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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 5/18/2005

File Folder USSR: PRESIDENTIAL BRIEFING [1983-1984]

FOIA

F06-114/9

Box Number 32

YARHI-MILO

3208

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
10900	MEMO	CLARK RE BRIEFING ON THE MIDDLE EAST MONDAY FEBRUARY 14, 1983 R 9/25/2012 F2006-114/9	2	2/12/1983	B1
10901	MEMO	BAILEY/ROBINSON TO POINDEXTER RE BRIEFING FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN ON THE INTERNATIONAL DEBT CRISIS R 3/24/2011 F2006-114/9	1	4/15/1983	B1
10902	MEMO	NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING THURSDAY JUNE 15, 1983 AGENDA PAR 9/25/2012 F2006-114/9	1	ND	B3
10903	MEMO	SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS FOR MEETING WITH NSC R 9/25/2012 F2006-114/9	1	ND	B1
10904	MEMO	ROBINSON TO CLARK RE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING, JUNE 16, 1983 PAR 9/25/2012 F2006-114/9	2	6/16/1983	B3
10905	MEMO	DOBRIANSKY TO CLARK RE BRIEFING PRESIDENT ON THE SOVIET UNION R 9/25/2012 F2006-114/9	2	6/29/1983	B1
10906	MEMO	POINDEXTER TO RYAN RE BRIEFING PRESIDENT ON THE SOVIET UNION R 9/25/2012 F2006-114/9	1	7/28/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 5/18/2005

File Folder USSR: PRESIDENTIAL BRIEFING [1983-1984]

FOIA

F06-114/9

Box Number 32

YARHI-MILO

3208

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
10907	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #10905 R 9/25/2012 F2006-114/9	2	6/29/1983	B1
10908	PAPER	BRIEFING OUTLINE ON USSR R 9/25/2012 F2006-114/9	3	ND	B1
10909	PAPER	BRIEFING OUTLINE ON USSR R 9/25/2012 F2006-114/9	7	ND	B1
10910	PAPER	THE SOVIET WORLD VIEW AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR US-SOVIET RELATIONS R 9/25/2012 F2006-114/9	8	ND	B1
10911	MEMO	CLARK RE BRIEFING ON SOVIET UNION FRIDAY AUGUST 5, 1983 R 9/25/2012 F2006-114/9	1	8/4/1983	B1
10916	MEMO	REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS FOR WILLIAM CLARK	1	8/5/1983	B6
10912	PAPER	SAME TEXT AS DOC #10909 R 9/25/2012 F2006-114/9	7	ND	B1
10913	PAPER	SOVIET PUBLIC TREATMENT OF PRESIDENT REAGAN NOVEMBER 1980-MAY 1984 PAR 9/25/2012 F2006-114/9	66 67	6/1/1984	B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

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JET 5/18/2005

File Folder USSR: PRESIDENTIAL BRIEFING [1983-1984]

FOIA

F06-114/9

Box Number 32

YARHI-MILO

3208

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
10914	PAPER	SOVIET TREATMENT OF PRESIDENT REAGAN SINCE 11 MAY PAR 9/25/2012 F2006-114/9	13	6/8/1984	B3
10915	PAPER	SOVIET TREATMENT OF PRESIDENT REAGAN SINCE 8 JUNE PAR 9/25/2012 F2006-114/9	11	7/13/1984	B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

January 25, 1983

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: WILLIAM K. SADLEIR, DIRECTOR
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND SCHEDULING

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *WPC*

REQUEST: Briefing the President

PURPOSE: To brief the President on the status of
his peace initiative in the Middle East.

BACKGROUND: In view of the importance we now attach
to our Middle East policy and the extra-
ordinary complexity of some of the most
contentious issues, it is essential that
the President receive at least two, and
possibly three, in-depth background
briefings as soon as possible. The four
topics to be covered are: 1) The West
Bank Settlements Problem, 2) The Jerusalem
Issue, 3) Domestic Constraints on Israeli
and Arab Leaders, and 4) The Palestinian
Question (see Tab A for more details).

PREVIOUS
PARTICIPATION: N/A

DATE AND TIME: As soon as possible

DURATION: 40 minutes, on two separate dates

LOCATION: The White House Situation Room

PARTICIPANTS: President Reagan
Vice President Bush
Secretary Shultz
William P. Clark
Robert C. McFarlane
Donald Gregg
Geoffrey Kemp
Howard J. Teicher

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: The President will be orally briefed on the
status of his peace initiative in the Middle
East.

REMARKS REQUESTED: None

MEDIA COVERAGE: None

RECOMMENDED BY: William P. Clark

OPPOSED BY: None

PROJECT OFFICER: Geoffrey Kemp

WPC
C85D 9 & NVP
JAN 25 1983

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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file 2

NLRR F06-114/9 #10900

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

10900

BY KML NARA DATE 9/25/12

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 12, 1983

[Handwritten mark]

BRIEFINGS ON THE MIDDLE EAST

DATE AND TIME: Monday, February 14, 1983 at 10:30 a.m.
and
Tuesday, February 15, 1983 at 11:30 a.m.
LOCATION: The White House Situation Room
FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *[Signature]*

I. PURPOSE

To alert you to the subject matter of your Middle East briefings on Monday, February 14 and Tuesday, February 15.

II. BACKGROUND

In view of the ongoing crisis in the Middle East and the fact that the Middle East peace process has become a cornerstone of your foreign policy, two in-depth briefings have been scheduled to cover some of the more complicated and important issues that are bound to be politically sensitive in the months ahead. Four subjects have been chosen; two to be addressed on Monday and two to be addressed on Tuesday. They are, respectively, the settlements question, the status of Jerusalem, the internal politics of Israel and the major Arab countries, and the Palestinian/PLO question.

At this point, we are not providing you with reading material for these briefings, but instead are going to rely on maps, photographs, and experts from the CIA and State Department who will be able to give you an up-to-date overview of these issues.

On Monday, when we consider the question of settlements and Jerusalem, we hope to have Brandon Grove, our Consul General in Jerusalem, present; and Tuesday, when we consider the political scene, we will be joined by Robert Ames of CIA, who briefed you during the summer.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECL ON: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

cc Vice President
Ed Meese
Jim Baker
Mike Deaver

[Handwritten note: 9/25/12]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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2

III. PARTICIPANTS

Monday, February 14, 1983 at 10:30 - 11:10 a.m.

President Reagan
Vice President Bush
Secretary Shultz
Judge Clark
Robert McFarlane
Brandon Grove, Consul General
Nick Veliotis, State
Geoffrey Kemp, NSC
Howard Teicher, NSC

Tuesday, February 15, 1983 at 11:30 a.m. - 12:10 p.m.

President Reagan
Vice President Bush
Secretary Shultz
Judge Clark
Robert McFarlane
Nick Veliotis, State
Robert Ames, CIA
Geoffrey Kemp, NSC
Howard Teicher, NSC

IV. PRESS PLAN

N/A

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

- o Monday, February 14, 10:30 - 11:10 a.m.,
White House Situation Room
- o Tuesday, February 15, 11:30 a.m. - 12:10 p.m.,
White House Situation Room

Prepared By:
Geoffrey Kemp

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109 add-on

MEMORANDUM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

February 10, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

THROUGH CHARLES P. TYSON ¹

FROM: GEOFFREY KEMP ^{JK}

SUBJECT: President's Briefings on the Middle East, Monday, February 14 at 10:30 a.m. and Tuesday, February 15 at 11:30 a.m., The White House Situation Room

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President giving him an overview of the briefings we will be preparing for next Monday and Tuesday on the Middle East. The purpose of the memo is to inform the President about the subjects that will be covered. No background material is necessary at this time.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

Attachment:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1992
By CSS NARA, Date 8/5/02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL ON: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 15, 1983

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO:

FREDERICK RYAN, DIRECTOR
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND SCHEDULING

FROM:

JOHN M. POINDEXTER *CEH
bjs*

REQUEST:

Two separate briefings for the President.

PURPOSE:

A critical two-part briefing for the
President on the international debt crisis.

BACKGROUND:

In view of the velocity and global dimensions of the international debt crisis and the complexity of the issues and implications involved, it is essential that the President receive at least two in-depth background briefings as soon as possible. The first briefing will cover: What is the debt problem; how did it develop; and why should the United States be concerned? The second briefing will cover: What is being done to address the problem, how long will the problem be with us, and what are the present and potential U.S. policy responses?

PREVIOUS
PARTICIPATION:

None

DATE AND TIME:

Monday, April 25 and
Tuesday, May 3DURATION: 40 minutes
for each date

LOCATION:

The White House Situation Room

PARTICIPANTS:

President Reagan
William P. Clark
Robert C. McFarlane
Norman A. Bailey
Roger W. Robinson
David Missert

OUTLINE OF EVENTS:

The President will be orally briefed on the
topics outlined under background.

REMARKS REQUESTED:

None

MEDIA COVERAGE:

None

RECOMMENDED BY:

William P. Clark

OPPOSED BY:

None

PROJECT OFFICER:

Charles P. Tyson

URGENT

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

April 15, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

THROUGH: CHARLES P. TYSON *CT*FROM: NORMAN A. BAILEY *NAB* ROGER W. ROBINSON *RWR*

SUBJECT: Briefing for the President on the International Debt Crisis

Attached (Tab I) for your signature is a Schedule Proposal requesting that two separate times (April 25 and May 3) be scheduled to brief the President on the international debt crisis. This proposed briefing is in response to your inquiries urging that such a briefing take place sooner than later.

In discussing the most effective format for this briefing with Chuck Tyson, he suggested that the complexity and specialization of this issue warrants two separate briefings to enable the President to fully absorb and reflect on the backdrop of the debt crisis prior to a presentation and discussion of where we see developments going and alternative policy responses. It was also recommended that memos be prepared for the President in advance of each briefing to ensure maximum effectiveness, which we concur is a good idea. Should you approve this approach, we will provide a more detailed memo to you outlining how each of the presentations is to be structured. We have already completed coordination with the CIA on the preparation of numerous visuals to accompany our oral presentations.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the Schedule Proposal at Tab I.

Approve *[Signature]*

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I

Schedule Proposal

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/9 #10901

BY KML NARA DATE 4/7/2011

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 16, 1983

PR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEETING WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

DATE: June 16, 1983

LOCATION: Room 208, OEOB

TIME: 11:00 a.m.

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *WPC*

I. PURPOSE

To provide a briefing on the current international financial crisis.

II. BACKGROUND

In view of the global dimensions of the international debt problem and the significance of the issues and implications involved, it is essential that the President receive a comprehensive briefing on this subject. The briefing will address: What is the debt problem? How did it develop? Why should the United States be concerned? What is presently being done about it?

III. PARTICIPANTS

To be provided.

IV. PRESS PLAN

No press coverage. .

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

The President will be orally briefed on the topics outlined under background and a discussion will follow among the participants.

Prepared by:
Roger W. Robinson

Attachment

Tab A

Agenda

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By *CWS* NARA, Date *8/5/02*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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8

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

Thursday, June 15, 1983
11:00 a.m.AGENDA

FOIA(b)(3)

- | | |
|---|---|
| 1. Introduction | William P. Clark |
| 2. Presentation on International Debt Problem | <div data-bbox="987 629 1235 676" style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 150px; height: 22px;"></div> (CIA)
Roger Robinson (NSC)
Norman Bailey (NSC) |
| 3. Discussion | Cabinet |
| 4. Conclusion | William P. Clark |

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR F06-114/9 #10902

BY KML NARA DATE 9/25/12~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS FOR MEETING WITH
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

- AGREE THAT NUMBER OF UNCERTAINTIES REMAIN CONCERNING THIS PROBLEM. WOULD FEEL MORE COMFORTABLE IF CONTINGENCY MEASURES DEVELOPED WHICH ANTICIPATE POTENTIAL "WORST CASE" DEVELOPMENTS.

- DON, COULD YOU WORK TOGETHER WITH BILL ON THIS AND GET ME SOMETHING THAT ADDRESSES THESE POSSIBLE NEGATIVE SCENARIOS. ONCE IN PLACE, THINK WE HAVE WORKABLE STRATEGY FOR THE DIFFICULT ADJUSTMENT PERIOD AHEAD.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/9 #10903
BY KML NARA DATE 9/25/12

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

MEMORANDUM

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

10904

June 16, 1983

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FOIA(b)(3)

ACTION

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

THROUGH: NORMAN A. BAILEY/CHARLES P. TYSON

FROM: ROGER W. ROBINSON

SUBJECT: National Security Council Meeting,
June 16, 1983, 11:00 a.m., Room 208, OEOB

Attached (Tab I) is the latest draft of the presentation being given to the President tomorrow by [] (Chief of Global Issues, CIA), Norman Bailey and me. We plan on a final run-through tomorrow morning. Our objective in this session is not only to provide a comprehensive briefing (the dimensions of the problem, how it developed, why the U.S. should be concerned, and what is being done about it) but to stimulate a discussion following the presentation (10-15 minutes) which will result in the President tasking you and Don Regan to coordinate on the formulation of a set of contingency measures to cope with plausible "worse-case" scenarios. This is the key ingredient missing from Treasury's five part strategy.

Chuck has been key in forging this tactical approach which we believe effectively "bridges" Treasury's traditional sensitivities on the subject and brings them around to recognizing the critical need for the U.S. to be prepared for any eventuality concerning this highly volatile crisis.

This approach involves ending the presentation with a summary of the major unresolved issues and vulnerabilities that can serve as a natural lead-in to your talking points (Tab III) and brief tasking comments by the President (Tab II).

At Tab I is a briefing memo for the President for the meeting.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you explain this strategy and provide the talking points at Tab II to the President prior to the briefing.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR E06-114/9 #10904

BY KML NARA DATE 9/25/12

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Attachments

Tab I

Memo to President

Tab A Agenda

Tab II

Tasking Comments by the President

Tab III

Clark Talking Points

Tab IV

Copy of Debt Presentation

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

RECEIVED

10905

~~SECRET~~

June 29, 1983

83 JUN 29 P 3: 18

ACTION

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

NLRR F06-114/9 #10905

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY

BY kml NARA DATE 9/25/12

SUBJECT: Briefing President on the Soviet Union

U.S.-Soviet relations are presently at a low ebb. Ongoing arms control negotiations -- both theater and strategic -- have failed thus far in finding common conceptual ground. The Soviets also, have not displayed any signs of moderation on such regional issues as Afghanistan, the Middle East or Poland. At the same time, considerable domestic and Allied pressures for enhanced dialogue and summitry are building.

In the current atmosphere, it would be highly desirable to present the President with a comprehensive Red Team type briefing, which would entail a comprehensive review of Moscow's currently emerging domestic, foreign and military policies. This briefing would paint a picture of the world as viewed by Moscow and would examine the range of likely Soviet responses to a variety of U.S. and Allied policy initiatives. Thus, the suggested briefing would bring into focus the entire spectrum of U.S.-Soviet interactions and would provide a useful backgrounder -- integrating all relevant policy questions on which the President would have to make decisions in the months ahead.

So as to provide the President with a comprehensive review of Soviet views, intentions, and policies, the briefing would entail presentations by Jack Matlock, John Lenczowski, George Kolt (CIA) and myself. Each of us would cover a particular aspect of Soviet policy:

- Introduction. (Matlock)
- Soviet views on U.S.-Soviet relations; likely future steps in the bilateral and arms control arena. (Matlock)
- Soviet views on relations with East/West Europe; likely initiatives and developments. (Dobriansky)
- Projected evolution of Soviet policy toward the Third World; developments in human rights; ideology/propaganda. (Lenczowski)

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- Projected Soviet economic policies; likely trends in the development of Soviet military power. (Kolt)
- Implications of trends/developments for U.S. national security policy. (Matlock)

(Note: The above order and assignments may be subject to change; Timing third/fourth week of July.)

In sum, I believe that such a briefing would provide an informative and policy-relevant backgrounder for the President and would be useful in light of the decisions that lie ahead.

Jack Matlock ^{SL} and John Lenczowski concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the proposed scheduling of a Presidential briefing on the Soviet Union.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

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DECLASSIFIED

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FILE 14

NLRR FDL-114/9 #10906

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

BY KML NARA DATE 9/25/12

July 28, 1983

Dobriansky

~~SECRET~~

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR., / DIRECTOR
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND SCHEDULING

FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER

REQUEST: Briefing.

PURPOSE: To brief the President on the Soviet Union:
Soviet views, intentions and policies.

BACKGROUND: U.S.-Soviet relations are presently at a low
ebb. At the same time, considerable domestic
and Allied pressures for enhanced dialogue
and summitry are building. In the current
atmosphere, it would be highly desirable to
brief the President on Communist ideology and
the nature of the Soviet system, the psychology
of Soviet leaders, Moscow's perspective of
the Reagan Administration, the Soviet threat
assessment/foreign policy mix and its
implications for future decisions. The
briefing would provide an informative and
policy-relevant backgrounder for the President
and would be useful in light of decisions
that lie ahead.

PREVIOUS
PARTICIPATION: None

DATE AND TIME: August 5, 1983/time open DURATION: 1 hour

LOCATION: Room 208 (OEOB) or Situation Room

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President Jack F. Matlock
The Secretary of State Paula Dobriansky
William P. Clark John Lenczowski

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: 1) Briefing (30 minutes); 2) Qs & As (30 minutes)

REMARKS REQUIRED: Briefing papers to be provided by State/NSC.

MEDIA COVERAGE: None.

RECOMMENDED BY: NSC and the Department of State OPPOSED: None

PROJECT OFFICER: Charles P. Tyson

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Declassify on: OADR

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET

July 27, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

THROUGH: CHARLES P. TYSON

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY

SUBJECT: Briefing the President on the Soviet Union

Attached at Tab I is a Schedule Proposal requesting that time be set aside for the President to be briefed on the Soviet Union.

The Department of State and Jack Matlock concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the Schedule Proposal at Tab I to Fred Ryan.

Approve

Disapprove

Attachment:

Tab I Schedule Proposal

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Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CW NARA, Date 8/5/02

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

7/20

Jack Matlock,

Go ahead and
approach Rick Bunt
with this idea.

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MEMORANDUM

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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June 29, 1983

83 JUN 29 P 3:18

ACTION

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

NLRR E06-114/9 #10907

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY

BY KML NARA DATE 9/25/12

SUBJECT: Briefing President on the Soviet Union

U.S.-Soviet relations are presently at a low ebb. Ongoing arms control negotiations -- both theater and strategic -- have failed thus far in finding common conceptual ground. The Soviets also, have not displayed any signs of moderation on such regional issues as Afghanistan, the Middle East or Poland. At the same time, considerable domestic and Allied pressures for enhanced dialogue and summitry are building.

In the current atmosphere, it would be highly desirable to present the President with a comprehensive Red Team type briefing, which would entail a comprehensive review of Moscow's currently emerging domestic, foreign and military policies. This briefing would paint a picture of the world as viewed by Moscow and would examine the range of likely Soviet responses to a variety of U.S. and Allied policy initiatives. Thus, the suggested briefing would bring into focus the entire spectrum of U.S.-Soviet interactions and would provide a useful backgrounder -- integrating all relevant policy questions on which the President would have to make decisions in the months ahead.

So as to provide the President with a comprehensive review of Soviet views, intentions, and policies, the briefing would entail presentations by Jack Matlock, John Lenczowski, George Kolt (CIA) and myself. Each of us would cover a particular aspect of Soviet policy:

- Introduction. (Matlock)
- Soviet views on U.S.-Soviet relations; likely future steps in the bilateral and arms control arena. (Matlock)
- Soviet views on relations with East/West Europe; likely initiatives and developments. (Dobriansky)
- Projected evolution of Soviet policy toward the Third World; developments in human rights; ideology/propaganda. (Lenczowski)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

- Projected Soviet economic policies; likely trends in the development of Soviet military power. (Kolt)
- Implications of trends/developments for U.S. national security policy. (Matlock)

(Note: The above order and assignments may be subject to change; Timing third/fourth week of July.)

In sum, I believe that such a briefing would provide an informative and policy-relevant backgrounder for the President and would be useful in light of the decisions that lie ahead.

Jack Matlock ^{SL} and John Lenczowski concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the proposed scheduling of a Presidential briefing on the Soviet Union.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

BRIEFING OUTLINE

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
I. INTRODUCTION

An attempt to describe how the Soviet leaders view the world and the implications of this for U.S.-Soviet relations. There is often a tendency to assume that the Soviets view the world as we would if we were sitting in Moscow. This is emphatically not the case, and today we shall try to explain some of the more important characteristics of Soviet thinking. John Lenczowski will discuss the nature of the Soviet system, Paula Dobriansky will take a look at how the Soviets view their international position and assess the threats to it, and Jack Matlock will describe the psychology of the Soviet leaders and discuss some implications for U.S. policy.

II. NATURE OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM (Lenczowski)

III. SOVIET THREAT ASSESSMENT (Dobriansky)

IV. PSYCHOLOGY OF SOVIET LEADERS (Matlock)

A. Some widespread characteristics

- Communist ideology, Russian traditions and the imperatives of ruling a highly bureaucratized, multinational empire are fused in the thinking of the leadership.
- The legitimacy of the rulers rests entirely on the ideology; they must cling to it even if they do not fully believe it.
- Their first priority is preserving their system; their second is expanding their power, so long as it does not conflict with the first.
- Legitimacy and status are extremely important to them and comprise an important foreign policy objective. This contributes to an acute sense of saving face.
- Their attitude is fundamentally totalitarian: citizens are viewed as property of the state, allies as puppets (or else they are not really allies).
- They take a long-term view and do not accept defeats as permanent. A defeat in one area is viewed as a challenge to find other means to achieve the same objective.

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BY KML NARA DATE 9/25/12

- They are persistent bargainers, adept at exploiting time pressures on the other side, but willing to strike deals rapidly if they feel compelled to.
- They are often prisoners of their own ideological proclivities and thus misjudge the effect of their actions on others.
- They are much more preoccupied with the United States than we are with them.

B. Soviet view of Reagan Administration

- Soviets cautiously welcomed the President's election because they were fed up with Carter and thought a Republican president might return to the Nixon-Ford policies.
- When they realized in early 1981 that there would be no return to "detente," they played with the idea of "waiting out" the Reagan Administration, in the hope that it would only last four years.
- They have been surprised and impressed by the President's ability to get his defense programs through, keep unity in the alliance, and get the economy moving again. At the same time, they have experienced a series of foreign policy defeats and growing economic difficulties at home.
- There are signs now that they are reassessing their foreign policy. They may feel overextended, and in need of some reduction of tension to allow more attention to domestic problems. They seem convinced that the President is likely to be reelected, and if so must be asking themselves whether it might not be better to deal with him before rather than after his reelection.
- Given their preoccupation with U.S.-Soviet relations, they may well exaggerate the political benefits to the President in dealing with them. This could lead them to overplay their hand.

IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR US POLICY

- A. The struggle is long-term. There are no quick fixes. This means that we must devise a strategy which can be sustained for a decade or, probably, more.

B. Two broad options in theory:

1. Unrelenting pressure on the Soviets; and
2. Negotiation of specific differences on basis of strength, with follow-up to keep gains permanent rather than temporary.

Only the second seems sustainable in a democratic society, but it requires a recognition that agreements are only stages in the struggle, not the end of it.

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BRIEFING OUTLINE

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NLRR E06-114/9 #10909

BY KML NARA DATE 9/25/12

I. INTRODUCTION

An attempt to describe how the Soviet leaders view the world and the implications of this for U.S.-Soviet relations. There is often a tendency to assume that the Soviets view the world as we would if we were sitting in Moscow. This is emphatically not the case, and today we shall try to explain some of the more important characteristics of Soviet thinking. John Lenczowski will discuss the nature of the Soviet system, Paula Dobriansky will take a look at how the Soviets view their international position and assess the threats to it, and Jack Matlock will describe the psychology of the Soviet leaders and discuss some implications for U.S. policy.

II. NATURE OF SOVIET SYSTEM, FOREIGN POLICY DETERMINANTS AND STRATEGY (Lenczowski)

The USSR as a Communist Power

- A. Distinction between a communist power and a traditional imperialist great power: limited versus necessarily unlimited objectives.
- B. Various influences encourage us to believe that USSR is no longer communist:
 - 1. Wishful thinking.
 - 2. Mirror imaging.
 - 3. Soviet disinformation.
- C. Inescapable fact: USSR must be communist because of the role of ideology in the system.
 - 1. Ideology as source of legitimacy.
 - 2. Ideology as key to internal security system: Emperor's New Clothes.
 - 3. A key index that this is so is to observe that ideology defines basic structure of society.
- D. Ideology and Foreign Policy.
 - 1. Ideology serves as frame of reference to view the world.
 - 2. Ideology defines international reality as struggle between two social systems: capitalism and socialism, a struggle inevitably to be won by socialism.

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3. Therefore ideology determines friends and enemies -- it sets an international standard of behavior.
4. Ideology presents a discrete set of strategies and tactics of revolutionary behavior.
5. Ideology sets a standard of measurement of correlation of forces: strategic decisions to advance or retreat are made on the basis of "scientific" assessments of the correlation of forces. Ideological strength or weakness is the key criterion.
6. Ideology serves as a weapon of political influence: an instrument of subversion and deception.
7. Foreign ideologies (and therefore any competing version of the truth) are the principal threats to the Soviet system.

Soviet Strategy

- A. Because USSR is prisoner of the ideology, its lies, and its predictions, it is compelled to try to fulfill those predictions. This means:
 1. Creating false appearances -- therefore a strategy of deception.
 2. Creating new realities, by exporting revolution.
- B. The principal means of Soviet expansionism is "ideological struggle".
 1. To win men's minds.
 2. To deceive those who cannot be won.
 3. Therefore propaganda, subversion and disinformation are the key features of Soviet foreign policy.
 4. Suppression of the truth is the ultimate objective -- self-censorship by Soviet adversaries is prelude to political uniformity.
 5. A principal effort: to define the acceptable vocabulary of international political debate -- both words and issues.
- C. Military power is the principal adjunct to this.
 1. It can forcibly create the new reality.

2. It can serve to intimidate and accelerate the process of ideological subversion.
- D. Struggle between two systems as a protracted conflict.
1. Soviet control over the time frame of the conflict enables them to control timing of attack and choice of battlefield while permitting possibility of strategic retreat.
 2. Proper understanding of time permits strategy of attrition -- nibble at edges of Free World, never risk final showdown.
 3. Strategy of indirect attack:
 - A deceptive means of escaping culpability.
 - Use of proxies, front groups, agents of influence, etc.
 4. Strategy of monopoly of offensive.
 5. Strategy of psychological conditioning:
 - War-zone, peace zone.
 - Demarcation of scrimmage line.
 - Soviets have conditioned us to believe that peace zone is inviolable but war zone is not.
 - Therefore Soviets have developed a no-lose strategy: they have nothing to lose by continually trying to cross the scrimmage line.

III. SOVIET THREAT ASSESSMENT: THREATS, OPPORTUNITIES, CHALLENGES (Dobriansky)

a. Zero-sum mentality: The U.S. poses the greatest threat to Soviet security as it is the main obstacle to the achievement of Soviet geo-political objectives. Ergo, Soviet foreign policy is generally designed to reduce and curtail the U.S. geo-political position. Moscow evaluates all international situations from one perspective -- whether they would detract or enhance the Soviet position vis-a-vis that of the U.S.

b. Soviet conception of a threat: In contrast to the Western conception of a threat -- an action which might undermine one's existing position -- the Soviet definition also includes any actions which might frustrate potential Soviet gains. As the Soviets strive for absolute security, any attempts to upset the current balance or Soviet gains are perceived by Moscow as a threat. There are two underlying reasons: (1) Soviet penchant for expansionism to

solve security problems (2) Existence of democratic societies poses constant threat to domestic Soviet stability by providing an example of an alternative social and political entity. Public and private Soviet complaints indicate that U.S. ideological offensive is taken seriously and regarded as an important threat.

c. Role of military power in foreign policy: Soviet leaders regard military strength as the foundation of the USSR's status as a global superpower and as the most critical factor underlying successful Soviet foreign policy. Yet, concern about the danger of nuclear war has been a serious consideration in Soviet foreign policy decisions. Essentially, the nature of the Soviet dilemma has been how to wage a successful expansionist foreign policy without unduly increasing the risk of a nuclear war.

Soviet Assessment of Current International Environment/Projected Trends

a. U.S.: Despite domestic opposition, budgetary pressures and Intra-Alliance tensions, the Soviets expect that the U.S. is likely to sustain its present foreign and defense policies (i.e., MX, INF, etc.) which seeks to curtail Soviet expansionism.

b. Western Europe: Despite Intra-Alliance tensions, the peace movement, etc., the Soviets do not realistically expect a break up of NATO, and believe that Western European governments would continue to follow (by and large) the U.S. lead on major security issues.

c. Third World: Soviets anticipate exceleration of the process of disintegration, anarchy triggered by economic stagnation, border and resource disputes and the lack of stable political organizations. They anticipate many Third World crises which will present both opportunities and threats to Soviet security. Soviet concern is that a newly assertive U.S. bent on stemming Soviet expansionism would intervene in a future Third World conflict.

Regional Geographic Assessments: Threats/Opportunities (Countries are listed in order of priority from Soviet perspective)

a. Eastern Europe: Only area which offers no opportunities, only potential threats;

b. Western Europe: European military capability is minimal threat in short term, but with U.S. support it is a significant military threat. Substantial ideological/political threat, moderate opportunities.

c. Asia: High threat/high opportunity; East Asia -- China, Japan, Korea -- growing security threat; main option

= containment; Southeast/Southwest Asia - opportunities, of immense strategic value.

d. Middle East: Moderate Threat/Moderate Opportunity; do not anticipate dramatic successes.

e. Africa: Low risk/low threat/moderate opportunities; no dramatic successes; recognition of gains and losses.

f. Central America: High risk/low threat/high opportunities; creation of strategic diversion -- tying up U.S. resources, distracting U.S. attention from other critical areas, generating U.S. domestic cleavages.

IV. PSYCHOLOGY OF SOVIET LEADERS (Matlock)

A. Some widespread characteristics

- Communist ideology, Russian traditions and the imperatives of ruling a highly bureaucratized, multinational empire are fused in the thinking of the leadership.
- The legitimacy of the rulers rests entirely on the ideology; they must cling to it even if they do not fully believe it.
- Their first priority is preserving their system; their second is expanding their power, so long as it does not conflict with the first.
- Legitimacy and status are extremely important to them and comprise an important foreign policy objective. This contributes to an acute sense of saving face.
- Their attitude is fundamentally totalitarian: citizens are viewed as property of the state, allies as puppets (or else they are not really allies).
- They take a long-term view and do not accept defeats as permanent. A defeat in one area is viewed as a challenge to find other means to achieve the same objective.
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- They have been surprised and impressed by the President's ability to get his defense programs through, keep unity in the alliance, and get the economy moving again. At the same time, they have experienced a series of foreign policy defeats and growing economic difficulties at home.
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gains permanent rather than temporary.

Only the second seems sustainable in a democratic society, but it requires a recognition that agreements are only stages in the struggle, not the end of it.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

7/29/83

MEMORANDUM

TO: WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR. *for*

SUBJ: APPROVED PRESIDENTIAL ACTIVITY

MEETING: Clark Briefing

DATE: August 5, 1983

TIME: 1:30 pm

DURATION: 60 minutes

LOCATION: Situation Room

REMARKS REQUIRED: Talking points to be covered in briefing paper

MEDIA COVERAGE: No

FIRST LADY
PARTICIPATION: No

NOTE: PROJECT OFFICER, SEE ATTACHED CHECKLIST

cc: A. Bakshian	J. Rosebush	J. Poindexter
R. Darman	B. Shaddix	C. Tyson
R. Deprospero	W. Sittmann	R. Kimmitt
K. Duberstein	L. Speakes	
D. Fischer	WHCA Audio/Visual	
C. Fuller	WHCA Operations	
W. Henkel	A. Wrobleski	
E. Hickey	Nell Yates	
G. Hodges		

OK 9/1/83
Paula Schumaker

FYI

COPY TO

JACK *✓*

JOHN,

PD

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The Soviet World View and
Its Implications for US-Soviet Relations

I. Introduction

A. Briefing seeks to put ourselves in shoes of Soviet leadership; see world as they see it; critical perspective if we are to respond effectively to Soviet challenge.

(1) Moscow's Worldview - Overview of Essential Points:

--Maintenance of CPSU monopoly on power at home and expansion of Soviet power, influence, prestige internationally are preeminent objectives; U.S. is most important real and potential impediment to Soviet objectives and threat to Soviet security; thus superpower relations critical;

--U.S.-Soviet relations fundamentally adversarial and competitive, but can and must be managed without general war in nuclear age;

(2) Factors underlying Soviet view of world and U.S.

--Ideological antagonism toward Western values -- inevitable given communist doctrine;

--Geopolitical rivalry with U.S. in third areas -- would no doubt exist to some degree even if USSR were not communist state;

--Russian/Soviet imperial tradition -- history of expansionism but also keen awareness of real and potential vulnerabilities.

(3) Differences between US and Soviet perspectives and policy implications:

--Americans traditionally uncomfortable with long-term competitive relationship; tendency to seek breakthrough to better relations; sometimes willing to offer concessions in hope of moderating Soviet behavior;

--Soviets see conflict as fundamental nature of political life and international relations; events in arenas of U.S.-Soviet competition as well as superpower negotiations

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BY KML NARA DATE 9/25/12

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> Background
> [Back drop of
world map.]

always reflect prevailing balance of forces and interests of two sides; agreements with U.S. possible and sometimes desirable, but cannot change inherent competitive nature of superpower relations.

--In past these differences in approach have sometimes led to Soviet exploitation of U.S. desire for better relations. Result has been strong, if sometimes belated, U.S. response, and increased tension in U.S.-Soviet bilateral relationship.

B. Preview of categories for expanded discussion: 5 - Introduction

(1) Nature of Soviet System and Underlying Determinants of Soviet Behavior: critical to understanding of long-term patterns of continuity and change in Soviet policy; 7

(2) Leadership Psychology: essential to understanding outlook of current Soviet leaders;" 5

(3) Soviet Threat Assessment/View of Soviet International Position: important to understanding of factors in external environment which shape Soviet behavior; 8

(4) Soviet Foreign Policy Agenda and its Implications for future U.S. decisions: essential to understanding Soviet expectations for relationship in remainder of first term of Reagan Administration. 5

II. Nature of Soviet System and Underlying Determinants of Soviet Behavior

A: Role of Ideology

(1) Internal

--Still important source of regime legitimacy;

--Provides rationale for CPSU monopoly of political power, privileged position of ruling elite in Soviet society, press censorship, suppression of political dissent;

--Gives leadership framework for managing its deeply-rooted fear of "anarchy" and absence of regularized process for transferring power from one leader to another.

(2) External

--Posits inevitable struggle between capitalism and socialism; thus legitimizes view of non-socialist states both as potential threats and potential targets for subversion.

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--Sees policies of other states, including U.S., as shaped by internal contradictions which can be exacerbated by adroit Soviet manipulation.

--Reinforces expansionist strain in Russian imperial tradition and assures Soviet leadership that history is on their side -- that over long haul world balance of power (correlation of forces) is shifting in favor of the Soviet Union.

B. Multinational Character of Soviet Society

(1) Soviet Union world's last great multinational empire; leadership acutely conscious of need to manage potential vulnerabilities; Andropov personally has emphasized nationalities question in early speeches on domestic policy, but no clear signal of new initiatives.

(2) Current and future problems focus on implications of uneven economic development and demographic trends among nationality areas; little evidence of overt, widespread political dissent linked directly to nationalities strains.

(3) Nationalities questions will increasingly preoccupy leadership, but impossible to predict long-term impact on Soviet capacity to sustain external expansionism.

C. Economic and Social Weaknesses and Constraints

(1) Despite important underlying strengths of Soviet economy, slow growth rates confronting leadership with increasingly tough policy choices. To sustain increases in military spending, leadership may have to accept stagnation or decline in living standards and, most important, rate of investment in basic industry and infrastructure on which long-term economic growth depends.

(2) Economic difficulties exacerbated by deep malaise in Soviet society: reduced effectiveness of ideology in mobilizing greater worker productivity, drunkenness and crime approaching epidemic proportions, evidence of underlying popular lack of commitment to the system and political order.

(3) Andropov and successors will attempt Administrative reform of economy, but political and bureaucratic resistance to far-reaching reform extremely difficult to overcome.

(4) Long-term impact of economic/social problems on military spending uncertain. Likely to be increasing pressure

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to reduce growth in military spending. Absolute reductions in defense effort unlikely, but possibly some reduction in rate of growth of defense spending. Even with reduced rate of growth, Soviet military capabilities would continue to increase well into 1990s.

III. Leadership Psychology

A. Russian tradition: Autocracy and secrecy in decision-making, lack of effective autonomy of society and individual from the state, tendency toward bureaucratization and militarization of society, increasing centralization of power in Moscow and emphasis on Russian nationalism, sense of "mission" justifying external expansionism, preoccupation with suppression of internal dissent and neutralization of external threat, sense of material, technical, economic inferiority to the West and obsession with catching up.

B. Historical Experience of Leadership: Mixed legacy of Stalinism -- rise to power of current leadership generation in purges but fear of excessive centralization of power in one individual. World War II experience -- German invasion threatened maintenance of Soviet power, but eventual victory brought unprecedented expansion of Soviet influence. Current generation has experienced both global inferiority to U.S. and expansion of Soviet power to superpower parity or better.

C. Historical Importance of Personalities: Despite rhetorical emphasis on leading role of CPSU and collective leadership, personalities have been critical in determining Soviet policies:

1. Stalin -- architect of centralized and powerful Soviet state, but at costs that would now be prohibitive;
2. Khrushchev -- Put Soviet power on world stage for first time, but political costs of improvisation were too high;
3. Brezhnev -- Expansion of Soviet power abroad and leadership stability at home were welcome, but ultimately stagnation set in;
4. Andropov -- Gradually strengthening his position but still dependent on coalition of Politburo oligarchs which put him in power. Thus far hallmark of foreign and domestic policy has been continuity and emphasis on USSR's domestic agenda.

D. Bureaucratic Politics - Struggle and Consensus at the Top

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(1) Role and prerogatives of entrenched bureaucracies has become more pervasive in recent years. Difficult for any leader to establish firm priorities, particularly in resource allocation arena. Importance of defending bureaucratic turf likely to increase throughout coming decade of greater resource stringency.

(2) At same time, broad and durable consensus among all elements of Soviet elite on certain essentials: growth of Soviet power abroad and maintenance of CPSU monopoly on power at home.

E. Implications for Leadership Psychology

(1) Insecurity, suspicion tempered somewhat by confidence generated by emergence of USSR as superpower. View of military power as essential foundation of assertive foreign policy. Perception of continuing opportunities to exploit and foster international tension and instability to benefit of USSR. At same time, new insecurity introduced by serious domestic problems, problems within Soviet empire, and resurgent U.S.

(2) Bargaining Tactics: Assertion of "positions of principle" which preclude (or may seem to preclude) concessions in interest of agreement. Impressive staying power in negotiations. Tendency to withhold agreement to last possible moment to extract greatest possible concessions from adversary. Willingness to settle quickly when agreement appears in Soviet interest.

(3) View of U.S. in general: Renewed vitality and competitive vigor. Economic recovery and rearmament. USSR faces more determined and capable U.S. adversary than at any time in past decade. Nonetheless, Moscow continues to hope that domestic political, budgetary, and other constraints will undermine more aggressive U.S. posture.

(4) View of Reagan Administration: Hostility to Soviet Union; determination to compete around the world; impressive political strength domestically. Suspicious of Administration commitment to "dialogue" with USSR, but strategy of "waiting out" Reagan Administration increasing less tenable. Soviets may consider whether coming year may not offer better opportunities for bargaining than a second Reagan term.

IV. Soviet View of its International Position/Threat Assessment

A. First few months of Andropov regime marked by continuity, less dynamism and innovation than expected. Soviet policy setbacks in recent months and changing Soviet view of

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Reagan Administration "staying power" likely to provoke some degree of review of Soviet policy. Difficult to predict how far ranging this review will be, but there will be opportunities for us to affect Soviet behavior.

B. Direct Military threats to USSR - us (military Thr. - is it?)

(1) Reagan Administration ability thus far to sustain increases in U.S. military budget and acceleration of new U.S. strategic programs, MX etc.
 > political consistency
 > hardware - used for deterrent & defensive purposes.

(2) Prospect of new competition with U.S. in new military technologies in which USSR would be at disadvantage.

(3) Deployments of new U.S. INF in Western Europe.

(4) Chinese strategic programs: at present no threat to close gap in capabilities, but have potential for expansion -- particularly should Chinese acquire greater access to U.S. advanced technology.

C. Soviet View of Indirect Threats/Challenges/Opportunities

(1) Eastern Europe -- Although worst past in Poland, Pope's visit was dramatic evidence of alienation of Polish people from regime. Costs of maintaining empire in Eastern Europe high, economic troubles persist, East Europeans are resisting Andropov's call for greater economic integration, political coordination, ideological orthodoxy.

(2) Western Europe -- Soviets facing major defeat on INF. Outcome of FRG elections, Williamsburg, Madrid all point up revival of Alliance cohesion. Nonetheless, Soviet efforts to exploit European peace and anti-nuclear movements will continue.

(3) China and Japan -- Soviets have not taken advantage of Brezhnev's passing to take major steps toward better relations with China and Japan. Consequently, Moscow still sees East Asia as posing more problems than opportunities. Soviets remain cautious and distrustful of major Asian neighbors and see range of choices as very narrow.

(4) Middle East -- Moscow has recouped some of its losses of last year through closer military cooperation with Syria and retains important capacity to play spoiler role. But Soviets themselves cannot take diplomatic lead nor count on long-term Syrian unwillingness to negotiate with U.S., thereby freezing Moscow out of role in the region.

(5) Afghanistan and Persian Gulf -- Soviet hopes that

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Islamabad would acquiesce in pro-Soviet settlement in Afghanistan disappointed. Afghan resistance holding its own. Soviet-Iranian relations continue to deteriorate.

(6) Central America: Moscow may hope that turmoil in region will necessitate increasing commitment of scarce U.S. resources while generating divisive domestic policy debate. However, recent U.S. actions may have induced Soviets to take closer look at risks they are running. For instance, Soviets now probably take possibility of fall of Sandinistas seriously. Nevertheless, Moscow has cards to play -- possibly including increased Cuban role in Nicaragua.

(7) Southern Africa: Soviet dynamism of late 1970s reduced. Moscow preoccupied with keeping pro-Soviet regimes in Angola and Mozambique in power. Both regimes threatened by growing uncertainties and tempted to cooperate with U.S. diplomacy.

D. Challenge from Renewed U.S. Emphasis on Ideology and Western Values:

--Public and private Soviet complaints indicate that U.S. ideological offensive is taken seriously and regarded as → (2) p.1 - important threat. (example) Democratic

--Soviets beginning to recognize capacity of this political offensive to mobilize the strength of the West and the Third World to resist Soviet expansionism. (example)

V. The Soviet Policy Agenda & its Implications for U.S. Policy

A: Short term implications for US-Soviet relations

(1) Reasons for Soviet caution in relations with U.S.: hopes that domestic constraints will ultimately undermine the Administration's capacity for more aggressive competition; approach of initial U.S. INF deployments to which Moscow is committed to respond; uncertainties about U.S. Presidential politics; perception that U.S. is reluctant to see rapid progress in arms control; small steps possible and even likely and Soviets will be under some pressure to respond positively to any U.S. initiatives.

(2) Prospects for Movement on US-Soviet Agenda

--Human Rights: Possibility of further steps by Moscow to resolve cases covered in Kampelman talks at Madrid, but Soviets will want to avoid impression of open-ended responsiveness to U.S. concerns on human rights.

--Arms Control: In START, Soviets will not accept proposals

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that require early and costly restructuring of their forces. But if period of adjustment is further stretched out, they may be more receptive. In INF, after responding demonstrably to U.S. deployments, Soviets may reassess value of agreements to limit deployments of these new systems short of full 572. In other arms control areas (such as CBMs), Soviets will be wary of giving Administration a "success" which could be used to reduce pressures for concessions in START and INF.

--Consulates and Cultural Agreement: Experience with new Grains LTA suggests that Soviet will bargain hard. But if convinced that agreements would serve Soviet interests, Moscow will probably be willing to deal.

--Regional Issues: Progress less likely here than in any other area of the agenda. Indeed, Moscow may conclude that more confrontational or costly policies are needed in particular areas to advance Soviet long-term objectives. At the same time, there are some signs of Soviet efforts to delimit more carefully their commitments in the Third World and to avoid taking on new ones.

--US-Soviet summit prospect: Soviets would find it difficult to turn down serious offer of US-Soviet summit. At same time probably see little to be gained under current circumstances. There may be a small window next spring if there is some progress, particularly in arms control. But Soviet interest in summit is likely to erode as U.S. Presidential campaign season goes into full swing.

B. Longer-Term Implications

(1) As noted in NSDD 75, over longer-term, U.S. influence on Soviet behavior is limited but not negligible.

(2) Continue to believe that U.S. policy approach should consist of three elements outlined in NSDD 75:

--Effective competition to contain and over time reverse Soviet expansionism;

--Promotion, within narrow limits available to us, of processes of change in Soviet Union toward more pluralistic political and economic system;

--Negotiations to attempt to reach agreements which protect and enhance U.S. interests.

(3) This policy will over time position us for a real and lasting improvement in our relations with the Soviet Union if the Soviets are willing. If not, the blame for persistence of tensions will rest clearly with Moscow.

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BY KML NARA DATE 9/25/12

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 4, 1983

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BRIEFING ON THE SOVIET UNION

DATE AND TIME: Friday, August 5, 1983, 1:30 p.m.

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

- I. PURPOSE: To provide a briefing on the Soviet Union -- Soviet views, intentions and policies.
- II. BACKGROUND: U.S.-Soviet relations are presently at a low ebb. Ongoing arms control negotiations have failed thus far in finding common conceptual ground. The Soviets also have not displayed any signs of moderation on such regional issues as Afghanistan or the Middle East. At the same time, considerable domestic and Allied pressures for enhanced dialogue and summitry are building.

In view of the current situation, a briefing has been scheduled to provide you with a comprehensive review of Soviet views of the current international situation and prospective developments, as well as Soviet intentions and policies. Specifically, the briefing will cover: 1) the nature of the Soviet system and underlying determinants of Soviet behavior, 2) leadership psychology, 3) Soviet threat assessment/view of Soviet international position, and 4) the Soviet foreign policy agenda and its implications for future U.S. decisions. Given the crucial upcoming decisions on our policies toward the Soviet Union that lie ahead, the briefing will provide an informative background which will be useful in devising effective responses to the Soviet challenge.

III. PARTICIPANTS:

The President
The Vice President
Secretary of State Shultz
Secretary of Defense Weinberger
Director of Central Intelligence Casey
William P. Clark, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Richard Burt, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
Jack F. Matlock, NSC
Paula Dobriansky, NSC
John Lenczowski, NSC

IV. PRESS PLAN: Not applicable.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:

1. Briefing (30 minutes) 2. Qs and As (30 minutes)

cc: Vice President
Edwin Meese

James Baker
Michael Deaver

Prepared by:
Paula Dobriansky

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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August 2, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

SIGNED

THROUGH: CHARLES P. TYSON *CT*FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY *PD*SUBJECT: President's Briefing on the Soviet Union
(Friday, August 5, 1983; 1:30 p.m, Situation Room)

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President providing an overview of the briefing we have prepared for Friday, August 5 on the Soviet Union. The purpose of this memorandum is to inform the President about the subjects that will be covered.

JS
Jack Matlock concurs.RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachment:

Tab I. Memorandum to the President

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By *CWS* NARA, Date *8/5/02*

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MEMORANDUM

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL

August 5, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY

SUBJECT: Briefing Outline on the Soviet Union

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to the Vice President, Secretary Shultz and Secretary Weinberger transmitting the briefing outline on the Soviet Union. (C)

RECOMMENDATION: Sign your memo of transmittal at Tab I.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

Attachments:

Tab I Your memo of transmittal
A Briefing Outline

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DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CVS NARA, Date 8/5/02

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Briefing Outline on the Soviet Union

Attached is a copy of the Briefing Outline used in the NSC briefing of the President on the Soviet Union on August 5. Please note that the contents of this outline reflect the views of the NSC briefers and were not cleared in the formal interagency process.

William P. Clark

Attachment
Briefing Outline

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CJS NARA, Date 8/5/02

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NLRR F06-114/9 #10912

BRIEFING OUTLINE

BY KML NARA DATE 9/25/12

I. INTRODUCTION

An attempt to describe how the Soviet leaders view the world and the implications of this for U.S.-Soviet relations. There is often a tendency to assume that the Soviets view the world as we would if we were sitting in Moscow. This is emphatically not the case, and today we shall try to explain some of the more important characteristics of Soviet thinking. John Lenczowski will discuss the nature of the Soviet system, Paula Dobriansky will take a look at how the Soviets view their international position and assess the threats to it, and Jack Matlock will describe the psychology of the Soviet leaders and discuss some implications for U.S. policy.

II. NATURE OF SOVIET SYSTEM, FOREIGN POLICY DETERMINANTS AND STRATEGY (Lenczowski)

The USSR as a Communist Power

- A. Distinction between a communist power and a traditional imperialist great power: limited versus necessarily unlimited objectives.
- B. Various influences encourage us to believe that USSR is no longer communist:
 - 1. Wishful thinking.
 - 2. Mirror imaging.
 - 3. Soviet disinformation.
- C. Inescapable fact: USSR must be communist because of the role of ideology in the system.
 - 1. Ideology as source of legitimacy.
 - 2. Ideology as key to internal security system: Emperor's New Clothes.
 - 3. A key index that this is so is to observe that ideology defines basic structure of society.
- D. Ideology and Foreign Policy.
 - 1. Ideology serves as frame of reference to view the world.
 - 2. Ideology defines international reality as struggle between two social systems: capitalism and socialism, a struggle inevitably to be won by socialism.

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3. Therefore ideology determines friends and enemies -- it sets an international standard of behavior.
4. Ideology presents a discrete set of strategies and tactics of revolutionary behavior.
5. Ideology sets a standard of measurement of correlation of forces: strategic decisions to advance or retreat are made on the basis of "scientific" assessments of the correlation of forces. Ideological strength or weakness is the key criterion.
6. Ideology serves as a weapon of political influence: an instrument of subversion and deception.
7. Foreign ideologies (and therefore any competing version of the truth) are the principal threats to the Soviet system.

Soviet Strategy

- A. Because USSR is prisoner of the ideology, its lies, and its predictions, it is compelled to try to fulfill those predictions. This means:
 1. Creating false appearances -- therefore a strategy of deception.
 2. Creating new realities, by exporting revolution.
- B. The principal means of Soviet expansionism is "ideological struggle".
 1. To win men's minds.
 2. To deceive those who cannot be won.
 3. Therefore propaganda, subversion and disinformation are the key features of Soviet foreign policy.
 4. Suppression of the truth is the ultimate objective -- self-censorship by Soviet adversaries is prelude to political uniformity.
 5. A principal effort: to define the acceptable vocabulary of international political debate -- both words and issues.
- C. Military power is the principal adjunct to this.
 1. It can forcibly create the new reality.

2. It can serve to intimidate and accelerate the process of ideological subversion.

D. Struggle between two systems as a protracted conflict.

1. Soviet control over the time frame of the conflict enables them to control timing of attack and choice of battlefield while permitting possibility of strategic retreat.
2. Proper understanding of time permits strategy of attrition -- nibble at edges of Free World, never risk final showdown.
3. Strategy of indirect attack:
 - A deceptive means of escaping culpability.
 - Use of proxies, front groups, agents of influence, etc.
4. Strategy of monopoly of offensive.
5. Strategy of psychological conditioning:
 - War-zone, peace zone.
 - Demarcation of scrimmage line.
 - Soviets have conditioned us to believe that peace zone is inviolable but war zone is not.
 - Therefore Soviets have developed a no-lose strategy: they have nothing to lose by continually trying to cross the scrimmage line.

III. SOVIET THREAT ASSESSMENT: THREATS, OPPORTUNITIES, CHALLENGES (Dobriansky)

a. Zero-sum mentality: The U.S. poses the greatest threat to Soviet security as it is the main obstacle to the achievement of Soviet geo-political objectives. Ergo, Soviet foreign policy is generally designed to reduce and curtail the U.S. geo-political position. Moscow evaluates all international situations from one perspective -- whether they would detract or enhance the Soviet position vis-a-vis that of the U.S.

b. Soviet conception of a threat: In contrast to the Western conception of a threat -- an action which might undermine one's existing position -- the Soviet definition also includes any actions which might frustrate potential Soviet gains. As the Soviets strive for absolute security, any attempts to upset the current balance or Soviet gains are perceived by Moscow as a threat. There are two underlying reasons: (1) Soviet penchant for expansionism to

solve security problems (2) Existence of democratic societies poses constant threat to domestic Soviet stability by providing an example of an alternative social and political entity. Public and private Soviet complaints indicate that U.S. ideological offensive is taken seriously and regarded as an important threat.

c. Role of military power in foreign policy: Soviet leaders regard military strength as the foundation of the USSR's status as a global superpower and as the most critical factor underlying successful Soviet foreign policy. Yet, concern about the danger of nuclear war has been a serious consideration in Soviet foreign policy decisions. Essentially, the nature of the Soviet dilemma has been how to wage a successful expansionist foreign policy without unduly increasing the risk of a nuclear war.

Soviet Assessment of Current International Environment/Projected Trends

a. U.S.: Despite domestic opposition, budgetary pressures and Intra-Alliance tensions, the Soviets expect that the U.S. is likely to sustain its present foreign and defense policies (i.e., MX, INF, etc.) which seeks to curtail Soviet expansionism.

b. Western Europe: Despite Intra-Alliance tensions, the peace movement, etc., the Soviets do not realistically expect a break up of NATO, and believe that Western European governments would continue to follow (by and large) the U.S. lead on major security issues.

c. Third World: Soviets anticipate acceleration of the process of disintegration, anarchy triggered by economic stagnation, border and resource disputes and the lack of stable political organizations. They anticipate many Third World crises which will present both opportunities and threats to Soviet security. Soviet concern is that a newly assertive U.S. bent on stemming Soviet expansionism would intervene in a future Third World conflict.

Regional Geographic Assessments: Threats/Opportunities (Countries are listed in order of priority from Soviet perspective)

a. Eastern Europe: Only area which offers no opportunities, only potential threats;

b. Western Europe: European military capability is minimal threat in short term, but with U.S. support it is a significant military threat. Substantial ideological/political threat, moderate opportunities.

c. Asia: High threat/high opportunity; East Asia -- China, Japan, Korea -- growing security threat; main option

= containment; Southeast/Southwest Asia - opportunities, of immense strategic value.

d. Middle East: Moderate Threat/Moderate Opportunity; do not anticipate dramatic successes.

e. Africa: Low risk/low threat/moderate opportunities; no dramatic successes; recognition of gains and losses.

f. Central America: High risk/low threat/high opportunities; creation of strategic diversion -- tying up U.S. resources, distracting U.S. attention from other critical areas, generating U.S. domestic cleavages.

IV. PSYCHOLOGY OF SOVIET LEADERS (Matlock)

A. Some widespread characteristics

- Communist ideology, Russian traditions and the imperatives of ruling a highly bureaucratized, multinational empire are fused in the thinking of the leadership.
- The legitimacy of the rulers rests entirely on the ideology; they must cling to it even if they do not fully believe it.
- Their first priority is preserving their system; their second is expanding their power, so long as it does not conflict with the first.
- Legitimacy and status are extremely important to them and comprise an important foreign policy objective. This contributes to an acute sense of saving face.
- Their attitude is fundamentally totalitarian: citizens are viewed as property of the state, allies as puppets (or else they are not really allies).
- They take a long-term view and do not accept defeats as permanent. A defeat in one area is viewed as a challenge to find other means to achieve the same objective.
- They are persistent bargainers, adept at exploiting time pressures on the other side, but willing to strike deals rapidly if they feel compelled to.
- They are often prisoners of their own ideological proclivities and thus misjudge the effect of their actions on others.

--They are much more preoccupied with the United States than we are with them.

B. Soviet view of Reagan Administration

- Soviets cautiously welcomed the President's election because they were fed up with Carter and thought a Republican president might return to the Nixon-Ford policies.
- When they realized in early 1981 that there would be no return to "detente," they played with the idea of "waiting out" the Reagan Administration, in the hope that it would only last four years.
- They have been surprised and impressed by the President's ability to get his defense programs through, keep unity in the alliance, and get the economy moving again. At the same time, they have experienced a series of foreign policy defeats and growing economic difficulties at home.
- There are signs now that they are reassessing their foreign policy. They may feel overextended, and in need of some reduction of tension to allow more attention to domestic problems. They seem convinced that the President is likely to be reelected, and if so must be asking themselves whether it might not be better to deal with him before rather than after his reelection.
- Given their preoccupation with U.S.-Soviet relations, they may well exaggerate the political benefits to the President in dealing with them. This could lead them to overplay their hand.

IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR US POLICY

- A. The struggle is long-term. There are no quick fixes. This means that we must devise a strategy which can be sustained for a decade or, probably, more.
- B. Two broad options in theory:
 - 1. Unrelenting pressure on the Soviets; and
 - 2. Negotiation of specific differences on basis of strength, with follow-up to keep

gains permanent rather than temporary.

Only the second seems sustainable in a democratic society, but it requires a recognition that agreements are only stages in the struggle, not the end of it.

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1 June 1984
FB 84-10030

Special Memorandum

Soviet Public Treatment of President Reagan
November 1980 – May 1984

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BY KML NARA DATE 9/25/12

Foreign Broadcast Information Service

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FBIS SPEC. MEMO

1 June 1984

FB 84-10030

Soviet Public Treatment of President Reagan

November 1980 – May 1984

Introduction

The treatment accorded an American president in Soviet authoritative statements and media commentary can be a sensitive barometer of Soviet expectations for Moscow's relations with Washington. Historically, Soviet efforts to promote improved relations have been accompanied by restraints on public criticism of presidents and their policies. By the same token, harsh public attacks on presidents have been made during periods when the Soviets seemed to believe that no improvement in relations was possible or advantageous.

Soviet public treatment of President Reagan has proved to be no exception to this pattern. Twice since November 1980 Moscow has significantly moderated its propaganda line to test the prospects for reduced bilateral tensions. Commentary during the last two months has been harsh, however, and gives no hint that a third Soviet effort of this sort is in the offing.

Pattern of Statements

The first Soviet effort to improve relations with the current Administration came immediately after the November 1980 elections. Soviet media pictured President-elect Reagan in positive terms, asserting that he had moderated anti-Soviet views expressed during the campaign and raising the possibility that he would reverse the deterioration in bilateral relations that had occurred during the period of the Carter Administration. Faced with continued criticism after the Administration took office, Moscow abandoned such professed optimism in low-level media comment, resorting to strident censure of the Administration and to direct, if somewhat less harsh, attacks on the President himself. Soviet political leaders continued to abide by their normal strictures against attacking a U.S. president directly, although by May 1981 they were strongly indicting President Reagan's policies.

This pattern of leadership and media comment continued until Brezhnev's death in November 1982. It was broken only by a month-long interlude of more moderate comment late in 1981, after agreement was reached to begin

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talks on limiting intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) and before U.S. sanctions were adopted in response to the imposition of martial law in Poland.

A second, more tentative Soviet effort to promote improved U.S.-Soviet relations came after Andropov's accession to power. Soviet leaders and specialists on the United States muted their anti-U.S. rhetoric, which had become particularly harsh in the last months of the Brezhnev regime, and expressed receptivity to any U.S. gestures for improved relations. This selective restraint on criticism—routine Soviet propaganda was little affected—lasted only from November 1982 until early spring 1983, when contention over INF and other issues took its toll.

In the aftermath of the shooting down of a South Korean airliner last September, Soviet leadership statements and media commentary on the President became more abusive than at any time in the last two decades. This harsh rhetoric continued into 1984. Only in the final days of the Andropov regime did Soviet leaders appear to indicate a desire to lower the decibel level of their polemics against the President. The usual strident invective was missing from Andropov's 25 January *Pravda* interview in response to President Reagan's 16 January speech expressing interest in U.S.-Soviet dialogue, and routine Soviet propaganda became marginally less sharp in its criticism of the President.

Although Chernenko's accession to power in February 1984 brought a brief period of moderation in Soviet leadership polemics against the President and his Administration, this restraint disappeared more quickly than had been the case after Brezhnev's death. As early as 23 February a *Pravda* article by Defense Minister Ustinov excoriated "U.S. leaders" for pushing mankind "toward a nuclear catastrophe." By late March, even Chernenko, the Soviet leader who had been least critical of the United States in February and early March, began attacking the Administration in harsh terms. Routine Soviet propaganda also became more strident, and in the last two months some commentary has approached the level of abusiveness that was common last fall.

Different Voices

Soviet statements about the Administration are made at three levels of authority: the top political leadership, midlevel officials with ties to the

leadership, and routine media commentators. The behavior pattern of each of these groups has distinguishing features:

- Although it authorized media attacks on the President, the leadership itself conspicuously avoided attacking him directly until 1983, thereby observing its traditional posture of standing aloof from the extremes of the polemical fray. Even in his strongest criticisms of U.S. policy, Brezhnev attacked U.S. "ruling circles," "Washington," and "the line of the United States and those who follow it" without naming the President. The Soviet leadership broke this pattern last September in the wake of U.S. charges that the Soviet Union had knowingly shot down a passenger airliner. Andropov's January *Pravda* interview and statements coming after his death have returned to the more familiar pattern of sharply attacking the Administration but avoiding the extremes witnessed last fall.
- Midlevel officials and political commentators (for example, Aleksandr Bovin, Georgiy Arbatov, Vadim Zagladin, and Nikolay Shishlin) have been less restrained than the leaders in blaming the President for the U.S. policies they have so sharply condemned. They have also provided the most sensitive indicator of changing Soviet perceptions about the direction of bilateral relations, registering in their comments apparent fluctuations in Soviet expectations regarding U.S.-Soviet cooperation.
- Routine media commentary has been the least sensitive barometer of changes in the atmosphere of U.S.-Soviet relations. When President Reagan was elected, this low-level propaganda was more optimistic than some Soviet political observers. But as Soviet assessments of Administration policy toward the Soviet Union hardened, the propaganda assumed a hostile tone which has continued despite some fluctuations in intensity.

* * * * *

This report presents a compilation of significant Soviet statements about President Reagan from the time of his election in November 1980 through May 1984. It is intended to provide a comparative baseline for use by analysts in judging future Soviet statements about the President. The compilation of statements is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

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FBIS SPEC. MEMO
1 June 1984
FB 84-10030

Soviet Statements on President Reagan

November 1980 - May 1984

This compilation is divided into two parts. The first section presents authoritative statements, including those by top political leaders. The second presents assessments by well-connected midlevel officials and a small sampling of routine Soviet media commentaries.

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Midlevel and Routine Media Commentary	33

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Authoritative Statements

Premier Nikolay Tikhonov, October Revolution anniversary speech (*Pravda*, 7 Nov 80)

Regarding our relations with the United States of America, just as with any other country which belongs to a different social system, they can only be built up on the basis of equality, noninterference in internal affairs, not causing harm to the security of one another. . . .

I would like to express the hope that the new Administration in the White House will manifest a constructive approach to questions or relations between our countries.

General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, Kremlin dinner speech (*Pravda*, 18 Nov 80)

Much in the development of the international situation will, of course, depend on the position of the United States. A new president has now been elected there. I shall not dwell on what was said by him and his supporters and opponents in the heat of the election struggle. I can only state with full responsibility that any constructive steps by the U.S. Administration in the field of Soviet-American relations and urgent world problems will meet with a positive response on our part.

TASS statement (*Pravda*, 3 Feb 81)

Soviet leading circles have taken note of a new anti-Soviet hostile campaign being unfolded in the United States. This time they ascribe to the Soviet Union involvement in "international terrorism." Such inventions could be simply ignored as a new primitive trick by professional anti-Soviets if not for the fact that this campaign was started by high-ranking officials of the American Administration including U.S. Secretary of State A. Haig. His statements, made at a press conference on 28 January this year, and subsequent additional comments made by another official representative of the U.S. State Department, clearly indicate that this is not a matter of some occasional unhappy expression but a deliberate political subversion. . . .

Soviet leading circles would like to hope that they in Washington will give serious thought as to what the continuation there of the campaign hostile to the Soviet Union can lead and will take measures to stop it.

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Brezhnev, speech to 26th CPSU Congress (*Pravda*, 24 Feb 81)

Unfortunately, the previous Washington Administration by no means considered the development of relations and of mutual understanding. Attempting to exert pressure on us, it began to destroy all the positive results which had been scored with no little difficulty in Soviet-American relations over the preceding years. . . .

Even after the change of leadership in the White House, candidly bellicose calls and statements are being heard from Washington, calls and statements which seem to be specially intended to poison the atmosphere of relations between our countries. In any case, we would like to hope that those who now determine U.S. policy will ultimately be able to look at things more realistically. . . .

The present state of relations between us and the sharpness of international problems demanding solution dictate the need for dialogue at all levels and, what is more, an active dialogue. We are ready for dialogue. Experience shows that the decisive link here is meetings at the highest level.

Brezhnev, speech in Kiev (*Pravda*, 10 May 81)

There are quite a few sober-minded people among those who today shape the policy of capitalist countries. They understand that the emphasis on strength, the emphasis on war in relations with the socialist world is madness in our day and age, that there is only one reasonable road—peaceful coexistence, mutually advantageous cooperation.

But there are also such statesmen in the bourgeois world who, judging by everything, are accustomed to thinking only in terms of strength and diktat. They actually regard the attainment of military superiority over the Soviet Union as their main political credo. The solution of international problems by way of talks and mutually advantageous agreements appears to be way down their list of priorities, if they give serious thought to this at all.

Among them there are also those who openly state that peace is not the most important matter, that there are things more important than peace.

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Just think, comrades: Can one imagine a more horrendous position, a more cynical disregard for the destinies of peoples, including one's own people, for the lives of hundreds of millions of people! . . .

This is not to mention how absurd are any plans which are intended by means of threats, economic blockade or military aggression to impede the development of socialist countries or the struggle of peoples for national freedom and social justice. . . .

As for the Soviet Union, it is not the first time that we are hearing inventions about our policy, slander, and threats. But we do not give in to intimidations.

Marshal Viktor Kulikov, first deputy minister of defense, and commander in chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Nations (*Krasnaya Zvezda*, 21 Jun 81)

If you look at the statements of the leaders of the present U.S. Administration, you cannot help noticing in them a similarity with the aims set by the Hitlerite leadership in attacking the Soviet Union. Speaking at Notre Dame in June, R. Reagan said: "The West will outlive communism. . . . We will write it off as a sad, unnatural chapter in the history of mankind."

Defense Minister Dmitriy Ustinov (*Pravda*, 25 Jul 81)

The ruling circles of Washington have decided to overturn all the positive elements in Soviet-American relations achieved during the seventies and to break down the approximate equality in the military sphere between the USSR and the United States.

Without putting forward any positive initiatives the Reagan Administration has taken a standpoint of unconcealed anti-Sovietism. At the same time it is grossly interfering in the affairs of other states and is high-handedly dictating its demands to them. . . .

The ruling circles of the United States are intensifying international tension and exacerbating Soviet-American relations. . . .

Washington, once again, as a decade ago, is trying to speak to the Soviet Union in the language of "cold war." At the same time, its disregard for agreements which were reached between our two countries in the field of

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arms restriction is demonstrated. A. Haig states: "We are not very concerned about the understandings of 1972, although they were agreed by both sides."

Brezhnev, interview with *Der Spiegel* (*Pravda*, 3 Nov 81)

Unfortunately, the leading powers of the West, above all, the NATO bloc, do not show so far a serious interest in talks on all of these questions that are vital to mankind and its peaceful future. Some people there are by far more willing to speak not on detente, but on confrontation; not on peaceful mutually beneficial cooperation, but on the use of trade to military-strategic ends; not on agreements on the basis of equality and equal security, but on diktat from the positions of military supremacy; not on the elimination by joint efforts of seats of conflicts, but on the creation of ever new military bases, on the buildup of their military presence in various parts of the world; not on curbing the arms race, but on "rearmament"; not on a limitation or prohibition of some or other types of weapons, but on the creation of ever new, even more destructive means of mass annihilation of people.

This way, unfortunately, they not only speak, but also act in practice. You, certainly, understand that I have in mind, above all, the policy of the present U.S. Administration, the way it was manifest both in statements by high-ranking statesmen of that country and, which is even more important, in their practical deeds.

All of it is actually an opposite to detente, blunt disregard for the striving of all peoples for lasting peace. And it is, certainly, profoundly deplorable that the leaders of one of the world's biggest powers have deemed it possible to build their policy on such a basis. . . .

President Reagan has recently expressed the readiness of the United States to discuss with the Soviet Union also other problems, which cause differences between the two countries. We welcome such readiness, as we have always considered talks to be the most appropriate method of resolving international problems. The main thing, of course, is that appropriate practical deeds should be matched to correct words.

And it would be better to abandon dreams of ensuring military supremacy over the USSR.

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Ustinov, October Revolution anniversary speech (*Pravda*, 7 Nov 81)

The Washington Administration is with increasing frequency resorting to frankly inflammatory language. High-ranking U.S. representatives, with cynical disregard for the fate of the peoples, state that there are allegedly some things more important than peace. . . .

The preservation of peace is inseparable from the curbing of the arms race—from stage-by-stage disarmament. Important steps in that direction were taken in the seventies. But the present U.S. Administration is intent on casting doubt on all the positive things that have been jointly achieved in the field of Soviet-U.S. relations. It openly declares its intention to speak to the Soviet Union from positions of strength.

TASS statement on U.S. stance on Poland (*Pravda*, 14 Jan 82)

The United States and its NATO allies are continuing attempts at crudely interfering in the internal affairs of a sovereign state—the Polish People's Republic, at whipping up international tensions. This has been most clearly revealed also in the statement, which was issued on 11 January by the foreign ministers of the North Atlantic Alliance.

It is well known that the whole of this disgraceful farce has been initiated by the U.S. Administration. Its style is felt both in the impudent distortion of facts, the high-handed tones, and excessive political ambitions.

Yes, Washington makes no little effort to try to bring about a turnaround in international politics from detente to confrontation between blocs. Why is it done? It is not too difficult to answer this question.

What it amounts to is above all an attempt at crowding socialism and impairing the positions of the USSR and other socialist countries on the European and world scene. Certain figures of the imperialist camp are day and night beset by nightmares because socialism is growing stronger. The international positions of socialism rely on the existing balance of forces in Europe and in the world; and are guaranteed by the might of the socialist community.

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Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov, first deputy minister of defense and chief of the General Staff (*Always In Readiness To Defend The Homeland*, Moscow: Voenizdat, approved for publication 26 Jan 82)

World imperialism, and particularly U.S. imperialism, is seeking to extend its tentacles into every part of the world. Militant U.S. circles have openly adopted a course of policy aimed at undermining detente, engagement in a massive arms race, and active preparations for nuclear war. The various actions and acts of sabotage against the USSR and the other nations of the socialist community and against progressive forces throughout the world which they are presently conducting are of a coordinated nature and are joined together by a common scheme. The main goal which the U.S. imperialists have set for themselves is gradually and sequentially to weaken and undermine socialism as a system, using any and all methods and means, and ultimately to establish their world domination.

This is not a new phenomenon. History has seen many claimants to world domination. Napoleon persistently sought to achieve world domination, as did Hitler at a later time. The outcome of their ambitions is well known. An even harsher outcome may await these latter-day claimants.

Brezhnev, Soviet Trade Union Congress speech (*Pravda*, 17 Mar 82)

The newly fledged devotees of cold war and dangerous balancing on the brink of a real war would like nothing better than to tear up the legal and ethical norms of relations between states that have taken shape over the centuries and to cancel their independence and sovereignty. They are trying to retailor the political map of the world and have declared large regions on all continents as zones of their "vital interests." They have arrogated the "right" to command some countries and to judge and "punish" others. Unembarrassed, they publicly announce, and try to carry out, plans for economic and political "destablization" of governments and states that are not to their liking. With unexampled cynicism they gloat over difficulties experienced by this or that nation. They are trying to substitute "sanctions" and blockades for normal communications and international trade, and endless threats of armed force, not short of threats to use nuclear weapons, for contacts and negotiations.

It is simply astonishing to see it all. And you cannot help asking yourself: What is there more of in this policy—thoughtlessness and lack of experience in international affairs, or irresponsibility and, to say it bluntly, an adventurist approach to problems crucial for the destiny of mankind? Not in our country, but in the columns of respectable organs of the U.S. bourgeois press this policy was described as “a course to political disaster.” It is hard to deny the validity of this description.

Brezhnev, *Pravda* interview (*Pravda*, 18 Apr 82)

I already spoke on the value of an active dialogue with the United States at all levels, especially emphasizing that the decisive link here is summit-level meetings. Today we also support such meetings. It is understandable that a meeting between the U.S. President and myself must be well prepared and conducted properly, not just in passing in connection with some international forum or other.

Yuriy Andropov, Politburo member and chairman of the KGB, Lenin anniversary speech (*Pravda*, 23 Apr 82)

The imperialist bourgeoisie, frightened by the upsurge of the antiwar movements, is making ever-wider use of the weapons of lies and sophisticated deception. What is Washington doing now? One hysterical propaganda campaign replaces the other. People are at one moment being persuaded of a Soviet military threat, then lied to unscrupulously about the lagging behind of the United States, intimidated with international terrorism, fed cock-and-bull stories about events in Poland, Central America, South and Southeast Asia. . . .

Attempts are made to make use of diplomatic talks themselves in order to deceive the public, among them talks on the limitation of arms and on disarmament. The impression is created that often they are entered into only to create illusions and, by lulling public vigilance, continue the arms race. . . .

Brezhnev, Komsomol congress speech (*Pravda*, 19 May 82)

President Reagan, on his part, has now declared that the United States is ready for the resumption of the talks. In our opinion, this is a step in the right direction. It is, however, important that the talks should begin immediately in the right key.

In the same speech the President said that the United States at the talks would be in favor of substantial reductions. Well, we have always been in favor of substantial reductions of strategic arms; there is no need to persuade us in this respect.

But if one looks at the essence of the ideas voiced by the U.S. President on such reductions, one notes unfortunately that the American position is absolutely unilateral in nature. Above all, because the United States would like in general to exclude from the talks the strategic arms it is now most intensively developing.

Brezhnev, speech at Kremlin meeting of military commanders (*Pravda*, 28 Oct 82)

The ruling circles of the United States of America have launched a political, ideological, and economic offensive on socialism and have raised the intensity of their military preparations to an unprecedented level. . . .

The masses of people on all continents angrily protest against Washington's aggressive policy which is threatening to push the world into the flames of a nuclear war. The adventurism, rudeness, and undisguised egoism of this policy arouse growing indignation in many countries, including those allied with the United States. . . .

TASS report of 15 November 1982 meeting between General Secretary Andropov and Vice President Bush (*Pravda*, 16 Nov 82)

In this respect Yu. V. Andropov stressed that the Soviet Union, consistently carrying out a policy of peace, is prepared to build relations with the United States on a basis of full equality, noninterference, mutual respect in the interests of the peoples of both countries, and normalization [*ozdorovleniye*] of the international situation. . . .

Tikhonov, Kremlin dinner speech to U.S. trade delegation (*Pravda*, 19 Nov 82)

We are meeting with you at a time which is not the best for Soviet-American relations. Their climate has considerably cooled and, to be frank, not through our fault.

The official stand taken in the United States towards the Soviet Union, naturally, is also reflected in trade between our countries. All sorts of discriminatory measures, attempts to use various sanctions, embargoes, etc., against our country do not, of course, inspire kind feelings, but rather undermine the confidence of Soviet foreign trade organizations in the American market. . . .

The Soviet Union has been and is for normal, and even better, friendly relations with the United States. There were such relations in the past, and they can again become a reality. This would meet the interests of our countries and the interests of universal peace. I am confident that this is precisely what our peoples wish. They wish lasting peace and mutually beneficial cooperation.

Andropov, speech at CPSU Central Committee plenum (*Pravda*, 23 Nov 82)

All are equally interested in preserving peace and detente. Therefore, statements in which the readiness for normalizing relations is linked with the demand that the Soviet Union pay for this with preliminary concessions in different fields do not sound serious, to say the least. We shall not agree to this and, properly speaking, we have nothing to cancel: We did not introduce sanctions against anyone, we did not denounce treaties and agreements that were signed, and we did not interrupt talks that were started. I should like to stress once more that the Soviet Union stands for accord but this should be sought on the basis of reciprocity and equality.

In our opinion the point of talks with the United States and other Western countries, primarily on questions of restraining the arms race, does not lie in the statement of differences. For us talks are a way of joining efforts by different states in order to achieve results useful to all sides. The problems will not disappear by themselves if the talks are held for the sake of talks, as it unfortunately happens not infrequently. We are for the search on a healthy basis, acceptable to the sides concerned, for a settlement of the most complicated problems, especially, of course, the problems of curbing the arms race, involving both nuclear and conventional arms. But let no one expect unilateral disarmament from us. We are not naive people.

We do not demand unilateral disarmament from the West. We are for equality, for consideration for the interests of both sides, for honest agreement. We are ready for this.

Ustinov, TASS interview (*Pravda*, 7 Dec 82)

[President Reagan] said in his speech of 22 November that the Soviet Union now has a clear margin in practically any type of military power. Such assertions are not in keeping with reality. They are calculated at deceiving the public and have the purpose of justifying the United States' unprecedented military programs and aggressive doctrines. It is regrettable that such attempts to convince people of the existence of what does not exist in nature are made by the leader of a great power whose very position presupposes realism and responsibility in assessing reality. . . .

At the same time, the President's speech contains an attempt to sow distrust in the Soviet Union's stand. He stated that the Soviet Union violates the unilateral moratorium it announced on the deployment of its medium-range missiles in the European part of the USSR. I state quite definitely that the USSR is true to its word.

Andropov, *Pravda* interview responding to President Reagan's Open Letter (*Pravda*, 2 Feb 83)

I must say quite definitely that there is nothing new in President R. Reagan's proposal. What it is all about—and this all the world's news agencies have immediately taken note of—is the same "zero option." That it is patently unacceptable to the Soviet Union now is already generally recognized. Really, can one seriously speak about a proposal according to which the Soviet Union would have to scrap unilaterally all its medium-range missiles, while the United States and its NATO allies would retain all their nuclear weapons of this category?

It is precisely this unrealistic position of the United States that has blocked, and this is well known, progress at the talks in Geneva. That now the U.S. President has reiterated again this position indicates one thing: The United States does not want to look for a mutually acceptable accord with the Soviet Union and thereby deliberately dooms the Geneva talks to failure. . . .

We have believed and still believe that summit meetings have special significance to resolving complicated problems. This determines our serious approach to them.

For us this is not a matter of a political or a propaganda game. A meeting between the leaders of the USSR and the United States aimed at finding mutually acceptable solutions to urgent problems and at developing relations between our countries would be useful both to the Soviet Union and to the United States of America, to Europe, and to the whole world.

But when the U.S. President makes the meeting conditional on the Soviet Union's consent to the patently unacceptable solution to the problem of nuclear armaments in Europe, proposed by him, this by no means testifies to the seriousness of the American leadership's approach to the whole of this issue. This can only be regretted.

Andropov, *Pravda* interview (*Pravda*, 27 Mar 83)

The President pretends that almost a thousand medium-range nuclear systems of the United States and its NATO allies do not ostensibly exist in the zone of Europe, and that it is unknown to him that NATO has a 1.5-1 advantage over the USSR in the aggregate number of nuclear warheads on those systems.

The President not only keeps silent about all that. He tells a deliberate untruth [*on govorit zavedomuyu nepravdu*], asserting that the Soviet Union does not observe its own unilateral moratorium on the deployment of medium-range missiles. . . .

The incumbent U.S. Administration continues to tread an extremely perilous path. The issues of war and peace must not be treated so flippantly. All attempts at achieving military superiority over the USSR are futile. . . . It is time they stopped devising one option after another in search of the best ways of unleashing nuclear war in the hope of winning it. Engaging in this is not just irresponsible, it is insane.

Andropov, speech to CPSU Central Committee plenum (*Pravda*, 16 Jun 83)

This period is marked by a confrontation, unprecedented in the entire post-war period by its intensity and sharpness, of two diametrically opposite world outlooks, two political courses—socialism and imperialism. A struggle is going on for the minds and hearts of billions of people in the world. And the future of mankind depends in no small measure on the outcome of this ideological struggle. . . . It is no less important to skillfully expose the lying, subversive nature of imperialist propaganda. . . .

On the one hand, as has already been said, the aggressiveness of ultrareactionary forces led by U.S. imperialism has sharply increased. Attempts are being made to reverse the course of events at all costs. Of course, this policy will not bring imperialists success but, being adventurous, it is extremely dangerous to mankind. This is why it is meeting with powerful opposition on the part of the peoples, which, undoubtedly, will grow even further.

In the present-day capitalist world, however, there are also other trends and other politicians who take a more realistic account of the international situation.

Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko, TASS interview (*Pravda*, 22 Jun 83)

Naturally, a [summit] meeting which could produce major results for both bilateral Soviet-U.S. relations and the international situation would be useful.

Quite a few words are now being said in the West, particularly in Washington, about a Soviet-American summit. An outsider can even get the impression that Washington is indeed giving serious thought to such a meeting. But if we look into the crux of the matter, the situation, regrettably, is different.

Obviously, proper preconditions are needed to hold a meeting of the top leaders of the two major powers. First, it is necessary to have a certain degree of mutual understanding on major issues which are fundamental to the state of relations between the two countries and the overall international situation. There also is a need for the desire of both sides actually to strive for positive developments, or even better, for a breakthrough in their mutual relations.

If we consider the state of affairs from this point of view, it becomes clear that the discourses of American figures on a meeting are not backed by anything. U.S. policy on relations with the Soviet Union does not pursue any constructive goals at all, of which American leaders make no secret. Moreover, it is oriented in the totally opposite direction.

When there appear in American politics real signs of a readiness to conduct affairs in a serious and constructive manner, the question of the possibility of a summit will appear in a different light.

TASS statement on Korean airliner incident (*Pravda*, 3 Sep 83)

The intrusion into [Soviet] airspace by the aforementioned plane cannot be regarded in any other way than a preplanned act. It was obviously thought possible to attain special intelligence aims without hindrance using civilian planes as a cover.

More than that, there is reason to believe that those who organized this provocation deliberately desired a further aggravation of the international situation striving to smear the Soviet Union, to sow hostility towards it and to cast aspersions on the Soviet peace-loving policy.

This is illustrated also by the impudent, slanderous statement in respect to the Soviet Union that was made instantly by President Reagan of the United States.

USSR Government statement on Korean airliner incident (*Pravda*, 7 Sep 83)

The assertion of the U.S. President that Soviet pilots knew that it was a civilian aircraft are absolutely not in keeping with reality. . . .

It is the sovereign right of every state to protect its borders. . . . So the U.S. President makes himself out as an ignoramus saying, as he did in his address on 5 September, that the Soviet Union "arbitrarily proclaims" its borders in the airspace [sic].

But the point here, of course, is not the ignorance of one U.S. official or another. The point is a deliberate preplanned action in an area that is strategically important to the Soviet Union. The instigators of that action could not help realizing what its outcome could be, but went ahead with a major intelligence operation with the use, as is now becoming clear, of a civilian plane, deliberately exposing its passengers to mortal danger. . . .

This conclusion is confirmed by all subsequent actions of the U.S. Administration. Its leaders, including the U.S. President, launched a malicious and hostile anti-Soviet campaign over a very short time, clearly using a prearranged script. Its essence has been revealed in its most concentrated form in the televised speech of U.S. President R. Reagan on 5 September—to try to blacken the image of the Soviet Union and discredit its social system, to provoke a feeling of hatred toward the Soviet people, to present the aims of the USSR foreign policy in a distorted perspective, and to distract attention from its peace initiatives.

The entire responsibility for this tragedy rests wholly and fully with the leaders of the United States of America.

Ogarkov, article (*Izvestiya*, 23 Sep 83)

The struggle for peace in our times has acquired special significance. That is due primarily to the sharply enhanced aggressiveness of international imperialism, Zionism, and reaction headed by the United States. In recent years their actions have been significantly reminiscent of fascism's actions in the thirties. Having adopted flagrant lies and slander, the United States and its allies have launched a global offensive against socialism on all fronts, initiating, as they openly assert, a new "crusade" against us. The Washington Administration is nurturing sinister plans. Expatriating on its alleged adherence to peace, the U.S. Administration, through its defense secretary, blasphemously states that "the path to peace is marked by preparation for war." The "Directive in the Defense Field for Fiscal 1984," drafted on instructions from the U.S. President, is evidence of how far the U.S. "hawks" have gone. This official document sets as its main aim "the destruction of socialism as a sociopolitical system." That's all! There is no need to explain this gibberish. Commentary is superfluous, as they say. We can only marvel at the sheer ignorance and self-sufficiency of the transatlantic strategists, so infinitely far removed from a knowledge of the elementary foundations and laws of the development of human society.

Andropov, statement (*Pravda*, 29 Sep 83)

The Soviet leadership deems it necessary to inform the Soviet people, other peoples, and all who are responsible for determining states' policy of its assessment of the course pursued in international affairs by the current U.S. Administration.

In short, it is a militarist course that represents a serious threat to peace. Its essence is to try to ensure a dominating position in the world for the United States of America regardless of the interests of other states and peoples. . . .

When the U.S. President bombastically declares from the UN rostrum his commitment to the cause of peace, self-determination, and sovereignty of the peoples, these rhetorical declarations can convince no one.

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If anyone has any illusions about the possibility of an evolution for the better in the present American Administration's policy, recent events have dispelled them once and for all. The Administration is going so far for the sake of achieving its imperial objectives that one cannot help doubting whether any restraints [*tormoza*] at all exist for Washington to prevent it from crossing a line before which any thinking person ought to stop.

The sophisticated provocation organized by the U.S. special services using a South Korean plane is also an example of extreme adventurism in policy. . . .

In their endeavor somehow to justify their dangerous, misanthropic policy, they are heaping mountains of slander on the Soviet Union and socialism as a social system, and the tone is being set by the U.S. President himself. It must be frankly said that it is an unseemly spectacle when, having set themselves the aim of denigrating the Soviet people, the leaders of a country like the United States resort to what is virtually foul-mouthed abuse mingled with hypocritical sermons on morality and humanity. . . .

Now Washington, in addition to morality, is also flouting elementary rules of decency, displaying disrespect not only for statesmen and states but also for the United Nations. . . .

Of course, malicious attacks on the Soviet Union arouse in us a natural sense of indignation, but we have strong nerves, and we do not build our policy on emotions. It is founded on common sense, realism, and profound responsibility for the destiny of peace.

Ustinov, article (*Pravda*, 19 Nov 83)

The aggressiveness of ultrareactionary imperialist forces increased sharply when the R. Reagan Administration came to power in the United States. They have declared a "crusade" against socialism. . . .

The R. Reagan Administration, in blatant contradiction with this commitment, is now stating its "right" to inflict a first nuclear strike in the hope of victory. . . .

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The Washington Administration's war preparations are accompanied by shameless anti-Soviet hysteria. Discarding all decency, top U.S. officials are slandering the USSR, its people and policy, and the socialist way of life. Lies, disinformation, juggling with facts, and provocations are being brought into play. It is with the aid of such methods that Washington figures, heating up the international situation, are counting on ensuring the unobstructed implementation of their course aimed at an unrestrained arms race. This policy on the part of the White House leaders does not consist solely of emotions or rhetoric. It is a consciously and coldly and deliberately implemented long-term strategy aimed at broadening confrontation and thus increasing the danger of war.

Andropov, statement (*Pravda*, 25 Nov 83)

The leadership of the Soviet Union has already apprised Soviet people and other peoples of its assessment of the present U.S. Administration's militarist course and warned the U.S. Government and the Western countries which are in agreement with it about the dangerous consequences of that course. . . .

The Soviet leadership appeals to the leaders of the United States and of the states of West Europe to weigh up once again all the consequences with which the implementation of the plans for the deployment of the new U.S. missiles in Europe threatens their own peoples and all mankind.

We are already living, even now, in a peace that is too fragile. Responsible statesmen must therefore evaluate what is taking place and make a rational decision. Only human reason can and must safeguard mankind from the awesome danger. We call upon those who are nudging the world along the path of an ever more dangerous arms race to renounce the unrealizable calculations of achieving military superiority by such a path with the aim of dictating their will to other peoples and states.

Gromyko, speech at Conference on Disarmament in Europe (*Pravda*, 19 Jan 84)

Instead of conducting talks and displaying a desire to work for accord, the U.S. Administration has chosen a course of breaking the existing alignment of forces. . . .

The incumbent U.S. Administration is an administration thinking in categories of war and acting accordingly....

What is needed is deeds and not verbal equilibristics, the resort to which has been made particularly often in Washington lately. They clearly are a sign of short-term considerations, and people already know sufficiently well the worth of such tricks. No matter how hard one tries to lie—be it a crude lie or a virtuoso one—this will change nothing in the actual state of affairs. What is needed is a turn of substance in policy—from the policy of militarism and aggression to a policy of peace and international cooperation.

Andropov, interview (*Pravda*, 25 Jan 84)

Interstate relations have found themselves in an atmosphere of dangerous tension. The leaders of the United States, the U.S. Administration, bear full responsibility for this turn of events....

So, one may ask, why is the present situation in the world being deliberately distorted in the statements of American leaders? First of all to try to dispel the concern of the peoples, which has been mounting with every day, over Washington's militaristic policy and to undercut the growing resistance to this policy....

There is no need to convince us of the usefulness and expedience of dialogue. This is our policy. But the dialogue should be conducted on an equal footing and not from a position of strength, as it is proposed by Ronald Reagan. The dialogue should not be conducted for the sake of dialogue. It should be directed at the attainment of concrete accords. It should be conducted honestly and no attempts should be made to use it for selfish aims.

The American leadership, as all signs indicate, has not given up its intentions to conduct talks with us from positions of strength, from positions of threats and pressure.

General Secretary Konstantin Chernenko, Central Committee plenum speech (*Pravda*, 14 Feb 84)

Nowadays, in the age of nuclear weapons and super-accurate missiles, people need [peaceful coexistence] as never before. Deplorably, some

leaders of the capitalist countries, to all appearances, do not clearly realize, or do not wish to realize that.

We can very well see the threat created today to humankind by the reckless, adventurist actions of imperialism's aggressive forces—and we speak up about it, drawing to that danger the attention of the peoples of the whole earth. We need no military superiority. We do not intend to dictate our will to others. But we will not permit the military equilibrium that has been achieved to be upset. And let nobody have even the slightest doubt about that: We will further see to it that our country's defense capacity be strengthened, that we should have enough means to cool the hot heads of militant adventurists.

Gromyko, speech delivered at Andropov's funeral (*Pravda*, 15 Feb 84)

Our country has put forward a series of major initiatives of principled importance. Their aim is to strengthen peace. For this it is necessary first and foremost that the attempts to tip the existing military-strategic equilibrium be renounced, that the nuclear arms buildup be stopped and that efforts be made to limit and reduce these weapons. Those who are pursuing a policy of militarism, the mad arms race, and interference in the internal affairs of other countries should renounce this policy and substitute for it a policy of peace and cooperation.

Ustinov, article for Armed Forces Day (*Pravda*, 23 Feb 84)

Mankind's development along the path of democracy and socialism does not suit the most reactionary imperialist circles. They are deliberately exacerbating the international situation. The American imperialists in the grip of class hatred have proclaimed the Soviet Union to be "the focus of evil" and, ignoring the lessons of history, have declared a "crusade" against the USSR and world socialism. In practice the United States is today playing the role of chief organizer of the imperialist policy of aggression. All Washington's actions in the political, military, economic, and ideological fields are subordinated to the course aimed at establishing world domination and primarily at achieving military superiority over the USSR and the other Warsaw Pact countries. To this end the United States has unleashed an unrestrained arms race and is commissioning more and more new systems of nuclear and conventional weapons, spending enormous sums on this. . . .

Disregarding generally accepted norms of international law, the U.S. Administration is declaring whole regions of the globe to be "zones of U.S. security" and flouting the sovereignty and independence of other states' peoples. The United States' naked aggression against Grenada, undeclared wars against Lebanon and Nicaragua, overt support for reactionary dictatorial regimes in Central and South America, Africa, and Asia, and the campaign of threats against socialist Cuba will go down as pages of shame in U.S. history. . . .

In an attempt to dull the vigilance of peoples alarmed by the U.S. Administration's militarist course its official representatives have begun to adopt the garb of "peacemakers." But the peoples cannot be deceived. They can see increasingly clearly that the present U.S. leaders' words are at variance with their actions. They are continuing to push mankind toward a nuclear catastrophe.

Gromyko, election speech (*Sovetskaya Belorussiya*, 28 Feb 84)

The world situation remains complex, sometimes tense. The source of the tension is aggressive imperialist circles' adventurist actions. The present U.S. Administration has set itself the aim of disrupting in the United States' favor the existing military-strategic equilibrium, achieving for the United States dominant positions in the world and by relying on force, dictating its will to others. It is trying to climb to the top of the world and issue commands to everyone from there.

The policy of the senseless arms race and flagrant pressure, including the use of armed force against sovereign states, is aimed at achieving these aims. This aggressive political course is shaking the foundations of peace.

The already enormous arsenals of nuclear weapons which the NATO bloc possesses in Europe are no longer enough for Washington politicians. They have decided to increase them.

The danger of war has increased substantially as a result of the deployment of new U.S. nuclear weapons in West Europe. These actions destroyed the Geneva talks aimed at limiting and substantially reducing nuclear arms. . . .

For some time now allegations have circulated to the effect that nothing special is happening in the international situation, that the world has become more secure with the U.S. missiles in Europe. The aim of this deliberate distortion of reality is obvious—to lull the vigilance of the European and world public.

All indications are that not the least role here is played by considerations dictated by the election campaign in the United States. The candidate from the Republican Party now in power would very much like to look respectable in the eyes of public opinion. Otherwise, who knows, the electorate may vote for the other party's candidate. . . .

It is not our choice that the state of Soviet-American relations is characterized by tension. None other than the present American Administration has worsened and exacerbated them by its actions.

This Administration has done considerable work to upset and, what is more, destroy what its predecessors did. It has worked, if I can put it this way, with a big stick, striking out now at one and now at another agreement. In fact, little remains of what was done earlier by both sides—the Soviet Union and the United States—in their common interests.

If prizes were given for this destructive work, or undermining agreements aimed at strengthening the cause of peace, then of course the present Washington Administration could with reason claim the prize.

Of course, it is easier to destroy and easier to overturn agreements which were achieved by others. No special effort is required for this. All that is needed is a sizable dose of recklessness and irresponsibility.

In Washington today it is possible to hear even at an official level statements in favor of improving relations between the USSR and the United States. But it is hard to trust these statements. The U.S. Administration has repeatedly demonstrated how cheaply it values statements of this sort.

Of course, I would like to hope that the recent statements will not be empty talk and that they are not a sop to the election situation. Of course, we will judge whether the United States has serious intentions by its practical actions.

Ustinov, election speech (*Moskovskaya Pravda*, 29 Feb 84)

The Soviet people and all peace-loving forces of the planet are deeply concerned over the complication of the world situation. The cause of this is the aggressive, imperialist policy of the United States. The United States is unleashing armed conflicts in different parts of the planet. Imperialism is striving to liquidate the national liberation and democratic movements and is interfering openly in the internal affairs of sovereign states by using armed force, provocations, terror, and subversion.

The United States has launched an unprecedented arms race and is spending fabulous amounts of money on it. . . .

The deployment of the new U.S. first-strike nuclear missiles (Pershing II and cruise missiles) in West European countries creates particular alarm among the world public. These actions by U.S. and NATO leaders have posed an additional threat to the security of the USSR and its allies and have made it impossible to continue the Geneva talks on the limitation of nuclear arms in Europe.

The Washington Administration is trying to claim that security in Europe has supposedly become stronger as a result of the deployment of these missiles. This is a blatant lie. The purpose of such claims is to distract the world public's attention from the dangerous consequences of the White House's adventurous course.

Nor do the U.S. Administration's assertions that the new arms are being deployed because the United States lags behind the USSR in that sphere correspond with the real state of affairs. They do not correspond with reality in the slightest. Approximate parity in the military-strategic sphere exists between the USSR and the United States.

Chernenko, election speech (*Pravda*, 3 Mar 84)

The past few years have seen a dramatic intensification of the policy of the more aggressive forces of U.S. imperialism, a policy of blatant militarism, claims to world dominance, resistance to progress, and violations of the rights and freedom of the peoples. The world has seen quite a few examples of the practical application of this policy. These included the invasion of Lebanon, the occupation of Grenada, the undeclared war against Nicaragua, threats to Syria, and finally the turning of

West Europe into a launching site for U.S. nuclear missiles targeted at the USSR and its allies. . . .

Far from all the leaders of Western countries and influential political parties approve the adventurism of the U.S. Administration. It worries a considerable segment of the U.S. public itself as well. They are realizing ever more clearly there that the intensive militarization and the aggravation of the international situation have not brought nor are going to bring the USA military superiority and political achievements. They only lead everywhere in the world to the escalation of criticism of Washington's belligerent course. . . .

Regrettably, the United States has turned its participation in talks on this subject into a tool of propaganda to camouflage the arms race and cold war policy. We will not participate in this game. The Americans created obstacles to the talks both on "European" and on strategic nuclear weapons by deploying their missiles in Europe. It is the removal of these obstacles (which would also remove the need for measures taken in response) that offers the way to working out a mutually acceptable accord.

The U.S. Administration has lately begun to make peaceable sounding statements, urging us to enter into a "dialogue."

Attention was drawn worldwide to the fact that these statements are in sharp conflict with everything that the present United States Administration has said and, which is the main thing, done and continues doing in its relations with the Soviet Union. Assurances of its good intentions can be taken seriously only if they are substantiated with real actions.

Chernenko, speech at dinner for Ethiopian leader Mengistu (*Pravda*, 30 Mar 84)

In order to camouflage its policy the American Administration is now trying in every way to pass itself off as a "lover of peace." However, everyone can see the real value of such posturing. Recently the Soviet Union expressed readiness to reach agreement with other nuclear powers to jointly recognize norms regulating relations between them which should eventually contribute to the reduction and subsequent liquidation of nuclear armaments. How did the United States respond to this? I must say that no reply has come from Washington to this proposal.

The value of the lofty phrases about U.S. readiness to work for lessening international tension and to act in a spirit of restraint and nonuse of force or the threat of force can be clearly seen from the example of Nicaragua, against which the American special services and their hirelings are waging an undeclared war. They are committing acts of violence and are killing peaceful civilians. Does Washington really think that its policy of state terrorism and intervention in the affairs of sovereign states will be interpreted as "peacemaking" efforts? It is profoundly erroneous to think so.

Chernenko, *Pravda* interview (9 Apr 84)

[The situation in the world] remains very dangerous. And this is explained by the U.S. Administration's continued gamble on military force, on the attainment of military superiority, on the imposition of its order of things on other peoples. This was confirmed once again by President Reagan's recent speech at Georgetown University.

Even if sometimes peace-loving rhetoric is heard from Washington, it is impossible, however hard one tries, to discern behind it even the slightest signs of readiness to back up these words with practical deeds. . . .

Our contacts with the American side also show that no positive changes have taken place in the position of the United States on these cardinal questions [of arms control].

Those who circulate [the idea that the USSR is waiting for the outcome of the presidential election there] either do not know or, most probably, deliberately distort our policy. It is a principled policy and is not subject to transient vacillations.

Throughout the history of Soviet-American relations we have dealt with various administrations in Washington. In those cases when realism and a responsible approach to relations with the Soviet Union were shown on the part of the U.S. leadership, matters, it can be said, proceeded normally. This had a favorable effect on the general situation in the world as well, but in the absence of such a realistic approach our relations worsened accordingly.

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Statement of the National Olympic Committee of the USSR (TASS, 9 Apr 84)

U.S. President Reagan submitted to the IOC written guarantees of the U.S. Government's respect for the traditions, rules, and provisions of the Olympic Charter. Facts show, however, that these obligations and guarantees are not respected in a number of major matters. The U.S. Administration is trying to use the Olympic Games on the eve of the elections for its selfish political ends.

A large-scale campaign against the Soviet Union's participation in the Olympic Games has been mounted in the USA. . . . In particular, a coalition called "Ban the Soviets," enjoying the support of the U.S. official services, has been set up. Open threats of physical victimization and provocative actions are made to sportsmen and officials of the USSR and other socialist countries. Slandorous allegations are being made that the participation of a Soviet delegation in the Olympic Games would presumably threaten U.S. security.

Tikhonov, speech to Supreme Soviet (*Pravda*, 13 Apr 84)

The measures we take to strengthen our defense are a logical response to the reckless attempts by militarist circles in the United States and other NATO countries to upset the military-strategic balance. We state that this will be maintained whatever the conditions. Security—both ours and that of our friends and allies—will remain reliably safeguarded.

Vladimir Dolgikh, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, Lenin anniversary speech (Soviet domestic radio, 20 Apr 84)

We . . . now have to conduct our course in the international arena in a complex and very dangerous situation.

The origins of its sharp exacerbation are to be found in the aggressive policy of the imperialist circles of NATO, above all the United States.

Under the flag of the struggle against communism, the present White House Administration is opposing freedom and progress everywhere. It is making open claims to world domination. It is waging an unrestrained arms race that is fraught with the threat of a nuclear conflict. The United States is declaring more and more areas of the world to be in the sphere

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of its vital interests. It is fanning hotbeds of war and violence. It is brazenly trampling on the rights of entire peoples. Not confining itself to blackmail and threats and crude interference in the affairs of sovereign states, Washington is also resorting to direct aggression. Suffice it to recall the piratical attack on Grenada, the barbaric actions of the U.S. brass hats in Lebanon, and the incessant acts of state terrorism against Nicaragua, against which an undeclared war is in effect being waged. . . .

In the capitalist countries, representatives of very different sections of the population are jointly participating in a mass antiwar and antimissile movement that is unprecedented in its breadth. The voice of the nonaligned movement is making itself heard ever more loudly and authoritatively in the struggle for peace. Concern at the increase in the danger of war and, sometimes, criticism of Washington's bellicose course are also increasing among state and public figures in the West, both in Europe and in the United States itself. All this shows how deep the roots of detente are. It makes it possible to hope that it will ultimately be possible to redirect the current, dangerous course of events toward the strengthening of peace, limitation of the arms race, and development of international cooperation. . . .

President Konstantin **Chernenko**, speech at dinner for Polish leader Jaruzelski (TASS, 4 May 84)

. . . Those who today are at the helm of government in the United States declare their intention to conduct external affairs from positions of strength. . . .

Unprecedented large-scale programs of the arms race, first and foremost the development and deployment of nuclear weapons, have been put to the service of this imperial course of achieving military superiority and imposing one's writ on other nations.

Having gone ahead with the deployment in West Europe of U.S. missiles aimed at the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, Washington and those in NATO who follow it unconditionally deliberately frustrated the process of the limitation and reduction of nuclear armaments by depriving the talks on both strategic arms and on nuclear arms in Europe of their subject matter.

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And are not the large-scale programs of militarization of outer space aimed at promoting the self-same goals of world domination? They are now discussing these programs in Washington virtually every day and arrogantly, refusing even to enter into talks with the Soviet Union on this problem.

The U.S.A. is speeding up the production, modernization, and stockpiling of chemical weapons, those abominable means of killing people. To camouflage its real stand, it had begun deceitful maneuvers at the Disarmament Conference in Geneva. But if the rhetorical shell of its so-called "new" proposal on the prohibition of chemical weapons is cast off, there is an obvious desire to legalize, under the pretext of verification, U.S. intelligence gathering activity. It is impossible to detect any positive shifts in the U.S. position on this problem.

There is every reason to state that a similar U.S. policy of military buildup is distinctly visible in many other areas of the arms race, whether in nuclear weapons or in armaments referred to as conventional.

All sorts of advertising tricks are being used to cover up the course of conventional buildup. The West's latest proposals at the Vienna talks on the limitation of armaments and armed forces in Central Europe constitute just a new packing for the old position, which has already deadlocked those talks.

In the recent period, mostly after the deployment of new U.S. missiles started in West Europe, appeals for contacts and talks have begun to be issued by Washington and some other Western capitals. However, regrettably, there is nothing concrete behind those appeals. He who could hope that realism and rationality are making their way here at long last would be profoundly deceived, which, perhaps, is precisely what the authors of these appeals would like to happen.

The proposals put forward for discussion bristle with so many provisions and conditions patently unacceptable to the other side as to confirm that these proposals are not meant for serious, businesslike talks. The Soviet Union for its part is prepared for dialogue. But we stand for a dialogue filled with real content. A possibility for the resumption of talks on nuclear armaments can only be opened if the U.S. side removes the obstacles raised by it here and restores the previous situation.

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~**USSR National Olympic Committee statement (TASS, 8 May 84)**

As is known, in its statement of 10 April 1984 the National Olympic Committee of the USSR voiced serious concern over the rude violations by the organizers of the games of the rules of the Olympic Charter and the anti-Soviet campaign launched by the reactionary circles in the United States with the connivance of the official authorities, and asked the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to study the obtaining situation. . . .

Disregarding the opinion of the IOC the United States authorities continue rudely to interfere in affairs belonging exclusively to the competence of the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee. It is known that from the very first days of preparations for the present Olympics the American Administration has set course at using the games for its political aims. Chauvinistic sentiments and an anti-Soviet hysteria are being whipped up in the country. . . .

In these conditions the National Olympic Committee of the USSR is compelled to declare that participation of Soviet sportsmen in the games of the 23d Olympiad in Los Angeles is impossible. To act differently would be tantamount to approving of the anti-Olympian actions of the U.S. authorities and organizers of the games. . . .

Ustinov, article (*Pravda*, 9 May 84)

Imperialist, reactionary circles are trying to ignore the lessons of the past and are nurturing plans for unleashing new wars and military conflicts. The aggressiveness and adventurist policy are manifested particularly blatantly in the actions of the present U.S. Administration. The United States has proclaimed a "crusade" against socialism in order to abolish it as a sociopolitical force. To this end, Washington has resolved, come what may, to break the military-strategic equilibrium and to achieve military superiority over the USSR and the socialist community. An unprecedentedly large-scale arms buildup has been planned for many years ahead, and nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction are being stockpiled. Washington has embarked on the militarization of space. New first-strike nuclear missile weapons are being deployed on the territory of a number of West European states.

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The aggressive U.S. actions are also borne out by the fact that it is thwarting the talks on questions of arms limitation and is refusing to observe, and indeed is even violating, previously concluded agreements.

Marching along the path of preparation for war, the imperialist circles are seeking to conceal and camouflage their aggressive policy by every means. Various "peacemaking" speeches have recently begun to be delivered. Their aim is clear—to mislead the peoples of the world with regard to the true intentions of the extreme reactionary U.S. forces and their stooges.

In an attempt to justify the buildup of military preparations, the United States is using the myth of the "Soviet military threat," which it fabricated itself, and is expatiating on the extreme need to defend its "vital interests" in almost all regions of the world. On these phony pretexts, it is expanding its military presence many thousands of kilometers from its own territory, seeking any opportunity to aggravate international tension, fuel military conflicts, and then, by threatening to use or by using its own armed forces, is trying to channel them to its own predatory imperialist purposes. This is confirmed by the rampaging in Lebanon, the aggression in Grenada, the undeclared war against Nicaragua and Afghanistan, the interference in El Salvador's internal affairs, and the overt threats to Cuba and Syria. Terror and subversive activity against other states have become a component of the present U.S. Administration's foreign policy.

The reckless, adventurist actions of imperialist reaction pose a threat to all mankind. They carry within them the danger that world war and nuclear catastrophe will be unleashed.

Chernenko, reply to letter from U.S. scientists on weapons in space (*Pravda*, 20 May 84)

Some people . . . would like to turn space into a bridgehead of aggression and war. It is clear from U.S. announcements that it plans to deploy anti-missile weapons in space, give scope to the operation of various sorts of antisatellite systems, and deploy super-new types of weapons designed for dealing strikes against targets on land, in the air, and at sea.

The Soviet Union is a firm opponent of competition in the race of any kind of armaments, including space weapons.

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At the same time it should be understood that in the face of a threat from space the Soviet Union will be forced to take measures in order to guarantee its security reliably. Calculations that it is possible to lay the road to military superiority through space are built on illusions. However, they do not want to give up such calculations and this is fraught with extremely dangerous consequences. To prevent such a train of events, before it is too late, is the direct duty of responsible state figures, scientists, of all who are really concerned for the future of mankind.

The Soviet Union again confirms that it is ready to make maximum efforts to see that sinister plans for transferring the arms race into space do not become reality. It is our conviction that a policy aimed at safely protecting space from the deployment of weapons should be the compulsory norm of conduct of states, a universally recognized international obligation.

We are resolutely against the development of large-scale antimissile defense systems, which cannot be regarded otherwise than as calculated for the unpunished implementation of nuclear aggression. There is a Soviet-American treaty on antimissile defense, without time-limit, banning the creation of such systems. It must be strictly observed. The solemn renunciation of the very idea of the deployment in space of antimissile systems would meet the spirit and letter of this treaty and the task of ensuring a peaceful status of outer space in the interests of all mankind. Such a step would be interpreted everywhere in the world as a manifestation of genuine concern for the peaceful future of mankind.

The matter of banning antisatellite weapons is also urgent. Deployment of such weapons would result in sharp destabilization of the situation, to an increased threat of sudden attack, and would undermine the efforts for ensuring trust between nuclear states.

Gromyko, speech at luncheon for West German Foreign Minister Genscher (TASS, 21 May 84)

The United States Administration is absolutely clearly banking on confrontation and arbitrariness in international relations, on breaking up in its favor the existing military equilibrium.

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Now it appears that in the West, too, many have come to realize that the torpedoing of the talks on nuclear arms in Geneva was programmed in advance. This was done by those who were bent on one thing—to deploy at all cost in NATO West European countries their first-strike nuclear missiles against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. That is how they exploded the talks. They tried to feign grief at this but nothing came out of it. Their pretense is too obvious.

They try to cover up their actions with talk like the end of the world has not come and a “new glacial period” has not set in. But this is a sham, artificial optimism. Is it not clear that the appearance in Europe of new American missiles has drastically aggravated the nuclear threat. And this threat continues to grow with every new missile that is being deployed, including on the territory of the FRG.

Chernenko, remarks to West German Foreign Minister Genscher (Soviet domestic radio, 22 May 84)

During the talk, Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko reaffirmed the invariability of the USSR's course for guaranteeing peace, curbing the arms race, and averting a nuclear catastrophe. He drew attention to the serious growth of the danger of war, especially following the emergence in West Europe—including the territory of the FRG—of new U.S. first-strike missiles. In connection with this, it was stressed that if the United States and NATO continue to step up the nuclear threat, adequate countermeasures will steadfastly be implemented by the Soviet Union and its allies. They will not permit any military superiority over themselves. However, building up the military confrontation is not of our choosing.

The USSR is in favor of radical limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons in accordance with the principle of equality and identical security. . . .

It is the Soviet Union that advocates meaningful dialogue and puts forward specific proposals aimed at reaching practical agreements. The U.S. Administration is aware of the Soviet proposals. The USSR proposes to the United States, in particular, that negotiations should be started on preventing the militarization of space, and that the negotiations on a total and universal ban of nuclear weapons tests should be resumed, with the participation of Britain.

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We have called upon the United States to bring into force, finally, the Soviet-U.S. treaties of 1974 and 1976 on limiting underground nuclear explosions. The USSR also persistently raises the question of a mutual freeze on nuclear arsenals. A negative answer is invariably given to all these proposals by the American side. In other words, Washington is not interested in negotiating. The usefulness of dialogue is discussed there only in general terms, nothing more.

Editorial article on U.S. chemical weapons convention proposal (*Pravda*, 27 May 84)

The Soviet Union has . . . made considerable efforts to secure progress in resolving the tasks of banning chemical weapons within the framework of multilateral forums—the United Nations and the Geneva Disarmament Committee. The document “Fundamental Provisions of a Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Chemical Weapons and Their Destruction” submitted by the Soviet Union in the summer of 1982 took account of the viewpoints of many other states. This document, which received a broad positive assessment, provided an opportunity to achieve a speedy mutually acceptable accord on banning chemical weapons and establishing reliable verification of its observance. In February this year the Soviet Union made yet another important step, proposing the establishment of permanent monitoring of the process of the destruction of chemical weapons.

The United States has a different approach. Having made extensive use of toxins in the Vietnam war, the United States continues even today to allocate this means of mass destruction an important place in its aggressive military plans. It took the United States over 50 years to accede to the Geneva protocol. While being compelled to participate in multilateral talks on banning chemical weapons, it nevertheless dodges the reaching of an accord in every way, often retreats from its own positions, and complicates the solution of already complex questions. . . .

For several months extensively publicized statements were made in the U.S. capital that the United States would be submitting “constructive proposals” on banning chemical weapons to the Geneva Disarmament Conference. But when the United States presented its much-publicized draft convention it immediately became clear how far removed it was from promoting the achievement of an accord. Moreover, any unprejudiced person familiarizing himself with the American draft convention is

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left in no doubt that it is compiled in such a way as to make it deliberately unacceptable to all who are interested in seeing that there is no room on earth for chemical weapons.

This applies primarily to the verification provisions contained in the American draft. The verification system it envisages would mean in practice free access for verification officials to any chemical enterprises irrespective of whether they have anything to do with the production or storage of chemical weapons.

Gromyko, speech during visit by Australian Foreign Minister Hayden (TASS, 29 May 84)

Peoples of the Soviet Union and Australia, who fought against the common enemy in the years of World War II, want to live in peace, and peace is the main achievement of mankind. Our meeting gives us an opportunity to compare the positions of the Soviet Union and Australia on international problems, to exchange views on possible ways of alleviating the dangerous tension existing now in the world. To this we are prompted by all mankind's worry for its future, for its very existence which has never before been subjected to such a serious threat.

What are the reasons for this situation? They lie in the imperial, hegemonist course of the USA in world affairs, its stake on the acquisition of military superiority. That is the policy proclaimed in Washington, that is the policy made there. All over the world more and more people whose convictions are often different from ours come to realize where the danger of war has built its nest, from where it threatens peace. In these circumstances the Soviet Union considers it to be its duty to take all necessary response measures of a defensive nature. No more than that but no less either.

Midlevel and Routine Media Commentary

Oleg Anichkin, CPSU Central Committee official (Soviet domestic radio, 14 Nov 80)

Reagan is in favor of stepping up American military might and the achievement of U.S. military supremacy. . . .

At the same time his advisers direct attention to such points. The nearer Reagan has approached the White House, the more moderate have been his enunciations. One can suppose that this process will continue.

Georgiy Arbatov, director of the USA and Canada Institute (Soviet television, 29 Nov 80)

It has become clear in any case that both Reagan and many in his entourage have come to some serious conclusions during the course of this campaign. The shift to the center has begun. This is generally typical of U.S. political life. Whichever candidate stands away from the center will shift. If he is left of center, he will drift to the right. If he is right of center, he will drift slightly to the left remaining at some distance, but even so will approach the center. Reagan is a rather experienced man in this respect. I would like to say that I have heard and read in the foreign press that as a film actor he is a man without much experience. However, it is difficult to judge from the past. There were excellent presidents who were former loggers. . . .

The fact itself that moderate statements are made seems important to me, because quite a few obstacles were left over from the election campaign. This certainly does not mean that we will be rancorous and will not let anything pass, including what was said in the heat of the election struggle. We have already said publicly that we will not act like that. However, even words are deeds to a certain extent at present, because they influence atmosphere and climate. Atmosphere and climate are rather important in politics and any beginnings depend on them.

Aleksandr Bovin, *Izvestiya* political observer and reputed adviser to Presidents Brezhnev and Andropov (Soviet domestic radio, 7 Dec 80)

Reagan, of course, realizes that he cannot get away from continuing talks with the Soviet Union. But, by all accounts, it seems to me, in general,

that a harder line U.S. policy is at hand, particularly where it concerns, for example, the problems of disarmament and military detente. It seems to me that soon we will have to confront a harder line of this kind and preparations for this should be made, although in general I do not exclude the possibility that after a while everything may return to the beaten track, as we say.

Vitaliy Kobysh, CPSU Central Committee official (*Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 1 Jan 81)

Reagan, with his reputation for being a politician belonging to the extreme right wing of the Republican Party, has formed his cabinet from people of basically moderate views. . . .

When "taking over," every new administration strives to show that it is different from the previous one and that its policy will meet the country's interests to a greater degree. Statements by Reagan and some of his closest assistants indicate that they consider the status to which the Carter-Brzezinski administration has reduced Soviet-U.S. relations to be abnormal and that they see the normalization of these relations as the next U.S. Government's foremost priority. At the same time they stress that they will pursue a "tough policy"; in other words, they will act from a "position of strength." We will see how all this will appear in practice.

TASS report on President Reagan's 29 January press conference (*Pravda*, 31 Jan 81)

Referring to the Soviet Union's policy, the U.S. President permitted a number of premeditated distortions in his assessment of the aims and character of the USSR's international activities. He said, in particular, that up to now detente has been a one-way street which the Soviet Union has used for the achievement of its own aims, and that detente is more favorable to the Soviet Union than to the United States. . . .

In an unworthy manner Reagan went on to talk about some sort of insidiousness in the Soviet Union's policy which allegedly aims to establish a worldwide socialist or communist state. . . .

Concerning one of the important problems, the SALT II treaty, the President committed obvious distortions of the treaty's essence.

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Anichkin (Soviet domestic radio, 6 Feb 81)

On the whole President Reagan [at his press conference on 29 January] said nothing new in comparison with what he said during the election campaign. He attributed to the Soviet Union designs to establish world domination and to set up a worldwide socialist or communist state. Then he declared that the Soviet Union is using detente for its own ends and has allegedly turned it into a one-way street. All of this is untrue. . . .

It is one thing when minor politicians are talking in this spirit; it is another when such words are being pronounced by the President. After all, it is a question of the deliberate distortion of Soviet policy. . . .

In the words of *The Washington Post*, Reagan had adopted a tone which is very strikingly different from the Republican and Democratic administrations of the 60's and 70's. The President, the same newspaper writes, spoke of the Soviet Union in terms that recall the most difficult times of the cold war.

"I. Aleksandrov," pseudonym used in officially inspired articles (*Pravda*, 25 Mar 81)

Regretfully, from their very first public statements and practical steps the leaders of the new U.S. Government appear to be bent not on rectifying but on multiplying the errors of the previous administration, on facilitating not a lessening of international tension but its growth. . . .

The leaders of the Washington Administration and some hawkish lawmakers are now engaged in a competition of belligerent phraseology, are trying to outdo one another by the hugeness of military programs.

Bovin (Soviet television, 29 Mar 81)

I now think that the essential outlines of the new foreign policy course, of Reagan's foreign policy, have now become sufficiently visible. It is a harsh, conservative, power policy, it is a policy whose cornerstone comprises extremely primitive anticommunist concepts. In general the views of Reagan and his supporters on world developments are extremely simple: Anything they do not like, anything that is contrary to the interests of imperialism, they say is all the result of the insidious actions of the Soviet Union. From this primitive package a simple conclusion is

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drawn: The time for playing at detente is over, it is necessary to rearm immediately, it is necessary to strive for military strategic superiority over the Soviet Union, and on this basis impose the will of America the Great on the whole world.

Well, this is approximately the philosophy. Let us now examine the practice. We all know that during the past decade, let us say, despite all the difficulties and complexities, between the Soviet Union and the United States there became established a fairly well-developed structure of mutual relations which was formulated in dozens of different agreements. Now the new Administration is beginning to break up this structure and deal a mean blow to its foundation, the process of strategic arms limitation.

Arbatov (*Pravda*, 4 May 81)

Most observers agree that, even by late April, no in any way coherent U.S. foreign policy has emerged—at any rate when it comes to actions. There have been plenty of words and rhetoric—so much that the Administration itself has more than once had to backpedal. But can words and rhetoric be regarded as policy?

They probably can be, in some respects.

First of all, they can shed light on political views and intentions. In this light the “noises” from Washington are almost unambiguous: They indicate a desire to accelerate the arms race in every possible way and to secure military superiority, a wish to switch relations with the USSR and the other socialist countries onto the road of confrontation and power struggle, to rule according to whim the fate of the countries that have liberated themselves from colonialism, to dictate unceremoniously to the allies. The very fact that the people who have come to power in the United States talk at length and insistently of these desires and intentions cannot be left out of account. The fact must be viewed as an objective reality. But another fact remains no less a reality—the fact that intentions and wishes alone are not enough to constitute a policy. Politics has been and will remain the art of the possible. And the possibilities, the realities of the modern world certainly do not leave a great deal of room for the imperial ambitions which people in Washington are today going on about with new force.

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The question whether the new U.S. Administration has formulated its foreign policy should be left open, I think. Some may hope that it has not been formulated yet, others may think differently. It is clear, however, that the continuation of the existing situation would itself pose grave dangers, particularly the attempts to transform bombastic propaganda slogans into practical policy premises. All this is dangerous not only for other countries but also for the United States itself and for its national interests, which need more than ever before a realistic, sober analysis.

Leonid Zamyatin, chief of the CPSU Central Committee International Information Department (Soviet television, 16 May 81)

On many questions the foreign policy concept of the new Reagan Administration has already been formulated. . . .

On the basis of speeches, although at times you could say they are quite saturated with anti-Soviet rhetoric, and on the basis of documents which have already been published, it can be definitely concluded that the new U.S. Administration has chosen a sharp whipping up of the arms race as its course. The new Administration considers that opposition to the Soviet Union—as its leaders, the leaders of the United States, say—in the economic, political, and other fields is its main foreign policy concept. Besides, they maintain that this opposition must be on a global scale.

Reagan recently said: I do not wish to live in a world where the Soviet Union is first. What does this mean? If these words of Reagan's are translated into another language—into the language of politics from everyday language—this means that the United States has chosen military supremacy over the Soviet Union as its political concept; that it is rejecting the policy of peaceful coexistence, the policy of detente; and that it is making a stake on sharply raising the military presence of the United States in various parts of the world, including along the perimeter of Soviet borders. It is also attempting, by increasing its military potential, to put pressure on the Soviet Union.

Arbatov (Soviet television, 31 Oct 81)

If we are to speak about American policy, then of course we can say that the most extremist views have prevailed in the question of military spending, and generally in American behavior in the international arena. Well, of course, many say that maybe these people bark more than they

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bite. It is still difficult and too early to judge. But they do in fact bark a lot, and a lot of militaristic talk can be heard coming from Washington every day. This is not just talk. There are military appropriation decisions on military programs, certain U.S. positions and actions on various continents, and interference into the affairs of a number of countries—all of this has become a reality. Therefore, we are undoubtedly seeing a period which gives cause to remember the cold war and to suspect that quite a lot has been done to sweep aside all the positive things that were accumulated at the expense of great labor in international relations and thus a big step has been taken toward a cold war....

So things in the economy are not turning out quite the way the President figured, and to a certain extent this can be a limiting factor for many far-reaching American plans....

All of these realities are just beginning to appear—after all this government has not been in power very long—and these political and social mechanisms, which demand some kind of accommodation on the part of the Administration, have just been set in motion.

Of course, there are people there who ... it is difficult to imagine that they can reform. But overall—and we have seen this in history more than once—even the most conservative politicians have been sufficiently pragmatic in understanding what can be done and what cannot be done....

Even in America, they are beginning to somehow understand that the question is becoming extremely acute, that some kind of reaction to it is necessary, that in Europe and the world as a whole—and even in the United States, as a matter of fact—some sentiments are appearing.

Bovin (Soviet domestic radio, 29 Nov 81)

In fact, what did this Reagan speech of 18 November mean? Does it, to some degree ... signify a reassessment of the U.S. position, or ... is it an attempt to gain a political alibi with respect to the pressures being exerted by America's allies in Europe? As for which of these elements was more evident in the speech, this is an open question both for us and for Europe. We will find out when the talks begin.

Nikolay Shishlin, CPSU Central Committee official (Soviet television, 5 Dec 81)

Regarding the fact of an alteration in the U.S. foreign policy course taking place, an alteration in the U.S. foreign policy course beginning to become perceptible—this is true.... It seems that in this respect in particular we are right in talking neither of a cosmetic operation nor of a break with past policies, but rather of a certain alteration in course, a certain adaptation of American policies to reality.

Bovin (Soviet domestic radio, 20 Dec 81)

One of the main problems for Europe at the moment is the problem of the so-called Eurostrategic weapons. . . . One can view these [INF] talks in different ways. On the one hand, the talks have a specific object—medium-range weapons. But their principal significance is the fact that after a whole year of agitation and alarm and hysterical kinds of statements by Washington, generally speaking things there are quietly beginning to stabilize.

TASS report on U.S. sanctions after the imposition of martial law in Poland (*Pravda*, 30 Dec 81)

The U.S. Administration has taken a provocative step the purpose of which is to poison the international climate even more, to exacerbate tensions, to worsen confrontation and toughen the militarist foreign policy course. . . .

President R. Reagan has published a statement, announcing the introduction of a whole number of unilateral discriminatory measures with regard to the Soviet Union, ranging from a suspension of Aeroflot service to the USA to a review of bilateral Soviet-U.S. agreements in trade and scientific-technical cooperation, agreements signed by the Government of the United States.

To justify this crude diktat with regard to a sovereign state unprecedented and absolutely inadmissible in universally accepted international practice, the head of the U.S. Administration has resorted to direct forgery and lies, maintaining that the Soviet Union allegedly "interfered" in Polish affairs and bears "direct responsibility" for the situation in Poland.

Arbatov (*Pravda*, 1 Jan 82)

"Seeking a crisis" is precisely how Washington's stance regarding Poland can be described. . . . Attempts are being made to "internationalize" the crisis and to exploit the events to still further exacerbate the international situation and relations with the USSR in particular.

The question naturally arises of the true motives and true aims of the campaign unleashed by the United States over the events in Poland. . . .

I want immediately to stipulate that in mentioning the present leaders, I mean not only the President and his most influential ministers but also a broader stratum of the Washington bureaucracy, above all the stratum comprising the deputy and assistant cabinet members, the President's chief advisers and entourage, the heads of a number of departments, and so forth. . . . And with the utmost responsibility I would venture to claim that as a group, this "second echelon" is in considerable part composed of extremists representing the far right wing, extreme militarist flank of the U.S. ruling class. . . . A whole series of conclusions can be derived from all that is known of these people. One is that they are people who rose to prominence on a wave of crisis and feel like fish out of water outside a crisis. . . .

A certain circle of American figures now needs a crisis as a condition of its political success, even political survival. And it is apparently prepared to go to any lengths for the sake of that.

Aleksandr Kaverznev, Soviet television political observer (Hungarian domestic radio, 18 Feb 82)

We are of the opinion that the coming years will be difficult. In the beginning, when the Reagan Administration came to power in the United States, we had certain hopes that the President would not implement the policy he announced during his election campaign. We hoped that life would oblige him to see many things in a different way. But now we are forced to conclude that for the entire duration of the Reagan Administration we can hardly expect a different U.S. policy.

Shishlin (Soviet domestic radio, 11 Apr 82)

Reagan, it must be said, has garnished these rather bellicose statements with the somewhat curious assertion that he, the President of the United States, is willing to meet Leonid Ilich Brezhnev in the summer at the second special session of the UN General Assembly on disarmament. And there is a rather strange contradiction here. Actually, the idea of a summit meeting—a Soviet-American summit meeting—was proposed over one year ago from the platform of the 26th party congress. In that time, the Soviet Union has covered a considerable part of the distance toward finding ground for mutually acceptable solutions in the interests of improving Soviet-American relations. We saw nothing of the kind from the American side. And now into the midst of these rather definite statements, which can only be called militaristic, he inserts the claim that he is ready for a Soviet-American summit meeting.

Ernst Genri, prominent journalist (*Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 14 Jul 82)

Consequently, has the failure of Hitler's blitzkrieg against the USSR taught the U.S. militarists nothing? By all accounts, this is exactly the case and must be taken into account. It is not hard to understand what is guiding the Pentagon's thinkers.

They are not taking the failure of the Hitlerite adventure into account simply because there has been a revolution in military hardware since then. It is now proposed to deliver a surprise strike against the USSR not by means of tanks and conventional aircraft, but by nuclear missiles and other "super weapons" which can fly thousands of kilometers in a few minutes.

Arbatov (*Pravda*, 16 Jul 82)

U.S. policy would be good to the extent to which it is not allowed to be bad, safe (not only for us but also for America itself and its allies) to the extent to which it is not allowed to become dangerous. It will not be allowed to evolve in those directions by economic and political realities, by the policies of other countries, by the Americans' common sense and by the striving of the peoples for self-preservation. I hope that these factors will be enough for the continued political processes to bolster the realistic principles and to return American policy to an understanding of not only the existing contradictions but also of very serious and vitally important

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common interests, the interests of peace and survival, which require not only talks but also agreements as well as the overall improvement of relations between the two countries. What if this does not come to pass? I personally would find solace in the thought that a time will come and it will be possible to say: It is not with this Administration that history began, and it is not with it that it has ended.

Vadim Zagladin, first deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee International Department (Czechoslovak domestic radio, 30 Jul 82)

Reagan and his Administration—and I deliberately do not say the United States since there are various internal groupings—Reagan and his Administration represent that part of the capitalist world of monopoly capital, which is convinced that the solution of questions of the future, of problems of mutual relations between the two systems, can be achieved only by means of force. Circles currently in the leadership of a substantial part of European countries take a completely different viewpoint. It is not easy for them but they give preference to a peaceful development of relations and to solving questions by competition in a peaceful atmosphere....

Extreme views exist; there are people who say that the situation is so complex and difficult that there is no way out, that only the worst can be expected, that we are on the very threshold of war. That of course is an extreme view and is incorrect because there are a number of positive factors; the head-on struggle and existing equilibrium of forces is a guarantee that we can advance and not allow imperialism to realize its plans.

On the other hand there are some people who say that there have been all kinds of crises; this will pass, too. We are strong; we have the strength of the Soviet Union, the strength of the socialist countries; it will all pass of its own accord. It will not pass of its own accord; of course that, too, is incorrect.

Yes, without doubt we are capable of defending ourselves, of rebuffing the imperialist wave, but that depends on us, on the situation of our countries and in our countries, on the unity of our countries and their joint activity in the international arena.

Bovin (*Izvestiya*, 6 Aug 82)

In general it is hard to deal with the Americans now. They dissemble, twist and turn, say one thing and do another. They have many ambitions and a great deal of self-esteem. They have little responsibility. But what can you do? We do not choose our partners, they are given us by destiny, by history. We have to talk and negotiate with them although, to be frank, I do not believe that any serious agreement can be reached with the Americans as long as Reagan is in the White House.

Vladimir Ostrogorskiy, commentator (Moscow radio in German, 22 Aug 82)

If Reagan knew history better and made its lessons his own, he would not harbor any illusions, since there were people before him who, like Hitler, had a special liking for using the miraculous weapon of inflammatory propaganda on the air. It is typical for aspirants to world domination to rely on miraculous weapons. It is, however, well known how they usually have ended.

Bovin (*Izvestiya*, 5 Nov 82)

Now let us allow the skeptic to have his say. He is bound to ask: Are we not overestimating our own strength? Can international security and international cooperation seriously be expected when the world is divided into opposing sociopolitical systems? Is the "Reagan phenomenon" an accident? The questions are not farfetched. The difficulties are indeed huge. Militarism and aggressiveness are inherent in imperialism. We do not choose our partners; fate, history hands them to us.

All that is true. Nonetheless, the hope is realistic. The hope is realistic because the forces advocating that detente get a "second wind" represent a real, weighty factor in world politics. The Soviet Union is a mighty power. People across the Atlantic cannot help but take this into account—whatever team is assembled in the White House, it is still not a suicide team. The socialist community and the communist and workers' parties are with us. Dozens of nonaligned states advocate detente and disarmament and oppose the division of the world into military-political blocs. The antinuclear, antiwar movement is gaining unprecedented scope and its social and political spectrum is becoming increasingly broad. . . .

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I repeat, we would like to reach agreement, even with Reagan. What if this does not happen? We will wait.

Shishlin (Soviet domestic radio, 21 Nov 82)

Actions for the benefit of peace would carry a lot more weight than conciliatory words. If we were to see a real shift in the American position at the talks that are being held on strategic armaments, on European armaments, on conventional armaments in Central Europe—that would surely be more substantial than the words spoken by the American statesmen. So the situation remains pretty difficult. . . .

Pravda editorial (*Pravda*, 21 Nov 82)

Judging by international reactions, Andropov's meetings with foreign delegations gave new impetus to people's hopes for the maintenance and development of the detente process. The Soviet Union is always ready for honest, equal, and mutually advantageous cooperation with any state which wishes it, particularly with the United States. Normal, or better still, friendly Soviet-American relations would accord with the interests of both peoples and of world peace.

Gennadiy Gerasimov, Novosti deputy chairman (Soviet television, 28 Nov 82)

The events of the last weeks in Moscow, by the very nature of things, have caused a certain pause in international relations. The world has been watching Moscow to see what will happen and, in its turn, Moscow has been watching the world attentively, too. American Senator Robert Dole, a prominent figure in the Republican Party—Reagan's party—has been in Moscow during these days. He stated that he observes an advancement by the Reagan Administration toward a new beginning—that is how he expressed himself. Some observers have begun cautiously seeking signs of a thaw, even a weak one, in American-Soviet relations.

Arbatov, speech to U.S. trade delegation (*Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 8 Dec 82)

In the last few days many people's hopes regarding the prospects of Soviet-American relations have revived. The dramatic nature of the moment, when events are prompting reflection on the most serious problems perturbing people, may even have helped in a way. . . .

Something seems to be beginning to change for the better. Something has happened and something positive too. I think it is a good thing that ASTEC has met. It seems to me that it is an important event and shows that many Americans (and Soviet people, too, of course) understand the fundamental interests of their countries and "gas for pipes" deal. We assessed positively the American leaders' expression of condolences on the death of Leonid Ilich Brezhnev and the fact that the U.S. President personally visited the Soviet Embassy and sent the U.S. vice president and secretary of state to Moscow. We have carefully followed the words spoken in this connection, and the positive [*khorooshiye*] words we have greeted positively.

But if I were asked if I could assess these facts as evidence of the abandonment by the United States of a policy that in our country—I must be frank with you—is seen as a policy of cold war and as a course of a headlong arms race and of unbounded—mortal, as the saying goes—enmity? [sentence as published] Or is what has happened in the last few days merely a maneuver aimed at reassuring the public at large and the allies so that they do not prevent this policy of total enmity from being pursued in the future? If I were asked those questions, I would honestly say that as yet I have no answer.

Bovin (Soviet television, 30 Dec 82)

It is difficult to escape the impression that the opponents of detente in Washington are gradually beginning to give ground. I would even risk making the following conclusion: The isolation of Reagan and his policy is growing both within the United States and outside it. Evidently, we can assume that this will force the White House to intensify its maneuvering. But at the moment it is difficult to say whether this will affect the essence of the foreign policy course or only its form, as has already been the case.

Commentators **Aleksandr Korshunov** and **Oleg Blinov** (Soviet domestic radio, 12 Jan 83)

At the end of his [latest radio] speech, Reagan stated the readiness of the United States—and I quote—to sit down at the conference table with the Russians to discuss practical measures capable of resolving the problems and leading to a more durable and genuine improvement of relations between East and West. If this is really so, then one can only welcome the U.S. President's utterances. The Soviet Union believes that the path

toward mutual talks is open and that our two countries could make an important contribution to the cause of creating a climate of mutual trust, mutual understanding and cooperation in the world.

Valentin Zorin, Soviet television political observer (Moscow radio [in English] to North America, 3 Apr 83)

But the leaders in Washington are not only rude and tactless in their political styles, they also break another unwritten rule of statesmanship. It is unfortunate when the mass media juggles with facts but it is inexcusable when leaders in positions of utmost responsibility resort to overt lies. There have been many instances when the current leaders in Washington have flagrantly distorted the truth and deliberately lied to the public. That was the case in the most recent statements made by President Reagan about Soviet policy.

Kobysh (*Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 6 Apr 83)

[In his] 1 April speech and in previous speeches, R. Reagan cast aside all Easter rhetoric and explained quite clearly and bluntly that the Administration that he heads, far from intending to renounce its military preparations on a monstrous scale and its hegemonist aggressive course, actually contemplates something still more sinister. Playing with words, he presented to the public in the guise of "ABM defense" the announcement that the United States is embarking on the implementation of a vast new, purely aggressive program of military preparations, mainly covering space. This announcement was further evidence that the present U.S. Government is not simply preparing for nuclear war, but has set a course toward unleashing such a war.

Valentin Falin, *Izvestiya* political observer (*Izvestiya*, 14 Aug 83)

And what does the U.S. leadership think now? It links the maintenance of peace between our states to the United States' acquisition of military superiority in addition to the USSR's renunciation of a socialist social system. In other words, the Soviet Union must learn to be at the United States' beck and call or it will only have itself to blame. It is perfectly obvious that this view has nothing in common with the "Basic Principles of Mutual Relations between the USSR and the United States" which the U.S. leader sealed with his signature in May 1972. . . .

True, for some time now representatives of the present administration have been going in for soft-pedaling. They have been transforming R. Reagan from a dashing mindless horseman into a soft-hearted "peace champion." A broad stream of misinformation is being broadcast in which they want to whitewash the U.S. stance at the talks on nuclear arms in Europe and on strategic arms limitation and reduction.

Arkadiy Sakhnin (*Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 5 Oct 83)

Under pressure from the peoples, imperialism seemed to accept the incipient detente. But it could not keep it up. What do you mean, detente?! So much power! Must rule the world!

A familiar turn. We heard it from the madman [Hitler]. It was also heard by a smart master of ceremonies, an actor from the "General Electric Theater" television program. He was advertising washing machines and detergents. He got it into his head: A career can be built around this tune. He selected the words to the tune and rehearsed the pose of sovereign. He uttered: "I will not end the ideological 'drama.'" Those who writhe with pain at the sound of the word "peace" liked the pose. They liked the words, too. They decided to give it a try and brought the actor in for a test. They hauled him off the theatrical and onto the political stage. On the small stage, to start with. The familiar tune sounded louder, the words more threatening. The test was successful. On to the big stage.

This is how the second plenipotentiary of imperialism to lay a claim to world-domination appeared on earth in our days. He picked a team worthy of himself and settled into the White House.

Today the Second Pretender holds in his hands not a bomb but a nuclear missile. He is waving it about on land, on the water, under the water, and in the sky, and is carrying it into space. . . .

Take the plugs out of your ears, Reagan. Time to think about God. That is what religious people would say. But we are realists: Think about Nuremberg.

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Aleksandr Yakovlev, director of the World Economics and International Relations Institute (*Izvestiya*, 7 Oct 83)

There can be no doubt that the current U.S. President is exerting an extremely destructive influence on the international situation. His personal contribution to bringing the danger of war closer is great, and he bears the responsibility for the very rapid demolition of the structure of international cooperation built by the efforts of many countries on the platform of deepening and strengthening peace. . . .

As the *Los Angeles Times* notes, Reagan does not have an inquiring mind. Eyewitnesses invariably stress that he has more horses in his stables than books in his library. He believes in flying saucers, assiduously reads horoscopes, and believes in the actions of secret evil spirits.

Aleksey Leontyev, *Krasnaya Zvezda* commentator (*Krasnaya Zvezda*, 15 Oct 83)

In an attempt to somehow justify their adopted course of war preparations, the new aspirants to world domination—in that sense too the heirs of the raving Fuehrer—excel in slander against the Soviet Union and resort virtually to foul-mouthed abuse alternating with hypocritical homilies about morality and human rights, with the White House incumbent himself setting the tone.

If we are to believe Reagan, America is ruled by "the most noble," "the most magnanimous," and "the most philanthropic" gentlemen. But there is no mention of the fact that each of these gentlemen possesses heaps of dollars in his bank account, acquired from the drudgery of modern-day slaves, taken from widows and orphans, and collected from the corpses of soldiers who have perished in the dirty wars and criminal adventures of the United States.

Bovin (*Otechestven Front*, 1 Dec 83)

When the Americans agreed to detente and when they held constructive talks with us, this was an attempt to adapt their policy to the changes in life and in the world that had emerged. Now the reverse process is occurring—Reagan is trying to adapt the whole world to the interests of the United States as he understands them. Such an approach, however, again undermines the realistic basis for any constructive agreements. Evidence of this is the failure of the Geneva talks.

The dominance of a conservative, reactionary, and archaic ideology in the United States, an ideology which is being transformed to politics, is the main obstacle for regulating disputed problems. I think that Reagan cannot change himself. . . . Since Reagan will probably stay in the White House for another four years, it is my belief that for that period of time we will not succeed in reaching an agreement on anything meaningful. We will, of course, conduct negotiations, we will try to sign agreements and we will probably even succeed somewhere on the political fringes. However, I think that concerning the main and basic issues we will have to face a game of nerves, confrontation, and conflicts for another four years. This is not a very optimistic prospect. I would very much like to be wrong but I can draw no other conclusion at present.

Fedor Burlatskiy, *Literaturnaya Gazeta* political observer and CPSU Central Committee official (*Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 4 Jan 84)

It is impossible to deny that a serious turnabout occurred in U.S. geopolitics on the threshold of the eighties, or that the United States has completely rejected the very idea of detente and has embarked on the path of global confrontation with the Soviet Union. . . .

It is well known that this shift is basically linked with the arrival of President Reagan in the White House, a man with extremely reactionary views representing the interests of the "iron triangle"—the military business, the Pentagon, and the militarist wing in the U.S. Congress. . . .

[Whether the present militarist course in the United States is irreversible] is a very complicated question. Much depends on whether R. Reagan manages to win the forthcoming U.S. election in the fall of 1984. Much also depends on the correlation of forces within the framework of the U.S. economic and political elite and on public opinion in that country.

R. Reagan is hastening to consolidate the basic foundations of militarism for the future. He is inflating the military budget and planning programs for new types of weapons. Nonetheless, political forces in the United States and the U.S. people still have not had their final say. I am convinced that ordinary people in the United States fear thermonuclear war no less than other people in the world.

TASS report on President Reagan's State of the Union Address (TASS, 26 Jan 84)

President Ronald Reagan made a traditional "State of the Union" address to a joint meeting of the two houses of Congress. His statement, made in a spirit of electioneering, was an attempt to picture in a favorable light the results of his three-year rule and justify his policy, marked by extreme aggressiveness in the international field and total disregard for the needs of the common people in the home policy field.

The foreign policy section of the President's State of the Union address was notable for demagoguery and hypocrisy. The President was trying to justify his militaristic policy by claiming that "the United States is safer ... and more secure in 1984 than before", albeit, in real fact, the threat to general security, including to the security of the United States itself, has increased. And the leaders of the United States bear all responsibility for such a turn of events.

Yuriy Kornilov, TASS commentator (TASS, 30 Jan 84)

The U.S. Administration speaks a great deal about "the need of a dialogue." Yet, it deadlocks, disrupts, and blocks all the talks on the problems of curbing the arms race. ...

Our hands are clean, and we have never been aggressors, U.S. President R. Reagan pointed out recently at the Congress in the State of the Union message. This is an obvious lie. In the past six years alone the U.S. Administration resorted to armed actions or the threat of force against other states 38 times. ...

The thing is that from whatever point of view we assess the situation, it is more than obvious: The allegedly "peacemaking" tricks of Reagan and his team, brought about by the purely time-serving considerations, have nothing to do with the real foreign policy pursued by Washington, which is based today, the same as before, on the desire to make history reverse its course, to reshape the political map of the world.

Eduard Mnatsakanov, Soviet television political observer (Soviet television, 29 Feb 84)

It looks as though Reagan's people are working on preparations for ... a stunning finale [to the election campaign], but the plans for this are stunningly primitive: simply turn things upside down, call black white and vice versa. And so much chauvinist demagoguery is being poured over millions of Americans that it makes one recall the times of German history at the beginning of the thirties.

Bovin (Czechoslovak domestic radio, 2 Mar 84)

During his entire three and a half years in the White House Reagan spoiled practically everything he could. But now something rather peculiar is beginning to happen. Today Reagan is preparing himself for a new election and has realized the necessity of altering his image. No longer does he want to be seen as a warmonger. ... The fact is that the words now being delivered by the U.S. President do not correspond to his actions. ... My own impression, however, is that the Americans are not ready for such a dialogue and that so long as Reagan is in the White House we will not reach an agreement with the Americans on anything solid. ...

The question of [a summit meeting] is ... complicated, for, above all, thorough preparation would have to precede it. Second, if I may be frank, I would not even want such a meeting to take place, because, after all, in the current situation it would mean throwing a lifeline to Reagan, and I think that there is no need to do that.

Leonid Ponomarev, TASS commentator (TASS, 20 Mar 84)

Large-scale propaganda of nuclear war has become an integral element of the policy of the present U.S. Administration which preaches not only the admissibility and the moral justification of a nuclear conflict but also the certainty of a U.S. victory in it.

Kornilov (TASS, 20 Mar 84)

It is common knowledge that Washington has made militarist plans for a "limited" nuclear war although it is perfectly obvious that nuclear holocaust, wherever it might spring from, will not spare the United

States. It is Washington's strategists who are making plans for the first "disarming" nuclear strike, which can only be viewed as an attempt to tailor Hitler's delirious "blitzkrieg" idea to the realities of the nuclear age.

Bovin (*Izvestiya*, 21 Mar 84)

Reagan and his advisers realize that the dangerous formula "Reagan Means War!" is being bandied about. It is no accident that the President has been saying so much about peace, negotiations, and disarmament in recent months. The image of the wild cowboy is hurriedly being replaced by the image of the wise statesman concerned to avert a war. What if the voters do not believe it? . . .

Reagan's immense strength is his personal attractiveness, his ability to be just the way people want to see him. In the television age this is not just a "subjective factor" but the most objective and politically significant reality. The indomitable optimism, the ostentatiously emphasized confidence, the permanent mask of the regular, good-natured guy—all this impresses the "average American." Much is said and written about the fact that Reagan is not weighed down by erudition and culture, reads virtually nothing, spends his evenings in front of the television, does not overwork himself, confuses facts, names, and events, and so on. And here is the paradox. What is a minus from the standpoint of a more or less developed political culture becomes a plus in the eyes of that "average American" who is pleased that the President is not some intellectual or Harvard know-it-all, but a down-to-earth, unsophisticated guy like himself. . . .

In my opinion, conservatism in the United States has already peaked. Reagan's mass base is starting to contract. In an attempt to get control of the situation the President is moving away from conservative rhetoric increasingly often and toward political pragmatism.

Georgiy Shakhnazarov, president of the Soviet Association of Political Science (Soviet domestic radio, 23 Mar 84)

In the words of a Canadian journalist, the people in European countries believe in the majority that under Reagan the threat of war is no less than under Genghis Khan.

Anatoliy Krasikov, commentator (TASS, 5 Apr 84)

Nowadays the entire huge military machine of the United States prepares to repeat what was done by Hitler and his Wehrmacht. Only the scope of this preparation is immeasurably greater. Washington opens up new fronts of the arms race one after another and dreams of war going beyond our planet and out into space. Like Nazi Germany's leaders at their time, the White House leaders nowadays accompany preparations for war by stirring up hatred for the Soviet Union.

TASS report on President Reagan's press conference (TASS, 6 Apr 84)

It is noted by observers . . . that since the times of Hitler's Reich no government has so openly set the task of liquidating lawful regimes in other sovereign states and so cynically declared its intention to use the force of arms, armed intervention and blockade for subversive purposes.

Sergey Kulik, TASS commentator (TASS, 11 Apr 84)

In one day, Ronald Reagan signed two documents. In one . . . the President, in the bombastic style which is all his own, laid himself out to lend credibility to his Administration's alleged commitment to the rule of law and democracy. In the second document, circulated in the form of a U.S. State Department statement "On the International Court in The Hague," he refused downright to recognize international law.

Many mass media organs and prominent U.S. politicians note that by its posture vis-a-vis the International Court in The Hague, Washington had actually admitted pursuing subversion against the lawful government of a sovereign nation, mining its ports and sinking vessels with peaceful cargo, subversion authorized, according to an admission by today's *Washington Post*, by Reagan personally.

Vladimir Kudryavtsev, *Izvestiya* political observer (*Izvestiya*, 11 Apr 84)

The actions of the U.S. Administration's leading trio—the President, the secretary of state, and the secretary of defense—are absolutely full of ultramilitarism, lightly powdered with an ostentatious "love of peace."

Reagan's speech at Georgetown University and Secretary of State Shultz's speech at a session of the so-called "Trilateral Commission" in Washington promise a repetition of what has already taken place and an expansion of what is now being done by terrorist methods elevated to the rank of state policy. . . .

Summing up briefly the essence of the recent speeches in this sphere by Reagan and Shultz, it boils down to this: The United States is now officially striving to cast aside everything that hinders its armed assertion of its "leading role in the world," that is, to free itself from the operative provisions of international law and the directive decisions of the United Nations. We do as we please—that is the "moral" that guides the present U.S. Administration.

Sergey Losev, director general of TASS (*Ogonek* magazine, 14 Apr 84)

The American Administration's destructive approach to the problem of restricting the arms race fits into the framework of Reagan's policy of a "crusade" against socialism and against the sovereignty and freedom of peoples. Terror, arbitrariness, and interference in the affairs of sovereign, independent states have been elevated to the level of state policy by the present U.S. Administration. Since the times of the Hitler Reich no government has so openly set the task of the forcible liquidation of lawful regimes in other sovereign states. Claims to international brigandage—that is the meaning of the American President's arguments that "peace based on force is by no means a slogan but a fact of life."

Viktor Olin, commentator (Moscow Radio World Service in English, 16 Apr 84)

The United States Administration persists in relying upon military strength, on achieving a military superiority, on imposing its system on other nations. The policies of the Washington Administration also cause serious concern because of their historical associations. Nazi Germany too adopted the strategy of a blitzkrieg and justified its attack on other countries by speaking of the need to deal preemptive strikes. Militarist Japan was following the same doctrine in attacking Pearl Harbor. Such methods brought no success to past exponents of international terrorism, but they did cause the suffering and death of tens of millions of people. Today, in the nuclear age, their consequences could be immeasurably more tragic.

TASS commentary (TASS, 3 May 84)

President Reagan's visit to the PRC has drawn to a close. The U.S. Administration was striving to use it to the fullest possible extent as an election-year visit and for the realization of its hegemonistic plans in the Asian and Far Eastern region. . . .

Reagan and his Administration, taking account of the continuing election campaign in the U.S.A., wanted to use the "China factor" to the full to further its plans, to play the "China card," above all, in the context of confrontation with the Soviet Union in the Asia-and-Pacific region, to broaden out, in Reagan's words, areas of coinciding and parallel interests with China, to carry on with the coordination of actions with China on a series of issues in the international arena.

The American President was in every way trying to give his talks and, especially, his public statements, a provocative anti-Soviet orientation. This came as a fresh confirmation of the militarist course steered by the U.S. Administration and of its reluctance to seek agreement with the Soviet Union, including on disarmament issues. In doing so, Reagan speculatively assured the Chinese leadership that the U.S.A. would never consent to sign an agreement with the Soviet Union on the reduction or elimination of nuclear armaments in Europe, if the Soviet missiles deployed in Asia remained unaffected. . . .

TASS report (TASS, 6 May 84)

R. Reagan, the United States President, has come forward with a new demagogic statement timed for the beginning of the second round of the Stockholm Conference on measures for strengthening confidence, security, and disarmament in Europe. . . .

Reagan also touted other U.S. pseudo-initiatives, including the draft treaty on chemical weapons tabled at Geneva whose purpose is to camouflage the Pentagon's policy of stepping up the rate of production, updating and stockpiling this monstrous means of dealing a strike against people. The U.S. draft is aimed, under the pretext of monitoring, at legalizing U.S. intelligence-gathering activity. . . .

Reagan's assurances of the wish "to hold serious talks" look particularly flimsy against the background of the course he has mapped out for the militarization of space, signifying an undermining of the whole process of limiting nuclear weapons.

Vikentiy Matveyev, *Izvestiya* political observer (*Izvestiya*, 8 May 84)

The U.S. leaders, having wrecked the Geneva talks through their actions by way of unleashing a dangerous new round of the nuclear arms race and having ignored the will of the vast majority of the population in the FRG, Britain, and Italy, where the deployment of the new American missiles has begun, would now like to weaken the wave of criticism of them by stubbornly repeating statements in favor of a "resumption of the Geneva talks."

On the eve of the resumption of the Stockholm Conference's work, President Reagan spoke again, expatiating on the "desirability" of talks on medium-range missiles. Yet a few days earlier he was demonstrating his anti-Soviet obsession to the whole world with his calls to knock together a "front" whose creation was striven for in the thirties by inveterate reactionaries in the West together with the fascist aggressors. . . .

TASS report (TASS, 10 May 84)

President Ronald Reagan of the United States made a televised speech devoted to the policy of the United States in respect to Central America. A shameless lie from beginning to end—this is how one can characterize his speech that is yet another exercise in demagoguery, slander, whipping up of anticommunism, chauvinism and hatred for other countries and peoples, in preaching openly state terrorism and war. In effect Reagan called military interference and aggression in Central America with the aim of suppressing the revolutionary and national-liberation movement, that has spread throughout that region, a "legal right and moral duty" of the United States.

TASS report on U.S. Olympic ceremony (TASS, 15 May 84)

Addressing a White House ceremony on the occasion of the arrival of the Olympic flame in Washington from New York, President Reagan was hypocritically speaking about his Administration's adherence to the ideals

of the Olympic movement and "observance of the Olympic Charter." President Reagan claimed that he and his Administration have done their utmost to ensure a warm reception for all states at the Olympic Games.

But what sort of a "warm reception" for the athletes can it be, if, judging by the press reports, Peter Ueberroth, the president of the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee, himself, turned to the authorities with a request that he and his family be ensured security in connection with the outrages of fascist-type and terrorist groupings in Los Angeles?! And the American press refutes the hypocritical statements by the U.S. President.

TASS report on Administration stand on MX, INF (TASS, 15 May 84)

Speaking at a press conference on Monday, President Reagan presented Congress with an ultimatum, demanding from it approval for the White House's plan to spend in fiscal 1985 3.1 billion dollars to build another 40 modern MX first-strike intercontinental ballistic missiles under the program "to rearm America." According to him, there is no more important problem on the agenda of his Administration than the fulfillment of the strategic modernization program, on which more than 180 billion dollars are going to be spent and which is aimed at achieving military superiority over the USSR.

Last year the Administration pushed through Congress appropriations for the manufacture of 21 MX missiles. All in all, 100 such missiles are going to be deployed in Nebraska and Wyoming. Washington at that time used an outright lie in claiming that approval of its plans by Congress would "stimulate" efforts to control nuclear armaments. Reagan resorted to this tactic again: "Without . . . the MX the incentive for the Soviets to return to the negotiating table is greatly reduced," he claimed. Observers point out that practice has demonstrated the utmost fallacy of these calculations because every spurt of Washington in building up its nuclear arms arsenals aggravates the military and political situation in the world and lessens the chance of progress in arms reduction.

During the press conference the President again hypocritically appealed to the Soviet Union to return to the negotiating table of the Geneva talks although they had been scuttled by the deployment of new U.S. nuclear missiles in West Europe by the United States and its NATO partners. The Soviet Union's position on this issue is well known: The possibility to

reopen the talks on nuclear armaments can appear only if the U.S. side removes the obstacles of its own making and restores and predeployment situation.

Trying to justify his position, which is dangerous to the cause of peace, the President again distorted facts and indulged in outright slander. For instance, he claimed that the United States did not start wars but maintained its might to deter aggression and safeguard peace. That was said by the same man who personally ordered a piratic act of aggression against tiny Grenada, sanctioned the CIA's "secret war" against revolutionary Nicaragua and the mining of the civilian ports of that country, and directed the U.S. armed intervention in Lebanon.

TASS commentary (TASS 23 May 84)

As a result of these [Soviet] measures, the security of the United States has diminished, of course. However, the Reagan Administration's spokesmen, who at one time deceived the U.S. people in the question of the correlation of the military power of the USSR and the USA with a view to stepping up the arms race without hindrance, are now misleading their own population by belittling the importance of Soviet military counter-measures—so as to conceal the dangerous consequences of the deployment of U.S. missiles in West Europe. . . .

The Pentagon spokesmen nevertheless note that the travel time of the missiles on new Soviet submarines to targets in the United States has decreased from 20-25 minutes to 5-7 minutes. This alone already means that Reagan's calculations to make the Russians go to sleep with a thought that the United States will deliver a nuclear strike against them, have failed. Such plans of Washington are unrealistic. Retaliation for an aggression is inevitable.

Burlatskiy (*Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 23 May 84)

During my recent trip to the United States, I gained the impression that the political pendulum, which for four years now has been pushing the country's present leadership solely in the direction of militarism and adventurism, has reached its culmination point. The United States has undertaken open, armed interference in Lebanon, mined the ports in Nicaragua, and begun implementing the "Star Wars" program.

All this has frightened Americans. Not only the public, but Congress as well, seem to have realized clearly for the first time that the President really is capable of involving the United States in a war—a “small one” to start with, like the one in Vietnam, and then, by way of escalation, possibly even a large one. . . .

The President has spent billions of dollars on consolidating U.S. security. As a result of this, however, the country's security has weakened while the threat of war has increased. He has repeatedly resorted to military force in different parts of the globe. And he has suffered one defeat after another, as was clearly evidenced by events in Lebanon. The intoxication of the “victory” over tiny Grenada failed to capture the imagination of serious and thinking people in the United States. The President proclaimed the resumption of the arms limitation talks process. But he wrecked Geneva and has turned out to be the only U.S. leader whose term in office did not contain the conclusion of a single agreement in this sphere. Finally, he has brought relations with the Soviet Union to their lowest level.

These results of the President's military and foreign policy are forcing many representatives of the country's elite to recall Talleyrand's memorable saying: “This is worse than a crime. This is a mistake!” And although the average American is highly impressed by strong policies and a “strong president,” he is now saying more and more often: Stop, this is impractical! Practical politics is the art of the possible, not just of the desirable. . . .

I asked one of the famous U.S. political scientists in confidence: What is the psychological explanation for the incumbent U.S. President's fondness for nuclear games? One gets the impression that some kind of mysterious force seems to attract him to them. “Yes, yes, I myself have thought of this,” my interlocutor said. “And what strikes me more than anything else in this connection is our President's statements about the inevitability of Armageddon, the ‘end of the world.’”

According to religious beliefs, Armageddon is the place where the final battle between the forces of good and evil will be fought. At that moment God will take the affairs of mankind in his hands and he will walk the earth and punish the sinners.

This is what R. Reagan said to correspondents of a television company:
"It could be that our generation will be the one to witness Armageddon."

An anticommunist complex multiplied by a superstition complex and added to a boundless faith in the military-industrial complex—are these not rather too many complexes for just one man? . . .

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Special Memorandum

Soviet Treatment of President Reagan Since 11 May

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SOVIET TREATMENT OF PRESIDENT REAGAN SINCE 11 MAY

HIGHLIGHTS

Moscow has not wavered from its uncompromising public stance toward President Reagan and his policies. Authoritative Soviet statements on the United States focused on arms control issues, dismissing the President's Dublin proposals as a propaganda ploy designed to advance his election prospects and calm the fears of U.S. allies.

- A 7 June PRAVDA editorial article denounced the President's 4 June initiative in Dublin as "another dose of pseudopeaceful rhetoric" aimed at American voters and the West Europeans.
- Soviet President Chernenko, in a letter to U.S. scientists (published in PRAVDA on 20 May), repeated Soviet charges that the President's strategic defense initiative is designed to turn space into a "bridgehead of aggression and war."

Influential mid-level commentators offered expanded but no less critical views of U.S. policy and the near-term prospects for U.S.-Soviet relations.

- In a two-part series in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, political observer Fedor Burlatskiy asserted that Administration concern that Americans were frightened by President Reagan's "militarism and adventurism" had led only to efforts to change the President's image, not his views or policies toward the Soviet Union. Burlatskiy concluded that it was still too early to tell whether a shift in the views of the American people would defeat President Reagan in November.
- Nikolay Shishlin, a CPSU Central Committee official, argued in a 3 June domestic radio broadcast that President Reagan's belief in "America's messianic function" is the source of current U.S.-Soviet problems.

Routine Soviet propaganda continued to castigate the President in harsh terms. A 3 June TASS commentary, for example, charged that the President, like the "ringleaders of the Third Reich," is pursuing "military superiority in the world" and instituting a "policy of terror against all who stand in the way." To support this allegation, TASS claimed that the President had approved the construction of "concentration camps for an inmate population of 200,000."

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AUTHORITATIVE SOVIET STATEMENTS

President Konstantin Chernenko, reply to letter from U.S. scientists on weapons in space (PRAVDA, 20 May 84)

Some people . . . would like to turn space into a bridgehead of aggression and war. It is clear from U.S. announcements that it plans to deploy antimissile weapons in space, give scope to the operation of various sorts of antisatellite systems, and deploy super-new types of weapons designed for striking targets on land, in the air, and at sea.

The Soviet Union is a firm opponent of competition in the race of any kind of armaments, including space weapons.

At the same time it should be understood that in the face of a threat from space the Soviet Union will be forced to take measures in order to guarantee its security reliably. Calculations that it is possible to lay the road to military superiority through space are built on illusions. However, they do not want to give up such calculations and this is fraught with extremely dangerous consequences. To prevent such a train of events, before it is too late, is the direct duty of responsible state figures, scientists, of all who are really concerned for the future of mankind.

The Soviet Union again confirms that it is ready to make maximum efforts to see that sinister plans for transferring the arms race into space do not become reality. It is our conviction that a policy aimed at safely protecting space from the deployment of weapons should be the compulsory norm of conduct of states, a universally recognized international obligation.

We are resolutely against the development of large-scale antimissile defense systems, which cannot be regarded otherwise than as calculated for the unpunished implementation of nuclear aggression. There is a Soviet-American treaty on antimissile defense, without time-limit, banning the creation of such systems. It must be strictly observed. The solemn renunciation of the very idea of the deployment in space of antimissile systems would meet the spirit and letter of this treaty and the task of ensuring a peaceful status for outer space in the interests of all mankind. Such a step would be interpreted everywhere in the world as a manifestation of genuine concern for the peaceful future of mankind.

The matter of banning antisatellite weapons is also urgent. Deployment of such weapons would result in sharp destabilization of the situation, in an increased threat of sudden attack, and would undermine the efforts for ensuring trust between nuclear states.

Defense Minister Dmitriy Ustinov, TASS "interview" (PRAVDA, 21 May 84)

Having taken the path of deploying its missiles in Europe, the United States has upset the military balance and has created an additional nuclear threat to the Soviet Union and its allies. We could not ignore it and responded to this threat in a proper way. . . .

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Has the security of West Germany, Britain and Italy been consolidated as a result of the deployment of American missiles in those countries? Quite the other way around--their security has been reduced. The threat to the United States itself has also been increased. All this is well known to Washington leaders. However, they prefer to keep silent about the reply measures taken by the Soviet Union concerning U.S. territory. U.S. ruling circles do not want to tell the truth about them to their own people: It would make too obvious the consequences for the United States itself of the deployment of their medium-range missiles in Europe and of the policy of confrontation with the Soviet Union pursued by the Reagan Administration. . . .

Lately, certain leaders of the American Administration have been making such statements as well: They say all the nuclear arms limitation treaties, signed with the Soviet Union earlier, should be abrogated. Those unrestrained persons, who are unwilling to reckon with the real correlation of forces and are trying to embark on the road of blackmail and threats, should be reminded that the United States, if one proceeds from the security interests of the peoples of both countries, needs the agreements on nuclear arms limitation no less than the Soviet Union. Their renunciation will in no way contribute to the security of the United States itself.

Washington leaders should not hypnotize themselves and deceive world public opinion that with the help of new missiles or new plans for the establishment of a "comprehensive anti-missile defense of the United States" it is possible to make the Soviet Union, through threats and pressure, agree to unilateral concessions. These are futile hopes. We will not negotiate under threats and pressure. The USSR is for honest, equal and constructive negotiations.

Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko, speech at luncheon for West German Foreign Minister Genscher (PRAVDA, 22 May 84)

The U.S. Administration is absolutely clearly banking on confrontation and arbitrariness in international relations, on breaking up in its favor the existing military equilibrium.

Now it appears that in the West, too, many have come to realize that the torpedoing of the talks on nuclear arms in Geneva was programmed in advance. This was done by those who were bent on one thing--to deploy at all cost in NATO West European countries their first-strike nuclear missiles against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. That is how they exploded the talks. They tried to feign grief at this but nothing came out of it. Their pretense is too obvious.

They try to cover up their actions with talk, saying that the end of the world has not come and a "new glacial period" has not set in. But this is a sham, artificial optimism. Is it not clear that the appearance in Europe of new American missiles has drastically aggravated the nuclear threat. And this threat continues to grow with every new missile that is being deployed, including on the territory of the FRG.

Chernenko, remarks to West German Foreign Minister Genscher (PRAVDA, 23 May 84)

During the talk, Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko reaffirmed the invariability of the USSR's course for guaranteeing peace, curbing the arms race, and averting a nuclear catastrophe. He drew attention to the serious growth of the danger of war, especially following the emergence in West Europe--including on the territory of the FRG--of new U.S. first-strike missiles.

The USSR proposes to the United States, in particular, that negotiations should be started on preventing the militarization of space, and that the negotiations on a total and universal ban of nuclear weapons tests should be resumed, with the participation of Britain. We have called upon the United States to bring into force, finally, the Soviet-U.S. treaties of 1974 and 1976 on limiting underground nuclear explosions. The USSR also persistently raises the question of a mutual freeze on nuclear arsenals. A negative answer is invariably given to all these proposals by the American side. In other words, Washington is not interested in negotiating. The usefulness of dialogue is discussed there only in general terms, nothing more.

Editorial article on U.S. chemical weapons convention proposal (PRAVDA, 27 May 84)

The Soviet Union has . . . made considerable efforts to secure progress in resolving the tasks of banning chemical weapons within the framework of multilateral forums--the United Nations and the Geneva Disarmament Committee. . . .

The United States has a different approach. Having made extensive use of toxins in the Vietnam war, the United States continues even today to allocate to this means of mass destruction an important place in its aggressive military plans. It took the United States over 50 years to accede to the Geneva protocol. While being compelled to participate in multilateral talks on banning chemical weapons, it nevertheless dodges the reaching of an accord in every way, often retreats from its own positions, and complicates the solution of already complex questions. . . .

But when the United States presented its much-publicized draft convention it immediately became clear how far removed it was from promoting the achievement of an accord. Moreover, any unprejudiced person familiarizing himself with the American draft convention is left in no doubt that it is compiled in such a way as to make it deliberately unacceptable to all who are interested in seeing that there is no room on earth for chemical weapons.

This applies primarily to the verification provisions contained in the American draft.

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Chernenko, speech at dinner for Romanian President Ceausescu (PRAVDA, 5 June 84)

The socialist countries have to fulfill their peaceful, creative plans in a complex, tense international situation. The fault for whipping up this tension lies with the ruling circles of the United States which have set themselves the aim of running the world. They stubbornly pursue the course of achieving military superiority over the Soviet Union, over socialist states, are accelerating the fulfillment of large-scale programs of producing ever new types of arms, first of all nuclear ones. The United States wants to turn outer space into an area of military confrontation as well. . . .

Sometimes it is said: Would it not be better to ignore the American missiles in Western Europe and sit down at the negotiating table? This appears to sound all right. But still one cannot accept such a position. What sort of talks would these be? In fact the topic at them would be not the reduction of arms but the "rearmament" of NATO--how many American missiles and where they should be deployed in Western Europe. The possibility of reducing strategic arms would remain blocked as well. For in conditions when the channel for the building up of American forward-based nuclear weapons along the perimeter of socialist countries remains open, it would be at least imprudent--from the point of view of the security of the socialist community--to reduce one's own armaments. In short, talks in conditions of the deployment of American missiles would only generate in people an illusion of security and would give a free hand to the exponents of the arms race.

But there exists a road to create proper conditions for constructive talks. What is needed for this? It is necessary to remove the direct threat to peace that originated with the appearance of American missiles on European soil. It is necessary to discard the claims to superiority that to this day cloud the heads of American politicians and which manifested themselves so patently in the proposals of the United States at the Geneva talks.

Editorial article on President Reagan's speech in Dublin (PRAVDA, 7 June 84)

The West Europeans as well as the American voters were regaled with another dose of pseudopeaceful rhetoric. . . .

It is claimed . . . that the White House chief displayed a "new initiative" in the field of nuclear arms control, by alleging preparedness to halt the deployment of American missiles in Western Europe.

What is not mentioned in these claims is that the U.S. President in effect kept on harping on the same string: The talks should resume now, with the deployment of the American missiles going on, and only then, if it is possible to come to terms on everything, the United States would maybe halt the missile deployments in Europe.

What this "coming to terms" means, the President prefers not to mention. Why? Because, as is known, and this was confirmed at the NATO Council's

recent session, no changes have occurred in Washington's stance on nuclear armaments in Europe. These are the same "zero" and "interim" options which the White House used to bring the Geneva talks into a blind alley and start the deployment of Pershings and cruise missiles in Europe.

What kind of talks would they be? They would not be concerned, in fact, with a mutual reduction of armaments, but with NATO's "rearmament"--how many and where American missiles should be sited in Western Europe. The Soviet Union will not agree to such talks.

The President is apparently striving to create also a semblance of the United States' readiness for talks on the nonuse of force. But this is only a semblance. In reality, the American representatives at Stockholm are unwilling to discuss this issue today, either. . . .

The American Administration does not want progress at Stockholm, it is not interested in establishing trust, which is as vital as vital can be.

The President's new "European speech" has been definitely conceived with a view to calming down the Western Europeans and creating a semblance of respectability and peacefulness by the American Administration in the conditions of election struggle in the United States. But that Administration is faithful to itself and its policy of militarism and the arms race. It's a pity. Washington, as all signs indicate, is sticking to the positions that are hostile to the cause of peace, even though it is seeking to conceal that by verbose discourses.

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SOVIET COMMENTARY

TASS report on U.S. Olympic ceremony (TASS, 15 May 84)

Addressing a White House ceremony on the occasion of the arrival of the Olympic flame in Washington from New York, President Reagan was hypocritically speaking about his Administration's adherence to the ideals of the Olympic movement and "observance of the Olympic Charter." President Reagan claimed that he and his Administration have done their utmost to ensure a warm reception for all states at the Olympic Games.

But what sort of a "warm reception" for the athletes can it be, if, judging by the press reports, Peter Ueberroth, the president of the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee, himself, turned to the authorities with a request that he and his family be ensured security in connection with the outrages of fascist-type and terrorist groupings in Los Angeles?! And the American press refutes the hypocritical statements by the U.S. President.

TASS report on Administration stand on MX, INF (TASS, 15 May 84)

Speaking at a press conference on Monday, President Reagan presented Congress with an ultimatum, demanding from it approval for the White House's plan to spend in fiscal 1985 3.1 billion dollars to build another 40 modern MX first-strike intercontinental ballistic missiles under the program "to rearm America." According to him, there is no more important problem on the agenda of his Administration than the fulfillment of the strategic modernization program, on which more than 180 billion dollars are going to be spent and which is aimed at achieving military superiority over the USSR. . . .

During the press conference the President again hypocritically appealed to the Soviet Union to return to the negotiating table of the Geneva talks although they had been scuttled by the deployment of new U.S. nuclear missiles in West Europe by the United States and its NATO partners. . . .

Trying to justify his position, which is dangerous to the cause of peace, the President again distorted facts and indulged in outright slander. For instance, he claimed that the United States did not start wars but maintained its might to deter aggression and safeguard peace. That was said by the same man who personally ordered a piratic act of aggression against tiny Grenada, sanctioned the CIA's "secret war" against revolutionary Nicaragua and the mining of the civilian ports of that country, and directed the U.S. armed intervention in Lebanon.

Fedor Burlatskiy, political observer, report on visit to the United States, part I (LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 23 May 84)

During my recent trip to the United States, I gained the impression that the political pendulum, which for four years now has been pushing the country's present leadership solely in the direction of militarism and adventurism, has reached its culmination point. The United States has

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undertaken open, armed interference in Lebanon, mined the ports in Nicaragua, and begun implementing the "Star Wars" program.

All this has frightened Americans. Not only the public, but Congress as well, seem to have realized clearly for the first time that the President really is capable of involving the United States in a war--a "small one" to start with, like the one in Vietnam, and then, by way of escalation, possibly even a large one. . . .

The President has spent billions of dollars on consolidating U.S. security. As a result of this, however, the country's security has weakened while the threat of war has increased. He has repeatedly resorted to military force in different parts of the globe. And he has suffered one defeat after another, as was clearly evidenced by events in Lebanon. The intoxication of the "victory" over tiny Grenada failed to capture the imagination of serious and thinking people in the United States. The President proclaimed the resumption of the arms limitation talks process. But he wrecked Geneva and has turned out to be the only U.S. leader whose term in office did not contain the conclusion of a single agreement in this sphere. Finally, he has brought relations with the Soviet Union to their lowest level.

These results of the President's military and foreign policy are forcing many representatives of the country's elite to recall Talleyrand's memorable saying: "This is worse than a crime. This is a mistake!" And although the average American is highly impressed by strong policies and a "strong president," he is now saying more and more often: Stop, this is impractical! Practical politics is the art of the possible, not just of the desirable. . . .

I asked one of the famous U.S. political scientists in confidence: What is the psychological explanation for the incumbent U.S. President's fondness for nuclear games? One gets the impression that some kind of mysterious force seems to attract him to them. "Yes, yes, I myself have thought of this," my interlocutor said. "And what strikes me more than anything else in this connection is our President's statements about the inevitability of Armageddon, the 'end of the world.'" . . .

This is what R. Reagan said to correspondents of a television company: "It could be that our generation will be the one to witness Armageddon."

An anticommunist complex multiplied by a superstition complex and added to a boundless faith in the military-industrial complex--are these not rather too many complexes for just one man?

Burlatskiy, report on visit to the United States, part II (LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 30 May 84)

So is it true that somewhere alongside R. Reagan, the man with the blindfold, another R. Reagan has appeared--a pragmatist capable of a flexible policy and constructive steps in the world arena? . . .

Would it not be more correct to say that the Administration's maneuvering is the result of the tremendous pressure which is being brought to bear

on it from both inside the country and outside? The White House is making desperate efforts to rectify the reputation the President has acquired, particularly with regard to his foreign policy. The "image" of a strong man capable of resisting all America's enemies in a difficult time, of a defender of age-old American values, and simply of a "nice guy," charming and approachable, which has been instilled so zealously into public opinion--this "image" has developed a crack, so to speak, right across the face. Serious fears have developed among the majority of Americans and in their European allies that R. Reagan is just the man to involve America in a serious adventure, that he has turned out to be the least capable of all the postwar presidents (even H. Truman!) of "dealing with the Russians" and controlling the arms race. This reputation could do R. Reagan much harm in the coming elections. . . .

U.S. cooperation with the PRC in no way makes up for the frozen relations with the Soviet Union; it is Soviet-American relations that have the decisive influence on the entire international climate, on the key problems of war and peace.

True, we hear increasingly frequent appeals from the White House for an improvement in our relations. But what do they sound like? R. Reagan recently delivered a speech on the problems of U.S. policy in Latin America which entirely nullified the peace-loving rhetoric in his "historic" 16 January speech. . . .

The U.S. election struggle is gathering speed. It is still far from its peak. But it can already be said that no contender will win an easy victory. So we will continue to follow this noisy contest, which is not a matter of indifference to us, and which will determine which way the political pendulum will swing in November of this year.

Vadim Biryukov, TASS commentator (TASS, 3 June 84)

One can imagine the unconcealed pleasure with which thugs from the ultra right-wing organization, Liberty Lobby, close to the presidential entourage, received the news that the Reagan Administration is preparing for massive arrests in the United States. The U.S. President has signed a directive which instructs competent agencies to build concentration camps for an inmate population of 200,000.

However, this decision taken by Washington, which is fond of talking sweetly about "democracy," has caused bitter resentment among the progressively-minded public of the United States who believe with good reason that the war on dissidents is aimed against those Americans who express their disagreement with the militaristic anti-people policies of the White House. . . .

The horrors of fascism during the Second World War have now become a thing of the past. However, nowadays there are people who, just as the ringleaders of the Third Reich, are striving for military superiority in the World, just as the Nazis 40 years ago, pursue a policy of terror against all those who stand in the way of that adventurist policy. The case in point is above all the Reagan Administration and the regime which it sponsors.

Nikolay Shishlin, consultant to the CPSU Central Committee (Soviet domestic radio, 3 June 84)

Nevertheless, his approach to the Soviet Union as an empire of evil is a determining factor. I think it is not fortuitous that in a recent Irish television interview, Reagan quoted with clear satisfaction a statement made immediately after World War II by Pope Pius XIII to the effect that God had chosen America as the savior of much-suffering mankind. It is America's messianic function, or, more accurately, its dominant position in the world, that is very close to Reagan's heart, and moreover it is precisely this postulate that he is attempting to pursue in the realm of practical politics. This is the origin of the problems that we are encountering. At the same time, of course, Reagan cannot fail to consider the preelection situation. Recently a public opinion poll was taken in the United States, and when potential voters were asked for their appraisal of Reagan's foreign policy, 50 percent gave a negative appraisal.

Vasiliy Kharkov, TASS commentator (Soviet international radio in Russian, 5 June 84)

The leaders of the United States and a number of other NATO countries are continuing to pronounce in favor of dialogue between West and East: phrases that are loud but backed up by nothing at all. In his speech in the Irish parliament on Monday President Reagan once again expatiated on the need for "the Russians to return to the negotiating table."

Reagan's speech in the Irish parliament, and the American press itself admits this was opportunistic and designed rather to mask the opportunistic position of the United States and NATO. "Reagan's speech," the CBS television company considers, "was most carefully prepared in order to allay the impression existing in Europe of him as a man who is trigger-happy." The WASHINGTON POST writes that Reagan's speech was for the most part a reiteration of the American Administration's previous position. It was an obvious attempt to diminish broad public concern at the consequences of the White House's foreign policy.

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Special Memorandum

Soviet Treatment of President Reagan Since 8 June

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SOVIET TREATMENT OF PRESIDENT REAGAN SINCE 8 JUNE

HIGHLIGHTS

Moscow is showing no inclination to moderate its polemics against President Reagan despite his expression of readiness for a U.S.-Soviet summit and a Soviet offer of talks on space weaponry. Soviet commentaries have continued their broad assault on the President's policies and persist in portraying U.S.-Soviet relations as being in a state of acute crisis. Soviet media treatment of the two key issues of the past month illustrates Moscow's unbending approach to the President:

- U.S.-Soviet Summit. Moscow insisted that the President's summit offer in mid-June did not alter U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union. The Soviet media's most direct and authoritative response on the summit issue, a TASS commentary published in PRAVDA on 22 June, dismissed the offer as nothing substantially new and as a "purely tactical" move motivated by electoral considerations.
- Space Weapons Talks. Soviet handling of its 29 June proposal for talks on limiting space weapons and of the U.S. response suggests that Moscow's main objective in taking the initiative was to appeal to Administration critics, not the Administration itself. Moscow has given no credit to the Administration for accepting the Soviet proposal. This negative appraisal was conveyed authoritatively in TASS statements on 1 and 6 July, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's speech on 2 July at a Moscow luncheon for British Foreign Secretary Howe, and a 13 July PRAVDA editorial article. The 6 July TASS statement and the PRAVDA editorial article also suggested that Moscow may be considering raising new preconditions for the talks--requiring advance agreement on an agenda and a moratorium on testing and deployment of space weapons.

Lower level commentary has questioned President Reagan's sincerity in expressing a desire for dialogue with the Soviet Union and, despite the Soviet initiative on space weapons talks, mid-level commentators have restated their long-standing assessment that no agreements on major arms control issues will be reached while President Reagan remains in office. Political observer Aleksandr Bovin, in a 28 June IZVESTIYA article, contended that President Reagan's "eloquence" in reassuring the public about his peaceful intentions might influence "his place in the race for the Presidency" but would not affect his place in history--"the place of a man toying with the fate of mankind." Political observer Valentin Zorin claimed on a 30 June Soviet television program that President Reagan's expressions of interest in U.S.-Soviet dialogue are "mere rhetoric" and predicted that if he is reelected, "nothing will remain of his current peace-loving statements."

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AUTHORITATIVE SOVIET STATEMENTS

General Secretary Konstantin Chernenko, PRAVDA interview (PRAVDA, 14 June 84)

We hold that [nuclear arms] issues be considered in earnest at the negotiating table as soon as the American side withdraws its essentially peremptory conditions for talks. In this connection, a real positive shift in the stance of the United States and its allies would not be left without a proper response on our part. . . .

I will single out, as an example, the problem of preventing the militarization of outer space. The entire world recognizes its utmost importance. Our proposals on how to resolve this problem have been submitted to Washington. But it does not want to handle this problem, does not want even to discuss it. In all likelihood, the U.S. Administration is fond only of its own ambitious stance whose essence is opening outer space to the most formidable kinds of armaments and thus trying to gain military superiority. . . .

It does not befit those who practice "state terrorism" to set forth declarations on "democratic values," as happened at the London conference. This is just a variation of the adventurist concept of the "crusade," another attempt to transfer ideological struggle to the sphere of interstate relations.

Politburo member Mikhail Gorbachev, speech in Smolensk (PRAVDA, 28 June 84)

The international situation now is tense. The aggressiveness of imperialism's reactionary circles led by the Reagan Administration is intensifying. They are pushing through more and more programs for building up armaments, including armaments in space. With each passing day, the atmosphere of anti-Sovietism and antisocialism is being fueled in the United States, and the activity of all kinds of extremist and far rightwing, essentially profascist forces, is being encouraged.

Convinced, however, that overtly inflammatory statements discredit U.S. policy, the White House rulers are now hypocritically declaring their adherence to peace and disarmament, while in fact continuing to gamble on military force in the hope, come what may, of disrupting in their favor the military-strategic parity between the United States and the USSR and between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

The more aggressively the ruling circles of imperialism behave, the more resistance they encounter from the forces of peace, above all from the Soviet Union and the socialist community as a whole and the international communist movement and other anti-imperialist forces and from the mass antiwar movement in West Europe, Japan, and the United States itself.

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The world does not want to and will not live under U.S. diktat. And we are sure that the world community of peoples will sooner or later be able to return to the path of realism even those politicians who, oblivious of their responsibility, are creating a threat to man's very existence.

In the face of imperialism's mounting aggressiveness, we need more than ever to be on guard, to display high vigilance, and to strengthen our defense. Here, however, we certainly do not believe that the cause of international detente has been irreversibly undermined.

TASS statement on U.S. response to USSR Government statement of 29 June proposing talks to limit space weapons (PRAVDA, 2 July 84)

The U.S. Administration has demonstrated more than once that it is not interested in ending the arms race, in holding businesslike, constructive talks to settle this problem. This is evidenced once again by its negative response to the Soviet Government's statement on questions of preventing the militarization of outer space.

A statement, hastily released in Washington, makes an attempt to avoid considering the essence of the problem, grossly replacing the subject of talks with other issues. A precondition is being advanced that the discussion of space weapons should include questions related both to medium-range nuclear armaments in Europe and to strategic armaments. It is well-known, however, that the talks on nuclear armaments were deliberately thwarted by Washington, which is deploying new missiles in Europe. The U.S. Administration has not made, nor does it wish to make, a single step to open the way for considering these questions by way of talks. . . .

TASS is authorized to state that the U.S. Administration's reply to the Soviet Government's statement is totally unsatisfactory, clearly intended to turn outer space into an arena for the deployment of weapons of mass annihilation.

Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko, speech at a lunch for British Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe (PRAVDA, 3 July 84)

Today the chief threat to peace comes from Washington's striving to upset the existing military balance in the world, attempts at attaining positions of superiority with the aim of imposing its will on other countries, other peoples. . . .

Trampling upon the UN Charter, grossly disregarding accepted international standards, the United States is trying to force its system on other countries, and intervenes in their internal affairs without ceremony. Most criminal means and methods are used, down to state terrorism. Some kind of a cult of terrorism, in all of its manifestations, today exists in U.S. policy. . . .

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In order to produce results, talks must be conducted in earnest, with a wish to reach agreement. And this is what those in Washington did not want. The verbal fencing Washington is engaged in in order to secure votes does not help the matter. . . .

We regret that Washington gave a negative reply [to the USSR proposal for talks to limit space weapons] permeated with the spirit of intensification of the arms race and its spreading to outer space. By way of a precondition, the demand is made that talks on space should be combined with talks on medium-range nuclear weapons systems in Europe and on strategic armaments. In other words, to combine them with the talks that Washington torpedoed. This is like playing with a stacked deck. . . .

The purpose of Washington's negative answer is to mislead people and create the impression that the U.S. Administration is in favor of talks. In reality, it does not want talks, it avoids them by heaping up preliminary conditions. . . .

All this is playing with words in order to bury the Soviet Union's proposal. I would like to express hope that the U.S. Government will after all show a more serious and responsible approach to the Soviet Union's proposal on talks and will not block them with preliminary conditions that have no relation to the problem at all.

TASS statement on U.S. response to Soviet proposal (PRAVDA, 7 July 84)

In response to this explicit offer of the USSR, the U.S. Administration has assumed a negative posture, embarking on the path of advancing preconditions and linking the talks on space with a discussion of questions of strategic and European-based nuclear arms. . . .

By linking questions of nuclear armaments to the problem of preventing the militarization of space, the U.S. Administration is seeking to evade the talks on space.

It is also indicative that the U.S. Administration is sidestepping such an important element of the Soviet Union's proposal as the establishment of a mutual moratorium on the testing and deployment of space weapons systems from the moment the talks go ahead.

In Washington they are now trying to conceal this position of theirs with statements on their readiness to arrive for the talks in Vienna. But what the American representatives will be talking on there is, ostensibly, not so important. No, it is important. And before the delegations of both sides get together, agreement must be reached on the subject of the talks.

TASS is authorized to declare that the Soviet Government confirms its offer to the Government of the United States to open formal

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talks on preventing the militarization of outer space. It is these, and not some other talks, that [the USSR] is urging the U.S. Government to start, and it is awaiting a positive response from the latter.

PRAVDA editorial article on space weapons talks (PRAVDA, 13 July 84)

It is common knowledge that serious talks are impossible if it is not clear what precisely the sides are going to discuss and to reach agreement upon. . . .

Perhaps, Washington does not know this? The fact is that it does know but acts the other way around, as is clear from the continued maneuvers of the U.S. Administration with regard to the Soviet initiative on the problem of preventing the militarization of space. . . .

The U.S. side has taken a negative attitude to this proposal. At the same time they in the U.S. capital are creating the impression that they are all but packing their bags to go to Vienna and trying to feign support for the proposed talks although in reality they do not want them.

The Soviet Union offered talks precisely on space. In reply the Reagan Administration says that it will send a delegation to discuss nuclear armaments. As for space weapons, the U.S. side, reluctantly, just expresses its readiness to discuss in general terms only "some aspects" of one type of these weapons, namely, anti-satellite systems.

In other words, they in Washington behave as if they are going to talk to themselves. Putting it forthrightly, it is not a serious approach to a question of extreme importance.

Indeed, Washington's loud assurances of its readiness to come to the talks in Vienna and to conduct them "without any preconditions" are worth but little.

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SOVIET COMMENTARY

Nikolay Prozhogin, commentator (PRAVDA, 10 June 84)

It is true that since [the President's trip to Europe in 1982] the vocabulary employed by the U.S. President in his public utterances has changed somewhat. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said of the policy he pursues and personifies. . . .

He announced that he would enter, even "gladly," into discussions on the proposal put forward by the Soviet Union at the Stockholm conference on mutual nonuse of force and maintenance of relations of peace between the Warsaw Pact states and NATO countries--a proposal which he himself had only recently called nothing but "propaganda."

On closer examination, however, it turns out that in exchange for an affirmation by the United States of the principle of nonuse of force, it is demanding that the socialist states accept the NATO espionage program--the notorious "transparency" which, incidentally, will not apply to U.S. territory. . . .

Alas, the "new Reagan" is in fact no different from the old one. Do you think that Washington has discarded a single one of its crazy doctrines, which include the "doctrine" of limited nuclear war in Europe? Do you think the U.S. Administration has stopped whipping up the already excessive arms race or waging undeclared wars in various parts of the world?

Unsigned TASS commentary on President Reagan's remarks about a U.S.-Soviet summit meeting (PRAVDA, 22 June 84)

The President did not say anything that was substantially new but did say that he was in favor of holding a summit and without any preliminary preparations at that. . . .

Have those in the White House really decided to alter their negative course concerning dealings with the Soviet Union? The answer was immediately furnished by representatives of the Administration. They clearly explained that the President's remarks do not signify a softening of policy toward the USSR and thus confirmed that Washington is now busy searching for purely tactical moves in the interests of the election campaign.

Aleksandr Bovin, political observer (IZVESTIYA, 28 June 84)

To all the posts of any significance connected with arms limitation R. Reagan has appointed people who have a firm reputation as "hawks" and have repeatedly opposed agreements with the Soviet Union. I'm afraid that this indicates neither an excessive love of peace on the part of the U.S. President, nor an ardent desire on his part to end the arms race. I'm afraid that, to use the words of the President himself, everything is "quite the reverse."

No, it is not for nothing that people are worried. And it is not for nothing that they link their anxieties to R. Reagan's policy. This policy, which is centered on the uncontrolled buildup of the U.S. strategic potential, on calls for a "crusade" against "world communism," and on insults to and intimidation of the Soviet Union, is what has brought the crisis of Soviet-American relations to its present pitch. The continuation of this policy will cause a still greater destabilization of international relations, which, for understandable reasons, will increase the threat of war and reduce America's security. The continuation of this policy will increase the likelihood of the emergence and escalation of crises in various parts of the world. Reagan does not want people to realize this. And he is trying to rehabilitate himself and his policy. Hence the flood of reassuring presidential eloquence. . . .

The eloquence may influence his place in the race for the Presidency. But it will not influence the place that R. Reagan now firmly holds in history--the place of a man toying with the fate of mankind.

Valentin Zorin, political observer of Soviet television and radio, "Studio 9" (Soviet television, 30 June 84)

One Reagan speech after the other is directed at proving that the United States wants talks and that the United States has constructive proposals, although these constructive proposals are not named, only discussed in general terms. In short, the President tries to appear not in the role of a person who endangers peace, as his opponents in the Democratic Party say he is, but as a politician who is concerned about peace. . . .

This whole campaign is restricted to mere rhetoric. No real policy changes are occurring. Policy is made independently and follows the same direction that it has gone in years past, but the statements now have a different tone.

The question arises about what the actions of a new Administration will be after the elections have been held, when 6 November has passed. . . . If the current President manages to remain in power, I personally think that nothing will remain of the current peace-loving statements, and so on, and Reagan will return to the Reagan that existed in the first period of his coming to power, his first 3-year period.

Political observer Aleksandr Bovin, political observer Nikolay Shishlin, and radio commentator Viktor Levin, "International Observers Roundtable" (Soviet domestic radio, 8 July 84)

Bovin: Well, the first thing they did as soon as they received our statement [proposing talks on space weaponry] was to say: Yes, we will go to Vienna and discuss the problem, but only if at the same time we can discuss other questions relating to the arms race--the

Euroweapons and overall strategic weapons. And this second point was presented as a preliminary condition. Then there was quite an uproar even among the Americans themselves, who realized that in this way Reagan was trying to get out of these talks, because this condition is unacceptable to us: We will not discuss the problem of the Euroweapons while there are Pershings in Europe. And the Administration started clever maneuvering, and it is obvious why: because Reagan is under a great deal of pressure. The elections are coming up soon, he wants to look like a peace-maker and is trying to avoid having anyone grabbing him by the arm and telling him to his face: Look, you're refusing to go and listen to the Russians' proposals! . . .

Shishlin: I agree with the point that the United States is maneuvering. The maneuvering is being done on several levels: at the White House, the State Department, the Defense Department, and, of course, by the media. Literally in the last few days the United States has started to say that it is working hard to put together its stance on possible talks with the Russians, and that perhaps it will have its stance ready by September. But what makes us wary, of course, are both the attempts to link this problem with other unconnected problems [Bovin interrupts].

Bovin: And also, ultimately, the whole context of U.S. policy. After all, it's no accident, for example, that the U.S. press is very actively highlighting the subject of whether Reagan is sincere or insincere. That is what they are discussing themselves, and they themselves are writing that it is quite difficult for the Russians to believe in the sincerity of a President who is well known for his statements to the effect that we are the empire of evil, that there should be a crusade against communism and that socialism will be thrown onto the ash-heap of history. . . .

Levin: I would like to illustrate what you have said with an article by Joseph Kraft in THE WASHINGTON POST, who writes frankly: If Washington were to refuse to join in these talks--meaning the talks on space weapons--Reagan's new conciliatory policy, meaning his conciliatory rhetoric, would be revealed as a piece of swindling dictated by downright opportunistic internal political considerations. . . .

Bovin: In his new target map, Reagan has included all these centers [of command and control] as strategic targets. There is thus an altogether different approach--destroy the command centers, destroy the control centers, [wage] war to a victorious conclusion on the part of America. Strategic thought is evolving in this direction, and we cannot fail to reckon with this. It is extremely dangerous. It shows their true intentions. And it is against all this background that we take this American maneuvering. . . .

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THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

EMBARGOED FOR RELEASE AT THE
CONCLUSION OF THE BRIEFING

July 17, 1984

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

I am happy to be able to announce today that we and the Soviet Union have reached agreement to expand and improve the operation of the Direct Communications Link, or the "Hotline".

This agreement is a modest but positive step toward enhancing international stability and reducing the risk that accident, miscalculation or misinterpretation could lead to confrontation or conflict between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

With the addition of a facsimile capability, we will not only be able to exchange messages faster, but for the first time we will be able to send graphic material such as maps or pictures which would play a crucial role in helping to resolve certain types of crises or misunderstandings.

The negotiations which led to this agreement began about one year ago (August 1983), based upon a series of proposals that we first made in May 1983.

In developing this and other initiatives designed to reduce the risk of war due to accident, misunderstanding or miscalculation, we had the benefit of excellent advice from a number of key Congressional leaders, including Senators Warner and Nunn and the late Senator Jackson.

I see this agreement as both an appropriate technical improvement to the Hotline, which has served both our governments well for over twenty years, and as a good example of how we can, working together, find approaches which can move us towards a reduction in the risks of war.

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Pres/Pres
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

August 15, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI *JK*

SUBJECT: The President's Joke About Russia

If public discussion and press attention to the President's joke about bombing Russia persists, one way we can handle it is by explaining the real nature of the joke: the President was merely making a parody of Soviet propaganda attempts to portray him as a trigger-happy warmonger. The joke, therefore, was designed to illuminate how ludicrous that propaganda is.

Such an explanation can put the President on the offensive rather than remaining on the defensive with explanations of how it was an "unfortunate comment."

cc: Karna Small
Bob Sims
Walt Raymond

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Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By *CS* NARA, Date *8/5/02*

Shultz

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File:
Pres - Gorbachev
Meeting -
Press Announcements -

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

July 3, 1985

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE P. SHULTZ

Room 450 OEOB

1:30 P.M. EDT

SECRETARY SHULTZ: President Reagan has often stated the desire to improve our relationship and improve communications with the Soviet government, and to find ways to narrow the differences between us.

He sees the planned meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev as an opportunity to deepen our dialogue and to lay the basis for practical steps to improve U.S.-Soviet relations.

At this meeting, of course the two leaders will, as I said, get acquainted. And that is worthwhile in and of itself. However, as the President sees it, the best way to get acquainted is through serious substantive discussion of the principle issues between our countries. And as we approach this meeting, and from what I can see the way the Soviet Union will approach this meeting, we will both be wanting to discuss in one way or another these principal issues.

We have no illusions about the distance between U.S. policies and Soviet policies, nor about the fact that our systems are very different systems. So it is a difficult problem to develop this relationship in a more constructive way. At the same time, I think it is one of the very necessary challenges to leadership on both sides to work at the problem of finding a way for two different systems to coexist in this small world that we have.

So it is important for us to redouble our joint search for ways to reduce tensions, lower the dangers of confrontation and conflict. And the President hopes that from this meeting we will make progress in that direction.

I think we have to see that this is an ongoing process. His meeting with the General Secretary will be a very important part of it. It will be preceded by, I am sure, a determined preparatory effort, and if the meeting is successful it will result in a kind of an agenda for what should result in the future. So the meeting needs to be seen as important, but at the same time a part of a process that will -- has been going on and will go on before the meeting and will continue afterwards.

Since General Secretary Gorbachev has stated his desire to find practical ways to improve relations, and the President of the United States is also looking in that direction, we hope and expect that both sides will approach this meeting in the same constructive spirit.

If you have any questions, I will be glad to take them.

Q You talk about an agenda. Do you contemplate that there will be any tangible actions that would come out of this meeting that we could look at and determine whether success had been achieved or not?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't think that it is wise to try to construct a scorecard of some kind for success. The fact that the

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meeting will be held, it will be a serious meeting, it will be a substantive meeting, I am sure - certainly that is our intent, and I am certain that is the Soviet intent -- and just how the meeting will go remains to be seen. We obviously have had much discussion with the Soviet Union about the broad agenda of issues between us, and we will have more before the meeting, and we will just have to see how it proceeds.

Q One obvious area --

Q Mr. Secretary, could we go over what the substance is and what the broad agenda encompasses specifically?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I can't do that with you because we have not worked it out, and to a certain extent I suppose when you get two heads of state of these two great nations together that

there will likely be an interplay between them, and they'll construct their own agenda to a certain extent. Yet, certainly we plan to have discussions between ourselves and diplomatic channels that will make an effort, at least, to organize the meeting somewhat, and obviously we will continue to work at things where we've been negotiating on one matter or another.

But the whole problem of constructing the way the meeting will work is something that we're now working on.

Q Mr. Secretary, you'll be seeing the new Soviet Foreign Minister in Helsinki, and presumably in New York. But those are kind of brief encounters by their nature, I mean, one day or so. Do you think it's conceivable, as some of your predecessors have, prior to other summit meetings, go to Moscow yourself for any -- three days or so, kind of preliminary discussions?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I don't -- there is no plan for anything of that kind. I do look forward to meeting in Helsinki with the new Soviet Foreign Minister, and welcome that opportunity to talk with him, get to know him, as I got to know Foreign Minister, now Chairman Gromyko. So we'll just have to see how it unfolds as to the way in which the preparatory effort takes place.

We don't know, but we expect, as you've suggested, that the new Foreign Minister will come to New York for the UN meetings, and that will be a time when he's likely to be here for a little while, and so we'll have opportunities for at least one, perhaps more meetings during that time.

Q Mr. Shultz, in light of the fact that Mr. Gorbachev has suggested that the Soviets might pull out of the arms control talks since there's no progress, will President Reagan be under any kind of special pressure, do you think, to make some attempts to move that along so that after the summit meeting the Soviets won't walk out of the talks?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: There is no special pressure, as far as we're concerned. It doesn't take special pressure for the President to wish to see the Geneva negotiations move along. And to that end, we have put, we think, quite interesting and forthcoming proposals on the table and our negotiators are there and prepared to negotiate. So that is our posture and that's where we'll stay.

As far as agreements are concerned, of course, we're always -- welcome an opportunity to make a good agreement, but we're not interested in agreements for the sake of agreement, and I don't expect the other side is, either.

Q Mr. Secretary, on that point, November, as I recall it, is the time when the Soviet moratorium which they announced recently with regard to medium-range missiles is to expire, and November -- mid-November is the time when

President Reagan has asked for a report about the next decision-making on compliance with SALT II. In the light of that, do you see this meeting in mid-November as being one that would be some kind of a crucial turning point, not only in the arms control negotiations, but in the field of military programs for the two sides?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I think that that's certainly overstating things and I would deliberately stay away from words like "turning point." But, certainly, we regard this as a very important meeting and, as I said, we'll be prepared for serious, substantive discussion there. It's part of an on-going process and that's the way the President will be approaching it.

Q Mr. Secretary, over the last four years the President and you have literally grown hoarse telling us that there is no point in having a summit unless there was -- it would be well prepared and have good -- expectation of having substantive results. What's changed?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, in the first place, I think that there will be a extensive preparatory effort, so we won't have a situation where two people just get together and say "hello" with no preparation. We want to see the meeting prepared for thoroughly and so do the Soviet Union. So, we will do that.

I think that, here, we have a situation, as I said some time ago, where we have new leadership in the Soviet Union that has clearly established itself. For that matter, we have a new Foreign Minister and a President with his basic term ahead of him and his policies established and I think, under those circumstances, it's quite sensible for these two men to meet. And, as you know, this -- they agreed that it would be a good idea to have a meeting some time ago, and now they have agreed on the time and place for the meeting.

I might say that they both have agreed that, as they have told each other, that they would like to see a more constructive relationship emerge from the meeting. So, maybe the first two conditions having been satisfied, who knows, maybe the third will. But, at any rate, that's the spirit in which the United States will approach the meeting.

Q Mr. Secretary, the administration has said in the past that it would expect to see some indication of progress in the arms control talks before such a summit meeting could be expected to be successful. Do you expect that the arms control talks will move in some direction -- some positive direction between now and November or will they, in effect, be on hold until after the summit?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: As far as we're concerned, we're prepared for progress. And as I said a moment ago, we have strong positions on the table and we have negotiators there ready for the give and take of negotiation. The fact of the matter is that there

hasn't been any real progress in those talks, and that's just descriptive of where they stand. And that's about what you can say on the subject right now.

Q Mr. Secretary, in two days you depart for meetings with the Asian and Pacific allies. Does the fact that you're also discussing a Soviet-American summit indicate that you will toughen your stand even further regarding the Asian and Pacific allies? In other words, would the United States ever change its policies concerning them, the alliances in that region?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, our policies toward the -- Asia and the Pacific have been developed, and they're clear and they're ongoing, and I think basically quite successful. And we intend to continue to pursue them.

And in the trip, I will not only go to Southeast Asia and Australia, but also at the same meetings will be the Foreign Minister of Japan as well as from many other countries. And so it's a good setting for the continual nourishment of something that is basically positive.

We do, of course, have the fact that Vietnam has virtually occupied Cambodia and we strongly support the ASEAN effort to resist that and to create a situation where Cambodians will have their country back.

Q Will you --

Q Are you -- nevertheless -- go ahead.

Q I just wondered, on the ANZUS, are you going to press for a bilateral relationship with Australia or keep ANZUS the way it is?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We have, of course, a strong bilateral relationship with Australia. We will meet in Canberra, the United States and Australia. Our agenda for discussion will be like the one that typically we had at ANZUS meetings. But under the circumstances, with New Zealand's withdrawal of a willingness to have our ships call in New Zealand ports, this has put that aspect of the ANZUS to the side. However, the ANZUS Treaty remains as it is and we will continue forward with Australia and hope that in the end the problems with New Zealand will work themselves out. But there's no indication of that.

Such a gentleman deserves the next question.

Q Over recent years, the administration has spoken of Soviet support of international terrorism, specifically Soviet training, arming, financing of terrorist groups. Is it your current information that the Soviet Union continues to do that? And if that's the case, might that be a subject at the summit?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think the agenda for the summit is yet to be determined. But certainly, the general subject of hijacking and terrorism is a subject that must be on everybody's mind and probably we'll want to talk about it.

Q What about the first part of the question?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't have any comment.

Q Mr. Secretary, understanding that it's too early for the agenda to be set, does the President nonetheless already know that he wants Afghanistan or the Soviet role in Central America to be discussed in any summit?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We generally have a four-part agenda of our own, the Soviet Union has its agenda, but we have talked with the Soviet Union, of course, about arms control issues, they're very important and central. We have a whole set of bilateral opportunities and problems where progress is possible. We have developed a pattern of discussions with them of what are called "regional issues." You mentioned one -- Afghanistan.

We had a meeting about Afghanistan with the Soviet Officials recently, so regional issues, in one way or another, are subjects for discussion, and we always carry on our agenda. The general subject of human rights, and as a matter of fact, a basic reason for going to the Helsinki meeting, commemorating the 10th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act is to call attention to the commitments made in that act by all of the governments who are party to it.

Q Mr. Secretary, if I may, I have question and a follow-up on the TWA hijacking. Now that the FBI has firmly identified the hijackers, what will our government do to prosecute the case, and if you can respond to that, I have follow-up, please.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I won't respond to that, so I'll save you the follow-up. (Laughter.)

Q Thank you, sir.

Q Mr. Secretary, there are reports that Iran played a positive role in securing the release of the TWA hostages. Could you comment on that?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, it's hard for us to know, precisely, who said or did what, so I won't make any comment. I think as far as Iran is concerned, we would like to see them try and bring to justice the hijackers they hold from the earlier hijacking in which two Americans were murdered.

Q On the regional issue in the summit, about Middle East, do you think that there will be any agreement between the United States and the Soviets, if the Russians did not put into action some of the examples which the State Department mentioned a couple of weeks ago?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't -- I'm not following your question.

Q There were some examples which you said that the Soviet Union should see to prove that they can be helpful in solving the Middle East problems.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, the Middle East problems are among those that we have discussed from time to time with the Soviet Union, and certainly as in all of these discussions of regional issues, there is an important, you might say, damage control element to those discussions and information-sharing, and when -- of course when you speak of the Middle East, you -- it's a big place, and there are the

excruciating problems of Lebanon right now. There is the Arab-Israeli set of issues, there is the Iran-Iraq War, and the problems of the Gulf, so there is a wide array -- not to mention Afghanistan. So these issues may very well be discussed.

Q Mr. Secretary, the Islamic Jihad today has threatened the remaining hostages in Lebanon with a black fate if you go ahead with our plans to shut down the Beirut airport. I wonder if you have any response to that?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, as far as the -- we don't respond to threats -- but as far as the Beirut airport is concerned we have a very clear picture. Here is an airport that over the past decade and a half has been the point of origination or termination or transit of a full 15 percent of all the hijackings outside the United States, and in the most recent hijacking it became a place from which hijackers were resupplied and supplemented, and from which hostages were taken and held. And so that airport, I think, constitutes a menace. And we have said our opinion about that and what we will do as far as the United States is concerned. We have sent our views out to other governments. I think there was an outstanding statement made today by Prime Minister Thatcher of the United Kingdom and Vice President Bush in London in which the British have stated views very parallel to ours, and we look for a meeting of the so-called Bonn Group -- I think it is on the eleventh or so -- and we want to focus in on the importance of making the Beirut airport off-limits until it makes terrorists off-limits.

Q But will you go ahead with this, Mr. Secretary, even if it means harm to our hostages?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We must think not only about the present, but we must think about the future, and recognize that we have a place here that has become a genuine menace. Now of course we are very concerned, and have been working in every way we can think of to obtain the release of the seven hostages now being held. And we will continue to do so.

Q Mr. Secretary, was Geneva specifically chosen by the two superpowers to give a particular impetus to the nuclear arms talks taking place there, and could you say whether you think any progress is possible in Geneva between now and November so long as the Soviets continue to demand that the United States give up its Star Wars program -- or its SDI program -- as a condition for real negotiations?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Not on those conditions. But it's always possible that progress can be made, but there's no -- there's nothing in the negotiations that's emerged to date that would tell you that that is likely. But our people will continue there; they'll continue to work at it in good faith and with good proposals.

As far as the selection of Geneva is concerned, it's a place that historically has been a -- considered a neutral place where meetings of this kind can be held and there are good facilities there. And so it's a natural place for this sort of meeting.

Q Mr. Secretary, if I could follow that point --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, you're next.

Q Mr. Secretary, is the question of Poland likely to come up during the summit meeting? There are reports that Mr. Gorbachev has been increasing the pressure -- the Soviet pressure on the government in Warsaw. Is this subject likely to come up?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It may very well. It's part of the regional picture. But I can't say what will come up and what won't come up. You have to remember that even though the meeting will take place over a period of two days, that's still a limited amount of time, and we will try to use that as effectively as possible. And the issues presented by the problems of Poland we consider to be very important issues. But what will actually come up and how the agenda will be framed, I can't say at this point because we haven't framed it yet.

Q Mr. Secretary, this morning The L.A. Times said that State was considering a reward for the hijackers. Larry Speakes confirmed that a reward is under consideration. Can you tell us what, in fact, triggers that reward apparatus? Do you have to say something, do you have to do something, or is it in effect right now?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The Congress authorized an appropriated fund for -- in connection with our efforts to develop action on terrorism whereby we're in a position to offer rewards for information leading to the trial and successful prosecution of terrorists. And the authority to put such rewards forward resides in the Secretary of State, who will do whatever the President tells him to do.

Q Well, have you done that --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: But I will make recommendations, too. And when we have something to say on that, we'll say it. But it's an authority we have and it's an interesting way of going about the gathering of information. We have tried to equip ourselves with the help of Congress to have an ability to throw as wide a net as possible, and that's one possible way to seek a certain class of information.

Q Mr. Secretary --

Q Mr. Secretary --

Q Sir, there have been several references by the hostages to the fact that

the people in the United States do not understand or realize the problems or the depth of misery in the Middle East. As a result of this experience, have you any goal or constructive plan in diplomacy to try to make things better, a better understanding between the United States and the Middle East?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I suppose anybody who watched the films that have been shown during the period when the hostages were held in Beirut by this time is familiar with the destruction which, basically, the Lebanese have inflicted upon themselves in Lebanon, not only in Beirut, but pictures weren't shown, for instance, of Tripoli or other cities. So there is great turmoil there and it's a -- it is something that effects anyone, particularly like me who's been there and seen it in better times, with a wish that somehow it could be returned to that order. And the United States has made, and continues to make, strenuous efforts to do so.

I can't help but wonder if some of those involved who were so anxious to see the agreement we worked out abrogated might be scratching their heads and thinking if they might not be better off right now if the stability envisaged in that agreement were present.

As far as the broader issues of the Middle East are concerned, we continue to work hard at the Arab-Israeli issues. And I think, with the leadership of King Hussein and President Mubarak and elements of the Palestinian movement on the one hand and of Israel and Prime Minister Peres on the other, there seems to be some motion. And we are doing everything we can to nourish that.

And, of course, in the Iran-Iraq War, there you have a war where more people have been killed and injured than anything in recent memory. And it continues. There seems to be little that we, as the United States can do, although we try and we have done some things. But it's a very distressing situation.

Q Mr. Secretary, is it thinkable or likely that the --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Is it what?

Q Is it thinkable or likely that the superpowers one month after the Geneva meeting would allow SALT II to expire?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Would allow what to expire?

Q Would allow SALT II to expire, one month after the --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't want to speculate on what might or might happen as a result of the discussions coming up in Geneva. As I said, the agenda is yet to be established.

I see my keeper here. And so --

MR. SPEAKES: Two more questions.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I'll take one question, and then I have one other comment I want to make. So, who wants -- you pick the last questioner, Larry.

Q Mr. Secretary --

MR. SPEAKES: You've had your chance. We'll go -- go here.

Q The President has said on more than one occasion -- in fact, invited Mr. Gorbachev to come to Washington for the summit. Why did the President decide to give in on this point?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I don't think it's a question of giving in, particularly. The -- I think each party wanted the other to come to its capitol, and, so this is the first meeting in quite awhile and we agreed that the site of Geneva would be appropriate. I think, in the end, if this moves along in a reasonable way, there's a great deal to be said for the two most powerful countries in the world having the meetings between their heads of state in their own countries. But, on this occasion, it seemed more sensible to go ahead and have the meeting in Geneva.

Now I have one additional statement that I'd like to make before we close. I want to take this opportunity to congratulate Prime Minister Peres and his government for the courage and foresight they've shown in moving boldly to address Israel's serious economic problems. The new economic measures that have already been announced are far ranging and include new cuts in government budget expenditures, additional sizeable reductions in consumer subsidies, a realignment of the shekel exchange rate, a reduction in public sector employment, and a three month wage price freeze.

The new economic measures, if fully and vigorously implemented, represent an important step forward in Israel's continuing efforts to stabilize its economy and restore growth and prosperity. The United States understands, from its own experience, the difficulty of taking such decisions as sizeable cuts in the budget. We also recognize that there are no substitutes for the forthright action in these circumstances.

That is why we stand ready to support Israel in this important undertaking with supplemental economic assistance which we expect soon will be approved by Congress and will be available to be used in the way that will be most helpful to Israel.

Q Can you pronounce the new Soviet Foreign Minister's name?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Yes.

Q What is it? (Laughter.)

Q I'll ask the questions here.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

2:00 P.M. EDT