

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library

Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: Secretary Shultz - Speeches
Box: 34

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

2

AS PREPARED FOR DELIVERY

EMBARGOED UNTIL DELIVERY, SCHEDULED FOR APPROXIMATELY 10:00 A.M. (PDT)
MONDAY, OCTOBER 14, 1985. NOT TO BE PREVIOUSLY CITED, QUOTED FROM, OR
USED IN ANY WAY.

ADDRESS BY

THE HONORABLE
GEORGE P. SHULTZ
SECRETARY OF STATE

BEFORE THE

NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

MONDAY, OCTOBER 14, 1985

For 40 years, the Western democracies have wrestled with the problem of relations with the Soviet Union.

As legislators you know first hand that democracies love peace, and really do not like spending money on defence. But you also know how precious freedom and democracy are, and therefore how important it is that we defend the values we hold dear. We democracies know that freedom has enemies in this world. But we also know that the purpose of our defensive strength is peace. Therefore we all conduct foreign policies whose aim is a more positive and constructive relationship between East and West.

Nearly two years ago, President Reagan offered the Soviet Union a challenge to begin building a more constructive relationship: "Our challenge is peaceful. It will bring out the best in us. It also calls for the best from the Soviet Union ... If the Soviet Government wants peace, then there will be peace."

Since that time, we have made a start. The Geneva and other arms control negotiations are underway. We have initiated a process for discussing ways to defuse regional tensions and manage our competition peacefully. We have urged the Soviet Union to take practical steps to fulfil its international commitments on human rights. We have advanced ideas for expanding contact and interchange between our two societies, to fashion the network of bilateral ties that is a necessary feature of any productive relationship between two countries. These are steps forward, but much more needs to be done. One of President Reagan's major goals when he meets next month with General Secretary Gorbachev is to discuss this entire agenda giving new impetus to all of these efforts.

Arms control, of course, is a key part of this agenda. It has been a focal point of our Alliance deliberations for many years. Allied unity and support are a key to the success of our endeavours with the Soviet Union. And indeed, Europe's security is one of the principal objectives at stake.

In Geneva today, American and Soviet negotiators are in the middle of a new round of talks. An American proposal for radical reductions in offensive nuclear arms has been on the table for some time. The Soviet Union has recently come forward with -- and extensively publicized -- a new counter-proposal.

Let me review for you today where we stand, the United States and the Soviet Union, on the main issues in arms control.

OUR OBJECTIVES IN ARMS CONTROL

Let us start at the beginning. What is it we are trying to accomplish?

The purpose of arms control negotiations is not agreement for its own sake. A bad agreement could do harm. Loopholes could be a source of new mistrust; the structure of limitations could leave one side with special advantages that only leave the other less secure; loose limits could only legitimize an intensifying arms race in areas left open by the agreement. Saving money on weapons expenditure is, of course, a worthwhile goal, but it is not sufficient, or even the main issue.

What we really want, in short, are measures that enhance security and reduce the risk of war. Arms control is not just a technical exercise; it has to be embedded in a policy and in an environment that reduce our real dangers and make the world safer. The rivalry between East and West is not the result of personalities or simple misunderstandings. It is grounded in fundamental moral differences about justice and freedom; it is reflected in political differences over a range of international problems. Weapons are the symptom of this struggle, not its cause. Arms reduction can help reduce tensions; yet expansionist Soviet behaviour can so fuel insecurity and mistrust that, at the very least, the arms control process itself is undermined. Do not forget that it was Soviet geopolitical challenges -- like intervention in Angola, Ethiopia, and most particularly Afghanistan -- that derailed detente and the Salt II Treaty in the 1970s.

Preventing a war means addressing not only these political conflicts but also the military postures of the two sides. In the nuclear age, even more than in the past, force structure can shape not only how a conflict might be fought, but more importantly, whether or not a conflict would break out at all. President Reagan's programme to rebuild our military strength is addressed to this problem.

The concept of strategic stability is a fundamental one. At various periods in history, war was prevented by a balance of power. The balance was not always stable, but much of the time it worked, deterring attack by denying the attacker his confidence in victory and posing the risk of counter-attack. In the age of the ICBM -- the intercontinental ballistic missile with thermonuclear warheads -- security has had to rest largely on the threat of retaliation, since there has been no defence against these missiles. This form of deterrence -- the mutual threat of mass destruction -- is what Churchill called the balance of terror.

Is this balance stable? Will it remain stable in the face of the steady Soviet build-up of weaponry with first-strike potential? Or is the balance in danger of breaking down in crisis conditions? This is one of the central issues -- if not the central issue -- in arms control today. We cannot afford -- as we have been tempted in the past -- to assume that the balance is automatically stable. We have come to recognize that the

vulnerability of a country's retaliatory forces, in a crisis, could put a premium on striking first, or pre-emptively, and thus magnify the dangers. Or it could call into question America's commitment effectively to support its Allies against Soviet conventional attack.

This is why one of the key tests by which we judge arms control proposals is whether they will enhance strategic stability. The military balance that results from an agreement should be one that reduces the incentive for a first strike. It should enhance deterrence by ensuring that no first strike can succeed, that no one can be tempted by illusions of "victory". A stable environment reduces the incentive to build new weapons, and enhances the incentive to reduce the levels of arms. It defuses the tension and danger of any crisis that may occur. Thus an emphasis on strategic stability goes to the heart of reducing the danger of the outbreak of war.

We must also remember that the forces of history have cast the United States in the role of most powerful member of an alliance of democracies. Any agreement we reach with the Soviet Union must enhance our Allies' security as well as our own. Since 1945, Soviet military power has cast its shadow over both Europe and Asia; this is a reality, as is the relentless build-up of Warsaw Pact forces, both nuclear and conventional. The Western concept of security, which has kept the peace in Europe for 40 years, is that of a close and permanent link between Western Europe and the United States. The American pledge to underwrite the defence of Europe is given concrete expression in the presence of American forces and American weapons in Europe, which make it a certainty that any Soviet attack on Europe engages us. Thus our strategic forces defend Europe as much as they defend the United States. This is what deters war, and it has worked. Arms control must enhance, not weaken, this dimension of deterrence.

We have other criteria for judging arms:

- An arms control agreement, to strengthen stability, should be based on equality, leaving both sides with equal or essentially equivalent levels of forces.
- An agreement should emphasize strategically significant reductions. Past agreements only codified existing levels or rechannelled the competition. It is time, now, to reverse the pattern of constant build-up; it is time to begin radical reductions.
- An arms control agreement must be verifiable. The Soviets' selective record of compliance with previous agreements unfortunately makes this indispensable. Radical reductions, in fact, can increase the incentive to cheat, since a balance at lower levels can more easily be tipped.

THE US PROPOSAL

The United States has serious proposals now on the table at Geneva. We have been criticized for our restraint in the public relations field. But our proposals were not made for propaganda; they were made to make progress toward these central objectives. Our proposals cover reductions in strategic offensive forces; reduction or elimination of US and Soviet intermediate-range nuclear forces; and a serious dialogue on defensive weapons and the relationship between offence and defence. These issues are being discussed now in the Geneva negotiations in three separate but interrelated forums.

First, in the talks on strategic arms reduction, the United States has proposed radical reductions down to 5,000 ballistic-missile warheads on each side. This represents a cut of nearly 50 per cent from the current Soviet level. We have proposed substantial reductions in the number and destructive power of ballistic missiles, and limits on heavy bombers and on the Cruise missiles they carry.

The strategic forces of the United States and the Soviet Union are very different. The great majority of Soviet warheads and destructive power are concentrated on their large, land-based ICBMs. We have a more balanced approach, with as much emphasis on submarine-based missiles and bombers as on ICBMs. The Soviet force is designed for pre-emption, ours for retaliation. These differences greatly complicate the achievement of an equitable agreement. We are prepared to explore trade-offs between areas of relative advantage -- such as our advantage in bombers versus their advantage in ICBMs -- to establish an overall balance.

Our proposal is comprehensive, but its core is a recognition that reductions should focus on the most destabilizing systems. Weapons like large fixed land-based ICBMs with multiple warheads, capable of destroying missile silos -- these are the most powerful strategic weapons, the most rapid, the most provocative, the most capable of carrying out a pre-emptive strike, the most likely to tempt a hair-trigger response in a crisis.

The Soviets have over 300 heavy ICBMs; we at present have none. (Our first deployments of MX, a smaller missile but roughly comparable because of its accuracy, will begin late next year.) With their accuracy, destructive power, and multiple warheads, the Soviet weapons are capable of destroying virtually the entire land-based portion of our retaliatory force. For nearly a decade this category of weapons has been, for us, one of the central issues of arms control. One of the odd features of the current debate is that the Soviets would have us believe this central issue has disappeared. It is as if the threat from these powerful weapons, which already exist in the hundreds, is somehow less important than research into new categories of systems which do not exist, will not exist for many years at best, and will not come into being at all unless research is successful in meeting stringent criteria we ourselves have set.

The second negotiation in Geneva is about intermediate-range nuclear forces, or INF. This negotiation is taking place because in 1977 the Soviet Union began deploying SS-20 intermediate-range nuclear missiles in the western USSR, aimed at our European Allies, and in the Soviet Far East, aimed at our friends and Allies in East Asia. Today there are 441 operational launchers deployed; with three warheads on a missile, that makes over 1,300 modern nuclear warheads aimed at the cities and defence facilities of our friends and Allies.

In response -- and I repeat, in response -- the Atlantic Alliance decided in 1979 that it had no choice but to deploy weapons of its own in this category, as a deterrent, while seeking to negotiate with the Soviet Union on a formula for mutual restraint. The Soviets agreed to talk, but have not negotiated on the basis of mutuality. They insisted on their right to a monopoly of longer-range INF missiles; they waged an unprecedented campaign of political warfare to intimidate our Allies into retreating from the NATO decision of 1979. Our Allies -- governments and legislatures -- stood firm; NATO Pershing II ballistic missiles and ground-launched Cruise missiles began to be deployed in several allied countries in 1983 -- six years after the SS-20 deployment began.

The United States proposed at Geneva that we agree to eliminate both sides' longer-range land-based INF missiles on a global basis. The Soviets refused. Then we proposed that both sides reduce to the lowest possible equal number of warheads. The Soviets still refuse. Our position is based on the principle of equality between the United States and the Soviet Union. And limits must be applied globally, since the SS-20 is a mobile missile and it is not our objective simply to shift the SS-20 threat from Europe to Asia.

The threat of the SS-20 goes to the heart of our commitment to our Allies. These are weapons aimed at Europe -- although they could be aimed at America. Their purpose is to "decouple", that is to separate you from us by intimidating you. The Alliance's response is a united response, and a unifying response, in that it symbolizes once again that our destinies are tied together. The principle of collective security is thus confirmed, and reinforced. Europe is safer, because deterrence is strengthened.

The third area of negotiation is that of defence and space arms. But the core issue is the same: the stability of deterrence.

The Salt I Accords of 1972 limited anti-ballistic missile systems and were also a partial first step toward limiting offensive weapons. We continue to comply with them, provided the Soviet Union corrects its non-compliance and negotiates seriously in Geneva. We must remember, however, that those Accords of 13 years ago, and the hopes they engendered, were founded on certain assumptions. Developments since then have called those assumptions into question.

First of all, when the ABM Treaty was signed, it was assumed that offensive weaponry would be reduced by further negotiations. In fact, offensive weapons proliferated. Each side now -- and particularly the Soviet side -- has vastly higher numbers than in 1972. We see the Soviet heavy ICBMs with a first-strike potential. On both sides we see offensive weapons of astonishing accuracy, and with multiple warheads. The Soviets are developing two new varieties of ICBM whose mobility makes them harder to identify and count. If we fail to respond to these trends, at some point in the future they could undermine the military balance on which deterrence is based.

Secondly, in the ABM Treaty we also assumed that we had set up critical barriers that would prevent any breakout, that is, any sudden and significant expansion of ABM systems in violation of the Treaty. In fact, while the United States has dismantled even the one ABM complex that was permitted, the Soviets have taken full advantage of the deployments allowed by the Treaty. And some Soviet activities are clear violations, such as the large radar at Krasnoyarsk, which raises a question of whether the Soviets might be planning a nation-wide ABM system, negating the Treaty entirely.

But technological advance, which helps create these new problems, also offers other possibilities. Methods of defence against ballistic missiles, which were relatively rudimentary in 1972, now offer new hope as a possible counter to the growing offensive threat. What if it were possible, even in this age of ballistic missiles, to block an attack, rather than simply suffer the attack and then retaliate? What if the balance of power could rest more on a mutual sense of security, and less on a mutual threat of annihilation? Thus the President's Strategic Defense Initiative (or SDI), a research programme to explore promising new technologies. Effective strategic defences, able to intercept and destroy missiles before they reach their targets, would strengthen security. Even if far less than 100 per cent perfect, such a defensive system would vastly complicate any aggressor's first-strike planning and frustrate any temptation to consider launching an attack.

In an age of anxieties about nuclear weapons, this should provide enormous hope for the future. As former Soviet Premier Kosygin once eloquently stated, an anti-missile system "is intended not for killing people but for saving human lives".

The last few decades' emphasis on offensive strategies reflected the state of technology, not a law of nature. Mutual vulnerability was a fact of life, not a positive virtue. A new strategic equilibrium based on defensive technologies and sharply reduced offensive deployments on both sides could be the most stable and secure arrangement of all. It cannot be fully achieved without negotiations, and therefore we have sought the fullest dialogue on this subject with the Soviet Union -- as well as with our Allies. In fact, General Abrahamson, Director of our SDI Office, travelled to Geneva to take part in a briefing of the Soviet negotiators on our programme, its potential and its prospects.

Our research programme is and will continue to be consistent with the ABM Treaty. The Treaty can be variously interpreted as to what kinds of development and testing are permitted, particularly with respect to future systems and components based on new physical principles. The Treaty's text, the agreed statements accompanying it, the negotiating record, and official statements made since that time are subject to differing interpretations.

Because of the great potential contribution that SDI could make to our security, and because of our interest in a rigorous implementation of the ABM Treaty by both sides, we have devoted much attention to the question of how to interpret the Treaty. It is our view, based on a careful analysis of the Treaty text and the negotiating record, that a broader interpretation of our authority is fully justified. This is, however, a moot point; our SDI research programme has been structured and, as the President has reaffirmed, will continue to be conducted in accordance with a restrictive interpretation of the Treaty's obligations. Furthermore, any SDI deployment would be the subject of consultations with our Allies, and to discussion and negotiation, as appropriate, with the Soviets in accordance with the terms of the ABM Treaty.

Our policy thus reflects:

- The President's commitment to explore thoroughly the potential contribution of strategic defences to peace and stability, and his vision of a "balance of safety" replacing the "balance of terror".
- Our commitment to pursue the programme as currently structured, which is consistent with a restrictive interpretation of our obligations under the ABM Treaty.
- Our judgment that the SDI Programme, provided that it is consistently funded at the levels required, will be adequate to answer the question of whether a cost-effective and survivable defence against ballistic missiles is feasible.

In sharp contrast to Soviet behaviour, our policy of restraint with respect to the conduct of the SDI Programme demonstrates by deeds US seriousness and sincerity in seeking a more stable international environment.

The American proposals in Geneva are a comprehensive blueprint for reducing nuclear weapons, for strengthening deterrence, and for making the world safer. They are paralleled by other proposals in other forums:

- To strengthen safeguards and controls against the proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities.
- To ban chemical weapons, and to prevent chemical weapons proliferation.

- To stabilize the conventional military balance in Europe, by mutual and balanced reductions of forces, and by measures to reduce the risk of war by surprise attack, accident or miscalculation, which would give concrete form to a reaffirmation of the principle of non-use of force.

This is President Reagan's arms control agenda -- the most comprehensive arms control agenda of any President in our history.

THE SOVIET COUNTERPROPOSAL

Now we have, at long last, a Soviet counterproposal in Geneva. It could be a step forward, and thus, in and of itself, represents a success for our Alliance policies. The very fact that the Soviets have offered a new proposal is directly due to the patience, strength, and unity of the Western democracies. We have maintained our principles and our standards, and these in turn are carrying us farther than sceptics had believed possible.

Remember that for over a year in 1983 and 1984, the Soviets boycotted any negotiation of these issues. That effort to intimidate the Alliance failed, just as their earlier efforts to block INF deployments failed. Continued Alliance firmness and unity eventually brought the Soviets back to the negotiating table earlier this year. In these new talks, the Soviets stated in the most general terms that they agreed with us on the importance of offensive reductions. But they gave no specifics. Rather, they have devoted their greatest effort to propaganda against SDI and held everything hostage to getting their way on SDI.

Two weeks ago, the Soviets did begin to offer specific and detailed ideas about deep cuts in offensive forces. We welcome this. While some of their ideas may indicate progress, altogether the new Soviet position remains deeply flawed and self-serving. It would have a particularly dangerous impact on the security of our Allies. Let me touch on the highlights.

The Soviet proposal is a combination of various bans, freezes, limitations, and reductions of some but not all offensive forces. Overall the Soviets propose a reduction by 50 per cent of each side's "delivery vehicles which can reach the territory of the other side".

The hooker is their definition of what they consider "relevant" systems -- systems which can strike the territory of the other side. Under their definition American systems in Europe pointed toward the USSR are constrained, while Soviet missiles and aircraft aimed at Europe are not. It would imply no necessary reduction of the SS-20 threat (which, incidentally, can reach Alaska) but calls for a unilateral withdrawal of the United States counter to that threat. I can think of nothing that would more smack of a United States-Soviet deal at Europe's expense.

This one-sided definition is a step backward. It is the Soviet position of 1969, which the United States and its Allies could not accept then or at any time since. It is not reflected in the SALT I Accords nor in SALT II nor in the distinction between Strategic and INF Systems that was the basis of the Geneva negotiations from 1981 to 1983.

The Soviets also propose to limit "nuclear charges" (that is, warheads and bombs) on strategic forces to 6,000. Of these 6,000 weapons no more than 60 per cent could be on any one component (that is, ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, or aircraft). This would limit the number of Soviet ICBM warheads to 3,600 -- but there is no commitment to reduce their most destabilizing heavy ICBMs, the SS-18s. Thus the Soviet proposal does not directly address the main problem of strategic stability. With deep reductions in US systems, it would add to NATO's vulnerability and increase the significance of the Soviet advantage in hard-target-killer ICBMs.

The Soviets also propose to ban or severely limit all "new" nuclear delivery systems, defining as "new" those systems not tested as of an agreed date. Assuming the agreed date would not be in the past, such a ban would preclude our Midgetman missile, D-5 Trident submarine missile, and Stealth bomber. Oddly enough, it would allow the two new ICBMs (the SS-X-24 and the SS-25), new submarine-launched ballistic missile, and new Blackjack bomber they are now testing or deploying.

The Soviet position on INF is not totally clear. But to the extent that they now agree that an acceptable INF Accord could be concluded separately -- no longer held hostage to SDI and other issues -- we would regard it as constructive. And implicit in their new position may be a grudging acceptance of the presence of some US INF missiles in Europe defending our Allies.

However, they propose a stop to all further deployments in Europe of intermediate--range nuclear forces. This would halt NATO's INF deployment at about 200 warheads -- while they have about seven times as many SS-20 warheads already deployed. And it would permit unlimited new SS-20 deployments against our Allies and friends in Asia.

The Soviets also ask to be "compensated" in these negotiations for the British and French strategic nuclear deterrents. This is not only part of their effort to undercut NATO's decision of 1979; it is also an effort to undercut support for British and French nuclear forces. Yet those forces represent those countries' determination to maintain their independence and their control over their own destiny in the face of the nuclear danger. Those independent forces contribute to deterrence and to Europe's security. Of course, in the context of deep US and Soviet reductions, British and French forces could become a relatively larger part of the picture. And both countries have made clear that in that context they would consider discussions on their forces.

The Soviet proposal tabled in Geneva, finally, indicates that all limitations on offensive forces are contingent on banning SDI -- banning not only its testing and deployment but also "scientific research". This is rather sweeping. Indeed it flies in the face of the ABM Treaty, which puts no limits on research.

The problem is that, just as with SS-20s, the Soviets have not yet given up their efforts to keep a unilateral advantage. They want to stop our programme while they continue their own programme in the same field. Behind the curtain that encloses Soviet society, free from the scrutiny or open debate we have in the West, a major Soviet strategic defence programme has proceeded for decades. In the past 20 years, the Soviets have spent about as much on strategic defence -- missile defence, civil defence, and air defence -- as they have spent on strategic offense. They deploy the world's only operational ABM System, and are continuing to modernize it. Their propaganda about the "militarization of space" rings rather hollow when one considers that they have the world's most active military space programme; last year they conducted about 100 space launches and nearly 80 per cent of them were military in nature, while the United States had only about 20 total space launches. The Soviets also have the world's only extensively tested and fully operational anti-satellite system. And their own research efforts into SDI technologies -- high-energy lasers, particle-beam weapons, radio-frequency weapons, and kinetic-energy weapons -- long antedate our own. Indeed, some of the Soviet scientists most active in signing declarations against our SDI Programme are themselves the men leading the Soviet military research in the same technologies.

I said it at the United Nations and I will say it again: the Soviet leaders know full well their own programmes in all these fields. Their propaganda against American programmes is blatantly one-sided and not to be taken seriously.

Aside from the central issues of the Geneva nuclear and space talks, the Soviets have taken constructive positions in some fields and less constructive positions in others.

In the struggle against nuclear proliferation, for example, they and we have worked together well. We welcome Mr. Gorbachev's expression of interest in working with us to check the spread of chemical weapons.

Their proposed moratorium on nuclear testing, however, was aimed more at invidiously publicizing the Hiroshima Anniversary than at serious arms control. Let us remember that in 1962, after the Soviets had unilaterally broken an earlier joint moratorium on nuclear tests, President Kennedy said, "We know now enough about broken negotiations, secret preparations, and the advantages gained from a long test series never to offer again an uninspected moratorium". We have stressed over and over again the crucial importance of improving verification, whether with respect to the threshold test ban or any other more ambitious effort. We have on the table some precise and practical ways to move

forward on verification. For example, we have proposed that they send experts to our nuclear test site to measure the yield of a nuclear test in order to provide better calibration of their instruments and thus more accurate verification.

The Soviets are also practitioners of vague, superficially attractive proposals like non-use of force, no-first-use of nuclear weapons, or nuclear-free zones. The problem with such ideas is that they are a kind of escapism, evading the reality of the political problems that give rise to conflict. Peace will ultimately depend on solving the political problems, not on high-sounding declarations. We recall the basic principles of US-Soviet relations of 1972, and the 1973 Agreement on the prevention of nuclear war. These Accords stated the right principles -- particularly the need to forswear the perpetual quest for unilateral advantage. The problem was not the principles but the performance. Soviet calls for the non-use or threat of force look rather unimpressive against the background of events in Afghanistan or Poland.

PROSPECTS

In sum, the new Soviet positions on arms control could be a step forward, but do not meet the basic criteria of strengthened stability, equality, strategically significant reductions, and increased verifiability. But we approach this positively. We are now in a new phase of the negotiations in which, if the Soviets are serious, real progress can be made. The President has given our negotiators unprecedented authority to explore ways of bridging differences. Whether or not there is genuine progress before the time of the President's meeting with Mr. Gorbachev, we at least are now both getting down to business.

You hear from the Soviets a lot of talk about the "increasing danger of war". This is propaganda designed to intimidate. Deterrence has kept the peace, certainly in the NATO area. With the restoration of Western strength in the last few years, the world is really more stable and secure than it has been in a long time. It is when the West is weak that the world is a more dangerous place.

So we will pursue arms reductions, with seriousness and dedication, but also with realism.

We have a complex task. As the President has put it, "We must both defend freedom and preserve the peace. We must stand true to our principles and our friends while preventing a holocaust".

There is no escape from this dual responsibility. The world we seek is a world of both peace and freedom. Such a world is attainable if the democracies are true to themselves and steadfast of purpose.
