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Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 5/17/2005

File Folder USSR: PARTY CONGRESS 26TH, 27TH 4/4 [26TH ONLY]

FOIA

F06-114/9

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3005

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
10561	CABLE	281327Z FEB 81 R 3/24/2011 F2006-114/9	4	2/28/1981	B1
10562	CABLE	021721Z MAR 81 R 3/24/2011 F2006-114/9	5	3/2/1981	B1
10564	CABLE	031420Z MAR 81 R 3/24/2011 F2006-114/9	3	3/3/1981	B1
10566	CABLE	041545Z MAR 81 R 3/24/2011 F2006-114/9	12	3/14/1981	B1
10567	PAPER	CURRENT REPORTS USSR P 11/17/2009 F06-114/9	1	3/4/1981	B1
10568	CABLE	050220Z MAR 81 R 3/24/2011 F2006-114/9	2	3/5/1981	B1
10569	PAPER	TRENDS IN THE USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE R 3/24/2011 F2006-114/9	29	3/9/1981	B1
10571	PAPER	EUROCOMMUNISM AT 26TH CPSU CONGRESS PAR 9/25/2012 F2006-114/9	6	3/19/1981	B3
10573	PAPER	26TH CPSU CONGRESS: DOMESTIC ASPECTS R 3/24/2011 F2006-114/9	1	3/31/1981	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
10559	PAPER	IMAGE OF UNITY <i>R 3/24/2011 F2006-114/9</i>	7	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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26th
Congress 10

2. 26TH PARTY CONGRESS: SUBDUED TREATMENT OF ECONOMIC GUIDELINES

Premier Tikhonov's Friday morning report on economic goals for the 1981-85 period revealed no major departures from the draft plan guidelines published in December. According to the TASS highlights of the speech, Tikhonov emphasized consumer welfare and social programs, but any improvements in these sectors are likely to be modest and selective.

* * *

Tikhonov's report was not broadcast or telecast, probably in deference to the handling of Brezhnev's speech on Monday. Whereas Brezhnev's speech was discussed for three-and-a-half days at the Congress, Tikhonov's probably will rate only one-and-a-half days of "debate". In any event, he had nothing new to say. By his account:

- heavy industry and energy development will remain priority goals in the next five years, with the building of gas lines to increase dramatically.
- the armed forces will continue to have "everything needed to counter imperialism's attempts to gain military superiority"; and
- the door was open for US-Soviet trade, but the American side was responsible for declining levels.

Although he admitted the existence of a large gap between purchasing power and available consumer goods, Tikhonov reiterated the regime's intentions to increase wages and maintain retail price stability, thus perpetuating inflationary pressures. He also revealed that the vaunted food and consumer goods programs designed to meet public demand were still only in the drafting stage.

Growing official concern over the low Slavic birth rate apparently dictated the new programs Tikhonov alluded to in speaking of better medical care for children and new state allowances for mothers and children. Although details have not been published, a Leningrad lecturer said recently that under the new programs, mothers would get a monthly stipend of 35 rubles per child in European Russian and 50 rubles beyond the Urals. The effect of this change is to extend benefits to Slavic women for the first time.

The programs also provide higher benefits for pensioners and war veterans (a large proportion of the total population) and increase minimum rural pensions to 40 rubles per month and urban pensions to 52 rubles, some even retroactively.

C/S 7/29/02

5

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

26th Congress

CURRENT REPORTS

March 4, 1981

1. USSR

A. 26th Party Congress Keeps All the Old Leaders

Brezhnev closed the Congress yesterday after announcing that the current membership of the Politburo and Secretariat had been confirmed in office without any changes, according to press reports.

INR Comment: The deliberate decision to keep on octogenarian Arvid Pelshe (82) and ailing Defense Minister Ustinov (72) reflects the regime's determination to sidestep the issue of leadership renewal once again--leaving that problem to geriatric attrition.

Just as leadership change was deferred, so were the many pressing economic problems facing the regime. The Congress merely retained current policies and priorities which hold little promise of solving industrial and agricultural shortcomings. (UNCLASSIFIED)

B. Party Officials Stress Urgent Need for Summit

At a March 3 press conference, Soviet Party spokesmen Leonid Zamyatin and Vadim Zagladin emphasized Brezhnev's summit proposal:

--Zagladin stressed that the pressure of the arms race and existing international conflicts "do not leave us much time for pondering." The Soviet Union, he declared, is "prepared to have a dialogue and to act quickly" in order to prevent the growth of "present conflicts into something...much more serious."

--Zamyatin argued that in view of the "acuteness" of the present international situation, "a dialogue is necessary now." He said that the Soviets expected that Washington would answer Brezhnev's proposal after study. (UNCLASSIFIED)

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INR Comment

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BY RW NARA DATE 11/17/09

~~TOP SECRET/BXDIS/COBWORD~~

26 m
Capers

Key Brezhnev Aides, Including Arbatov, Get High Party Jobs

By John Morrison
Reuter

MOSCOW, March 4 — Several relatives and key associates of Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev including Georgy Arbatov, the Kremlin's top adviser on U.S. affairs, have been moved up to the Communist Party Central Committee, according to lists published today in the party newspaper Pravda.

The elevation of Arbatov, who is director of the Institute of the U.S.A. and Canada, appears to dispel speculations in the West that Moscow was shifting its policy away from detente with the West and that the influence of relatively moderate personalities such as Arbatov was on a decline.

Brezhnev's son Yuri, first deputy foreign trade minister, became one of 151 candidate (nonvoting) members of the committee. Lt. Gen. Yuri Churbanov, Brezhnev's son-in-law and first deputy interior minister, was moved to the same level.

Brezhnev's position was further strengthened by the promotion of a senior personal aide, Andrei Alexandrov-Agentov, from candidate to full committee member while another aide, Anatoly Blatov, became a candidate member.

The Central Committee meets twice a year. The exact extent of its influence on Politburo policy is unknown, but it can play a crucial role if there is a leadership conflict.

Soviet diplomats who moved up to become full members of the Central Committee included First Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Korniyenko and Ambassador to India Yuri Vorontsov.

Moscow's representative at the European security review conference in Madrid, Deputy Foreign Minister Leonid Ilyichov, also became a candidate member in a rare political comeback. Ilyichov is a political veteran who was a party secretary for propaganda and ideology under Nikita Khrushchev but was demoted to deputy foreign minister after the fall of his patron in 1964.

Several senior officers from the armed forces moved into the Central Committee as full members, and at least three figures from the KGB security police were promoted to the same level.

They included First Deputy Chairman of the Committee for State Security, Gen. Semyon Tsvigun, the leading career security man under KGB Chairman Yuri Andropov, a party appointee.

Also promoted from candidate member to full member were KGB deputy chairmen Gen. Georgy Tsinez and Col. Gen. Viktor Chebrikov.

The new Central Committee list contained 81 full members joining the body for the first time but there were no real surprises.

Most of those removed from the committee were officials whose retirement or dismissal from party or government posts had been announced in the last five years.

They included Brezhnev's predecessor as head of state, Nikolai Podgorny, who lost his Politburo seat in 1977, and former Politburo members Kiril Mazurov and Dmitri Polyansky.

The Central Committee remains overwhelmingly a male preserve, with only eight women full members, the same number as elected by the 1976 congress. About 12 of the full members are workers or farmers, while the bulk of the seats go to senior party, government or military figures on an ex officio basis.

26th Congress
(West Europ. CPs)

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AMEMBASSY OSLO 0846
AMEMBASSY PARIS 9558
AMEMBASSY ROME 4959
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 1059
USMISSION USNATO 9294
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 2426
AMEMBASSY LISBON 0916

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 02898

USNATO ALSO FOR EUR/SOV DIRECTOR GERMAN
MADRID ALSO FOR USDEL CSCE
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 2/28/01 (MATLOCK, JACK F.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, UR, XT
SUBJECT: (C) SOVIET DIFFICULTIES WITH WESTERN EUROPEAN
COMMUNISTS AT THE XXVI PARTY CONGRESS

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~, ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: STRAINED RELATIONS BETWEEN THE CPSU AND
WESTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES ARE CONTINUING TO
HAUNT THE XXVI PARTY CONGRESS. THE ITALIAN CP DELEGATION
WAS REPORTEDLY NOT ALLOWED TO DELIVER ITS PREPARED
SPEECH, WHICH MENTIONED BOTH AFGHANISTAN AND POLAND,
IN THE MAIN CONGRESS HALL. THE SPANISH DELEGATION HAS
DEPARTED MOSCOW WITHOUT DELIVERY OF ANY SPEECH, AND THE
FR NCH CP DELEGATION IS REPORTEDLY IRRITATED BY THE
STRONG PRAISE OF GISCARD IN BREZHNEV'S ADDRESS. WHILE
THE SECONDARY EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES ARE GENERALLY
TOWING THE SOVIET LINE IN THEIR PUBLIC APPEARANCES,

*****~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~*****WHSR COMMENT*****

POS NOTE
EOB:AFRECON,EURE,EURW,EEUR,WEUR

PSN:020960 PAGE 01 TOR:059/14:01Z DTG:281327Z FEB 81

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THE REPORTS OF SOVIET DIFFICULTIES WITH THE "BIG THREE" PARTIES, TOGETHER WITH THE ABSENCES OF THEIR LEADERS, ARE TURNING INTO WHAT MAY BE A CONSIDERABLE SOURCE OF SOVIET EMBARRASSMENT AT THE CONGRESS. END SUMMARY.

3. THE HEAD OF THE ITALIAN CP DELEGATION, GIAN CARLO PAJETTA, DELIVERED HIS PREPARED ADDRESS TO THE XXVI PARTY CONGRESS AT A SPECIAL SIDE MEETING OF THE CONGRESS HELD FEBRUARY 27 AT THE HALL OF COLUMNS IN THE HOUSE OF TRADE UNIONS. GRISHIN WAS THE RANKING SOVIET PRESENT, AND SEVERAL SMALLER DELEGATIONS, INCLUDING THE VENEZUELAN AND ECUADORIANS, ALSO SPOKE. WITHOUT SPECIFICALLY MENTIONING THE SOVIET UNION, PAJETTA REPORTEDLY CALLED FOR THE REMOVAL OF ALL FOREIGN TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN AND SAID THAT THE AFGHAN PEOPLE SHOULD BE THE MASTERS OF THEIR OWN DESTINY. HE ALSO CALLED FOR RESPECT FOR THE AUTONOMY AND INDEPENDENCE OF POLAND. ACCORDING TO AN ITALIAN JOURNALIST WHO REPORTED THE ABOVE TO US, THERE IS SOME SPECULATION AS TO WHETHER THIS WAS NOT A PREARRANGED COMPROMISE WHICH ALLOWED THE ITALIANS TO MAKE THEIR STATEMENT BUT NOT DIRECTLY TO THE CONGRESS. ACCORDING TO THE ITALIAN EMBASSY, HOWEVER, PAJETTA HAD HOPED ORIGINALLY TO ADDRESS THE MAIN MEETING AND WAS REPEATEDLY PUT OFF BY THE SOVIETS. THE ITALIAN JOURNALIST ALSO TELLS US THAT PAJETTA WAS ASSURED THAT HIS REMARKS WOULD BE REPORTED UNCENSORED IN THE CENTRAL PRESS, ALTHOUGH THE FEBRUARY 28 PRAVDA REPORTS ONLY THE FACT THAT PAJETTA SPOKE AND GIVES NO PARTICULARS. WHILE IT MAY TAKE SOME TIME TO CONFIRM THE DETAILS OF THIS INCIDENT, THE FACT THAT THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE LARGEST WESTERN EUROPEAN CP COULD NOT ADDRESS THE CONGRESS DIRECTLY SPEAKS FOR ITSELF AND CANNOT HELP BUT LEAD TO EMBARRASSMENT FOR MOSCOW.

4. THE ABOVE IS COMPOUNDED BY REPORTS THAT THE SPANISH CP DELEGATION LEFT MOSCOW WITHOUT DELIVERING ITS SPEECH AND DOES NOT PLAN TO RETURN. ALTHOUGH THE ATTEMPTED COUP IN MADRID WAS REPORTEDLY THE REASON GIVEN FOR THE ABRUPT DEPARTURE, THERE IS OBVIOUS SPECULATION AS TO WHETHER THE SPANISH DID NOT USE THIS AS AN EXCUSE FOR AVOIDING THE DIFFICULTIES FACED BY THE ITALIANS. ALSO, THE FRENCH EMBASSY TELLS US THAT THE FRENCH CP DELEGATION IS PRIVATELY VERY UPSET WITH THE HIGH PRAISE OF GISCARD IN BREZHNEV'S CONGRESS REPORT. TO SOME IN DELEGATION, IT REPORTEDLY SEEMED ALMOST AS THOUGH THE SOVIETS HAD ALREADY CHOSEN THEIR PREFERRED PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE. COMPARED TO MANY OTHER SPEECHES, GASTON PLISSON'S ADDRESS TO THE CONGRESS DOWNPLAYED THE BREZHNEV SPEECH, REFERRING

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BRIEFLY TO THE NEW INITIATIVES MADE BY BREZHNEV BUT OTHERWISE FOCUSING ON THE FRENCH DOMESTIC SCENE.

5. WHILE MOST OF THE OTHER SPEAKERS FROM EUROPEAN PARTIES HAVE FAITHFULLY TOWED THE SOVIET LINE, THEIR REMARKS ARE LIKELY TO BE OVERSHADOWED BY THE WESTERN PRESS INTEREST IN SOVIET DIFFICULTIES WITH THE BIG THREE. PORTUGUESE CP LEADER CUNHAL PREDICTABLY DELIVERED A HARDLINE, PRO-SOVIET ORATION MOST NOTABLE FOR ITS DEFENSIVE POSTURE IN INSISTING THAT THE PORTUGUESE REVOLUTION IS NOT DEAD BUT ALIVE AND WELL. FINNISH CP
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 02898

USNATO ALSO FOR EUR/SOV DIRECTOR GERMAN
MADRID ALSO FOR USDEL CSCE
LEADER ARNE SAARINEN STRONGLY CRITICIZED THE U.S.
ADMINISTRATION FOR "POISONING THE INTERNATIONAL
ATMOSPHERE" AND STRESSED THE NEED FOR CONTINUED DETENTE.
FLORAKIS OF GREECE TOOK A SIMILAR ANTI-U.S. LINE AND
CALLED FOR ZONES OF PEACE IN THE BALKANS AND
MEDITERRANEAN. OTHER SPEAKERS FOLLOWED IN LINE PAYING
HOMAGE TO MOSCOW AND ECHOING THE BASIC SOVIET LINES.
MATLOCK
BT

26th Congress
(PCI)

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INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 2325
AMEMBASSY BONN 2555
AMEMBASSY LONDON 4978
AMEMBASSY MADRID 5128
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 9516
AMEMBASSY PARIS 0340
AMEMBASSY WARSAW 1350
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AMCONSUL FLORENCE 6122
AMCONSUL GENOA 5402
AMCONSUL MILAN 6853
AMCONSUL NAPLES 8737
AMCONSUL PALERMO 5392
AMCONSUL TRIESTE 3549

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 04707

DOCOSOUTH FOR POLAD
MADRID ALSO FOR USDEL CSCE
E.O. 12065: GDS 3/2/87 (GAWF, J.) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR UR IT
SUBJECT: PAJETTA'S ADDRESS TO THE XXVI CPSU PARTY
CONGRESS: A MUTED STATEMENT OF PCI VIEWS

1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: VIEWED FROM ROME, THE CONTENT OF PAJETTA'S SPEECH TO THE CPSU 26TH CONGRESS LOOKS ROUTINE AND DESIGNED TO BE RELATIVELY INOFFENSIVE TO THE SOVIETS. ON AFGHANISTAN PAJETTA CALLED FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION "LEADING TO" THE EXCLUSION OF FOREIGN TROOPS AND ON POLAND HE EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR THE RECENT ACTIONS OF THE POLISH PARTY AND GOVERNMENT, WHILE AVOIDING SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO SOLIDARNOSC OR THE ROLE OF THE CHURCH. HE

*****WHSR COMMENT*****

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CHARACTERIZED U.S. "EQUATION" OF TERRORISM WITH MOVEMENTS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION "ABSURD" AND SAID THE PCI WOULD RESPOND WITH "INCREASED SOLIDARITY" WITH "LIBERATION MOVEMENTS" IN EL SALVADOR AND ELSEWHERE. PAJETTA SAID BREZHNEV'S SPEECH HAD AROUSED "NEW HOPES OF PEACE", BUT OTHERWISE HIS PRAISE OF THE SOVIETS WAS LIMITED TO REFERENCES TO THE GREAT OCTOBER REVOLUTION AND TO THE SOVIET CONTRIBUTION TO THE DEFEAT OF FASCISM AND COLONIALISM. CONSPICUOUSLY ABSENT FROM PAETTA'S SPEECH ARE THE RITUAL PHRASES ABOUT "FRATERNAL RELATIONS" AND "SOLIDARITY" WHICH STILL CHARACTERIZED BERLINGUER'S ADDRESS TO THE 25TH PARTY CONGRESS. DISCUSSION OF IMPACT HERE OF EVENTS SURROUNDING DELIVERY AND PUBLICATION OF SPEECH IN MOSCOW FOLLOWS SEPTEL. END SUMMARY.

3. THE ENORMOUS AMOUNT OF ATTENTION RECEIVED HERE BY THE CPSU'S "HUMILIATING" TREATMENT OF THE HEAD OF THE PCI'S DELEGATION TO THE CPSU XXVI PARTY CONGRESS, GIANCARLO PAJETTA, HAS ALMOST COMPLETELY OBSCURED THE CONTENT OF THE SPEECH ITSELF. (WE NOTE THE FULL TEXT IS AVAILABLE TO THE DEPARTMENT IN FBIS TRANSLATION FROM A RADIO MOSCOW BROADCAST TO ITALY AND ITALIAN RADIO REPORTED THIS MORNING THAT PRAVDA HAD FINALLY PUBLISHED AN INTEGRAL TEXT.) FROM THE ROME PERSPECTIVE THE PAJETTA SPEECH CONTAINS NO MAJOR SURPRISES AND APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN DESIGNED TO GIVE THE SOVIETS AS LITTLE REASON TO TAKE UMBRAGE AS POSSIBLE WITHOUT EXPLICITLY ABANDONING WELL KNOWN PCI POSITIONS ON ISSUES IN WHICH THE TWO PARTIES HAVE ALREADY PUBLICLY CLASHED.

4. POLAND - PAJETTA'S CAUTIOUS APPROACH WAS MOST EVIDENT WITH REGARD TO HIS DISCUSSION OF THE POLISH SITUATION. (IN AN APPARENT ATTEMPT TO EMBARRASS OR PRESSURE PAJETTA, PANORAMA MAGAZINE HAD PUBLISHED EXCERPTS, APPARENTLY SPURIOUS, FROM THE TEXT WHICH PAJETTA IS SUPPOSED TO HAVE TAKEN TO MOSCOW, WHICH CONTAINED SOME OF THE MORE PROVOCATIVE LANGUAGE THE PCI HAS USED ON POLAND.) MISSING FROM PAJETTA'S BRIEF DISCUSSION OF POLAND WAS ANY DIRECT REFERENCE TO SOLIDARNOSC OR THE ROLE OF THE CHURCH, OR EVEN A DIRECT WARNING ABOUT FOREIGN INTERFERENCE. INSTEAD, PAJETTA ENDORSES THE CURRENT LINE OF THE PZPR, WHILE NOTING THAT IT MUST BE "GUARANTEED BY THE CONSENT AND PARTICIPATION OF THE POLISH PEOPLE - RESPECTING FULLY THE INDEPENDENCE AND AUTONOMY OF THE POLISH NATION," AND ADDING THAT IT MUST ASSURE "SOCIALIST DEVELOPMENT AND RENEWAL."

5. AFGHANISTAN AND "NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS" - AFTER THE RITUAL FORMULATION THAT THE VIEWS OF THE PCI ON AFGHANISTAN WERE "WELL KNOWN", PAJETTA CALLED FOR A

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"POLITICAL SOLUTION NEGOTIATED BY THE INTERESTED PARTIES, WHICH WOULD LEAD TO THE EXCLUSION OF FOREIGN INTERFERENCE AND ANY FOREIGN TROOP PRESENCE AND GUARANTEE AFGHANISTAN'S INDEPENDENCE AND NON-ALIGNMENT AND THE RIGHT OF ITS PEOPLE TO DECIDE ITS OWN DESTINY." SIGNIFICANTLY, THIS PASSAGE WAS FOLLOWED BY A SHARP REJECTION OF THE "ABSURD" U.S. VIEW THAT EQUATES TERRORISM WITH NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS AND AN ASSERTION THAT THE PCI WOULD "RESPOND WITH BT

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AMEMBASSY LONDON 4982
AMEMBASSY MADRID 5132
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 9520
AMEMBASSY PARIS 0344
AMEMBASSY WARSAW 1354
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USNMR SHAPE BE
USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
AMCONSUL FLORENCE 6126
AMCONSUL GENOA 5406
AMCONSUL MILAN 6857
AMCONSUL NAPLES 8741
AMCONSUL PALERMO 5396
AMCONSUL TRIESTE 3552

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 ROME 04708

INCREASED SOLIDARITY WITH ALL THOSE WHO, FROM EL SALVADOR TO NAMIBIA, FROM PALESTINE TO THE SAHARA, ARE FIGHTING FOR NATIONAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOM." THE JUXTAPOSITION OF THE TWO ISSUES UNDERSCORED THE PCI'S REJECTION OF THE VIEW HELD BY OTHER ITALIAN POLITICAL PARTIES, THAT THE AFGHAN GUERRILLA MOVEMENT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED A NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT.

6. DETENTE AND DISARMAMENT - PAJETTA PRAISES BREZHNEV FOR "ADVANCING CONCRETE PROPOSALS FOR HALTING THE ARMS RACE" AND FOR AWAKENING "NEW HOPES FOR PEACE". HE CRITICIZES THE U.S. FAILURE TO RATIFY SALT II AND THE "DECISION TO INSTALL NEW MISSILES IN EUROPE INSTEAD OF OPENING NEW NEGOTIATIONS TO VERIFY THE BALANCE AND REDUCE THE NUMBER OF MISSILES ON BOTH SIDES." (THE LATTER PHRASE CAN ALSO BE READ AS A CRITICISM OF THE SOVIET DECISION TO PROCEED WITH THE INSTALLATION OF SS-20'S). PAJETTA ALSO CALLS FOR A

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PAGE 01

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GREATER DEGREE OF (WESTERN) EUROPEAN AUTONOMY, LINKED TO A STRENGTHENED ROLE FOR "DEMOCRATIC AND WORKERS MOVEMENTS", AND LEADING TO AN "EFFECTIVE INITIATIVE FOR DETENTE AND A NEW WORLD POWER BALANCE."

7. PCI-CPSU RELATIONS - GIVEN THE RECENT STRAINS IN PARTY-TO-PARTY RELATIONS, IT IS PERHAPS NOT SURPRISING THAT PAJETTA SHOULD AVOID THE USUAL CLICHES ABOUT "FRATERNAL" RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PCI AND CPSU. (BERLINGUER USED THE TERM BOTH AT THE OPENING AND CONCLUSION OF HIS ADDRESS TO THE XXV CPSU PARTY CONGRESS. BERLINGUER ALSO SPOKE OF THE NEED FOR "SOLIDARITY" AMONG COMMUNIST PARTIES, ANOTHER TERM WHICH PAJETTA AVOIDS, EXCEPT IN ONE RATHER AMBIGUOUS CONTEXT.) PAJETTA ALSO ADMITS "DISAGREEMENTS" (DIVERGENZE) BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES ON IMPORTANT ISSUES, (BERLINGUER HAD LIMITED THE EXPRESSION TO THE MILDER "DIFFERENCES"), AND OPINED THAT THE "DEBATE" BETWEEN THE PARTIES CAN BE USEFUL FOR "MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING". AT THE CONCLUSION OF HIS SPEECH HE CALLS FOR "COLLABORATION AND FRIENDSHIP" BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES BUT, CONSPICUOUSLY, NOT BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES. AT THE SAME TIME PAJETTA PAID RITUAL OBEISANCE TO THE SOVIET ROLE IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST NAZISM AND FASCISM AND THE LIBERATION OF FORMER COLONIES. THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION, HE SAID, "OPENED THE ERA OF LIBERATION OF MAN FROM OPPRESSION AND EXPLOITATION."

8. COMMENT: PAJETTA'S BLAND PRESENTATION SERVED A DOUBLE PURPOSE -- TO KEEP CURRENT STRAINS BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES FROM GETTING OUT OF HAND, AND TO PREVENT THE CPSU FROM PRESENTING ITSELF AS THE "VICTIM" OF A PCI IDEOLOGICAL ATTACK. THE TONE OF INJURED INNOCENCE WHICH THE PCI IS ADOPTING WITH REGARD TO THE CPSU'S TREATMENT OF PAJETTA (SEPTEL) WOULD BE LESS CREDIBLE TO PART OF THE PCI'S CONSTITUENCY (INCLUDING SOME FOREIGN CP'S) HAD PAJETTA GONE HURLING THUNDERBOLTS. (NOT THAT PAJETTA HIMSELF, GENERALLY ONE OF PCI LEADERS MOST SINCERELY COMMITTED TO KEEPING STRAINS WITH THE CPSU TO A MINIMUM, WOULD HAVE AGREED TO A POLEMICAL APPROACH IN MOSCOW.) BY USING HIM AS THE PCI EMISSARY, BERLINGUER PROTECTED HIMSELF FROM POSSIBLE ACCUSATIONS WITHIN THE PARTY THAT HE HAD STACKED THE DECK AGAINST MOSCOW AND AT THE SAME TIME -- GIVEN PAJETTA'S PENCHANT FOR GIVING JOURNALISTS EXCELLENT "COPY" -- ASSURED SYMPATHETIC COVERAGE IN THE NON-COMMUNIST PRESS.

PAGANELLI
BT

26th Congress //

(Closing Session)

220

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10564

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DE RUEHMO #3032 062142Z
O 031420Z MAR 81
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0567

INFO DIA WASHDC
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USICA WASHDC
AMEMBASSY WARSAW 7788
AMEMBASSY BEIJING 2983
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 6361
AMEMBASSY BERLIN 2442
AMEMBASSY BONN 0279
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 6784
AMEMBASSY CAIRO 2621
USINT HAVANA 0659
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 2079
AMEMBASSY LONDON 2643
AMEMBASSY MADRID 0916
AMCONSUL MUNICH 5352
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1913
AMEMBASSY PARIS 9582
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 6574
AMEMBASSY ROME 4983
USNMR SHAPE BE
AMEMBASSY SOFIA 5948
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 3312
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 4296
USMISSION USNATO 9317
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 9273
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE

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CINCEUR; SHAPE FOR POLAD/INTAFF
MADRID FOR USDEL CSCE
USNATO ALSO FOR EUR/SOV DIRECTOR GERMAN
E.O. 12065: GDS 3/3/87 (MATLOCK, JACK F., JR.) OR-M
TAGS: PINT, UR
SUBJECT: XXVI PARTY CONGRESS: EIGHTH DAY - CLOSING
SESSION

DECLASSIFIED

NLRRF06-114/9 #10564

BY KML NARA DATE 4/7/2011

*****WHRS COMMENT*****

PUBS VP
EOB:SEA,EA,PRC,ARA,EURE,EURW,NEA,EEUR,WEUR

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PAGE 01

TOR:062/14:32Z

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REF: (A) MOSCOW 2988

1. ~~CONF.~~ ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUSLOV, CHAIRING THE CONGRESS' FINAL SESSION, CALLED ON BREZHNEV TO ANNOUNCE THE RESULTS OF THE PARTY ELECTIONS. JUDGING FROM THE LIVE TV COVERAGE, BREZHNEV GOT OFF TO A RATHER ROCKY START. HIS HANDS SEEMED TO SHAKE A LITTLE AS HE PUT ON HIS GLASSES, HE HAD TO CLEAR HIS THROAT TWO OR THREE TIMES BEFORE STARTING TO SPEAK, AND MOPPED HIS FOREHEAD WITH HIS HANDKERCHIEF. ONCE HE WAS UNDER WAY, HOWEVER, HE TURNED IN A REASONABLY GOOD PERFORMANCE DEVOID OF HEAVY SLURRING.

3. BREZHNEV SPENT ABOUT FIVE MINUTES ANNOUNCING THE ELECTION OF THE PARTY'S GENERAL SECRETARY, POLITBURO, AND SECRETARIAT, AS WELL AS THE HEADS OF THE AUDITING COMMISSION AND THE CONTROL COMMISSION. THERE WERE NO PERSONNEL CHANGES IN ANY OF THESE GROUPS (REFTEL). COMMENT: THE FAILURE TO MAKE A SINGLE CHANGE IN THE COUNTRY'S TOP POLITICAL LEADERSHIP MATCHES THE LACK OF DOMESTIC POLICY INITIATIVES, AND CONFIRMS THE INTENTION OF BREZHNEV AND HIS CONTEMPORARIES TO POSTPONE DEALING WITH THE SUCCESSION QUESTION. IT MAY ALSO INDICATE A DELICATE BALANCE WITHIN THE SENIOR LEADERSHIP THAT ITS MEMBERS ARE RELUCTANT TO UPSET. END COMMENT.

4. WITH THE SUSPENSE SURROUNDING PERSONNEL DECISIONS ENDED, THE GENERAL SECRETARY DELIVERED A 15-MINUTE CLOSING SPEECH (ABOUT THE SAME LENGTH AS HIS 1976 CLOSING SPEECH) WHICH HIT STANDARD RHETORICAL THEMES INCLUDING CALLS FOR PEACE, FOR "CONTINUING AND DEEPENING THE RELAXATION OF TENSIONS," AND HALTING THE ARMS RACE. NO NEW FOREIGN POLICY ELEMENTS WERE INTRODUCED BY THE SPEECH.

5. BREZHNEV NOTED IN HIS SPEECH THAT "THE LARGEST NUMBER OF FOREIGN DELEGATIONS EVER" HAD BEEN PRESENT AT THE CONGRESS. TELEVISION VIEWERS COULD SEE (AMONG OTHERS) CASTRO, LE DUAN, KANIA, HONECKER, HUSAK, KADAR, ZHIVKOV, KARMAL, BUT NOT THE ALREADY DEPARTED CEAUCESCU, AS THEY STOOD AND JOINED IN THE SINGING OF THE "INTERNATIONALE" AT THE END OF THE FINAL

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1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY. THE XXVI PARTY CONGRESS REVEALED A SOVIET UNION WEIGHED DOWN BY AN AGING LEADERSHIP WHICH REFUSED TO RENEW ITSELF AND BY INTERNAL AND FOREIGN POLICIES WHICH ARE ENCOUNTERING SEVERE PROBLEMS. DIFFICULTIES THE SOVIET UNION IS NOT A WEAK COUNTRY, NOR IS IT UNSTABLE OR HEADING INTO A PERIOD OF DECLINE. IT IS, HOWEVER, BESET WITH SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES AT THE PRESENT TIME CAUSED BY ITS INEFFICIENT ECONOMY, ITS STAGNANT AGRICULTURE, AND ITS OVEREXTENDED POSTURE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS. THE CONGRESS GAVE THE CLEAR IMPRESSION THAT THE OSSIFIED LEADERSHIP - WHICH HAS REMAINED MORE OR LESS INTACT SINCE 1964 - IS UNWILLING TO EXPERIMENT WITH NEW IDEAS IN DEALING WITH THE DOMESTIC SITUATION. IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS, BY CONTRAST, THE CONGRESS DEMONSTRATED ONCE AGAIN THAT THE SOVIETS ARE CAPABLE OF PACKAGING AN OSTENSIBLY PROMISING APPROACH TO THEIR PROBLEMS, WHILE NOT DEPARTING IN ANY SUBSTANTIVE WAY FROM THEIR POSITION ON KEY ISSUES. ECONOMIC STRINGENCY AND A PERCEIVED NEED TO AVOID A COSTLY RACE IN NEW WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY UNDOUBTEDLY UNDERLAY THEIR FOREIGN POLICY "INITIATIVES." END SUMMARY.

FOREIGN POLICY: RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. HOLD CENTER STAGE

3. FOREIGN POLICY WAS THE CENTERPIECE OF BREZHNEV'S OPENING REPORT. THE SOVIETS MADE LITTLE EFFORT TO GLOSS OVER THE FACT THAT THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE IS LESS HOSPITABLE FOR THEM NOW THAN IT WAS FIVE YEARS AGO: THE PROBLEMS, INCLUDING A TOUGHER U.S. POSTURE, AFGHANISTAN, POLAND, A TREND AGAINST THEIR INTERESTS IN FAR EAST, ARE TOO OBVIOUS FOR THAT. INSTEAD, BREZHNEV AND OTHER SOVIET SPOKESMEN TRIED TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE TO IMPROVE THEIR INTERNATIONAL POSTURE. THEY USED THE CONGRESS TO TRY TO GET A DIALOGUE UNDERWAY WITH THE UNITED STATES, TO BEGIN THE PROCESS OF REBUILDING THE TARNISHED SOVIET IMAGE ABROAD BY TAKING THE HIGH ROAD OF STATESMANSHIP RATHER THAN CONFRONTATION, AND TO DOWNPLAY THE INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS IN WHICH THEY HAVE ENMESHED THEMSELVES.

THE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP REMAINED CENTER STAGE ALL WEEK

4. THE SOVIETS MOVED DELIBERATELY TO PLACE THEMSELVES

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IN A DEMANDEUR POSITION VIS-A-VIS THE UNITED STATES BY
PRESSING FOR A DIALOGUE AT ALL LEVELS, REPEATEDLY
URGING PREPARATIONS FOR A SOVIET-AMERICAN SUMMIT,
CALLING FOR A RESUMPTION OF THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS AT
THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY, AND EVEN EXPRESSING THEIR
HOPE THAT THE U.S. GRAIN AND OTHER TRADE RESTRICTIONS
WILL SOON BE LIFTED. THEY MINIMIZED ANTI-U.S.
BT

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DE RUEHMO #3112/02 0631601
O 041545Z MAR 81
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0617

INFO DIA WASHDC
SECDEF WASHDC
USICA WASHDC
AMEMBASSY WARSAW 7791
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USINT HAVANA 0661
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 2103
AMEMBASSY LONDON 2651
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AMCONSUL MUNICH 5354
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1916
AMEMBASSY PARIS 9590
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 6578
AMEMBASSY ROME 4990
USNMR SHAPE BE
AMEMBASSY SOFIA 5952
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 3316
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 4299
USMISSION USNATO 9330
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CINCEUR, SHAPE FOR POLAD/INTAFF
MADRID FOR USDEL CSCE
USNATO ALSO FOR EUR/SOV DIRECTOR GERMAN
RHETORIC AND MADE EFFORTS TO AVOID TWO IMPORTANT
ISSUES THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION HAS RAISED IN THE U.S.-
SOVIET CONTEXT: EL SALVADOR AND TERRORISM. SIMILARLY
AND PERHAPS WITH AN EYE TOWARD WASHINGTON, THEY

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DOWNPLAYED LATIN AMERICA AND THE TREATMENT OF CASTRO
ALL WEEK WAS A CLEAR CASE OF SUBSTITUTING PROTOCOL
AND FLATTERY FOR A FIRM COMMITMENT TO BACK HIS
CONFRONTATION WITH THE U.S.(

5. THERE WAS MORE TO ALL THIS THAN AN EFFORT TO
APPEAR THE REASONABLE PARTNER IN THE RELATIONSHIP
IN THE FACE OF U.S. RELUCTANCE. THE SOVIETS
UNDOUBTEDLY WOULD LIKE TO FIND A WAY TO FORESTALL
A NEW WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY RACE WHICH THEY CAN ILL
AFFORD AND WORRY THAT THEY MAY LOSE. THEY ALSO
HOPE TO BLUNT U.S. EFFORTS TO CAPITALIZE ON
THEIR INTERNATIONAL DIFFICULTIES, TO ENCOURAGE
THE WESTERN EUROPEANS TO DISTANCE THEMSELVES FROM
THE TOUGHER U.S. POSTURE, AND PERHAPS EVEN REDUCE
SUPPORT IN THE U.S. FOR A MAJOR INCREASE IN U.S.
MILITARY EXPENDITURES.

? evidence?

6. IN DISCUSSING U.S.-SOVIET TRADE THE SOVIETS MIXED
EXPRESSIONS OF INTEREST IN IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH
RECRIMINATIONS OVER U.S. WILLINGNESS TO USE TRADE
AS A POLITICAL WEAPON. DESPITE THE RECRIMINATIONS,
WE BELIEVE THE CONGRESS SPEECHES INDICATE SOVIET
ANXIETY TO IMPROVE THE TRADE RELATIONSHIP AND
PARTICULARLY THEIR DESIRE FOR A NEW GRAINS AGREE-
MENT. INDEED, WE THINK THE SOVIETS ARE NOT AS
INDIFFERENT TO THE THREAT OF AN ECONOMIC EMBARGO
AS THEY PRETEND TO BE. HOWEVER, THEY ARE NOT
WILLING TO SACRIFICE ANY FUNDAMENTAL SECURITY
INTEREST TO OBTAIN IMPROVED TRADE AND A NEW GRAINS
AGREEMENT. EVEN THOUGH TRADE IS HIGH ON THEIR LIST
OF TOPICS IN THEIR CALLS FOR "DIALOGUE."

FOREIGN POLICY: THE REST OF THE WORLD

7. REGARDING OTHER WORLD AREAS, THE SOVIETS DE-
EMPHASIZED THEIR DIFFICULTIES, PORTRAYED THEMSELVES
AS REASONABLE AND WANTING TO TALK, BUT GAVE UP NO
GROUND ON ANY OF THE REAL ISSUES. THE RHETORIC
ON POLAND AND AFGHANISTAN WAS RELATIVELY MUTED, BUT
THE UNDERLYING POSITION WAS UNYIELDING. THE GESTURE
TO CHINA WAS REAL, ALTHOUGH MEANT MERELY TO SHOW
THAT AN ACCOMMODATION WAS EVENTUALLY POSSIBLE; IT
DID NOT CARRY ANY OF THE IMMEDIACY OF THE GESTURES
TO THE U.S. THE RELATIVELY RESTRAINED RHETORIC
ON OTHER ISSUES WAS DESIGNED TO SPRUCE UP THE
SOVIET IMAGE AROUND THE WORLD AND PERHAPS TO

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INFLUENCE THE VISITING SPEAKERS TO KEEP THEIR PRESENTATIONS WITHIN FAIRLY NON-CONTROVERSIAL BOUNDS.

THE SOVIETS DID NOT EXPECT, AND WILL NOT GET, AN IMMEDIATE CHANGE IN THE INTERNATIONAL ATMOSPHERE FROM THIS LAST WEEK'S EFFORTS. THEY KNOW WE ARE NOT SUDDENLY GOING TO LEAP AT THE CHANCE FOR A SUMMIT, OR SCALE DOWN THE DEFENSE BUDGET, THAT THE EUROPEANS UNDERSTAND THE IMPORTANCE OF CONSULTATIONS
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OP IMMED
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 DE RUEHMO #3112/03 0631608
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0618

INFO DIA WASHDC
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 AMEMBASSY CAIRO 2624
 USINT HAVANA 0662
 AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 2104
 AMEMBASSY LONDON 2652
 AMEMBASSY MADRID 0922
 AMCONSUL MUNICH 5355
 AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1917
 AMEMBASSY PARIS 9591
 AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 6579
 AMEMBASSY ROME 4991
 USNMR SHAPE BE
 AMEMBASSY SOFIA 5953
 AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 3317
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 USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 9282
 USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 04 MOSCOW 03112

CINCEUR, SHAPE FOR POLAD/INTAFF
 MADRID FOR USDEL CSCE
 USNATO ALSO FOR EUR/SOV DIRECTOR GERMAN
 WITH THE U.S., THAT THE CHINESE ARE NOT GOING TO
 BECOME LESS ANTAGONISTIC OVERNIGHT, OR THAT THE
 THIRD WORLD WILL SOON FORGET AFGHANISTAN, KAMPUCHEA,
 OR OTHER SOVIET TRANSGRESSIONS. THE SOVIET OLD

GUARD HAS, HOWEVER, USED THE CONGRESS TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA AND AT LEAST BEGIN A PROCESS DESIGNED TO IMPROVE THEIR INTERNATIONAL POSTURE. THAT IS A GREAT DEAL MORE THAN THEY ACTUALLY PRODUCED IN TERMS OF NEW POLICIES TO GRAPPLE WITH THEIR INTERNAL, LARGELY ECONOMIC MALAISE.

THE LEADERSHIP - IMPLICATIONS FOR FOREIGN POLICY MAKING

8. THE XXVI CONGRESS' FAILURE TO MAKE A SINGLE CHANGE IN THE COUNTRY'S HIGH POLITICAL LEADERSHIP - DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE AVERAGE AGE OF THESE POLITBURO AND SECRETARIAT MEMBERS IS APPROACHING 70 - IS UNPRECEDENTED FOR A CONGRESS IN THE POST-STALIN PERIOD. THIS IMMOBILITY CORRESPONDS WITH THE VIRTUAL LACK OF SERIOUS POLITICAL INFIGHTING OR EVIDENCE OF MAJOR LEADERSHIP SPLITS IN RECENT YEARS. IT ALSO MAY SATISFY THE IMPORTANT VESTED INTERESTS REPRESENTED BY THE MILITARY, THE SECURITY APPARAT AND THE PARTY ORGANIZATION ITSELF. THE LEADERSHIP HAS MANAGED TO RULE BY CONSENSUS BY DEFERRING DECISIONS ON MOST HARD POLICY QUESTIONS (PARTICULARLY INTERNAL ECONOMIC QUESTIONS) AND BY POSTPONING PERHAPS THE POTENTIALLY MOST DIVISIVE ISSUE OF ALL - ITS OWN REJUVENATION. PRIOR TO THE CONGRESS, SOME BELIEVED THAT THE LEADERSHIP WOULD AT LONG LAST MAKE A FEW CHANGES TO CONVEY AT LEAST AN IMPRESSION THAT SUCH A PROCESS HAD BEGUN. THERE WERE PREDICTIONS THAT THE YOUNG AND DYNAMIC LENINGRAD ROMANOV WOULD JOIN THE SECRETARIAT. BUT ROMANOV AND THE OTHER YOUNGER MEMBER OF THE LEADERSHIP, GORBACHEV, WCKE KEPT OUT OF THE MEDIA LIMELIGHT DURING THE CONGRESS, AND IN THE ENSUING LEADERSHIP ELECTIONS BREZHNEV AND HIS AGED COHORTS YIELDED LITTLE IF ANY OF THE MOSCOW POWER BASED TO THEM.

9. IN TERMS OF FOREIGN POLICY OVER THE SHORT TERM, THE SMALL CIRCLE CONSISTING OF BREZHNEV, CHERNENKO, SUSLOV, GROMYKO, KIRILENKO, USTINOV, PONOMAREV, ANDROPOV, AND BREZHNEV'S PERSONAL AIDES WILL CONTINUE TO BE MOST INFLUENTIAL. IN THE LONGER TERM, BREZHNEV'S EBBING CAPABILITIES WILL INEVITABLY FORCE HIM TO PLAY A LESS ACTIVE PERSONAL ROLE. THIS MAY MEAN:

- - INCREASED BREZHNEV RELIANCE ON (AND PERHAPS GROWING INFLUENCE OF) AIDES SUCH AS CHERNENKO, ALEKSANDROV, BLATOV, SAMOTEIKIN, ZAGLADIN, AND ZAMYATIN, WITH THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE INTERNATIONAL

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- . AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION DEPARTMENTS CONTINUING TO PLAY KEY ROLES;
- . - AN ENHANCED ROLE FOR THE STILL VERY ACTIVE GROMYKO AND HIS KEY FOREIGN POLICY AIDES IN THE DAY-TO-DAY MANAGEMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY;
- . - OVERALL, AND MORE PROBLEMATICALLY, A MORE

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O 041545Z MAR 81
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0619

INFO DIA WASHDC
SECDEF WASHDC
USICA WASHDC
AMEMBASSY WARSAW 7793
AMEMBASSY BEIJING 2988
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 6366
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AMEMBASSY BONN 0288
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 6790
AMEMBASSY CAIRO 2625
USINT HAVANA 0663
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 2105
AMEMBASSY LONDON 2653
AMEMBASSY MADRID 0923
AMCONSUL MUNICH 5356
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1918
AMEMBASSY PARIS 9592
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 6580
AMEMBASSY ROME 4992
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USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 MOSCOW 03112

CINCEUR, SHAPE FOR POLAD/INTAFF
MADRID FOR USDEL CSCE
USNATO ALSO FOR EUR/SOV DIRECTOR GERMAN
• COLLECTIVE APPROACH TO DECISION-MAKING AND
• HENCE GREATER IMMOBILISM IN POLICY.
DESPITE THE ROUGH ROAD THAT U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS
HAS TRAVELED IN RECENT YEARS, IT IS NOTEWORTHY

This stresses importance of USA

THAT THOSE SOVIETS CLOSELY IDENTIFIED WITH "DETENTE" FARED WELL IN THE "ELECTION" TO THE NEW CENTRAL COMMITTEE: ARBATOV AND INOZEMTSEV, HEADS OF THE TWO PRINCIPAL "THINK TANKS" DEALING WITH THE U.S., ADVANCED TO FULL MEMBERSHIP. MFA "AMERICANOLOGISTS" LIKE KORNIYENKO, VORONTSOV, AND TROYANOVSKIY MOVED UP, ALTHOUGH THEIR INVOLVEMENT WITH THE U.S. MAY NOT HAVE BEEN THE SOLE FACTOR.

• DOMESTIC ECONOMIC POLICY

10. BENEATH ALL THE CHEERING ABOUT PAST ACCOMPLISHMENTS, THE REGIME RATHER FRANKLY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT A PERIOD OF ECONOMIC STRINGENCY LIES AHEAD. RESOURCES MUST BE ECONOMIZED AS NEVER BEFORE IF THE COUNTRY IS TO FIND THE CAPITAL TO MODERNIZE OLD AND OBSOLETE INDUSTRIAL PLANTS, DEVELOP ENERGY AND MINERAL RESOURCES IN SIBERIA AND THE FAR EAST, AND PROVIDE THE AVERAGE CITIZEN WITH A HIGHER STANDARD OF LIVING. WHILE BOTH BREZHNEV AND TIKHONOV EMPHASIZED THE NEED FOR GREATER ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY, THE METHODS BY WHICH THEY PROPOSE TO ACHIEVE THIS GOAL ARE FROM THE PAST: WITHIN THE CONGRESS HALL, DELEGATES WERE TOLD THAT THERE HAD TO BE GREATER WORKER PRODUCTIVITY AND CENTRALIZED PLAN DISCIPLINE; OUTSIDE THE HALL, IN PROPAGANDA FILMS TIMED FOR THE CONGRESS, THE POPULACE WAS EXHORTED TO RECAPTURE THE SPIRIT OF SELF-SACRIFICE DISPLAYED IN THE EARLY FIVE-YEAR PLANS, IN POST-WAR RECOVERY, AND IN OPENING THE VIRGIN LANDS. NO ONE CALLED FOR FUNDAMENTAL DECENTRALIZING CHANGES IN THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMY, DESPITE THE FACT THAT SUCH CHANGES ARE OCCURRING IN SOME OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. INDEED, NO PROGRESS WAS DISCERNIBLE EVEN IN THE TWO LIMITED INITIATIVES (FOOD AND CONSUMER GOODS) ANNOUNCED BY BREZHNEV AT THE OCTOBER 1980 PLENUM. MORE IMPORTANTLY, THE LEADERSHIP GAVE NO INDICATION THAT HEAVY DEFENSE SPENDING IS ONE OF THE REASONS WHY THE ECONOMY IS IN DIFFICULT STRAITS NOR DID IT INDICATE THAT CONSUMER WELFARE WILL IN ANY MEANINGFUL WAY TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER DEFENSE SPENDING. QUITE THE CONTRARY - TIKHONOV PROMISED "THAT THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES WILL HAVE EVERYTHING THEY NEED TO COUNTER ATTEMPTS OF THE IMPERIALIST FORCES TO GAIN MILITARY SUPERIORITY." IN SUM, THE ECONOMIC MESSAGE FROM THE XXVI CONGRESS WAS: "WE'LL DO WHAT WE'VE DONE IN THE PAST -- ONLY BETTER."

11. BRAVE RHETORIC NOTWITHSTANDING, NOTHING COULD

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HIDE THE FACT THAT THIS CONGRESS LACKED THE
"SOCIALISM TRIUMPHANT" AIR OF SOME OF ITS
PREDECESSORS. MATLOCK
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DE RUEHC #5310 0640241
O 050220Z MAR 81
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 9980

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E.O. 12065: GDS 3/4/87 (THOMAS, CHARLES H.)

TAGS:NATO, CSCE, TNF, SALT

SUBJECT:MATERIAL FOR RESPONSE TO BREZHNEV SPEECH

REF: HAWES-HARRISON TELCON

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. THERE FOLLOWS ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FOR SUBMISSION TO IS IN CONNECTION WITH DRAFT RESPONSE TO THE BREZHNEV SPEECH.

3. CDE: A RESPONSE SHOULD WELCOME BREZHNEV'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE -- FIRST PROPOSED BY PRESIDENT GISCARD -- THAT FUTURE CBMS SHOULD APPLY EQUALLY TO ALL OF EUROPE, INCLUDING ;LL OF THE EUROPEAN AREAS OF THE SOVIET UNION. IT SHOULD POINT OUT THAT THIS ACCEPTANCE HAS REMOVED ONE OBSTACLE TO A SECURITY MEETING, WITHIN THE CSCE FRAMEWORK, AS PART OF A BALANCED OUTCOME AT MADRID. BUT IT SHOULD CALL ON THE SOVIET UNION TO ACCEPT THE OTHER ESSENTIAL CRITERIA REQUIRED FOR A POST-MADRID SECURITY MEETING, INCLUDING SPECIFICALLY THE REQUIREMENTS THAT CBMS BE MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT, VERIFIABLE AND CARRY A HIGH DEGREE OF POLITICAL OBLIGATION.

4. SALT: WITH RESPECT TO BREZHNEV'S INDICATIONS OF SOVIET READINESS TO CONTINUE APPROPRIATE TALKS ON LIMITING STRATEGIC ARMS, WE WOULD NOTE THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS STATED HIS WILLINGNESS TO UNDERTAKE THE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR E06-114/9 #10568

BY KML NARA DATE 4/7/2011

*****WHSR COMMENT*****

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NEGOTIATION OF REALISTIC, BALANCED AND VERIFIABLE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, A VIEWPOINT WHICH THE ALLIES SHARE. HOWEVER, THE FEASIBILITY AND TIMING OF SUCH EFFORTS WILL DEPEND TO A CONSIDERABLE DEGREE ON A BROAD RANGE OF POSSIBLE SOVIET ACTIONS AFFECTING NATO'S SECURITY INTERESTS. WHILE THE US IS REVIEWING ITS SALT POLICY, IT WILL TAKE NO ACTION THAT WOULD UNDERCUT EXISTING AGREEMENTS AS LONG AS THE SOVIET UNION EXERCISES THE SAME RESTRAINT. HAIG

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TRENDS IN THE USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE 1/

Summary

The final months before the 26th CPSU Congress in February were marked by a slowdown in all other regime functions as the party concentrated on its assessment of the last five years and on development of agreed policy lines for the next five. Indications were that this Congress would herald no sharp breaks with the past, but instead would legitimize current policy orientation. Nor did any major change in the prevailing leadership arrangements seem likely; all indicators were that Brezhnev would remain in office for the time being. Despite his physical problems, he had been relatively active in recent months and had exploited Kosygin's retirement to reshuffle the upper levels of the government to the advantage of some of his proteges.

The Soviet economic performance in 1980, however, was expected to cast a pall over the Congress. The second poor grain crop in succession held down real GNP growth to about 1.5 percent for the year. Production shortfalls in various intermediate goods continued to contribute to bottlenecks in industry; meat and other basic commodities were in short supply for the consumer. The draft economic guidelines for 1981-85 call for some of the lowest growth rates ever planned, but even these are probably beyond reach.

The new US administration's tougher stance toward the USSR generally, and on military issues in particular, dampened Soviet hopes for an early return to business-as-usual with the US. Insisting that it was

1/ This report, prepared for the semi-annual NATO Experts Meeting, focuses on the period October 1980-February 1981.

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still prepared for a positive dialogue and a resumption of the SALT process, Moscow nevertheless seemed to be increasingly uncertain about Washington's intentions and about the future course of US-USSR ties.

Toward Western Europe, the USSR attempted to project an image of reasonableness and willingness to cooperate on such issues as CSCE, TNF, and MBFR. To that end, Soviet delegates at the CSCE review conference carefully avoided escalating the human rights debate, concentrating instead on promoting the creation of a new disarmament forum. To avoid a stalemate in the disarmament dialogue, the Soviets made small gestures at the MBFR talks and entered into an exchange with the US on theater nuclear forces.

Even though the USSR succeeded in keeping the Karmal regime in power, Soviet troops in Afghanistan were unable to suppress the internal resistance to the regime, nor were Soviet advisers able to place the regime on a viable footing. Despite some shows of flexibility in probing Pakistan on negotiating possibilities, the USSR made clear its intention to stay in Afghanistan for the time being. It also continued to insist that the May 14 Afghan peace plan was the only "realistic" basis for an eventual political solution.

In the face of the Iran-Iraq war, Moscow's immediate priority was to head off any repercussions that might work to US advantage. Thus it maintained a public stance of neutrality and repeatedly advocated a negotiated settlement, but behind the scenes worked to keep open its options with both sides. Some East European arms again began to filter into Iraq, presumably with Soviet sanction. Concurrently, Moscow stepped up its attempts to court Tehran after the release of the US hostages.

On the other hand, no significant new Soviet economic aid was advanced to Ethiopia following Mengistu's visit to the USSR last fall, despite Brezhnev's expressions of satisfaction with the state of USSR-Ethiopian relations. Ethiopian disappointment subsequently gave rise to talk in Addis Ababa of soliciting Western assistance. Mozambique apparently was similarly disappointed in its expectations of Soviet largess.

Soviet access to military facilities in Indochina continued to expand, presumably in return for continuation of Moscow's extensive aid to Hanoi. The growing Soviet presence, however, further impaired the USSR's already strained relations with ASEAN states (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) and Burma. To assuage regional suspicion, Moscow urged Vietnam to end its military operations across the Thai-Kampuchean border and proposed a regional conference to discuss Kampuchea, an initiative that the Indochinese Foreign Ministers formally endorsed.

Soviet relations with China meanwhile remained stalemated, while those with Japan hit a new low in the face of the Suzuki government's stand on the Kurile Islands and Afghanistan. Moscow's perennial concern over a possible US-Japanese-Chinese military collaboration seemed to grow in intensity as a result.

In Latin America, the USSR mounted a strong propaganda campaign in support of the insurgents in El Salvador, centered around the charge that the US was preparing to intervene militarily. Whatever role the Soviets themselves were playing there remained well concealed under cover of Cuban and other surrogates. Elsewhere in the hemisphere, Soviet trade officials continued to look to Argentina and Brazil for agricultural supplies to offset the effects of the US grain embargo.

Following legalization of the Solidarity trade union in November, the Polish crisis intensified: confrontations between the Kania regime and the workers multiplied and disarray spread throughout the Polish party. The Warsaw Pact leaders meeting in Moscow in December apparently granted Kania time to master the situation but did not rule out eventual military intervention. Soviet forces in and around Poland remained in a state of readiness. Appointment of General Jaruzelski to the premiership did, however, seem to ease the atmosphere and the prospects for near-term consolidation of the party/state leadership brightened.

The other East European regimes meanwhile grew increasingly concerned about the potential impact of Polish developments on their own domestic situations. As it was, economic growth in Eastern Europe as a whole slowed to about half a percent in 1980, the lowest in the postwar period. Deterioration of the Polish economy brought further repercussions, especially in the energy field where additional Soviet shipments of oil, gas, and other items to Poland may have been at the expense of the other members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA).

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Contents

	<u>Page</u>
Summary.....	i
Soviet Union.....	1
Internal Political Situation.....	1
26th Party Congress.....	1
The Leadership.....	2
Kosygin's Death.....	2
Succession Rivals.....	3
Government Shakeup.....	3
Agricultural Reorganization.....	3
Jewish Emigration.....	4
Repression of Dissent.....	5
Soviet Economic Performance in 1980.....	6
Agriculture.....	6
Plan Goals.....	7
Soviet Foreign Policy.....	7
Relations With the US.....	7
Relations With Western Europe.....	9
Afghanistan.....	9
The USSR and the Middle East.....	10
Iran-Iraq War.....	11
Persian Gulf Proposals.....	11
Iran.....	12
Syria.....	12
Jordan.....	13
Arabian Peninsula.....	13
North Africa.....	14
Sub-Saharan Africa.....	14
Sino-Soviet Relations.....	16
Northeast Asia.....	16
South Asia.....	16
Southeast Asia.....	17
Latin America.....	17

	<u>Page</u>
The Situation in Eastern Europe.....	18
Relations Between Communist Countries and Parties.....	18
Warsaw Pact.....	18
CEMA.....	19
The Internal Situation.....	20
The Polish Crisis.....	20
Impact on Eastern Europe.....	20
Economic Slowdown.....	22
The Situation in Yugoslavia and Albania.....	23
Yugoslavia.....	23
Albania.....	24

SOVIET UNION

Internal Political Situation

The 26th Party Congress. The CPSU Congress was scheduled to open on February 23. All evidence indicated it would follow the pattern of the last three Brezhnev Congresses; its function was to legitimize current trends rather than to herald any sharp breaks with the past. Turnover among first secretaries of regional party committees in advance of the Congress was minimal. This of itself argued that the ruling Politburo intended to limit the proceedings to a reaffirmation of extant policies and leadership arrangements. That emphasis on continuity was also implicit in the heavy volume of publicity given to Brezhnev, who would deliver the Central Committee Accountability Report to the Congress. At 74, he seemed as well ensconced as ever and likely to stay in office until physically incapacitated.

Meanwhile, Party Secretaries Kirilenko, 74, and Chernenko, 69, remained in place as the preeminent candidates for succession. The Kremlin elders gave no sign of readiness to bring into the CPSU Secretariat--and into presuccession maneuvering--such key figures of the "younger" generation as Ukrainian party head Shcherbitskiy (62) and his counterpart in Leningrad, Romanov (58). To ease the promotion immobilism at lower echelons, however, the Central Committee seemed likely to be further enlarged and some of the heretofore stalemated junior leaders granted membership in it.

On international issues, the Congress was expected to give equal weight to the USSR's commitment to detente and its commitment both to the unity of the socialist camp and to the progressive forces and liberation movements of the Third World. Brezhnev was expected to find "dangerous" tendencies inherent in recent US policy directions, especially the trend toward what Moscow regards as growing militarization; he probably would contrast them pointedly with the stand of "sober, realistic" political leaders in Western Europe. But his specific formulations would provide the first authoritative Soviet reading of the Reagan administration's first month in office. Brezhnev's report would also shed additional light on Soviet thinking about other major problems, such as Poland, Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq war, and the future of East-West relations generally.

Although internal progress is traditionally accentuated at any Congress, much of this Congress's oratory probably would reflect concern about popular morale and possible spillover effects from the Polish crisis. Pre-Congress party meetings paid special attention to the subject of working and living conditions of ordinary citizens. Party units were instructed to encourage trade union activity and to take public complaints seriously.

Press discussion of the draft plan guidelines for 1981-85 indicated that the relatively minor concessions to consumers in the new scheme of investment priorities would get exaggerated treatment. The modest steps envisaged for raising living standards might even be acclaimed as the centerpiece of a Congress platform of domestic "peaceful construction," in tandem with reaffirmation of Brezhnev's international "Peace Program."

On the ideological front, stress on the directing role of the party bureaucracy was certain, accompanied by exhortation to intensify the fight against bureaucratism. Also scheduled for special promotion, if press commentary was any guide, were social discipline, ideological vigilance, and Great Russian nationalism.

The Leadership. Brezhnev was almost three times more active in public during the second half of 1980 than he was during the first half. Nonetheless, his performance in India in December demonstrated once again that his stamina was limited.

Despite such manifest limitations, Brezhnev unveiled a major economic initiative at the October Central Committee Plenum when he announced a new "agro-industrial" complex designed to unify food production and distribution. He also apparently capitalized on Kosygin's retirement to push through a limited shakeup of the Council of Ministers. And he was awarded another Order of the October Revolution on his 74th birthday (December 18), to the applause of the Politburo and Secretariat membership.

Kosygin's Death. The October Central Committee Plenum retired Kosygin as premier, in the wake of his mid-August heart attack, but announced no action on his Politburo membership. He died on December 18, but Pravda waited three days to announce the death. A desire not to mar the Brezhnev birthday publicity presumably accounted for some of the delay, but apparently there was also argument in the Politburo over funeral arrangements. The eventual decision to give Kosygin first-class honors appeared intended to signal to Soviet citizens that his passing would not mean significant changes in domestic economic priorities (he was popularly identified with consumer interests). But the reluctance of Brezhnev and the party media to pay Kosygin homage reflected the longstanding rivalry and disagreement between the two leaders.

Succession Rivals. Kirilenko was outranked by Andropov, Ustinov, and Chernenko in Pravda photographs at least four times in the October-December period, but managed to retain his No. 3 slot (next to Suslov) on other occasions. Such indicators of political maneuvering, while inconclusive, suggest that Kirilenko is not an uncontested choice for the political succession. Chernenko presumably is jockeying to increase his authority in the senior leadership, and the format of leadership photographs could be interpreted to indicate that he, Andropov, Ustinov, and perhaps Grishin may oppose Kirilenko's candidacy.

Kirilenko's fortunes probably will be affected by the October promotion of Mikhail Gorbachev to full membership on the Politburo. As one of the five leaders who are both full members and secretaries of the Central Committee, Gorbachev is well positioned to become a candidate for the succession if he can survive the pitfalls connected with responsibility for agriculture. Shcherbitskiy and Romanov, putative claimants for the succession, still appear blocked in their efforts to secure posts in Moscow. Romanov's ambition seems to have stimulated some resentment in Moscow, decreasing his chances for promotion at the Congress.

Government Shakeup. With Kosygin's retirement, Nikolay Tikhonov was promoted to premier; Ivan Arkhipov was raised to first deputy premier; two longtime deputy premiers in charge of foreign economic relations, Lesechko and Novikov, were replaced by younger technicians; and Ivan Bodyul was brought from Kishinev to Moscow as a deputy premier. Several other ministers were retired, mostly because of age, and several ministries were consolidated. Some of these personnel changes involved removal of Kosygin men; others appeared to be routine preparations for naming a new Central Committee in February.

Agricultural Reorganization. Presumably in connection with the new agro-industrial complex mechanism which Brezhnev announced in October, party secretary for agriculture Gorbachev was given full membership on the Politburo; Bodyul was brought into the government, probably to head the state component of the new system; a new Central Committee section for farm machinery was created, in mid-1980; new ministers were installed in farm machinery-producing ministries; and a new union-republic system of ministries responsible for fruit and vegetables was created. The new system probably will operate within the framework of food production plans being drafted locally for the 1981-85 period. But in the absence of major investments in agriculture, the new system so far looks like an administrative nostrum designed to offset public unhappiness about food shortages rather than increase food supplies significantly.

34a

Jewish Emigration. In 1980, more than 20,000 Jews received visas to leave the USSR compared with about 2½ times that number in 1979. Circumstantial evidence suggests that Soviet authorities set both years' totals in advance and then manipulated emigration procedures to achieve them.

The 1979 total was the peak annual figure for emigration from the Soviet Union. Despite a drop in the number of exit visas issued monthly during the second half of 1979, more than 50,000 Jews were permitted to leave. Had the monthly rate continued to rise as it did during the first months of the year, the annual total that year could have reached 60,000. Instead, during the latter part of 1979 Moscow evidently was venting its displeasure with US actions; e.g., the granting of most-favored-nation (MFN) status to China but not the USSR, delay in approving SALT II, and the "Cuban Brigade" furor.

In 1980, monthly statistics showed a drop from over 3,000 visas in January to almost 700 in July, when emigration virtually halted as the USSR prepared for the Moscow Olympics. After a weak post-Olympic recovery, the monthly figures resumed their decline later in the year, bringing the annual total to just over 20,000.

The round totals for 1979 and 1980, as well as circumstantial evidence, suggest that these were target figures set by Soviet authorities, who then manipulated emigration procedures to achieve them. Publicly, Soviet officials and media blandly explained the precipitous drop as evidence of declining interest in emigration--i.e., those who wanted to leave had already left. But the monthly and annual statistical pattern argues that the USSR's emigration policy is actually shaped by domestic and foreign policy considerations and is implemented by the setting of annual quotas, even though these quotas may be altered on short notice to reflect new developments.

When Soviet leaders decided to retaliate against the US by substantially cutting emigration, they first limited departure eligibility to individuals with primary relatives in Israel, arguing that Soviet Jews and their allies abroad had been circumventing Soviet emigration regulations. But this step in itself did not ensure a reduction of emigration to planned levels, because enough Jews were able to satisfy the requirement to keep emigration at a relatively high level. To reduce monthly visa issuance figures to desired levels, the authorities then had to resort to their customary methods of intimidation and arbitrary disapproval of applications.

Repression of Dissent. After two years of methodical repression, membership in the human rights movement in the USSR has been reduced to a few isolated individuals. Arrests and trials continue but have the appearance of a mopping-up operation. Many of those arrested recently are activists little known in the West. Meanwhile:

- The Sunday Scientific Seminar was blocked from further meetings following the arrest of its leader, Jewish activist Victor Brailovskiy.
- Police auxiliaries broke up a Jewish religion class in early December.
- A legal seminar conducted by dissidents on the subject of emigration-related legal questions suspended operations after the militia broke up two of its sessions.
- Activists who planned to attend the annual observance of Human Rights Day (December 10) in Moscow's Pushkin Square were prevented from leaving their apartments.

These measures, though momentarily effective, ironically are creating conditions for the long-term reemergence of dissent on a more solid base:

- Restrictions on Jewish emigration have greatly increased the number of "refuseniks" (estimated at 6,000 in Kiev alone). Widespread discrimination, especially in employment and education, now encompasses all Soviet Jews, who as a result are unable to assimilate, preserve their group identity, or emigrate.
- The nationalistic protest in the Baltic states shows discernible effects of the events in Poland. Moscow's policy of suppressing nationalist unrest in Estonia without satisfying local grievances has aroused concern among Estonia's "establishment" intellectuals. Their letter of October 28 to Brezhnev, carrying 40 signatures, warned that "nationality conflicts can easily lead to distrust and escalation of hate and make the peaceful evolution of society impossible."
- In the first mass action of its kind, 30,000 Pentecostals staged a five-day hunger strike (November 11-15) to call their plight to the attention of the CSCE review conference in Madrid.

35a

--Samizdat continues to circulate, albeit in lesser volume, and arrives in the West despite official obstacles. The growing diversity of its subject matter indicates that the infection of independent thought and criticism may be spreading from Moscow's literary intellectuals--the original dissidents--to a larger category of white-collar professionals.

Soviet Economic Performance in 1980

Economic performance in 1980--the base year for the new five-year plan period--once again fell far short of target, notwithstanding downward revision of many key plan sectors. Real GNP grew an estimated 1.5 percent. According to statistics released by the USSR Central Statistical Administration, national income increased 3.8 percent, industrial production grew 3.6 percent, but gross agricultural output fell 3 percent. (The 1980 plan called for increases of 4 percent, 4.5 percent, and 8.8 percent, respectively.) The planned increases in labor productivity once again missed the mark by a wide margin.

Oil output increased by 3 percent but was 3 million metric tons (mmt) short of the revised target of 606 mmt (the original target was 620-640 mmt). Coal output, at 716 mmt, failed to meet the plan just as it did every year during the past five, and fell absolutely for the second consecutive year. Natural gas output, however, reached the plan target of 435 billion cubic meters. Among other key industrial materials failing to meet planned targets in 1980 were various steel products, chemicals (including mineral fertilizer and agricultural chemicals), cement, timber, and paper products. Output of the light and food industries and of everyday household items also fell below plan, leaving consumer demand for many basics largely unmet.

Agriculture. Gross production in the USSR fell for the second consecutive year as a result of the back-to-back grain harvest failures. Grain output in 1980 totaled 189 mmt--10 mmt more than the disastrous 1979 harvest but 46 mmt below plan. Meat output at 15.1 mmt was down about 3 percent as a result of the 1979 harvest failure and the grain embargo imposed on the USSR following its invasion of Afghanistan. Milk and wool production also fell, reflecting lower milk yields because of reduced feed rations and the culling of sheep flocks. Although reduced feed rations also lowered the average slaughter weight, they allowed the Soviets to maintain larger livestock inventories--and perhaps therefore to speed recovery of meat production--than they ordinarily might have, given the poor 1979 grain and fodder crops.

For example, total cattle numbers on January 1, 1981, were up slightly over the previous year despite their decline in the

private sector. Gains in the socialized sector were not enough, however, to offset the decline in pig, sheep, and goat inventories in the private sector. Output of sunflower seeds--an important source of edible oil--and vegetables also declined in 1980, adding to the Soviet population's food shortages. But the cotton crop, an important export commodity, came in at a record 9.98 mmt.

Plan Goals. The Soviets had to prepare the draft guidelines for the 1981-85 plan period against a background of growing resource constraints and unprecedented back-to-back harvest failures. The growth rates for national income and industrial production are the lowest ever planned, and nonetheless perhaps unobtainable. Targets for 1985 for some key industrial products are little different from the targets for 1980 (e.g., oil, coal, and finished rolled ferrous metals); targets for grain production are unrealistically high, calling for average annual output greater than the USSR ever produced in any single year. The plan also calls for increased conservation of fuels and materials and increased labor productivity.

Such goals have been and are likely to continue to be elusive. Overall, there are substantially fewer quantitative indicators in the 1981-85 plan than in earlier plan guidelines. While this is consistent with the trend since the mid-1970s to publish fewer specific indicators, it may also reflect delay, uncertainty, and possible conflicts in decisionmaking.

Soviet Foreign Policy

Relations With the US. Moscow saw in the election of a new US President the prospect of some improvement in US-Soviet relations, if only because an administration allegedly dominated by "anti-Soviet ideologues" had been replaced by a "tough" but "realistic" one. The Soviet leadership appeared to be clinging to the belief that the deterioration in atmosphere would prove temporary, related to the election period (i.e., that the economic countermeasures and the Olympics boycott were essentially "political" footballs).

Commentaries immediately following the election expressed the hope that, despite the new administration's conservative cast, President Reagan might turn out to be a leader with whom the USSR could deal. The unusual access given to Senator Charles Percy, incoming chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (who spent 10 hours in late November with Brezhnev, Gromyko, Ustinov, and Ogarkov), clearly signaled Moscow's interest in starting a dialogue.

For Moscow, SALT remained the central issue of the bilateral relationship. To keep the arms control dialogue alive, the Soviets

agreed to preliminary bilateral talks on theater nuclear forces (held in Geneva, October 17-November 17) and continued tacitly to observe the limitations of both SALT I and the unratified SALT II. And while insisting publicly that the treaty needed no renegotiation, they nevertheless left open the possibility of discussing US proposals for changes--and obviously their own. Gromyko, however, summed up the basic USSR position in the December issue of Kommunist when he said that Moscow "cannot and will not participate in talks which will render the SALT II treaty null and void."

Moscow undoubtedly anticipated that it may be some time before a formal SALT agreement of any kind will be ready for ratification, but appeared to hope that a continuing dialogue would, at a minimum, generate pressures for restraint in US military programs. Soviet concern about the new administration's advocacy of a tougher military posture was clearly reflected in Gromyko's Kommunist warning that the USSR "cannot and will not allow" an overturn of the "present military parity."

Moscow also hoped that the new administration would lift the grain embargo imposed following the invasion of Afghanistan and renew the US-Soviet long-term grain agreement (which expires in September 1981). Although the embargo had a significant impact initially and contributed to the 3-percent decline in Soviet meat production during 1980, Soviet spokesmen have argued that they largely filled the gap from other suppliers. But the Kremlin still wanted a termination of economic sanctions, as well as a resumption of US-Soviet scientific exchanges and trade contacts, if for no other reason than to clear the ground for an eventual bilateral "normalization."

The new administration's charges of Soviet involvement in the El Salvador insurgency and support for international terrorism quickly clouded Soviet hopes for a quick and easy transition. Moscow's heated, albeit defensive, response included a widely publicized TASS statement which called Secretary Haig's January 28 charges of Soviet complicity in such activities a "gross and malicious deception" and declared that the Soviet Union "has always been and remains a principled opponent" of terrorism. Subsequent commentaries accused the new US administration of using the issue in much the same way its predecessor had used the human rights campaign, and of deliberately equating terrorism with national liberation struggles in order to undermine the latter. While condemning such organizations as the Italian Red Brigades, Moscow reaffirmed that the USSR, as its international duty, would always support such national liberation movements as the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Nicaraguan Sandinistas, etc.

Relations With Western Europe. During a period when relations with the West were roiled by Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, and the fear of Soviet intervention in Poland, the USSR sought to project an image of reasonableness and willingness to negotiate on such issues as CSCE, TNF, and MBFR.

- In the CSCE review conference at Madrid, the Soviets sought to respond to Western criticisms but to prevent escalation of the debate on human rights. Moscow concentrated its efforts on trying to get agreement on the creation of a new disarmament forum on terms that would be as favorable as possible to the USSR.
- On TNF, the Soviets were businesslike in tone but unyielding in substance in bilateral talks with the US at Geneva, October 17-November 17. Their primary intent appeared to be to respond to West European interest in the subject in the hope that the allies would press the US to resume talks early in the new administration.
- In the MBFR negotiations at Vienna, the USSR remained intransigent on the central issue of data but made small gestures in an effort to avoid the appearance of complete stalemate. During the 22nd round, completed December 18, the East proposed to fix the duration of an agreement on first-phase reductions to three years and modified its position on an interphase freeze, suggesting that it could be collective in nature.

Afghanistan. During their first year in Afghanistan, the Soviets succeeded in keeping in power a pro-Soviet, Marxist government and in denying Afghanistan to the West and China. But they failed to quell domestic resistance or to generate widespread support for the Babrak Karmal government. Despite some recent show of flexibility in regard to negotiations, there are no indications that Soviet determination to stay in Afghanistan is weakening, or that major changes are in the offing.

Notwithstanding their insistence that the Afghanistan situation is returning to "normal," the Soviets still face significant opposition and serious problems. Neither they nor the Kabul government controls the provinces; the Afghan Army continues to disintegrate despite concerted conscription efforts and local defense plans. Though relatively poorly equipped and organized, the guerrilla forces have taken a toll on Soviet equipment and personnel; roads and cities are still vulnerable to attack. The ruling People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) remains divided, in power only because of the Soviet presence. The Soviets, however, still have not chosen to increase the size of

their force. Instead, they have adopted new tactics built around more mobile ground forces and the use of helicopter and aircraft strikes. In addition, they are building troop housing, stronger defense positions, and permanent logistic and support bases.

Moscow's red-carpet treatment for Karmal during his visit to the USSR in October put to rest earlier rumors that the Soviets were dissatisfied with his performance and considering a replacement. The Soviets made clear their continued military and economic support, repeated earlier claims that the only realistic approach to a negotiated settlement was the Afghan peace plan of May 14, and re-emphasized the need to broaden the base of the Afghan party. The USSR continues to send in party and government delegations to train the Afghans in party and government work. It no doubt approved, if it did not engineer, Karmal's effort at the end of the year to form a National Fatherland Front in order to create the illusion of broad-based popular support. It probably was also instrumental in cooling the open warfare between the two wings of the Afghan party, the Parcham and the Khalq. But whatever the problems in Afghanistan itself, the Soviets seemed to believe they had seen the worst in terms of international reaction. Although the November 20 UN vote of censure was unwelcome, Moscow probably judged that Soviet intervention was slowly being accepted as a fait accompli.

Soviet diplomacy in the region meanwhile centered on Pakistan. In a speech on August 28, Brezhnev called on Islamabad to "cease its counter-revolutionary intervention" in Afghanistan. In September, Soviet Ambassador Smirnov warned that the USSR might soon feel compelled to attack Afghan insurgent bases and refugee camps in Pakistan. There were repeated shallow Soviet/Afghan air and ground incursions into Pakistan, reports of intensified Soviet contacts with President Zia's domestic opposition and separatist elements in the country, and sweeping propaganda attacks on Pakistani policies. At the same time, however, the Soviets developed an inconclusive dialogue with Islamabad on the issue of a political settlement for Afghanistan, probing for signs of greater Pakistani accommodation. In this context, they probably found it promising that the Islamic Conference meeting in Saudi Arabia in late January softened its resolution on Afghanistan at Pakistani urging.

The USSR and the Middle East. The primary focus of Soviet policy in the Middle East, nevertheless, remained the Persian Gulf and the Iran-Iraq war. Although Moscow obviously hoped that the war would generate new opportunities for Soviet influence, its immediate objectives were to limit any damage to Soviet interests in the Gulf and head off developments that might work to US advantage.

Iran-Iraq War. From the first, the USSR adopted a position of neutrality, apparently informing the Iraqis that they would receive no major arms deliveries as long as hostilities continued. Within days of the outbreak of fighting, the Soviets called for a ceasefire and negotiations, arguing that the war served only to divert attention from the core Middle East issue--the Arab-Israeli conflict--and was playing into US hands. Despite the pretense of neutrality, this initial stance favored Baghdad; Moscow apparently was then estimating that the conflict would be short and end in an Iraqi victory.

By early October, when it became clear that the war would be protracted, the Soviets began to right their tilt. They officially supported Cuban and nonaligned movement initiatives calling for a withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Iran, turned a blind eye toward Syrian and Libyan military aid to Tehran, and made a show of support for Iraq's traditional rival in the region, Syria.

The Soviets unquestionably consider Iran the greater geopolitical prize in the region and, given Iraqi dependence upon Soviet arms, evidently calculated that they had room to maneuver vis-a-vis Baghdad despite likely short-term friction. By late November or early December, however, the level of friction seemed to Moscow sufficiently acute to warrant its authorizing a step-up--albeit slightly--in at least East European arms deliveries to Iraq. The Soviets probably see no real alternative to a zigzagging if they are to preserve any hope of eventually improving relations with Iran and capitalizing on their investment in Syria. Thus, they still view a ceasefire and negotiated settlement as the most desirable outcome of the war. Such a denouement, they calculate, could also pave the way for broader international discussions of oil and Gulf security in which the USSR can carve a niche for itself along the lines suggested by Brezhnev during his visit to India in early December.

Persian Gulf Proposals. In his December 10 address to the Indian Parliament, Brezhnev surfaced the long-expected Soviet initiative on security of the Persian Gulf and its oil lanes. The five-point proposal was a collation of earlier Soviet servings on the subject, and probably reflected a perception that the Iran-Iraq war had increased international receptivity to some such arrangement. Moscow probably had few illusions that the proposals would become the basis of actual negotiations. Indeed, Brezhnev did not even suggest how they might be put into effect. Rather, the aim seemed merely to discourage support for any US military presence in the region and keep alive the notion that the USSR has a legitimate role there. Nor did the lukewarm international reaction to the proposals deter the USSR from advertising them as examples of Soviet interest in peaceful solutions to

38a

knotty international problems--in contrast to the US threat to the region. That line became particularly strident in January as the hostage situation moved toward solution.

Iran. Repeated Soviet efforts to improve relations with Iran continued to be frustrated; the record of Soviet support for Iraq, continued Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, and basic Iranian suspicions of Soviet intentions in Iran and the Gulf all worked against any change in Tehran's attitude. Although the Soviets were able to exploit the trade embargo on Iran to increase their exports to Iran almost twofold over the year, they proved unable to translate this into significant political influence. Moreover, Iranian natural gas deliveries still have not been resumed; Soviet imports from Iran have dropped by almost half as a result.

The Soviets are concerned that the Iran-Iraq war will improve the position of the Iranian moderates and military who tend to be relatively more anti-Soviet and more pro-Western, as well as desirous of access to Western arms. It was in part to counter this possibility that Moscow cut off major military deliveries to Iraq and may even have approached the Iranians with arms offers (if so, they were rebuffed). Since the hostage release, the USSR has again been trumpeting the threat of US military intervention and warning that the US would remain Iran's principal foe. The Soviet-supported clandestine radio, the National Voice of Iran, is also charging that the moderates who pushed for the hostages' release are enemies of the Islamic Revolution.

The continued Soviet intervention in Afghanistan worked against such efforts, however. On the December 27 anniversary of the invasion, a group of Afghan students stormed the Soviet Embassy in Tehran. A Soviet protest two weeks later (January 12) warned that the USSR would protect its personnel in Iran if Tehran could not. The Iranians, who did little to hide their sympathy for the Afghan students, replied sharply, comparing the USSR to other "imperialist" powers, even while apologizing for the incident and thanking the Soviets for support during the embargo.

Syria. Although the Syrian-Soviet friendship treaty was under negotiation well before the Iran-Iraq war began, the conflict probably made the treaty all the more attractive to the USSR. Moscow has long sought to codify its relationship with Syria, which has now replaced Egypt as the pivotal Soviet client in the Middle East. For Moscow, the treaty testifies to its continuing influence in the area and its ability to maneuver diplomatically there in the wake of Afghanistan. In addition, the Soviets presumably expect that the treaty will pave the way for closer Soviet-Syrian ties and possibly increased access to Syrian military facilities, especially at Tartus and Latakia.

39

The treaty closely resembles those the USSR has signed with other Third World countries. Although far from a mutual defense pact, it does pledge continued military cooperation and coordination of positions when either party's security is threatened and emphasizes the need to strengthen military ties. It also calls for regular consultations on "problems of the Middle East"; the USSR evidently hopes thereby to influence future Syrian decision-making in this area.

Despite the treaty, Moscow and Damascus have sharply divergent views of their relationship. Syria presumably solicited even stronger guarantees that the USSR would come to its aid in a confrontation with Israel; Moscow for its part would be reluctant to make such commitments for fear that Damascus might be emboldened to try adventures that would lead to confrontation with the US. Although the Soviets apparently are now willing to provide Syria with more arms, they still seem hesitant about filling all Syrian requests. Nevertheless, they gave the speedy ratification of the treaty unprecedented propaganda coverage, again signaling the importance of Damascus in the Soviet scheme of things.

The first strains under the new treaty came with the Syrian-Jordanian military confrontation in late November--the Soviets were clearly irritated by Syrian failure to consult with them. Candidate Politburo member Kuznetsov's trip to Damascus to exchange treaty ratification instruments accidentally coincided with the Syrian action, which tended to create the impression that the USSR approved the Syrian decision to increase tensions. During his visit, in any event, Kuznetsov reportedly advised caution and restraint.

Jordan. Although Moscow's embarrassment over the Syrian-Jordanian confrontation was temporary, it complicated Soviet efforts to improve ties with Amman. Even before the Syrian move, the Soviets had postponed King Hussein's scheduled trip to Moscow for fear it would appear that they were countenancing Jordan's support for Iraq in the Iran-Iraq conflict. They also apparently shelved plans for extending military aid to Amman for the time being even while persisting in their efforts to exploit Jordanian differences with the US over Camp David.

Arabian Peninsula. Periodic hints about its interest in improving relations with Saudi Arabia notwithstanding, the USSR evidently expects little change on this score as long as the present Saudi leadership remains in power and the Soviets stay in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the Soviets are concentrating on improving their ties with the Yemen Arab Republic and broadening their relationship with the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen as a way of assuring Soviet influence in the peninsula. Military

39a

deliveries to Sanaa increased over the last year, training and cultural programs were expanded, and new economic aid was extended. Aden meanwhile continued to support Soviet policy in Afghanistan and to allow the USSR access to its naval facilities.

North Africa. Soviet-Libyan relations still depend primarily on Soviet willingness to supply Tripoli with advanced military equipment, but the Syrian-Libyan "merger" raised questions about the future course of the relationship. The USSR apparently moved to get Syria's signature on a friendship treaty before the Syrian-Libyan plan went any further (but probably did not expect the merger to amount to much). On the other hand, there were rumors that the Soviets and Libyans might sign a treaty of their own. Moscow's response to Libya's intervention in Chad and merger talk there was to criticize the French and imply guarded approval of Tripoli's action. Nevertheless, the Soviets seemed concerned that Qadafi had overreached himself and that Soviet relations with France could be adversely affected.

Indirect Soviet assistance continues to go to the Polisario by way of both Algeria and Libya. Concurrent Soviet attempts to expand relations with Morocco beyond the economic sphere elicit little response because of that fact. Morocco's seizure of several Soviet trawlers in its Atlantic fishing grounds has not helped the atmosphere.

Sub-Saharan Africa. During the last half of 1980, the USSR confined its activities in sub-Saharan Africa largely to consolidating ties with its main clients.

Ethiopia occupied pride of place in this context, largely because of the already sizable Soviet political and military investment there and the country's strategic location. Soviet use of Ethiopian port facilities continued; that of Dahlak Island may have expanded. During Mengistu's two-week visit to the USSR in October-November, Brezhnev expressed satisfaction with the relationship but again underscored the importance Moscow attached to the development of a vanguard political party as an instrument for assuring political stability (and continued Soviet influence). But despite Brezhnev's promise of continued support for the Ethiopian revolution, he evidently did not agree to advance significant economic aid to Addis Ababa. Indeed, Ethiopian disappointment with the amount of assistance Moscow was willing to give apparently has stimulated Ethiopian consideration of soliciting Western assistance. The Soviets, however, seem confident that Mengistu's dependence on Soviet arms and Cuban troops will prevent any major policy shift.

US indications of interest in Somali port facilities triggered another widespread Soviet propaganda campaign about the alleged

dangers of an expanded US military presence in the Horn and stimulated further Soviet approaches to Siad. But no change in the stalemated Somali-Soviet relationship was apparent.

In Uganda, Moscow treated Obote's return to power positively and quickly extended offers for scholarships and cultural training. It probably is prepared to resume a military aid relationship as well if Kampala shows any responsiveness.

Soviet promises of continued support for Mozambique's "principled" stand on Afghanistan and other international issues accompanied Machel's visit to Moscow in November. According to the communique, both sides pledged improved party-to-party ties, but, as with Mengistu, no major economic aid program was revealed. Subsequently, however, the Soviets may have offered aid to counter Western grants, and Maputo announced that Mozambique intended to join CEMA.

The USSR still had no diplomatic ties with Zimbabwe. Soviet contacts with Mugabe throughout the fall evidently came to nothing because of Moscow's refusal to sever its ties with Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), the main recipient of Soviet aid during the civil war.

Zambia has now received its first deliveries of Soviet arms under the military agreement concluded a year ago, although Soviet influence there has not perceptibly increased. The Soviets presumably take some satisfaction from the fact that the arms deal they apparently have finally concluded with neighboring Botswana now gives them arms-supply relationships with all the Frontline states except Zimbabwe. Furthermore, there are reports that the Soviet presence in Madagascar may have increased and that Moscow will be helping the development of Malagasy military facilities.

The latest turn in the Namibian negotiations sparked Soviet media warnings that the West was using the negotiations as a stalling tactic to aid South Africa. Privately, Soviet officials intimated that the impasse gave them no choice but to increase their military support of the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO).

The rumored Congolese visit to the USSR, during which a friendship treaty was to be signed, failed to materialize. Similarly, the contemplated visit of the new Liberian regime head, M. Sgt. Doe, evidently was shelved. The USSR did, however, finally reach accord with Nigeria over the construction of the Abeokuta steel complex.

40a

Sino-Soviet Relations. The vociferous Soviet media campaign against China continued, in tandem with continued Soviet professions of interest in normalizing Sino-Soviet relations. Soviet leaders are evidently agreed that current Chinese domestic developments reflect factional infighting among an elite that shares a common hostility toward the USSR. They therefore expect little in the way of rapprochement in the near future. The current Soviet objective therefore is to limit external assistance to Beijing's modernization efforts, restrain US military aid and defense cooperation, and discourage Western Europe and Japan from closer economic and defense ties with Beijing.

Northeast Asia. Moscow and Tokyo intensified their criticism of each other in recent months. Soviet leaders repeatedly warned the Suzuki government against closer defense cooperation with the US and China and accused Tokyo of fabricating a "Soviet threat" to justify expansion of Japanese military activities demanded by Washington. In August, the USSR towed a crippled nuclear submarine through Japanese waters despite Tokyo's objections, an incident that, together with the disputes over Afghanistan and the Northern Territories, made for a tense confrontation between Gromyko and Japanese Foreign Minister Ito at the UN in September. Presumably to ease the situation, the Soviet Union hosted a Soviet-Japanese "Public Roundtable" in November; more than 130 Japanese politicians, businessmen, and academicians met with Soviet colleagues to discuss ways of improving the bilateral atmosphere.

Soviet leaders evidently expect no significant warming of relations with North Korea for the time being. They are especially unhappy with Pyongyang's continued criticism of Vietnam's involvement in Kampuchea and with North Korean failure to support the USSR on Afghanistan.

South Asia. In a major speech in August, Brezhnev praised India for playing an "important role" in Asia; Soviet media extolled the Indo-USSR Friendship Treaty as an example of "organic unity between socialist and nonaligned states" and depicted India as the cornerstone of the Soviet position in the Third World. Moscow remains India's primary arms supplier, and Soviet-Indian trade almost doubled in the past year. Indian President Reddy paid a cordial and well-publicized ceremonial visit to the USSR in October.

Brezhnev's stay in New Delhi was only partially successful, however. Despite a lavish official welcome, street demonstrations and public comments by Indian leaders about Afghanistan frustrated Moscow's hopes of focusing the visit exclusively on positive aspects of the Indo-Soviet relationship. Furthermore, India failed to endorse the Persian Gulf security initiative announced by Brezhnev during his stay; Gandhi promised only "careful consideration."

Southeast Asia. Soviet assistance continued to keep Vietnam's economy afloat while Soviet advisers played an increasingly visible role throughout the Indochina peninsula, reinforcing Vietnam's dominance but also strengthening the USSR's own position in Laos and Kampuchea. The Soviet Navy expanded its air and naval operations off the Indochina coast and consolidated its operations at Cam Ranh Bay. The USSR did, however, attempt to discourage Vietnamese military operations across the Thai-Kampuchean border. It sought to shift the blame for clashes that occurred to Thailand, China, and the US.

Evidently to divert international discussion of Kampuchea away from the question of the Heng Samrin regime's legitimacy, the Soviet Ambassador to Thailand proposed (January 22) that the nations of Southeast Asia meet for a general discussion of regional problems including Kampuchea. He added that Hanoi was prepared to withdraw its troops when outside interference from Thai territory ceased. The proposal, repeated publicly by the Indochinese Foreign Ministers on January 27, clearly seemed designed to undercut the October UN General Assembly resolution calling for an international (rather than regional) conference on Kampuchea.

ASEAN concerns over Vietnamese and Soviet military activities in the region meanwhile worked against any expansion of Moscow's meager economic and cultural ties with Asia. Malaysia and Indonesia, traditionally more fearful of China than of the USSR, became increasingly suspicious of Soviet intentions. Moscow's already cool relations with Singapore were further chilled by the abrupt Soviet cancellation of Prime Minister Lee's scheduled September visit to the USSR. Soviet efforts to woo the Philippines proved of little avail; Manila once again refused to grant landing rights to Aeroflot. Although Moscow may have gained some ground with Thailand as a result of recent bilateral discussions on the Kampuchean issue, Bangkok nevertheless reacted sharply to the movement of the aircraft carrier Minsk into the Gulf of Thailand in late October. Soviet leaders for their part indicated increasing concern over ASEAN's links to the West, particularly with respect to the planned resumption of Commonwealth military exercises involving Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Malaysia, and possibly Thailand.

Latin America. Clear evidence came to light in January that the Soviet Union, though not a direct supplier itself, was closely involved in planning a concerted international communist arms supply effort to aid the El Salvador insurgents. The evidence showed that some East European states, Vietnam, and Ethiopia were participating in the effort. Although most of the arms came through Cuba, donor countries took pains to obscure the origin of the arms they supplied. In the face of this expose', Moscow escalated its charges that Washington was trying to divert

4/a

attention from planned US military intervention in El Salvador and warned that such interference would prolong the conflict and spread it to other countries of the region. The USSR appeared apprehensive, however, that Cuba's surrogate role in an area of such high American concern would embroil Cuba with the US. Marshal Ogarkov's visit to Havana in February was evidently intended, at least in part, to reassure Castro of Soviet support.

Soviet relations with Nicaragua, meanwhile, expanded quietly with the initial implementation of various cooperation agreements signed in 1980 and the establishment of an air link between Moscow and Managua via Havana. There was still no significant infusion of Soviet aid to the Nicaraguan economy, however.

Expectations that US policy toward Latin America as a whole would become more assertive under the new US administration evidently prompted the many Soviet propaganda warnings against US attempts to prevent Nicaraguan-style revolutions elsewhere in Latin America. But despite declarations that the revolutionary tide was now irreversible, there was a defensive note in the Soviet stance which was also reflected in Cuban pronouncements. Both Moscow and Havana seemed to perceive the need for mutual shows of solidarity, a mood particularly manifest at the Second Cuban Communist Party Congress in December, where Soviet Politburo member Chernenko pledged Soviet support for Cuba, and Castro for the first time personally gave unequivocal backing to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Moscow was careful, however, to avoid any overt actions in the region that might precipitate difficulties with the new US administration.

In South America, Soviet attention remained fixed on developing commercial ties and building more balanced trade relationships with Argentina and Brazil. Soviet officials evidently hoped that an expansion of markets for Soviet products, mainly electric power equipment, would follow increased Soviet purchases of Latin American agricultural products and help offset the unfavorable trade balance. The announced sale of heavy water to Argentina for development of nuclear power facilities promised greater cooperation in that field as well. At the same time, Brezhnev's invitation to the Brazilian President to visit the Soviet Union and an exchange of Brazilian-Soviet parliamentary delegations attested to the Soviet intent to cultivate political ties in tandem with commercial ones.

THE SITUATION IN EASTERN EUROPE

Relations Between Communist Countries and Parties

Warsaw Pact. Warsaw Pact leaders met in Moscow on December 5 in an extraordinary session on Poland. Soviet military preparations

and troop movements had raised the specter of intervention, but no signal for immediate military action emerged from the meetings. Instead, the communique expressed confidence in Poland's ability to overcome its difficulties, although military intervention was not ruled out. The communique pledged "firm, fraternal solidarity and support" to Poland, which "has been, is, and will remain a socialist state." Following the summit, the military situation in and around Poland remained essentially unchanged, with the Soviet forces remaining in a position to intervene quickly if necessary.

Romanian Foreign Minister Andrei's meeting with Brezhnev in Moscow on December 2 apparently was aimed at ensuring that the summit would take no decisions counter to Romania's opposition to intervention. Andrei probably also sought a broadening of the summit agenda to avoid the appearance that Romania was interfering in the internal affairs of another socialist state. In any event, the communique gave formalistic treatment to several international issues, notably the Pact proposal for a Conference on Military Detente and Disarmament in Europe (CMD); this served as a fillip for the Poles, who tabled the proposal on December 8 at the CSCE review conference in Madrid. (The Pact's Deputy Foreign Ministers reviewed their strategy for the second phase of the CSCE conference at a meeting on January 19-20 in East Berlin.)

The Pact summit was preceded by a regular session of the Defense Ministers Committee on December 1-3 in Bucharest. The defense ministers discussed "current activities of Joint Armed Forces" and probably the changes in Soviet military command announced on December 4. The latter involved the designation of General Zaytsev as Commander of the Soviet Group of Forces, Germany, replacing General Ivanovskiy, and the departure from Czechoslovakia of Colonel General Yazov, Commander of the Soviet Central Group of Forces. These changes were not expected to affect Soviet military command and operational capabilities. Pact Commander in Chief Kulikov's various visits in January to Pact capitals, including Warsaw and Bucharest, were consistent with the annual series of consultative visits made in connection with current training exercises. The exercises during the period appeared to be ones normally scheduled for that time of the year.

CEMA. The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance remained preoccupied with energy issues and its efforts to obtain European Community acceptance of recent CEMA proposals for a cooperation agreement. The CEMA Executive Committee meeting in Moscow on January 13-15 called for a better rationalization of raw material and energy resource usage and urged new proposals to ensure the fulfillment of energy requirements through 1990. (There have been indications that the USSR may scale down the pledges it made at

the CEMA summit in June 1980 to maintain oil deliveries over the next five years at 1980 levels.) The communique failed to mention the status of CEMA's dialogue with the EC, probably reflecting pique over the lack of progress.

The Internal Situation

The Polish Crisis. The legalization of Solidarity in November did not dampen the Polish crisis. Confrontations between the trade unions and the authorities multiplied and wildcat strikes fueled the contest for prestige and authority between Solidarity and the Kania regime.

Relative quiet during the Christmas-New Year period quickly gave way to a cycle of confrontations and compromises, each further humiliating the party and only temporarily easing the crisis. Repeated demonstrations of the party's weakness led to heightened Soviet concern and increased pressure on Kania to reassert the party's authority.

The elevation of Defense Minister Jaruzelski, a nationalist who publicly exemplifies discipline, integrity, and restraint with regard to the use of force, to the premiership suggests that Kania has won more time to seek a peaceful internal solution to the country's problems. Kania's speech at the 8th plenum and Jaruzelski's maiden speech to the Sejm point to a continuation of the carrot-and-stick approach, pairing willingness to conduct a dialogue with Solidarity with calls for discipline and veiled threats of force.

Jaruzelski's call for a 90-day moratorium on strikes was tentatively accepted by the Solidarity leadership on the understanding that there would be a genuine dialogue and no reprisals against strike leaders. Walesa depicted the February 10 Supreme Court ruling that private peasants may form associations but not unions as a "draw," and Rural Solidarity did not reject the ruling outright. The more active intervention of the church, especially Cardinal Wyszynski's call (February 9) for the unions to eschew political demands, could contribute significantly to the stabilization process.

Despite those promising developments, prospects for near-term consolidation of the party-state leadership remain uncertain. Should the party come up with imaginative reforms at its 9th Congress, its stature could begin to improve. Such a program, however, would have to fire the imagination of a population too often disappointed in the past.

Impact on Eastern Europe. Most of the other regimes in Eastern Europe have become increasingly concerned about the possible

repercussions of the Polish crisis on their own policies and populations, particularly if Polish workers wrest lasting political and economic concessions from the Kania leadership. Some of the regimes seem to have deep misgivings about being required by Moscow to give economic assistance to Warsaw. Such assistance not only would tax their already hard-pressed economies, but also would increase resentment within populations already disgruntled about declining living standards. Poland's failure to deliver planned amounts of coal and other supplies to Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Romania has already adversely affected the functioning of these economies; further disruptions appear certain as the confrontations between the Polish regime and Solidarity continue.

Prior to the Jaruzelski appointment, the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Romania--which feel most vulnerable to any spillover of the Polish "contagion"--took measures underscoring their apprehension and concern:

- To curb Western influences, above all those from the FRG, the GDR increased the minimum daily exchange rates for Western visitors, a step that has already resulted in a marked decline in these visits. The GDR also abolished visa-free travel between East Germany and Poland, reducing contacts between Poles and East Germans. Efforts to strengthen Abgrenzung vis-a-vis the FRG included a tougher stance against institutions and persons perceived as abetting alleged FRG "penetration" of the GDR--e.g., the Evangelical (Lutheran) Church. The activities of several FRG journalists, and of some East German authors seeking to publish in the FRG, were restricted.
- Czechoslovakia also implemented travel restrictions vis-a-vis Poland. Longstanding factionalism within the Prague leadership may have been exacerbated by the Polish crisis; relevant party discussions were said to have revealed deep divisions between dogmatists and moderates over ways to react to the crisis and to prevent a similar occurrence in Czechoslovakia. These divisions may have prompted the sudden appearance of CPSU leader Kirilenko in Prague in late October. In any event, Czechoslovakia's strident attacks on Solidarity and "anti-socialist elements" in Poland suggest that the dogmatists retained Soviet support and that Prague was serving as surrogate for Moscow in its approach to Polish developments. Some dogmatists were also said to have opposed the January 1981 introduction of a cautious reform of the economy, arguing that, because of the mounting uncertainties in Poland, no experiments should be undertaken in Czechoslovakia; the limited reforms were nevertheless introduced on schedule.

43a

--Ceausescu, after criticizing the Gierek leadership for its failures to prevent the crisis and railing against the concept of independent trade unions in a communist society, returned to his original position of avoiding criticism of Poland and asserting that it must be left alone to resolve its own problems. He apparently decided that it would be dangerous for him to stray from basic tenets of Romania's independent foreign policy even though the Polish example posed a potential threat to his style of rule and policy priorities. Foreign policy nonconformity remains his main claim to political legitimacy.

Neither Bulgaria nor Hungary felt as threatened by events in Poland, but both monitored the situation closely. In contrast to the fears of hardline regimes that the Polish situation would increase pressures on them for relaxation of domestic political and economic policies, the moderate Kadar leadership was concerned that its relatively innovative policies, above all its economic reform program, would be jeopardized if there were Soviet intervention and a consequent tightening of internal controls throughout the area. The nonaligned Yugoslav leadership meanwhile stressed that Polish problems must be resolved by the Poles themselves, without outside pressure or interference. Yugoslav officials remained concerned that an eventual Soviet resort to force would seriously threaten detente and undermine Yugoslavia's security.

Economic Slowdown. Economic growth in Eastern Europe slowed to about one-half percent in 1980, its lowest annual rate in the postwar period. GNP growth rates ranged from a 4-percent increase in Romania to a 4-percent decline in Poland. Much of the slowdown in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania was attributable to slower growth in industrial production. Labor unrest, a 12-percent drop in agricultural output, and a breakdown in economic leadership accounted for Poland's disastrous year--the GNP decreased by 4 percent following a lesser decline in 1979. East Germany and Czechoslovakia, the most advanced CEMA economies, showed increased, if lackluster, growth rates, caused in part by higher farm output.

The deterioration in the Polish economy continued to have repercussions throughout CEMA. Soviet assistance to Poland, through additional deliveries of industrial raw materials, consumer items, and foodstuffs, came in part at the expense of the Soviet Union's other CEMA customers; and promises of additional oil and gas shipments came at a time when Soviet supplies for export were leveling off. Thus such countries as East Germany and Czechoslovakia, which receive at present virtually all of their oil and gas from the USSR, may have to use scarce hard-currency resources to purchase elsewhere.

Poland's failure to maintain coal exports has had a substantial effect on supplies available for export to CEMA countries. Warsaw

publicly acknowledged that shipments to the Soviet Union were stopped in November while deliveries to other CEMA countries were cut back by two-thirds. Such shortfalls were certainly considered at the January CEMA meetings in Moscow and have contributed to delays in concluding Poland's 1981-85 trade protocols.

The lessons of the Polish economic catastrophe have not been lost on other East Europeans. The consequences of allowing hard-currency indebtedness to grow have accelerated East European efforts to boost exports to the West while limiting imports. Hungary has made this a top priority and managed to reduce its 1980 account deficit to just \$0.2 billion, the lowest in the region. Romania, on the other hand, had a record current account deficit of \$2.3 billion in 1980; the Romanian hard-currency debt increased by \$2.6 billion, largely through a buildup of short-term debt. The Polish debt situation--i.e., threatened default or rescheduling--is viewed with great concern throughout Eastern Europe, given its potential impact on Western lenders' attitudes toward the area as a whole.

Hungary continued to move toward economic reform, combining three ministries concerned with the industrial sector into one. The new Ministry of Industry will have half the staff of its predecessors, as well as a reduced role in economic management. The Hungarian five-year plan itself includes but general targets, serving more as a policy statement than a specific program. Poland instituted a small reform program in January, keyed to reducing central direction in some sectors and placing enterprises on a profit basis, although the measures are expected to have little effect on the country's deteriorating economy. The Hungarian case aside, true reform in Eastern Europe--decentralization and far-reaching price reform through market mechanisms--remains politically unpalatable. Some quarters, however, are beginning to accept a need for some change, given declines in the growth of output and productivity.

The Situation in Yugoslavia and Albania

Yugoslavia. The performance of the post-Tito leadership continued to be impressive. The party-state collegium tackled previously neglected, pressing economic problems and hammered out compromises on controversial issues involving ethnic/regional relationships and federal-republic prerogatives. Additional measures were taken to strengthen the collective, rotating leadership. Yugoslav-Soviet relations improved, as well as those with neighboring Albania and Bulgaria. Tito's successors repeatedly underscored their commitment to his long-established policies of self-management, national independence, unity, and nonalignment.

The virtual paralysis of the nonaligned movement and Yugoslavia's diminished influence in it following Tito's death

95

have, however, raised questions about foreign policy priorities. Some ranking officials also find the growing dependence of the Yugoslav economy on trade with the USSR a disquieting development. Moreover, efforts to improve the economy--the most critical issue confronting the leadership--may force changes in the economic "autarky" of individual republics. Failure to cope with rising inflation (40 percent), chronic unemployment (12 percent), trade imbalances, uncontrolled investments, low productivity, etc., is likely to exacerbate latent ethnic/republic tensions and affect the credibility and viability of the collective leadership.

Since Tito's death, the pace of political life in Yugoslavia has quickened. A public debate is under way on how best to resolve the country's economic problems; intellectuals and dissidents have called for greater political and cultural freedom; the media have attacked corruption and mismanagement. It has become increasingly clear that differences exist within the party-government leadership on a wide range of political, security, cultural, economic, and foreign policy issues. How these differences are resolved--i.e., whether favoring so-called reformers or conservatives--will have a major impact on the future direction of Yugoslav society.

Albania. The Albanian Government continued to press unsuccessfully for solutions to the few outstanding disputes it has with Western Europe. Its continuing insistence on the unconditional delivery of the gold held by the Tripartite Gold Commission, unwillingness to honor the World Court award of compensation to the United Kingdom for the Corfu Channel incident, and demands for war-time reparations from the Federal Republic of Germany prevented movement toward establishment of diplomatic ties with the UK and the FRG. The reception of the first Spanish trade delegation in Albania last fall signaled, however, a friendlier climate between Tirana and Madrid that could ultimately lead to diplomatic ties. A token of Albania's glacial opening up to the rest of the world was the visit to Tirana of UNESCO Director General M'Bow in October, the first high-level UN agency official to visit that country.

In contrast, Albania registered considerable progress in consolidating economic ties with its neighbors. Five-year trade agreements (1981-85) were renewed with all East European countries. The agreements with Romania in October (a trade protocol for 1981 and the long-term agreement for 1981-85) also provided for "important increases" that could transform Romania into one of Albania's leading trade partners (Yugoslavia ranks first). Most significant, however, was the confirmation that Albania was to be included in plans for construction of a "Trans-Balkan Railway," which ultimately will connect the Albanian port of Durres, via the Yugoslav railway system, with the Bulgarian port of Varna.

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BY KML NARA DATE 9/25/12

EUROCOMMUNISM AT THE 26th CPSU CONGRESS

The treatment of the theme of "socialist unity" by Soviet speakers and by representatives of pro-Soviet Communist parties at the Soviet Party Congress verified that Moscow remains unforgiving of independent tendencies in the international Communist movement that do not serve Moscow's interests. Indeed, the Soviets' heavyhanded attempts to muzzle the Italian Communists in particular suggest that concern over the appeal of Eurocommunism is now at least as great as at any time during the past five years. Nevertheless, unlike the 25th CPSU Congress in 1976 which saw a virtual open debate on the validity of the concept of independent roads to socialism, Moscow in 1981 sought to avoid the appearance of debilitating dissension. In part, this reflects Moscow's concern that the Eurocommunist heresy not detract from broader Soviet policy objectives during a time of heightened East-West tensions.

The Eurocommunist Problem, Then . . .

A comparison of the two most recent Congresses and the impact on them of Eurocommunism is revealing. There had been relatively restrained allusions to diversity among Communist parties by a number of European delegations at the 24th CPSU Congress in 1971, but by 1976 the impulse toward self-determination had assumed the dimensions of a movement under the leadership of the three major Communist parties in Western Europe. CPSU Central Committee Secretary Mikhail Suslov opened the 25th Congress by noting proudly the presence of delegates from 103 Communist and Workers' parties and national liberation movements, but the leaders of the French and Spanish Communist parties were not among them--an unprecedented snub to the Soviet party

In 1976, General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, in an obvious attempt to preempt the ideological high ground,

19 March 1981

4

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stressed in his keynote address the duty of all Communists to preserve and defend the Marxist-Leninist foundations of the Communist movement, to accept "proletarian internationalism" as its main precept, and to resist ideological concessions to achieve short-term political advantages. Belorussian Party Secretary Petr Masherov issued a more direct warning to the independent-minded West European Communists:

Unfortunately, there are still champions of socialism who, on the pretext of defending their so-called "originality" and national peculiarities, are essentially revising the principles of proletarian internationalism and emasculating the revolutionary essence of Marxism-Leninism and its class-action character. . . . Our party and the Soviet people, possessing the entire wealth of revolutionary theory and the colossal experience of struggle against forces hostile to socialism, are well aware of the value of all kinds of attempts to, so to speak, "modernize" Marxism and stretch it into "national compartments." [redacted]

Italian Communist Party (PCI) General Secretary Enrico Berlinguer, leader of the largest Communist party in Western Europe, defended the principles of Eurocommunism in his address to the Congress. Responding to the major points of the Brezhnev and Masherov speeches, Berlinguer underlined differences of view on a number of issues, including key ideological questions; pointedly omitted any laudatory reference to "proletarian internationalism," which has become recognized as shorthand for subservience to Moscow's authority; and reiterated the PCI's opposition to any "foreign interference" in its affairs, implicitly including Soviet influence. Representatives of the French, Danish, British, Belgian, and Austrian delegations also made statements noting differences among Communists and/or advocating independent approaches to socialism. [redacted]

The debate continued beyond the conclusion of the Congress. Suslov, in an address to the Soviet Academy of Sciences two weeks later, delivered a panegyric to the principle of proletarian internationalism that was designed to chastise and instruct the unorthodox Europeans. Probably intended also as a directive for the conference of European Communist parties that was

19 March 1981

scheduled to convene in June in East Berlin, Suslov's speech was uncompromising in asserting the doctrine that all Communist parties must accept the same basic theoretical principles and warned that " . . . those things the opportunists present as some 'regional' or 'national' version of Marxism have nothing in common with revolutionary theory and do harm to the cause of the working class."

[redacted]

. . . and Now

The 26th CPSU Congress was, on the surface, more harmonious than its predecessor. Memories of the glaring absence of the French and Spanish party leaders from the earlier Congress clearly continued to rankle, however, and, in a noteworthy departure from tradition, Suslov did not welcome foreign delegations by name. The French and Spanish Communist Party (PCF and PCE) leaders, Georges Marchais and Santiago Carrillo, again were not in attendance (although, this time, Marchais's absence was not taken as an affront by the Soviets, who accepted his explanation that it was necessary because of the demands of his campaign for the French presidency). This time, however, Berlinguer, who had never missed a CPSU Congress since assuming the PCI leadership, was also absent. [redacted]

[redacted]

Brezhnev, in his opening speech, again tried to gain the initial advantage on the issue of Moscow's leadership of the international Communist movement. He magnanimously conceded that "we (Soviets) are not at all of the opinion that everything has been ideal in our country," and asserted that "we listen attentively to comradely and constructive criticism." But, as in 1976, he drew a clear line for the Eurocommunists and those who would emulate them:

However, we are resolutely against criticism which distorts socialist reality, thus rendering, willy-nilly, a service to imperialist propaganda, the class enemy. Our party proceeds from the fact that differences in opinions between Communists can be overcome provided, of course, they are not differences in principle, between revolutionaries and reformers, between creative Marxism and dogmatic sectarianism, ultraleftist adventurism. Here, naturally enough, there can be no compromise, today as during the times of Lenin.

19 March 1981

To underscore his point, the General Secretary pointedly omitted the Italian and Spanish parties from a list of "fraternal parties" in Europe with which the CPSU maintained good relations. Ukrainian Central Committee First Secretary Vladimir Shcherbitskiy, like Masherov five years before, underlined elements in Brezhnev's address for the Eurocommunists:

There is a particularly increasing need for unity and a principled internationalist position of the fraternal socialist countries and the Communist and Workers' parties. History clearly teaches that any attempt to disassociate oneself from the experience of real socialism and to put in question the international character of Leninism inevitably leads to the loss of class orientation and, in the final analysis, causes enormous harm to the people of one's own country, to the world revolutionary process, and to the cause of struggle for peace.

[redacted]



Pravda ©

Alvaro Cunhal, General Secretary of the Portuguese Communist Party [redacted]



Pravda ©

Gaston Plissonier, French Communist Party Politburo member and head of the PCF delegation [redacted]

19 March 1981

At this Congress, no strong voice and supporting chorus were permitted to sound counterpoint to the Soviets' theme. Neither the PCF delegation, which during the past year has largely returned to the Soviet fold, nor the Spanish party's representatives, who left Moscow* before they could make their address, disturbed the apparent harmony of the Congress. The dissenting voice of the Italian party was rudely and not effectively stilled. Most of the remaining West European parties duly paid homage to the twin principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. Alvaro Cunhal, leader of the pro-Soviet Portuguese Communist Party, averred that "reactionary forces are putting great pressure on Communist parties, striving to force them to break or weaken their ties of fraternal friendship with the CPSU and the Soviet people." Cunhal later reassured a press conference in Moscow that "Eurocommunism as a tendency is obviously on the downgrade, and it seems to us that it has no future in Europe." [redacted]

Again, unlike 1976, there is no conference of European Communist parties in prospect after the Congress to further test "socialist unity." The precedents of the 1976 Berlin conference--which established Eurocommunism as a recognized phenomenon--and the Paris conference in April 1980--which was boycotted by the Yugoslav and Romanian as well as the Italian and Spanish parties--have clearly made Moscow cautious on this score. Leonid Zamyatin, CPSU International Information Department chief and the official spokesman for the 26th Congress, responded carefully to a question on the issue at a press conference during the Congress. He noted that Moscow favors the convening of a world conference of Communist parties "in principle" if a "majority" of Communist parties are similarly inclined. [redacted]

This year's post-Congress period has, however, had its analog to Suslov's attack on independent Communists in 1976. Pravda, on 7 March, lauded the 26th Congress as proof of Communism's "strength in unity," reflecting Brezhnev's approach of accentuating the positive rather than highlighting impermissible dissent by condemning it:

*The PCE delegation returned to Spain upon learning of the coup attempt in Madrid on 23 February, the opening day of the CPSU Congress. [redacted]

19 March 1981

As the influence of the Communist parties marching in the vanguard of the struggle for peace and progress grows, the tasks facing them become increasingly complex and diverse. This sometimes generates differing assessments and differences of approach to the solution of specific questions of the class struggle. But life has proved convincingly that even when differences exist, it is possible and necessary to develop political cooperation in the struggle against the common class enemy.

As if to lay any remaining doubts to rest, Pravda observed that even "bourgeois journalists" covering the Congress had been "obliged to admit that the 'Eurocommunist movement' is subsiding and the Communist parties' unity, cohesion, and ideological integrity are growing." [redacted]

Clearly, the Soviets were determined to present the image of a united Communist movement, healthfully self-critical, but untroubled by serious internal differences. Moscow, its attention focused on the West--as reflected in the only meaningful policy initiatives put forward at the Congress--did not want to have to mediate intra-Communist arguments. Considering the absence of the most likely troublemakers, and the nonbelligerent tone of the speeches by those West European Communist leaders present, this Soviet strategy could have succeeded. Moscow's tactics, however, proved to be crude and counterproductive. [redacted]

Particular Problems With the PCI

Moscow continues to regard the PCI as the enfant terrible of the international Communist movement. CPSU-PCI relations, troubled for over a decade, have deteriorated markedly within the past few months. The PCI leadership, already at odds with Moscow over the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, were particularly critical of what they perceived as aggressive Soviet intentions toward Poland. In mid-February, the text of a letter from the CPSU accusing the PCI of "solidarity with those forces which have unleashed in Poland a genuine offensive against socialism" was leaked to the Italian press and aroused lively debate in Italy. Although the Italian party itself could have been the source of the leak, it is entirely possible that the Soviets, on the eve of the Congress, chose this way to advertise to its fellow European Communists the PCI's alleged perfidy. [redacted]

19 March 1981

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26th CPSU Congress 91

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CURRENT
ANALYSES

(U) 26th CPSU CONGRESS: DOMESTIC ASPECTS

(LOU) Summary

The 26th CPSU Congress, held in Moscow from February 23 to March 3, proved to be a carefully deliberated show of unity and calm optimism by the Soviet leadership. Senior personnel actions were kept to a minimum, central Party authority was strengthened, still greater homage was paid to the military and the KGB, and more promises of betterment were made to a variety of social interests.

The Congress proceedings did, however, provide a few inklings of the acute stresses within the Soviet system as the Brezhnev era nears its end. Discontent on the part of consumers, workers, and nationalities emerged as a major problem besetting the Kremlin leaders, but little more than palliatives were offered as a solution. Overriding pressures from the defense-minded elites were clearly in evidence.

Concern about possible spillover from Poland surfaced chiefly in the context of internal bureaucratic concerns. Few speakers mentioned it directly, and it had not been mentioned at all at the Party congresses held earlier in the Union Republics.

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Report 102-CA
March 31, 1981

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NLRR # 06-114/9 # 10559

BY KML NARA DATE 4/7/2011

Image of Unity

(C) Signs of policy debate and power rivalry centering around Brezhnev were rife on the eve of the Congress. Varying degrees of concern about consumer dissatisfaction in particular could be detected in leadership speeches and press materials. The status indicators of such candidates for political succession as Party Secretary Kirilenko were mixed. And the Party boss of Leningrad, Romanov, was reportedly making a bid for the key vacancy of Party Secretary in charge of defense-related industry. All this was a fitting prelude to Brezhnev's unusual admission to the Congress that differing opinions had been expressed in the Politburo, both in preparation for sessions and at the sessions themselves.

(S/NF/NC/OC) Rumors circulating in Eastern Europe prior to the Congress, however, proved closer to the mark: the Soviet leadership would make no changes, because the Politburo wished to give the impression of absolute unity in the face of events in Poland. When changes came, they would occur one by one, in the months ahead, according to these stories.

(U) In fact, the Politburo took the unusual step of freezing its own membership and that of the Party Secretariat: retention of the entire 14-member Politburo was an event unparalleled since the 20th Congress in 1956. Although the Presidium (the then Politburo) remained intact on that occasion, Khrushchev succeeded in getting a few of his proteges promoted to alternate membership or to secretaries of the Central Committee. The 26th Congress made no changes at all in the Politburo's alternate membership or in the membership of the Secretariat.

(U) Some shifts did occur in the Central Committee and the Central Auditing Commission, although over 75 percent of the members elected at the 25th Congress in 1976 were reelected. This high survival rate is not unusual: the inner circle of Soviet leaders is generally unwilling, and sometimes unable, to make sweeping personnel changes in the governing bodies at any one time.

(U) The few elections to full membership of the Central Committee tended to illustrate the leadership's attachment to

central control. Most of the promotions from candidate member status were from within the Party and state offices in Moscow. The number of Central Committee department heads and deputy heads with full membership on the Committee rose from four to 15. While in 1976 most Central Committee department heads were only candidate members or Auditing Commission members, most are now full members. Moreover, most of the first deputy heads are now full members as well, whereas before few were even candidate members. Military representation on the Central Committee meanwhile increased slightly (from 35 to 39), and three senior officials of the KGB were promoted from candidate to full membership.

(U) The continuing importance Moscow attaches to the Soviet-American relationship probably accounts for the promotions of several who have long preached it. Arbatov, director of the USA-Canada Institute, and Inozemtsev, director of the International Economics and International Relations Institute, moved up from candidate to full membership in the Central Committee. Senior commentator Bovin, who is alleged to be close to Brezhnev, was elected to the Auditing Commission.

(U) Brezhnev himself, at 74 and in declining health, was in good enough shape to give the entire keynote report (4 hours) to the Congress. But when he stumbled at the start of his speech, Moscow television (clearly by prearrangement) switched from live coverage to a professional announcer who read all but the conclusion. Brezhnev nevertheless attended all sessions and related public functions and received a series of foreign leaders. His obvious preeminence was underscored by several officials who spoke of him as "at the head" of the Central Committee or Politburo and lauded his personal traits of leadership. (But none went so far as did the first secretary of the Azerbaijan writers' union, who, at that republic's Party congress earlier in February, hailed Brezhnev as vozhd, or supreme leader, a title reminiscent of the Stalin era.) To judge by the 26th Congress protocol, Party Secretaries Suslov, Kirilenko, and Chernenko-- in that order--now stand after Brezhnev in line of authority.

Economic Guidelines Revised

(S/NF/NC/OC) East European officials in Moscow for the Congress later reported that their Soviet hosts appeared deeply troubled by the fact that their economy, particularly the agricultural sector, remained plagued with confusion and inefficiency. This pervasive sense of disquiet was implicit in much of the proceedings and was reflected to some extent in changes

in the Basic Guidelines for the Soviet economy for 1981-85 and the period until 1990.

(U) A draft of the Basic Guidelines had been issued in December 1980 under the imprimatur of the CPSU Central Committee. Nationwide discussion ensued and, at the Congress, a commission headed by Premier Tikhonov examined proposals to amend the Draft. The commission took no action to modify the Draft's continued emphasis on developing heavy industry, energy, and transportation as priority sectors.

(U) But a higher degree of response was shown to various pressures from below, and changes were made on a broad range of popular and bureaucratic interests:

- Consumers. The Draft had enjoined planners to do no more than "create the conditions" for improved satisfaction of consumers' wants, but the completed text forcefully told them to "satisfy more fully" those wants. (The revision was in the spirit of Brezhnev's pro-consumer speech to the October 1980 Plenum, whereas the Draft was closer to one of Kirilenko's conservative speeches at the time.) Additions to the Guidelines also urged more efforts to re-equip consumer-oriented industries and increase the output of certain household and clothing items.
- Workers. A new minimum wage target of 80 rubles monthly was specified. Attention was called to the importance of industrial safety devices, less-noisy machinery, and better living conditions for young workers. This heightened concern about labor seems related to public opinion polls taken among workers in Gorkiy Oblast and discussed at a scientific conference held there last June, soon after rumors of work stoppages emanated from that area.
- Peasants. On the heels of Brezhnev's demand for a "radical solution" to the food problem, some new gestures were made to producers. Cash incentives for working harder in the socialized sector were emphasized, and the planned rise of investment in rural housing increased by almost 10 percent. Several of the country's largest farm machinery plants were to be further modernized.
- Regionalists. A less-restrictive approach was taken to the building of new irrigation projects in European areas of the USSR. Central Asia, too, was to be offered

automated systems for managing its water facilities. But an even more cautious stance was adopted toward the idea of diverting north-flowing waters to Central Asia, in spite of the regional Party leaders' concerted lobbying, in tandem, for this costly scheme at the Congress.

- Scientists. Increased emphasis was given to the need to speed up scientific and technical progress, and basic research received clear-cut priority over applied research.
- Ideologues. "Scientific communism" was added to the list of social sciences deserving greater support. The importance of using moral (rather than material) incentives in socialist competition and of politicizing cultural recreational activities was upgraded.
- Detente-ism. The "advantages" of an "international division of labor" were reaffirmed in the Guidelines' section on foreign economic ties. On the eve of the Congress, some press commentators had been arguing the merits of economic self-sufficiency, others the value of economic ties with the West. The latter evidently are still in the running.

(U) Although most of the revisions of the Basic Guidelines were for the benefit of disadvantaged groups, one pro-labor proposal (aired in Pravda on January 16) was rejected. Someone from Estonia, where labor unrest had occurred lately, asked that the Guidelines' clause on trade unions be so amended that management would be required to observe all labor legislation. The proposal was evidently viewed as an infringement of the discretionary power of Party and management officials in the "struggle" for plan fulfillment and was not adopted.

(U) Party Program To Be Rewritten

The Draft economic directives text specified that its compilers were "guided" in their work by the CPSU Program, along with recent Party Congress decisions.

Brezhnev's proposal to the Congress for a new edition of the Program thus may have come as a surprise. In any event, the suggestion was greeted with less than unanimity on the floor and in major press editorials. Its most avid backers seemed to be adherents of the more dogmatic school of political thought in Moscow.

The present Program was adopted in 1961 and reflected Khrushchev's contention that Soviet living standards could equal, or even exceed, those of capitalism within 20 years. According to Brezhnev, the new edition should define tasks and not attempt to predict particulars. And its basic principles should include reference to the current "lengthy" stage of "advanced socialist society" on the road to full communism (i.e., universal prosperity). Brezhnev also stated that the new program would have to recognize such changes abroad as "the sharp rise in the role of the military-industrial complex." Since Soviet propagandists insist that the US "military-industrial complex" is the perpetuator of the East-West arms race, the revised Party Program would presumably be setting an ideological backdrop for further slow growth in Soviet living standards and large outlays on armaments.

Brezhnev's proposal, of course, was accepted by the Congress, and the Central Committee--i.e., its Politburo and Secretariat--was entrusted with preparing a new edition of the CPSU Program in time for the next Party Congress in 1986. Surprisingly, however, 22 regional Party leaders, including two Politburo members, ignored the extraordinary bid for a new Program in their discussions of Brezhnev's report. Ukrainian boss Shcherbitskiy and Kazakhstan chieftain Kunayev were among this silent majority. Only six endorsed the proposal, including Politburo members Grishin (Moscow) and Romanov, long on record for their conservatism. Party secretaries from Gorkiy and Sverdlovsk who spoke up for a new Program also made especially hardline attacks on the Reagan administration or the West at large.

The editorials on Brezhnev's report which appeared in Pravda, Izvestiya, and Red Star on February 25 mirrored the disarray at the Congress over the new Program. Pravda and Izvestiya ignored the proposal, while the Defense Ministry newspaper devoted an entire paragraph to it.

The idea of overhauling the 1961 Party Program seems especially appealing to, if not inspired by, more doctrinaire elements in the Kremlin hierarchy who seek a kind of symbolic final burial of Khrushchevian revisionism. For Brezhnev, the appeal may be that of adding his name to another basic Soviet document. Furthermore, updating the 1961 Program would eliminate that embarrassing, if seldom mentioned, Khrushchev pledge to overtake or surpass capitalist standards of well-being by 1980.

(U) Social Problems

One leitmotif of Brezhnev's report was the necessity of narrowing the gulf between the system's humane ideals and the poor quality of life for the masses. Nevertheless, only a few new components of social policy were unveiled. One new plan concerned faster improvement of living conditions in distant industrial regions for the purpose of stabilizing labor there. Another would cope with the severe demographic problem by providing more support--medical and financial--for women and families.

Before the Congress, Soviet agrarian experts had insisted that the state should launch a much more vigorous drive against the widespread rural squalor, known by the euphemism of "differences between the town and country" (Agrarnye problemy razvitogo sotsializma, Moscow: 1980). Brezhnev acknowledged that "we still have no small number of backward farms, no small amount of villages which need rebuilding, renewal and amenities." But he counseled gradualism: "much effort, time and funds will be required to improve the cultural and domestic services for life in the countryside and to overcome the substantial differences between the town and country." Evidently little will be done immediately about the problem.

Rhetorically and symbolically, greater sensitivity toward the non-Russian ethnic minorities was exhibited at the Congress. The melting-pot image was diluted a bit as representatives of 66 nations and nationalities were chosen to attend the Congress, compared with 60 at the 25th Congress in 1976. Brezhnev admitted that "quite a few problems" had arisen in nationality relations which require the Party's "delicate attention." He also stressed that nationalities have the right to due representation in Party and state bodies and ruled out both the "artificial erosion" and "artificial exaggeration" of national characteristics. But old-fashioned tribute was still paid to the "great" Russian people as "our elder brother" in the Congress speeches of Party bosses from the borderlands, (e.g., Baku's Aliyev.)

Brezhnev added anti-Semitism to the list of ethnic prejudices usually denounced; however, this was one of the rare times it was denounced at the Soviet level. His action may in part have been a belated response to an upsurge of anti-Semitism in the USSR--reflected in the scandal within the CPSU itself over publication of Valentin Pikul's anti-Semitic novel in 1979--and an effort to stem emigration pressures by reassuring the apprehensive Soviet Jewish community.

Brezhnev also paid lip service to citizen morale in his attacks on dishonesty in retail trade and housing allocation as well as on callousness in the public health service. The populace at large, however, was chided for drunkenness, shirking, hoarding, and misuse of housing. Brezhnev's nostrum for these deep-seated ills was the familiar one of stricter supervision of Party and public organizations in all spheres.

(U) Impact of Poland

The Polish crisis and fear of a spillover effect may well have moved Brezhnev and his colleagues to discuss negative phenomena in the USSR more openly than is usual on such occasions. But aside from Brezhnev's tough talk about Poland in the foreign section of his report, few Soviet speakers mentioned the Polish troubles (nor was it discussed directly at the republic-level Party congresses in January and early February). Lithuanian Party head Grishkyavichus did, however, say that the Polish situation was being followed with "concern," and Writers' Union head Markov referred to a "counterrevolutionary threat" next door.

In spite of the unusually heavy criticism of domestic failing at the Congress, however, one cannot safely conclude that Kremlin leaders are preoccupied with them or consider them a deterrent to forceful action elsewhere. Premier Tikhonov seemingly gave a blank check to the military when he said that it "will be supplied with everything needed" to oppose imperialists' attempts to achieve military superiority. Soviet security obviously still takes precedence over all else.

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