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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. notes (4pp)	R 11/20/83 MOZ-005 #7	2/11/84	P-1 P-5
2. notes (2pp)	R ~ ~ #8	1/28/84	P-1 P-5
3. notes (1p)	R ~ ~ #9	n.d.	P-1 P-5
4. notes (1p)	R ~ ~ #10	n.d.	P-1 P-5
5. notes (1p)	R ~ ~ #11	n.d.	P-1 P-5
6. notes (5pp)	R ~ ~ #12	n.d.	P-1 P-5
7. draft press announcement (1p)	R ~ ~ #13	n.d.	P-1
8. briefing paper re: US/Soviet relations (2pp)	R ~ ~ #14	n.d.	P-1 P-5
9. notes (3pp)	R ~ ~ #15	n.d.	P-1 P-5
10. notes (2pp)	R ~ ~ #16	n.d.	P-1 P-5
11. notes (1p)	R ~ ~ #17	n.d.	P-1 P-5
COLLECTION: MATLOCK, JACK F: Files			dlb
FILE FOLDER: Saturday Group - Notes (Jan-Feb 1984) OA 92219 Box 34			10/13/95

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
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- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
12. notes (1p)	R 11/20/03 MOZ-005 #18	n.d.	P-1 → P-5
13. notes (1p)	R - - #19	n.d.	P-1 → P-5
14. notes (1p)	R - - #20	n.d.	P-1 → P-5
15. notes (1p)	R - - #21	n.d.	P-1 → P-5
16. notes (1p)	R - - #22	n.d.	P-1 → P-5
17. notes (3pp)	R - - #23	n.d.	P-1 → P-5
18. notes (1p)	R - - #24	n.d.	P-1 → P-5
19. notes (1p)	R - - #25	n.d.	P-1 → P-5
20. notes (1p)	R - - #26	n.d.	P-1 → P-5
21. notes (1p)		n.d.	P-1 P-5
22. position paper (4pp)	R - - #27	n.d.	P-1 → P-5
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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23. drafts	of item # 22 (3pp)	n.d.	P-1 P-5
COLLECTION: MATLOCK, JACK F: Files			dlb
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PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O 13233

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer CAS

Box Number 34

FOIA M02-005

File Folder (SATURDAY GROUP - NOTES_ (JAN-FEB 1984)

DATE 3/21/2007

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
1	NOTES	HANDWRITTEN NOTES (#7)	4	2/11/1984	
2	NOTES	HANDWRITTEN NOTES (#8)	2	1/28/1984	
3	NOTES	HANDWRITTEN NOTES (#9)	1	ND	
4	NOTES	(#10)	1	ND	
5	NOTES	(#11)	1	ND	
6	NOTES	(#12)	5	ND	
8	BRIEFING PAPER	RE US SOVIET RELATIONS (#14)	2	ND	
9	NOTES	HANDWRITTEN (#15)	3	ND	
10	NOTES	HANDWRITTEN (#16)	2	ND	
11	NOTES	HANDWRITTEN (#17)	1	ND	
12	NOTES	HANDWRITTEN (#18)	1	ND	
13	NOTES	HANDWRITTEN (#19)	1	ND	
14	NOTES	HANDWRITTEN (#20)	1	ND	
15	NOTES	HANDWRITTEN (#21)	1	ND	
16	NOTES	HANDWRITTEN (#22)	1	ND	
17	NOTES	HANDWRITTEN (#23)	3	ND	
18	NOTES	HANDWRITTEN (#24)	1	ND	

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19	NOTES	HANDWRITTEN (#25)	MVH 3/17/08 1	ND	
20	NOTES	HANDWRITTEN (#26)	MVH 3/17/08 1	ND	
22	NOTES	HANDWRITTEN (#27)	MVH 3/17/08 4	ND	

Feb 11, 1984

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED
NLS M02005 #7

BY CIS, NARA, DATE 11/21/83

RB- Mar boundary
Soviet Reserve
Stockholm } No progress

JA- Chernenko delivered vitriolic attack on exch. prop.

CW- ① Mideast - Int. is trying to open dialogue -
② Intervene in election

- Disc. of ME as topic -

- Quest of resolution

Sec- Red-team paper -

We ready for dialogue -
Has to be sub.

Sov say: import to have dialogue -
That posture for opposition internally -
Also other things gain forward -
Diff posture to manage -

Our ~~position~~ posture ok, But must have negotiable
position. Need position on shelf as we can
move rapidly without long integrating process.

MBFR, bilat issues, START -

Meese- Question of Pres. inty.

Burt- VP's staff

Secy Knock down

CW- Avoid letting them demonstrate that we ineffective

Avoid sit whereby we urgently & publicly want st. they can withhold.

LSE - Fine line -

Sovs in uncomfortable pos.

Pos. with anti-spl. intent undercut

We can't let them off hook.

CW - Must avoid expectation of inst. agmt.

RCME - Devil's argument for meeting soon.

Mtg w/o sub. are bad policy.

Would not meeting to shake hands pre-empt pressure of concussions.

LSE - Conveying wrong signal to Sovs. Think we need for election.

BS - Puts us in box with Allies.

We shouldn't dump proposals for many negs.

RCM - Not summit.

Fears ability in our govt to resist this summer.

RB - Pass Sov int in START

Sec - Pres has gotten elected by taking positions we did not initially seem popular. He being advised to go to country & change policies.

BS - That worries me. Better to say election does not affect.

LSE - Have to think how we handle during election year.

CW - Not just Sov pressure. Mood here that mood low. Peace overshadows everything. Want st. signal.

Must avoid symbolic acts w/o content.

RB. What if WM went to Moscow.

EM. Not this the prob - but steady demand
of need to show self as much / place
Need paper for Pres & discussion.

- (1) Get this paper up.
- (2) Do more on politics / it
- (3) Ask for session with Pres.
- (4) 2nd meeting on 1984 & foreign pol.

LSE. Call Baker re same points

Mtg later
→ VP Trip

{ Sov put to package - Not as extensive as
Lrom.

{ Don't want VP to do Spec Emissary now.

→ Letter -

Sec feels not enough support for some things
now -

Saturday, Jan 28, 1984

Secy. ① Update

sleepers - ① olympics
② Forced labor

← Gram - Mtg.
Good pos re Sov Union
speech - imp in Eur
Sov. stance turning ppl off -

Gram - 8 pts bluster. But, even as compared with
mtg in NY, more exchange.

M+B. On Gram mtg + prospects -

S- Don't need arms cont agmt. Need dialogue.

Nature of Contacts

- S- 1. Grams confirmed priv. dialogue. off. but not publicized.
- 2. Ministerial-level meetings pass if useful.
- 3. Mil to military - { Scow - no need to rush. Don't
push -
- X 4. Parl { Too soon?
Attn to Sov. issues.
EM - Don't let get pt of campaign -

Substance

Arms Cont -- Non nuclear CW & MBFR
-- START --

Regional - S- Potentially worthwhile -

HRts
Bi lat - { Cons
Cust Exch Agmt -

(5.) - Paper - for Pres?

framework for future

- And's condition (W) then (S) then (G)

MCF

Questions - what's going to happen?

Need explanation of how we expect the short term to evolve.

Goes in introspective mode. Impact of our programs.

Have confidence it will be steady relationships.

Meece! Don't let their willingness to return be touchstone of our success

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NLS MOZ-005 #9

BY CS, NARA, DATE 11/2/03

Next Steps:

Process

- Secy to Dir. Man.
- Another Sec /

Contacts

Parl.

Mil / Mil

Substance

Arms Cont

~~Cont~~

Regional

Bridat

(Montreal /

Sleepers:

{ Olympics
ICAO
Forced Labor

Complainer

[Dir / Sec State / Union - Int. in what Sec had on START
Scholar - 5-page paper on US compliance -]

No change in pos on nuclear issue.
Some ^{very} limited prog on other issues.

Frank, comprehensive, useful.

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED
NLS MOZ 005 #10
BY CVS, NARA, DATE 11/21/03

Ironie to hear such accusations
from representative of country
which has never hesitated to
seize territory from which
attacks launched against it —
or even could be launched
against it.

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NLS MOZ-005 #11
BY CK, NARA, DATE 11/21/03

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

- Speech
- Letters - hit something new
 - deliver before speech, with copy of speech
- Propose quietly some conversations on: ME
Arms control in general
- Stockholm
 - agenda

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NLS MOZ-005#12

BY CVS, NARA, DATE 11/21/03

COMMUNICATING WITH THE SOVIETS

Background

Soviet Attitude

U.S. Interests

Conclusion :- Our ^{U.S.} pub dipl. interests almost diametrically opposed.

- Soviets will not cooperate in a "show" of dialogue

- Manageable from standpoint of pub diplomacy so long as we upholding this char.

- Need for content of dialogue to attract Sovs.

Modalities:

Public: Press statement

Offer meetings

NSDD following Press addresses re public statements.

Private: ① Letter with adv. copy of statement

② Offer to discuss agenda for Stockholm

Secy Sh

Discussion of special channels.
Kiss, = Dolegovskiy

Secy: ACTION

Paper on subject of communicating

Pros & Cons

Addresses what to do in Dec & Jan.

Agmt: ① Should be ready to estab. priv. means of communication

Th-Pick issue with some chance of success

Secy - Does anxious to talk about ME

② How to construct -
Need confirmation from Andropov -
Someone needs to go to Moscow.

③ Public stance. Major speech.

④ Controlling statements elsewhere

EM - Pub. perception of relationship - Chart graph
warm/cold not helpful. Talk about
our approach. Rll. continuum of series
of events, not something one can plot on
graph.

Sey -

MEF Admin must explain why relations are strained. Result of something good ~~we~~ have done. Trend of 70's checked.

Sey - Judge relationship not by vodka toasts, but

JFM to do paper#

Round Table with Pres. before holidays.

Sey - J-L's mts emerging

Evencroft - Compliance issues -
Enormous budget on what are talking
abt.

Lead off - Stockholm

JFM

Scowcroft -

Means of com & purpose must be consistent -

Bart - { Sovs reluctant to be seen talking -
Hammer to meet with And -
(JFM) - Topics & appropriate means -

Secy - { Substantive
Imagery

{ Secy. on contacts }

A3 re Burlatsky

Sov perception of what is serious
proposal -

Kamlenov -

{ Normal dip contacts

- Speech

- ^{McF-} How? ☐ Study? ☐

{ Paper analysing ☐☐☐☐

Less than discreet in use -

States re Sovs will view in context of elects.

Secy - Speech

Rhetoric -

A3 - Campbelle -

DRAFT PRESS ANNOUNCEMENT

The President intends to make a speech dealing with U.S.-Soviet relations on Monday, January 16, at the National Press Club.

Questions and Answers

- Q. Is the speech connected with the report on compliance?
- A. No, not directly. His speech will set forth his views of the relationship and his policy in broad terms.
- Q. Will it contain new initiatives?
- A. I doubt it, since the purpose of the speech is not to make new proposals--we have diplomatic channels for that--but to explain his attitude and policy.
- Q. Is the speech meant to be a signal to the Soviets?
- A. We assume the Soviets will pay attention to his statement, along with the world public.
- Q. Is this a sign that the President is seriously worried about the U.S.-Soviet relationship? Are we on the brink of war?
- A. No, the speech is not the result of any specific event and certainly does not reflect alarm that we are on a collision course--because we are not. The President will be speaking on the subject because he has a genuine desire to improve the relationship and believes it will be helpful to spell out his policy and his goals in comprehensive fashion.

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED
NLS 1402-005 #13
BY CJS NARA, DATE 11/21/03

U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS:
THE NEXT YEAR

Background Factors

--We have arrested U.S. decline and are in strong negotiating position.

--Soviets are on diplomatic defensive and have growing problems at home.

--Disarray in Soviet leadership makes it difficult to reach major decision for a change in policy.

--Soviets will resist steps they perceive as vindicating President's policy, assisting his reelection, and undermining their ability to split our alliances.

--At same time, Soviets respect President's strength and his ability to deliver agreements reached; they may, however, doubt that he is willing to reach any major agreement acceptable to them.

U.S. Goals

--Maintain domestic support for an adequate deterrence posture.

--Shore up Allied public support for U.S. policy and reduce opposition to necessary defense programs in key allied countries, especially the FRG.

--Maximize chances for a major arms reduction agreement and for a summit, recognizing that prospects, at best, are dim in 1984.

--Minimize Soviet potential both for adventurism or provocation (by deterrence), and for political maneuvering which weakens friendly governments and weakens our alliances (by dialogue and negotiation).

Means to Be Employed

--Keep pressure on Soviets by maintaining momentum of defense programs and, as feasible, counteracting or exacting a price for adventures abroad.

--Keep diplomatic pressure on Soviets to negotiate seriously.

--Keep onus on Soviets if they refuse negotiations.

--Intensify the dialogue, both publicly and privately.

--Demonstrate that responsible, fair agreements with the USSR are part of our overall policy.

Intensifying the Dialogue

A. General Considerations

DECLASSIFIED/RE/CLASSIFIED
NLS M02-005 #14
BY OLJ NARA, DATE 11/21/03

--Types of communication, in terms of public visibility: (1) public statements; (2) meetings or messages which are announced, but contents not disclosed; (3) meetings conducted or messages exchanged without public knowledge.

--The first two are those most useful for public diplomacy.

--The second two are the only practical means for reaching concrete agreements.

--The Soviets consider the third type the most appropriate for conducting real business; in the present atmosphere they will be suspicious of the second and reluctant to engage us in it unless it is accompanied by the third.

B. Content

--Given the Soviet suspicion that our professed interest in dialogue is merely for show, to alleviate domestic and allied public pressure, and that we have no intention of reaching any agreement, they will resist the public appearance of a dialogue unless they are convinced that we are prepared to deal with issues of interest to them.

--Current tensions are the result of Soviet actions and we owe them nothing for the "privilege" of dealing with them. We must resist any temptation to offer substantive concessions merely to induce them to talk.

--We should, however, identify areas where some practical accommodation would be in our mutual interest and signal a willingness to discuss them privately.

--

Sovs: Felling that reason always prevails.

An thresh. of "major response" to "sober up" RA

US seeks to remove them as wld power.

Focused on Arab-Iz-Lib area.

- Danger of situation flowing from proximity of US & Sov mil personnel.
- Obviously will like to see Marines out of Beirut (did not dwell on)
- Sov. interest: Say more int in stability than controlled tension. Because tension not controlled. Don't want upheaval in Saudi Arabia.

DECLASSIFIED (REF 1950)

NLS MOE-005 15

AS 4/21/03

BY , NARA, DATE

- Open in acknowledging that we
don't control Is & they don't
Syn - Sit. part. dangerous
because of latter.

- Harped on US policy of excluding them
from process in M.E.
(Idea that Sec Shultz blocked
exchange) Amb's with Egypt)

- Suggestions: Three-phase process

① Sov & Amer & Sov tips talk about

- process to move toward peace

- framework for peace.

[G. Sisco - Dohr talks in '69]

② Period of bilate diplomacy

[Rel with Is? Sovs did offer respect in
non-aligned community.]

③ Larger meeting (maybe only
to ratify something worked out)

Neumann re officials

- "Not going to run us out of the ME" -
- Not rushing for confrontation, but prepared for it. Syria the place.
- [Rapidity with wc Neumann, at oppts]
- Precise message re "don't hit Syria"
[Primakov & Belqayer -]
Sovs wld respond (ADsgst) if Is hit.

Podyalov re UNIFIL -

- ① vote for extension
 - ② issue ? expanding has not arisen
- Others: Have to be outside May 17 agreement.

Objectives over next 12 months.Background factors:

Soviet

US Allies

US Domestic

Goals:

1. Maintain domestic support
2. Shore up Allied support
3. Maximize chances for a deal. minimize ~~the~~ potential for Sov. ~~to~~ counteraction

Means:

1. Keep ~~ours~~ ^{pressure} on them to negotiate realistically
2. ~~Make clear both to public & leadership~~ that keep ours on them if they don't
3. Demonstrate, when possible, that reasonable agreements are possible.
- 4.

Tactics:

- intensify dialogue, both private & public
- ~~██████~~
-

Sequence

Private

1- Letter →

2- Speech

3- Stockholm meeting (if accepted)

IF NOT ACCEPTED: ~~then~~

a) Tell them, then a few days later, announce that we willing to arrange meeting at mutual convenience

IF ACCEPTED: Inform Soviets of our readiness to arrange other meetings

1. Distinction between public & private
Must be in synch BUT:

- public necessary for ~~the~~ down & allied ops.
- private ~~needed~~ necessary if we want
to find practical solutions -
and perhaps in order to make pub.
possible -

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

BAIT

- 1- Discussions of ME
- 2- KAL, ICAO & Olympics
- 3- MBFR
- 4- SCC - Concurrent operations
- 5- Exchanges
- 6- Consulates

~~BAIT~~ POSSIBLE BAIT

~~SECDEF~~
 &
JCS Contacts

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NLS MDZ-005 #77

BY CL, NARA, DATE 11/21/03

Timing

Public

Fact of contact public,
Content Private

Fact of
Content private

Dec. 20

~~Letter of Pres.~~
Pres. Letter

~~Early Jan.~~ Speech

Also Pres. interviews
before & after.

Jan 17

~~Jan~~
- Campaign to use
speech as basis for
gaining wider support
for our policies.

{ Possible Shultz/Doherty
Hartman - Shuman intps.

Shultz/Grumkyko

Test and
possibly
activate
private

① Channels
- some like publicized
"emissary (ies)"

- Seawright

- Massie (culture)

- Webb (?) only)

② Respond to
problem
"special channel"

Feb

to

April

Another Shultz -
Shuman Meeting

Ambassadorial
contacts.

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NLS MOC-005 #18

BY CL NARA, DATE 11/21/03

→ McFarlane only. Possibilities for contacts.

1. ~~Shultz / Gromyko~~ also

Direct with WFE

~~Complete~~

- ① Scowcroft
- ② Massie
- ③ Cobb
- ④ Myself

⑤ ~~■~~ If there is a "problem," need some contingency planning on how to handle.

BY CYS, NARA, DATE 11/21/03

(2 longer than sched.)

- 5 hrs - Sec made all points in his brief -

Gr in truculent mood. But see me for talking. Gr said me offer record. May want progress in some areas.

Re nuclear arms - new position. Considering how to handle. Not yet decided. Not willing to discuss.

~~Sec~~ Claimed HM./FBS trade-off in Salt II.

Sec said if Pershys + cruise discussed, SS-20's must be in. Also attach an Alhier same as att on us.

Re- Other Arms Control.

MBFR - Mar. 16 (d. 7 channels)

Chem Weapons - Seemed int. Willing to discuss global as well as regional.

CDE - Urged heads of del to stay in contact.

HR - Secy made our points, mainly Stch, Sak + Perm Reg. issues. Debate essentially - Showed most int in talking about ME

Bilat: ICAO - perhaps

Compliance: If more Secs pub, will respond with changes of our own.

Speech - Some passages "taken in isolation" constructive.

Want to intensify dialogue in gen.

No mention on either side of another Sh - Her mtg -

Draver:

Pres comments:

Too much into one speech.

No news.

No new ground.

Pe dest ~~exam~~

Gizon - Need for rationale

Check p 8 - "confidence"

→ Cover memo

DECLASSIFIED (RELEASE)

NLS MUZ-005 #21

BY CIS, NARA, DATE 11/21/03

1)

Sec-Pres

Sec made all points
2 hrs over

He in turbulent mood

They see necessity for talking

On some issues very want papers -

Position on nuclear arms -

MBFR - Mar. 16 (Ed's channels)

Chem. Wiegman - seemed very interested

Compliance: If more becomes public, will respond with
charges of our own -

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Series 7 Map

(1) US objectives & probs

Arms Control
Reg. conflicts
Bilat

(2) Existing & future probs we could affect

- unexpected
- Andropov's
- Allied & domestic nervousness
- Sov trouble - why cap -
- engam

DECLASSIFIED/CR/04573

NLS 1402-005 #123

BY CLS, NARA, DATE 1/21/03

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

(2) How to talk to
Sovs -

AH -
Dohr -

Other avenues -

Non Admin -

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

③ How to discuss
pol publicly

- Spch
- ltr
-

For final statement at
Ditchley

DECLASSIFIED / RE / (ASD)
NLS MOZ-005 #24
BY CIS, NARA, DATE 11/21/03

- 1 - Caveat
- 2 - "Subset" of Rls with SU
- 3 - Military basis of Soviet influence
- 4 - Relaxation of tensions - but make sure tensions are being relaxed before you act as if they are.
- 5 - Pol toward EE
"Finlandization"
Importance of setting clear goal
Impact on EE population
hope for change in future
cultural heritage.
- 6 - Need sustainable policy on realistic basis.

Sov. goal to instill hopelessness

Catalogue of steps and Rough Sequence

Timing:

Channel

Early
Mar.

1. Propose resumption of negotiation of exchange agreement & reopening consulates Official (Chultz/Doh)
 2. Reiterate expectation of Sov. coop. in nav aids (Montreal). Official ~~(Chultz)~~
 3. Propose consultations by experts in ME & policy planning Official (Hartman)
 4. ~~Informal~~ Discussion of INF & START issues, indicating acceptability of "Win W" + ~~new~~ framework agmt for START Private (Snowcroft)
- [If favorable Soviet response & agmt to do so, move into official channels]
5. Present proposed ^{contingency} "work program" ~~Private~~ Channel

Soviet action on human rts; no add'l probs in 3rd areas will bring US response in areas of int. to sell.

TTBT/PNE
ASAT
Aeroflot
Fisheries
Maritime

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Individual Issues

START/INF

- The key issues for Soviets ^{and} for West Europe.
- The most visible issue for our own public.
- A negotiable START framework - one that preserves our basic objectives of sig. lower levels, restraint on the most threatening Soviet system and verifiability

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

It was - scenario
**U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS IN 1984:
A PROGRAM OF ACTION**

Background

MEMORANDUM

The Soviets are holding to the position that it is up to us to make the next step. ~~NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL~~ *The National Security Council* is doubtless to bring pressure to bear on us to make concessions in advance, in order to satisfy public opinion. Other contributory factors may be that they are unable to reach agreement on initiatives of their own, and -- to a degree -- that they genuinely doubt our good faith in proposing negotiations.

Their stance is unreasonable and we should avoid steps which undermine important substantive positions.

Initiatives, however, are not necessarily the same as concessions. The Soviet stance does give us the opportunity to shape the agenda to our advantage by carefully considered initiatives. There are some steps which are to our net advantage; in other areas, largely cosmetic alterations on our part could be used both to defuse domestic and allied pressures and to attempt to elicit more substantial concessions on the Soviet part.

We should also bear in mind that some of our positions are likely to come under intense public and Congressional pressure in this election year. Minor modifications in advance of that pressure can preserve negotiating leverage which might be undermined if we stand pat and the pressures grow.

A Fundamental Choice

Since we need the image of negotiations for our public diplomacy in this election year we should decide at the outset whether:

(1) We will do only what is minimally necessary to keep the public appearance of a dialogue, without a serious attempt to make major progress on key issues; or

(2) We will in fact attempt to achieve some major breakthroughs, while recognizing that they may not be possible given the disarray in the Soviet leadership and election-year pressures here.

The first option ("Modest Scenario") would require some expansion of the dialogue and some steps in bilateral areas where solution favors our long-term interests (e.g., exchanges, consulates).

The second option ("Ambitious Scenario") would require, in addition, some movement -- either cosmetic or conceptual -- in our arms control positions. While concessions on basics are neither required nor desirable, we must be prepared to concede enough in form to make it possible for the Soviets to negotiate seriously. And we must be prepared to consider innovative ways to achieve our basic objectives.

Public Diplomacy

Whichever option we choose, it will be essential to minimize public expectations during the next few months. If we raise expectations at this point, we hand the Soviets a powerful lever to make our policy seem ineffectual just as the result of their

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inaction. For several months to come we should be very guarded in our predictions, both on the record and on background, and should not encourage expectations either of a summit or of major breakthroughs.

Such a stance would enhance the impact of a summit (if a productive one can be arranged) and of any substantial progress in the relationship. In the absence of major progress, however, it would permit us explain in late summer what we had attempted and to place the blame squarely on the Soviets. ✓

The Modest Scenario

This would involve moving rapidly to resolve some bilateral issues which are in our own long-term interest (exchanges agreement and consulates in Kiev and New York), pressing for Soviet cooperation in establishing better navigation aids on the airline route KAL 007 should have followed, trying to settle other outstanding bilateral issues, and expanding the dialogue into a number of regional and general topics. On arms control, however, we would merely discuss the potential of our existing proposals and wait for Soviet movement before changing any of ours. On human rights, we would continue to make representations, but would not offer concrete incentives (other than an improved atmosphere) for better performance. An illustrative scenario is at TAB A.

PROS

- If properly managed, ^{could possibly} ~~would probably~~ result in sufficient diplomatic activity to make our public diplomacy defensible.
- Would preserve our current negotiating positions in arms control areas.
- Might increase pressure on Soviets ^{eventually} to make more basic concessions that they would do otherwise.
- Since substantial achievements are unlikely this year anyway, it ^{could be} ~~is~~ the safer course.

CONS

- Unlikely to provide sufficient incentive to the Soviets to achieve any breakthroughs in arms control.
 - ~~Might not provide sufficient incentive for Soviets to~~ maintain an ^{intense} dialogue.
- Would make it more difficult to arrange a meaningful summit.
- Leaves much of the initiative in shaping the agenda to the Soviets.
- Does not fully utilize our potential leverage on Soviet human rights practices and on Soviet behavior in regional disputes.
- Domestic and allied pressures could force some unravelling of our arms control positions without obtaining adequate recompense from the Soviets.

The Ambitious Scenario

This would test the limits which might be achieved this year and would include all the items in the Modest Scenario plus the following:

(1) An attempt (initially in informal channels) to get START and INF off dead center by proposing a new START framework and indicating that, in resumed negotiations, we would accept a modified "Walk-in-the-Woods" solution to INF. (This would address the most important immediate Soviet concerns.)

(2) An attempt through private channels to agree on a series of independent or joint steps by which the Soviets would take specified actions in the human rights area, which would in turn trigger certain actions by us on arms control or bilateral issues, provided the Soviets refrain from going after additional "targets of opportunity" in the Third World or on their borders.

Significant movement on either of these points would provide an adequate basis for a successful summit meeting, which could produce either renewed negotiations on START/INF or an agreed "work program" on other issues. If the Soviets fail to move on any of them (as they well might), the initiatives could be made public in late summer or early fall to prove Soviet intransigence.

An illustrative scenario is at Tab B.

PROS

-- Would maximize whatever chances exist to make significant progress this year.

-- Could be used eventually, whether it works or not, to bolster our public diplomacy.

-- Could provide the basis for a successful summit.

-- Since any alterations in our position would, for the most part, be contingent upon prior or simultaneous action by the Soviets, implicit concessions could not easily be pocketed.

-- If successful, it would vindicate our policy of strength and could be used to keep public support behind future efforts to deal realistically with the Soviets.

CONS

-- Soviets are unlikely to be both able and willing to make the hard decisions rapidly enough to make it work.

-- Premature leaks could endanger the whole process.

-- Making proposals contingent upon Soviet actions does not totally remove the danger that they would try to pocket changes in our positions without corresponding changes in theirs.

-- ~~Even~~ If successful, this course might lead to public euphoria, which could undermine necessary support for our defense

programs. It might also be interpreted as a signal that we have written off Afghanistan, Poland, and other important issues which would remain unsolved.