

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library

Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: Science/Space, etc - Soviet Union (1)
Box: 34

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 5/23/2005

File Folder SOVIET UNION: SCIENCE/SPACE, ETC. 1/2

FOIA

F06-114/10

Box Number 34

YARHI-MILO

3407

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
11358	MEMO	STEARMAN TO ALLEN RE GROMYKO PROPOSES TREATY ON SPACE WEAPONS <i>R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10</i>	1	8/12/1981	B1
11362	PAPER	USSR <i>R 3/28/2011 F2006-114/10</i>	3	8/11/1981	B1
11360	PAPER	A STRATEGY FOR NEAR TERM PUBLIC POSTURE ON ASAT AND ARMS CONTROL IN OUTER SPACE <i>R 3/28/2011 F2006-114/10</i>	15	8/31/1981	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

~~SECRET~~

VIA LDX 54-space
NSC 507 (Add-on)
1

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

→ Pipes
1545

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
ACTING DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY
ACTING ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS
AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

SUBJECT: Soviet Space Event (U)

As requested by Richard Allen in his memorandum of February 23 on the above subject, an interagency group will be formed to develop an action plan to deal with the possible Soviet manned space event. The group will be chaired by Ben Huberman on behalf of OSTP and the NSC staff. It will hold its initial meeting at 2:00 p.m. Tuesday, March 3 in Room 305 OEOB. Please have the name of your representative phoned to Mrs. Betty Lewis (395-4823) by 2:00 p.m. Monday, March 2. (S)

Allen J. Lenz
Allen J. Lenz
Staff Secretary

~~SECRET~~

Review on February 24, 1987

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 23, 1997

By CWS NARA, Date 8/5/02

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

17 March 1981

To: Richard V. Allen
From: Barbara Honegger *BH*
Re: Science policy and organization in the USSR

What are the Soviets doing at the Cosmos Club?
Last night I attended an interesting lecture by Igor Makarov, science attache with the Embassy of the USSR here in Washington. The presentation was held at the Cosmos Club. One of the members of the Club has kindly provided a copy of Mr. Makarov's slide information, which is attached for your use.

How important is this document?
I feel it my duty to let you know that Mr. Makarov's presentation was extremely formal and in many places aggressive, and that it began with the following "joke":

An American said to someone from the USSR how he was concerned that with the new strained relations between the two countries that there would be a third World War. The Russian laughed and said that the American had nothing to worry about--that there would be no war, just a "struggle for peace" so devastating that no one would be left to worry about war.

Following this "joke," Mr. Makarov opened his remarks, which he read from a prepared text, by saying that, now that we (Americans) knew what future lay ahead of us, he could continue. His tone was curt and serious. Following the formal presentation, however, he appeared freed of his role and interacted loosely with the group in a friendly manner.

3/27/81

I did not raise this question directly w/ Janet but, in view of her question on the routing slip, it would seem this item should be stopped at least "for any action necessary"

JCP

81 MAR 17 P 2: 26

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

DICK ALLEN

IRENE DERUS

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

KAY

CY TO VP

CY TO MEESE

CY TO BAKER

CY TO DEEVER

CY TO BRADY

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

what
will we
do w/ this?
Ja

(3/27/81)

SCIENCE POLICY AND ORGANIZATION

IN THE USSR

INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM

IGOR MAKAROV
SCIENTIFIC ATTACHE
EMBASSY OF USSR

MARCH 16, 1981

TR

RECEIVED 27 MAR 81 16

15

TO

ALLEN

FROM HONEGGER, B

DOCDATE 17 MAR 81

KEYWORDS: USSR

SCIENTIFIC

MAKAROV, IGOR

SUBJECT: LECTURE BY MAKAROV RE SCIENCE POLICY & ORGANIZATION IN THE USSR

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR ALLEN

DUE: 31 MAR 81 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

PIPES

HUBERMAN

NO COMMENT
per Mc Gaffigan/OST
x5636

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(M /)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

NSC/S C 31 Mar NFAR per R Pipes

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pipes
Soll/Space
6

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

4800

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

August 12, 1981

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: WILLIAM L. STEARMAN *WLS*

SUBJECT: Gromyko Proposes Treaty on Space Weapon

At Tab I is text of a letter from Gromyko to Waldheim (released by TASS) proposing a treaty to ban all weapons in space. The letter proposes that the treaty be an item on the next UNGA agenda and has a draft treaty attached. State (INR) believes that the performance of the space shuttle Columbia may have provided the immediate impetus for the Soviet initiative. I agree with this assessment. The Soviets characteristically seek arms control agreements when they see us forging ahead in some aspect of national defense. SALT I is a good example of this.

Concern about our potential anti-satellite capability is clearly reflected in Article III of the draft treaty. Member states are not to destroy, damage or disturb the "normal functioning" of space vehicles.

I trust we will all come up with a response to this treaty proposal before the UNGA convenes.

Attachment

Tab I Treaty Banning Weapons in Space

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 106-114/10 #11358
BY CW NARA DATE 1/2/08

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review on August 12, 1987

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FBIS 28

Stearns

7

TASS: GROMYKO PROPOSES TREATY BANNING WEAPONS IN SPACE

LD111608 MOSCOW TASS IN ENGLISH 1508 GMT 11 AUG 81

("LETTER FROM SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER TO U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL"--TASS HEADLINE)

(TEXT) MOSCOW, 11 AUG (TASS)--THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR, ANDREY GROMYKO TO THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE U.N.O. HAS BEEN PUBLISHED HERE:

"ESTEEMED MR. SECRETARY-GENERAL,

"THE SOVIET UNION PROPOSES THAT AN ITEM 'ON THE CONCLUSION OF A TREATY BANNING THE DEPLOYMENT OF ANY WEAPONS IN OUTER SPACE' BE PLACED ON THE AGENDA OF THE 36TH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

"IN 1982 MANKIND WILL CELEBRATE THE 25TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE BEGINNING OF THE EXPLORATION OF OUTER SPACE, ONE OF THE GREATEST ACHIEVEMENTS OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY OF THE 20TH CENTURY. THE USE OF OUTER SPACE ALREADY TODAY GREATLY BENEFITS MANKIND IN SUCH SPHERES AS COMMUNICATIONS, STUDY OF THE EARTH'S NATURAL RESOURCES, METEOROLOGY, NAVIGATION, TO MENTION BUT A FEW. IT CAN BE SAID THAT PEOPLE HAVE BEGUN 'SETTLING DOWN' IN OUTER SPACE.

"AT THE VERY INCEPTION OF THE COSMIC ERA, WAY BACK IN 1958, THE SOVIET UNION MADE A PROPOSAL AT THE UNITED NATIONS ENVISAGING A BAN ON THE MILITARY USES OF OUTER SPACE.

"THROUGHOUT ALL SUBSEQUENT YEARS THE SOVIET UNION HAS INVARIABLY FAVOURED AND CONTINUES TO FAVOUR MAKING OUTER SPACE A SPHERE OF EXCLUSIVELY PEACEFUL COOPERATION. IT CAN BE NOTED WITH SATISFACTION THAT MUCH HAS BEEN DONE IN THIS DIRECTION.

"AN INTERNATIONAL TREATY BANNING TESTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE ATMOSPHERE, IN OUTER SPACE AND UNDER WATER WAS CONCLUDED IN 1963. THE 1967 TREATY ON THE PRINCIPLES GOVERNING STATES IN THE EXPLORATION AND USE OF OUTER SPACE, INCLUDING THE MOON AND OTHER CELESTIAL BODIES, ENVISAGES THE EXCLUSIVELY PEACEFUL USES OF THE MOON AND OTHER CELESTIAL BODIES AND ALSO BANS THE ORBITING AROUND THE EARTH OR PLACING INTO OUTER SPACE IN ANY OTHER WAY ANY OBJECTIVES WITH NUCLEAR ARMS OR OTHER TYPES OF WEAPONS OF MASS ANNIHILATION.

"THE 1979 AGREEMENT ON THE ACTIVITY OF STATES ON THE MOON AND OTHER CELESTIAL BODIES DEVELOPS AND SPECIFIES COMMITMENTS OF THE STATES IN ENSURING EXCLUSIVELY PEACEFUL USES OF THE MOON AND OTHER CELESTIAL BODIES OF THE SOLAR SYSTEM.

ZALL ABOVE-MENTIONED INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS, HOWEVER, DO NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF THE DEPLOYMENT IN OUTER SPACE OF SUCH TYPES OF WEAPONS WHICH CANNOT BE DEFINED AS WEAPONS OF MASS ANNIHILATION. AS A RESULT OF THIS, THE RISK OF MILITARISATION OF OUTER SPACE IS MAINTAINED AND RECENTLY HAS BEEN INCREASED.

"THE SOVIET UNION BELIEVES THAT THIS CANNOT BE TOLERATED. IT IS IN FAVOUR OF KEEPING OUTER SPACE CLEAN AND FREE OF ANY WEAPONS FOR ALL TIME, OF PREVENTING IT FROM BECOMING A NEW ARENA OF THE ARMS RACE AND A SOURCE OF AGGRAVATION OF INTER-STATE RELATIONS.

"THE ATTAINMENT OF THESE AIMS, IN THE OPINION OF THE SOVIET UNION, WOULD BE PROMOTED BY THE CONCLUSION OF AN INTERNATIONAL TREATY BANNING THE DEPLOYMENT OF ANY TYPES OF WEAPONS IN OUTER SPACE.

"THE DRAFT OF SUCH A TREATY WE PROPOSE IS ATTACHED TO THIS LETTER.

"I ASK YOU, MR. SECRETARY-GENERAL, TO REGARD THIS LETTER AS A MEMORANDUM ENVISAGED BY THE RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND TO CIRCULATE IT WITH THE DRAFT TREATY AS AN OFFICIAL DOCUMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY."

11AUG 1716Z 96/CAJ

DECLASSIFIED
NLR 70-11410 #11362
BY RUD NARA DATE 3/28/11

LD111944 MOSCOW TASS INTERNATIONAL SERVICE IN RUSSIAN 1525 GMT Q1 AUG 81

8

("FULL TEXT" OF DRAFT TREATY--"ON THE CONCLUSION OF A TREATY BANNING THE DEPLOYMENT OF ANY WEAPONS IN OUTER SPACE"--PROPOSED BY THE SOVIET UNION FOR INCLUSION ON THE AGENDA OF THE 36TH SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY)

(TEXT) MOSCOW, 11 AUG (TASS)--"THE MEMBER STATES OF THE PRESENT TREATY, GUIDED BY THE GOALS OF CONSOLIDATING PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, PROCEEDINGS FROM THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, ABSTAINING FROM THE THREAT OF FORCE OR FROM ITS USE IN ANY WAY AS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE GOALS OF THE UNITED NATIONS, AND, SEEKING NOT TO PERMIT OUTER SPACE TO BE TURNED INTO AN AREA OF THE ARMS RACE AND A SOURCE OF THE AGGRAVATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES, HAVE AGREED ON THE FOLLOWING:

ARTICLE I

SECTION 1: THE MEMBER STATES UNDERTAKE NOT TO PUT INTO ORBIT AROUND THE EARTH OBJECTS WITH WEAPONS OF ANY KIND, NOT TO INSTALL SUCH WEAPONS ON CELESTIAL BODIES AND NOT TO DEPLOY SUCH WEAPONS IN OUTER SPACE IN ANY OTHER WAY, INCLUDING ALSO ON PILOTED SPACE VESSELS OF MULTIPLE USE BOTH OF THE EXISTING TYPE AND ALSO OF OTHER TYPES WHICH MAY APPEAR IN MEMBER STATES IN THE FUTURE.

SEC. 2: EACH MEMBER STATE OF THE PRESENT TREATY UNDERTAKES NOT TO HELP, NOT TO ENCOURAGE AND NOT TO IMPEL ANY STATE, GROUP OF STATES OR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION TO ENGAGE IN ACTIVITIES RUNNING COUNTER TO THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION ONE OF THE PRESENT ARTICLE.

ART. II

THE MEMBER STATES SHALL USE SPACE VEHICLES (OBYEKTY) IN STRICT ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW, INCLUDING THE UN CHARTER, IN THE INTERESTS OF MAINTAINING INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY, AND OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING.

ART. III

EACH MEMBER STATE SHALL BE BOUND NOT TO DESTROY, DAMAGE OR DISTURB THE NORMAL FUNCTIONING AND NOT TO ALTER THE FLIGHT TRAJECTORY OF SPACE VEHICLES OF OTHER MEMBER STATES WHERE THE LATTER HAVE, FOR THEIR PART, BEEN PUT INTO ORBIT IN STRICT ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION ONE, ARTICLE ONE OF THE PRESENT TREATY.

ART. IV

SEC. 1: FOR THE PURPOSES OF ENSURING CONFIDENCE IN THE OBSERVATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE PRESENT TREATY, EACH MEMBER STATE SHALL USE THE NATIONAL TECHNICAL MONITORING FACILITIES AT ITS DISPOSAL IN SUCH A WAY AS COMPLIES WITH THE GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

SEC. 2: EACH MEMBER STATE SHALL BE BOUND NOT TO CAUSE HINDRANCE TO THE NATIONAL TECHNICAL MONITORING FACILITIES OF OTHER MEMBER STATES CARRYING OUT THEIR FUNCTIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION ONE OF THIS ARTICLE.

SEC. 3: IN ORDER TO PROMOTE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AIMS AND PROVISIONS OF THE PRESENT TREATY, THE MEMBER STATES SHALL, WHERE NECESSARY, CONSULT WITH EACH OTHER, MAKE INQUIRIES AND PROVIDE INFORMATION IN CONNECTION WITH SUCH INQUIRIES.

ART. V

SEC 1: ANY MEMBER STATE OF THE SAID TREATY MAY PUT FORWARD AMENDMENTS TO THE SAID TREATY. THE TEXT OF EACH PROPOSED AMENDMENT MUST BE SUBMITTED TO THE DEPOSITORY, WHO WILL IN TURN SEND A COPY TO EACH MEMBER STATE WITHOUT DELAY.

SEC. 2: THE AMENDMENT SHALL COME INTO FORCE FOR ALL MEMBER STATES WHICH ACCEPT IT IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE DOCUMENT REFERRING TO ITS ADOPTION BY A MAJORITY OF MEMBER STATES HAS BEEN DEPOSITED FOR SAFEKEEPING. AFTER THIS DAY THE AMENDMENT SHALL COME INTO FORCE FOR EACH REMAINING MEMBER STATE ON THE DAY THEY DEPOSIT THEIR DOCUMENT OF ACCEPTANCE.

ART. VI

THE SAID TREATY WILL HAVE NO TIME LIMIT.

9
FBIS 40

TAKE 2 OF 2--39 (SPACE DRAFT TREATY)

/// NO TIME LIMIT.

LD111958

(TEXT) ART. VII

EACH MEMBER STATE HAS THE RIGHT TO WITHDRAW FROM THE SAID TREATY, AS PART OF ITS STATE SOVEREIGNTY, IF IT FEELS THAT IN EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES THE CONTENTS OF THE SAID TREATY HAVE PLACED ITS HIGHEST INTERESTS IN JEOPARDY. THEY WILL INFORM THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL OF THEIR DECISION 6 MONTHS PRIOR TO WITHDRAWING FROM THE SAID TREATY. SUCH INFORMATION MUST CONTAIN A STATEMENT WITH REGARD TO THE EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH THE MEMBER STATE FEELS IS PLACING ITS HIGHEST INTERESTS IN JEOPARDY.

ART. VIII

SEC. 1: THE PRESENT TREATY SHALL BE AVAILABLE FOR SIGNING BY ALL STATES IN THE CENTRAL AGENCIES OF THE UN ORGANIZATION IN NEW YORK. ANY STATE WHICH DOES NOT SIGN THE PRESENT TREATY BEFORE ITS ENTRY INTO FORCE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SECTION THREE OF THIS ARTICLE SHALL BE ABLE TO SUBSCRIBE TO IT AT ANY TIME.

SEC. 2: THE PRESENT TREATY SHALL BE SUBJECT TO RATIFICATION BY THE STATES WHICH SIGN IT. INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION AND DOCUMENTS OF SUBSCRIPTION MUST BE DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UN ORGANIZATION.

SEC. 3: THE PRESENT TREATY SHALL ENTER INTO FORCE BETWEEN THE STATES WHICH HAVE DEPOSITED INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION AFTER DEPOSITION OF THE FIFTH INSTRUMENT OF RATIFICATION WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UN ORGANIZATION.

SEC. 4: FOR STATES WHOSE INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION OR DOCUMENTS OF ADHERENCE ARE HANDED OVER FOR KEEPING AFTER THE COMING INTO FORCE OF THE ACTUAL TREATY, IT WILL COME INTO FORCE ON THE DAY OF THE HANDING OVER FOR KEEPING OF THEIR INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION OR DOCUMENTS OF ADHERENCE.

SECM 5: THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL WILL IMMEDIATELY INFORM ALL THE SIGNATORY AND ADHERENT STATES ABOUT THE DATE OF EACH SIGNING, ABOUT THE DATE OF THE HANDING OVER FOR KEEPING OF EACH INSTRUMENT OF RATIFICATION AND DOCUMENT OF ADHERENCE, ABOUT THE DATE OF THE COMING INTO FORCE OF THE ACTUAL TREATY, AND ALSO ABOUT OTHER NOTIFICATIONS.

ART. IX

THE ACTUAL TREATY, THE RUSSIAN, ENGLISH, ARAB, SPANISH, CHINESE AND FRENCH TEXTS OF WHICH ARE EQUALLY AUTHENTIC, IS HANDED OVER FOR KEEPING TO THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL TO FORWARD, IN THE APPROPRIATE MANNER, ATTESTED COPIES OF THE TREATY TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF STATES WHICH HAVE SIGNED THE TREATY AND ADHERED TO IT."

(ENDALL)

11 AUG 2140Z GMS/MT

A Strategy for Near-Term Public Posture on ASAT and ArmsControl in Outer Space*I. PRELIMINARIESPurpose

This memorandum sets forth an interim declaratory policy for the United States on the issue of ASAT and arms control in outer space. The policy is designed to be responsive to domestic and international pressures for a more clearcut and forthright U.S. position on ASAT and related space arms control activities, while preserving U.S. prerogatives consistent with strategic imperatives, Defense Guidance, and our overall national security. It is intended for use in the near-term (into the winter of 1981, i.e., through the U.N. General Assembly), and is subject to review and revision pending more comprehensive study of outer space arms control issues.

Issues to Address

The U.S. government's public posture should address the questions which have been posed by Congress, Allies, and NNAs as to whether we seek to foster an arms race in outer space, how we intend to respond to the draft treaty banning weapons in space which the Soviets have submitted to the UN, and whether the U.S. will engage in any future multilateral or U.S./U.S.S.R. bilateral negotiations on outer space arms control.

* Changes from first draft - additions and deletions - are indicated by lines in margin.

Background

Outer space weapons systems are still in the planning or concept stage, with the exception of antisatellite (ASAT) systems. The following background information on ASAT may be of use to the reader in considering this paper.

U.S. and Soviet ASAT Programs. Since the early 1970s the U.S.S.R. has had an operational ASAT interceptor capable of attacking low-altitude satellites. The Soviets are currently testing a developmental version of this interceptor. Also, there are indications that the Soviets may presently or in the near future be capable of laser attacks on space objects. We are not certain, however, of their developmental intentions regarding laser ASATs.

The U.S. is currently developing its own ASAT interceptor, with an initial test scheduled for 1983 and a planned IOC of 1985. It is anticipated that the U.S. ASAT will have a low-altitude capability considerably greater than that of the Soviet interceptor. In addition, the U.S. may be capable of developing a ground-based laser ASAT system by 1987, with a more capable space-based system possible in the next decade.

ASAT Negotiations to Date. Three rounds of bilateral ASAT negotiations were held in 1978-79. None have been held since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Although agreement was reached on some points, major problems remained unresolved:

- Soviet attempts to characterize the Space Shuttle as a weapons system and to use the proposed ASAT test suspension to inhibit Shuttle activities;

- U.S. concerns about the verifiability of testing constraints on ASAT systems other than interceptors;

- Soviet insistence upon excluding from the protection of an ASAT agreement any space object operating in an "illegal" or "hostile" manner, which we assume they would interpret to include reconnaissance satellites, direct

Principal Audiences

Because there are several different constituencies interested in the issues noted above, it is useful to distinguish them at the outset. Their interests vary, and a public presentation package should be sensitive to the differences.

1. U.S. Congress and Public. S. Res. 129 (May 6, 1981) introduced by Senator Pressler and forwarded to Secretary Haig by Senator Percy, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, dealt with ASAT. In it, the President is asked to "promptly resume" negotiations with the U.S.S.R. on ASAT chiefly as a way to protect our own assets in space, and to forestall a "costly and destabilizing arms race in space."

Congressional interests in outer space arms control are sophisticated and sensitive to U.S. security needs. Although other audiences (such as, say, the Neutral and Non-Aligned Nations) may not be swayed by a U.S. declaratory policy, an argument against the precipitous resumption of the arms control process should have an impact on Congress if we can make a solid case based on grounds of U.S. security. The same case could also be prepared in unclassified form for public use.

2. Allies. There continues to be significant pressure from certain of our allies for greater U.S. efforts in all types of arms control. While TNP and SALT are the main issues of concern, outer space questions are of special interest to Italy, the Netherlands, and the FRG. Canada too (because of its unfortunate experience with the Soviets' nuclear powered satellite) has expressed an interest

in space arms control. The allies present special problems in that while they may appreciate some of the individual national - and collective allied - security aspects of outer space defense issues, they are generally more inclined to see value in arms control approaches than is the U.S. In addition, the Europeans, who value their detente relationship with the Soviet Union, would probably not view as constructive an approach that flatly rejected negotiations.

3. The Soviet Union. In a letter signed by Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, the U.S.S.R. has asked that the agenda of the 36th UNGA include an item on "Conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space." A draft treaty on this subject was circulated at the UN with the letter. The Soviets can be expected to emphasize this initiative, along with their other arms control proposals, this fall. The draft treaty

- commits member states "not to place in orbit...objects carrying weapons of any kind, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or deploy such weapons in outer space in any other manner, including on reusable manned space vehicles of an existing type or of other types which States Parties may develop in the future";
- commits member states to "use space vehicles in strict accordance with international law";
- constrains each member state "not to destroy, damage or disturb the normal functioning or alter the flight trajectory of space vehicles of other States Parties," as long as those vehicles are in compliance with the ban on weapons.

The draft treaty is part of the Soviet effort to pose as champions of arms control, but it is also directed

at limiting the use of the US Space Shuttle for weapons deployment. Possible future US programs such as a space-based ABM defense are also implicit targets. Soviet propaganda typically characterizes the US space program as belligerent, theirs as peace-loving, and has tried to minimize attention paid to the USSR's own ASAT interceptor and other military space programs.

Annex B analyzes options for procedures and substantive points to guide our UNGA delegation in responding to the Soviet initiative.

4. Neutrals and Non-Aligned. With few exceptions the NNA view an arms race in space as a particularly dangerous competition between the superpowers which can and should be nipped in the bud while there is still time.

5. Special Cases.

A. Non-NATO Allies: The position of countries such as Australia, Japan and New Zealand, which normally caucus with us in the GA, is not yet known. We presume that they will want to support our position, but we cannot count on this support. If they believe that our position is not defensible in a public forum, they may well break ranks.

B. Other: A number of countries (Botswana, Senegal, Spain, Seychelles) support U.S. space efforts with ground stations for tracking sites, and in other ways. Some have requested U.S. guidance to assist them in responding to charges of Shuttle-as-weapon.

II. BASIC ELEMENTS OF POSTURE: OUTLINE

U.S. declaratory policy should establish clearly that the United States has always acted with sensitivity to the space environment, and in non-threatening ways. Soviet efforts to militarize space, e.g., their ASAT interceptor, stand in sharp contrast, and undercut the validity of the U.S.S.R.'s public posture. The essentially military nature of the Soviet approach to outer space has narrowed our options considerably. The following points outline the declaratory policy:

1. The United States holds that the space systems of any nation are national property and have the right of free passage through and operation in space without interference. Purposeful interference with space systems constitutes an infringement on sovereign rights.

2. The United States has been supportive of efforts to control arms in outer space. We have sought in the past, through such major international agreements as the Limited Test Ban and Outer Space Treaties, to prevent arms races in space.

3. The U.S. will pursue policies in space which protect and enhance U.S. national security interests. We recognize the contribution which space systems can make to self-defense, deterrence, and arms control verification. And we cannot ignore the value that these systems may have in compensating for Soviet military advantages in other areas.

4. Some military uses of outer space contribute to international peace and security. Specific examples are national technical means of verification and other intelligence and communications functions performed by satellites

that minimize surprise and reduce the likelihood of preemptive or accidental nuclear war.

5. Military and arms control issues are enormously complex (e.g., verification), and problems of definition (e.g., what is "military"? what is "hostile"?) present difficult obstacles in international negotiations. Because of the many problems involved, we must not count on progress in the area of space arms control.

6. U.S. military activities in space have, in large part, been needed because Soviet activities have made space an area for potential military conflict. In ASAT, for example, the Soviets have a lead as a result of years of effort to develop and deploy a satellite intercept capability. Failure by the U.S. to respond to the various Soviet military threats in space has consequences which could jeopardize not only U.S. and Western security, but also the interests of all nations.

7. Specific questions regarding our intentions to resume ASAT negotiations with the Soviet Union should be addressed candidly, indicating our disappointment with the failure of past efforts. This is the best - and indeed only - approach to take in this period while we are stonewalling attempts to negotiate. While the U.S. should not raise this issue, we should be fully prepared to discuss the factors which vex it. - - This policy issue is currently undergoing careful study which must necessarily be completed before this question can be satisfactorily answered. At the same time, we should emphasize the hypocrisy inherent in the Soviet position - labeling the Space Shuttle an ASAT system while maintaining the world's only operational ASAT - and the degree to which current Soviet ASAT activities complicate our

policy formulation. The U.S. might note that Mr. Gromyko's statement that "the risk of militarization of outer space. . . recently has been increased" seems to apply more accurately to the latest Soviet ASAT test than to the Shuttle launch.

III. IMPLEMENTING DECLARATORY POLICY

Implementation of the declaratory policy should be differentiated with respect to the nature of the audience, as detailed in Section I. The goals in implementation should be two:

-- In cases where we expect efforts to levy on the U.S. the burden for progress in space arms control, we should attempt to forestall these efforts, using bilateral consultations where a sympathetic hearing of our case is possible. Specific proposals from allies or NNAs should be specifically addressed.

-- Where pressure is not anticipated, we should not encourage it by raising the issue ourselves.

With respect to the specific audiences of Section I :

Congress and Public

Senators Pressler and Percy and other concerned members of Congress should be assured of the Executive Branch's commitment to arms control measures consistent with U.S. national security interests. Care should be taken to insure that Senator Pressler in particular is informed of the current policy review and provided with a forthcoming

response to his concerns, one which deals with the issues which complicate negotiation at this time. We should also be prepared to respond to public interest in this subject.

The Soviet Union

Options for our procedural and substantive response to the Soviet initiative on outer space arms control are described in Annex B to this paper.

Allies

Reports from USNATO and USMission Geneva indicate that that the Italians are preparing a competing resolution on space arms control for submission to the UNGA. They intend to outline it for the EC 10 at that group's September 7-8 meeting (Geneva 8650). The UK, FRG, and French have all asked for the U.S. reaction to the Soviets' initiative, and there have been renewed requests from FRG for a briefing on this issue at the September 28-29 NATO Disarmament Experts' meeting (USNATO 5205). It is clear that an approach will have to be developed for presentation of the U.S. declaratory policy at USNATO and in the bilateral and multilateral allied consultations which will presumably take place before the UNGA convenes. The option we choose for our UNGA strategy will determine the tack we will take in these meetings with our Allies. USUN, USNATO, and USMission Geneva should all be given guidance at the earliest possible date for use in seeking a consolidated allied approach to the Soviet UN initiative.

Neutrals and Non-Aligned

The new Soviet initiative may attract strong support from the NNAs at the General Assembly. We should at least

insure that the points in Section II are presented to prevent the Soviets from capitalizing on NNA discontent. Some possible fora for this to surface are the Fall session of UNGA (September 15), First Committee (October-December 1981), Outer Space Committee of the GA, Committee on Disarmament (yearly), Special Session on Disarmament of UNGA (May-June 1982) and the Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (Vienna, August 1982).

Special Cases; Related Efforts

The policy should be presented to special-case countries in consultations as needed.

If necessary, USICA resources could be used to present the U.S. case directly to foreign publics.

Additional Tasking and Determinations

The steps remaining in the formulation and implementation of the declaratory policy include:

1. Determination of what if any information on U.S. and Soviet ASAT capabilities and civilian vs. military expenditures can be declassified for use in support of the U.S. case.

2. Drafting of contingency guidance for U.S. Mission USUN, U.S. Mission USNATO, and other missions abroad, and the relevant State and Defense Department offices (including press spokesmen), setting out the U.S. declaratory policy.

3. A classified briefing should be prepared for Senator Pressler, relevant members of the Senate and House

Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees, other concerned members of Congress, and/or their principal assistants in order to assure them of the Administration's commitment to space arms control measures consistent with our national security, and to detail the negotiating complexities involved. An unclassified version should also be prepared for public use.

In view of the impending convocation of the UNGA it is highly desirable that our declaratory policy, with interagency approval, be established no later than Labor Day, September 7.

ANNEX A. SUPPLEMENTARY DETAILED TALKING POINTS

Substantively, the U.S. declaratory policy covers three basic elements: the Soviet space program, the U.S. space program, and the complexity posed by questions of arms control in outer space. There are special problems of security classification related to each, and careful consideration should be given to the declassifying of information which would serve as persuasive evidence to support our policy. Much of what follows is based on a recent OSTP memo ("Background Information on Soviet Space [Program]") used to provide limits for a press backgrounder at the level of Official Use Only. The material below is to be drawn on by U.S. representatives as needed.

Soviet Space Program

• In spite of the continuous and longstanding Soviet rhetoric that its space program is geared exclusively to peaceful purposes, in fact its program is predominantly military in character. [If data can be released to contrast the USSR's military and civilian space expenditures, they should be supplied here.]

• One of the most dramatic of the USSR's military programs is their development of an operational anti-satellite system. Soviet testing of ASAT weaponry has been extensive. It dates from the late 1960s and has included successful attacks on a number of Soviet target satellites in orbit with the use of conventional explosives. The most recent Soviet ASAT test occurred shortly before the first launch of the U.S. Space Shuttle.

• Current Soviet ASAT capabilities are twofold. First, an operational, non-nuclear orbital interceptor

works by intercepting the targeted satellite and discharging a warhead which either destroys or damages the target. A potential second ASAT capability is the nuclear-armed anti-ballistic missiles surrounding Moscow, which could be targeted against U.S. satellites using either nuclear or conventional warheads.

- The Soviet space program, like that of the US, also includes military satellites designed for photoreconnaissance, electronic warfare, intelligence, radar, early warning, communications, weather reporting, navigation, and geodetic survey.

- In addition, the Soviet manned space program is extensive and heavily militarily oriented. In space they have carried out many experiments with military applications; they have orbited military space stations which serve as test platforms for sensory development and man-machine interface experiments; additional military space stations are planned. Soviet press coverage of joint space flights under their Intercosmos program also highlights the military background of the participating foreign cosmonauts as a way of emphasizing the solidarity of the member nations' armed forces.

- The Soviets have also undertaken extensive research and development in laser weapons, which could have application in space.

These many programs represent a serious, sustained, and costly commitment to marshal substantial military capabilities in space. It is especially significant that Soviet military doctrine emphasizes war-fighting, and Soviet strategists increasingly reflect the view that outer space is a mere extension of war-fighting territory or a force multiplier for warfare closer to home.

U.S. Space Program

In contrast, the U.S. space program has historically had a predominantly civilian character, and has emphasized the peaceful uses of outer space in both policy and activities. (DoD and NASA should be tasked to support this point by providing declassified data on dollars and man-years expended in civilian vs. military space projects.) We have never tested an ASAT system -- in 1967 we dismantled the nuclear ASAT system we had been developing at Johnston Island -- and never deployed our ABM system, which like the Soviets' could have had ASAT potential.

Current U.S. R&D efforts in ASAT began many years after the Soviets had already fielded an operational system. Our current R&D efforts are in part a response to the manifest asymmetries in this increasingly important military indicator: we are playing "catch-up ball." To leave the Soviet Union in exclusive possession of an operational ASAT capability clearly jeopardizes U.S. and international security.

The military proportion of the U.S. space effort is substantially less than that of the Soviets'. Furthermore, U.S. military activity in space is defensive in character, is intended to insure a measure of stability in the strategic nuclear balance, and constitutes an essential pillar in U.S. and Western security. Moreover, it consists in large part of reconnaissance systems. These systems have contributed directly to arms control successes by making verification possible. Our military space assets are designed to insure a secure command and control function in order to prevent accidental war, and launch-detection satellites are vital links in strategic stability. Our security, and that of our allies, depends heavily on these defense aspects of our space program - indeed, we rely on our military space program for a far higher percentage of our intelligence information than does the USSR.

The extent to which space becomes "militarized" is not ours alone to decide. The Soviets have taken the lead, and have developed both defensive and offensive weapons systems capable of conducting warfare in space. We believe that Soviet precedents have advanced the potential for space conflict.

Arms Control in Outer Space

The U.S. is seeking arms control measures which are equitable and verifiable. Among the numerous arms control agreements the United States has sponsored or become a signatory to are several whose jurisdiction includes outer space in some important way, e.g. the Limited Test Ban, the Outer Space Treaty, and the ABM Treaty. In addition, the U.S. sought to conclude an ASAT treaty with the Soviet Union, but failed to get Soviet agreement on several provisions we felt were fundamental to a viable agreement.

The overriding consideration which has increasingly come to influence responsible sentiments favoring arms control in outer space is that while the U.S. should remain committed to this worthwhile aim, achieving it is neither easy nor simple. The issues involved are enormously complex and have far-reaching implications for U.S. national security interests.

A principal impediment to outer space arms agreements is the difficulty of assuring adequate verification. Even if an otherwise acceptable agreement could be reached in ASAT, for example, it would be difficult to establish verification procedures which would be effective in the face of the rapid pace of technological developments.

~~The Reagan Administration is engaged in a thorough-~~
going review of U.S. security and defense requirements.

NSC/S PROFILE

UNCLASSIFIED

FILE 7 25
ID 8304708

RECEIVED 09 JUL 83 10

TO CLARK FROM PETERSON, R

DOCDATE 08 JUL 83

KEYWORDS: EUROPE EAST

USSR

PALMER, M

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL

SUBJECT: HR-601 EASTERN EUROPEAN-SOVIET RESEARCH AND TRAINING ACT & HR-1220
THE EXCHANGE FOR UNDERSTANDING ACT & HJR-254 EXCHANGE FOR PEACE

ACTION: MEMO KIMMITT TO PETERSON

DUE: 11 JUL 83 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

THOMPSON

DOBRIANSKY

FORTIER

LEHMAN, C

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFIID (R /)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

DISPATCH W/ATTCH FILE (C)



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

4708

July 8, 1983

SPECIAL

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM

TO:

✓ Legislative Liaison Officer-

National Security Council
Department of Education

SUBJECT:

State draft testimony on H.R. 601, the "Eastern European-Soviet Research Act."

The Office of Management and Budget requests the views of your agency on the above subject before advising on its relationship to the program of the President, in accordance with OMB Circular A-19.

A response to this request for your views is needed no later than
COB, MONDAY, JULY 11, 1983.

Questions should be referred to Tracey Lawler (395-4710)
the legislative analyst in this office, or to Jim Barie (395-4580).

Ronald K. Peterson

RONALD K. PETERSON FOR
Assistant Director for
Legislative Reference

Enclosures

cc: Barry White

SPECIAL

STATEMENT OF
MARK PALMER
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON
FOREIGN AFFAIRS

JULY 13, 1983

MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE:

IT IS A PLEASURE TO APPEAR BEFORE THE COMMITTEE TODAY TO PROVIDE THE DEPARTMENT'S VIEWS ON H.R. 601, "THE SOVIET-EASTERN EUROPEAN RESEARCH AND TRAINING ACT," H.R. 1220, "THE EXCHANGE FOR UNDERSTANDING ACT," AND H.J. RES. 254 ON CREATING A US-SOVIET STUDENT EXCHANGE FOR PEACE PROGRAM.

CONCERNING H.R. 601, TO DEAL EFFICIENTLY AND COMPETENTLY WITH THE SOVIET UNION, AMERICAN DECISION-MAKERS MUST BE EQUIPPED WITH CURRENT ANALYTICAL INFORMATION, BASED ON A THOROUGH UNDERSTANDING OF THE POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES OF THAT SOCIETY. IT IS IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST TO KEEP OUR DECISION-MAKERS AS ACCURATELY AND ADEQUATELY INFORMED AS POSSIBLE. THIS TASK CAN ONLY BE ACCOMPLISHED IF WE HAVE A BROAD, CAPABLE AND WELL-COORDINATED BASE OF GOVERNMENTAL AND ACADEMIC EXPERTS AND AREA SPECIALISTS CONCENTRATING ON THE SOVIET BLOC TO SUPPLY THE NEEDED INFORMATION. THE NEED FOR SUCH A BASE IS CONSTANT. WITHIN THE NEXT DECADE, HOWEVER, THE U.S. WILL LOSE A LARGE NUMBER OF ITS SOVIET AND EASTERN EUROPEAN AREA SPECIALISTS TO RETIREMENT. LESS THAN ADEQUATE PROVISION HAS BEEN MADE IN RECENT YEARS TO TRAIN YOUNG AREA SPECIALISTS TO REPLENISH OUR RESERVE OF SOVIET AND EASTERN EUROPEAN SCHOLARS. IN THE PAST DECADE THERE HAS BEEN A DRASTIC

-2-

DROP IN THE NUMBER OF EASTERN BLOC PROGRAMS WITHIN THE ACADEMIC COMMUNITY. THIS TREND CAN UNDOUBTEDLY BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN THE U.S. OVER THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS. AS UNIVERSITIES HAVE BEEN FORCED TO CUT BACK PERSONNEL AND ACADEMIC PROGRAMS, SEVERAL SOVIET STUDIES PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN ELIMINATED. IF THIS DECLINE IS NOT HALTED, MORE VALUABLE CAPABILITIES WILL DISAPPEAR, TO THE DETRIMENT OF SOVIET AREA RESEARCH AND NATIONAL SECURITY INTEREST.

IN A STUDY PUBLISHED IN 1982, THE SOVIET AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL ON FOREIGN LANGUAGES AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES FOUND A TOTAL NEED FOR SOME 1660 PRIMARY PERSONNEL IN THIS FIELD TO MEET THE NATIONAL NEED IN GOVERNMENTAL, ACADEMIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS. IT FOUND, HOWEVER, ONLY 1074 PRIMARY PERSONNEL ACTIVE IN THE FIELD, EXCLUDING LANGUAGE TEACHERS IN ELEMENTARY INSTRUCTION. A SUMMARY BREAKDOWN BY DISCIPLINE SHOWS WHERE THE COMMITTEE FOUND THE NEED FOR MORE PEOPLE GREATEST:

	<u>CURRENT</u>	<u>NEED</u>	<u>ABSOLUTE GAP</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE GAP</u>
SOCIOLOGY	18-20	88	68-70	360
POLITICS	260	500-520	240-260	96
ECONOMICS	100-120	200-225	100-105	93
HISTORY	420	675	255	61
LANGUAGE/LITERATURE	220	420	200	91

SOURCE: WALTER D. CONNOR, "SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST: ACADEMIA, GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC," IREX OCASIONAL PAPER, 1982.

DESPITE THESE NEEDS THE FLOW OF PEOPLE INTO THE SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARCH FIELD IS DRYING UP. OF PARTICULAR CONCERN TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE IS THE FACT THAT IN THE AREA OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY THE NUMBER OF DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS DEFENDED IN AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES IN RECENT YEARS IS MINISCULE. IN THE YEARS 1974-79 THE AVERAGE NUMBER WAS EIGHT, AND LESS THAN SIX WHEN DISSERTATIONS BY FOREIGN STUDENTS WERE ELIMINATED. IN THE STUDY OF SOVIET AND EASTERN EUROPEAN ECONOMIES, THE RECORD IS EVEN WORSE WITH FEW NEW SPECIALISTS IN GRADUATE TRAINING.

OF ADDITIONAL CONCERN FOR THE FUTURE, THE MODERN LANGUAGE ASSOCIATION HAS FOUND THAT BETWEEN 1972 AND 1980 AMERICAN COLLEGE ENROLLMENT IN RUSSIAN LANGUAGE COURSES FELL BY ONE-THIRD. COLLEGE ENROLLMENTS IN THE LANGUAGES OF EASTERN EUROPE AND THE SOVIET MINORITY NATIONALITIES RANGE FROM SMALL TO NON-EXISTENT. THIS AT A TIME WHEN MINORITIES ARE BECOMING AN INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT DEMOGRAPHIC AND POLITICAL FACTOR IN THE USSR. UNDERSTANDING OF A FOREIGN SOCIETY PROBABLY CAN NEVER BE PERFECT, BUT STUDY OF A SOCIETY WITHOUT THE AID OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE LANGUAGE OF ITS PEOPLE IS LARGELY GROPING IN THE DARK.

no unified
Exec. Branch
decision - Q/A

-4-

serious
concerns re:
funding of managerial
aspects.
(i.e. annual fund)

(not opposed
but we support)

31

WE BELIEVE THE NEED TO REVERSE THE DECLINE IN A VITAL
NATIONAL CAPABILITY IS CLEAR. WE ARE, HOWEVER, UNABLE TO
SUPPORT H.R. 601 IN ITS PRESENT FORM, BECAUSE THE METHOD OF
FINANCING IT, I.E. THROUGH A TRUST FUND, IS INAPPROPRIATE. THE
ADMINISTRATION CONSIDERS THAT ANY PROGRAM OF SUFFICIENT
NATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE TO REQUIRE THE USE OF FEDERAL TAX DOLLARS
SHOULD BE FINANCED BY AN ANNUAL GENERAL FUND APPROPRIATION. IN
THIS CURRENT STRINGENT OVERALL BUDGET ENVIRONMENT FUNDING FOR
ANY NEW INITIATIVE TO MEET THIS NEED SHOULD NOT BE MADE AT THE
EXPENSE OF OTHER DEPARTMENT OF STATE PROGRAMS.

at this point as
we are still reviewing some of the
its financial
or
managerial
components.

AS CONCERNS H.R. 1220, THE DEPARTMENT OPPOSES IT ON GROUNDS
BOTH OF POLICY AND OF PRACTICABILITY. AS DRAFTED, THE BILL
WOULD EFFECTIVELY FREE FROM FOREIGN POLICY GUIDANCE AND CONTROL
EXCHANGES FUNDED BY THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPEAN
EXCHANGES COMMISSION TO BE ESTABLISHED UNDER IT. IN THE
ABSTRACT, FREEING PROGRAMS DESIGNED TO PROMOTE INTERNATIONAL
UNDERSTANDING FROM POLITICAL RESTRAINTS MAY SEEM ATTRACTIVE,
BUT IN PRACTICE IT WOULD PLACE THE AMERICAN SIDE, WITH OUR OPEN
SOCIETY, AT A GREATER DISADVANTAGE THAN AT PRESENT IN DEALING
WITH REGIMES WHICH SUBJECT EVERY ASPECT OF EXCHANGES TO TIGHT
POLITICAL CONTROLS.

THE DRAFT BILL PROVIDES NO SPECIFIC GUIDANCE ON THE PURPOSE TO BE SERVED BY COMMISSION-FUNDED ACTIVITIES. IT PROVIDES ONLY VERY GENERAL GUIDELINES ON THE TYPES OF EXCHANGES TO BE FUNDED AND NONE AT ALL ON WHAT CATEGORIES OF INSTITUTIONS AND INDIVIDUALS WOULD BE ELIGIBLE FOR PARTICIPATION. WITHOUT WELL-DEFINED AND FAIRLY RESTRICTIVE GUIDELINES ON ELIGIBILITY FOR PARTICIPATION THE COMMISSION STAFF COULD EXPECT TO BE FACED WITH LARGE NUMBERS OF APPLICATIONS FOR FUNDING FOR WHAT IN MANY CASES WOULD BE LITTLE MORE THAN TOURISM. IN ADDITION, THE DRAFT CONTAINS NO PROVISIONS CONCERNING THE APPLICATION OF THE RECIPROCITY PRINCIPLE, WHICH HAS BEEN BASIC TO THE SUCCESSFUL FUNCTIONING OF EXCHANGE PROGRAMS WITH COMMUNIST COUNTRIES.

WE BELIEVE IT PREFERABLE THAT FUNDING FOR US GOVERNMENT EXCHANGE PROGRAMS CONTINUE TO COME FROM ANNUAL APPROPRIATIONS TO ENSURE THAT CONGRESSIONAL AND ADMINISTRATION INTENT IS PROPERLY OBSERVED. WE DO NOT BELIEVE ADDITIONAL, NON-APPROPRIATED FUNDING IS NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN A USEFUL LEVEL OF EXCHANGES.

IN A RELATED MANNER, THE DEPARTMENT IS SYMPATHETIC TO THE IDEALISTIC INTENT OF THE H.J. RES. 254, BUT DOES NOT BELIEVE

THAT IT COULD BE SUCCESSFULLY IMPLEMENTED OR THAT IT WOULD HAVE A SIGNIFICANT EFFECT IN REDUCING TENSIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION. AS TOURISM AND VARIOUS PROGRAMS FOR EXCHANGES OF VISITS SHOW, THE AMERICAN AND SOVIET PEOPLE FOR THE MOST PART DO NOT HOLD ANY ANTAGONISM TOWARD EACH OTHER. THE ANTAGONISMS WHICH EXIST BETWEEN AMERICAN AND SOVIET SOCIETIES RESULT NOT FROM PERSONAL FEELINGS, BUT FROM FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES IN NATIONAL INTERESTS AND OUTLOOKS. NO SIMPLE ANSWER EXISTS TO THE PROBLEM OF RESOLVING THOSE DIFFERENCES.

THE SOVIETS HAVE SHOWN NO INTEREST IN SENDING YOUTH OF THE AGES PROPOSED IN THE LEGISLATION TO WESTERN COUNTRIES FOR EXTENDED STAYS. THEY PREFER NOT TO EXPOSE PEOPLE AT AN IMPORTANT FORMATIVE STAGE IN THEIR MENTAL DEVELOPMENT TO INFLUENCES NOT IN HARMONY WITH COMMUNIST IDEOLOGICAL TENETS.

THIS CONCLUDES MY WRITTEN TESTIMONY. I THANK THE COMMITTEE FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT THE DEPARTMENT'S VIEWS ON THESE THREE ITEMS. I WOULD BE HAPPY TO RESPOND TO ANY QUESTIONS FROM THE COMMITTEE.

1 (1) the term "Commission" means the Soviet
2 Union and Eastern Europe Exchange Commission es-
3 tablished by section 7; and

4 (2) the term "Fund" means Soviet Union and
5 Eastern Europe Exchange Fund established by section
6 3.

7 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FUND

8 SEC. 3. There is established in the Treasury of the
9 United States a trust fund to be known as the Soviet Union
10 and Eastern Europe Exchange Fund. The Fund shall consist
11 of amounts appropriated to it under section 4(a) and interest
12 and proceeds credited to it under section 6(c).

13 AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS

14 SEC. 4. (a) There is authorized to be appropriated to the
15 Fund, without fiscal year limitation, \$80,000,000.

16 (b) There is authorized to be appropriated, without fiscal
17 year limitation, \$500,000 for operating expenses incurred by
18 the Commission during the first year of its operation.

19 PAYMENTS FROM THE FUND; USES OF PAYMENTS

20 SEC. 5. (a) The interest on any obligations held in the
21 Fund shall be available, as provided in advance by appropri-
22 ation Acts, for payments to the Commission for use in ac-
23 cordance with subsection (b).

24 (b)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the Commis-
25 sion shall use the funds made available pursuant to subsection

1 (a) to make grants to support academic, agricultural, busi-
2 ness, cultural, journalistic, labor, and scientific exchanges be-
3 tween the United States and the Soviet Union and the coun-
4 tries of Eastern Europe. Exchanges supported under this sec-
5 tion shall include those from two to six weeks' duration.

6 (2) Funds made available pursuant to subsection (a) may
7 also be used for operating expenses of the Commission in-
8 curred after the first year of its operation.

9 (c) Funds available for payment to the Commission
10 under subsection (a) shall be paid to the Commission upon its
11 request.

12 MANAGEMENT OF THE FUND

13 SEC. 6. (a) It shall be the duty of the Secretary of the
14 Treasury to invest such portion of the Fund as is not required
15 to meet current withdrawals. Such investments may be made
16 only in interest-bearing obligations of the United States or in
17 obligations guaranteed as to both principal and interest by
18 the United States. For such purpose, such obligations may be
19 acquired on original issue at the issue price or by purchase of
20 outstanding obligations at the market price. The purposes for
21 which obligations of the United States may be issued under
22 section 3102 of title 31, United States Code, are extended to
23 authorize the issuance at par of special obligations exclusive-
24 ly to the Fund. Such special obligations shall bear interest at
25 a rate equal to the average rate of interest, computed as to

1 the end of the calendar month next preceding the date of
2 such issue, borne by all marketable interest-bearing obliga-
3 tions of the United States then forming a part of the public
4 debt; except that where such average rate is not a multiple of
5 one-eighth of 1 per centum, the rate of interest of such spe-
6 cial obligations shall be the multiple of one-eighth of 1 per
7 centum next lower than such average rate. Such special obli-
8 gations shall be issued only if the Secretary determines that
9 the purchase of other interest-bearing obligations of the
10 United States, or of obligations guaranteed as to both princi-
11 pal and interest by the United States on original issue or at
12 the market price, is not in the public interest.

13 (b) Any obligation acquired by the Fund (except special
14 obligations issued exclusively to the Fund) may be sold by the
15 Secretary at the market price, and such special obligations
16 may be redeemed at par plus accrued interest.

17 (c) The interest on, and the proceeds from the sale or
18 redemption of, any obligations held in the Fund shall be cred-
19 ited to and form a part of the Fund.

20 ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMISSION

21 SEC. 7. There is established a commission to be known
22 as the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe Exchange Commis-
23 sion.

DUTIES OF THE COMMISSION

SEC. 8. The Commission shall, within sixty days after the effective date of this Act, issue regulations governing the operation of the Commission and the use of the funds made available under section 5.

MEMBERSHIP

SEC. 9. (a) The Commission shall be composed of five members as follows:

(1) The Secretary of Education or his designee.

(2) The Director of the United States Information Agency or his designee.

(3) One individual, who is not an officer or employee of the Federal Government, appointed by the President.

(4) One individual appointed by the President from a list of three nominees submitted by the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

(5) One individual appointed by the President from a list of three nominees submitted by the President pro tempore of the Senate.

A vacancy in the Commission shall be filled in the manner in which the original appointment was made.

(b) Members of the Commission shall be appointed for the life of the Commission, except members serving under paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (a) shall serve only by

1 virtue of their positions. Members appointed under para-
2 graphs (4) and (5) of subsection (a) who are Members of Con-
3 gress shall serve only for the remainder of their congressional
4 terms.

5 (c) Members of the Commission shall serve without pay,
6 except members of the Commission shall be entitled to reim-
7 bursement for travel, subsistence, and other necessary ex-
8 penses incurred by them in carrying out the functions of the
9 Commission, as provided by section 5703 of title 5, United
10 States Code.

11 (d) Three members of the Commission shall constitute a
12 quorum, but a lesser number may hold meetings.

13 (e) The Chairman of the Commission shall be designated
14 by the President. Except as provided under subsection (b),
15 the term of office of the Chairman shall be the life of the
16 Commission.

17 (f) The Commission shall meet no less than four times
18 annually at the call of the Chairman.

19 DIRECTOR AND STAFF OF COMMISSION

20 SEC. 10. (a) The Commission shall have a Director who
21 shall be appointed by the Commission and who shall be paid
22 at a rate determined by the Commission in consultation with
23 the Director of the Office of Personnel Management. The Di-
24 rector may be appointed and paid without regard to section
25 5311(b) of title 5, United States Code.

1 (b) The Director may appoint and, in consultation with
2 the Director of the Office of Personnel Management, fix the
3 pay of four additional staff personnel.

4 (c) The Director and the four staff personnel of the
5 Commission may be appointed without regard to the provi-
6 sions of title 5, United States Code, governing appointments
7 in the competitive service, and may be paid without regard to
8 the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53
9 of such title relating to classification and General Schedule
10 pay rates. Appointments or promotions of the Director and
11 other staff may not be on the basis of political party prefer-
12 ence.

13 (d) The Director and staff of the Commission shall not
14 be exempted from the provisions of subchapter III of chapter
15 83 of title 5, United States Code.

16 POWERS OF COMMISSION

17 SEC. 11. (a) The Commission may, for the purpose of
18 carrying out this Act, hold such hearings, sit and act at such
19 times and places, take such testimony, and receive such evi-
20 dence as the Commission considers appropriate.

21 (b) The Commission may use the United States mails in
22 the same manner and under the same conditions as other
23 departments and agencies of the United States.

1

REPORT

2

SEC. 12. Not later than twelve months after it is duly
3 organized and every twelve months thereafter, the Commis-
4 sion shall transmit a report describing the activities of the
5 Commission to the President and to each House of Congress.

6

TERMINATION

7

SEC. 13. The Commission shall cease to exist six years
8 after the effective date of this Act. Investments shall be liqui-
9 dated and all funds remaining in the Fund shall be deposited
10 in the miscellaneous receipts account in the Treasury.

11

EFFECTIVE DATE

12

SEC. 14. This Act shall take effect on October 1, 1983.

○

98TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. J. RES. 254

Requesting the President to negotiate the creation of a United States-Soviet student exchange for peace program.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

APRIL 28, 1983

Mr. UDALL (for himself, Mr. MOAKLEY, Mr. LOWRY of Washington, Mr. DWYER of New Jersey, Mr. HOYER, Mr. BEILENSEN, Mr. MARKEY, Mr. WILLIAMS of Montana, Mr. CROCKETT, Mr. EDWARDS of California, Mr. STOKES, Mr. LEHMAN of Florida, Mr. OTTINGER, Mr. LANTOS, Mr. BEDELL, Mr. PRITCHARD, Mr. MITCHELL, Mr. DE LUGO, Mr. WEISS, Mr. SIMON, Mr. OBERSTAR, Mr. MCHUGH, Mr. WOLPE, Mr. BARNES, Mr. ROYBAL, Mr. NEAL, Mr. CONTE, Mr. MORRISON of Connecticut, Mr. TORRICELLI, Mr. FAZIO, Mr. WASHINGTON, Mr. CLARKE, Ms. KAPTUR, Mr. McNULTY, Mr. RATCHFORD, Mr. GARCIA, Mr. EDGAR, Mr. RICHARDSON, Mr. BROWN of California, Mr. CHANDLER, Mrs. SCHROEDER, Mr. SPRATT, Mr. CONYERS, Mr. PANETTA, Mr. WHEAT, Mr. HUGHES, Mr. STARK, Mr. BATES, and Mr. GREEN) introduced the following joint resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

JOINT RESOLUTION

Requesting the President to negotiate the creation of a United States-Soviet student exchange for peace program.

Whereas the greatest challenge facing the United States and the Soviet Union is the establishment of peaceful ties and the prevention of hostilities;

Whereas ties of culture and friendship between our two countries need to be expanded;

Whereas the great threat to peace between our two nations is the absence of close ties and mutual trust;

Whereas young people are a nation's greatest resource and its most treasured asset; and

Whereas both nations have a mutual interest in closer ties and the prevention of a nuclear holocaust: Now, therefore, be it

1 *Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives*
2 *of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*
3 That the United States and the Soviet Union should immedi-
4 ately begin talks that have the objective of creating a joint
5 United States-Soviet student exchange for peace program to
6 provide for an ongoing country-to-country exchange of quali-
7 fied young people aged fifteen through twenty. The program
8 should:

9 (1) give qualified young people an opportunity to
10 go to the other country for one year to study, work,
11 travel, talk with various political leaders, and live with
12 a host family;

13 (2) be administered by a joint United States-
14 Soviet Exchange for Peace Commission to be estab-
15 lished and supported by the Department of Education
16 and composed of civic, educational, and cultural leaders
17 from both countries;

18 (3) be financed by both government- and private-
19 source contributions;

1 (4) recruit at least two thousand qualified partici-
2 pants from each country;

3 (5) endeavor to recruit half of the program's par-
4 ticipants from the families of civic, educational, cultur-
5 al, and political leaders;

6 (6) result in a widespread geographic distribution
7 of program participants; and

8 (7) be expanded as interest and resources permit.

○