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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

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JET 5/22/2005

File Folder SOVIET UNION - SALT EE 1/2

FOIA

F06-114/10

Box Number 34

YARHI-MILO

3403

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
11267	CABLE	USSR D 7/18/2008 F06-114/10	2	2/12/1981	B1 B3
11268	REPORT	USSR R 7/18/2008 F06-114/10	2	2/16/1981	B1
11243	MEMO	LORD TO ALLEN RE INTERIM POLICY ON SALT AND ARMS CONTROL R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10	2	2/17/1981	B1
11244	PAPER	SALT 11 D 7/18/2008 F06-114/10	1	ND	B1 B3
11245	MEMO	KRAEMER TO ALLEN RE IG WORKING GROUP MEETING ON SOVIET SALT COMPLIANCE--MARCH 10, 1981 R 11/28/2011 F2006-114/10	1	3/13/1981	B1
11246	MEMO	ALLEN TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE SCC POSTPONEMENT R 6/25/2009 NLRRF06-114/10	2	3/17/1981	B1
11257	MEMO	HAIG TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE POSTPONEMENT OF THE SALT STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION (SCC) SESSION R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10	2	3/9/1981	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
11247	MEMO	SCHWEITZER/KRAEMER TO ALLEN RE SCC POSTPONEMENT <i>R</i> 6/25/2009 <i>NLRRF06-114/10</i>	3	3/10/1981	B1
11248	MEMO	SCHWEITZER/KRAEMER TO ALLEN RE SCC POSTPONEMENT <i>R</i> 6/25/2009 <i>NLRRF06-114/10</i>	2	3/17/1981	B1
11269	REPORT	USSR <i>R</i> 7/18/2008 <i>F06-114/10</i>	1	4/15/1981	B1
11258	REPORT	AN APPROACH ON SALT RELATED ISSUES IN PREPARATION FOR THE MAY 27 MEETING OF THE US-SOVIET SALT STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION (SCC)	3	ND	B1
11259	CABLE	291253Z MAY 81 <i>R</i> 1/2/2008 <i>NLRRF06-114/10</i>	1	5/29/1981	B1
11260	CABLE	041253Z JUN 81 <i>R</i> 1/2/2008 <i>NLRRF06-114/10</i>	2	6/4/1981	B1
11261	CABLE	051717Z JUN 81 <i>D</i> 1/2/2008 <i>NLRRF06-114/10</i>	7	6/5/1981	B1
11262	CABLE	051651Z JUN 81 <i>R</i> 1/2/2008 <i>NLRRF06-114/10</i>	1	6/5/1981	B1

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
11270	REPORT	USSR R 7/18/2008 F06-114/10	4	6/15/1981	B1
11249	FAX COVER SHEET	LEHMAN TO SCHWEITZER; STEARMAN; PIPES RE SALT WG PAR 7/18/2008 F06-114/10	1	7/7/1981	B3
11250	MEMO	LEHMAN RE SALT WORKING GROUP	3	8/7/1981	B1
11263	CABLE	022212Z UN 81 R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10	2	6/2/1981	B1
11251	FAX COVER SHEET	LEHMAN TO SCHWEITZER; LORD; STEARMAN; AND PIPES PAR 7/18/2008 F06-114/10	1	7/10/1981	B3
11252	MEMO	LEHMAN RE SALT WORKING GROUP PAR 7/18/2008 F06-114/10	1	8/10/1981	B3
11264	REPORT	SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10	4	ND	B1
11253	FAX COVER SHEET	LEHMAN TO PIPES RE STATE COMMENTS ON SECOND DRAFT OF DOD'S BASIC CONSIDERATIONS FOR SALT POLICY" PAR 7/18/2008 F06-114/10	1	7/10/1981	B3

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
11254	MEMO	LEHMAN RE STATE COMMENTS ON SECOND DRAFT OF DOD'S "BASIC CONSIDERATIONS FOR US SALT POLICY" PAR 7/18/2008 F06-114/10	1	8/10/1981	B3
11265	REPORT	ARMS CONTROL R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10	1	ND	B1
11266	CABLE	251806Z JUL 81 R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10	2	7/25/1981	B1
11255	MEMO	PIPES TO MEESE; ALLEN; AND RIXSE RE "SOVIET REACTIONS TO US STRATEGIC FORCE IMPROVEMENTS" PAR 7/18/2008 F06-114/10	1	ND	B3
11256	REPORT	"SOVIET REACTIONS TO US STRATEGIC FORCE IMPROVEMENTS" PAR 7/18/2008 F06-114/10	4	ND	B1 B3

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RA

FBIS 27

TASS SEES U.S. 'LINKAGE' POLICY AS "CONFRONTATION"

LD161306 MOSCOW TASS INTERNATIONAL SERVICE IN RUSSIAN 1225 GMT
16 FEB 81

(BY TASS OBSERVER VLADIMIR VASHEDCHENKO; "POLICY OF LINKAGE
IS A POLICY OF CONFRONTATION"--TASS HEADLINE)

(TEXT) MOSCOW, 16 FEB (TASS)--THE NEW AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION
DECLARES THAT THE SALT II TREATY AGREED UPON AND SIGNED BY THE
LEADERS OF THE USSR AND THE UNITED STATES IN JUNE 1979 IN
VIENNA IS UNACCEPTABLE AND THAT IT DOES NOT INTEND TO PRESENT
IT TO CONGRESS FOR RATIFICATION. WASHINGTON IS THUS DEMONSTRATING
AGAIN THE INCONSTANCY, INCONSISTENCY AND UNPREDICTABILITY OF
ITS FOREIGN POLICY, AND ALSO ITS UNRELIABILITY AS A PARTNER,
NOT ONLY IN TALKS WITH THE SOVIET UNION BUT ALSO WITH REGARD
TO THE WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES.

IN EFFECT, THE UNITED STATES SWINDLED THEM BY PROMISING TO
RATIFY SALT II IN THE EVENT OF AN AGREEMENT BY ITS NATO
PARTNERS TO DEPLOY AMERICAN MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES ON THEIR
TERRITORIES.

IN ORDER SOMEHOW TO JUSTIFY THE VIOLATION OF ITS OBLIGATIONS
AND PROMISES, AND ALSO TO LESSEN THE WORLDWIDE WAVE OF
INDIGNATION, THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION DECLARES THAT IT IS
READY TO HOLD TALKS ON STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION, BUT WITH THE
INDISPENSABLE CONDITION OF "LINKAGE" WITH OTHER PROBLEMS AND
EVENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LIFE, OF CORRELATION WITH THE "BEHAVIOR
OF THE SOVIET UNION IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA."

WHY DO THE NEW AUTHORITIES IN WASHINGTON REJECT SALT II,
AND DO THEY INTEND AT ALL TO UNDERTAKE SERIOUS EFFORTS TO
LIMIT THE ARMS RACE? IN THE SALT II TREATY, ON WHICH THE TWO
COUNTRIES WORKED FOR 7 YEARS, THE PRINCIPLE OF PARITY AND
IDENTICAL SECURITY IS SET OUT. IN SIGNING THE TREATY,
THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES TOOK AS THEIR POINT OF

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NLRR F06-114/10 #11268

BY 101 WARA DATE 7/18/08

4

DEPARTURE THE FACT THAT THERE EXISTS APPROXIMATE PARITY OF MILITARY MIGHT BETWEEN EAST AND WEST, AND THEY STIPULATED MEASURES SO THAT THIS BALANCE WOULD BE MAINTAINED. BUT, TO ALL APPEARANCES, THIS IS NOT TO THE LIKING OF THE NEW U.S. ADMINISTRATION WHICH OPENLY PROCLAIMS A COURSE OF ATTAINING MILITARY SUPERIORITY OVER THE SOVIET UNION. THE SALT II TREATY IS AN OBSTACLE ON THIS PATH; IT HINDERS THE EFFORTS OF THE NATO COUNTRIES TO ALTER THE WORLD'S STRATEGIC BALANCE IN FAVOR OF THAT BLOC.

WASHINGTON'S THESIS THAT FURTHER TALKS WITH THE USSR ON STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION MUST BE CONDUCTED IN "LINKAGE" WITH OTHER QUESTIONS WHICH HAVE NO RELATION TO THIS PROBLEM SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN PRECISELY THIS CONTEXT. IN ESSENCE, IT IS AN ATTEMPT TO LEAD THE TALKS INTO A BLIND ALLEY SINCE THE MESHING OF ALL PROBLEMS INTO ONE WILL ALLOW NONE OF THEM TO BE SOLVED. SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD ONLY CREATE THE APPEARANCE OF TALKS, AND WOULD DELIBERATELY DOOM THEM TO FAILURE.

WASHINGTON'S COURSE OF CONFRONTATION, THE DESIRE TO USE THE "POWER FACTOR," THAT IS, AN ATTEMPT TO DICTATE ITS OWN CONDITIONS TO THE SOVIET UNION, TO MAKE "DEMANDS" ON IT, ARE CONCEALED BEHIND THE PROPOSAL CONCERNING TALKS WITH "LINKAGE."

HOWEVER, THE WHITE HOUSE IS DEEPLY MISTAKEN IF IT THINKS THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO TALK WITH THE SOVIET UNION IN SUCH MANNER. THE ONLY RELIABLE PATH ALONG WHICH RELATIONS BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE UNITED STATES CAN DEVELOP IS BY OBSERVANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY AND REJECTION OF "POWER FACTORS" IN POLITICS. THE SOVIET UNION IS READY TO DO BUSINESS WITH THE UNITED STATES ONLY AS AN EQUAL, IF THE AMERICAN SIDE ALSO SHOWS READINESS FOR THIS.

C O R R E C T I O N: PARAGRAPH THREE, LINE TWO MAKE READ ///
WAVE OF INDIGNATION AT THIS DECISION, THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION///
(SUPPLYING OMITTED WORDS).

16 FEB 1423Z GMS/CAJ

MEMORANDUM

The President has seen

0500

file SALT 5

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 17, 1981

meant for
European
this

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD ALLEN *Allen*
SUBJECT: TASS Sees U.S. "Linkage" Policy as "Confrontation"

The following is the text of an article which appeared in yesterday's TASS international service under the title, "Policy of Linkage in a Policy of Confrontation."

Begin text

The new American administration declares that the SALT II treaty agreed upon and signed by the leaders of the USSR and the United States in June 1979 in Vienna is unacceptable and that it does not intend to present it to Congress for ratification. Washington is thus demonstrating again the inconstancy, inconsistency and unpredictability of its foreign policy, and also its unreliability as a partner, not only in talks with the Soviet Union but also with regard to the West European countries.

In effect, the United States swindled them by promising to ratify SALT II in the event of an agreement by its NATO partners to deploy American medium-range missiles on their territories.

In order somehow to justify the violation of its obligations and promises, and also to lessen the worldwide wave of indignation at this decision, the Reagan administration declares that it is ready to hold talks on strategic arms limitation, but with the indispensable condition of "linkage" with other problems and events of international life, of correlation with the "behavior of the Soviet Union in the international arena."

Why do the new authorities in Washington reject SALT II, and do they intend at all to undertake serious efforts to limit the arms race? In the SALT II treaty, on which the two countries worked for 7 years, the principle of parity and identical security is set out. In signing the treaty, the Soviet Union and the United States took as their point of departure the fact that there exists approximate parity of military might between East and West, and they stipulated measures so that this balance would be maintained.

But, to all appearances, this is not to the liking of the new U.S. administration which openly proclaims a course of attaining military superiority over the Soviet Union. The SALT II treaty is an obstacle on this path; it hinders the efforts of the NATO countries to alter the world's strategic balance in favor of the bloc.

Washington's thesis that further talks with the USSR on strategic arms limitation must be conducted in "linkage" with other questions which have no relation to this problem should be considered in precisely this context. In essence, it is an attempt to lead the talks into a blind alley since the meshing of all problems into one will allow none of them to be solved. Such an approach would only create the appearance of talks, and would deliberately doom them to failure.

Washington's course of confrontation, the desire to use the "power factor," that is, an attempt to dictate its own conditions to the Soviet Union, to make "demands" on it, are concealed behind the proposal concerning talks with "linkage."

However, the White House is deeply mistaken if it thinks that it is possible to talk with the Soviet Union in such manner. The only reliable path along which relations between the USSR and the United States can develop is by observance of the principle of equality and equal security and rejection of "power factors" in politics. The Soviet Union is ready to do business with the United States only as an equal, if the American side also shows readiness for this."

End text

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
INFORMATION

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

February 17, 1981

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR:

RICHARD V. ALLEN

NLRR FOI 104/10 #1124

FROM:

CARNES LORD *CL*BY *CN* NARA DATE 1/2/08

SUBJECT:

Interim Policy on SALT and
Arms Control (U)

There would seem to be an acute need for a coordinated interim declaratory policy on SALT and arms control generally, pending the interagency review of these matters promised by the Administration. Conflicting signals are now being emitted, and unnecessary fears stirred in foreign (particularly European) capitals. It is essential to avoid either being stampeded into premature commitments in this area or retreating to an overly intransigent attitude which will afford a propaganda windfall to the Soviet Union. We must attempt to seize and hold the high ground of arms control vis-a-vis the Soviets as soon as possible, while preserving maximum flexibility for considered review of our overall arms control and defense posture. (C)

An interim declaratory policy of this sort would involve the following essential points:

-- We are not against arms control, only bad arms control; arms control is bad if it becomes a political symbol devoid of operational meaning and capable of being manipulated by adversaries to obstruct essential defense plans and programs; (C)

-- We are not against SALT as such, only against an agreement which has failed to achieve the original purpose of limiting strategic arms in an effective and verifiable manner and enhancing strategic stability; (C)

-- The failure of SALT is a result of Soviet, not U.S., actions -- their strategic offensive buildup threatening U.S. forces, and their deficient compliance record; (C)

--Further progress in SALT will depend on two things:

- A restoration of U.S. strategic capabilities to counteract the effect of the Soviet buildup of the 1970s; (C)

- A restoration of a minimum of trust between the two sides by Soviet demonstration that it continues to respect the fundamentals of international law and security. (C)

-- SALT must accordingly be rethought in the context of a general review of the U.S. strategic posture -- a review necessitated by the qualitative changes in the strategic balance caused

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Review February 17, 1987

by the Soviet buildup -- and thus cannot be restarted in the near future; ~~(C)~~

-- With respect to the Soviet Union, SALT must be "linked" to Soviet willingness to satisfy U.S. concerns over:

- Arms control compliance issues, both in SALT and elsewhere; ~~(C)~~

- Soviet behavior in the international arena generally, where the Soviets have increasingly flouted elementary standards of international law. ~~(C)~~

[As regards the question of "linkage," it is almost certainly desirable not to be specific in public pronouncements on the issue. Privately, the Soviets and others could be given to understand that the U.S. regards resolution of the Afghan question as an essential precondition for the resumption of SALT, but that we will not insist on the cessation of Soviet military activities in Africa or elsewhere in the Third World. ~~(C)~~]

As regards the compliance question, quick and effective action in this area is essential both to satisfy important domestic constituencies and to indicate to the Soviets the seriousness of the Administration's commitment to verification. Stressing this issue also has potentially great propaganda benefits for the U.S. by helping us get off the defensive on SALT and arms control generally. ~~(C)~~

cc: Maj. Gen. Robert Schweitzer
Sven Kraemer

MEMORANDUM

1149

file SALT
11245 10

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~INFORMATION

March 13, 1981

L22D
PIPES

MEMORANDUM FOR:

RICHARD V. ALLEN

THROUGH:

ROBERT SCHWEITZER

FROM:

SVEN KRAEMER ^{SK}

SUBJECT:

IG Working Group Meeting on Soviet
SALT Compliance -- March 10, 1981 (U)

On March 10, I attended an IG Working Group meeting on Soviet SALT compliance. The meeting was convened by PM's William Barnett to discuss ACDA's initial draft of a 190-page study of Soviet SALT compliance which is to provide the basis for an IG study on this subject. (S)

Although the ACDA draft was initially distributed on February 18, the NSC was provided no copies until the morning of the March 10 meeting. CIA has provided extensive comments, JCS intends to provide comments this week, and we are reviewing the draft as well. (C)

At the meeting, a consensus was reached by the participants that this study should become the major, factual annex for senior-level officials as they review summary papers on issues and options currently being developed by the SALT IG. PM favors dropping all consideration of options from the study, and instead listing, but not evaluating, them in the summary papers. (S)

Mark Schneider, from Policy Plans, and I urged that the comprehensive annex include a review of issues raised in past SCC meetings and evaluations of the success or non-success achieved on these issues by the American representatives. At the same time, we urged that either the annex or a separate paper discuss US compliance strategy, what it has been, and how we should change it to make it more effective. We made our points, but are not yet confident that we prevailed and will watch developments carefully. (S)

This SALT IG Working Group is scheduled to meet again next Tuesday, March 17, to review an ACDA executive summary of its comprehensive compliance study, in preparation for an IG to be held next Thursday, March 19. We are being "IG-ed" to death, but it is a good way to guarantee an NSC role in the process. (C)

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Review March 13, 1987

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NLRR E06-114/10 #11245

BY KML NARA DATE 11/28/11

The President has seen _____ *set*
11THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONSECRETACTION

March 17, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: EDWIN MEESE

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *Allen*

SUBJECT: SCC Postponement (U)

Secretary Haig recommends that we postpone the scheduled March 25 meeting of the SALT Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) until May 27 (Tab A). There are arguments that can be made both for and against postponement. Secretary Haig has laid out the arguments in favor. The arguments against are:

-- The Congress and people and our allies will view the postponement as a step against the arms control and peace process at the very time we are requesting major increases in defense expenditures.

-- The Soviets will use a US postponement for propaganda in order to present this Administration as "anti-peace," even as they may be escalating their involvement in Poland.

-- We will lose an opportunity at the SCC to lay down a brief but strong early marker for the Soviets that we are concerned with arms control compliance issues and with linkage of the SALT process to Soviet conduct elsewhere (e.g., Afghanistan, El Salvador, Poland).

-- We can use the scheduled March SCC meeting as a mechanism to begin a comprehensive review of the entire SALT process and to alert the Soviets to our desire to reevaluate arms control in general. (S)

We should proceed rapidly to decide this issue since we have but ten days until the SCC is scheduled to convene, and some of our delegates are beginning to assemble in Geneva. (S)

SECRET

Review March 10, 1987

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NLRR F06-114/10 #11246

BY CN NARA DATE 6/25/09

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I have reviewed these considerations with Secretary Haig in light of the press leak (Evans and Novak) that there are different opinions within the Administration on the matter, and have concluded that concurrence with his recommendations to postpone is, regrettably, our appropriate course of action.

RECOMMENDATION

That the SCC meeting be postponed. (S)

Rd Approve

_____ Disapprove

cc: The Secretary of State
Ed Meese
James Baker

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

March 9, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From: Alexander M. Haig, Jr. 

Subject: Postponement of the SALT Standing
Consultative Commission (SCC) Session

After a careful review of the options, I believe that we should postpone the SCC, which was tentatively scheduled at last fall's session to begin March 25. (The SCC is a US-Soviet body which meets at least twice a year to promote the objectives and implementation of existing strategic arms limitation agreements.)

Postponement will allow us adequate time to review the pros and cons of continuing to adhere to the provisions of the 1972 SALT agreements. A postponement would also enable us to conduct a fresh and comprehensive review of Soviet compliance with these agreements. These are complex issues, from both a technical and a political perspective. In my view, it makes no sense to attend the first formal US-Soviet meeting on SALT without a well-considered position.

Public discussion of a possible postponement (e.g., in the New York Times on March 2) reinforces the importance of informing NATO Allies and the Soviets soon about any SCC postponement. When informing the Soviets, we would also propose May 27 as the date for the meeting. By announcing a date in public at the same time and emphasizing that our postponement had no policy significance, we would demonstrate to both domestic and foreign public opinion that we were still committed to the SALT process, but that time was needed to formulate our positions.

ACDA was consulted as to its views and had initial reservations. ACDA is now, however, willing to accept this decision.

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GDS - 3/6/87

NLRR FOI 714/10 #1257
BY CL NARA DATE 1/2/88

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-2-

In short, I believe that we should not rush into SALT discussions with the Soviets until we are very sure where we want to come out. I recommend that you approve postponement of the SCC meeting until May 27.

The Secretary of Defense is comfortable with this approach.

Approve NR

Disapprove _____

cc: The Secretary of State
Ed Meese
James Baker

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~ACTION

March 10, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: ROBERT SCHWEITZER
SVEN KRAEMER *SK*

SUBJECT: SCC Postponement (U) */*

Secretary Haig has now forwarded a memorandum (Tab A of Tab I) to the President proposing that we should postpone the March 25 SCC until May 27. SECSTATE notes SECDEF is comfortable with this approach. *(S)*

As we have outlined in our earlier memorandum to you, serious objections to postponement were expressed by the Arms Control Disarmament Agency and within the Defense Department by the JCS, the Ikle/Perle level of OSD, and by Weinberger himself. We know that ACDA's and other opposition arguments were not fully presented to the two Secretaries. We understand that SECDEF may not be firmly wedded to postponement. *(S)*

The chief objections to postponement include:

- We would be taking on a major diplomatic and public affairs problem with our public, our Congress, and our allies by postponing (read "cancelling") an important part of the "peace process" at the very time we are presenting an enormously expanded defense budget at home, and we could jeopardize allied support for TNF modernization.
- We would give the Soviet Union a substantial and immediate propaganda advantage, ironically at the very time when possible new Soviet escalation in Poland should cause us to think of ways of putting the propaganda monkey for any postponement on the Soviets' back.
- The Soviets could take advantage of such a postponement to highlight the differences between Brezhnev's "new proposals" for arms control compared to our apparent stalling the SALT process.
- By not going, we will certainly draw public attention to the SCC and raise expectations in Moscow and elsewhere that when our long awaited review is finished, we will have something "big" to say at the SCC when we finally go in May or June.

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Review on March 10, 1987

NLRR FD06-714/10 #11247
BY CN NARA DATE 6/25/07

- It is at least possible that the Soviets may say something useful at the March SCC if we go on time (such as pledging adherence to the Interim Agreement and SALT II as long as we do), but the Soviets may reassess their position if we insist on a postponement.
- We would lose an early opportunity to leave a marker with the Soviets expressing our grave concern about arms control compliance and "detente" code of conduct issues (Afghanistan, El Salvador, and perhaps, by March 25, even Poland). If we went to the March SCC, we could tell the Soviets that we would explore these issues in some detail at a special SCC meeting in three to four months, certainly prior to any summit.
- SECSTATE states that postponement of the March meeting would "allow us adequate time to review the pros and cons of continuing to adhere to provisions of the 1972 SALT agreements" and to prepare "fresh and comprehensive reviews of Soviet compliance."
- However, by attending the March meeting and laying down brief markers, then convening a special meeting three to four months hence, we would gain even more time, without the costs of postponement.
- The option of expressing grave concern to the Soviets for noncompliance in March, does not preclude, should we really want to, our indicating in a special subsequent meeting that in view of earlier Soviet nonresponsiveness, we are considering abandoning the SALT I and SALT II agreements.
- The March meeting would thus strengthen, not weaken, our options.
- At the March 4 SIG meeting on SALT, Admiral Austin, ACDA's Acting Commissioner at the SALT SCC, commented that an early go/no-go decision was required because members of the US delegation would be getting in the train from Moscow and elsewhere during the past weekend. Whatever the merits of this part of the argument might have been a week ago, the fact remains that one senior delegation member is now in Geneva and others will follow. It is really too late to cancel. (S)

We believe we should now proceed as follows:

- We should continue with current, relatively simple, preparations for the scheduled March meeting.
- We should add the two brief statements of concern on compliance and code of conduct (which we see as simple two-to-three sentence statements, while also keeping a watchful eye on developments in Poland).

~~SECRET~~

3

- 17
- We should propose a special SCC meeting for three to four months hence and should prepare comprehensive interagency policy reviews for such a meeting.
 - We should designate Ed Rowney or Bill Van Cleave as the senior US representative at the scheduled March SCC to deliver the Administration's intended markers on the final day of the session. (S)

We suggest that you reach Al Haig as soon as possible in order to persuade him of the above, and that you then send the attached memorandum (Tab I) to the President, its last paragraph reflecting the outcome of your discussion with the Secretary of State. (S)

RECOMMENDATION

That you discuss the above with Al Haig and, after incorporating the results of your discussion, you forward the memorandum to the President attached for your signature at Tab I. (C)

_____ Approve

_____ Disapprove

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET

March 17, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
THROUGH: EDWIN MEESE
FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *Allen*
SUBJECT: SCC Postponement *(S)*

Secretary Haig recommends that we postpone the scheduled March 25 meeting of the SALT Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) until May 27 (Tab A). There are arguments that can be made both for and against postponement. Secretary Haig has laid out the arguments in favor. The arguments against are:

-- The Congress and people and our allies will view the postponement as a step against the arms control and peace process at the very time we are requesting major increases in defense expenditures.

-- The Soviets will use a US postponement for propaganda in order to present this Administration as "anti-peace," even as they may be escalating their involvement in Poland.

-- We will lose an opportunity at the SCC to lay down a brief but strong early marker for the Soviets that we are concerned with arms control compliance issues and with linkage of the SALT process to Soviet conduct elsewhere (e.g., Afghanistan, El Salvador, Poland).

-- We can use the scheduled March SCC meeting as a mechanism to begin a comprehensive review of the entire SALT process and to alert the Soviets to our desire to reevaluate arms control in general. *(S)*

We should proceed rapidly to decide this issue since we have but ten days until the SCC is scheduled to convene, and some of our delegates are beginning to assemble in Geneva. *(S)*

SECRET

Review March 10, 1987

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FOI 114/10 #11248

BY CU NARA DATE 6/25/09

I have reviewed these considerations with Secretary Haig in light of the press leak (Evans and Novak) that there are different opinions within the Administration on the matter, and have concluded that concurrence with his recommendations to postpone is, regrettably, our appropriate course of action.

RECOMMENDATION

That the SCC meeting be postponed. (S)

_____ Approve

_____ Disapprove

RM

NUCLEAR TALKS

BY BARRY SCHWEID

WASHINGTON (AP) -- THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION IS POSTPONING TECHNICAL TALKS WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON LIVING UP TO THE ORIGINAL SALT TREATY WHILE TAKING A FIRST STEP TOWARD NEW NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL IN EUROPE.

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS SAID SUNDAY NIGHT THAT THE LACK OF SOMEONE TO HEAD THE U.S. DELEGATION AND A NEED FOR FURTHER PREPARATION NECESSITATED A POSTPONEMENT OF THE SALT REVIEW, WHICH HAD QUIETLY BEEN PLANNED TO BEGIN WEDNESDAY IN GENEVA.

"IT'S NOT A MAJOR, SUBSTANTIVE DEVELOPMENT," SAID ONE OFFICIAL, WHO ASKED NOT TO BE IDENTIFIED. HE EXPLAINED THAT ROBERT BUCHHEIM, WHO HAD HEADED THE U.S. DELEGATION, RESIGNED AT THE END OF THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION AND HAS YET TO BE REPLACED.

THE TWO SIDES HAVE MET TWICE A YEAR SINCE FORMER PRESIDENT NIXON AND SOVIET LEADER LEONID I. BREZHNEV SIGNED THE TREATY AT A MOSCOW SUMMIT IN 1972, PLACING RESTRICTIONS ON SOME NUCLEAR WEAPONS SYSTEMS.

THE MEETINGS PROVIDE A FORUM FOR EXCHANGING COMPLAINTS ABOUT POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS AND OTHER TECHNICAL INFORMATION.

WHILE THIS WEEK'S SALT SESSION HAS BEEN POSTPONED, SOURCES HERE SAID THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION HAS AGREED TO SEND A DELEGATION TO BRUSSELS LATER THIS MONTH TO MAP PLANS WITH WEST EUROPEAN ALLIES ON REDUCING NUCLEAR MISSILES IN EUROPE.

U.S. OFFICIALS ARE CAUTIONING, HOWEVER, THAT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS MAY NOT EVEN START BY THE END OF THE YEAR.

HEADING THE U.S. DELEGATION TO BRUSSELS IS LAWRENCE EAGLEBURGER, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EUROPE, WHO CONCURS IN THE ADMINISTRATION'S HARD LINE TOWARD THE SOVIETS.

EVEN WHILE CONSIDERING ARMS CONTROL TALKS, THE ADMINISTRATION IS MOVING AHEAD WITH PLANS TO DEPLOY NUCLEAR MISSILES AIMED AT THE SOVIET UNION. THE PERSHING AND CRUISE MISSILES WILL BE DEPLOYED BEGINNING IN 1983 IN BRITAIN, WEST GERMANY AND ITALY.

THE SOVIETS ALREADY HAVE HUNDREDS OF SS20 NUCLEAR MISSILES AIMED AT WEST EUROPE.

AP-WX-03-23-81 0918EST

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FBIS 46

MOSCOW COMMENTATOR ATTACKS U. S. LINKAGE IN ARMS TALKS

LD15 1710 MOSCOW WORLD SERVICE IN ENGLISH 1400 GMT 15 APR 81

(TEXT) OUR OBSERVER YURIY SOLTAN NOW EXAMINES THE ATTITUDE OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE NATO COUNTRIES TO NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT. THIS IS WHAT HE WRITES:

TO BEGIN WITH I WOULD LIKE TO RECALL ONE OF THE SOVIET PEACE PROPOSALS. THE SOVIET UNION SUGGESTS THAT A FURTHER DEPLOYMENT OF NEW MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES AND THE REPLACEMENT OF THE EXISTING MISSILES BY QUALITATIVELY NEW KINDS OF WEAPONS SHOULD BE STOPPED IN EUROPE. IN MAKING THIS PROPOSAL THE SOVIET UNION PROCEEDS FROM THE ASSUMPTION THAT MILITARY PARITY STILL EXISTS IN EUROPE. THIS IS A FACTOR THAT WAS ACKNOWLEDGED BY THE NATO LEADERS ONLY RECENTLY. SIMULTANEOUSLY, TALKS SHOULD BEGIN WITHOUT DELAY ON LIMITING, AND, IF THE NATO COUNTRIES ARE PREPARED FOR THAT, REDUCING SUCH WEAPONS TO A CONSIDERABLE DEGREE. WHILE ADVOCATING THE IDEA OF TALKS, THE SOVIET UNION PUTS FORWARD NO PRELIMINARY CONDITIONS AND IS READY TO CONSIDER ANY REASONABLE PROPOSAL NO MATTER WHO IT COMES FROM.

THE SOVIET UNION'S PROPOSAL FOR A MORATORIUM IS NOT THE AIM IN ITSELF BUT A MEANS OF MAKING THE TALKS EASIER. AFTER ALL IT IS CLEAR TO ANY REALISTICALLY-MINDED PERSON THAT IT WOULD BE MORE RATIONAL TO REDUCE ARMS FROM THE LEVEL ALREADY AGREED UPON THAN DISCUSS THIS REDUCTION AND ARMS AT THE SAME TIME. THE NATO LEADERSHIP, HOWEVER, DEMONSTRATES AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT APPROACH TO THIS QUESTION. IT CAN BE EXPRESSED IN THE FOLLOWING CONCISE FORMULA--FIRST TO COUNTERARM, AND THEN TO NEGOTIATE.

AS REPORTS INDICATE, AT THE RECENT MEETING OF THE NATO DEFENSE MINISTERS, AMERICAN DEFENSE SECRETARY CASPAR WEINBERGER WAVED

~~SECRET~~

(SALT) — ARMS CONTROL

Department of State

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

25

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00215 291330Z
ACTION ACDA-12

4947

MBFR V 00215 291330Z

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 INR-10 EUR-12 SS-15 OIC-02 CIAE-00
EB-00 ICA-11 H-01 IO-15 NSC-05 NSAE-00 L-03
CSCE-04 ACDE-00 TRSE-00 PM-09 PA-01 OMB-01 SMS-01
SAL-01 SP-02 SPRS-02 /116 W

-----352047 291336Z /43

P R 291253Z MAY 81
FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6692
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO USMISSION USNATO
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USNMR SHAPE BEL
USCINCEUR

~~SECRET~~ MBFR VIENNA 0215

E.O. 12065: RDS-3, 4 5/27/91 (DEAN, JONATHAN) OR-M
TAGS: MBFR, PARM, NATO
SUBJECT: COMMENTS BY SOVIET DEPREP ON US ATTITUDES TOWARDS ARMS
CONTROL

1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: ACCORDING TO SOVIET DEPREP KUTOVOY, MOSCOW
IS BECOMING CONVINCED THAT THE US ADMINISTRATION HAS NO
SERIOUS INTEREST IN ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS INCLUDING
MBFR. AS A POSSIBLE REFLECTION OF CURRENT OFFICIAL
SOVIET VIEWS, KUTOVOY'S REMARKS ARE SUMMARIZED BELOW
AS BEING OF POTENTIAL INTEREST TO WASHINGTON AGENCIES.
END SUMMARY.

3. SOVIET DEPREP KUTOVOY RECENTLY TOLD US DELOFF THAT
STATEMENTS BY US ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS HAD RAISED
THE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION IN MOSCOW'S MIND OF WHETHER THE
US GOVERNMENT WAS AT ALL INTERESTED IN SERIOUS ARMS
CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS. MOSCOW SAW LITTLE EVIDENCE OF
ACTUAL US INTEREST IN ANY ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATION,
WHETHER IT BE SALT, TNF OR MBFR. IT SEEMED EVIDENT
TO MOSCOW THAT THE US WAS INDEED INTERESTED ONLY IN A
WESTERN MILITARY BUILDUP AND WAS USING ARMS CONTROL
TALKS AS A FACADE.

4. IT WAS IN PARTICULAR EVIDENT TO MOSCOW, KUTOVOY
SAID, THAT THE US WAS NOT INTERESTED IN PROGRESS
IN THE VIENNA TALKS, SINCE AN MBFR AGREEMENT, WHICH
WOULD REDUCE AND LIMIT CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE,
WOULD CONFLICT WITH THE FUNDAMENTAL PURPOSES OF
THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S DEFENSE BUILDUP PROGRAM.
THIS US ATTITUDE TOWARD MBFR WAS NOT REALLY NEW, HOWEVER,
IN KUTOVOY'S VIEW. HE SAID THAT MOSCOW AUTHORITIES
CONSIDERED THAT THE US HAD NEVER SEEN MBFR AS ANYTHING
MORE THAN A PLOY TO FEND OFF CONGRESSIONAL PRESSURES FOR
UNILATERAL TROOP REDUCTIONS. FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE
KISSINGER HAD ADMITTED THIS OPENLY IN HIS LAST BOOK.

5. KUTOVOY BELIEVED THAT THE ONLY INDICATION OF THE
SLIGHTEST REAL US INTEREST IN AN MBFR AGREEMENT HAD
BEEN IN WEST'S APRIL, 1978 PROPOSAL, TO WHICH THE EAST,
IN JUNE, 1978, GAVE A SUBSTANTIAL AND FORTHCOMING RESPONSE.
THE SOVIETS SAW THE WEST'S DECEMBER, 1979 PROPOSALS AS
BEING A CLEAR RETREAT FROM THE APRIL 1978 POSITION AND
AS A CONFIRMATION THAT NEITHER THE US NOR OTHER MAJOR
WESTERN POWERS WERE SERIOUSLY INTERESTED IN PROGRESS IN
VIENNA.

6. KUTOVOY INSISTED, HOWEVER, THAT THE SOVIET UNION FOR

ITS PART WAS SERIOUS ABOUT CONCLUDING AN MBFR AGREEMENT.
KUTOVOY SAID THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE, IN RESPONSE TO THE
OBVIOUSLY NEGATIVE US ATTITUDE TOWARDS SUCH AN AGREEMENT,
DECIDED TO BE PATIENT AND TO WAIT TO SEE WHAT THE US
FINALLY DECIDES ON. UNTIL THE US POSITION BECOMES CLEARER,
HOWEVER, MOSCOW DID NOT SEE WHY THE SOVIETS SHOULD MAKE
ANY FURTHER MOVE IN THE VIENNA TALKS, ESPECIALLY GIVEN
THE EAST'S SUBSTANTIAL MOVES LAST YEAR, INCLUDING
EASTERN ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF COLLECTIVITY AND
OF THE THREE-YEAR DURATION OF A FIRST AGREEMENT.
DEAN

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 606-114/10 F11259
BY G1 NARA DATE 1/2/08~~SECRET~~

Honorable Jake Garn
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator:

The President has asked me to reply to your letter of May 12 on Soviet compliance with SALT agreements and specifically the ABM Treaty.

This Administration intends to hold the Soviet Union to the highest standards of compliance with arms control agreements. Clearly, no arms control agreement can serve its function of enhancing U.S. and Alliance security unless there is strict compliance with its terms.

As your letter notes, the issue of Soviet compliance with SALT has been an essential element of the Administration's review of the role of strategic arms control in our national security policy. Since January we have intensively and comprehensively analyzed the record of Soviet compliance with SALT, and have also reviewed their compliance with other arms control agreements. This analysis has given rise to serious *(a number)* concerns with respect to the Soviet Union's compliance record, *and we are making* ~~we plan to make~~ these concerns unambiguously clear to the Soviet Government.

Through several channels we are impressing on the Soviets that their responses to the questions we raise on compliance and, more importantly, their future actions with regard to compliance will in large measure determine our approach to possible future negotiations. The Soviets will have to recognize that questions regarding their compliance with existing agreements must be promptly and satisfactorily resolved if the arms control process is to be viable.

With regard to the ABM Treaty in particular, I can assure you that this Administration has carefully analyzed the issues you mention and will insist on the strictest standards of Soviet compliance with regard to the provisions and concerns that you cite as well as the other provisions of the ABM Treaty. If you wish, I would be pleased to arrange a classified briefing for you to provide detailed answers to the questions you have raised.

A similar response has been sent to the co-signers of your letter.

Finally, in response to your remarks regarding a U.S. SCC Commissioner, I should note that the President has named Brigadier General John R. Lasater to be Acting U.S. Commissioner to the SCC.

Sincerely,

SALT

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IN

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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

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NLRR #86-114/18 #11260

BY 01 NARA DATE 1/2/08

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3486

~~SECRET~~ MOSCOW 07708

NODIS
E.O. 12065: RDS-3 6/4/01 (MATLOCK, JACK) OR-M
TAGS: PARM, UR, US
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE TO SOVIETS ON COMPLIANCE ISSUES --
- REQUEST FOR BACKGROUND INFORMATION
REF: STATE 141431

1. (8-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. CHARGE HAS APPOINTMENT WITH DEPUTY FOREIGN
MINISTER KORNIYENKO ON FRIDAY, JUNE 5 AT 10:30 A.M.
REQUEST ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON
FOLLOWING POINTS WHICH KORNIYENKO COULD RAISE
OR REFER TO:

-- SALT: WAS THE U.S. UNILATERAL STATEMENT ON
HEAVY MISSILES OF MAY 26, 1972 FORMALLY REJECTED
BY THE SOVIET SIDE ON THE NEGOTIATING RECORD?

ON THE USSR'S RESPONSE TO U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY
RESOLUTION 35/144C, AND TO THE U.N. SECRETARIAT'S
REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON CW USE OF LATE JANUARY
(USUN 320). WE ASSUME THAT, IF ASKED, WE SHOULD
CITE THE 1925 GENEVA PROTOCOL AS THE ARMS CONTROL
AGREEMENT TO WHICH OUR DEMARCHE IS RELATED. IF
KORNIYENKO QUESTIONS OUR POSITION ON CW NEGOTIATIONS,
WE ASSUME CHARGE SHOULD STATE ONLY THAT U.S. POLICY
TOWARD THOSE TALKS IS UNDER REVIEW.

-- LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY: PLEASE PROVIDE US WITH
THE NUMBER OF TIMES THE SOVIETS HAVE PROTESTED
NUCLEAR VENTING BY THE U.S., AND THE DATE OF THEIR
MOST RECENT PROTEST.

SIT: NAN POIN COL VP
EOB: (PIPER)
WHSR COMMENTS:

PAGE 01

MOSCOW 7708

DTG:041253Z JUN 81
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PSN:031874
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-- THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY: IN CASE KORNIYENKO
RAISES THE QUESTION OF U.S. ADHERENCE TO THE TTBT
AND PNET, CAN WASHINGTON PROVIDE US WITH ANY
CONTINGENCY GUIDANCE ON THE ADMINISTRATION'S
POSITION ON THESE TREATIES, AND WHETHER WE STILL
CONSIDER THEM TO BE BEFORE THE SENATE FOR
RATIFICATION? (IF REPLY NOT POSSIBLE AT THIS
TIME, ANY QUESTIONS POSED WILL SIMPLY BE TAKEN
FOR LATER REPLY.)

3. RESPONSE REQUESTED BY COB JUNE 4, WASHINGTON TIME.

MATLOCK

BT

PAGE 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 7708

DTG:041253Z JUN 81 PSN:031874
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IN

36

FLASH /OP IMMED
DE RUEHC #6974 1561652
Z 0 051651Z JUN 81 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PRAGUE FLASH 2699

INFO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 6539

~~SECRET~~ STATE 146974

NODIS
E.O. 12065: RDS-2 6/5/01 (EAGLEBURGER, LAWRENCE S.)

TAGS: PEPR, PINT, CZ, US

SUBJECT: ASYLUM SEEKER

REF: PRAGUE 2319

1. ~~(S-ENTIRE TEXT)~~

2. YOU SHOULD NOT DISCUSS THIS QUESTION FURTHER WITH
ANY MEMBER OF THE PRESS, AND SHOULD REFER ANY
PRESS INQUIRY TO THE DEPARTMENT. HAIG
BT

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/10 #11762

BY CN NARA DATE 1/2/08

SIT: COL VP JP
EOB: PIPES, STEARMAN
WHSR COMMENTS:

PAGE 01 OF 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 6974

DTG: 051651Z JUN 81
TOR: 156/1654Z

PSN: 033669
CSN: EHA482

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SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO ON U.S. ARMS POLICY

31

TAKE 1--GROMYKO SPEECH

LD151818 MOSCOW TASS INTERNATIONAL SERVICE IN RUSSIAN 1655 GMT
15 JUN 81

(TEXT) MOSCOW, 15 JUN (TASS)--ANDREY GROMYKO, USSR MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SPOKE TODAY AT A LUNCHEON IN HONOR OF CHARLES-FERDINAND NOTHOMB, BELGIAN MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. ANDREY GROMYKO SAID:

IN WELCOMING OUR BELGIAN GUESTS I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS SATISFACTION THAT RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND BELGIUM HAVE ON THE WHOLE BEEN GOOD IN RECENT YEARS. THESE RELATIONS NOW INCLUDE MUTUALLY ADVANTAGEOUS TRADE AMOUNTING TO BILLIONS OF RUBLES, FAR-REACHING SCIENTIFIC-TECHNICAL AND TRANSPORTATION LINKS AND EXCHANGES OF CULTURAL WEALTH. AND PROBABLY MORE IMPORTANT ARE THE FAIRLY STABLE CONTACTS AND CONSULTATIONS IN THE POLITICAL FIELD.

FROM THIS STANDPOINT YOUR VISIT TO MOSCOW, MR MINISTER, CONTINUES THE PRACTICE OF MEETINGS AND TALKS BETWEEN SOVIET AND BELGIAN STATESMEN. AND ALTHOUGH THERE ARE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE SOCIAL SYSTEMS AND THE IDEOLOGIES OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES, THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND BELGIUM IS INVARIABLY PERMEATED BY A DESIRE TO UNDERSTAND EACH OTHER BETTER IN FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS OF PEACE AND SECURITY OF PEOPLES. IN CONDITIONS OF AN INTERNATIONAL SITUATION WHICH HAS BECOME COMPLICATED, DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE STATES OF EAST AND WEST IS ESPECIALLY USEFUL, FOR NONE HAS YET THOUGHT UP A MORE EFFECTIVE METHOD OF SETTLING CONTROVERSIAL PROBLEMS--IF, OF COURSE, THEY ARE TO BE SOLVED PEACEFULLY-- THAN BY EXCHANGE OF VIEWS, DISCUSSION, NEGOTIATIONS AT VARIOUS LEVELS.

MOREOVER--AND WE STRESS THIS--NEGOTIATIONS ARE NEEDED ON THE ESSENCE OF THE PROBLEMS, AND NOT ABOUT HOW TO START ON NEGOTIATIONS, SAID GROMYKO. IT IS NO SECRET THAT IT IS NOW FASHIONABLE IN SOME CAPITALS TO TALK INTERMINABLY ABOUT NEGOTIATIONS, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME NOT LIFTING A FINGER TO BEGIN SUCH NEGOTIATIONS, TO START DISCUSSING HOW TO RELAX THE SITUATION, TO ELIMINATE THE DIFFERENCES, TO STRENGTHEN PEACE.

AT THE RECENT 26TH CPSU CONGRESS A SPECIAL-PURPOSE PROGRAM OF INITIATIVES WAS RAISED, THE IMPLEMENTATION OF WHICH WOULD HELP CORRECT THE SITUATION IN THE WORLD--FROM RESTRAINING THE BACCHANALIA OF ARMS, ESPECIALLY NUCLEAR MISSILES, TO ELIMINATING HOTBEDS OF TENSION--AND MEASURES THAT WOULD PROVIDE A RELIABLE SHIELD AGAINST THE ERUPTION OF CONFLICTS AND CRISIS SITUATIONS.

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED

NLRR F06-114/104/11270

BY 195 NARA DATE 7/18/08

IN BELGIUM, AS IN OTHER STATES, PEOPLE CAN BE SURE THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL NOT LEAVE THE PATH OF CONSOLIDATION OF PEACE, DETENTE, AND CURBING THE ARMS RACE. 38

AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 1980'S QUITE A FEW SKEPTICS APPEARED WHO DIRECTLY ASKED THE QUESTION: IS A NORMALIZATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL CLIMATE POSSIBLE AT ALL? THE SOVIET UNION CONFIDENTLY REPLIES: YES, IT IS POSSIBLE. THERE HAS BEEN AND THERE IS NO FATAL INEVITABILITY OF MILITARY CLASHES, NO RETURN TO THE "COLD WAR." "THERE IS NO DISPUTED MATTER IN RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES," SAYS LEONID BREZHNEV, "WHICH CANNOT BE SOLVED AT THE CONFERENCE TABLE; THERE IS NO KIND OF WEAPON WHICH THE USSR WOULD NOT BE PREPARED TO LIMIT OR TO BAN ON A MUTUAL BASIS BY AGREEMENT WITH OTHER STATES."

THIS, STRESSED GROMYKO, RELATES ENTIRELY TO ONE OF THE MOST CRUCIAL MATTERS OF THE PRESENT TIME--NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE. IT IS ASKED: WHAT IS HINDERING RESOLUTION OF THIS MATTER ON A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE BASIS, A SOLUTION IN THE INTERESTS OF THE SECURITY OF ALL PEOPLES? IN ANY CASE, IT IS NOT THE POSITION OF THE SOVIET UNION.

OUR COUNTRY IS READY FOR TALKS, FOR HONEST TALKS, ON THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY, TAKING ACCOUNT OF EACH OTHER'S INTERESTS. IF OUR PARTNERS ARE READY FOR THIS, THEN WE ARE AGREEABLE TO A REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR POTENTIALS, TAKEN AS A WHOLE, AND ON A CONSIDERABLE SCALE AT THAT, AS LEONID BREZHNEV HAS SAID MORE THAN ONCE.

IT WAS WITH THE VERY AIM OF CREATING THE MOST FAVORABLE CONDITIONS FOR TALKS THAT WE SUBMITTED OUR RECENT PROPOSAL FOR THE DECLARATION OF AMORATORIUM ON THE DEPLOYMENT IN EUROPE OF NEW MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILE SYSTEMS BY NATO AND THE USSR. THE SENSE OF IT IS THAT BOTH SIDES SHOULD STOP MEASURES TO INCREASE AND UPGRADE THE CORRESPONDING SYSTEMS IN EUROPE AND, DURING NEGOTIATIONS, AGREE ON THE LEVELS WHICH EACH SIDE CAN HAVE IN THE FUTURE.

UNFORTUNATELY, THOSE WHO OUGHT TO TAKE THEIR PLACE ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE NEGOTIATING TABLE ARE POSTPONING THE NEGOTIATIONS UNDER VARIOUS PRETEXTS, NOR DO THEY CONSENT TO THE MORATORIUM. APPARENTLY SENSING THE UNCONVINCING NATURE OF THEIR POSITION, THEY ARE RESORTING TO VARIOUS TRICKS IN ORDER TO DECEIVE PEOPLE.

(MORE)

15 JUN 1955Z JTD/SAH

/// TO DECEIVE PEOPLE.

(TEXT) THE MOST FREQUENTLY ENCOUNTERED OF THESE IS THE FALSE ASSERTION THAT ALLEGEDLY THE SOVIET UNION IS TIPPING THE BALANCE IN NUCLEAR ARMS IN EUROPE IN ITS FAVOR.

BUT DO NOT THE NATO COUNTRIES NOW HAVE IN THAT AREA ONE AND A HALF TIMES MORE NUCLEAR WARHEADS THAN THE SOVIET UNION? HAS ANYONE REFUTED THIS? AS FOR MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPON CARRIERS, IF ONE COUNTS EVERYTHING RELATING TO THEM, AND DOES NOT ARBITRARILY SUBTRACT ONE TYPE, THERE REMAINS AN APPROXIMATE EQUALITY BETWEEN NATO AND THE SOVIET UNION--INDEED AN EQUALITY THAT WAS QUITE RECENTLY ADMITTED EVEN BY WASHINGTON.

THOSE WHO ARE STUBBORNLY RELUCTANT TO CALL THINGS BY THEIR NAMES, TO QUOTE TRUE FIGURES, ARE MISLEADING PEOPLE. THE DATA SHOWING THE REAL RELATION OF FORCES ARE HIDDEN IN STRONG SAFES.

ANY OBJECTIVE PERSON HAS THE RIGHT TO ASK: WHY SUCH A THICK WALL OF UNWILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS THE PROBLEM IN ESSENCE, TO SIT AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE; WHY ARE UNTRUE DATA BEING USED?

WE ARE DEALING HERE WITH THE FACT THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS EMBARKED ON A COURSE OF IMPLEMENTING THE PLANS FOR THE DEPLOYMENT IN WESTERN EUROPE OF NEW AMERICAN MISSILES, COME WHAT MAY. GROMYKO STRESSED: PRIORITY IS GIVEN TO THIS AND NOT AT ALL TO THE TALKS. ALL THE REST--OBJECTIVE ASSESSMENTS, FACTS, TRUTH--IS DISCARDED.

AT PRESENT WASHINGTON IS FIGHTING TO PUT THE UNITED STATES AHEAD OF EVERYONE MILITARILY--THEY USE THE WORDS: AHEAD OF EVERYONE--TO MAKE THE UNITED STATES OCCUPY THE TOP RUNG ON THE PEDESTAL OF THE ARMS RACE. HOWEVER, THOSE WHO WORSHIP THE IDOL OF THE ARMS RACE FORGET THAT THE SAME LAWS EXIST IN POLITICS AS IN A STADIUM WHERE THE RUNNERS ARE TRYING TO OUTDISTANCE EACH OTHER. IF ONE PERSON SUCCEEDS IN MOVING AHEAD ANOTHER PERSON DOES EVERYTHING IN HIS POWER IN ORDER NOT TO LAG BEHIND, OR EVEN TO OUTDISTANCE THE OTHER PERSON. THE SOVIET UNION CONSIDERS THAT THE MILITARIST PLANS AND CONCEPTS THAT ARE EXPRESSED IN THE UNRESTRAINED ARMS RACE SHOULD BE DISCARDED. IT IS NECESSARY AND POSSIBLE, I AM STRESSING, NECESSARY AND POSSIBLE, TO TURN TOWARD AN EFFECTIVE RESTRAINT IN THE ARMS RACE AND TOWARD DISARMAMENT.

40
OTHERWISE PEACE, ONE OF THE HIGHEST BLESSINGS OF MANKIND, WILL REMAIN, LIKE THE "BLUE BIRD" IN THE TALE BY THE FAMOUS BELGIAN WRITER MAETERLINCK, ONLY AN ALLURING BUT UNATTAINABLE DREAM. OUR COUNTRY STANDS FOR MAKING STABLE PEACE A REALITY FOR THE PEOPLES OF EUROPE AND THE WHOLE WORLD.

MORE ABOUT ONE MAJOR TOPIC THAT WAS DISCUSSED IN OUR CONVERSATIONS THE MADRID MEETING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN CONFERENCE. IF IT MANAGES TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE CONVOCAION OF A CONFERENCE ON MILITARY DETENTE AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE, ESPECIALLY ON CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES, AND MAKES PROGRESS ON DIFFERENT SECTIONS OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, THIS WILL HAVE GOOD, FAVORABLE REPERCUSSIONS IN THE WORLD.

THE SOVIET UNION WENT TO MADRID WITH ONE WISH--TO PROMOTE THE SUCCESS OF THE TALKS, STATED THE SOVIET MINISTER. TOGETHER WITH OUR ALLIES WE ARE DOING ALL WE CAN TOWARD THIS AIM. IT IS TO BE HOPED THAT OTHER PARTICIPANTS IN THE MADRID MEETING ALSO SHOW THE NECESSARY POLITICAL WILL FOR ITS SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION.

NOT JUST IN BELGIUM BUT THROUGHOUT THE WORLD RUBENS HAS FOR GENERATIONS BEEN CONSIDERED A GREAT ARTIST, EXPRESSING IN HIS CANVASE THE TURBULENT RICHNESS OF LIFE. BUT, PERHAPS BECAUSE DESTINY ALSO OPENED A WINDOW FOR HIM INTO THE BUSINESS OF FOREIGN POLICY, RUBENS UTTERED A FAMOUS PHRASE WHICH EVEN TODAY HAS A STRONG RELEVANCE: "FOR MYSELF I WOULD LIKE THE WHOLE WORLD TO BE IN A STATE OF PEACE, AND WE COULD LIVE IN A GOLDEN AGE, NOT AN IRON ONE."

WELL SAID! THERE WOULD BE NO HARM IN CASTING THIS PHRASE IN GOLD OVER THE MAIN ENTRANCE TO THE NATO HEADQUARTERS WHICH IS IN RUBENS' HOMELAND, SAID ANDREY GROMYKO IN CONCLUSION.

(ENDALL)

15 JUN 2014Z JTD/RSC

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WHITE
INFORMATION ROOM
No. Pages **3**

LDX MESSAGE NO. 000730 CLASSIFICATION SECRET
FROM: Christopher Lehman PM/SNP 632-1611 7321
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION **SALT WG**

LDX TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
OSD	George Schneider	695-0931	5-A-670
JCS	COL. Frank Jenkins	695-9148	2D990
CIA			
NSC	Sven Kraemer	395-5014	(OEOb) 380
VP Military Office	Michael Fry	395-4224	(OEOb) 294
OMB	William Schneider	395-6190	(OEOb) 262

REMARKS: FOR: CLEARANCE ☐ INFORMATION ☐ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐

S/S Officer:

COL NAN JP
NSC

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AG: 16



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INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 3411

USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 1952

WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 6654

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NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 6/29/2001 (SCANLAN, JOHN D.)

TAGS: PARM, UR, US

SUBJECT: BRIEFING PERMREPS ON ARMS CONTROL COMPLIANCE

REF:A)MOSCOW 7776; B) MOSCOW 8649; C) USNATO 3428

1. ~~(S-ENTIRE TEXT)~~.

2. USNATO SHOULD USE FOLLOWING TALKING POINTS TO BRIEF PERMREPS IN RESTRICTED SESSION ON OUR DEMARCHE TO THE SOVIETS ON ARMS CONTROL COMPLIANCE.

- THE UNITED STATES HAS INITIATED AN EXCHANGE IN MOSCOW WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON THE GENERAL SUBJECT OF ARMS CONTROL COMPLIANCE. THE SOVIET RESPONSE HAS TO DATE BEEN UNSATISFACTORY.

- THE U.S. CHARGE TOLD SOVIET FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KORNIYENKO ON JUNE 5 OF OUR CONCERN OVER

SOVIET COMPLIANCE WITH A NUMBER OF ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS AND OVER SOVIET RELUCTANCE TO RESOLVE CERTAIN COMPLIANCE ISSUES WHICH HAVE ARISEN. HE CITED THEGENERAL PROBLEM OF SOVIET ACTIONS INCONSISTENT WITH THE OBJECTIVES OF THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS, THE SUSPICIOUS OUTBREAK OF

SIT:

EOB: KIMMITT,PIPES,SCHWEITZER,LORD

WHSR COMMENTS:

PAGE 01

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BY OK NARA DATE 1/2/08

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ANTHRAX IN SVERDLOVSK IN 1979, REPORTS THAT SOVIET FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN ARE USING LETHAL AND INCAPACITATING CHEMICAL WEAPONS, REPEATED VENTING OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL FROM SOVIET NUCLEAR TESTS IN THE PAST AND SOVIET UNDERGROUND TESTS WHICH MAY HAVE EXCEEDED THE 150 KILOTON THRESHOLD. THE DEMARCHE WAS INTENDED TO MAKE CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS THAT WE HAD BROADER COMPLIANCE CONCERNS IN ADDITION TO THOSE SALT RELATED ISSUES BEING ADDRESSED IN THE SCC.

- THE CHARGE ASKED FOR SOVIET COOPERATION IN ALLAYING OUR CONCERNS. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE WILLINGNESS OF THE SOVIET UNION TO DEAL WITH THESE ISSUES IN A CANDID AND COOPERATIVE MANNER WILL AFFECT THE POSSIBILITIES FOR FUTURE PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL.

- KORNIYENKO REPLIED ON JUNE 22. HE PROFESSED SOVIET INTEREST IN A DIALOGUE WITH THE U.S. ON ARMS CONTROL, BUT ACCUSED THE U.S. OF TRYING TO DIVERT THE DISCUSSION ONTO "CONTRIVED" ISSUES. HE DENIED ANY VIOLATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF SALT OR OTHER ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS. FOR EXAMPLE, HE ASSERTED THAT THE SOVIET UNION TAKES ALL NECESSARY MEASURES TO PREVENT VENTING OF RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT OUTSIDE THE USSR AND THAT THE SOVIET UNION FAVORS STRICT OBSERVANCE OF THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY. HE DENIED THAT THE OUTBREAK OF ANTHRAX IN SVERDLOVSK HAD ANY CONNECTION WITH THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION AND DESCRIBED REPORTS OF THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS BY SOVIET TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN AS FABRICATIONS. IN SHORT, KORNIYENKO REFUSED TO ENTER INTO A SUBSTANTIVE DIALOGUE ON THESE KEY ISSUES.

- IN SPITE OF THIS UNCOOPERATIVE REACTION, THE UNITED STATES INTENDS TO PURSUE THE ISSUE OF SOVIET COMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS. OUR PURPOSE IS TO ENCOURAGE STRICT SOVIET COMPLIANCE IN THE FUTURE, AS WELL AS TO FOSTER THE RESOLUTION OF EXISTING AND VERY GENUINE COMPLIANCE CONCERNS. HAIG
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LDX MESSAGE NO. 000779

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No. Pages 5

FROM: Christopher Lehman

PM/SNP

632-1611

7321

(Officer name)

(Office symbol)

(Extension)

(Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION

LDX TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
OSD	George Schneider	695-0931	5-A-670
JCS	COL. Frank Jenkins	695-9148	2D990
CIA			
NSC	Sven Kraemer JP NSC	395-5014	(EOB) 380
VP Military Office	Michael Fry	395-4224	(EOB) 294
OMB	William Schneider	395-6190	(EOB) 262

REMARKS: FOR: CLEARANCE ☐ INFORMATION ☐ PER REQUEST ☒ COMMENT ☐

S/S Officer:

A E. Lehman

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NLS FOL-114/10# 11251

By LOT, NARA, Date 7/18/08



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

August 10, 1981

(b) (3)

UNCLASSIFIED (with SECRET attachment)

MEMORANDUM TO: ACDA - James Timbie
CIA - [redacted]
JCS - Col. Frank Jenkins
NSC - Sven Kraemer
OSD - George Schneider
VP's Office - Michael Fry

FROM: PM/SNP - Christopher M. Lehman *CMF*

SUBJECT: SALT Working Group

Attached is a revised State draft of "Soviet Foreign Policy Objectives," which will be discussed at the Working Group meeting tomorrow, August 11.

Attachment:

As stated.

cc: OMB - William Schneider

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NLS F06-114/10#11252
By LOI, NARA, Date 7/18/08

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SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES

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Soviet security policy combines both military and foreign policy in an attempt to shift the global balance in favor of the Soviet Union. SALT has played a prominent role in this political-military strategy for more than a decade.

The Soviets have sought to promote a number of broad foreign policy objectives through SALT. While we cannot be certain of Moscow's exact motivations, a major Soviet objective undoubtedly has been to use SALT to facilitate their efforts to shift the overall balance of forces between the U.S. and the USSR to their advantage by impeding the modernization of U.S. nuclear forces while continuing to enhance the overall capabilities of their strategic forces. The shift in the strategic balance that has occurred over the last decade (in part as a result of the SALT process) has helped the Soviets to further their foreign policy objectives. They have also used SALT as a centerpiece of a ~~detente~~ policy designed to promote close ties with the West, and in particular trade and technology transfer; to achieve recognition as a coequal superpower in political and military terms; to capitalize on anti-military sentiment caused by the Vietnam war to reduce U.S. and Allied support for military programs and by codifying a U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship of parity to exploit Allied concern that the U.S. nuclear umbrella would be less reliable than in an era of unquestioned U.S. superiority.

The initiation of SALT talks in 1969 began the era of relations between the superpowers labeled detente. At that time Soviet strategic forces were qualitatively inferior to those of the U.S. but were closing the gap quantitatively. It is now generally recognized that the Soviet Union, in the era of detente has been more assertive in its international relations, and has used force with increasing boldness. The Soviets have also pursued opportunities and advantages during periods of relative military weakness (e.g., Korea, Laos, Congo, Berlin and Egypt). In the wake of the continuing Soviet military build-up over the past 15 years, Soviet adventurism in Africa, the Middle East and elsewhere, and finally their invasion of Afghanistan, the following elements characterize the current political landscape:

1. U.S.-Soviet relations are at their lowest point in almost twenty years;
2. Many of our allies are anxious to maintain what they consider to be detente relationship with the USSR, particularly in the area of arms control;

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BY CJ NARA DATE 1/2/08

3. the Soviet military build-up now has placed the U.S. in a weaker strategic position, and has increased Soviet ability to achieve foreign policy objectives in certain areas of the world. (Prospects for Soviet success are also influenced by local conditions and Soviet perceptions of any likely U.S. response.); and

4. The United States has made clear its readiness to undertake the defense effort needed to redress the strategic imbalance with the Soviets, and asserted a new willingness to resist Soviet challenges world-wide.

Current Soviet Objectives

Current Soviet SALT foreign policy objectives have been modified to take account of new political conditions, although they still exhibit many areas of basic continuity. The Soviets seek to use SALT negotiations to attain a more favorable balance and to promote detente on their terms without constraining their activities in other areas. In their relations with the U.S. the Soviets have the following foreign policy objectives with respect to a resumption of SALT talks:

-- To restore the perception of a return to "detente" in order to reduce U.S. public support for costly efforts to correct the existing military imbalance by fostering the illusion that arms control can take the place of force modernization, contribute to an atmosphere that would facilitate progress in other areas of bilateral relations of interest to them such as trade and technology transfer, and to reinforce the concept that strategic arms limitations can be divorced from wider linkages.

-- To shift the overall balance of forces in their favor -- and hence enhance their political leverage -- through negotiation of strategic arms limitation provisions which restrain U.S. technology and which facilitate the development of Soviet warfighting capabilities, including counterforce and damage limiting capabilities. The ultimate Soviet aim is to achieve a strategic posture which gives the Soviet the best chance of prevailing in a confrontation with the U.S. and thereby weakening our ability to stand up to Soviet aggression.

-- Complicate the improvement in U.S.-Chinese relations by stimulating Chinese suspicion of a superpower "condominium" and Chinese fears that the talks might be a sign of lessened U.S. willingness to counter the Soviet build-up in military terms.

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-- Decrease the risk of nuclear war with the U.S. by increasing Soviet certainty about the range of likely U.S. strategic responses in a crisis and by achieving a balance of forces which makes it increasingly risky for the U.S. to counter Soviet probes and initiatives.

-- Reduce the costs to the Soviets of achieving their strategic forces objectives, and reduce the economic costs of an arms competition with the technologically more advanced U.S.

-- Symbolize anew the special position of the U.S. and the USSR as superpowers.

The Soviets also have the following long-range objectives with respect to U.S. Allies that would be served by a resumption of SALT talks:

-- As with the U.S., reduce Allied willingness to assume the burdens of defense spending necessary to counter the Soviet military build-up and if possible, reduce the level of U.S. and Allied nuclear forces facing the Soviets in Western Europe, and hence erode the unity of NATO. (In the short run, however, a resumption of SALT talks would enhance Allied unity, in view of strong Allied concern that the SALT process continue.)

-- Stimulate and exploit Allied fears more generally about the reliability of the U.S. as a guarantor of their security interests by reinforcing the perception that the USSR is equal or superior to the U.S. in the strategic arena and encouraging doubts about U.S. capabilities or resolve to support the defense of Western Europe with nuclear weapons if necessary. (While the Soviets have asserted that they seek to achieve parity through the SALT process and their public spokesmen state there is an "appropriate equality" between U.S. and Soviet strategic capabilities, they also seek, in practice, to project an overall image of Soviet ascendancy.); and

-- Reinforce their selective approach to "detente" as a process for enhancing East-West diplomatic, economic, and cultural ties, without affecting Soviet policies of adventurism in the Third World, such as supporting "wars of national liberation," and thereby encouraging tendencies within Western Europe to adopt positions more in accord with Soviet interests.

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At present Moscow is seeking to exploit the hiatus in SALT talks through a widespread diplomatic and propaganda campaign aimed primarily at U.S. Allies. Soviet objectives in this campaign are: 1) to drive wedges between the U.S. and its Allies generally, 2) thwart TNF deployment in particular, and 3) increase pressure on the U.S. to return to talks before we are ready. In support of these objectives the Soviets are charging the U.S. with militarism, and in particular with adopting an irresponsible attitude toward initiation of nuclear war and with planning to fight a nuclear war in Europe. The Soviets also charge that the U.S. failure to ratify the SALT II Treaty and the alleged reluctance of the U.S. to resume SALT negotiations demonstrates that the U.S. is not interested in arms control: which they contrast with their own stated support for SALT II and desire for further negotiations.

With regard to the nations of the Third World, the Soviet diplomatic and propaganda campaign about SALT has many of the same anti-U.S., anti-defense aims as their campaign in Europe. In addition, the Soviets hope to exploit a politically popular pro-SALT posture to help local movements which support them and reduce the influence of pro-U.S. forces.

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LDX MESSAGE NO. 000771

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

No. Pages 2

FROM: Christopher Lehman
(Officer name)

PM/SNP

632-1611

7321

(Office symbol)

(Extension)

(Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION STATE COMMENTS ON SECOND DRAFT OF DOD'S

LDX TO: (Agency)

"BASIC CONSIDERATIONS FOR SALT POLICY" IA. & I.C.
DELIVER TO:

Extension

Room No.

OSD

George Schneider.

695-0931

5-A-670

JCS

COL. Frank Jenkins

695-9148

2D990

CIA

NSC

✓ Sven Kraemer

395-5014

(EOEB) 380

VP Military Office

✓ Michael Fry

395-4224

(EOEB) 294

OMB

✓ William Schneider

395-6190

(EOEB) 262

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By ADJ, NARA, Date 7/18/08



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

August 10, 1981

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MEMORANDUM TO: OSD - George Schneider
JCS - Col. Frank Jenkins
CIA -
NSC - Sven Kraemer
ACDA James Timbie
VP's Military Office - Michael Fry

SUBJECT: State Comments on Second Draft of DOD's
"Basic Considerations for US SALT Policy"

Attached for your information are State's comments on
the second draft of the DoD paper.

Christopher M. Lehman
Director
Office of Strategic Nuclear
Policy

cc: OMB: William Schneider

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By LST, NARA, Date 7/18/08

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Page 2

First two lines: The meaning of this final tic under the heading of strategic modernization goals should be clarified.

Second full paragraph, fourth line: Add "some" before "traditional:" One traditional basing mode, the SLBM, has not yet suffered increased vulnerability.

Fourth full paragraph, sixth line: We believe a typo was made here. The following words appeared between the words "US" and "missile" in the first draft:

-- "space systems. Moreover, we will increase our potential to deploy ballistic" --

Page 4

First paragraph, sixth line: We question the words "in the early 1990's." This may be inconsistent with the second tic on page 3, concerning SLBM modernization; moreover we understand that Secretary Weinberger has recommended 1988 or 1989.

Fifth paragraph, second line: Change "the defense program" to "our larger national security policies and programs." National security is dependent not only on defense but on such other factors as the state of the economy (thus Section I.C. of the study).

Fifth paragraph, third line: Change the words "lull us into again neglecting the needed strengthening of our defenses" to "contribute to the strategic imbalance by delaying needed defense programs in the hope of achieving an agreement."

Fifth paragraph, sixth line: Delete "most," as it could be read to prejudge future US negotiating position by implied concentration on heavy missiles exclusively.

Page 5

First paragraph, third line: Change "concealment" to "location uncertainty," a more precise description of the attribute of SLBM and MPS systems which aids their survivability.

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BY CN NARA DATE 1/2/08

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NLRR FOI-114/10 #1126

BY CN NARADATE 1/2/08

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 197125

EXDIS
E.O. 12065: GDS 7/25/87 (GOMPERT, DAVID C.)

TAGS: MNUC, NATO, UR, US

SUBJECT: SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

REF: THE HAGUE 4801

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. RE ZAGLADIN ASSERTION REFTEL, EMBASSY SHOULD INFORM D'ANSEBOURG THAT WHILE SOVIETS REPEATEDLY SOUGHT LIMITS IN SALT I AND II ON SO-CALLED U.S. FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS (E.G., F-111, F-4, PERSHING I), ON THE GROUNDS THAT THEY WERE CAPABLE OF STRIKING THE SOVIET UNION, AT NO TIME DID THEY OFFER LIMITS ON THEIR EQUIVALENT SYSTEMS SUCH AS THE SS-20 OR ITS PREDECESSORS, THE SS-4 OR 5, OR ON RTNF AIRCRAFT.

3. NOT UNTIL SHORTLY BEFORE THE NATO DECEMBER 12 DECISION ON TNF MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL DID THE SOVIETS SHOW ANY WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER NEGOTIATIONS THAT WOULD LIMIT THEIR OWN LRNF SYSTEMS, AND THEN THEY DID SO ONLY ON THE CONDITION THAT THEIR EXISTING SUPERIORITY IN LRNF BE PRESERVED. THUS, BREZHNEV'S OCTOBER 1979 PROPOSAL OFFERED NEGOTIATIONS ONLY ON CONDITION THAT NATO RENOUNCE ANY MODERNIZATION OF ITS OWN. FOLLOWING THE DECEMBER 1979

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DECISION, THE SOVIETS REFUSED NEGOTIATION FOR SIX MONTHS, EXCEPT ON THE CONDITION THAT NATO REVERSE ITS DECISION. THE BREZHNEV MORATORIUM PROPOSAL IS DESIGNED TO SERVE THE SAME PURPOSE -- E.G., BLOCK NATO'S MODERNIZATION WHILE PRESERVING THE GROWING SOVIET ADVANTAGE IN LRTNF AND ITS MONOPOLY IN LAND-BASED RTNF MISSILES.

4. ALTHOUGH SOVIET SS-20 DEPLOYMENT BEGAN IN 1977, THEY DID NOT OFFER TO NEGOTIATE LIMITS ON THEIR SYSTEMS UNTIL 1979. THE NATO DECEMBER 1979 DECISION, IN CONTRAST, OFFERED THE PROSPECT OF TNF ARMS CONTROL IN PARALLEL WITH LRTNF MODERNIZATION FROM THE OUTSET.

5. FINALLY, EMBASSY SHOULD NOTE THAT, FOLLOWING THE DECEMBER 1979 DECISION, THE US UNilaterally REDUCED ITS NUCLEAR INVENTORY IN EUROPE BY A TOTAL OF 1,000 WARHEADS.

6. OTHER ADDRESSEES MAY DRAW ON THE FOREGOING AS NEEDED.

HAIG
BT

LOX TO:

Edwin Meese III
Counsellor to the President
White House Sit Room

(b) (3)

Richard V. Allen
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
White House Sit Room

[Redacted]
Special Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense
Room 3E880, Pentagon (Phone: 697-8388)

NAM COX POIN SCHWEITZER NSC

Pipes

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NLS F06-114/104 11255
LST, NARA, Date 7/18/08

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While the programs described may not accord with final US planning decisions as to force mix and IOC dates, they are used here for forecasting possible political and military reactions. For example, our assessments concerning reactions to the MX ICBM would be the same if the D-5 SLBM were substituted for MX.

2. The estimate was prepared by the National Foreign Assessment Center and the Acting National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs.

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KEY JUDGMENTS

1. The Soviets have already characterized increases in US defense spending and media accounts of planned improvements in strategic programs as intended to regain the military advantage the United States formerly enjoyed. Decisions on modernization of US strategic programs coming on the heels of a reordering of national priorities to increase defense spending and the announcement of production of neutron weapons will impress Soviet leaders with the administration as a more determined rival.

2. Soviet reactions to the new US strategic programs will be determined by the extent to which these programs deviate from Moscow's expectations about US future capabilities when the SALT II Treaty was signed. Since the Treaty largely ratified Soviet strategic force plans, it follows that unanticipated elements of the new US programs would require some modifications in Soviet planning. Elements of the new US programs which may not have figured prominently in Soviet force planning in the 1970s include:

- The deployment of new ICBMs in long-endurance aircraft in the late 1980s and the possible deployment of the new ICBMs in C5A aircraft. The Soviets probably considered an air-launched ballistic missile as a US option after the demonstration in 1974 of a Minuteman launch from an aircraft.
- The prospect of a US program that would call for a revision or abrogation of the ABM was probably judged to be low.

US plans to deploy large numbers of cruise missiles probably took the Soviets by surprise in the late 1970s. A US program increasing the numbers and deployment modes of cruise missiles would further complicate their problems.

3. The Soviets will see the new programs as conveying mixed signals about future US arms control policies.

- Some of the new programs involve activities later in the 1980s limited by the Protocol to the SALT II Treaty. They almost certainly hoped that most of the Protocol provisions could be made permanent during the period of reduced US

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8. We believe that Soviet military reactions to specific US strategic force improvements, summarized in the table, would vary widely: some reactions probably would be minimal, whereas others would involve programmatic, technical, and operational changes in the late 1980s and 1990s that would be extremely difficult to carry out. Many, however, are both technically feasible and militarily sound.

- The greatest difficulty for the Soviets will be to develop and deploy systems and to perfect operational techniques for neutralizing US mobile ballistic missile carriers--submarines and aircraft on airborne alert. The increased dependence on space systems for this purpose and other military support missions could intensify the competition in space for survivable satellites and the means to counter those of the opponent.
- It may be equally difficult for the Soviets to meet the challenge of defending against a more sophisticated US aerodynamic threat composed of thousands of penetrating low-altitude cruise missiles and B-1 bombers with SRAMs. Also, Soviet planners must react to the prospect of declining visibility of US vehicles to Soviet air defenses as stealth technologies are introduced.
- Even though Moscow undoubtedly has anticipated an improvement in the hard-target capability of US forces--and hedged their development programs accordingly--the deployment of new US systems that severely threaten Soviet silo-based ICBMs and other hardened targets will pose a serious complication for Soviet planners. They will be faced with the difficult choices--already familiar to US planners--of further hardening their ICBM silos, relying more heavily on alternative basing schemes, or accepting a situation of increased vulnerability.
- The proliferation of new types of US launchers for ballistic and cruise missiles would add significantly to the uncertainties facing Soviet planners contemplating a counterforce strike against the US.

Even with a concerted Soviet development and deployment effort, the US force improvements when fully implemented, will create major uncertainties on the part of Soviet planners in the

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capabilities of their forces to perform all the missions envisioned in their strategy for nuclear war.

9. Reactions among West European governments and publics will be mixed:

- They will respect US resolve to meet the Soviet strategic challenge but will be concerned about the scope of new US strategic programs and their influence on West European security and the future of detente. They will object to bearing more of the conventional forces load in order that the US can concentrate on strategic forces.
- West European governments will seek assurances of the United States' willingness to negotiate reductions in planned new weapon developments or forego them if a satisfactory US-USSR agreement can be reached. They would prefer a "dual track" approach in which deployment plans would be matched by specific SALT proposals.
- European governments would understand a US program to intensify ABM research as a hedge against Soviet developments, but would regard a program calling for revision or abrogation of the ABM Treaty as a serious setback to their hopes for detente.
- A program that called for maintaining the new ICBMs in the US would be interpreted as a US commitment to the same type basing the Allies are being asked to accept. It would detract from the arguments of opponents of LRTNF in Europe.

10. The rest of the world perceives a situation of mutual deterrence between the superpowers, and are less concerned about claimed asymmetries in the strategic balance than they are about regional and more proximate threats to their security interests. The Chinese would welcome the new US programs as evidence of renewed US resolve, but would continue to insist that enhanced political and military cohesion is needed among powers opposing the USSR. The reactions of free world nations to the new US programs would be generally favorable, but there would be some concern that they could portend a further deterioration of US-Soviet relations and an increase in the risk of a superpower confrontation.

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