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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
10955	PAPER	SOVIET PUBLIC TREATMENT OF PRESIDENT REAGAN NOVEMBER 1980--MAY 1984 [1 - 67]	65	6/1/1984	B3
		PAR 7/18/2008 F06-114/10			
10956	PAPER	ANGLOA; FRG; USSR; AFGHANISTAN [68 - 68]	1	ND	B1
10963	PAPER	USSR: MOSCOW'S SPACE PROPAGANDA MANEUVER [69 - 69]	1	7/3/1984	B1
		R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10			
10964	PAPER	USSR: MOSCOW'S OFFICIAL REBUKE TO THE PRESIDENT [70 - 70]	1	8/15/1984	B1
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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
10965	PAPER	SOVIET INTERVENTION IN THE U.S. ELECTORAL PROCESS [72 - 75]	4	ND	B1
		R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10			
10957	MEMO	MATLOCK/RAYMOND/SESTANOVICH TO MCFARLANE RE REQUEST FOR INTERVIEW WITH GRANI MAGAZINE [76 - 77]	2	8/24/1984	B1
		R 6/25/2009 NLRRF06-114/10			
10958	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE ROBERT O. ANDERSON'S PROPOSALS ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS [97 - 97]	1	8/24/1984	B1
		R 6/25/2009 NLRRF06-114/10			
10959	MEMO	KIMMITT TO HILL RE PROPOSAL BY ROBERT O. ANDERSON REGARDING BERING STRAITS [98 - 99]	2	8/25/1984	B1
		R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10			

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10960	PAPER	USSR: NEW PROPAGANDA PUSH [100 - 100] ***D 7/18/2008 F06-114/10***	1	8/27/1984	B3
10961	MEMO	GROMYKO-MONDALE TALKS [108 - 109] ***PAR 7/18/2008 F06-114/10***	2	9/21/1984	B1 B3
10962	PAPER	USSR: THE CURSE OF THE EQUAL-RESPONSIBILITY DOCTRINE [110 - 110] ***PAR 7/18/2008 F06-114/10***	1	12/25/1984	B3

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File Soviet Propaganda

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1 June 1984
FB 84-10030

Special Memorandum

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Soviet Public Treatment of President Reagan
November 1980 – May 1984

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By LOJ, NARA, Date 7/18/08

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

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1 June 1984
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Soviet Public Treatment of President Reagan November 1980 – May 1984

Introduction

The treatment accorded an American president in Soviet authoritative statements and media commentary can be a sensitive barometer of Soviet expectations for Moscow's relations with Washington. Historically, Soviet efforts to promote improved relations have been accompanied by restraints on public criticism of presidents and their policies. By the same token, harsh public attacks on presidents have been made during periods when the Soviets seemed to believe that no improvement in relations was possible or advantageous.

Soviet public treatment of President Reagan has proved to be no exception to this pattern. Twice since November 1980 Moscow has significantly moderated its propaganda line to test the prospects for reduced bilateral tensions. Commentary during the last two months has been harsh, however, and gives no hint that a third Soviet effort of this sort is in the offing.

Pattern of Statements

The first Soviet effort to improve relations with the current Administration came immediately after the November 1980 elections. Soviet media pictured President-elect Reagan in positive terms, asserting that he had moderated anti-Soviet views expressed during the campaign and raising the possibility that he would reverse the deterioration in bilateral relations that had occurred during the period of the Carter Administration. Faced with continued criticism after the Administration took office, Moscow abandoned such professed optimism in low-level media comment, resorting to strident censure of the Administration and to direct, if somewhat less harsh, attacks on the President himself. Soviet political leaders continued to abide by their normal strictures against attacking a U.S. president directly, although by May 1981 they were strongly indicting President Reagan's policies.

This pattern of leadership and media comment continued until Brezhnev's death in November 1982. It was broken only by a month-long interlude of more moderate comment late in 1981, after agreement was reached to begin

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talks on limiting intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) and before U.S. sanctions were adopted in response to the imposition of martial law in Poland.

A second, more tentative Soviet effort to promote improved U.S.-Soviet relations came after Andropov's accession to power. Soviet leaders and specialists on the United States muted their anti-U.S. rhetoric, which had become particularly harsh in the last months of the Brezhnev regime, and expressed receptivity to any U.S. gestures for improved relations. This selective restraint on criticism—routine Soviet propaganda was little affected—lasted only from November 1982 until early spring 1983, when contention over INF and other issues took its toll.

In the aftermath of the shooting down of a South Korean airliner last September, Soviet leadership statements and media commentary on the President became more abusive than at any time in the last two decades. This harsh rhetoric continued into 1984. Only in the final days of the Andropov regime did Soviet leaders appear to indicate a desire to lower the decibel level of their polemics against the President. The usual strident invective was missing from Andropov's 25 January *Pravda* interview in response to President Reagan's 16 January speech expressing interest in U.S.-Soviet dialogue, and routine Soviet propaganda became marginally less sharp in its criticism of the President.

Although Chernenko's accession to power in February 1984 brought a brief period of moderation in Soviet leadership polemics against the President and his Administration, this restraint disappeared more quickly than had been the case after Brezhnev's death. As early as 23 February a *Pravda* article by Defense Minister Ustinov excoriated "U.S. leaders" for pushing mankind "toward a nuclear catastrophe." By late March, even Chernenko, the Soviet leader who had been least critical of the United States in February and early March, began attacking the Administration in harsh terms. Routine Soviet propaganda also became more strident, and in the last two months some commentary has approached the level of abusiveness that was common last fall.

Different Voices

Soviet statements about the Administration are made at three levels of authority: the top political leadership, midlevel officials with ties to the

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leadership, and routine media commentators. The behavior pattern of each of these groups has distinguishing features:

- Although it authorized media attacks on the President, the leadership itself conspicuously avoided attacking him directly until 1983, thereby observing its traditional posture of standing aloof from the extremes of the polemical fray. Even in his strongest criticisms of U.S. policy, Brezhnev attacked U.S. "ruling circles," "Washington," and "the line of the United States and those who follow it" without naming the President. The Soviet leadership broke this pattern last September in the wake of U.S. charges that the Soviet Union had knowingly shot down a passenger airliner. Andropov's January *Pravda* interview and statements coming after his death have returned to the more familiar pattern of sharply attacking the Administration but avoiding the extremes witnessed last fall.

- Midlevel officials and political commentators (for example, Aleksandr Bovin, Georgiy Arbatov, Vadim Zagladin, and Nikolay Shishlin) have been less restrained than the leaders in blaming the President for the U.S. policies they have so sharply condemned. They have also provided the most sensitive indicator of changing Soviet perceptions about the direction of bilateral relations, registering in their comments apparent fluctuations in Soviet expectations regarding U.S.-Soviet cooperation.

- Routine media commentary has been the least sensitive barometer of changes in the atmosphere of U.S.-Soviet relations. When President Reagan was elected, this low-level propaganda was more optimistic than some Soviet political observers. But as Soviet assessments of Administration policy toward the Soviet Union hardened, the propaganda assumed a hostile tone which has continued despite some fluctuations in intensity.

* * * * * * *

This report presents a compilation of significant Soviet statements about President Reagan from the time of his election in November 1980 through May 1984. It is intended to provide a comparative baseline for use by analysts in judging future Soviet statements about the President. The compilation of statements is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

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Authoritative Statements

Premier Nikolay **Tikhonov,** October Revolution anniversary speech (*Pravda,* 7 Nov 80)

> Regarding our relations with the United States of America, just as with any other country which belongs to a different social system, they can only be built up on the basis of equality, noninterference in internal affairs, not causing harm to the security of one another. . . .
>
> I would like to express the hope that the new Administration in the White House will manifest a constructive approach to questions or relations between our countries.

General Secretary Leonid **Brezhnev,** Kremlin dinner speech (*Pravda,* 18 Nov 80)

> Much in the development of the international situation will, of course, depend on the position of the United States. A new president has now been elected there. I shall not dwell on what was said by him and his supporters and opponents in the heat of the election struggle. I can only state with full responsibility that any constructive steps by the U.S. Administration in the field of Soviet-American relations and urgent world problems will meet with a positive response on our part.

TASS statement (*Pravda,* 3 Feb 81)

> Soviet leading circles have taken note of a new anti-Soviet hostile campaign being unfolded in the United States. This time they ascribe to the Soviet Union involvement in "international terrorism." Such inventions could be simply ignored as a new primitive trick by professional anti-Soviets if not for the fact that this campaign was started by high-ranking officials of the American Administration including U.S. Secretary of State A. Haig. His statements, made at a press conference on 28 January this year, and subsequent additional comments made by another official representative of the U.S. State Department, clearly indicate that this is not a matter of some occasional unhappy expression but a deliberate political subversion. . . .
>
> Soviet leading circles would like to hope that they in Washington will give serious thought as to what the continuation there of the campaign hostile to the Soviet Union can lead and will take measures to stop it.

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Brezhnev, speech to 26th CPSU Congress (*Pravda,* 24 Feb 81)

> Unfortunately, the previous Washington Administration by no means considered the development of relations and of mutual understanding. Attempting to exert pressure on us, it began to destroy all the positive results which had been scored with no little difficulty in Soviet-American relations over the preceding years. . . .
>
> Even after the change of leadership in the White House, candidly bellicose calls and statements are being heard from Washington, calls and statements which seem to be specially intended to poison the atmosphere of relations between our countries. In any case, we would like to hope that those who now determine U.S. policy will ultimately be able to look at things more realistically. . . .
>
> The present state of relations between us and the sharpness of international problems demanding solution dictate the need for dialogue at all levels and, what is more, an active dialogue. We are ready for dialogue. Experience shows that the decisive link here is meetings at the highest level.

Brezhnev, speech in Kiev (*Pravda,* 10 May 81)

> There are quite a few sober-minded people among those who today shape the policy of capitalist countries. They understand that the emphasis on strength, the emphasis on war in relations with the socialist world is madness in our day and age, that there is only one reasonable road—peaceful coexistence, mutually advantageous cooperation.
>
> But there are also such statesmen in the bourgeois world who, judging by everything, are accustomed to thinking only in terms of strength and diktat. They actually regard the attainment of military superiority over the Soviet Union as their main political credo. The solution of international problems by way of talks and mutually advantageous agreements appears to be way down their list of priorities, if they give serious thought to this at all.
>
> Among them there are also those who openly state that peace is not the most important matter, that there are things more important than peace.

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> Just think, comrades: Can one imagine a more horrendous position, a more cynical disregard for the destinies of peoples, including one's own people, for the lives of hundreds of millions of people! . . .
>
> This is not to mention how absurd are any plans which are intended by means of threats, economic blockade or military aggression to impede the development of socialist countries or the struggle of peoples for national freedom and social justice. . . .
>
> As for the Soviet Union, it is not the first time that we are hearing inventions about our policy, slander, and threats. But we do not give in to intimidations.

Marshal Viktor **Kulikov,** first deputy minister of defense, and commander in chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Nations (*Krasnaya Zvezda,* 21 Jun 81)

> If you look at the statements of the leaders of the present U.S. Administration, you cannot help noticing in them a similarity with the aims set by the Hitlerite leadership in attacking the Soviet Union. Speaking at Notre Dame in June, R. Reagan said: "The West will outlive communism. . . . We will write it off as a sad, unnatural chapter in the history of mankind."

Defense Minister Dmitriy **Ustinov** (*Pravda,* 25 Jul 81)

> The ruling circles of Washington have decided to overturn all the positive elements in Soviet-American relations achieved during the seventies and to break down the approximate equality in the military sphere between the USSR and the United States.
>
> Without putting forward any positive initiatives the Reagan Administration has taken a standpoint of unconcealed anti-Sovietism. At the same time it is grossly interfering in the affairs of other states and is high-handedly dictating its demands to them. . . .
>
> The ruling circles of the United States are intensifying international tension and exacerbating Soviet-American relations. . . .
>
> Washington, once again, as a decade ago, is trying to speak to the Soviet Union in the language of "cold war." At the same time, its disregard for agreements which were reached between our two countries in the field of

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arms restriction is demonstrated. A. Haig states: "We are not very concerned about the understandings of 1972, although they were agreed by both sides."

Brezhnev, interview with *Der Spiegel* (*Pravda,* 3 Nov 81)

Unfortunately, the leading powers of the West, above all, the NATO bloc, do not show so far a serious interest in talks on all of these questions that are vital to mankind and its peaceful future. Some people there are by far more willing to speak not on detente, but on confrontation; not on peaceful mutually beneficial cooperation, but on the use of trade to military-strategic ends; not on agreements on the basis of equality and equal security, but on diktat from the positions of military supremacy; not on the elimination by joint efforts of seats of conflicts, but on the creation of ever new military bases, on the buildup of their military presence in various parts of the world; not on curbing the arms race, but on "rearmament"; not on a limitation or prohibition of some or other types of weapons, but on the creation of ever new, even more destructive means of mass annihilation of people.

This way, unfortunately, they not only speak, but also act in practice. You, certainly, understand that I have in mind, above all, the policy of the present U.S. Administration, the way it was manifest both in statements by high-ranking statesmen of that country and, which is even more important, in their practical deeds.

All of it is actually an opposite to detente, blunt disregard for the striving of all peoples for lasting peace. And it is, certainly, profoundly deplorable that the leaders of one of the world's biggest powers have deemed it possible to build their policy on such a basis. . . .

President Reagan has recently expressed the readiness of the United States to discuss with the Soviet Union also other problems, which cause differences between the two countries. We welcome such readiness, as we have always considered talks to be the most appropriate method of resolving international problems. The main thing, of course, is that appropriate practical deeds should be matched to correct words.

And it would be better to abandon dreams of ensuring military supremacy over the USSR.

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Ustinov, October Revolution anniversary speech (*Pravda,* 7 Nov 81)

> The Washington Administration is with increasing frequency resorting to frankly inflammatory language. High-ranking U.S. representatives, with cynical disregard for the fate of the peoples, state that there are allegedly some things more important than peace. . . .
>
> The preservation of peace is inseparable from the curbing of the arms race—from stage-by-stage disarmament. Important steps in that direction were taken in the seventies. But the present U.S. Administration is intent on casting doubt on all the positive things that have been jointly achieved in the field of Soviet-U.S. relations. It openly declares its intention to speak to the Soviet Union from positions of strength.

TASS statement on U.S. stance on Poland (*Pravda,* 14 Jan 82)

> The United States and its NATO allies are continuing attempts at crudely interfering in the internal affairs of a sovereign state—the Polish People's Republic, at whipping up international tensions. This has been most clearly revealed also in the statement, which was issued on 11 January by the foreign ministers of the North Atlantic Alliance.
>
> It is well known that the whole of this disgraceful farce has been initiated by the U.S. Administration. Its style is felt both in the impudent distortion of facts, the high-handed tones, and excessive political ambitions.
>
> Yes, Washington makes no little effort to try to bring abut a turnaround in international politics from detente to confrontation between blocs. Why is it done? It is not too difficult to answer this question.
>
> What it amounts to is above all an attempt at crowding socialism and impairing the positions of the USSR and other socialist countries on the European and world scene. Certain figures of the imperialist camp are day and night beset by nightmares because socialism is growing stronger. The international positions of socialism rely on the existing balance of forces in Europe and in the world, and are guaranteed by the might of the socialist community.

Marshal Nikolay **Ogarkov,** first deputy minister of defense and chief of the General Staff (*Always In Readiness To Defend The Homeland,* Moscow: Voenizdat, approved for publication 26 Jan 82)

> World imperialism, and particularly U.S. imperialism, is seeking to extend its tentacles into every part of the world. Militant U.S. circles have openly adopted a course of policy aimed at undermining detente, engagement in a massive arms race, and active preparations for nuclear war. The various actions and acts of sabotage against the USSR and the other nations of the socialist community and against progressive forces throughout the world which they are presently conducting are of a coordinated nature and are joined together by a common scheme. The main goal which the U.S. imperialists have set for themselves is gradually and sequentially to weaken and undermine socialism as a system, using any and all methods and means, and ultimately to establish their world domination.
>
> This is not a new phenomenon. History has seen many claimants to world domination. Napoleon persistently sought to achieve world domination, as did Hitler at a later time. The outcome of their ambitions is well known. An even harsher outcome may await these latter-day claimants.

Brezhnev, Soviet Trade Union Congress speech (*Pravda,* 17 Mar 82)

> The newly fledged devotees of cold war and dangerous balancing on the brink of a real war would like nothing better than to tear up the legal and ethical norms of relations between states that have taken shape over the centuries and to cancel their independence and sovereignty. They are trying to retailor the political map of the world and have declared large regions on all continents as zones of their "vital interests." They have arrogated the "right" to command some countries and to judge and "punish" others. Unembarrassed, they publicly announce, and try to carry out, plans for economic and political "destablization" of governments and states that are not to their liking. With unexampled cynicism they gloat over difficulties experienced by this or that nation. They are trying to substitute "sanctions" and blockades for normal communications and international trade, and endless threats of armed force, not short of threats to use nuclear weapons, for contacts and negotiations.

It is simply astonishing to see it all. And you cannot help asking yourself: What is there more of in this policy—thoughtlessness and lack of experience in international affairs, or irresponsibility and, to say it bluntly, an adventurist approach to problems crucial for the destiny of mankind? Not in our country, but in the columns of respectable organs of the U.S. bourgeois press this policy was described as "a course to political disaster." It is hard to deny the validity of this description.

Brezhnev, *Pravda* interview (*Pravda,* 18 Apr 82)

I already spoke on the value of an active dialogue with the United states at all levels, especially emphasizing that the decisive link here is summit-level meetings. Today we also support such meetings. It is understandable that a meeting between the U.S. President and myself must be well prepared and conducted properly, not just in passing in connection with some international forum or other.

Yuriy **Andropov,** Politburo member and chairman of the KGB, Lenin anniversary speech (*Pravda,* 23 Apr 82)

The imperialist bourgeoisie, frightened by the upsurge of the antiwar movements, is making ever-wider use of the weapons of lies and sophisticated deception. What is Washington doing now? One hysterical propaganda campaign replaces the other. People are at one moment being persuaded of a Soviet military threat, then lied to unscrupulously about the lagging behind of the United States, intimidated with international terrorism, fed cock-and-bull stories about events in Poland, Central America, South and Southeast Asia. . . .

Attempts are made to make use of diplomatic talks themselves in order to deceive the public, among them talks on the limitation of arms and on disarmament. The impression is created that often they are entered into only to create illusions and, by lulling public vigilance, continue the arms race. . . .

Brezhnev, Komsomol congress speech (*Pravda,* 19 May 82)

President Reagan, on his part, has now declared that the United States is ready for the resumption of the talks. In our opinion, this is a step in the right direction. It is, however, important that the talks should begin immediately in the right key.

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In the same speech the President said that the United States at the talks would be in favor of substantial reductions. Well, we have always been in favor of substantial reductions of strategic arms; there is no need to persuade us in this respect.

But if one looks at the essence of the ideas voiced by the U.S. President on such reductions, one notes unfortunately that the American position is absolutely unilateral in nature. Above all, because the United States would like in general to exclude from the talks the strategic arms it is now most intensively developing.

Brezhnev, speech at Kremlin meeting of military commanders (*Pravda,* 28 Oct 82)

The ruling circles of the United States of America have launched a political, ideological, and economic offensive on socialism and have raised the intensity of their military preparations to an unprecedented level. . . .

The masses of people on all continents angrily protest against Washington's aggressive policy which is threatening to push the world into the flames of a nuclear war. The adventurism, rudeness, and undisguised egoism of this policy arouse growing indignation in many countries, including those allied with the United States. . . .

TASS report of 15 November 1982 meeting between General Secretary Andropov and Vice President Bush (*Pravda,* 16 Nov 82)

In this respect Yu. V. Andropov stressed that the Soviet Union, consistently carrying out a policy of peace, is prepared to build relations with the United States on a basis of full equality, noninterference, mutual respect in the interests of the peoples of both countries, and normalization [*ozdorovleniye*] of the international situation.

Tikhonov, Kremlin dinner speech to U.S. trade delegation (*Pravda,* 19 Nov 82)

We are meeting with you at a time which is not the best for Soviet-American relations. Their climate has considerably cooled and, to be frank, not through our fault.

The official stand taken in the United States towards the Soviet Union, naturally, is also reflected in trade between our countries. All sorts of discriminatory measures, attempts to use various sanctions, embargoes, etc., against our country do not, of course, inspire kind feelings, but rather undermine the confidence of Soviet foreign trade organizations in the American market. . . .

The Soviet Union has been and is for normal, and even better, friendly relations with the United States. There were such relations in the past, and they can again become a reality. This would meet the interests of our countries and the interests of universal peace. I am confident that this is precisely what our peoples wish. They wish lasting peace and mutually beneficial cooperation.

Andropov, speech at CPSU Central Committee plenum (*Pravda,* 23 Nov 82)

All are equally interested in preserving peace and detente. Therefore, statements in which the readiness for normalizing relations is linked with the demand that the Soviet Union pay for this with preliminary concessions in different fields do not sound serious, to say the least. We shall not agree to this and, properly speaking, we have nothing to cancel: We did not introduce sanctions against anyone, we did not denounce treaties and agreements that were signed, and we did not interrupt talks that were started. I should like to stress once more that the Soviet Union stands for accord but this should be sought on the basis of reciprocity and equality.

In our opinion the point of talks with the United States and other Western countries, primarily on questions of restraining the arms race, does not lie in the statement of differences. For us talks are a way of joining efforts by different states in order to achieve results useful to all sides. The problems will not disappear by themselves if the talks are held for the sake of talks, as it unfortunately happens not infrequently. We are for the search on a healthy basis, acceptable to the sides concerned, for a settlement of the most complicated problems, especially, of course, the problems of curbing the arms race, involving both nuclear and conventional arms. But let no one expect unilateral disarmament from us. We are not naive people.

We do not demand unilateral disarmament from the West. We are for equality, for consideration for the interests of both sides, for honest agreement. We are ready for this.

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Ustinov, TASS interview (*Pravda,* 7 Dec 82)

> [President Reagan] said in his speech of 22 November that the Soviet Union now has a clear margin in practically any type of military power. Such assertions are not in keeping with reality. They are calculated at deceiving the public and have the purpose of justifying the United States' unprecedented military programs and aggressive doctrines. It is regrettable that such attempts to convince people of the existence of what does not exist in nature are made by the leader of a great power whose very position presupposes realism and responsibility in assessing reality. . . .
>
> At the same time, the President's speech contains an attempt to sow distrust in the Soviet Union's stand. He stated that the Soviet Union violates the unilateral moratorium it announced on the deployment of its medium-range missiles in the European part of the USSR. I state quite definitely that the USSR is true to its word.

Andropov, *Pravda* interview responding to President Reagan's Open Letter (*Pravda,* 2 Feb 83)

> I must say quite definitely that there is nothing new in President R. Reagan's proposal. What it is all about—and this all the world's news agencies have immediately taken note of—is the same "zero option." That it is patently unacceptable to the Soviet Union now is already generally recognized. Really, can one seriously speak about a proposal according to which the Soviet Union would have to scrap unilaterally all its medium-range missiles, while the United States and its NATO allies would retain all their nuclear weapons of this category?
>
> It is precisely this unrealistic position of the United States that has blocked, and this is well known, progress at the talks in Geneva. That now the U.S. President has reiterated again this position indicates one thing: The United States does not want to look for a mutually acceptable accord with the Soviet Union and thereby deliberately dooms the Geneva talks to failure. . . .
>
> We have believed and still believe that summit meetings have special significance to resolving complicated problems. This determines our serious approach to them.

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For us this is not a matter of a political or a propaganda game. A meeting between the leaders of the USSR and the United States aimed at finding mutually acceptable solutions to urgent problems and at developing relations between our countries would be useful both to the Soviet Union and to the United States of America, to Europe, and to the whole world.

But when the U.S. President makes the meeting conditional on the Soviet Union's consent to the patently unacceptable solution to the problem of nuclear armaments in Europe, proposed by him, this by no means testifies to the seriousness of the American leadership's approach to the whole of this issue. This can only be regretted.

Andropov, *Pravda* interview (*Pravda,* 27 Mar 83)

The President pretends that almost a thousand medium-range nuclear systems of the United States and its NATO allies do not ostensibly exist in the zone of Europe, and that it is unknown to him that NATO has a 1.5-1 advantage over the USSR in the aggregate number of nuclear warheads on those systems.

The President not only keeps silent about all that. He tells a deliberate untruth [*on govorit zavedomuyu nepravdu*], asserting that the Soviet Union does not observe its own unilateral moratorium on the deployment of medium-range missiles. . . .

The incumbent U.S. Administration continues to tread an extremely perilous path. The issues of war and peace must not be treated so flippantly. All attempts at achieving military superiority over the USSR are futile. . . . It is time they stopped devising one option after another in search of the best ways of unleashing nuclear war in the hope of winning it. Engaging in this is not just irresponsible, it is insane.

Andropov, speech to CPSU Central Committee plenum (*Pravda,* 16 Jun 83)

This period is marked by a confrontation, unprecedented in the entire post-war period by its intensity and sharpness, of two diametrically opposite world outlooks, two political courses—socialism and imperialism. A struggle is going on for the minds and hearts of billions of people in the world. And the future of mankind depends in no small measure on the outcome of this ideological struggle. . . . It is no less important to skillfully expose the lying, subversive nature of imperialist propaganda. . . .

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On the one hand, as has already been said, the aggressiveness of ultrareactionary forces led by U.S. imperialism has sharply increased. Attempts are being made to reverse the course of events at all costs. Of course, this policy will not bring imperialists success but, being adventuristic, it is extremely dangerous to mankind. This is why it is meeting with powerful opposition on the part of the peoples, which, undoubtedly, will grow even further.

In the present-day capitalist world, however, there are also other trends and other politicians who take a more realistic account of the international situation.

Foreign Minister Andrey **Gromyko,** TASS interview (*Pravda,* 22 Jun 83)

Naturally, a [summit] meeting which could produce major results for both bilateral Soviet-U.S. relations and the international situation would be useful.

Quite a few words are now being said in the West, particularly in Washington, about a Soviet-American summit. An outsider can even get the impression that Washington is indeed giving serious thought to such a meeting. But if we look into the crux of the matter, the situation, regrettably, is different.

Obviously, proper preconditions are needed to hold a meeting of the top leaders of the two major powers. First, it is necessary to have a certain degree of mutual understanding on major issues which are fundamental to the state of relations between the two countries and the overall international situation. There also is a need for the desire of both sides actually to strive for positive developments, or even better, for a breakthrough in their mutual relations.

If we consider the state of affairs from this point of view, it becomes clear that the discourses of American figures on a meeting are not backed by anything. U.S. policy on relations with the Soviet Union does not pursue any constructive goals at all, of which American leaders make no secret. Moreover, it is oriented in the totally opposite direction.

When there appear in American politics real signs of a readiness to conduct affairs in a serious and constructive manner, the question of the possibility of a summit will appear in a different light.

TASS statement on Korean airliner incident (*Pravda,* 3 Sep 83)

> The intrusion into [Soviet] airspace by the aforementioned plane cannot be regarded in any other way than a preplanned act. It was obviously thought possible to attain special intelligence aims without hindrance using civilian planes as a cover.
>
> More than that, there is reason to believe that those who organized this provocation deliberately desired a further aggravation of the international situation striving to smear the Soviet Union, to sow hostility towards it and to cast aspersions on the Soviet peace-loving policy.
>
> This is illustrated also by the impudent, slanderous statement in respect to the Soviet Union that was made instantly by President Reagan of the United States.

USSR Government statement on Korean airliner incident (*Pravda,* 7 Sep 83)

> The assertion of the U.S. President that Soviet pilots knew that it was a civilian aircraft are absolutely not in keeping with reality. . . .
>
> It is the sovereign right of every state to protect its borders. . . . So the U.S. President makes himself out as an ignoramus saying, as he did in his address on 5 September, that the Soviet Union "arbitrarily proclaims" its borders in the airspace [sic].
>
> But the point here, of course, is not the ignorance of one U.S. official or another. The point is a deliberate preplanned action in an area that is strategically important to the Soviet Union. The instigators of that action could not help realizing what its outcome could be, but went ahead with a major intelligence operation with the use, as is now becoming clear, of a civilian plane, deliberately exposing its passengers to mortal danger. . . .
>
> This conclusion is confirmed by all subsequent actions of the U.S Administration. Its leaders, including the U.S. President, launched a malicious and hostile anti-Soviet campaign over a very short time, clearly using a prearranged script. Its essence has been revealed in its most concentrated form in the televised speech of U.S. President R. Reagan on 5 September—to try to blacken the image of the Soviet Union and discredit its social system, to provoke a feeling of hatred toward the Soviet people, to present the aims of the USSR foreign policy in a distorted perspective, and to distract attention from its peace initiatives.

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The entire responsibility for this tragedy rests wholly and fully with the leaders of the United States of America.

Ogarkov, article (*Izvestiya,* 23 Sep 83)

The struggle for peace in our times has acquired special significance. That is due primarily to the sharply enhanced aggressiveness of international imperialism, Zionism, and reaction headed by the United States. In recent years their actions have been significantly reminiscent of fascism's actions in the thirties. Having adopted flagrant lies and slander, the United States and its allies have launched a global offensive against socialism on all fronts, initiating, as they openly assert, a new "crusade" against us. The Washington Administration is nurturing sinister plans. Expatiating on its alleged adherence to peace, the U.S. Administration, through its defense secretary, blasphemously states that "the path to peace is marked by preparation for war." The "Directive in the Defense Field for Fiscal 1984," drafted on instructions from the U.S. President, is evidence of how far the U.S. "hawks" have gone. This official document sets as its main aim "the destruction of socialism as a sociopolitical system." That's all! There is no need to explain this gibberish. Commentary is superfluous, as they say. We can only marvel at the sheer ignorance and self-sufficiency of the transatlantic strategists, so infinitely far removed from a knowledge of the elementary foundations and laws of the development of human society.

Andropov, statement (*Pravda,* 29 Sep 83)

The Soviet leadership deems it necessary to inform the Soviet people, other peoples, and all who are responsible for determining states' policy of its assessment of the course pursued in international affairs by the current U.S. Administration.

In short, it is a militarist course that represents a serious threat to peace. Its essence is to try to ensure a dominating position in the world for the United States of America regardless of the interests of other states and peoples. . . .

When the U.S. President bombastically declares from the UN rostrum his commitment to the cause of peace, self-determination, and sovereignty of the peoples, these rhetorical declarations can convince no one.

If anyone has any illusions about the possibility of an evolution for the better in the present American Administration's policy, recent events have dispelled them once and for all. The Administration is going so far for the sake of achieving its imperial objectives that one cannot help doubting whether any restraints [*tormoza*] at all exist for Washington to prevent it from crossing a line before which any thinking person ought to stop.

The sophisticated provocation organized by the U.S. special services using a South Korean plane is also an example of extreme adventurism in policy. . . .

In their endeavor somehow to justify their dangerous, misanthropic policy, they are heaping mountains of slander on the Soviet Union and socialism as a social system, and the tone is being set by the U.S. President himself. It must be frankly said that it is an unseemly spectacle when, having set themselves the aim of denigrating the Soviet people, the leaders of a country like the United States resort to what is virtually foul-mouthed abuse mingled with hypocritical sermons on morality and humanity. . . .

Now Washington, in addition to morality, is also flouting elementary rules of decency, displaying disrespect not only for statesmen and states but also for the United Nations. . . .

Of course, malicious attacks on the Soviet Union arouse in us a natural sense of indignation, but we have strong nerves, and we do not build our policy on emotions. It is founded on common sense, realism, and profound responsibility for the destiny of peace.

Ustinov, article (*Pravda,* 19 Nov 83)

The aggressiveness of ultrareactionary imperialist forces increased sharply when the R. Reagan Administration came to power in the United States. They have declared a "crusade" against socialism. . . .

The R. Reagan Administration, in blatant contradiction with this commitment, is now stating its "right" to inflict a first nuclear strike in the hope of victory. . . .

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The Washington Administration's war preparations are accompanied by shameless anti-Soviet hysteria. Discarding all decency, top U.S. officials are slandering the USSR, its people and policy, and the socialist way of life. Lies, disinformation, juggling with facts, and provocations are being brought into play. It is with the aid of such methods that Washington figures, heating up the international situation, are counting on ensuring the unobstructed implementation of their course aimed at an unrestrained arms race. This policy on the part of the White House leaders does not consist solely of emotions or rhetoric. It is a consciously and coldly and deliberately implemented long-term strategy aimed at broadening confrontation and thus increasing the danger of war.

Andropov, statement (*Pravda,* 25 Nov 83)

The leadership of the Soviet Union has already apprised Soviet people and other peoples of its assessment of the present U.S. Administration's militarist course and warned the U.S. Government and the Western countries which are in agreement with it about the dangerous consequences of that course. . . .

The Soviet leadership appeals to the leaders of the United States and of the states of West Europe to weigh up once again all the consequences with which the implementation of the plans for the deployment of the new U.S. missiles in Europe threatens their own peoples and all mankind.

We are already living, even now, in a peace that is too fragile. Responsible statesmen must therefore evaluate what is taking place and make a rational decision. Only human reason can and must safeguard mankind from the awesome danger. We call upon those who are nudging the world along the path of an ever more dangerous arms race to renounce the unrealizable calculations of achieving military superiority by such a path with the aim of dictating their will to other peoples and states.

Gromyko, speech at Conference on Disarmament in Europe (*Pravda,* 19 Jan 84)

Instead of conducting talks and displaying a desire to work for accord, the U.S. Administration has chosen a course of breaking the existing alignment of forces. . . .

The incumbent U.S. Administration is an administration thinking in categories of war and acting accordingly. . . .

What is needed is deeds and not verbal equilibristics, the resort to which has been made particularly often in Washington lately. They clearly are a sign of short-term considerations, and people already know sufficiently well the worth of such tricks. No matter how hard one tries to lie—be it a crude lie or a virtuoso one—this will change nothing in the actual state of affairs. What is needed is a turn of substance in policy—from the policy of militarism and aggression to a policy of peace and international cooperation.

Andropov, interview (*Pravda,* 25 Jan 84)

Interstate relations have found themselves in an atmosphere of dangerous tension. The leaders of the United States, the U.S. Administration, bear full responsibility for this turn of events. . . .

So, one may ask, why is the present situation in the world being deliberately distorted in the statements of American leaders? First of all to try to dispel the concern of the peoples, which has been mounting with every day, over Washington's militaristic policy and to undercut the growing resistance to this policy. . . .

There is no need to convince us of the usefulness and expedience of dialogue. This is our policy. But the dialogue should be conducted on an equal footing and not from a position of strength, as it is proposed by Ronald Reagan. The dialogue should not be conducted for the sake of dialogue. It should be directed at the attainment of concrete accords. It should be conducted honestly and no attempts should be made to use it for selfish aims.

The American leadership, as all signs indicate, has not given up its intentions to conduct talks with us from positions of strength, from positions of threats and pressure.

General Secretary Konstantin **Chernenko,** Central Committee plenum speech (*Pravda,* 14 Feb 84)

Nowadays, in the age of nuclear weapons and super-accurate missiles, people need [peaceful coexistence] as never before. Deplorably, some

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leaders of the capitalist countries, to all appearances, do not clearly realize, or do not wish to realize that.

We can very well see the threat created today to humankind by the reckless, adventurist actions of imperialism's aggressive forces—and we speak up about it, drawing to that danger the attention of the peoples of the whole earth. We need no military superiority. We do not intend to dictate our will to others. But we will not permit the military equilibrium that has been achieved to be upset. And let nobody have even the slightest doubt about that: We will further see to it that our country's defense capacity be strengthened, that we should have enough means to cool the hot heads of militant adventurists.

Gromyko, speech delivered at Andropov's funeral (*Pravda,* 15 Feb 84)

Our country has put forward a series of major initiatives of principled importance. Their aim is to strengthen peace. For this it is necessary first and foremost that the attempts to tip the existing military-strategic equilibrium be renounced, that the nuclear arms buildup be stopped and that efforts be made to limit and reduce these weapons. Those who are pursuing a policy of militarism, the mad arms race, and interference in the internal affairs of other countries should renounce this policy and substitute for it a policy of peace and cooperation.

Ustinov, article for Armed Forces Day (*Pravda,* 23 Feb 84)

Mankind's development along the path of democracy and socialism does not suit the most reactionary imperialist circles. They are deliberately exacerbating the international situation. The American imperialists in the grip of class hatred have proclaimed the Soviet Union to be "the focus of evil" and, ignoring the lessons of history, have declared a "crusade" against the USSR and world socialism. In practice the United States is today playing the role of chief organizer of the imperialist policy of aggression. All Washington's actions in the political, military, economic, and ideological fields are subordinated to the course aimed at establishing world domination and primarily at achieving military superiority over the USSR and the other Warsaw Pact countries. To this end the United States has unleashed an unrestrained arms race and is commissioning more and more new systems of nuclear and conventional weapons, spending enormous sums on this. . . .

Disregarding generally accepted norms of international law, the U.S. Administration is declaring whole regions of the globe to be "zones of U.S. security" and flouting the sovereignty and independence of other states' peoples. The United States' naked aggression against Grenada, undeclared wars against Lebanon and Nicaragua, overt support for reactionary dictatorial regimes in Central and South America, Africa, and Asia, and the campaign of threats against socialist Cuba will go down as pages of shame in U.S. history. . . .

In an attempt to dull the vigilance of peoples alarmed by the U.S. Administration's militarist course its official representatives have begun to adopt the garb of "peacemakers." But the peoples cannot be deceived. They can see increasingly clearly that the present U.S. leaders' words are at variance with their actions. They are continuing to push mankind toward a nuclear catastrophe.

Gromyko, election speech (*Sovetskaya Belorussiya,* 28 Feb 84)

The world situation remains complex, sometimes tense. The source of the tension is aggressive imperialist circles' adventurist actions. The present U.S. Administration has set itself the aim of disrupting in the United States' favor the existing military-strategic equilibrium, achieving for the United States dominant positions in the world and by relying on force, dictating its will to others. It is trying to climb to the top of the world and issue commands to everyone from there.

The policy of the senseless arms race and flagrant pressure, including the use of armed force against sovereign states, is aimed at achieving these aims. This aggressive political course is shaking the foundations of peace.

The already enormous arsenals of nuclear weapons which the NATO bloc possesses in Europe are no longer enough for Washington politicians. They have decided to increase them.

The danger of war has increased substantially as a result of the deployment of new U.S. nuclear weapons in West Europe. These actions destroyed the Geneva talks aimed at limiting and substantially reducing nuclear arms. . . .

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For some time now allegations have circulated to the effect that nothing special is happening in the international situation, that the world has become more secure with the U.S. missiles in Europe. The aim of this deliberate distortion of reality is obvious—to lull the vigilance of the European and world public.

All indications are that not the least role here is played by considerations dictated by the election campaign in the United States. The candidate from the Republican Party now in power would very much like to look respectable in the eyes of public opinion. Otherwise, who knows, the electorate may vote for the other party's candidate. . . .

It is not our choice that the state of Soviet-American relations is characterized by tension. None other than the present American Administration has worsened and exacerbated them by its actions.

This Administration has done considerable work to upset and, what is more, destroy what its predecessors did. It has worked, if I can put it this way, with a big stick, striking out now at one and now at another agreement. In fact, little remains of what was done earlier by both sides—the Soviet Union and the United States—in their common interests.

If prizes were given for this destructive work, or undermining agreements aimed at strengthening the cause of peace, then of course the present Washington Administration could with reason claim the prize.

Of course, it is easier to destroy and easier to overturn agreements which were achieved by others. No special effort is required for this. All that is needed is a sizable dose of recklessness and irresponsibility.

In Washington today it is possible to hear even at an official level statements in favor of improving relations between the USSR and the United States. But it is hard to trust these statements. The U.S. Administration has repeatedly demonstrated how cheaply it values statements of this sort.

Of course, I would like to hope that the recent statements will not be empty talk and that they are not a sop to the election situation. Of course, we will judge whether the United States has serious intentions by its practical actions.

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Ustinov, election speech (*Moskovskaya Pravda,* 29 Feb 84)

> The Soviet people and all peace-loving forces of the planet are deeply concerned over the complication of the world situation. The cause of this is the aggressive, imperialist policy of the United States. The United States is unleashing armed conflicts in different parts of the planet. Imperialism is striving to liquidate the national liberation and democratic movements and is interfering openly in the internal affairs of sovereign states by using armed force, provocations, terror, and subversion.
>
> The United States has launched an unprecedented arms race and is spending fabulous amounts of money on it. . . .
>
> The deployment of the new U.S. first-strike nuclear missiles (Pershing II and cruise missiles) in West European countries creates particular alarm among the world public. These actions by U.S. and NATO leaders have posed an additional threat to the security of the USSR and its allies and have made it impossible to continue the Geneva talks on the limitation of nuclear arms in Europe.
>
> The Washington Administration is trying to claim that security in Europe has supposedly become stronger as a result of the deployment of these missiles. This is a blatant lie. The purpose of such claims is to distract the world public's attention from the dangerous consequences of the White House's adventurous course.
>
> Nor do the U.S. Administration's assertions that the new arms are being deployed because the United States lags behind the USSR in that sphere correspond with the real state of affairs. They do not correspond with reality in the slightest. Approximate parity in the military-strategic sphere exists between the USSR and the United States.

Chernenko, election speech (*Pravda,* 3 Mar 84)

> The past few years have seen a dramatic intensification of the policy of the more aggressive forces of U.S. imperialism, a policy of blatant militarism, claims to world dominance, resistance to progress, and violations of the rights and freedom of the peoples. The world has seen quite a few examples of the practical application of this policy. These included the invasion of Lebanon, the occupation of Grenada, the undeclared war against Nicaragua, threats to Syria, and finally the turning of

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West Europe into a launching site for U.S. nuclear missiles targeted at the USSR and its allies. . . .

Far from all the leaders of Western countries and influential political parties approve the adventurism of the U.S. Administration. It worries a considerable segment of the U.S. public itself as well. They are realizing ever more clearly there that the intensive militarization and the aggravation of the international situation have not brought nor are going to bring the USA military superiority and political achievements. They only lead everywhere in the world to the escalation of criticism of Washington's belligerent course. . . .

Regrettably, the United States has turned its participation in talks on this subject into a tool of propaganda to camouflage the arms race and cold war policy. We will not participate in this game. The Americans created obstacles to the talks both on "European" and on strategic nuclear weapons by deploying their missiles in Europe. It is the removal of these obstacles (which would also remove the need for measures taken in response) that offers the way to working out a mutually acceptable accord.

The U.S. Administration has lately begun to make peaceable sounding statements, urging us to enter into a "dialogue."

Attention was drawn worldwide to the fact that these statements are in sharp conflict with everything that the present United States Administration has said and, which is the main thing, done and continues doing in its relations with the Soviet Union. Assurances of its good intentions can be taken seriously only if they are substantiated with real actions.

Chernenko, speech at dinner for Ethiopian leader Mengistu (*Pravda,* 30 Mar 84)

In order to camouflage its policy the American Administration is now trying in every way to pass itself off as a "lover of peace." However, everyone can see the real value of such posturing. Recently the Soviet Union expressed readiness to reach agreement with other nuclear powers to jointly recognize norms regulating relations between them which should eventually contribute to the reduction and subsequent liquidation of nuclear armaments. How did the United States respond to this? I must say that no reply has come from Washington to this proposal.

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The value of the lofty phrases about U.S. readiness to work for lessening international tension and to act in a spirit of restraint and nonuse of force or the threat of force can be clearly seen from the example of Nicaragua, against which the American special services and their hirelings are waging an undeclared war. They are committing acts of violence and are killing peaceful civilians. Does Washington really think that its policy of state terrorism and intervention in the affairs of sovereign states will be interpreted as "peacemaking" efforts? It is profoundly erroneous to think so.

Chernenko, *Pravda* interview (9 Apr 84)

[The situation in the world] remains very dangerous. And this is explained by the U.S. Administration's continued gamble on military force, on the attainment of military superiority, on the imposition of its order of things on other peoples. This was confirmed once again by President Reagan's recent speech at Georgetown University.

Even if sometimes peace-loving rhetoric is heard from Washington, it is impossible, however hard one tries, to discern behind it even the slightest signs of readiness to back up these words with practical deeds. . . .

Our contacts with the American side also show that no positive changes have taken place in the position of the United States on these cardinal questions [of arms control].

Those who circulate [the idea that the USSR is waiting for the outcome of the presidential election there] either do not know or, most probably, deliberately distort our policy. It is a principled policy and is not subject to transient vacillations.

Throughout the history of Soviet-American relations we have dealt with various administrations in Washington. In those cases when realism and a responsible approach to relations with the Soviet Union were shown on the part of the U.S. leadership, matters, it can be said, proceeded normally. This had a favorable effect on the general situation in the world as well, but in the absence of such a realistic approach our relations worsened accordingly.

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Statement of the National Olympic Committee of the USSR (TASS, 9 Apr 84)

> U.S. President Reagan submitted to the IOC written guarantees of the U.S. Government's respect for the traditions, rules, and provisions of the Olympic Charter. Facts show, however, that these obligations and guarantees are not respected in a number of major matters. The U.S. Administration is trying to use the Olympic Games on the eve of the elections for its selfish political ends.
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> A large-scale campaign against the Soviet Union's participation in the Olympic Games has been mounted in the USA.... In particular, a coalition called "Ban the Soviets," enjoying the support of the U.S. official services, has been set up. Open threats of physical victimization and provocative actions are made to sportsmen and officials of the USSR and other socialist countries. Slanderous allegations are being made that the participation of a Soviet delegation in the Olympic Games would presumably threaten U.S. security.

Tikhonov, speech to Supreme Soviet (*Pravda,* 13 Apr 84)

> The measures we take to strengthen our defense are a logical response to the reckless attempts by militarist circles in the United States and other NATO countries to upset the military-strategic balance. We state that this will be maintained whatever the conditions. Security—both ours and that of our friends and allies—will remain reliably safeguarded.

Vladimir **Dolgikh,** candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, Lenin anniversary speech (Soviet domestic radio, 20 Apr 84)

> We ... now have to conduct our course in the international arena in a complex and very dangerous situation.
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> The origins of its sharp exacerbation are to be found in the aggressive policy of the imperialist circles of NATO, above all the United States.
>
> Under the flag of the struggle against communism, the present White House Administration is opposing freedom and progress everywhere. It is making open claims to world domination. It is waging an unrestrained arms race that is fraught with the threat of a nuclear conflict. The United States is declaring more and more areas of the world to be in the sphere

of its vital interests. It is fanning hotbeds of war and violence. It is brazenly trampling on the rights of entire peoples. Not confining itself to blackmail and threats and crude interference in the affairs of sovereign states, Washington is also resorting to direct aggression. Suffice it to recall the piratical attack on Grenada, the barbaric actions of the U.S. brass hats in Lebanon, and the incessant acts of state terrorism against Nicaragua, against which an undeclared war is in effect being waged. . . .

In the capitalist countries, representatives of very different sections of the population are jointly participating in a mass antiwar and antimissile movement that is unprecedented in its breadth. The voice of the nonaligned movement is making itself heard ever more loudly and authoritatively in the struggle for peace. Concern at the increase in the danger of war and, sometimes, criticism of Washington's bellicose course are also increasing among state and public figures in the West, both in Europe and in the United States itself. All this shows how deep the roots of detente are. It makes it possible to hope that it will ultimately be possible to redirect the current, dangerous course of events toward the strengthening of peace, limitation of the arms race, and development of international cooperation. . . .

President Konstantin **Chernenko,** speech at dinner for Polish leader Jaruzelski (TASS, 4 May 84)

. . . Those who today are at the helm of government in the United States declare their intention to conduct external affairs from positions of strength. . . .

Unprecedented large-scale programs of the arms race, first and foremost the development and deployment of nuclear weapons, have been put to the service of this imperial course of achieving military superiority and imposing one's writ on other nations.

Having gone ahead with the deployment in West Europe of U.S. missiles aimed at the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, Washington and those in NATO who follow it unconditionally deliberately frustrated the process of the limitation and reduction of nuclear armaments by depriving the talks on both strategic arms and on nuclear arms in Europe of their subject matter.

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And are not the large-scale programs of militarization of outer space aimed at promoting the self-same goals of world domination? They are now discussing these programs in Washington virtually every day and arrogantly, refusing even to enter into talks with the Soviet Union on this problem.

The U.S.A. is speeding up the production, modernization, and stockpiling of chemical weapons, those abominable means of killing people. To camouflage its real stand, it had begun deceitful maneuvers at the Disarmament Conference in Geneva. But if the rhetorical shell of its so-called "new" proposal on the prohibition of chemical weapons is cast off, there is an obvious desire to legalize, under the pretext of verification, U.S. intelligence gathering activity. It is impossible to detect any positive shifts in the U.S. position on this problem.

There is every reason to state that a similar U.S. policy of military buildup is distinctly visible in many other areas of the arms race, whether in nuclear weapons or in armaments referred to as conventional.

All sorts of advertising tricks are being used to cover up the course of conventional buildup. The West's latest proposals at the Vienna talks on the limitation of armaments and armed forces in Central Europe constitute just a new packing for the old position, which has already deadlocked those talks.

In the recent period, mostly after the deployment of new U.S. missiles started in West Europe, appeals for contacts and talks have begun to be issued by Washington and some other Western capitals. However, regrettably, there is nothing concrete behind those appeals. He who could hope that realism and rationality are making their way here at long last would be profoundly deceived, which, perhaps, is precisely what the authors of these appeals would like to happen.

The proposals put forward for discussion bristle with so many provisions and conditions patently unacceptable to the other side as to confirm that these proposals are not meant for serious, businesslike talks. The Soviet Union for its part is prepared for dialogue. But we stand for a dialogue filled with real content. A possibility for the resumption of talks on nuclear armaments can only be opened if the U.S. side removes the obstacles raised by it here and restores the previous situation.

USSR National Olympic Committee statement (TASS, 8 May 84)

> As is known, in its statement of 10 April 1984 the National Olympic Committee of the USSR voiced serious concern over the rude violations by the organizers of the games of the rules of the Olympic Charter and the anti-Soviet campaign launched by the reactionary circles in the United States with the connivance of the official authorities, and asked the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to study the obtaining situation. . . .
>
> Disregarding the opinion of the IOC the United States authorities continue rudely to interfere in affairs belonging exclusively to the competence of the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee. It is known that from the very first days of preparations for the present Olympics the American Administration has set course at using the games for its political aims. Chauvinistic sentiments and an anti-Soviet hysteria are being whipped up in the country. . . .
>
> In these conditions the National Olympic Committee of the USSR is compelled to declare that participation of Soviet sportsmen in the games of the 23d Olympiad in Los Angeles is impossible. To act differently would be tantamount to approving of the anti-Olympian actions of the U.S. authorities and organizers of the games. . . .

Ustinov, article (*Pravda,* 9 May 84)

> Imperialist, reactionary circles are trying to ignore the lessons of the past and are nurturing plans for unleashing new wars and military conflicts. The aggressiveness and adventurist policy are manifested particularly blatantly in the actions of the present U.S. Administration. The United States has proclaimed a "crusade" against socialism in order to abolish it as a sociopolitical force. To this end, Washington has resolved, come what may, to break the military-strategic equilibrium and to achieve military superiority over the USSR and the socialist community. An unprecedentedly large-scale arms buildup has been planned for many years ahead, and nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction are being stockpiled. Washington has embarked on the militarization of space. New first-strike nuclear missile weapons are being deployed on the territory of a number of West European states.

The aggressive U.S. actions are also borne out by the fact that it is thwarting the talks on questions of arms limitation and is refusing to observe, and indeed is even violating, previously concluded agreements.

Marching along the path of preparation for war, the imperialist circles are seeking to conceal and camouflage their aggressive policy by every means. Various "peacemaking" speeches have recently begun to be delivered. Their aim is clear—to mislead the peoples of the world with regard to the true intentions of the extreme reactionary U.S. forces and their stooges.

In an attempt to justify the buildup of military preparations, the United States is using the myth of the "Soviet military threat," which it fabricated itself, and is expatiating on the extreme need to defend its "vital interests" in almost all regions of the world. On these phony pretexts, it is expanding its military presence many thousands of kilometers from its own territory, seeking any opportunity to aggravate international tension, fuel military conflicts, and then, by threatening to use or by using its own armed forces, is trying to channel them to its own predatory imperialist purposes. This is confirmed by the rampaging in Lebanon, the aggression in Grenada, the undeclared war against Nicaragua and Afghanistan, the interference in El Salvador's internal affairs, and the overt threats to Cuba and Syria. Terror and subversive activity against other states have become a component of the present U.S. Administration's foreign policy.

The reckless, adventurist actions of imperialist reaction pose a threat to all mankind. They carry within them the danger that world war and nuclear catastrophe will be unleashed.

Chernenko, reply to letter from U.S. scientists on weapons in space (*Pravda,* 20 May 84)

Some people . . . would like to turn space into a bridgehead of aggression and war. It is clear from U.S. announcements that it plans to deploy antimissile weapons in space, give scope to the operation of various sorts of antisatellite systems, and deploy super-new types of weapons designed for dealing strikes against targets on land, in the air, and at sea.

The Soviet Union is a firm opponent of competition in the race of any kind of armaments, including space weapons.

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At the same time it should be understood that in the face of a threat from space the Soviet Union will be forced to take measures in order to guarantee its security reliably. Calculations that it is possible to lay the road to military superiority through space are built on illusions. However, they do not want to give up such calculations and this is fraught with extremely dangerous consequences. To prevent such a train of events, before it is too late, is the direct duty of responsible state figures, scientists, of all who are really concerned for the future of mankind.

The Soviet Union again confirms that it is ready to make maximum efforts to see that sinister plans for transferring the arms race into space do not become reality. It is our conviction that a policy aimed at safely protecting space from the deployment of weapons should be the compulsory norm of conduct of states, a universally recognized international obligation.

We are resolutely against the development of large-scale antimissile defense systems, which cannot be regarded otherwise than as calculated for the unpunished implementation of nuclear aggression. There is a Soviet-American treaty on antimissile defense, without time-limit, banning the creation of such systems. It must be strictly observed. The solemn renunciation of the very idea of the deployment in space of antimissile systems would meet the spirit and letter of this treaty and the task of ensuring a peaceful status of outer space in the interests of all mankind. Such a step would be interpreted everywhere in the world as a manifestation of genuine concern for the peaceful future of mankind.

The matter of banning antisatellite weapons is also urgent. Deployment of such weapons would result in sharp destabilization of the situation, to an increased threat of sudden attack, and would undermine the efforts for ensuring trust between nuclear states.

Gromyko, speech at luncheon for West German Foreign Minister Genscher (TASS, 21 May 84)

The United States Administration is absolutely clearly banking on confrontation and arbitrariness in international relations, on breaking up in its favor the existing military equilibrium.

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Now it appears that in the West, too, many have come to realize that the torpedoing of the talks on nuclear arms in Geneva was programmed in advance. This was done by those who were bent on one thing—to deploy at all cost in NATO West European countries their first-strike nuclear missiles against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. That is how they exploded the talks. They tried to feign grief at this but nothing came out of it. Their pretense is too obvious.

They try to cover up their actions with talk like the end of the world has not come and a "new glacial period" has not set in. But this is a sham, artificial optimism. Is it not clear that the appearance in Europe of new American missiles has drastically aggravated the nuclear threat. And this threat continues to grow with every new missile that is being deployed, including on the territory of the FRG.

Chernenko, remarks to West German Foreign Minister Genscher (Soviet domestic radio, 22 May 84)

During the talk, Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko reaffirmed the invariability of the USSR's course for guaranteeing peace, curbing the arms race, and averting a nuclear catastrophe. He drew attention to the serious growth of the danger of war, especially following the emergence in West Europe—including the territory of the FRG—of new U.S. first-strike missiles. In connection with this, it was stressed that if the United States and NATO continue to step up the nuclear threat, adequate countermeasures will steadfastly be implemented by the Soviet Union and its allies. They will not permit any military superiority over themselves. However, building up the military confrontation is not of our choosing.

The USSR is in favor of radical limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons in accordance with the principle of equality and identical security. . . .

It is the Soviet Union that advocates meaningful dialogue and puts forward specific proposals aimed at reaching practical agreements. The U.S. Administration is aware of the Soviet proposals. The USSR proposes to the United States, in particular, that negotiations should be started on preventing the militarization of space, and that the negotiations on a total and universal ban of nuclear weapons tests should be resumed, with the participation of Britain.

We have called upon the United States to bring into force, finally, the Soviet-U.S. treaties of 1974 and 1976 on limiting underground nuclear explosions. The USSR also persistently raises the question of a mutual freeze on nuclear arsenals. A negative answer is invariably given to all these proposals by the American side. In other words, Washington is not interested in negotiating. The usefulness of dialogue is discussed there only in general terms, nothing more.

Editorial article on U.S. chemical weapons convention proposal (*Pravda,* 27 May 84)

The Soviet Union has . . . made considerable efforts to secure progress in resolving the tasks of banning chemical weapons within the framework of multilateral forums—the United Nations and the Geneva Disarmament Committee. The document "Fundamental Provisions of a Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Chemical Weapons and Their Destruction" submitted by the Soviet Union in the summer of 1982 took account of the viewpoints of many other states. This document, which received a broad positive assessment, provided an opportunity to achieve a speedy mutually acceptable accord on banning chemical weapons and establishing reliable verification of its observance. In February this year the Soviet Union made yet another important step, proposing the establishment of permanent monitoring of the process of the destruction of chemical weapons.

The United States has a different approach. Having made extensive use of toxins in the Vietnam war, the United States continues even today to allocate this means of mass destruction an important place in its aggressive military plans. It took the United States over 50 years to accede to the Geneva protocol. While being compelled to participate in multilateral talks on banning chemical weapons, it nevertheless dodges the reaching of an accord in every way, often retreats from its own positions, and complicates the solution of already complex questions. . . .

For several months extensively publicized statements were made in the U.S. capital that the United States would be submitting "constructive proposals" on banning chemical weapons to the Geneva Disarmament Conference. But when the United States presented its much-publicized draft convention it immediately became clear how far removed it was from promoting the achievement of an accord. Moreover, any unprejudiced person familiarizing himself with the American draft convention is

left in no doubt that it is compiled in such a way as to make it deliberately unacceptable to all who are interested in seeing that there is no room on earth for chemical weapons.

This applies primarily to the verification provisions contained in the American draft. The verification system it envisages would mean in practice free access for verification officials to any chemical enterprises irrespective of whether they have anything to do with the production or storage of chemical weapons.

Gromyko, speech during visit by Australian Foreign Minister Hayden (TASS, 29 May 84)

Peoples of the Soviet Union and Australia, who fought against the common enemy in the years of World War II, want to live in peace, and peace is the main achievement of mankind. Our meeting gives us an opportunity to compare the positions of the Soviet Union and Australia on international problems, to exchange views on possible ways of alleviating the dangerous tension existing now in the world. To this we are prompted by all mankind's worry for its future, for its very existence which has never before been subjected to such a serious threat.

What are the reasons for this situation? They lie in the imperial, hegemonist course of the USA in world affairs, its stake on the acquisition of military superiority. That is the policy proclaimed in Washington, that is the policy made there. All over the world more and more people whose convictions are often different from ours come to realize where the danger of war has built its nest, from where it threatens peace. In these circumstances the Soviet Union considers it to be its duty to take all necessary response measures of a defensive nature. No more than that but no less either.

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Midlevel and Routine Media Commentary

Oleg **Anichkin,** CPSU Central Committee official (Soviet domestic radio, 14 Nov 80)

> Reagan is in favor of stepping up American military might and the achievement of U.S. military supremacy. . . .
>
> At the same time his advisers direct attention to such points. The nearer Reagan has approached the White House, the more moderate have been his enunciations. One can suppose that this process will continue.

Georgiy **Arbatov,** director of the USA and Canada Institute (Soviet television, 29 Nov 80)

> It has become clear in any case that both Reagan and many in his entourage have come to some serious conclusions during the course of this campaign. The shift to the center has begun. This is generally typical of U.S. political life. Whichever candidate stands away from the center will shift. If he is left of center, he will drift to the right. If he is right of center, he will drift slightly to the left remaining at some distance, but even so will approach the center. Reagan is a rather experienced man in this respect. I would like to say that I have heard and read in the foreign press that as a film actor he is a man without much experience. However, it is difficult to judge from the past. There were excellent presidents who were former loggers. . . .
>
> The fact itself that moderate statements are made seems important to me, because quite a few obstacles were left over from the election campaign. This certainly does not mean that we will be rancorous and will not let anything pass, including what was said in the heat of the election struggle. We have already said publicly that we will not act like that. However, even words are deeds to a certain extent at present, because they influence atmosphere and climate. Atmosphere and climate are rather important in politics and any beginnings depend on them.

Aleksandr **Bovin,** *Izvestiya* political observer and reputed adviser to Presidents Brezhnev and Andropov (Soviet domestic radio, 7 Dec 80)

> Reagan, of course, realizes that he cannot get away from continuing talks with the Soviet Union. But, by all accounts, it seems to me, in general,

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that a harder line U.S. policy is at hand, particularly where it concerns, for example, the problems of disarmament and military detente. It seems to me that soon we will have to confront a harder line of this kind and preparations for this should be made, although in general I do not exclude the possibility that after a while everything may return to the beaten track, as we say.

Vitaliy **Kobysh,** CPSU Central Committee official (*Literaturnaya Gazeta,* 1 Jan 81)

Reagan, with his reputation for being a politician belonging to the extreme right wing of the Republican Party, has formed his cabinet from people of basically moderate views. . . .

When "taking over," every new administration strives to show that it is different from the previous one and that its policy will meet the country's interests to a greater degree. Statements by Reagan and some of his closest assistants indicate that they consider the status to which the Carter-Brzezinski administration has reduced Soviet-U.S. relations to be abnormal and that they see the normalization of these relations as the next U.S. Government's foremost priority. At the same time they stress that they will pursue a "tough policy"; in other words, they will act from a "position of strength." We will see how all this will appear in practice.

TASS report on President Reagan's 29 January press conference (*Pravda,* 31 Jan 81)

Referring to the Soviet Union's policy, the U.S. President permitted a number of premeditated distortions in his assessment of the aims and character of the USSR's international activities. He said, in particular, that up to now detente has been a one-way street which the Soviet Union has used for the achievement of its own aims, and that detente is more favorable to the Soviet Union than to the United States. . . .

In an unworthy manner Reagan went on to talk about some sort of insidiousness in the Soviet Union's policy which allegedly aims to establish a worldwide socialist or communist state. . . .

Concerning one of the important problems, the SALT II treaty, the President committed obvious distortions of the treaty's essence.

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Anichkin (Soviet domestic radio, 6 Feb 81)

> On the whole President Reagan [at his press conference on 29 January] said nothing new in comparison with what he said during the election campaign. He attributed to the Soviet Union designs to establish world domination and to set up a worldwide socialist or communist state. Then he declared that the Soviet Union is using detente for its own ends and has allegedly turned it into a one-way street. All of this is untrue. . . .
>
> It is one thing when minor politicians are talking in this spirit; it is another when such words are being pronounced by the President. After all, it is a question of the deliberate distortion of Soviet policy. . . .
>
> In the words of *The Washington Post,* Reagan had adopted a tone which is very strikingly different from the Republican and Democratic administrations of the 60's and 70's. The President, the same newspaper writes, spoke of the Soviet Union in terms that recall the most difficult times of the cold war.

"I. **Aleksandrov,**" pseudonym used in officially inspired articles (*Pravda,* 25 Mar 81)

> Regretfully, from their very first public statements and practical steps the leaders of the new U.S. Government appear to be bent not on rectifying but on multiplying the errors of the previous administration, on facilitating not a lessening of international tension but its growth. . . .
>
> The leaders of the Washington Administration and some hawkish lawmakers are now engaged in a competition of belligerent phraseology, are trying to outdo one another by the hugeness of military programs.

Bovin (Soviet television, 29 Mar 81)

> I now think that the essential outlines of the new foreign policy course, of Reagan's foreign policy, have now become sufficiently visible. It is a harsh, conservative, power policy, it is a policy whose cornerstone comprises extremely primitive anticommunist concepts. In general the views of Reagan and his supporters on world developments are extremely simple: Anything they do not like, anything that is contrary to the interests of imperialism, they say is all the result of the insidious actions of the Soviet Union. From this primitive package a simple conclusion is

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drawn: The time for playing at detente is over, it is necessary to rearm immediately, it is necessary to strive for military strategic superiority over the Soviet Union, and on this basis impose the will of America the Great on the whole world.

Well, this is approximately the philosophy. Let us now examine the practice. We all know that during the past decade, let us say, despite all the difficulties and complexities, between the Soviet Union and the United States there became established a fairly well-developed structure of mutual relations which was formulated in dozens of different agreements. Now the new Administration is beginning to break up this structure and deal a mean blow to its foundation, the process of strategic arms limitation.

Arbatov (*Pravda,* 4 May 81)

Most observers agree that, even by late April, no in any way coherent U.S. foreign policy has emerged—at any rate when it comes to actions. There have been plenty of words and rhetoric—so much that the Administration itself has more than once had to backpedal. But can words and rhetoric be regarded as policy?

They probably can be, in some respects.

First of all, they can shed light on political views and intentions. In this light the "noises" from Washington are almost unambiguous: They indicate a desire to accelerate the arms race in every possible way and to secure military superiority, a wish to switch relations with the USSR and the other socialist countries onto the road of confrontation and power struggle, to rule according to whim the fate of the countries that have liberated themselves from colonialism, to dictate unceremoniously to the allies. The very fact that the people who have come to power in the United States talk at length and insistently of these desires and intentions cannot be left out of account. The fact must be viewed as an objective reality. But another fact remains no less a reality—the fact that intentions and wishes alone are not enough to constitute a policy. Politics has been and will remain the art of the possible. And the possibilities, the realities of the modern world certainly do not leave a great deal of room for the imperial ambitions which people in Washington are today going on about with new force.

The question whether the new U.S. Administration has formulated its foreign policy should be left open, I think. Some may hope that it has not been formulated yet, others may think differently. It is clear, however, that the continuation of the existing situation would itself pose grave dangers, particularly the attempts to transform bombastic propaganda slogans into practical policy premises. All this is dangerous not only for other countries but also for the United States itself and for its national interests, which need more than ever before a realistic, sober analysis.

Leonid **Zamyatin,** chief of the CPSU Central Committee International Information Department (Soviet television, 16 May 81)

On many questions the foreign policy concept of the new Reagan Administration has already been formulated. . . .

On the basis of speeches, although at times you could say they are quite saturated with anti-Soviet rhetoric, and on the basis of documents which have already been published, it can be definitely concluded that the new U.S. Administration has chosen a sharp whipping up of the arms race as its course. The new Administration considers that opposition to the Soviet Union—as its leaders, the leaders of the United States, say—in the economic, political, and other fields is its main foreign policy concept. Besides, they maintain that this opposition must be on a global scale.

Reagan recently said: I do not wish to live in a world where the Soviet Union is first. What does this mean? If these words of Reagan's are translated into another language—into the language of politics from everyday language—this means that the United States has chosen military supremacy over the Soviet Union as its political concept; that it is rejecting the policy of peaceful coexistence, the policy of detente; and that it is making a stake on sharply raising the military presence of the United States in various parts of the world, including along the perimeter of Soviet borders. It is also attempting, by increasing its military potential, to put pressure on the Soviet Union.

Arbatov (Soviet television, 31 Oct 81)

If we are to speak about American policy, then of course we can say that the most extremist views have prevailed in the question of military spending, and generally in American behavior in the international arena. Well, of course, many say that maybe these people bark more than they

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bite. It is still difficult and too early to judge. But they do in fact bark a lot, and a lot of militaristic talk can be heard coming from Washington every day. This is not just talk. There are military appropriation decisions on military programs, certain U.S. positions and actions on various continents, and interference into the affairs of a number of countries—all of this has become a reality. Therefore, we are undoubtedly seeing a period which gives cause to remember the cold war and to suspect that quite a lot has been done to sweep aside all the positive things that were accumulated at the expense of great labor in international relations and thus a big step has been taken toward a cold war. . . .

So things in the economy are not turning out quite the way the President figured, and to a certain extent this can be a limiting factor for many far-reaching American plans. . . .

All of these realities are just beginning to appear—after all this government has not been in power very long—and these political and social mechanisms, which demand some kind of accommodation on the part of the Administration, have just been set in motion.

Of course, there are people there who . . . it is difficult to imagine that they can reform. But overall—and we have seen this in history more than once—even the most conservative politicians have been sufficiently pragmatic in understanding what can be done and what cannot be done. . . .

Even in America, they are beginning to somehow understand that the question is becoming extremely acute, that some kind of reaction to it is necessary, that in Europe and the world as a whole—and even in the United States, as a matter of fact—some sentiments are appearing.

Bovin (Soviet domestic radio, 29 Nov 81)

In fact, what did this Reagan speech of 18 November mean? Does it, to some degree . . . signify a reassessment of the U.S. position, or . . . is it an attempt to gain a political alibi with respect to the pressures being exerted by America's allies in Europe? As for which of these elements was more evident in the speech, this is an open question both for us and for Europe. We will find out when the talks begin.

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Nikolay **Shishlin,** CPSU Central Committee official (Soviet television, 5 Dec 81)

> Regarding the fact of an alteration in the U.S. foreign policy course taking place, an alteration in the U.S. foreign policy course beginning to become perceptible—this is true. . . . It seems that in this respect in particular we are right in talking neither of a cosmetic operation nor of a break with past policies, but rather of a certain alteration in course, a certain adaptation of American policies to reality.

Bovin (Soviet domestic radio, 20 Dec 81)

> One of the main problems for Europe at the moment is the problem of the so-called Eurostrategic weapons. . . . One can view these [INF] talks in different ways. On the one hand, the talks have a specific object—medium-range weapons. But their principal significance is the fact that after a whole year of agitation and alarm and hysterical kinds of statements by Washington, generally speaking things there are quietly beginning to stabilize.

TASS report on U.S. sanctions after the imposition of martial law in Poland (*Pravda,* 30 Dec 81)

> The U.S. Administration has taken a provocative step the purpose of which is to poison the international climate even more, to exacerbate tensions, to worsen confrontation and toughen the militarist foreign policy course. . . .
>
> President R. Reagan has published a statement, announcing the introduction of a whole number of unilateral discriminatory measures with regard to the Soviet Union, ranging from a suspension of Aeroflot service to the USA to a review of bilateral Soviet-U.S. agreements in trade and scientific-technical cooperation, agreements signed by the Government of the United States.
>
> To justify this crude diktat with regard to a sovereign state unprecedented and absolutely inadmissible in universally accepted international practice, the head of the U.S. Administration has resorted to direct forgery and lies, maintaining that the Soviet Union allegedly "interfered" in Polish affairs and bears "direct responsibility" for the situation in Poland.

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Arbatov (*Pravda,* 1 Jan 82)

> "Seeking a crisis" is precisely how Washington's stance regarding Poland can be described. . . . Attempts are being made to "internationalize" the crisis and to exploit the events to still further exacerbate the international situation and relations with the USSR in particular.
>
> The question naturally arises of the true motives and true aims of the campaign unleashed by the United States over the events in Poland. . . .
>
> I want immediately to stipulate that in mentioning the present leaders, I mean not only the President and his most influential ministers but also a broader stratum of the Washington bureaucracy, above all the stratum comprising the deputy and assistant cabinet members, the President's chief advisers and entourage, the heads of a number of departments, and so forth. . . . And with the utmost responsibility I would venture to claim that as a group, this "second echelon" is in considerable part composed of extremists representing the far right wing, extreme militarist flank of the U.S. ruling class. . . . A whole series of conclusions can be derived from all that is known of these people. One is that they are people who rose to prominence on a wave of crisis and feel like fish out of water outside a crisis. . . .
>
> A certain circle of American figures now needs a crisis as a condition of its political success, even political survival. And it is apparently prepared to go to any lengths for the sake of that.

Aleksandr **Kaverznev,** Soviet television political observer (Hungarian domestic radio, 18 Feb 82)

> We are of the opinion that the coming years will be difficult. In the beginning, when the Reagan Administration came to power in the United States, we had certain hopes that the President would not implement the policy he announced during his election campaign. We hoped that life would oblige him to see many things in a different way. But now we are forced to conclude that for the entire duration of the Reagan Administration we can hardly expect a different U.S. policy.

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Shishlin (Soviet domestic radio, 11 Apr 82)

> Reagan, it must be said, has garnished these rather bellicose statements with the somewhat curious assertion that he, the President of the United States, is willing to meet Leonid Ilich Brezhnev in the summer at the second special session of the UN General Assembly on disarmament. And there is a rather strange contradiction here. Actually, the idea of a summit meeting—a Soviet-American summit meeting—was proposed over one year ago from the platform of the 26th party congress. In that time, the Soviet Union has covered a considerable part of the distance toward finding ground for mutually acceptable solutions in the interests of improving Soviet-American relations. We saw nothing of the kind from the American side. And now into the midst of these rather definite statements, which can only be called militaristic, he inserts the claim that he is ready for a Soviet-American summit meeting.

Ernst **Genri,** prominent journalist (*Literaturnaya Gazeta,* 14 Jul 82)

> Consequently, has the failure of Hitler's blitzkrieg against the USSR taught the U.S. militarists nothing? By all accounts, this is exactly the case and must be taken into account. It is not hard to understand what is guiding the Pentagon's thinkers.
>
> They are not taking the failure of the Hitlerite adventure into account simply because there has been a revolution in military hardware since then. It is now proposed to deliver a surprise strike against the USSR not by means of tanks and conventional aircraft, but by nuclear missiles and other "super weapons" which can fly thousands of kilometers in a few minutes.

Arbatov (*Pravda,* 16 Jul 82)

> U.S. policy would be good to the extent to which it is not allowed to be bad, safe (not only for us but also for America itself and its allies) to the extent to which it is not allowed to become dangerous. It will not be allowed to evolve in those directions by economic and political realities, by the policies of other countries, by the Americans' common sense and by the striving of the peoples for self-preservation. I hope that these factors will be enough for the continued political processes to bolster the realistic principles and to return American policy to an understanding of not only the existing contradictions but also of very serious and vitally important

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common interests, the interests of peace and survival, which require not only talks but also agreements as well as the overall improvement of relations between the two countries. What if this does not come to pass? I personally would find solace in the thought that a time will come and it will be possible to say: It is not with this Administration that history began, and it is not with it that it has ended.

Vadim **Zagladin,** first deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee International Department (Czechoslovak domestic radio, 30 Jul 82)

Reagan and his Administration—and I deliberately do not say the United States since there are various internal groupings—Reagan and his Administration represent that part of the capitalist world of monopoly capital, which is convinced that the solution of questions of the future, of problems of mutual relations between the two systems, can be achieved only by means of force. Circles currently in the leadership of a substantial part of European countries take a completely different viewpoint. It is not easy for them but they give preference to a peaceful development of relations and to solving questions by competition in a peaceful atmosphere. . . .

Extreme views exist; there are people who say that the situation is so complex and difficult that there is no way out, that only the worst can be expected, that we are on the very threshold of war. That of course is an extreme view and is incorrect because there are a number of positive factors; the head-on struggle and existing equilibrium of forces is a guarantee that we can advance and not allow imperialism to realize its plans.

On the other hand there are some people who say that there have been all kinds of crises; this will pass, too. We are strong; we have the strength of the Soviet Union, the strength of the socialist countries; it will all pass of its own accord. It will not pass of its own accord; of course that, too, is incorrect.

Yes, without doubt we are capable of defending ourselves, of rebuffing the imperialist wave, but that depends on us, on the situation of our countries and in our countries, on the unity of our countries and their joint activity in the international arena.

Bovin (*Izvestiya,* 6 Aug 82)

> In general it is hard to deal with the Americans now. They dissemble, twist and turn, say one thing and do another. They have many ambitions and a great deal of self-esteem. They have little responsibility. But what can you do? We do not choose our partners, they are given us by destiny, by history. We have to talk and negotiate with them although, to be frank, I do not believe that any serious agreement can be reached with the Americans as long as Reagan is in the White House.

Vladimir **Ostrogorskiy,** commentator (Moscow radio in German, 22 Aug 82)

> If Reagan knew history better and made its lessons his own, he would not harbor any illusions, since there were people before him who, like Hitler, had a special liking for using the miraculous weapon of inflammatory propaganda on the air. It is typical for aspirants to world domination to rely on miraculous weapons. It is, however, well known how they usually have ended.

Bovin (*Izvestiya,* 5 Nov 82)

> Now let us allow the skeptic to have his say. He is bound to ask: Are we not overestimating our own strength? Can international security and international cooperation seriously be expected when the world is divided into opposing sociopolitical systems? Is the "Reagan phenomenon" an accident? The questions are not farfetched. The difficulties are indeed huge. Militarism and aggressiveness are inherent in imperialism. We do not choose our partners; fate, history hands them to us.
>
> All that is true. Nonetheless, the hope is realistic. The hope is realistic because the forces advocating that detente get a "second wind" represent a real, weighty factor in world politics. The Soviet Union is a mighty power. People across the Atlantic cannot help but take this into account—whatever team is assembled in the White House, it is still not a suicide team. The socialist community and the communist and workers' parties are with us. Dozens of nonaligned states advocate detente and disarmament and oppose the division of the world into military-political blocs. The antinuclear, antiwar movement is gaining unprecedented scope and its social and political spectrum is becoming increasingly broad. . . .

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I repeat, we would like to reach agreement, even with Reagan. What if this does not happen? We will wait.

Shishlin (Soviet domestic radio, 21 Nov 82)

Actions for the benefit of peace would carry a lot more weight than conciliatory words. If we were to see a real shift in the American position at the talks that are being held on strategic armaments, on European armaments, on conventional armaments in Central Europe—that would surely be more substantial than the words spoken by the American statesmen. So the situation remains pretty difficult. . . .

Pravda editorial (*Pravda,* 21 Nov 82)

Judging by international reactions, Andropov's meetings with foreign delegations gave new impetus to people's hopes for the maintenance and development of the detente process. The Soviet Union is always ready for honest, equal, and mutually advantageous cooperation with any state which wishes it, particularly with the United States. Normal, or better still, friendly Soviet-American relations would accord with the interests of both peoples and of world peace.

Gennadiy **Gerasimov,** Novosti deputy chairman (Soviet television, 28 Nov 82)

The events of the last weeks in Moscow, by the very nature of things, have caused a certain pause in international relations. The world has been watching Moscow to see what will happen and, in its turn, Moscow has been watching the world attentively, too. American Senator Robert Dole, a prominent figure in the Republican Party—Reagan's party—has been in Moscow during these days. He stated that he observes an advancement by the Reagan Administration toward a new beginning—that is how he expressed himself. Some observers have begun cautiously seeking signs of a thaw, even a weak one, in American-Soviet relations.

Arbatov, speech to U.S. trade delegation (*Literaturnaya Gazeta,* 8 Dec 82)

In the last few days many people's hopes regarding the prospects of Soviet-American relations have revived. The dramatic nature of the moment, when events are prompting reflection on the most serious problems perturbing people, may even have helped in a way. . . .

Something seems to be beginning to change for the better. Something has happened and something positive too. I think it is a good thing that ASTEC has met. It seems to me that it is an important event and shows that many Americans (and Soviet people, too, of course) understand the fundamental interests of their countries and "gas for pipes" deal. We assessed positively the American leaders' expression of condolences on the death of Leonid Ilich Brezhnev and the fact that the U.S. President personally visited the Soviet Embassy and sent the U.S. vice president and secretary of state to Moscow. We have carefully followed the words spoken in this connection, and the positive [*khoroshiye*] words we have greeted positively.

But if I were asked if I could assess these facts as evidence of the abandonment by the United States of a policy that in our country—I must be frank with you—is seen as a policy of cold war and as a course of a headlong arms race and of unbounded—mortal, as the saying goes—enmity? [sentence as published] Or is what has happened in the last few days merely a maneuver aimed at reassuring the public at large and the allies so that they do not prevent this policy of total enmity from being pursued in the future? If I were asked those questions, I would honestly say that as yet I have no answer.

Bovin (Soviet television, 30 Dec 82)

It is difficult to escape the impression that the opponents of detente in Washington are gradually beginning to give ground. I would even risk making the following conclusion: The isolation of Reagan and his policy is growing both within the United States and outside it. Evidently, we can assume that this will force the White House to intensify its maneuvering. But at the moment it is difficult to say whether this will affect the essence of the foreign policy course or only its form, as has already been the case.

Commentators Aleksandr **Korshunov** and Oleg **Blinov** (Soviet domestic radio, 12 Jan 83)

At the end of his [latest radio] speech, Reagan stated the readiness of the United States—and I quote—to sit down at the conference table with the Russians to discuss practical measures capable of resolving the problems and leading to a more durable and genuine improvement of relations between East and West. If this is really so, then one can only welcome the U.S. President's utterances. The Soviet Union believes that the path

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toward mutual talks is open and that our two countries could make an important contribution to the cause of creating a climate of mutual trust, mutual understanding and cooperation in the world.

Valentin **Zorin,** Soviet television political observer (Moscow radio [in English] to North America, 3 Apr 83)

But the leaders in Washington are not only rude and tactless in their political styles, they also break another unwritten rule of statesmanship. It is unfortunate when the mass media juggles with facts but it is inexcusable when leaders in positions of utmost responsibility resort to overt lies. There have been many instances when the current leaders in Washington have flagrantly distorted the truth and deliberately lied to the public. That was the case in the most recent statements made by President Reagan about Soviet policy.

Kobysh (*Literaturnaya Gazeta,* 6 Apr 83)

[In his] 1 April speech and in previous speeches, R. Reagan cast aside all Easter rhetoric and explained quite clearly and bluntly that the Administration that he heads, far from intending to renounce its military preparations on a monstrous scale and its hegemonist aggressive course, actually contemplates something still more sinister. Playing with words, he presented to the public in the guise of "ABM defense" the announcement that the United States is embarking on the implementation of a vast new, purely aggressive program of military preparations, mainly covering space. This announcement was further evidence that the present U.S. Government is not simply preparing for nuclear war, but has set a course toward unleashing such a war.

Valentin **Falin,** *Izvestiya* political observer (*Izvestiya,* 14 Aug 83)

And what does the U.S. leadership think now? It links the maintenance of peace between our states to the United States' acquisition of military superiority in addition to the USSR's renunciation of a socialist social system. In other words, the Soviet Union must learn to be at the United States' beck and call or it will only have itself to blame. It is perfectly obvious that this view has nothing in common with the "Basic Principles of Mutual Relations between the USSR and the United States" which the U.S. leader sealed with his signature in May 1972. . . .

True, for some time now representatives of the present administration have been going in for soft-pedaling. They have been transforming R. Reagan from a dashing mindless horseman into a soft-hearted "peace champion." A broad stream of misinformation is being broadcast in which they want to whitewash the U.S. stance at the talks on nuclear arms in Europe and on strategic arms limitation and reduction.

Arkadiy **Sakhnin** (*Literaturnaya Gazeta,* 5 Oct 83)

Under pressure from the peoples, imperialism seemed to accept the incipient detente. But it could not keep it up. What do you mean, detente?! So much power! Must rule the world!

A familiar turn. We heard it from the madman [Hitler]. It was also heard by a smart master of ceremonies, an actor from the "General Electric Theater" television program. He was advertising washing machines and detergents. He got it into his head: A career can be built around this tune. He selected the words to the tune and rehearsed the pose of sovereign. He uttered: "I will not end the ideological 'drama.' " Those who writhe with pain at the sound of the word "peace" liked the pose. They liked the words, too. They decided to give it a try and brought the actor in for a test. They hauled him off the theatrical and onto the political stage. On the small stage, to start with. The familiar tune sounded louder, the words more threatening. The test was successful. On to the big stage.

This is how the second plenipotentiary of imperialism to lay a claim to world domination appeared on earth in our days. He picked a team worthy of himself and settled into the White House.

Today the Second Pretender holds in his hands not a bomb but a nuclear missile. He is waving it about on land, on the water, under the water, and in the sky, and is carrying it into space. . . .

Take the plugs out of your ears, Reagan. Time to think about God. That is what religious people would say. But we are realists: Think about Nuremberg.

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Aleksandr **Yakovlev,** director of the World Economics and International Relations Institute (*Izvestiya,* 7 Oct 83)

> There can be no doubt that the current U.S. President is exerting an extremely destructive influence on the international situation. His personal contribution to bringing the danger of war closer is great, and he bears the responsibility for the very rapid demolition of the structure of international cooperation built by the efforts of many countries on the platform of deepening and strengthening peace. . . .
>
> As the *Los Angeles Times* notes, Reagan does not have an inquiring mind. Eyewitnesses invariably stress that he has more horses in his stables than books in his library. He believes in flying saucers, assiduously reads horoscopes, and believes in the actions of secret evil spirits.

Aleksey **Leontyev,** *Krasnaya Zvezda* commentator (*Krasnaya Zvezda,* 15 Oct 83)

> In an attempt to somehow justify their adopted course of war preparations, the new aspirants to world domination—in that sense too the heirs of the raving Fuehrer—excel in slander against the Soviet Union and resort virtually to foul-mouthed abuse alternating with hypocritical homilies about morality and human rights, with the White House incumbent himself setting the tone.
>
> If we are to believe Reagan, America is ruled by "the most noble," "the most magnanimous," and "the most philanthropic" gentlemen. But there is no mention of the fact that each of these gentlemen possesses heaps of dollars in his bank account, acquired from the drudgery of modern-day slaves, taken from widows and orphans, and collected from the corpses of soldiers who have perished in the dirty wars and criminal adventures of the United States.

Bovin (*Otechestven Front,* 1 Dec 83)

> When the Americans agreed to detente and when they held constructive talks with us, this was an attempt to adapt their policy to the changes in life and in the world that had emerged. Now the reverse process is occurring—Reagan is trying to adapt the whole world to the interests of the United States as he understands them. Such an approach, however, again undermines the realistic basis for any constructive agreements. Evidence of this is the failure of the Geneva talks.

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The dominance of a conservative, reactionary, and archaic ideology in the United States, an ideology which is being transformed to politics, is the main obstacle for regulating disputed problems. I think that Reagan cannot change himself. . . . Since Reagan will probably stay in the White House for another four years, it is my belief that for that period of time we will not succeed in reaching an agreement on anything meaningful. We will, of course, conduct negotiations, we will try to sign agreements and we will probably even succeed somewhere on the political fringes. However, I think that concerning the main and basic issues we will have to face a game of nerves, confrontation, and conflicts for another four years. This is not a very optimistic prospect. I would very much like to be wrong but I can draw no other conclusion at present.

Fedor **Burlatskiy,** *Literaturnaya Gazeta* political observer and CPSU Central Committee official (*Literaturnaya Gazeta,* 4 Jan 84)

It is impossible to deny that a serious turnabout occurred in U.S. geopolitics on the threshold of the eighties, or that the United States has completely rejected the very idea of detente and has embarked on the path of global confrontation with the Soviet Union. . . .

It is well known that this shift is basically linked with the arrival of President Reagan in the White House, a man with extremely reactionary views representing the interests of the "iron triangle"—the military business, the Pentagon, and the militarist wing in the U.S. Congress. . . .

[Whether the present militarist course in the United States is irreversible] is a very complicated question. Much depends on whether R. Reagan manages to win the forthcoming U.S. election in the fall of 1984. Much also depends on the correlation of forces within the framework of the U.S. economic and political elite and on public opinion in that country.

R. Reagan is hastening to consolidate the basic foundations of militarism for the future. He is inflating the military budget and planning programs for new types of weapons. Nonetheless, political forces in the United States and the U.S. people still have not had their final say. I am convinced that ordinary people in the United States fear thermonuclear war no less than other people in the world.

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TASS report on President Reagan's State of the Union Address (TASS, 26 Jan 84)

> President Ronald Reagan made a traditional "State of the Union" address to a joint meeting of the two houses of Congress. His statement, made in a spirit of electioneering, was an attempt to picture in a favorable light the results of his three-year rule and justify his policy, marked by extreme aggressiveness in the international field and total disregard for the needs of the common people in the home policy field.
>
> The foreign policy section of the President's State of the Union address was notable for demagogy and hypocrisy. The President was trying to justify his militaristic policy by claiming that "the United States is safer . . . and more secure in 1984 than before", albeit, in real fact, the threat to general security, including to the security of the United States itself, has increased. And the leaders of the United States bear all responsibility for such a turn of events.

Yuriy **Kornilov,** TASS commentator (TASS, 30 Jan 84)

> The U.S. Administration speaks a great deal about "the need of a dialogue." Yet, it deadlocks, disrupts, and blocks all the talks on the problems of curbing the arms race. . . .
>
> Our hands are clean, and we have never been aggressors, U.S. President R. Reagan pointed out recently at the Congress in the State of the Union message. This is an obvious lie. In the past six years alone the U.S. Administration resorted to armed actions or the threat of force against other states 38 times. . . .
>
> The thing is that from whatever point of view we assess the situation, it is more than obvious: The allegedly "peacemaking" tricks of Reagan and his team, brought about by the purely time-serving considerations, have nothing to do with the real foreign policy pursued by Washington, which is based today, the same as before, on the desire to make history reverse its course, to reshape the political map of the world.

Eduard **Mnatsakanov,** Soviet television political observer (Soviet television, 29 Feb 84)

> It looks as though Reagan's people are working on preparations for . . . a stunning finale [to the election campaign], but the plans for this are stunningly primitive: simply turn things upside down, call black white and vice versa. And so much chauvinist demagogy is being poured over millions of Americans that it makes one recall the times of German history at the beginning of the thirties.

Bovin (Czechoslovak domestic radio, 2 Mar 84)

> During his entire three and a half years in the White House Reagan spoiled practically everything he could. But now something rather peculiar is beginning to happen. Today Reagan is preparing himself for a new election and has realized the necessity of altering his image. No longer does he want to be seen as a warmonger. . . . The fact is that the words now being delivered by the U.S. President do not correspond to his actions. . . . My own impression, however, is that the Americans are not ready for such a dialogue and that so long as Reagan is in the White House we will not reach an agreement with the Americans on anything solid. . . .
>
> The question of [a summit meeting] is . . . complicated, for, above all, thorough preparation would have to precede it. Second, if I may be frank, I would not even want such a meeting to take place, because, after all, in the current situation it would mean throwing a lifeline to Reagan, and I think that there is no need to do that.

Leonid **Ponomarev,** TASS commentator (TASS, 20 Mar 84)

> Large-scale propaganda of nuclear war has become an integral element of the policy of the present U.S. Administration which preaches not only the admissibility and the moral justification of a nuclear conflict but also the certainty of a U.S. victory in it.

Kornilov (TASS, 20 Mar 84)

> It is common knowledge that Washington has made militarist plans for a "limited" nuclear war although it is perfectly obvious that nuclear holocaust, wherever it might spring from, will not spare the United

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States. It is Washington's strategists who are making plans for the first "disarming" nuclear strike, which can only be viewed as an attempt to tailor Hitler's delirious "blitzkrieg" idea to the realities of the nuclear age.

Bovin (*Izvestiya,* 21 Mar 84)

Reagan and his advisers realize that the dangerous formula "Reagan Means War!" is being bandied about. It is no accident that the President has been saying so much about peace, negotiations, and disarmament in recent months. The image of the wild cowboy is hurriedly being replaced by the image of the wise statesman concerned to avert a war. What if the voters do not believe it? . . .

Reagan's immense strength is his personal attractiveness, his ability to be just the way people want to see him. In the television age this is not just a "subjective factor" but the most objective and politically significant reality. The indomitable optimism, the ostentatiously emphasized confidence, the permanent mask of the regular, good-natured guy—all this impresses the "average American." Much is said and written about the fact that Reagan is not weighed down by erudition and culture, reads virtually nothing, spends his evenings in front of the television, does not overwork himself, confuses facts, names, and events, and so on. And here is the paradox. What is a minus from the standpoint of a more or less developed political culture becomes a plus in the eyes of that "average American" who is pleased that the President is not some intellectual or Harvard know-it-all, but a down-to-earth, unsophisticated guy like himself. . . .

In my opinion, conservatism in the United States has already peaked. Reagan's mass base is starting to contract. In an attempt to get control of the situation the President is moving away from conservative rhetoric increasingly often and toward political pragmatism.

Georgiy **Shakhnazarov,** president of the Soviet Association of Political Science (Soviet domestic radio, 23 Mar 84)

In the words of a Canadian journalist, the people in European countries believe in the majority that under Reagan the threat of war is no less than under Genghis Khan.

Anatoliy **Krasikov,** commentator (TASS, 5 Apr 84)

> Nowadays the entire huge military machine of the United States prepares to repeat what was done by Hitler and his Wehrmacht. Only the scope of this preparation is immeasurably greater. Washington opens up new fronts of the arms race one after another and dreams of war going beyond our planet and out into space. Like Nazi Germany's leaders at their time, the White House leaders nowadays accompany preparations for war by stirring up hatred for the Soviet Union.

TASS report on President Reagan's press conference (TASS, 6 Apr 84)

> It is noted by observers . . . that since the times of Hitler's Reich no government has so openly set the task of liquidating lawful regimes in other sovereign states and so cynically declared its intention to use the force of arms, armed intervention and blockade for subversive purposes.

Sergey **Kulik,** TASS commentator (TASS, 11 Apr 84)

> In one day, Ronald Reagan signed two documents. In one . . . the President, in the bombastic style which is all his own, laid himself out to lend credibility to his Administration's alleged commitment to the rule of law and democracy. In the second document, circulated in the form of a U.S. State Department statement "On the International Court in The Hague," he refused downright to recognize international law.
>
> Many mass media organs and prominent U.S. politicians note that by its posture vis-a-vis the International Court in The Hague, Washington had actually admitted pursuing subversion against the lawful government of a sovereign nation, mining its ports and sinking vessels with peaceful cargo, subversion authorized, according to an admission by today's *Washington Post,* by Reagan personally.

Vladimir **Kudryavtsev,** *Izvestiya* political observer (*Izvestiya,* 11 Apr 84)

> The actions of the U.S. Administration's leading trio—the President, the secretary of state, and the secretary of defense—are absolutely full of ultramilitarism, lightly powdered with an ostentatious "love of peace."

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> Reagan's speech at Georgetown University and Secretary of State Shultz's speech at a session of the so-called "Trilateral Commission" in Washington promise a repetition of what has already taken place and an expansion of what is now being done by terrorist methods elevated to the rank of state policy. . . .
>
> Summing up briefly the essence of the recent speeches in this sphere by Reagan and Shultz, it boils down to this: The United States is now officially striving to cast aside everything that hinders its armed assertion of its "leading role in the world," that is, to free itself from the operative provisions of international law and the directive decisions of the United Nations. We do as we please—that is the "moral" that guides the present U.S. Administration.

Sergey **Losev,** director general of TASS (*Ogonek* magazine, 14 Apr 84)

> The American Administration's destructive approach to the problem of restricting the arms race fits into the framework of Reagan's policy of a "crusade" against socialism and against the sovereignty and freedom of peoples. Terror, arbitrariness, and interference in the affairs of sovereign, independent states have been elevated to the level of state policy by the present U.S. Administration. Since the times of the Hitler Reich no government has so openly set the task of the forcible liquidation of lawful regimes in other sovereign states. Claims to international brigandage—that is the meaning of the American President's arguments that "peace based on force is by no means a slogan but a fact of life."

Viktor **Olin,** commentator (Moscow Radio World Service in English, 16 Apr 84)

> The United States Administration persists in relying upon military strength, on achieving a military superiority, on imposing its system on other nations. The policies of the Washington Administration also cause serious concern because of their historical associations. Nazi Germany too adopted the strategy of a blitzkrieg and justified its attack on other countries by speaking of the need to deal preemptive strikes. Militarist Japan was following the same doctrine in attacking Pearl Harbor. Such methods brought no success to past exponents of international terrorism, but they did cause the suffering and death of tens of millions of people. Today, in the nuclear age, their consequences could be immeasurably more tragic.

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TASS commentary (TASS, 3 May 84)

> President Reagan's visit to the PRC has drawn to a close. The U.S. Administration was striving to use it to the fullest possible extent as an election-year visit and for the realization of its hegemonistic plans in the Asian and Far Eastern region. . . .
>
> Reagan and his Administration, taking account of the continuing election campaign in the U.S.A., wanted to use the "China factor" to the full to further its plans, to play the "China card," above all, in the context of confrontation with the Soviet Union in the Asia-and-Pacific region, to broaden out, in Reagan's words, areas of coinciding and parallel interests with China, to carry on with the coordination of actions with China on a series of issues in the international arena.
>
> The American President was in every way trying to give his talks and, especially, his public statements, a provocative anti-Soviet orientation. This came as a fresh confirmation of the militarist course steered by the U.S. Administration and of its reluctance to seek agreement with the Soviet Union, including on disarmament issues. In doing so, Reagan speculatively assured the Chinese leadership that the U.S.A. would never consent to sign an agreement with the Soviet Union on the reduction or elimination of nuclear armaments in Europe, if the Soviet missiles deployed in Asia remained unaffected. . . .

TASS report (TASS, 6 May 84)

> R. Reagan, the United States President, has come forward with a new demagogic statement timed for the beginning of the second round of the Stockholm Conference on measures for strengthening confidence, security, and disarmament in Europe. . . .
>
> Reagan also touted other U.S. pseudo-initiatives, including the draft treaty on chemical weapons tabled at Geneva whose purpose is to camouflage the Pentagon's policy of stepping up the rate of production, updating and stockpiling this monstrous means of dealing a strike against people. The U.S. draft is aimed, under the pretext of monitoring, at legalizing U.S. intelligence-gathering activity. . . .

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Reagan's assurances of the wish "to hold serious talks" look particularly flimsy against the background of the course he has mapped out for the militarization of space, signifying an undermining of the whole process of limiting nuclear weapons.

Vikentiy **Matveyev,** *Izvestiya* political observer (*Izvestiya,* 8 May 84)

The U.S. leaders, having wrecked the Geneva talks through their actions by way of unleashing a dangerous new round of the nuclear arms race and having ignored the will of the vast majority of the population in the FRG, Britain, and Italy, where the deployment of the new American missiles has begun, would now like to weaken the wave of criticism of them by stubbornly repeating statements in favor of a "resumption of the Geneva talks."

On the eve of the resumption of the Stockholm Conference's work, President Reagan spoke again, expatiating on the "desirability" of talks on medium-range missiles. Yet a few days earlier he was demonstrating his anti-Soviet obsession to the whole world with his calls to knock together a "front" whose creation was striven for in the thirties by inveterate reactionaries in the West together with the fascist aggressors. . . .

TASS report (TASS, 10 May 84)

President Ronald Reagan of the United States made a televised speech devoted to the policy of the United States in respect to Central America. A shameless lie from beginning to end—this is how one can characterize his speech that is yet another exercise in demagogy, slander, whipping up of anticommunism, chauvinism and hatred for other countries and peoples, in preaching openly state terrorism and war. In effect Reagan called military interference and aggression in Central America with the aim of suppressing the revolutionary and national-liberation movement, that has spread throughout that region, a "legal right and moral duty" of the United States.

TASS report on U.S. Olympic ceremony (TASS, 15 May 84)

Addressing a White House ceremony on the occasion of the arrival of the Olympic flame in Washington from New York, President Reagan was hypocritically speaking about his Administration's adherence to the ideals

of the Olympic movement and "observance of the Olympic Charter." President Reagan claimed that he and his Administration have done their utmost to ensure a warm reception for all states at the Olympic Games.

But what sort of a "warm reception" for the athletes can it be, if, judging by the press reports, Peter Ueberroth, the president of the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee, himself, turned to the authorities with a request that he and his family be ensured security in connection with the outrages of fascist-type and terrorist groupings in Los Angeles?! And the American press refutes the hypocritical statements by the U.S. President.

TASS report on Administration stand on MX, INF (TASS, 15 May 84)

Speaking at a press conference on Monday, President Reagan presented Congress with an ultimatum, demanding from it approval for the White House's plan to spend in fiscal 1985 3.1 billion dollars to build another 40 modern MX first-strike intercontinental ballistic missiles under the program "to rearm America." According to him, there is no more important problem on the agenda of his Administration than the fulfillment of the strategic modernization program, on which more than 180 billion dollars are going to be spent and which is aimed at achieving military superiority over the USSR.

Last year the Administration pushed through Congress appropriations for the manufacture of 21 MX missiles. All in all, 100 such missiles are going to be deployed in Nebraska and Wyoming. Washington at that time used an outright lie in claiming that approval of its plans by Congress would "stimulate" efforts to control nuclear armaments. Reagan resorted to this tactic again: "Without . . . the MX the incentive for the Soviets to return to the negotiating table is greatly reduced," he claimed. Observers point out that practice has demonstrated the utmost fallacy of these calculations because every spurt of Washington in building up its nuclear arms arsenals aggravates the military and political situation in the world and lessens the chance of progress in arms reduction.

During the press conference the President again hypocritically appealed to the Soviet Union to return to the negotiating table of the Geneva talks although they had been scuttled by the deployment of new U.S. nuclear missiles in West Europe by the United States and its NATO partners. The Soviet Union's position on this issue is well known: The possibility to

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reopen the talks on nuclear armaments can appear only if the U.S. side removes the obstacles of its own making and restores and predeployment situation.

Trying to justify his position, which is dangerous to the cause of peace, the President again distorted facts and indulged in outright slander. For instance, he claimed that the United States did not start wars but maintained its might to deter aggression and safeguard peace. That was said by the same man who personally ordered a piratic act of aggression against tiny Grenada, sanctioned the CIA's "secret war" against revolutionary Nicaragua and the mining of the civilian ports of that country, and directed the U.S. armed intervention in Lebanon.

TASS commentary (TASS 23 May 84)

As a result of these [Soviet] measures, the security of the United States has diminished, of course. However, the Reagan Administration's spokesmen, who at one time deceived the U.S. people in the question of the correlation of the military power of the USSR and the USA with a view to stepping up the arms race without hindrance, are now misleading their own population by belittling the importance of Soviet military countermeasures—so as to conceal the dangerous consequences of the deployment of U.S. missiles in West Europe. . . .

The Pentagon spokesmen nevertheless note that the travel time of the missiles on new Soviet submarines to targets in the United States has decreased from 20-25 minutes to 5-7 minutes. This alone already means that Reagan's calculations to make the Russians go to sleep with a thought that the United States will deliver a nuclear strike against them, have failed. Such plans of Washington are unrealistic. Retaliation for an aggression is inevitable.

Burlatskiy (*Literaturnaya Gazeta,* 23 May 84)

During my recent trip to the United States, I gained the impression that the political pendulum, which for four years now has been pushing the country's present leadership solely in the direction of militarism and adventurism, has reached its culmination point. The United States has undertaken open, armed interference in Lebanon, mined the ports in Nicaragua, and begun implementing the "Star Wars" program.

All this has frightened Americans. Not only the public, but Congress as well, seem to have realized clearly for the first time that the President really is capable of involving the United States in a war—a "small one" to start with, like the one in Vietnam, and then, by way of escalation, possibly even a large one. . . .

The President has spent billions of dollars on consolidating U.S. security. As a result of this, however, the country's security has weakened while the threat of war has increased. He has repeatedly resorted to military force in different parts of the globe. And he has suffered one defeat after another, as was clearly evidenced by events in Lebanon. The intoxication of the "victory" over tiny Grenada failed to capture the imagination of serious and thinking people in the United States. The President proclaimed the resumption of the arms limitation talks process. But he wrecked Geneva and has turned out to be the only U.S. leader whose term in office did not contain the conclusion of a single agreement in this sphere. Finally, he has brought relations with the Soviet Union to their lowest level.

These results of the President's military and foreign policy are forcing many representatives of the country's elite to recall Talleyrand's memorable saying: "This is worse than a crime. This is a mistake!" And although the average American is highly impressed by strong policies and a "strong president," he is now saying more and more often: Stop, this is impractical! Practical politics is the art of the possible, not just of the desirable. . . .

I asked one of the famous U.S. political scientists in confidence: What is the psychological explanation for the incumbent U.S. President's fondness for nuclear games? One gets the impression that some kind of mysterious force seems to attract him to them. "Yes, yes, I myself have thought of this," my interlocutor said. "And what strikes me more than anything else in this connection is our President's statements about the inevitability of Armageddon, the 'end of the world.' "

According to religious beliefs, Armageddon is the place where the final battle between the forces of good and evil will be fought. At that moment God will take the affairs of mankind in his hands and he will walk the earth and punish the sinners.

This is what R. Reagan said to correspondents of a television company: "It could be that our generation will be the one to witness Armageddon."

An anticommunist complex multiplied by a superstition complex and added to a boundless faith in the military-industrial complex—are these not rather too many complexes for just one man? . . .

File USSR Propaganda

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BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH - ANALYSIS - JULY 3, 1984

1. USSR: MOSCOW'S SPACE PROPAGANDA MANEUVER

Moscow probably expected a flat US turndown of its proposal for space-weapons talks, but had the US accepted it in toto, the Kremlin most likely would have been prepared to send its negotiators to Vienna whatever the impact on the President's reelection campaign. In the wake of the actual US response, Moscow's aim now is to continue to pressure the Administration on the issue and to try to shift the onus to Washington should the September talks fail to materialize.

* * *

Moscow apparently was unprepared for the US linkage of space weapons talks with START/INF issues. Soviet commentary has fallen back on attempting to portray Washington as opposed to talks and insincere on arms control in general.

The authorized July 1 TASS statement was deliberately disparaging of the US position, which it characterized as "totally unsatisfactory." It called the Administration's June 30 statement hasty, although Moscow itself had called for an "early and positive" response. Characteristically, at the July 2 luncheon for British Foreign Secretary Howe, Gromyko accused the Administration of a "deception" to gain votes. Gromyko and TASS have thus set the stage for a continuing campaign against the Administration on space issues and a possible Soviet no-show in Vienna, although the Soviet proposal, according to TASS, still remains in force.

The prompt publication of the original, June 30 Soviet government statement suggested that a renewed propaganda campaign focused on space issues was in the works. Weekend commentaries left the impression that Soviet propagandists had already prepared their attacks on what was expected to be the Administration's flat rejection of the proposed talks. Yuriy Zhukov, for example, wrote in Sunday's Pravda of the Administration's "stubborn rejection" of negotiations on space issues. Moscow clearly still hopes to capitalize on what it perceives as widespread support in Europe and among critics of the Administration for talks on space weaponry.

The latest Soviet proposal goes beyond the initiative put forward by Andropov last August in a meeting with the congressional delegation led by Senator Pell. It explicitly would rule out not only ASAT weapons, but also space-based ballistic-missile-defense weapons; in addition, it would ban systems on earth intended for use against objects in space. As was true of Andropov's initiative, the current proposal will probably be submitted in draft treaty form for consideration by the UN General Assembly this fall, whether or not talks in Vienna materialize.

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File Sov. Propaganda

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CONFIDENTIAL

--ANALYSIS--

8/15/84

1. USSR: MOSCOW'S OFFICIAL REBUKE TO THE PRESIDENT

After several days' consideration, Moscow today issued a statement decrying the President's off-the-record radio remarks. Moscow will undoubtedly maintain a harshly critical attitude toward the President, intensify efforts to cultivate Western audiences, and pressure the East Europeans to support its position on East-West issues. At the same time Moscow will reassure the Soviet populace that its security is not in peril.

* * *

An authoritative TASS statement was issued on August 15 that deplored the President's "invective," which it characterized as "unprecedentedly hostile," dangerous, and "incompatible with the high responsibility" born by state leaders, particularly of nuclear powers. The statement appeared only after several days of deliberation and apparently was cleared at the highest levels. As recently as August 13, a foreign ministry official said he had nothing to say about the remark. Although Moscow may have delayed in order to weigh carefully its response to a highly sensitive issue, TASS probably required time to get clearances from the vacationing Chernenko and Gromyko.

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NLRR 06-114/10 #1094
BY CJ NARA DATE 1/24/08

The Soviets are currently exploiting the remark in their campaign to impugn what TASS has characterized as the Administration's "pseudo-peace rhetoric." Such rhetoric, they have been arguing, is merely protective camouflage designed to combat the President's "warlike" image. The President's radio remarks, declared TASS, reflect the "bellicose" Reagan of the past three years. The President's "frankness," said TASS, should be an "eye-opener" for all those who had been deceived by the President's more recent stance.

In addition to using this incident to cultivate Western audiences, Moscow will also exploit it to pressure regimes in Eastern Europe to adhere more closely to its hard line on INF counterdeployments and East-West issues generally. Pravda's Yuriy Zhukov warned on August 15 that the Administration's claim that its weapons were meant solely for deterrence was put forth "to weaken the vigilance of peace-loving forces." As the President's remark reveals, TASS stated, US policy is "extremely dangerous" and "calls for high vigilance."

The incident offers Soviet propagandists new fare for their ongoing campaign to criticize the Administration for anti-Sovietism, but this theme has its perils. Careless overemphasis on the President's mention of bombing the USSR may generate real anxiety among the Soviet populace. There have been signs that Moscow's anti-INF propaganda evoked fears among their own citizenry about an increased war danger. To allay such fears, Zhukov wrote that the USSR and its allies "have everything necessary to defend their security."

File USSR propaganda

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ August 16, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI JL

SUBJECT: Statement on Soviet Intervention in the U.S. Electoral Process

Per your request, attached at Tab I is the paper on Soviet intervention in the U.S. electoral process. Anything that you might need on this should should already be included in this paper. For purposes of a public statement, however, you may want to cross out selected paragraphs.

Attachment:

Tab I Statement

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CNS NARA, Date 7/31/02

DECLASSIFIED/RE/OBD
NLRR F06-114/10 #10965
BY CL NARA DATE 1/2/08

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Soviet Intervention in the U.S. Electoral Process

The Administration is harboring a growing concern about Soviet attempts to intervene in the American election process and the effects this has on the international climate. We feel that the American people deserve to know the facts of this situation and the historical context in which they appear.

Recent Historical Context

There is a history of Soviet efforts to influence Western elections. Just last year, the world witnessed two of the most brazen attempts by the Soviets to affect the elections in Germany and Great Britain. These efforts included: Soviet support for "peace" and unilateral disarmament movements; the focusing of the considerable Soviet propaganda and disinformation apparatus toward the target countries; the issuing of a variety of threats -- especially of nuclear cataclysm -- should the wrong party be elected to office; and other methods. This intervention was not the figment of anyone's imagination. There has been broad consensus among scholars, experts and the electoral participants themselves that the Soviets in fact were engaging in the internal affairs of these states.

Soviet Consciousness of the U.S. Electoral Process

Today, we are witnessing a similar pattern of Soviet activities. These proceed from an unambiguous Soviet concern with the American electoral process. This concern manifests itself constantly in official statements by the Soviets, which portray various official acts by the President and the Administration as electioneering. For example:

-- Various Administration efforts, many of several years' standing, to conduct a business-like dialogue with the Soviets have been branded by them as "peace-making cosmetics" for domestic electoral purposes.

-- The President's trip to China and his participation in the D-Day ceremonies were scored as "electioneering."

-- The President's annual responsibility in delivering his State of the Union message was also branded as electioneering.

-- Soviet propaganda regularly cites U.S. public opinion polls that suit Soviet purposes and accuses the President of conducting policies designed to ameliorate temporarily his standing in these polls for electoral reasons.

Soviet Intervention in the U.S. Electoral Process

The principal method by which the Soviets attempt to influence American voters is by campaigning against the candidate and the Party they don't like. Their current campaign is designed to

portray the President as a threat to peace, to portray his policies as so unreasonable and aggressive that it is no longer possible to do business with him. Recognizing that there is widespread public support for East-West dialogue, they attribute the impasse to the President and try to engender the fear of war among the electorate.

The Soviets, using their disinformation and propaganda apparatus to which they devote billions of dollars worth every year, have focused on the American elections in a variety of ways:

-- They attempt to convince American voters that the Soviets have something genuine to fear from U.S. military forces such as our INF deployments, when in fact the Soviets know that our forces are exclusively for defensive and deterrent purposes.

-- They wildly exaggerate American involvement in Central America for the purpose of frightening Americans that we are in "another Vietnam."

-- They accuse the Administration of sending the Korean civilian airliner on an aggressive spy mission.

-- They accuse the President of using terrorism as an instrument of state policy.

-- They have charged the Administration with using Sakharov as a pawn in a CIA-sponsored subversive operation.

-- They have called bona fide arms reduction proposals by the Administration such as our chemical weapons ban mere "propaganda tricks."

-- In their effort to show how the President is a "warmonger" and man with whom it is impossible to do business, they have likened him to Hitler and called America a fascist state.

-- They have declared continuously that U.S.-Soviet relations are at their lowest and most dangerous levels in history.

-- They have accused the President of not being truly interested or serious about arms control, but rather that his genuine sentiments favor a perennial arms race.

-- They attribute the breakdown in the arms control negotiations to the President, when in fact it was they who walked out of the talks. (This propaganda is designed to distract public attention from the outrageous preconditions the Soviets maintain for resumption of these talks.)

-- They have attempted to demonstrate the President's alleged lack of willingness to negotiate by proposing talks on space weapons and anti-nuclear weapons. When the President showed immediate interest, it was the Soviets who backpedaled away from these talks -- again blaming the President.

-- They have accused the U.S. of violating various arms control agreements. (Such charges were meant to distract public attention from the undisputed credibility of the President's report to Congress on Soviet noncompliance with arms agreements.)

-- They have charged the President with preparing America both militarily and psychologically for war. The Administration has been called the most bellicose and militaristic in U.S. history.

As part of their effort to show how U.S.-Soviet relations are the worst ever:

-- They barred Ambassador Hartman from delivering the traditional July 4 TV speech, accusing it of being part of the U.S. election effort.

-- They have committed various acts designed to provoke the Administration into an angry reaction -- such as beating and imprisoning U.S. citizens and officials in Leningrad, imprisoning and possibly drugging Sakharov and ignoring the President's human rights demarches.

-- They organized an international boycott of the Olympics largely for the purpose of showing that the low state of East-West relations and the attendant lack of security for athletes were the cause. The Soviets hoped here that the American public would blame the President for spoiling the Olympics.

-- They engineered an "active measures" campaign of forgeries of Ku Klux Klan threats to athletes of Third World nations in order to bolster their claims of lack of security in Los Angeles and to widen the boycott.

Taking a different tack, and siding with the President's political opposition, the Soviets have praised the foreign policy planks of the Democratic platform. Pravda, for example, declared that the Democrats "are right on target" in their policies. They have also quoted approvingly various statements by Democratic candidates that were critical of the President's policies.

The most disturbing feature of the Soviet attempts to meddle with U.S. public opinion in an election year is their systematic campaign of intimidation. This has manifested itself in many ways that are profoundly destabilizing to the international climate:

-- They have issued numerous threats of a variety of dire consequences if the President continues to conduct his foreign policies.

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-- These threats include the overall danger of nuclear war, the deployment of ever larger Soviet military forces, the prospect of a never-ending arms race, and the impossibility of every achieving arms control so long as President Reagan remains in office. (These threats are not only designed to influence U.S. voters, but also to induce U.S. Allies: a) to distance themselves from the U.S., b) to pressure the U.S. to make negotiating concessions, and c) to support the President's domestic political opposition.)

-- They have been conducting military exercises that are increasingly large and offensive in nature.

-- They have made a point of loud announcements of new missile and submarine deployments.

-- They have increased their military presence in the Gulf of Mexico as well as in East Asia near U.S. shipping lines of communication.

-- They have been brazenly developing new and macabre varieties of biological weapons in the face of public exposure of this activity and in spite of the fact that it is a violation of the Biological Weapons Convention.

Altogether, the Soviets devote a massive amount of resources to influence American voters over the heads of the government. Their activities not only constitute intervention into the internal affairs of our country, but have done a great deal to aggravate the international climate.

USSR Pkgs

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL

August 24, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK, WALT RAYMOND and STEVE SESTANOVICH

SUBJECT: Request for Interview with Grani Magazine

Georgi Vladimov, the editor of the Russian emigre quarterly Grani (published in Frankfurt), has requested a written interview from you. The purpose of the interview would be to combat Soviet propaganda that current U.S. policy is anti-Russian and poses a threat to the Russian people.

We believe that Vladimov has put his finger on a real problem and that it would be useful to do what we can to undermine this particular strain of Soviet propaganda. Therefore, Steve Sestanovich has drafted a set of replies to questions which Vladimov submitted to us. We believe that they provide persuasive answers to the key questions and are particularly helpful in making clear to a Soviet audience that our defense modernization is in response to a massive Soviet military build-up (about which Soviet citizens hear little in their own media).

Although Grani has some readers in the Soviet Union, who see issues smuggled in, its readership is anything but wide. Therefore, if you authorize us to provide the interview we would recommend that, upon publication, it be broadcast by VOA and Radio Liberty as a news item. This would provide the widespread attention in the Soviet Union which the subject deserves.

Since the interview is neither provocative nor threatening, we do not believe its publication could become a factor in the election

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Declassify on: OADR

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NLRR F06-114/10 #10957
BY CH NARA DATE 6/25/09

campaign. If there is any anxiety on this score, however, we could ask Grani to publish it in its first issue after November 6.

Karna Small and Bob Sims concur.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the text at TAB I for publication in Grani and coverage on VOA and RL.

Approve ___ Disapprove ___

Timing: Next issue ___

First issue after Nov. 6 ___

Attachment:

Tab I - Draft text of interview

August 1984

Interview with Robert C. McFarlane

1. It is often argued in the American media and special publications that the aggressive and repressive policies of the Soviet Union are the continuation of former Russian attitudes and are inherent to Russian history, traditions, culture and psychology. President Reagan has called the Soviet Union an "evil empire." Does this mean that Russia and Russians are seen in the US as THE enemy?

Not at all. Our democratic political philosophy, as you know, distinguishes between state and society, or between the government and the people. This distinction carries over to our view of the Russian people. We Americans have deep feelings of friendship for the Russian people, and great respect for their cultural traditions and achievements.

There is an important point here that goes beyond expressions of friendship. Americans are by nature suspicious of the view that any dictatorship can be justified by "tradition." I know that there are endless and complicated scholarly arguments about the degree of continuity in Russian history. Certainly the Tsarist regime was not democratic, and in this respect the Bolshevik regime may superficially seem an example of continuity. But these are the controversies of scholars and specialists. For our part, while we have no intention of imposing our will on others, we believe in democracy as a universal possibility.

This is not a naive belief. In Russia, for example, didn't the February Revolution show that there are always pressures for change in any national tradition? These pressures were in fact rather great in the generation prior to 1917: they had already produced major changes in Russian politics and society. It seems likely to me that, given a chance to develop, they would have had far-reaching positive effects. In fact, had they been allowed to unfold fully, they would have become part of what we mean today by "the Russian tradition."

The Soviet regime cut your democratic development short. To my mind what that shows is not the true character of Russian tradition. It proves (which hardly needed proving!) that a state with all power in its hands can thwart pressures for democratic change.

We believe, in short, that Russians have as much right to govern themselves, and as much ability to do so, as any other people.

Finally, your term "THE enemy" leads me to remind you that, whatever difficulties may exist today in US-Soviet relations, Americans don't aspire to a relationship of confrontation. To the contrary, as the world's two greatest powers, our first (and shared) responsibility is to keep the peace. This was the message of President Reagan's speech on January 16 of this year.

2. The US is spending enormous sums to acquire more missiles, more warheads, more weapons of every kind. Why? Does the US feel threatened, and if yes, by whom? Does the US really intend to use all those missiles against our cities, our homes and families?

President Reagan has expressed himself on this matter in a single sentence that he has spoken again and again. "A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought." I don't think any words could be clearer than these: "must never be fought."

We do not desire war, and we do not desire an arms race either. Take a look at the past decade or more of arms control negotiations. It was almost always the United States that made the ambitious proposals for bringing the arms race under control. And almost always the Soviet government that rejected them.

For much of the 1970's in fact the United States was actually reducing its defense budget. To our regret, Soviet military spending continued to increase steadily. We cannot know precisely what the amounts are because the Soviet Union keeps its budget a secret, but our estimates are that approximately 14 or 15% of the Soviet GNP is drained away on military expenditure. The percentage for the United States is less than half that.

A few additional statistics may make clear why Americans grew so concerned during the 1970's at the pace of the Soviet military

buildup. In 1975, the U.S. and the Soviet Union had approximately the same number of warheads on their intercontinental ballistic missiles. Since then the U.S. figure has not increased at all. For some reason, however, the Soviet leadership chose to keep building, and today the number of weapons on their missiles has tripled.

Or take another example: although the Warsaw Pact has more than three times as many tanks as NATO, the Soviet Union keeps increasing its production of tanks -- in 1983, for example, by over 10%. As everyone knows, this was a very difficult year for the Soviet economy, and yet the leadership decided that they had to build 2700 tanks, over 60% more than were built that year by all the countries of the entire Western alliance put together.

Seeing continuing increases on the Soviet side, we Americans have to ask ourselves, how can we best reduce the danger that these weapons might someday be used? The decision about how much to spend for defense is vigorously debated every year in the United States: not just in the military but in each chamber of the Congress, in the newspapers and on television, in the universities, by civic organizations, among the Cabinet departments, with our allies, and so on. This debate is understandable, for we -- like the peoples of the Soviet Union -- have many things on which we would rather spend what we earn by our work. But over the past several years the conclusion of our national debate has been that the Soviet buildup does not allow us to spend less.

I might add one more point: many Americans including President Reagan are very unhappy with the levels that both the Soviet and U.S. nuclear arsenals have reached. We are therefore also looking into the possibility of defending ourselves in a way that is less threatening to others. The President has asked for more research to see whether technology can be developed so that if a nuclear attack were ever launched against our territory we would be able to destroy the incoming weapons themselves, not innocent people on the other side. The concept is simple. The technology obviously is terribly complicated. For now, our program is merely one of enhanced research, to explore what might be possible in the future.

This matter is one among many that we would like to discuss with the Soviet government. You may be interested to know that some Americans who have thought about these issues have publicly suggested that if we are able to develop such technology there would be no reason not to make it available to the Soviet Union also. Yet we have recently had great difficulty trying to engage Soviet representatives in negotiations, or even discussions, of any nuclear issues. Last year, they walked out of negotiations on strategic and intermediate-range nuclear systems. And this summer, when the Soviet government proposed talks on the militarization of space, President Reagan accepted; yet Soviet spokesmen are distorting our position and saying that we rejected the offer. The fact is we are still ready to meet, and without

any preconditions. For some reason, it seems that they don't want to talk. We can't be sure why.

13. Is it true that only the introduction of Soviet troops in Afghanistan prevented an American take-over? Why do the Americans support the Afghan mudjaheddeen, who kill Soviet soldiers, but are so excited when the USSR arms the Salvadoran guerrillas, who do not -- or not specifically -- shoot at Americans?

This charge is utterly absurd, as ordinary Soviet soldiers found out when they got to Afghanistan. As you may know, some Soviet soldiers who have come out of Afghanistan have said that the biggest surprise for them in that country was to discover that there were no Americans or Chinese fighting there, as Soviet propaganda organs had alleged. I doubt that very many people in the Soviet Union believe the official Moscow version of the invasion of Afghanistan. After all, if the Soviet leadership's real fear was an "American takeover", why was it necessary to kill the Afghan President as soon as the Soviet troops arrived?

As for the comparison you make between events in Afghanistan and Latin America, let me tell you how we see it. In both cases Soviet policy is making life harder for the people who live there, who desire only to live in peace and freedom. The Soviet Union works with Cuba and Nicaragua to support an insurgency in El Salvador despite the fact that El Salvador has a democratically-elected President, Jose Napoleon Duarte, who

represents the people. Why should the Soviet government act in this way? Simply because it aims to expand its "influence?" I can't believe that the peoples of the Soviet Union have the

slightest desire to gain "influence" in Latin America, which cannot improve their life in any way. The same is true in Afghanistan: the Soviet war of conquest there has resulted in great loss of life for both the soldiers of the Soviet occupation forces and for local population. And what have Soviet peoples gained from this?

For our part, we reject the idea that large nations need to control their small neighbors. We believe in national independence for all countries, whether they are close to our borders (like El Salvador) or not (like Afghanistan). This belief in no way threatens the security of the Soviet Union.

4. Is there a possibility of friendship between US and Russia? If yes, under what circumstances?

I believe friendship is certainly possible, and highly desirable. In the past, as you know, some writers have thought that rivalry between America and Russia was inevitable, perhaps because they are two large countries blessed with such talented peoples and rich territories. Frankly, I can't understand why this has to produce rivalry instead of cooperation. And even if there is

rivalry, it hardly has to be military. It hardly has to increase the danger of war.

Developing the potential friendship between our peoples is my hope and President Reagan's. But let us talk of practical

expectations too. The obstacles to friendship between our peoples have to do with one thing and one thing only -- the policies of the Soviet leaders, such as their extraordinary military buildup, the use of Cuban proxy forces to promote instability in distant regions, and so forth. Is there any chance that these policies will change? We can't know, for the Soviet leaders operate within a system in which there is no open debate and virtually no pressures on them to change those unfortunate policies, and in which secrecy is the rule. That makes it hard to predict what course they will take.

For this reason, our approach is two-fold. First, to be strong enough that no adversary ever miscalculates our resolve. Second, to be clear enough about our own goals that no would-be friend or partner ever fails to understand our desire for cooperation.

5. <u>Assuming that solid friendship and cooperation are established between the US and Russia: what would that mean for our respective countries, for the rest of the world?</u>

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5. <u>Assuming that solid friendship and cooperation are established between the US and Russia: what would that mean for our respective countries, for the rest of the world?</u>

It's no exaggeration to say it would be one of the most important turning points in modern history. It's hard even to assess all of the benefits that would follow from this, for both our nations and for others. But let me mention two that concern the Russian people.

First, the economic and technological benefits. The Soviet Union, for a modern economy, has participated very little in international trade. And its peoples have tended to lag in the enjoyment of modern technology, particularly in the consumer sector. I would expect this to change in conditions of East-West friendship. And not just because the Soviet Union would be freer to draw on some of the advances that have been made in the West. If the Soviet defense establishment did not have a virtual monopoly on top specialists, we'd see more Russian talent at work on techniques with civilian applications. We in the West would benefit from this too. There would be more that the outside world would want to buy from Russia -- not just natural resources, the primary Soviet export today. To my mind, the fact that the Soviet Union manufactures so little that the West wants to buy is a sign that the creative energy of your peoples is being stifled.

Second, I believe that an atmosphere of open exchange with the West would bring enormous vitality to the Soviet Union. Again, not because our own ideas are always correct in every particular.

But the ferment of open exchanges would enliven arts and letters, would enliven public debate, and so on. We would begin to learn more from you. Many Russians historically have made a great impact on Western society and culture. And Russians would be free to learn more from each other. Think what a liberation it would be if the Soviet media could leave behind their obsessive propaganda attacks on the West, and could argue honestly about things that have real meaning for the lives of their peoples.

Think what a liberation it would be if no one could ever again use the tired old argument that this or that internal restriction was required by the need for "vigilance."

At that point I suspect the writers and scholars would begin to explain that friendship between our nations had been inevitable all along!

USSR/Pres 9
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MEMORANDUM

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

UNCLASSIFIED

August 24, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Article on Soviet Fear of U.S.

Professor Nina Tumarkin, a member of the history department at Harvard who has specialized on Soviet internal propaganda, sent me an article she wrote following a trip to the Soviet Union this summer which I believe you will find of interest.

Tumarkin examines the question of Soviet fear of the U.S., and comes to the conclusion that while ordinary citizens fear our military might (as the result of regime propaganda), the Soviet rulers, on the other hand, fear our culture -- while respecting our military strength.

Although I am not sure the contrast between the attitudes of rulers and ruled is quite as stark as Tumarkin presents it, I believe there is a lot of truth in what she says.

Attachment:

Tab I - "Does the Soviet Union Fear the United States?'

DOES THE SOVIET UNION FEAR THE UNITED STATES?

There is an old Russian peasant proverb, "Don't take your garbage out of the hut." Its meaning: when you wield power, do so in secret. This proverb remains the operating principle of the Politburo, which is shrouded in secrecy (in striking contrast to American presidents who rush to publish their memoirs as soon as they leave office). It is therefore impossible to gauge what that small coterie of septuagenarians thinks and feels about the United States. But some of the psychological components of Soviet high politics can be illuminated through a long study of Soviet history. And ordinary Russians are garrulous and animated people; they are quite ready to tell the interested visitor what they think. I am an historian, fluent in Russian, and have just returned from a two-week trip to the Ukraine. I would like to share with you my impression of the Soviet people's attitudes toward the United States, and my speculations about the views held by the men at the top.

July is a wonderful month to visit the Ukraine. The weather is balmy and the fields lush. Farmers' markets are well-stocked with produce grown on small, privately-owned plots and sold by old peasant women, babushki, whose wrinkled faces peer out of colorful flowered scarves. In the small river town of Cherkassy I came upon an outdoor market. Two babushki immediately recognized me as a foreigner and asked where I was from. "The United States," I said, smiling broadly over an enormous pile of carrots. "Why does your country want war?" one of them asked. "We only want peace, war is bad for everyone," added the other woman. I assured them that my country wants peace as well, but they shook their heads in discouraged disbelief.

I was last in the Soviet Union in 1978 for five months, and during that time was never once accused of coming from a jingoistic country. But that was

before the breakdown of detente. Since that time, and particularly in the past four years, Soviet newspapers and magazines -- and political cartoons especially -- have depicted the United States as a warmongering nation pursuing an adventuristic foreign policy and led by a fanatically anti-Soviet president who has made a "crusade" (they use that exact term repeatedly) of anti-Communism.

Without going to the U.S.S.R. there is no way of telling how this propaganda has been received by the people. Friends and colleagues returning from Moscow and Leningrad of late have in fact been reporting a generalized popular anxiety about the United States, and have been recounting stories much like the one I sketched above, of ordinary people, largely women, protesting the United States' purported miliaristic stance. What struck me about the encounter I had in Cherkassy was that despite its small size and remote location, public fear of the United States was very much in evidence. It certainly does seem that the anti-American propaganda of the past several years has been enormously effective. My general impression is that the Soviet people -- particularly those without much sophistication -- do genuinely fear the United States, and that this fear has grown more intense since the deployment of missiles in Western Europe.

We may think, of course, that our past history best proves our peaceful intentions, since during the 1940's we never exploited our four-year monopoly of atomic weapons. Soviet propaganda, however, condemns our recent past behavior, arguing that we did use atomic weapons, twice, and that we have demonstrated our willingness to fight communism in Korea, Southeast Asia, and to some extent in Central America. Worse yet, the Soviet media labels our government fascistic, which is, of course, the most hateful term possible in a country that lost twenty million to the Nazis. "They kill you on the streets of Los Angeles. What's there to see in the United States? Fascism, that'- what!" said a tiny

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old crone to me as we stood in a small alley in the beautiful old port city of Odessa. She drew deeply on her cigarette and leaning heavily on her cane blew out the smoke and said, "I am a veteran of the Great Patriotic War. I have seen enough of fascism."

As distressing as this kind of negative publicity is to the concerned American, it is of small import for two reasons. For one thing, ours is a confident culture; our national self-esteem is not at all affected by what the Russians say about us. Secondly, and more important, Soviet popular fear of the United States does not in any way inform that country's politics. The fear comes from a deliberate propaganda campaign designed to portray the United States as a menace to world peace and the U.S.S.R. as a peacemaker (public gardens that used to display red flowering plants in the shape of a hammer and sickle now exhibit planted flowers that spell out the Russian word for peace). What does affect us all, of course, is the Communist Party leaders' perception of the United States. Do Mr. Chernenko and his colleagues fear our government and if so, what is the content of that fear?

There is no evidence whatsoever that the Politburo believes its own propaganda about the United States. It is hard to imagine the Kremlin's shrewd old guard actually thinking that we would be crazy enough to launch a first strike against them or against anyone else. But they do appear huffy and bellicose, an attitude that has filtered down to the quite ordinary Communist Party spokesmen with whom I interacted on my recent trip. "Why did your president call us an evil empire?" asked an English-language professor from Odessa State University of the American tourists to whom we were both lecturing during their travels through the Ukraine. This indignant professor was expressing the same prickly defensiveness that I believe operates right now at the Politburo

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level. When the Soviet leaders are anxious, they act in aggressive ways, both at home and abroad. And today they appear upset and angered by what they perceive as our government's disdainful refusal to accord them respect, and at times very legitimate. This is where it becomes necessary to understand the psychology of the Soviet leadership.

Soviet political culture is one that includes a shockingly low self esteem. Indeed it has often been said that the Soviet Union suffers from a massive inferiority complex. Therefore the Kremlin, unlike Washington, has an enormous need for visible proofs of world respect. When they call us names it matters little to our people or government. But when we respond in kind, they are enraged, because our government's invective feeds into a national psychology that has a high level of self-contempt. The Soviet leaders can be likened to a street bully in an urban neighborhood, the mixed-up kid who wants to have friends but is sufficiently twisted to alienate everyone, and ends up adopting offensiveness as his style, while continuing to get angry at the frustrating consequences, and to hate himself.

The men who rule the Soviet Union know full well that theirs is the only major world power with no friends and no real allies. I followed my recent trip to the U.S.S.R. with a week each in Romania and Hungary. I chatted with a variety of people. Not one had anything positive to say about their mighty Eastern neighbor; about Russia I heard only complaints, often in the form of bitter jokes. I was also struck by the fact that in neither country did anyone I asked admit to knowing the Russian language, although I know that students in both countries are required to study it.

While the leadership of the U.S.S.R. sees itself as underappreciated, isolated, and maligned, it appears convinced that the United States is unabl

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[redacted] They were enraged by the political fallout from last year's downing of KAL 007. Their press dwelt obsessively on the "anti-Soviet hysteria" that was "whipped up" by the Reagan administration. I suspect that Messrs. Chernenko, Gromyko, et al are genuinely worried that some terrible humiliation might come their way at any moment because of what they perceive to be the American government's refusal to recognize their status as a superpower. To them, being a superpower means having the freedom to deepen their security, if not through expansion, then at the very least through the inevitable proliferation of anti-American regimes, such as that of the Sandinistas. The Soviets see us as impossibly rigid and unrealistic, incapable of accepting political changes that are not to our liking -- particularly in Central America. Moreover, they fear our possible exploitation of their evident economic woes and the concomitant erosion of popular solidarity with the regime. [redacted]

With its vestiges of traditional culture, Soviet society today remains a far more conservative one than our own. Based on the old-fashioned virtues of patriotism, respect for authority, and loyalty to family and friends, Soviet social values are worlds away from the obsessive narcissistic quest for self-actualization that one encounters, for example, on the California coast. But time has a way of catching up, even with the U.S.S.R. Some of its

old values are eroding, enthusiasm for revolutionary legends and heroes has long since waned, and even the heroic memory of World War II is fading. In every Soviet town old men shuffle through the streets displaying rows of war medals on worn suit jackets of brown or grey -- but no one so much as glances at them. This is a most vulnerable transition period in the history of Soviet society and psychology. Communist ideology is drained of all dynamism; social and political apathy is evident to the sensitive observer; and the most coveted cultural artifacts come from the West, especially the United States.

If the mighty and powerful in the Soviet Union do fear something American they fear not our arsenal, but our culture. The Party leadership, the wider political establishment, and even to a certain extent a possible majority of Soviet people over fifty-five, see America as corrupting their nation's spirit with a flashy and seductive culture based on materialism, self-indulgence, a cult of youth, and a shocking moral lassitude. Indeed it is ironic that the evil empire of "Godless Communists" should assail our culture on moral grounds. But it does.

As a long-time scholar of Soviet history I am convinced that the Soviet Union's greatest asset has been not its economy, nor its technology, nor even its natural resources -- but its people. I agree with the novelist, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, who maintains that the U.S.S.R.'s six decades of suffering has produced a people with a greater strength and depth of spirit than the people of Western countries. The people of the Soviet Union know how to sacrifice, and how to endure hardship. Without their courage the U.S.S.R. would be a very poor country indeed. The possibility that Western culture might erode that popular spirit was a truly frightening concept for Chernenko and his colleagues to contemplate. The Soviet people, by and large, admire American culture and fear our weapons. Their leaders, in contrast, respect our military might, but fear the power of our culture.

I believe that our government ought not to encourage any of these fears. When the Soviet people are fearful, they draw more closely around their leaders. When the leaders are frightened they become angry, and take that anger out on their own people and -- to the extent possible -- on the rest on the world.

Nina Tumarkin

Nina Tumarkin
Russian Research Center
Harvard University

August 1984

Matlock SYSTEM II
90824 add-on

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET

August 24, 1984

ACTION

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Robert O. Anderson's Proposals on U.S.-Soviet Relations

In accord with your decision on my previous memorandum, a Kimmitt-Hill Memorandum is at TAB I, which transmits Anderson's proposal to State for its assessment.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve transmittal of the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve RHK Disapprove ___

Attachment:

Tab I - Kimmitt-Hill Memorandum with Anderson Proposal
Tab II - Matlock-McFarlane Memorandum of July 24, 1984

SECRET
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/10 # 10958
BY CN NARA DATE 6/25/09

SYSTEM II
90824

98

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 25, 1984

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Proposal by Robert O. Anderson Regarding Bering Straits (S)

Robert O. Anderson of ARCO has suggested that the U.S. Government propose to the Soviet Government that an agreement for cooperation in the Bering Straits area be negotiated. The text of his proposal, which he has discussed privately and informally with Vice President Velikhov of the USSR Academy of Sciences, is attached. (S)

It would be appreciated if the Department of State would examine this idea. (U)

Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Proposal by Robert O. Anderson: "Memo Re: Bering Straits"

SECRET
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/10 # 10959
BY CL NARA DATE 1/2/08

5/24/84

MEMO RE: BERING STRAITS

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The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. hereby agree to the following concepts as being in the long term interests of the two countries and the world community:

1) Both nations agree that the Bering Straits shall be open to peaceful navigation for all nations of the world in the belief that the concept of open sea lanes are a major need for world commerce.

2) Both nations agree to set up a joint organization to explore long range problems that are of mutual concern. Environmental problems, meteorological phenomena, mineral development in the Bering Sea, and others shall constitute the initial agenda for discussion.

3) A joint commission shall be constituted to put the foregoing into effect and to pursue any and all other matters of any nature whatsoever that may be of importance to the long term interests of both countries. The commission shall consist of 14 members, equally divided between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

   (a) It shall meet not less than three times per year at a site to be designated by the Co-Chairmen.

   (b) It shall be chaired by co-chairmen consisting of a U.S. and a Soviet member of the committee to be so designated.

   (c) The Chairman and the committee shall report directly to their respective Chiefs of State. The U. S. membership shall be bi-partisan and advisory in nature.

4) The first meeting of commission shall be within 90 days of this agreement, dated _____.

DECLASSIFIED (Released)
NLRR F06-114/10 #10593
BY CSL NARA DATE 1/26/06

USSR hers 9/84 101

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE PROBLEM OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Vladimir A. Lefebvre*

"Is the Soviet Union brave enough to extend a hand of friendship to President Reagan?" a friend of mine recently asked me. This is a critical question and, as a psychologist, I cannot answer it very briefly. The peculiarities of cognition in the common Soviet man and his American counterpart differ so deeply that even such seemingly general categories as "human dignity" and "sacrifice" have completely different meanings in Soviet and American culture. Schematically, the differences are as follows.

An American respects himself and is respected by others when he is willing to compromise with another person. A Soviet man respects himself and is respected by others when he is uncompromising toward another person. For example, a simple Soviet woman working as a librarian writes to a Soviet newspaper about a conflict she has with her supervisor, in which neither person has attempted to reach a compromise. This woman closes her letter by praising her co-workers for their support of her uncompromising behavior: "They are wonderful people! They weren't afraid to begin a fight!" Note that this conflict has nothing to do with class struggle, revolution, ideology, etc. This was a routine job conflict ~~at a job~~, and the people involved were average people behaving in

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*Research psychologist at the School of Social Sciences, University of California, Irvine, CA 92717; author of ALGEGRA OF CONSCIENCE: A Comparative Analysis of Western and Soviet Ethical Systems, D. Reidel, Holland, 1982.

"normal" ways. However, the "norms" in the Soviet Union are different from those in America, i.e., in the Soviet Union a good person is not supposed to compromise with his opponent.

The question which naturally arises is, how does one resolve such conflicts? The answer appears discouraging--in Soviet culture there is no procedure for conflict resolution. A conflict usually ends with the victory of one side over the other or is simply stopped by a higher authority.

Two more examples: in the early 1920's, my grandfather was in charge of ~~the~~ Moscow-Leningrad railroad traffic. At that time, every train was escorted by a military team headed by a "commander." It was not unusual for the commanders to threaten my grandfather with their pistols in order to receive scheduling priority. Sometimes the train commanders also confronted each other, brandished their weapons, and even shot in the air to establish their rights. Any attempts to compromise were considered disgraceful and unworthy of a person of the "proletarian state." The trains spent hours stuck on the tracks because their commanders refused to cooperate with each other.

During the Second World War, my father was a Soviet war correspondent. He told me that once on a narrow, snowy road ~~the~~ his car ~~he was in~~ encountered a jeep carrying Stalin's close associate, Marshall George M. Zhukov. Although the road was narrow, it was still wide enough for two cars to pass each other. However, this did not happen. Zhukov did not allow his driver to move his jeep slightly aside, and my father's driver was forced to move in reverse for more than a mile. Nobody was

surprised at this. Zhukov just could not allow himself to compromise in any way in front of his subordinates.

Unfortunately, not all conflicts in Soviet history have such a "happy ending." During the 1920s and '30s, millions of people were killed because no decent procedure for conflict resolution existed in Soviet society. The absence of such a procedure is now the main obstacle to needed social and economic transformations; in order to begin these transformations, different groups of Soviet leaders must arrive at a certain compromise, but they cannot, since it would lead to the disgrace of one of the groups.

Analogous situations appear in international relationships. Let us imagine that the Geneva arms negotiations resulted in an agreement about significant Soviet-American arms reductions. The American representative would return home triumphantly; this is a victory: a compromise has been reached! Contrarily, the Soviet representative would be perceived by his compatriots as a person who made a disgraceful deal. Therefore, in order for this compromise to be accepted without scorn by the Soviet people, it would have to be presented to them as a strategical maneuver in the battle between East and West.

The contrasting reactions of the Soviet and American media to the actual events in Geneva in early 1983 provide fertile ground for further comparisons of East-West perceptions. Every hint of a possible compromise or any step toward one was praised and exaggerated by the American media and diminished and denied by the Soviets. Here are two examples:

"The USSR declares that no progress has been made in the Geneva talks. Concerning the information about the fact that Washington may suggest some 'intermediate propositions' in the Geneva talks, Moscow asserts that in the discussions on this topic one cannot see any steps toward reality."

(Krasnaya Zvezda (the Red Star), February 26, 1983)

"The Soviet Union is warning the world, despite the rumors overseas: there is no improvement in the Geneva talks!"

(Komsomolskaya Pravda, March 4, 1983)

The absence of a compromise is "good news" for the Soviets.

We have been aware of similar incidents for quite a long time, but only now have we been able to speak of them as representing a special regular peculiarity of Soviet cognition. It became possible to explain this peculiarity after constructing a formal model of human ethical cognition which predicted the existence of the two different ethical systems. In the first ethical system, a person increases his ethical status when he compromises with another person, and in the second ethical system a person increases his ethical status when he confronts another person. We have numerous empirical data indicating that in American culture the first ethical system is dominant, while in Soviet culture the second system prevails. For example, in a comparative survey which Victorina Lefebvre and I conducted among people brought up in the Soviet Union vs. those in the United States one of the questions was:

Two terrorists are hijacking a small plane. There is a possibility of killing them without injury to the passengers. Another possibility is to start negotiations first and try to

persuade them to surrender. The head of the rescue group made the decision not to negotiate with the criminals.

Did he act correctly?

Fifty nine percent of those with a Soviet background approved the commander's decision, while only twenty four percent of Americans did so. As with the examples of real conflict, this survey indicates that a good person in Soviet culture must behave uncompromisingly toward his adversary.

The differences in ethical systems create mutual misperceptions and misunderstandings during Soviet-American negotiations. Very often Americans get the impression that their Soviet counterparts do not understand the advantages of a compromise. The Americans then direct their main efforts toward explaining to the Soviets all the advantages of compromise resolution. Moral problems are not taken into consideration. Americans believe that a compromise in relationships is universally evaluated as a meritorious act.

The Soviets know about the practical advantages of compromise very well, but the idea of a compromise in relationships has an immoral connotation. Therefore, a political leader making such a decision would be jeopardizing his moral reputation and his career. The following citation from Robert Kaiser about his meeting with Yuri Zhukov (no relation to Marshall George M. Zhukov), senior Pravda commentator, vividly illustrates this point:

> "I paid a call on Zhukov soon after I arrived in Moscow . . . . The meeting was short, and I remember only one thing he said. When I commented that the recent settlement of the Berlin problem demonstrated that both his government and the Americans seemed ready to make compromises, he replied that the Soviet side had made no compromise."
>
> (Robert Kaiser, Russia: The People and the Power, Atheneum, New York, 1976, p. 186)

Yuri Zhukov could not admit that Brezhnev compromised; it would mean that Brezhnev committed an act embarrassing to himself and to his country. A Soviet leader ought to play according to the rules of his culture. Only the most confident of leaders, one securely ensconced in power, can dare to make conciliatory moves in Soviet-American negotiations.

Apparently one of the main reasons for the recent deterioration in Soviet-American relations is the relative lack of political power on the part of Soviet leaders after Brezhnev. Though the psychological features of their personalities differ, it is their lack of political strength which causes them to demonstrate uncompromising behavior toward adversaries and prevents them from concentrating on the purely pragmatic aspects of Soviet-American relations.

The difference in ethical systems alters the problem of conflict resolution. Western theories on this problem did not foresee the possibility of ethical asymmetry; it stood to reason that the Soviets would willingly compromise if it were advantageous for them to do so. But the core of the problem is that, for both ethical and psychological

reasons, the side of the second ethical system cannot accept compromises offered by the side of the first ethical system.

This dramatic situation is also partly understood in the Soviet Union, as is evidenced by numerous articles written by Fedor Burlatsky, a close associate of Andropov during the 1950's. The solution offered by Burlatsky in an oblique form, may be called "controlled confrontation": the main task for the two superpowers is not to search for a compromise (which inevitably touches upon Soviet ideology and morality), but to try to stabilize international tension at a level which allows us to avoid armed confrontation. These ideas seem useful. Compromise is inimical to the Soviet mentality; confrontation to the American mentality. The solution is to "cheat" cultural stereotypes and to create a stable situation which can be interpreted as confrontation by the Soviets and as compromise by the Americans. It could be a "silent" coordination of military development and activity toward stabilization, while political and ideological confrontation proceeds.

Sadly, our world has a very dramatic ethical asymmetry; and our future depends on how well we will be able to realize the differences and cope with them.

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

File USSR 108
Propaganda

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLS F06-114/10 # 10961
By LOS, NARA, Date 7/18/08

[redacted]

21 September 1984

(b) (1)
(b) (3)

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: [redacted]

Background:

Although there is ample precedent for a meeting between Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and the US President during Gromyko's annual visit to the UNGA, no such election-year meeting has occurred--at least in the last twenty years--between Gromyko and the candidate of the political party out of power. [redacted]

Who Initiated The Meeting:

According to Mr. Mondale's Headquarters, the Soviets requested the meeting. [redacted]

Timing:

The timing of the meeting, after Gromyko's meeting with Secretary Shultz and before his meeting with the President, would seem to be ideal if Gromyko wants to somehow give Mondale's candidacy a boost. Gromyko might, for example, have calculated that by exiting from his meetings with Shultz and Reagan with a downbeat statement and from his meeting with Mondale with an upbeat one, he could give the impression to the US press that Mondale represents the best hope for improved US-Soviet relations. [redacted]

What The Soviets Want to Achieve:

The recent Presidential preference polls, which the Soviets follow closely, have probably lowered Soviet expectations about what they can hope to achieve from a Gromyko-Mondale meeting. Gromyko will have to be careful not to overplay his hand and be seen as attempting to interfere in the US election process. Gromyko, therefore, will probably temper his inclination to attempt to harm the President's chances of reelection. [redacted]

At this juncture, Gromyko's goals are probably more modest than they might have been if Mondale were making a better showing. Now Gromyko may have to be content with simply encouraging Mondale to push his ideas on arms control and US-Soviet relations, while assuring him that the Soviets would be ready to negotiate should Mondale win. The meeting also represents a Soviet attempt to mute the political benefit to the President of his meeting with

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

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Gromyko. At the same time, Gromyko's meeting with Mondale may be calculated to put some pressure on the President and the Secretary to be more forthcoming in their meetings with Gromyko.

Although Gromyko may well tell many of the same things to both Mondale and the President--for example, Soviet disatisfaction with a range of US policies--his objectives in meeting with the two men will differ. In talking to Mondale, Gromyko will be talking to a potential source of pressure on the Administration's policies. In talking to the President, he will probably be under tighter Politburo instructions about what he can say. We think Gromyko and his colleagues in Moscow will be both interested and anxious to hear directly from the President what the Administration has in mind now regarding the future of US-Soviet relations.

Other Political Aspsects;

At that time, Gromyko depreciated anything the current Administration would have to say about arms control at this time as campaign rhetoric. He wondered why the Democrats were not pushing a nuclear freeze,

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLS F06-114/10 # 10962
By LOJ, NARA, Date 7/18/08

File Sov Propaganda 110

12/25/84

3. USSR: THE CURSE OF THE EQUAL-RESPONSIBILITY DOCTRINE

(b) (3)

A broad spectrum of independent peace activists, as well as key non-ruling communist parties in Europe and Asia, hold both superpowers equally responsible for the nuclear arms build-up. Moscow has embarked on a new attempt to discredit that concept and its supporters to preserve Soviet influence within the anti-war movement.

* * *

CPSU ties with non-ruling communist parties and prominent independent European peace activists have grown progressively more strained over the past several years as a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, martial law in Poland, and the Soviet walkout from the arms-control talks in Geneva. This has frustrated a key element of Moscow's anti-INF strategy--the creation of a broad communist/noncommunist front in Europe that would focus criticism exclusively on the defense policies of the United States and NATO.

[redacted]

The task may prove too much for Moscow. Since 1979, and particularly since Soviet counterdeployments in East Germany and Czechoslovakia, Western pacifists' perceptions of the USSR role in the anti-war movement have fundamentally altered. Moscow now fears increased contact between them and their unofficial or illegal counterparts in the Soviet bloc.

Major non-ruling communist parties such as the Italian and French continue to urge a halt to the deployment of both US and Soviet missiles, while rejecting public [redacted] CPSU exhortations for more communist solidarity and support for Soviet policies. Japanese Communist party (JCP) chairman Kenji Miyamoto's meeting with CPSU leader Chernenko December 11, [redacted] came only three days after Pravda repeated sharp criticism by other communist parties of the JCP's advocacy of the equal-responsibility doctrine and its attacks on USSR foreign policy. Chernenko's reception of the JCP chairman under the circumstances suggests the CPSU's effort to reeducate the doctrine's supporters will be carried out at every level, with "revisionist" communists the primary targets.