeroflot flights and a ship call to support their participation in the Los Angeles Olympic Games.

Facts

The Soviets have made a series of requests to the Los Angeles Olympic Committee (LAOC) for approval of Aeroflot flights, a long-duration ship call at Long Beach, and for relaxation of other U.S. restrictions to enable them to provide support to their team in the Olympic Games. Granting the requests for Aeroflot flights would require suspending application of the sanctions applied to the Soviet airline following the KAL shoot-down. Other Soviet requests raise national security concerns.

Discussion

When the Los Angeles Olympic Committee was designated as host for the 1984 summer Olympics, it made a commitment to treat all members of the International Olympic Committee on a non-political and non-discriminatory basis. LAOC, therefore, feels constrained to reply to the Soviet requests in a manner as forthcoming as possible.

The Soviets have not yet formally accepted the Olympic invitation and have stated that it might be May before they would announce their decision. In the meantime, they are attempting to obtain assurance on as many points as possible regarding how they will be treated by U.S. authorities. While our intelligence community believes that the Soviets want to participate, there is a distinct risk that if we fail to suspend our sanctions and some of our normal restrictions on Soviet officials in order to permit them to support their team on a non-discriminatory basis, they will refuse to come and charge us with reneging on commitments to deal with participants on an equal basis. Given the high profile of the Olympics throughout the world, our decisions have the

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Declassify on: OADR

potential to create a major public stir if they are seen as unfairly handicapping Soviet participation and thus precipitating a Soviet refusal to attend.

On the Soviet request for special Aeroflot flights, all agencies recommend that these be granted for the specific purpose of bringing the Soviet "Olympic family" to Los Angeles, but without the right to land elsewhere in the U.S. or to carry third-country passengers. The FAA would direct appropriate flight routes to avoid sensitive U.S. facilities. However, we do not wish to convey an approval to the Soviets until the resolutions in ICAO related to the KAL shoot-down have been voted on, since approval of the flights could be interpreted as a weakening of our desire to have the Soviets condemned. This can be managed if LAOC instructs the Soviets to apply through normal diplomatic channels for permission to operate the flights, since the State Department could then delay notification until the actions in ICAO have been completed.

Regarding the Soviet request for a port call, the Port Security Committee has no objection to brief calls before and after the Olympics to deliver and, subsequently, pick up equipment and passengers. However, the Committee is strongly opposed to allowing the ship to stay at the pier in Long Beach Harbor during the Games.

At present, no other country has been granted permission to keep a ship in port during the Olympics, and so long as we allow no one else to have a ship there, we should be able to defend refusal of this request as non-discriminatory. Although the Soviets are likely to press the point, we believe that permission should not be granted. If it should subsequently appear that the Soviets will refuse to attend unless the ship stay is permitted, we can review the situation to see whether countermeasures are possible to minimize the potential national security threat.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the Olympic Games in Los Angeles be treated as a special event, for which every effort should be made to treat the Soviets on a non-discriminatory basis, unless overriding interests of national security require special arrangements.

OK

No

2. That Aeroflot be allowed to operate special flights to support their Olympic team, but without the right to transport third-country nationals or to land at intermediate stops in the U.S.

OKNo

3. That the Soviet ship be allowed to enter Long Beach Harbor before and after the Olympics, but not to remain at the pier during the Games, unless such privilege is granted other countries.

OKNo

4. That LAOC be instructed to ask the Soviets to submit their requests through normal diplomatic channels.

OKNo

Prepared by:
Jack Matlock

cc: Vice President

Per RCM 1/31/84 :

#3 means that Soviet ship will be allowed to enter Long Beach Harbor before and after the Olympics and will be allowed to remain at the pier during the Games subject to the establishment of all possible measures designed to minimize intelligence loss

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

January 29, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *[Signature]*

SUBJECT:

Soviet Olympic-Related Requests

The Soviets have made a series of requests to the Los Angeles Olympic Committee (LAOC) for approval of Aeroflot flights, a long-duration ship call at Long Beach, and the accreditation of an Olympic Attache for the duration of the Games (TAB II). LAOC is under pressure to provide a reply and has sought guidance from the federal government. Since some of the requests would require suspension of post-KAL sanctions against Aeroflot, the major questions should be subject to Presidential decision.

The Issues

Aeroflot flights: The Soviets have requested up to 25 round trips by IL-62M and two to three by IL-76T, to transport members of their "Olympic family," spectators, and third-country teams. Although they intend to fly most on a Moscow-Havana-Los Angeles route, they also ask for permission for some flights to land in New York and/or Washington to pick up and discharge passengers.

Ship call: The Soviets have requested that the 480-passenger-berth "Gruzia" be allowed to enter Long Beach harbor between July 15 and 20 and to remain at Pier No. 2 until after the Olympic Games have closed. The Port Security Committee will approve the entry of the vessel before and after the Games to discharge passengers and cargo and pick them up again, but is strongly opposed to the ship's staying at the berth for the duration of the games. Their objections are based on problems of ensuring the security of the ship while in port

[REDACTED]

Olympic Attache: The Soviets have requested accreditation of an attache with diplomatic status with access to Olympic facilities and to air transportation to San Francisco and Washington without the normal travel notifications required by the State Department.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS F95-074 #11

By *[Signature]*, NARA, Date 11/16/99

Procedural: The Soviets are pressing LAOC to provide answers to these requests. Most of them, however, are properly under the jurisdiction of USG agencies.

Timing: As regards permission to Aeroflot, it is important not to convey a favorable decision before the KAL-related resolutions in ICAO have run their course.

Discussion

1. Aeroflot: It is generally agreed that we should allow flights to carry the Soviet "Olympic family" on routes and under conditions as prescribed by the FAA to avoid exposure of sensitive U.S. installations. It is also agreed that Aeroflot should not be given intermediate landing rights in New York or Washington, or be allowed to transport nationals of third countries. Opinion is divided as to whether Aeroflot should be allowed to transport Soviet "spectators": it could be held that this is not strictly essential to participation in the Olympics, but Embassy Moscow has pointed out the practical difficulty of distinguishing between members of the Olympic family and "spectators" and recommends that we not attempt to draw the distinction. I personally concur with this view.

2. Ship call: We must recognize that the Soviets may well make a major issue over this, since it is probably very important to them, in terms of providing support to and control over their large team and officials [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] However, I believe we will be on strong ground in denying the request to stay if we do not grant a comparable privilege to another country.

According to the Port Security Committee, all such requests have either been deflected or turned down. If we can hold to this position, we can argue with the Soviets that our decision is not discriminatory.

3. Attache: This should be decided, to the degree our security permits, on a non-discriminatory basis. That is, if Olympic Attaches with diplomatic status are granted to other countries, we cannot defend a decision to treat the Soviets differently. The FBI, of course, should be alerted to the situation so that it can provide appropriate surveillance.

4. Procedures and timing: State recommends strongly that the Soviets be instructed to make their specific requests through normal diplomatic channels--that is, through the State Department (TAB IV). This is appropriate, and could be used to solve the problem of timing. Since the ICAO actions should have been taken in a few weeks, a request to State for approval of the Aeroflot flights could simply be held until the timing is right.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

That you recommend to the President:

1. That the Olympic Games in Los Angeles be treated as a special event, for which every effort should be made to treat the Soviets on a non-discriminatory basis, unless overriding interests of national security require special arrangements.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

2. That Aeroflot be allowed to operate special flights to support their Olympic team, but without the right to transport third-country nationals or to land at intermediate stops in the U.S.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

3. That the Soviet ship be allowed to enter Long Beach Harbor before and after the Olympics, but not to remain at the pier during the Games, unless such privilege is granted other countries.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

4. That LAOC be instructed to ask the Soviets to submit their requests through normal diplomatic channels.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

A memorandum to the President incorporating these points is attached at TAB I for your approval.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Richard Levine ^{RL (Myers)} concurs.

Attachments:

Tab I - Memorandum to the President
Tab II - Moorhead-McManus Memorandum with Soviet requests
Tab III - Letter of January 27, 1984, from Capt. Peebles
Tab IV - Derwinski-Deaver Memorandum

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THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 3-5 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

27 JAN 1984

SECRETDIA INPUT

Extracts from: Intelligence Operations of the Warsaw Pact Civilian Fleets (U) DDB-1700-47-83-SAO

(C/NOFORN/WNINTEL) SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE (SIGINT):

Soviet SIGINT collection priorities are:

- U.S. Navy Tactical Data System (NTDS) transmissions.
- Clear-test U.S. Navy teletype and manual morse transmissions regarding ship movement. Desired data includes time of departure, time of arrival, destination, mission and the identity of the ships involved.
- U.S. Navy radiotelephone communications.
- Any other transmissions of a military nature, including non-U.S.

(C) VISUAL INTELLIGENCE (VISINT):

In addition to their standing requirements, Soviet civilian ships are subject to both term and ad hoc VISINT collected tasking. Term tasking is often levied on civilian ships to provide enhanced observation of major US/NATO exercises. Ad hoc tasking usually results from a civilian ship being in a better location to provide timely coverage of a warship or event than any available military asset.

(C) PHOTOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE (PHOINT):

PHOINT analysis techniques range from looking at the photos for information of intelligence value to precisely measuring parts of the image (photogrammetry) to determine exact sizes or size relationships.

(S/NOFORN) HUMAN INTELLIGENCE (HUMINT):

- HUMINT resources abroad can have either legal or illegal status.
- Visits by merchant and other civilian ships to foreign ports provide an excellent opportunity for HUMINT operations.
- HUMINT activities by Warsaw Pact civilian ships include servicing of illegals.
- The civilian fleets are employed for infiltrating illegals into target countries.
- Warsaw Pact shipping company representative offices in foreign countries are commonly used as legal cover for HUMINT operations.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F95-074 #13BY CAS, NARA, DATE 7/10/01**SECRET**

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THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 35 LISTED ON THE
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THE COUNSELOR
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 23, 1984

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
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MICHAEL K. DEAVER,
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Soviet Olympic-Related Charter Flight and Port Call
Requests

Soviet sports authorities are attempting to use the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee (LAOOC) as a conduit for pressing certain demands on the US Government. We are particularly concerned that they are trying to use that channel to circumvent established procedures for the clearance of Soviet charter flights and port calls by Soviet passenger ships. These procedures have been developed to ensure that all interested USG agencies are consulted on such clearance requests, so that, in addition to commercial factors, policy, national security and intelligence factors are taken into consideration. A basic element in these procedures is that clearance requests must be in government-to-government channels, in the form of written communication either between the Soviet Embassy and the Department's Office of Soviet Union Affairs or between the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the US Embassy in Moscow. Use of these channels, with which the Soviets are quite familiar, ensures that all necessary information is transmitted and reduces the potential for confusion and delay.

The Department will accept only those Soviet clearance requests that are submitted in these official channels; it will not accept requests submitted through LAOOC. I would appreciate it if you reminded LAOOC that such requests are properly government-to-government matters and that it should decline to act as a middleman for the Soviets on them. We have reminded the Soviet Embassy at the working level that we will require the same formal requests for clearance of Olympic-related charter flights and port calls as for any other flights or calls.

I also call to your attention the memorandum of December 10 from Mr. McFarlane to the Secretary of State indicating that consideration of Soviet Olympic-related flights would be deferred until about January 15.


Edward J. Derwinski

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee

Los Angeles, California 90084 USA
Telephone (213) 209-1984
Telex 194694 • (Int'l) 4720482



Reply To:
1015 15th Street, N.W.
Suite 905
Washington, D.C. 20005
Telephone (202) 682-1984

December 16, 1983

MEMO TO: MICHAEL A. MCMANUS, JR.
FROM: JAY MOORHEAD 
SUBJECT: BACKGROUND FOR SOVIET REQUESTS

Per your request, the LAOOC asks that the White House take the following factors into consideration while making decisions on the Soviet requests:

1. The Soviet requests should be viewed as consistent with the Olympic Charter. Any country making a similar request to the U.S. government should be handled in the same way as the Soviet request.
2. U.S. policy regarding the Olympics (including the Olympic Family) and U.S. State Department policy regarding the Soviets, should be viewed as two distinct policies.
3. The Administration must take into consideration that any policy restricting the Soviet ship and airplanes will create a negative environment for the LAOOC and the U.S. government, creating the possibility of an Eastern Bloc boycott.
4. The Soviets are fully prepared to abide by all existing U.S. laws regarding the entry of their passenger and cargo ship -- including subjecting the vessel to inspection by the U.S. Customs Service and appropriate U.S. government agencies.
5. We support the Soviet requests, but suggest that the U.S. government put conditions on the request for docking the ship. For example, subject the ship to periodic inspections, in order to satisfy the objections that may be raised by the U.S. government agencies.

6. Since, the Soviet Olympic delegation may number over 1,000 plus, large amounts of cargo including horses, yachts, rowing shells, canoes, sports equipment and other logistical support materiel, it has been customary for the Soviet NOC to make similar requests at previous Olympic games where seaports were available. Given the distance and economics involved these requests reflect their typical preparation to participate in the Games. The requests therefore will be viewed in the Soviet Union and other nations as a test of U.S. willingness to abide by the Olympic Charter and facilitate the logistical support of foreign Olympic teams.

QUESTIONS OF THE SOVIET OLYMPIC COMMITTEE
WITH REGARD OF TRANSPORTATION OF THE SOVIET
OLYMPIC TEAM TO LOS ANGELES ON AEROFLOT FLIGHTS
TO THE LAOOC

- 1) Official confirmation for permission to use the Aeroflot Charter flights to transport the Soviet Olympic Delegation. It is planned to fly up to 25 round trips on the aircraft IL-62M and 2-3 round trips on aircraft IL-76T: Sports inventory and other belongings (Possibly horses). Anticipated start: July 1-10th, possible ending: August 15-30th, 1984. Aircraft load: 100-160 passengers.
- 2) Confirmation of agreement on flight route Moscow-Shannon-Havanna-Los Angeles and return.
- 3) Order of formalizing flights on definite dates, through Diplomatic channels, through the LAOOC, CAB, local Traffic Control.
- 4) Recommendations from American officials for commercial and technical servicing of Aeroflot flights including supply of fuel. Identifying servicing carrier and fuel-supply co. at main and auxiliary airports.
- 5) Permission for arrival to Los Angeles of 2 Aeroflot specialists (representative and engineer) in order to organize the arrival and service the flights.

It is anticipated that the specialists will arrive one month before the beginning of transportation operations, and will leave one month after their termination. Procedure for formalization of obtaining permissions.

- 6) Auxiliary airports on U.S. territory for Aeroflot aircraft. Characteristics of main and auxiliary airports. Estimate of navigation and landing taxes and fees. Any local requirements or landing rights. *which airports in an emergency?*
- 7) Obtaining visas for working crew members for flights to basic and auxiliary airports. Formalization of visas for 2-3 changing flight crews in Los Angeles as well as the possibility of their moving to auxiliary airports. Also visas for above mentioned specialists of Aeroflot, to basic and auxiliary airports.
- 8) Permission for Soviet and foreign passengers, Olympic participants and tourists to fly on Soviet planes. Possible permission to land in New York (Kennedy) and Washington (Dulles) airports to pick up and discharge same passengers.
- 9) Agreement on mutual recognition of flight documents between American carriers and Aeroflot for both individual passengers and cargo *fix, airway bills*
- 10) Permission for members of Olympic teams of other countries and tourists to fly on Aeroflot at their request.

- 11) Customs exemptions on spare parts on flights of Aeroflot, American or other carriers in case of need.
- 12) Accommodations for crew members and representatives as well as transportation between airports and hotels.
- 13) Provisions for security of Aeroflot aircrafts at basic and alternative airports.
- 14) Possibility of rental cars for Aeroflot personnel. Hiring of some local help (1 or 2) for temporary employment.

Tr LG/PFL
12/2/83

City of Los Angeles
" " December 1983

MEMORANDUM

On the discussions between the representatives of the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee and the representatives of the National Olympic Committee of the USSR (a list of names of those participating is attached).

The Soviet side gave the following information: the National Olympic Committee of the USSR made the decision to deliver part of the sport inventory, equipment, specific national foods and non-alcoholic beverages as well as part of the Sports delegation on board of the Soviet passenger ship "Gruzia" (Black Sea Shipping Company) rented by the Committee. The ship's size is as follows:

Length	-	156.18 meters
Width	-	21.82 meters
Depth	-	5.9 meters

Capacity 480 passengers berths; cargo space in the horizontal method of loading and unloading has 2 circumferences of 5400 cubic meters. The ship has three access ramps: at the bow, at the stern, and one on the right side.

The ship plans to arrive in port on July 15-20 and to remain there until the closing of the Olympic Games.

During the time the ship is docked, a portion of the above listed property will be stored, part of the sporting delegation will reside aboard ship, the ship will be used as a place for the Soviet delegation to conduct cultural entertainment, rest and recreation for part of the athletes.

In connection with this, the Soviet side has asked to examine and decide the following question connected with the stay of the ship in port:

- 1) The Port Authority of Long Beach, on the basis on the inquiry of the agency of the Soviet ship company "W. Diamond," agreed to grant a place at Pier #2 for the docking of "Gruzia" for the specified time. The Soviet side would like to receive confirmation from the Organizing Committee and the Port Authority of Long Beach that they do not require any additional agreements with the Government of the USA for entering and docking the ship, and that this place of docking will be retained for the ship for the whole time of her stay in the port, i.e. from July 15-20 to August 15th, 1984.
- 2) Conforming with the recommendations of the authorities of the Port of Long Beach and the Organizing Committee, it is necessary to take effective measures for the protection of the ship during the period of its mooring.

The Soviet side feels it is necessary to have guarantees that the LAOOC, the authorities of the port, and other organizations will take all necessary measures required from them to ensure the security of the ship at dock in agreement with corresponding international and local practices and will indicate the necessary security measures which the master of the ship must undertake with their assistance.

- 3) During the ship's mooring, the crew, passengers (part of the delegation), some athletes participating in the cultural events and in recreation, and the cargo will be on board. The ship will be visited by guests of the master and of the Head of the delegation. The Soviet side requests the acceptance by U.S. Officials that the following individuals have the authority to approve entry to the ship while in port:

- The Master of the Ship
- The Head of Delegation
- The Olympic Attache

The above-mentioned persons in agreement with U.S. authorities will establish three kinds of passes:

- a) For members of the crew
- b) For those living on ship
- c) For short time visitors

These passes will be issued by the Soviet side; these passes will be the basis for unimpeded passage onto the ship and from her.

The Soviet side would like confirmation that the above mentioned cargo located on board, may be loaded and unloaded without impediment and delivered to places of usage.

The ship will be supplied without any impediment with all necessary items: food, water, fuel etc. for its normal operation.

- 4) In view of the long distance between the USSR and the USA, the difference in time, the different languages, large number of members of the Soviet delegation, the Soviet side requests permission for operating the ship's radio station in its transmitting range.
- 5) Taking into consideration the length of the stay of the Soviet ship in the port and the necessity of solving many questions, the Soviet side feels it is expedient to have the representative Morflot USSR present in port during the length of this stay.

The American side having considered the above questions replies as follows:

STATUS OF THE OLYMPIC ATTACHE

- 1) Diplomat with diplomatic passport and diplomatic visa (A-1), Diplomatic tagplates for a car.
- 2) Free admission to all Olympic facilities (villages, sport sites, etc) without the regular notification required of Soviet Diplomatic and Consular officials.
- 3) Free admission to international airport for flights to San Francisco and Washington D.C. twice a month.
- 4) Free admission to shortest highway between Los Angeles and San Francisco.
- 5) Free admission to the airport to meet Soviet delegations.
- 6) Free admission to the Soviet ship in the port of Los Angeles.

~~SECRET~~
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

8677

December 10, 1983

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
The Secretary of State

SUBJECT: Visit of Soviet Olympic Delegation (U)

In light of the ongoing nature of the International Civil Aviation Organization investigation of KAL flight 007, USG consideration of Soviet Aeroflot flights into the United States to carry the Soviet "Olympic family" to the Olympics will be postponed until about January 15, 1984. At this time, recommendations concerning this issue should be forwarded to the NSC for consideration by the President. Consideration of Soviet commercial vessel port calls to the Long Beach Port should await the receipt of a formal Soviet request. (S)


Robert C. McFarlane

cc: Honorable Elizabeth H. Dole
The Secretary of Transportation

Honorable J. Lynn Helms
Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration

Honorable Michael Deaver
Deputy Chief of Staff to the President

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DRAFT

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 24, 1984

SUBJECT: Special Aeroflot Flights

In support of its participation at the 1984 Olympic Games in Los Angeles, the Soviet Union has requested that permission be granted for special Aeroflot flights to the United States.

The basic request is reasonable, however, the Soviets have stipulated that the flights should not only be allowed to land in Los Angeles, but also in New York and Washington, D.C. as well. The Soviets would like authorization to transport all Soviet, Eastern Bloc, or any other country's citizens as they deem fit. This would include a vast array of athletes, Olympic officials, and ordinary tourists. This would seem to evolve into something close to a commercial venture.

A more acceptable approach would be to limit the landing rights to the Los Angeles area, and permit as passengers only those Soviet citizens that are represented under the "Internationally Protected Persons" statute ie, athletes, coaches, trainers, Olympic officials, and their families.

Due to their sensitivity, if granted, these special Aeroflot landing rights should not be announced until after resolution of the conference on civil aviation in Montreal is concluded.

Recommendation: Aeroflot flights in support of Soviet Olympic participation be limited to landings in Los Angeles and passengers on these flights be restricted to Soviet citizens as indicated by the "Internationally Protected Persons" status.

File: Olympics folder

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT



PAGE 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 0464
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EXDIS
FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY DAM FROM ART HARTMAN
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: SCUL, PREL, UR, US
SUBJECT: USG ATTITUDES TOWARD SOVIET OLYMPIC
- PARTICIPATION

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. WITH ONLY ABOUT SIX MONTHS REMAINING BEFORE THE OLYMPIC FLAME IS LIT ABOVE THE LOS ANGELES COLISEUM, I FEEL IT IS IMPORTANT TO MEASURE OUR ROLE AS HOST OF THE 1984 GAMES AGAINST THE CURRENT STATE OF BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. THE FACT THAT THESE GAMES ARE BEING ORGANIZED PRIVATELY SHOULD NOT OBSCURE THE FACT THAT THE WORLD RIGHTLY ATTACHES GREAT SIGNIFICANCE TO THE ROLE OF THE USG AS THE HOST OF THE OLYMPICS. IF IT IS IN OUR NATIONAL INTEREST TO SHOW THAT WE CAN CARRY OUT THE ATTENDANT RESPONSIBILITIES CAPABLY AND SUCCESSFULLY -- AND IT MANIFESTLY IS -- THEN IT IS EQUALLY IN OUR INTEREST TO DEAL RESPONSIBLY AND IN TIMELY FASHION WITH THE QUESTION OF THE SOVIET UNION'S PARTICIPATION IN THE GAMES. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE SOVIET UNION COMPETE IN THE OLYMPICS, BOTH IN TERMS OF THE "OLYMPIC IDEAL" AND FROM THE STANDPOINT OF MAINTAINING THE CREDIBILITY OF OUR INTEREST IN STABLE RELATIONS WITH OUR RIVAL SUPERPOWER. I SEE NO ADVANTAGE IN SEEKING TO DISCOURAGE THE USSR FROM PARTICIPATING IN THE GAMES.

3. THE SOVIETS ARE NOT UNAWARE OF THE DYNAMICS OF THE SITUATION. WITH THE WOUNDS INFLICTED BY THE 1980 BOYCOTT STILL UNHEALED, THEY ARE HOLDING OPEN THEIR OPTIONS FOR AS LONG AS POSSIBLE AND NO DOUBT FEEL A CERTAIN MEASURE OF SATISFACTION AT THE ANXIETY AND UNCERTAINTY THEY ARE CREATING. NEVERTHELESS, IT IS OUR OPINION THAT THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES WANT THE USSR TO COMPETE IN LOS ANGELES. IN THE EXISTING CLIMATE, A BOYCOTT WOULD DO THEM MORE HARM THAN GOOD IN TERMS OF INTERNATIONAL IMAGE AND PRESTIGE (WHICH IS, OF COURSE, THEIR OVERRIDING CONCERN).

4. THIS JUDGMENT COULD BE WRONG, HOWEVER, IF THE SOVIETS CAN MAKE A PLAUSIBLE CASE THAT THE USG IS DISCRIMINATING AGAINST THEM. WITH AN ANCHOR TO THE

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PAGE 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 0464

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WINDWARD, THEY ARE COLLECTING ALLEGED GRIEVANCES (LACK OF ADEQUATE SECURITY, DENIAL OF ACCESS) FOR USE IN CASE THEIR PERCEPTION OF THE STATE OF BILATERAL RELATIONS COMPELS THEM TO PULL OUT. THEY HAVE ALREADY CITED SUCH ARGUMENTS AS JUSTIFICATION FOR THEIR RELUCTANCE TO MAKE FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS FOR HOTEL SPACE IN LOS ANGELES.

5. WHILE THE POLITICAL AND SECURITY ISSUES INVOLVED ARE UNDENIABLY COMPLEX, AND THE STATE OF RELATIONS TROUBLED, WE WOULD DO WELL TO BEAR IN MIND A FUNDAMENTAL PREMISE THAT SHOULD SHAPE OUR ATTITUDE TOWARD SOVIET PARTICIPATION IN THE GAMES: WE HAVE CHOSEN TO HOST AN INTERNATIONAL EVENT AND IN SO DOING HAVE ASSUMED CERTAIN RESPONSIBILITIES. THESE RESPONSIBILITIES EXTEND EQUALLY TOWARD THOSE COUNTRIES -- LIKE THE SOVIET UNION -- WITH WHOM WE HAVE LEGITIMATE AND SUBSTANTIVE GRIEVANCES. AN OLYMPIAD IS AN INAPPROPRIATE FORUM TO SEEK TO REDRESS BILATERAL DISAGREEMENT, MAINLY BECAUSE TAKING ON THE WORLD SPORT COMMUNITY IS A POLITICAL NO-WIN SITUATION. I ALSO DOUBT THAT TAKING ON THE STATE AND PEOPLE OF CALIFORNIA IS A HAPPY PROSPECT.

6. THE PRINCIPLE OF RECIPROCITY, BUILT INTO FORMAL AGREEMENTS WITH THE USSR AND A GUIDING FORCE IN OUR APPROACH TO BILATERAL RELATIONS, HAS YIELDED SOME TANGIBLE RESULTS. TO PUT IT BLUNTLY, RECIPROCITY IS A VALUABLE TOOL WHEN IT CAN BE USED TO EXTRACT CONCESSIONS OR TO FORCE THE SOVIETS TO MODIFY THEIR BEHAVIOR. HOWEVER, MANY OF OUR STANDARD PROCEDURES FOR DEALING WITH THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH ARE FOUNDED IN RECIPROCITY, ARE INAPPLICABLE IN THE EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE OLYMPIC GAMES.

7. A GOOD ILLUSTRATION OF THIS POINT IS PROVIDED BY THE QUESTION OF OPEN AND CLOSED AREAS IN AND AROUND LOS ANGELES. THE SOVIET MEDIA ARE ALREADY FULL OF MISLEADING REPORTS ON HOW THE "U. S. STATE DEPARTMENT" WILL DENY SOVIET ACCESS TO SOME EVENTS DURING THE GAMES. WHILE IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT WE CANNOT RESTRICT MEMBERS OF THE SOVIET "OLYMPIC FAMILY" (ATHLETES, COACHES, AND OTHER TEAM OFFICIALS), WE MUST ALSO DEVELOP A JUSTIFI-
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EXDIS
FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY DAM FROM ART HARTMAN
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: SCUL, PREL, UR, US
SUBJECT: USG ATTITUDES TOWARD SOVIET OLYMPIC
ABLE POLICY TO COVER SOVIET SPECTATORS, AS WELL AS
JOURNALISTS, DIPLOMATS, AND OTHER "OFFICIAL STATUS"
SOVIET CITIZENS. EXCEPT IN RARE CASES OF MAJOR
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CONCERNS, OUR POLICY ON CLOSED
AREAS IN THE U.S. HAS BEEN TO GRANT EXCEPTIONS WHEN
IT SUITS OUR PUBLIC INTERESTS. IMPOSING TIGHT RE-
STRICTIONS ON OLYMPICS-RELATED INDIVIDUALS WILL
CERTAINLY NOT ENCOURAGE A MODIFICATION OF SOVIET
POLICIES HERE, AND RISKS HANDING THE SOVIETS A DE-
FENSIBLE EXCUSE FOR REFUSING TO TAKE PART IN THE GAMES.
THE RESULT WILL BE MORE DISTORTED PROPAGANDA THAT WE
CANNOT EASILY REBUT.

8. AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, WE SHOULD CONSIDER
HOW AEROFLOT OLYMPIC CHARTER FLIGHTS COULD BE
DIVORCED FROM THE POST-KAL SANCTIONS. ASSUMING
WE AGREE TO MAKE AN EXCEPTION TO OUR AEROFLOT BOYCOTT
-- AND WE WILL CERTAINLY BE UNDER STRONG PRESSURE TO
LET SOME FLIGHTS IN -- THEN IT MAKES LITTLE SENSE TO
STAND ON A DUBIOUS PRINCIPLE IN DECIDING THAT OLYMPIC
FAMILY MEMBERS MAY BE ON BOARD BUT SPECTATORS MAY
NOT. SUCH DISTINCTIONS WOULD BE LOST NOT ONLY ON THE
SOVIETS BUT ON OUR FRIENDS AS WELL. WE STAND TO LOSE
A GREAT DEAL BY DESCENDING TO THE LEVEL OF PETTINESS
WHICH WE CONSISTENTLY DERIDE THE SOVIETS FOR EXHIBITING.
MOREOVER, A GENEROUS ATTITUDE ON OLYMPIC FLIGHTS WILL
MAKE THE DENIAL OF REGULAR COMMERCIAL SERVICE ALL THE
MORE TELLING AS A SANCTION WITH TEETH, WORTH SOMETHING
IF WE BEGIN BARGAINING FOR BETTER RELATIONS IN THE
FUTURE.

9. WE ARE NOT ARGUING FOR 'MAGNANIMITY' TOWARDS
THE SOVIET UNION, BUT ONLY FOR A POLICY THAT ADVANCES
OUR OWN INTERESTS AND AVOIDS PLAYING INTO SOVIET
HANDS. WE NEED TO WORK AT DEFLECTING THE SERIOUS
RISK WE COURT IN APPLYING A PRACTICED SET OF RESPONSES
TO A SITUATION WHICH IS UNIQUE AND CALLS FOR SOME
INNOVATIVE AND REASONABLE APPROACHES.

10. IN SUM, OUR POSTURE TOWARDS SOVIET PARTICIPATION

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PAGE 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 0464

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IN THE OLYMPICS SHOULD REFLECT OUR ROLE AS AN INTER-
NATIONAL HOST AND NOT THE STATE OF BILATERAL RELATIONS
OR OUR DISSATISFACTION WITH SOVIET BEHAVIOR IN A
VARIETY OF SPHERES. FROM THE STANDPOINT OF HOST,
WE SHOULD ACCORD THE SOVIET UNION THE SAME TREATMENT
AS WE WOULD OTHER PARTICIPANTS IN THE GAMES AND NOT
GIVE THEM GROUNDS FOR FURTHER COMPLAINTS OR QUIBBLING
AT OUR EXPENSE. THE ONUS FOR DECIDING WHETHER OR NOT
TO PARTICIPATE IN THE GAMES SHOULD BE SQUARELY ON
THE SOVIET BACK.
HARTMAN
BT

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Allen



"Fin," 1983, acrylic on canvas by Steven Cushner

I show Space

shopping center which ght on yet, it boasts a steel courtyard with hat look like bunkers and worthy of Leavenworth. with the blessing of Rob, a developer who center last fall, Miss is filled it with the mus-eat art that has been her since she became an art over a year ago.

page 2B

DIANA HEARS

THE RACE IS STRANGE, BUT THE BANNER IS FAMILIAR . . . A big stir among Democratic neighbors of Sen. Jesse Helms' home offices in Raleigh, North Carolina. Out of the blue, a steady stream of eager black voters began to trickle into Helms Headquarters. The sudden influx puzzled both Helmsers and fans of Governor Jim Hunt, the beloved-of-the-blacks Demo who plans to snatch Helms' Senate seat. Finally, both sides figured it out: The new fans were picking up campaign buttons that had been made by the thousand for the State Fair season. Each was simply emblazoned: "JESSE IN '84." And they have all now been retired.

DON'T JUDGE A PRESIDENT 'TIL YOU'VE HOPPED HALF A MILE IN HIS SHOE . . . Something new afoot. Locals will throng the Maison Blanche muncherie in a week or so for a "Shoes of the American Presidents" exhibit and soiree, tossed by the Johnson & Murphy Shoe Company. The Divine are invited to gaze at James Monroe's footwear — your basic buckled black; Abe Lincoln's ankle-length lace-up; Ulysses S. Grant's high-buttoned shoe; and Chester Arthur and James Garfield's ho-hum hoofwear. There is only shoe from each pair, which makes Ear wonder. Revellers will include the man who has shod Richard Nixon, Frank Sinatra and Liberace. The Johnson & Murphy folks tell Ear that the show "just looks like a lot of old shoes." Heavens. What doesn't, these weary days? We must grab our excitement where we can, darlings. Stick right here.

FUN AT THE FEEDBAG . . . And the Reagans' Old California Crowd poured into town for the State of the Union. Yesterday, Nancy whisked all her girl-friends off to the Jockey Club for a lunch of burgers and beans. (Of course, at the J.C. you dub it *Le Chop-Steak et Haricots Verts*, and pay through *le nez*.) In Nancy's merry party: Bunny Wrather, Mary Jane Wick, Mesdames Bill Wilson and Berlene Sprague, Marion Jorgenson — she's just jumping aboard the

mass-produced robots like the RB5X have a sense of touch and can be programmed to perform household chores.

KenCen Board — and Jean Smith, mate of the freshly-quit Attorney Gen. Tons and tons to talk about. Let's hope they'll all put on some weight, poor darlings.

PASS THE DILLED MEAT BALLS . . . Flash from our ace genealogist "John Earl Kendal:" Countess "Netta" Bonde, with whom Jack Kent Cooke super-bowled, is precisely a seventh cousin of count Wilhelm Wachtmeister, the Swedish Ambassador. You may not care, darlings, but History will.

OKAY, THAT'S TWO GOLD MEDALS IN DEFECTION ARTS AND A BRONZE IN SILICON VALLEY SNOOPING . . . Meanwhile, everyone's being most unsporting about the Spying Events at the Olympic Games. All official US biggies bound for Sarajevo early next month have been warned to steer clear of Commies on the prowl for Inside Info. Closer to home, the thought of about 5,000 Soviets tramping around Los Angeles in late July for the Summer Games has everyone ajitter. Rep. Phil Crane's pushing a House bill to force the Soviets to bow out altogether; his Republican Study Committee's racing 'round collecting signatures for a stinging Letter to the Prez. The Young Republicans are flinging a fit about the 25 planes Aeroflot wants to send over here, seeing Aeroflot's officially banned in the wake of the KAL shoot-down. The Russians are furioso that everyone says the only reason they need 5,000 people is so they can all stop each other from defecting; and some of the Right here is agitating to set up special defecting centers, to give the keen a sporting chance. To add to the uproar, a group of 90 organizations called the Ban The Soviets Coalition — it's led by "In Search of Noah's Ark" author Dave Bal-siger, and chaired by the late Rep. Larry MacDonald's 23-year-old son, Trigue — is hurling all the blame for everything at poor Michael Deaver, who's the White House Liaison to the Olympics. "Already, the Main Event looks like Mud-Slinging," sighs one sport. But tons more tomorrow.

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27 JAN 1984

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Extracts from: Intelligence Operations of the Warsaw Pact Civilian Fleets (U): DDB-1700-47-83-SAO

(C/NOFORN/NNINTEL) SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE (SIGINT):

Soviet SIGINT collection priorities are:

- U.S. Navy Tactical Data System (NTDS) transmissions.
- Clear-test U.S. Navy teletype and manual morse transmissions regarding ship movement. Desired data includes time of departure, time of arrival, destination, mission and the identity of the ships involved.
- U.S. Navy radiotelephone communications.
- Any other transmissions of a military nature, including non-U.S.

(C) VISUAL INTELLIGENCE (VISINT):

In addition to their standing requirements, Soviet civilian ships are subject to both term and ad hoc VISINT collected tasking. Term tasking is often levied on civilian ships to provide enhanced observation of major US/NATO exercises. Ad hoc tasking usually results from a civilian ship being in a better location to provide timely coverage of a warship or event than any available military asset.

(C) PHOTOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE (PHOINT):

PHOINT analysis techniques range from looking at the photos for information of intelligence value to precisely measuring parts of the image (photogrammetry) to determine exact sizes or size relationships.

(S/NOFORN) HUMAN INTELLIGENCE (HUMINT):

- HUMINT resources abroad can have either legal or illegal status.
- Visits by merchant and other civilian ships to foreign ports provide an excellent opportunity for HUMINT operations.
- HUMINT activities by Warsaw Pact civilian ships include servicing of illegals.
- The civilian fleets are employed for infiltrating illegals into target countries.
- Warsaw Pact shipping company representative offices in foreign countries are commonly used as legal cover for HUMINT operations.

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A



THE COUNSELOR
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 23, 1984

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MICHAEL K. DEEVER,
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Soviet Olympic-Related Charter Flight and Port Call
Requests

Soviet sports authorities are attempting to use the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee (LAOOC) as a conduit for pressing certain demands on the US Government. We are particularly concerned that they are trying to use that channel to circumvent established procedures for the clearance of Soviet charter flights and port calls by Soviet passenger ships. These procedures have been developed to ensure that all interested USG agencies are consulted on such clearance requests, so that, in addition to commercial factors, policy, national security and intelligence factors are taken into consideration. A basic element in these procedures is that clearance requests must be in government-to-government channels, in the form of written communication either between the Soviet Embassy and the Department's Office of Soviet Union Affairs or between the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the US Embassy in Moscow. Use of these channels, with which the Soviets are quite familiar, ensures that all necessary information is transmitted and reduces the potential for confusion and delay.

The Department will accept only those Soviet clearance requests that are submitted in these official channels; it will not accept requests submitted through LAOOC. I would appreciate it if you reminded LAOOC that such requests are properly government-to-government matters and that it should decline to act as a middleman for the Soviets on them. We have reminded the Soviet Embassy at the working level that we will require the same formal requests for clearance of Olympic-related charter flights and port calls as for any other flights or calls.

I also call to your attention the memorandum of December 10 from Mr. McFarlane to the Secretary of State indicating that consideration of Soviet Olympic-related flights would be deferred until about January 15.

Edward J. Derwinski

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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8677

December 10, 1983

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
The Secretary of State

SUBJECT: Visit of Soviet Olympic Delegation (U)

In light of the ongoing nature of the International Civil Aviation Organization investigation of KAL flight 007, USG consideration of Soviet Aeroflot flights into the United States to carry the Soviet "Olympic family" to the Olympics will be postponed until about January 15, 1984. At this time, recommendations concerning this issue should be forwarded to the NSC for consideration by the President. Consideration of Soviet commercial vessel port calls to the Long Beach Port should await the receipt of a formal Soviet request. (S)


Robert C. McFarlane

cc: Honorable Elizabeth H. Dole
The Secretary of Transportation

Honorable J. Lynn Helms
Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration

Honorable Michael Deaver
Deputy Chief of Staff to the President

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Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee

Los Angeles, California 90084 USA
Telephone (213) 209-1984
Telex: 194694 • (Int'l) 4720482



Reply To:
1015 15th Street, N.W.
Suite 905
Washington, D.C. 20005
Telephone (202) 682-1984

December 16, 1983

MEMO TO: MICHAEL A. MCMANUS, JR.
FROM: JAY MOORHEAD 
SUBJECT: BACKGROUND FOR SOVIET REQUESTS

Per your request, the LAOOC asks that the White House take the following factors into consideration while making decisions on the Soviet requests:

1. The Soviet requests should be viewed as consistent with the Olympic Charter. Any country making a similar request to the U.S. government should be handled in the same way as the Soviet request.
2. U.S. policy regarding the Olympics (including the Olympic Family) and U.S. State Department policy regarding the Soviets, should be viewed as two distinct policies.
3. The Administration must take into consideration that any policy restricting the Soviet ship and airplanes will create a negative environment for the LAOOC and the U.S. government, creating the possibility of an Eastern Bloc boycott.
4. The Soviets are fully prepared to abide by all existing U.S. laws regarding the entry of their passenger and cargo ship -- including subjecting the vessel to inspection by the U.S. Customs Service and appropriate U.S. government agencies.
5. We support the Soviet requests, but suggest that the U.S. government put conditions on the request for docking the ship. For example, subject the ship to periodic inspections, in order to satisfy the objections that may be raised by the U.S. government agencies.

6. Since, the Soviet Olympic delegation may number over 1,000 plus, large amounts of cargo including horses, yachts, rowing shells, canoes, sports equipment and other logistical support materiel, it has been customary for the Soviet NOC to make similar requests at previous Olympic games where seaports were available. Given the distance and economics involved these requests reflect their typical preparation to participate in the Games. The requests therefore will be viewed in the Soviet Union and other nations as a test of U.S. willingness to abide by the Olympic Charter and facilitate the logistical support of foreign Olympic teams.

QUESTIONS OF THE SOVIET OLYMPIC COMMITTEE
WITH REGARD OF TRANSPORTATION OF THE SOVIET
OLYMPIC TEAM TO LOS ANGELES ON AEROFLOT FLIGHTS
TO THE LAOOC

- 1) Official confirmation for permission to use the Aeroflot Charter flights to transport the Soviet Olympic Delegation. It is planned to fly up to 25 round trips on the aircraft IL-62M and 2-3 round trips on aircraft IL-76T: Sports inventory and other belongings (Possibly horses). Anticipated start: July 1-10th, possible ending: August 15-30th, 1984. Aircraft load: 100-160 passengers.
- 2) Confirmation of agreement on flight route Moscow-Shannon-Havanna-Los Angeles and return.
- 3) Order of formalizing flights on definite dates, through Diplomatic channels, through the LAOOC, CAB, local Traffic Control.
- 4) Recommendations from American officials for commercial and technical servicing of Aeroflot flights including supply of fuel. Identifying servicing carrier and fuel-supply co. at main and auxiliary airports.
- 5) Permission for arrival to Los Angeles of 2 Aeroflot specialists (representative and engineer) in order to organize the arrival and service the flights.

It is anticipated that the specialists will arrive one month before the beginning of transportation operations, and will leave one month after their termination. Procedure for formalization of obtaining permissions.

- 6) Auxiliary airports on U.S. territory for Aeroflot aircraft. Characteristics of main and auxiliary airports. Estimate of navigation and landing taxes and fees. Any local requirements or landing rights. *which airports in an emergency?*
- 7) Obtaining visas for working crew members for flights to basic and auxiliary airports. Formalization of visas for 2-3 changing flight crews in Los Angeles as well as the possibility of their moving to auxiliary airports. Also visas for above mentioned specialists of Aeroflot, to basic and auxiliary airports.
- 8) Permission for Soviet and foreign passengers, Olympic participants and tourists to fly on Soviet planes. Possible permission to land in New York (Kennedy) and Washington (Dulles) airports to pick up and discharge same passengers.
- 9) Agreement on mutual recognition of flight documents between American carriers and Aeroflot for both individual passengers and cargo. *fix, airway bills*
- 10) Permission for members of Olympic teams of other countries and tourists to fly on Aeroflot at their request.

- 11) Customs exemptions on spare parts on flights of Aeroflot, American or other carriers in case of need.
- 12) Accommodations for crew members and representatives as well as transportation between airports and hotels.
- 13) Provisions for security of Aeroflot aircrafts at basic and alternative airports.
- 14) Possibility of rental cars for Aeroflot personnel. Hiring of some local help (1 or 2) for temporary employment.

Tr LG/PFL
12/2/83

City of Los Angeles
" " December 1983

MEMORANDUM

On the discussions between the representatives of the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee and the representatives of the National Olympic Committee of the USSR (a list of names of those participating is attached).

The Soviet side gave the following information: the National Olympic Committee of the USSR made the decision to deliver part of the sport inventory, equipment, specific national foods and non-alcoholic beverages as well as part of the Sports delegation on board of the Soviet passenger ship "Gruzia" (Black Sea Shipping Company) rented by the Committee. The ship's size is as follows:

Length	-	156.18 meters
Width	-	21.82 meters
Depth	-	5.9 meters

Capacity 480 passengers berths; cargo space in the horizontal method of loading and unloading has 2 circumferences of 5400 cubic meters. The ship has three access ramps: at the bow, at the stern, and one on the right side.

The ship plans to arrive in port on July 15-20 and to remain there until the closing of the Olympic Games.

During the time the ship is docked, a portion of the above listed property will be stored, part of the sporting delegation will reside aboard ship, the ship will be used as a place for the Soviet delegation to conduct cultural entertainment, rest and recreation for part of the athletes.

In connection with this, the Soviet side has asked to examine and decide the following question connected with the stay of the ship in port:

- 1) The Port Authority of Long Beach, on the basis on the inquiry of the agency of the Soviet ship company "W. Diamond," agreed to grant a place at Pier #2 for the docking of "Gruzia" for the specified time. The Soviet side would like to receive confirmation from the Organizing Committee and the Port Authority of Long Beach that they do not require any additional agreements with the Government of the USA for entering and docking the ship, and that this place of docking will be retained for the ship for the whole time of her stay in the port, i.e. from July 15-20 to August 15th, 1984.
- 2) Conforming with the recommendations of the authorities of the Port of Long Beach and the Organizing Committee, it is necessary to take effective measures for the protection of the ship during the period of its mooring.

The Soviet side feels it is necessary to have guarantees that the LAOOC, the authorities of the port, and other organizations will take all necessary measures required from them to ensure the security of the ship at dock in agreement with corresponding international and local practices and will indicate the necessary security measures which the master of the ship must undertake with their assistance.

- 3) During the ship's mooring, the crew, passengers (part of the delegation), some athletes participating in the cultural events and in recreation, and the cargo will be on board. The ship will be visited by guests of the master and of the Head of the delegation. The Soviet side requests the acceptance by U.S. Officials that the following individuals have the authority to approve entry to the ship while in port:

- The Master of the Ship
- The Head of Delegation
- The Olympic Attache

The above-mentioned persons in agreement with U.S. authorities will establish three kinds of passes:

- a) For members of the crew
- b) For those living on ship
- c) For short time visitors

These passes will be issued by the Soviet side; these passes will be the basis for unimpeded passage onto the ship and from her.

The Soviet side would like confirmation that the above mentioned cargo located on board, may be loaded and unloaded without impediment and delivered to places of usage.

The ship will be supplied without any impediment with all necessary items: food, water, fuel etc. for its normal operation.

- 4) In view of the long distance between the USSR and the USA, the difference in time, the different languages, large number of members of the Soviet delegation, the Soviet side requests permission for operating the ship's radio station in its transmitting range.
- 5) Taking into consideration the length of the stay of the Soviet ship in the port and the necessity of solving many questions, the Soviet side feels it is expedient to have the representative Morflot USSR present in port during the length of this stay.

The American side having considered the above questions replies as follows:

STATUS OF THE OLYMPIC ATTACHE

- 1) Diplomat with diplomatic passport and diplomatic visa (A-1), Diplomatic tagplates for a car.
- 2) Free admission to all Olympic facilities (villages, sport sites, etc) without the regular notification required of Soviet Diplomatic and Consular officials.
- 3) Free admission to international airport for flights to San Francisco and Washington D.C. twice a month.
- 4) Free admission to shortest highway between Los Angeles and San Francisco.
- 5) Free admission to the airport to meet Soviet delegations.
- 6) Free admission to the Soviet ship in the port of Los Angeles.

~~SECRET~~
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 10, 1983

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
The Secretary of State

SUBJECT: Visit of Soviet Olympic Delegation (U)

In light of the ongoing nature of the International Civil Aviation Organization investigation of KAL flight 007, USG consideration of Soviet Aeroflot flights into the United States to carry the Soviet "Olympic family" to the Olympics will be postponed until about January 15, 1984. At this time, recommendations concerning this issue should be forwarded to the NSC for consideration by the President. Consideration of Soviet commercial vessel port calls to the Long Beach Port should await the receipt of a formal Soviet request. (S)

Robert C. McFarlane
Robert C. McFarlane

cc: Honorable Elizabeth H. Dole
The Secretary of Transportation

Honorable J. Lynn Helms
Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration

Honorable Michael Deaver
Deputy Chief of Staff to the President

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

US-USSR

~~MATROCK~~

8677

File
US-Sov
Olympics

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F95-074 #19

BY smf NARA, DATE 11/16/99

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

December 9, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

SIGNEDFROM: RICHARD LEVINE *RL*

SUBJECT: Visit of Soviet Olympic Delegation

State has written (TAB II) informing us of their plans to notify the Los Angeles Olympic Committee (LAOOC) and a visiting Soviet sports delegation of a USG decision to allow Aeroflot flights into the United States to carry only Soviet Olympic participants, not tourists, and to allow a Soviet vessel to disembark passengers at the Los Angeles/Long Beach port. The desire for this decision comes in the face of Soviet pressure for permission to dock a Soviet ship at Long Beach for the duration of the Games to serve as a "floating hotel," and for Aeroflot charter flights to be permitted to bring in Soviet spectators, as well as participants, to the Games. Because of port security concerns and the President's KAL decision, the original Soviet proposals were rejected by State and other concerned agencies.

In reviewing State's recommended position of allowing a Soviet vessel into Long Beach to disembark and pick up passengers, and Aeroflot charter flights for Soviets directly involved in the Olympics, we should bear in mind that we are under no obligation to let this particular vessel into this port. The interagency Port Security Committee, though, informs me that Soviet vessels have visited this port before and the intelligence concerns appear manageable. We should also realize that the President's KAL decision made no provision for accepting Aeroflot flights into the United States for the purpose of ferrying Soviet Olympic athletes. In both cases, if we follow State's recommendations, we would be bending established policies and procedures which, in fact, will serve Soviet interests. This would be done in the name of non-politicization of the Olympics.

Upon reviewing the State memo, through Bob Kimmitt, we informed State that they should not inform the LAOOC nor the Soviets of any USG plans concerning these issues until State gets a go-ahead from the White House. Throughout this past week, I have been coordinating on this issue with Lynn Helms and Don Segner of the FAA; Mike McManus; Edward Derwinski, Counselor to the Department of State; as well as Jack Matlock and John Poindexter. Through these many discussions has emerged a consensus course of action which all concerned parties agree to and which, most importantly, is the best avenue we could take on this matter.

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Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F95-074 * 80

BY *smf* NARA, DATE 11/16/99

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The recommended course of action is to delay any Administration consideration of the Aeroflot overflight issue until about January 15. Currently, Lynn Helms is fighting to get a positive report out of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) concerning the KAL incident. If the USG were to now announce our intention to allow Aeroflot Olympic flights into the United States, this action would be viewed as an abdication of our position on KAL by the international aviation community. If we, however, reserve our decision on allowing Aeroflot planes in for the Olympics, Helms feels this will be a useful chip on our side in his ongoing struggles with ICAO. The ICAO report on KAL would be completed by January 15, hence the timetable.

Derwinski agrees to delaying the Aeroflot entry decision until late January, but he was concerned about possible backlash from LAOOC. Mike McManus informs me that this will not be a problem.

With regard to the Soviet vessel visit, Mike McManus has already done a good deal of work on this score. Since the ship visit does not involve the KAL component, it is a more clear-cut issue. McManus plans to ask that the Soviets formally submit a request for port entry at Long Beach for embarkation or disembarkation. McManus will not rush our approval of such requests, rather we will consider them as best fits our schedule. When the time for decision on the port visit comes, I believe the NSC should not disapprove the Soviet vessel visit.

John Poindexter and I agree that the Aeroflot issue should be a Presidential decision, but it should be made in light of any progress we experience through Lynn Helms at ICAO. I feel that the dynamics of this issue will ultimately show that it is in our interest to allow the Aeroflot flights. I have been in a number of discussions with the FAA concerning overflight security. If the Soviet planes are allowed into our air space, standard procedures will be put into place so that there can be no prospect of Soviet covert intelligence collection. Other security concerns will also be addressed, as they come up, by an interagency group.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to the agencies on this matter at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Jack Matlock concurs.

Attachments

TAB I Memo to State

TAB II Memo from State

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

(8677)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 30, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSESUBJECT: Visit of Soviet Olympic Delegation: Aeroflot Charter
Flights

A ten-member delegation from the USSR Sport and Olympic Committees will begin a two-week visit to the U.S. November 30, calling on the Olympic venues and facilities. Two members, including the Chairman of the USSR Sports Committee, will come to Washington at the end of the visit. The Soviet Embassy indicates they will want to call on the Department. If the Embassy requests a call, the Counselor, as the Department's Olympic Coordinator, has agreed to receive them.

The Soviets have been pressuring the LAOOC to obtain permission for a Soviet passenger ship to dock in Los Angeles/Long Beach harbor as a "floating hotel" during the Games, and for Aeroflot charter flights to bring Soviet Olympic participants and spectators to the U.S. The delegation, which includes the Chairman of the Soviet Pacific passenger vessel enterprise and a civil air official, will undoubtedly make these issues a major item in their discussions.

State and all concerned agencies, including Coast Guard representing the port security committee, are opposed to any port call by a Soviet vessel, passenger or otherwise, during the Olympics that would involve the vessel berthing in Los Angeles/Long Beach for an extended period of time. There are extremely sensitive military installations in the area which can be targeted from a ship in the harbor. We propose to inform the Soviets we would not oppose a Soviet passenger vessel making a routine port call to disembark Soviet passengers and then departing from the port, as this would be consistent with our current maritime policy.

In line with the already-established policy that politics should not be a factor in the Olympics, we believe that we should allow Aeroflot charter flights, but only to bring over members of the Soviet "Olympic family" (coaches, participants, Olympic officials) and not tourists.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F95-074 #21

BY smf, NARA, DATE 11/16/99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

We propose to tell LAOOC and the Soviets now that this basic decision has been made, i.e. we will honor our obligations as hosts of the 1984 Summer Olympics and permit a reasonable number of Aeroflot charter flights to bring in members of the Soviet "Olympic family," subject only to such U.S. civil aviation regulations as may be in effect for non-U.S. carriers at the time.

Bruckmiller
for Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
EO 12958, Sec. 2.4(h)
White H.

Date DEC 09 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

File:
US-USSR-
Olympics

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Visit of Soviet Olympic Delegation: Aeroflot Charter
Flights

A ten-member delegation from the USSR Sport and Olympic Committees will begin a two-week visit to the U.S. November 30, calling on the Olympic venues and facilities. Two members, including the Chairman of the USSR Sports Committee, will come to Washington at the end of the visit. The Soviet Embassy indicates they will want to call on the Department. If the Embassy requests a call, the Counselor, as the Department's Olympic Coordinator, has agreed to receive them.

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State and all concerned agencies, including Coast Guard representing the port security committee, are opposed to any port call by a Soviet vessel, passenger or otherwise, during the Olympics that would involve the vessel berthing in Los Angeles/Long Beach for an extended period of time. There are extremely sensitive military installations in the area which can be targeted from a ship in the harbor. We propose to inform the Soviets we would not oppose a Soviet passenger vessel making a routine port call to disembark Soviet passengers and then departing from the port, as this would be consistent with our current maritime policy.

In line with the already-established policy that politics should not be a factor in the Olympics, we believe that we should allow Aeroflot charter flights, but only to bring over members of the Soviet "Olympic family" (coaches, participants, Olympic officials) and not tourists. That would be analogous to what we are permitting for Poland. There will be numerous other requests for such flights from friendly, as well as not-so-friendly countries.

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DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F95-074 #22

BY amy NARA, DATE 11/16/99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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We propose to tell LAOOC and the Soviets now that this basic decision has been made, i.e. we will honor our obligations as hosts of the 1984 Summer Olympics and permit a reasonable number of Aeroflot charter flights to bring in members of the Soviet "Olympic family," subject only to such U.S. civil aviation regulations as may be in effect for non-U.S. carriers at the time.

Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Drafted:EUR/SOV:LJGoodrich:BBMorton:
C:SClark
x26442 11/28/83

Clearances:EUR:RBurt (subs)
EB/TT/MA:RRoberts (subs)
DOD:JHoover (subs)
FBI:DOgden (subs)
USSS:SHarrison (subs)
INR:DKux (subs)
NSC:Amb. Matlock

bcc: Mr. Deaver, White House
Mr. McManus, White House
Mr. Hill, White House
Amb. Matlock, NSC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~