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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
11404	MEMCON	ZHANG WEN GIN, ROBERT WEST, AND ZUMWALT <i>R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10</i>	4	10/27/1980	B1
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The authors held discussions with the defense team of the People's Republic of China, during its recent visit and subsequently. The two sides both had quite similar views on Soviet strategy in the Pacific and Indian oceans: The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Soviet activity in Southeast Asia are ultimately designed to merge the Southwestern Pacific and Indian Ocean into a single theater, completing the encirclement of Asia and the Middle East.

We agreed that Moscow's seizure of Afghanistan had other local and worldwide objectives:

- Preventing the defeat of its client Marxist regime by Afghani loyalists.

- Sealing off the 45 million Moslems in Soviet southern provinces from the theological fervor that would flow as a result of a successful Afghani loyalist victory.

- Frightening NATO Europe and embarrassing the U.S. with a successful demonstration of Soviet power and Western helplessness to react.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan also was the first phase of an ultimate thrust toward the Indian Ocean which would then swing both west and east. Soviet forces moved 500 miles closer to the Indian Ocean, thus extending the encirclement of Middle East oil. Soviet bases in Syria, Iraq, Ethiopia, Mozambique and South Yemen already had contributed to that objective. Soviet invading forces also moved across Afghanistan to the Pakistan border. The presence of these forces has made Moscow's subversive operations more effective inside Pakistan. When Moscow brings a Marxist puppet to power there, the Kremlin will have its long-coveted warm-water port from which to swing west to close the ring around Arabian and Iranian oil. (Chaos in Iran may bring that country's oil under Moscow's control earlier.)

Soviet control of Pakistani bases will permit forces to swing east as well, thereby bringing pressure against India to shift from pro-Soviet neutrality to submissive cooperation with Moscow.

In Southeast Asia, the Soviet Treaty of Friendship with Vietnam resulted in Moscow's support of Hanoi's invasion of Cambodia, which deposed Pol Pot, destroying Beijing's client regime. In exchange, Moscow won the right to station forces at former U.S. bases in Vietnam. Initially, these forces were concentrated at the airfields and naval bases at Danang, in the northern part of conquered South Vietnam. In recent weeks, some of these forces have begun to deploy southward to the airfields and naval bases at Camranh Bay, one of the world's best harbors. This location makes it possible for Soviet forces to control the South China Sea and the critical Straits of Malacca, which provide access between the South Pacific and Indian Ocean.

Soviet fleets operating out of Camranh Bay, protected by aircraft operating from southern Vietnam, can deploy with security through the Straits of Malacca into the Indian Ocean. These forces will encircle Thailand from the ocean just as Soviet fleets have closed the ring on Scandinavia, eroding the resistance of those northern nations.

In a similar fashion, Soviet fleets projected eastward from Pakistan's ports and westward from the Malacca Straits will ring the Indian continent to accelerate India's accommodation.

Thus Moscow will have completed its strategic encirclement of Middle East oil and China.

It is clear to us that China is prepared to do its part to defeat the Soviet southern strategy. Beijing is providing covert aid to the Afghani loyalists to slow the Soviet timetable there. It has provided support to Pakistan. Chinese forces in Tibet, poised against the Indian subcontinent, slow the rate of Prime Minister Gandhi's slide toward Moscow. Chinese divisions along Vietnam's border engage in probes to restrain Vietnam's ambitions vis a vis Thailand.

To date, the U.S. has not contributed equally robust deterrence to Moscow's designs. Covert aid is being provided to Afghanistan. But we are withholding the hand-held surface-to-air missiles that could devastate the Soviet helicopter fleet.

Beijing's view is that the U.S. and China are potentially two tigers which, working together, can restrain the Soviet bear. But they are beginning to fear that one of the two tigers is made of paper.

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Memorandum of Conversation among Deputy Foreign Minister Zhang Wen Gin, Dr. Robert V. West, and Admiral Zumwalt - 27 October 1980

1. Amenities

2. DFM: He is pleased with the progress of US/PRC relationship. It has enormous significance for the non-Soviet world after such a long separation. It represents a heavy weight in favor of stability.

3. DFM: Judges that we are continuing to make satisfactory progress. Events have proved the value of the relationship: Cambodia, Afghanistan, Middle East tensions. Events are moving very fast in these areas and have proved the merit of the relationship.

4. DFM: The people of both countries realize the importance of the relationship and want to see it develop. Anything tending to stop progress is not welcome; no force can impede us in improving this relationship. He is optimistic about the future of the relationship.

5. DFM: In the last stages of Vietnam we had our differences.

6. DFM: PRC is no longer afraid of US domination. It now has its own power base and it understands how the US/PRC relationship can contribute to stability.

7. DFM: Sometimes the US, speaking frankly, comes on like a bulldozer.

8. DFM: There are problems between us; each country has its own outlook; but there are common interests. China needs US equipment. US needs China's market.

9. DFM: Of course there is one underlying principle; China is restricted by its capabilities; the US has some restrictions, too. After such a long separation we still have much to learn about each other. The US still has suspicions of China because it is run by a communist party. China still has suspicions of the US as a result of our long domination by the big powers. We want to be our own masters. We know we must depend on the outside.

10. DFM: We have a colossus of a neighbor which menaces us; USSR worries about having to deal with two fronts.

11. DFM: Sometimes people overestimate PRC's capabilities; we have lots of time; we are not a third superpower. We are part of the Third World in a

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multi-polar world. We know that the PRC cannot benefit from seeking to become a third superpower; we have seen empires pass and we have learned from that; our philosophy is against further expansion of China.

12. DFM: The Taiwan issue remains unsolved and continues to cause friction between us from time to time. The US has accepted conditions of the Shanghai Communiqué. We hope that you will continue to accept them. The Taiwanese people are the same ethnic background and culture as we. We are not in a hurry. A two-China solution will not work and will be forever unacceptable to us. The Taiwan issue will be settled in time. It worries us that from time to time we hear views from the US suggesting that the Taiwan issue can be solved differently than the Shanghai Communiqué.

13. Z: His view on Taiwan.

14. DFM: There is general agreement that we need to continue to move forward in our cooperation. Since Admiral Zumwalt's last visit, where he urged us to move forward with joint development of oil, we have begun to do so. We have now authorized drilling and seismic surveys, both on land and in the ocean. In 1977 when we began our economic expansion, we did not make a full appraisal of the difficulties. We thought we could move quickly with our development schemes. We have learned that those quick schemes were not realistic. We have had to make readjustments. We have, therefore, lowered our sights. We have learned that our oil requirements are increasing faster than our production. We must have more oil production if we are to stay ahead of demand and be able to export. For the time being, oil production will remain at the present level, although we hope to expand in the future.

15. W: Outlined his concept for working together on oil development.

16. DFM: Normalization of relations has moved the PRC views closer to those of Admiral Zumwalt of three years ago. However, we are not sure of US policy. It waivers. The world is more dangerous now and we are not sure how the US will react in the coming years. Whoever is president, we hope the US will maintain its responsibility as the most powerful adversary to the Soviet Union to maintain the peace. You have to work with other countries. No nation, however strong, can do it alone. You must use your allies and China. We hope the US realizes the danger now, but there is much to be done.

17. Z: Don't pay too much attention to what presidential candidates are saying, etc.

18. DFM: We know we must watch your deeds, not your words. One has to face the world as it is. We know that Governor Reagan has good advisors, and we believe that we will be friends in his presidency.

19. Z & W: Comments on the political process and general agreement with DFM's point.

20. Z: Concerning China's punishment of Vietnam, I was able to predict, based on what your leaders told me three years ago, that you would take this action because you assured me that China would stand up and be counted when put to the challenge that you believed the US had failed.

21. DFM: Thanks. Our action was controversial. I am glad to hear you approved. We attained our purpose. Vietnam understands that it will have to reckon with China in any future clashes in Southeast Asia. Vietnam knows that they have to count on China moving against them if they become aggressive. We took an action which was clearly limited.

22. Z: What probability did you place on the Soviet Union reacting against you at the time you made the decision to go into Vietnam?

23. DFM: The Soviets had to evaluate the whole picture. They knew that they could cause China serious losses by taking action against us, but they knew that China could take it. We concluded that they would take limited action, if any, and we came out better than we expected.

24. Z: Asked DFM what he thought about Japan's recent decision to expand their defenses.

25. DFM: Generally favorable in view of the Soviet threat. The whole line has to be strengthened (US, China, Japan, Europe, and the Third World). With all five working together, the balance of power is restored to a certain extent. We do worry that there is some increase in the martial spirit in Japan. We certainly don't want another greater East Asia co-property spirit and we don't rule out that that could happen. However, in the main, we think the Japanese development is helpful and adds some weight to the power balance.

26. Z: Asked what the Minister thought about Indian policy.

27. DFM: India is a difficult question. We don't know how to evaluate India. We know that she got assistance from the US. We don't agree with your decision there. India has been harmful to two countries we support -- Pakistan and Bangladesh -- so we are watching her with great concern. We don't consider that she followed her non-aligned policy, but is tilting toward Moscow. We are distressed with her recognition of the junta in Cambodia.

28. Z: Asked the Minister about Afghanistan.

29. DFM: The event is a watershed event. It is important that we both help Pakistan to become stable and firm enough to withstand Soviet pressure. We will help Afghanistan. The resistance in Afghanistan will survive. It will be a long war. The Soviets will be bogged in a quagmire. It is sad for the Afghanis, but they will make it tough for Moscow. Moscow didn't understand this. We can never restore the status quo ante, but we can work toward a non-aligned Afghanistan. We must support these efforts. The US should do more than it is now doing to get anti-tank and anti-air missiles to the Afghanis. We will help. The Afghanis will survive even mass killing. These mass killings will cause hatred to such an extreme that the Soviets can never set up a puppet government. They will not be able to do in Afghanistan what they have done in Eastern Europe.

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Memorandum of Conversation among Vice Premier Geng Biao, Admiral Zumwalt,
and Dr. West - October 28, 1980, 4 to 6 p.m.

1. Exchange amenities. VP said he had tried for years to coexist with a bad gall bladder -- three months ago he had to have it removed. This was his first meeting since surgery. Admiral Zumwalt said he was not surprised to learn that VP had been no more successful at coexistence with a gall bladder than the U.S. had been at coexistence with the USSR. VP laughed and said that in both cases surgery was the answer.

2. VP commented that he knew Zumwalt was in PRC to have defense and energy discussions. He was concerned about the Soviet threat. He knew that Zumwalt was a naval expert. He would give his views and ask for Zumwalt's. USSR had made much progress. He had had the chance to exchange views with Secretary of Defense Harold Brown on his recent visit to the U.S. They both concluded that the Soviet's are not a match for the U.S. Navy. He knows the Soviet Union is outspending the U.S. Navy. But there are circumstances of position and weather that make a difference.

3. Murmansk is the only Soviet ocean port that is ice free year round. The North Sea and Pacific ports are frozen with thick ice for as much as six months of the year. This requires many ice breakers, whereas the U.S. needs none.

4. The Soviets have a problem of access to the open ocean. They must pass through narrows and straits where U.S. or allies can prevent passage.

5. The Soviets have had over ten episodes of serious problems with their nuclear submarines. They obviously have much to learn about nuclear propulsion.

6. We visited the carrier Ranger. Your carriers are much better than theirs. Theirs are primarily for helos, with much shorter range than your aircraft.

7. When one gives consideration to all these factors, it is important not to overestimate Soviet naval power.

8. Yet the Soviets are clearly outspending the U.S. Navy. Moreover, their personnel costs are much lower. They pay their people very little. Their draft system makes it possible to put a much larger fraction of their budget into weapons programs. The AVF of the U.S. makes it possible to get career people who are therefore better trained.

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9. The Soviets have the advantage of being able to use instant force. They have a weakness with regard to sustaining war. They must win quickly. They made a major miscalculation in Afghanistan. Every Afghan has a gun -- many they make themselves. Their history is one of many tribes and tribal sheiks who are fiercely independent. Their resistance causes a heavy financial burden on the Soviets, which they can't afford. They are paying \$10 million per day to sustain the Vietnamese. Costs for Cuba are \$3.6 billion per year. It all adds up,

10. The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia has not been a complete blessing for Moscow. USSR estimated they would have a quick success. Instead Vietnam is bogged down in Cambodia. Moreover, Vietnam and USSR are isolated in the world community on the Cambodia and Afghan invasions.

11. We have had experience with what the Soviets are facing -- the anti-Japanese war. We were much weaker than the Kuomintang forces, but Chiang Kai Shek's policy was to retreat rather than resist the Japanese forces. We communists, with little equipment, surrounded the Japanese occupied cities by operating in the country side. When it was over, we had the people and Chiang had to retreat to Taiwan.

12. I understand that in addition to your discussions on defense issues, you are interested in talking about helping us to develop our oil. This is good. We have large deposits. We need to cut down the time to get into production.

13. We are aware of the immense strategic significance of the oil of the Middle East. We know that the Soviets covet it. They may get it. But this outcome is uncertain. It depends on the performance of the five centers of resistance: PRC, U.S., Japan, Europe, and the Third World. Sometimes events unfold independent of men's will. We need to watch the Soviets, evaluate their intentions, appraise their performance, and act.

15. With regard to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, we were not aware from our intelligence that the invasion was coming. We do not believe the U.S. was, either. Neither were either of us prepared to see the Shah fall so soon.

16. Iran is now in chaos. Soon this will impact on the whole Middle East. Therefore, the oil resources of China are critical. It will be very difficult for us if we fall short of oil. We used to have an excess. But our population is increasing and our industrialization also adds to consumption. We will soon

lack enough oil and must stop exporting. We therefore must exploit our new oil fields. Oil fields now producing are beginning to fall in production.

17. We must also develop other sources of energy. Hydro-electric power can be developed in many suitable sites. We have large deposits of coal. In Shan Shi Province we have large deposits. Sinkiang Province has a huge coal seam in its south and west, which is currently hard to exploit because of transportation problems. Shantung Province is as well supplied as Shan Shi. Altogether, PRC has an estimated 6 hundred billion tons of coal which, at presently projected requirements of 2 billion tons per year, is a 300 year supply.

18. We have invited our foreign friends to participate in joint development of energy. We can give compensatory trade for our oil. For coal this is difficult. For example, if we invited the Germans into a joint venture with our coal, they wouldn't want to take our coal as compensation. We have other precious metals which can be used as trade-offs, however.

19. PRC wants peace in order to survive. The Soviets call us bellicose. This is not true. We desire peace. But we must face reality. We cannot sit and watch with folded arms as Moscow moves. When they helped Vietnam invade Cambodia, could we sit idle? No. We made the decision to invade Vietnam to teach them a lesson, and this paid off.

20. When I exchanged views with your Secretary of Defense in Washington, D. C., he had identical views. I told him that I had no illusion that the Soviets or the Vietnamese would be peaceful of their own volition or would ever leave Cambodia and Afghanistan. He agreed.

21. Zumwalt then dealt with the world in three frames of reference -- strategic, conventional, sublimated. After a 30 minute description of Soviet strategy, Zumwalt made a plea for expedited development of PRC energy sources, which Dr. West backed up with specifics.

22. Zumwalt then asked the Vice Premier why PRC, with missiles already deployed which can hit any Soviet target, was putting such priority on still longer range missiles instead of devoting those resources to conventional improvements to deal with the Soviet threat.

23. The Vice Premier replied that it was a necessary continuation of missile development programs. France is developing long range missiles but no one believes

that they will be aimed at the U.S. The U.S. has done so and we accept your word that they are not aimed at us. Our scientists cannot stop at medium range missiles. They must develop the full range in pursuit of science. To show our intentions, with each missile test we have announced that we will never use ours first.

26. Vice Premier then complimented Dr. West on his interest in developing a relationship with PRC. He stressed PRC decision to improve its friendly ties with the U.S. in this way to build mutual confidence. He said, "Frankly, in some aspects we still do not have sufficient confidence in the U.S., and I am sure that the referse is also true."

27. Vice Premier said that he had asked Harold Brown of the reservations he had about China. Vice Premier said he told Harold Brown, I know the first concern is whether we will restore our relationship with Moscow. He had assured Harold Brown that there was no way that this could happen. We cannot return to 30 years ago. Soviet objectives require them to try to subjugate China. China and USSR come up against each other in almost every issue. They force us to be hostile by their actions.

28. Regardless of the outcome of the U.S. presidential election, we believe friendly relations will continue. But with respect to these friendly relationships, we hope that the U.S. understands the intensity of our feelings on the Taiwan issue. There can be no reneging on the Shanghai communique.

29. Zumwalt then gave his Taiwan position, with which Vice Premier did not argue.

CHINA'S VIEW OF THE WORLD

by Elmo R. Zumwalt and Worth H. Bagley

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PEKING -- The Chinese general staff invited us here to discuss Soviet strategy. These and subsequent discussions with top foreign ministry and defense officials were much more relaxed and friendly than when we were here three years ago. At that time, Teng Hsiao-p'ing was just being returned to power; Chinese officials, still shattered by a generation of policy and leadership upheavals, were guarded in their comments. Today, with China under the pragmatic leadership of Teng, officials are open and frank.

China's leaders view the world as facing greater danger today from an avaricious Soviet empire than it has at any time since the rampages of Hitler and Tojo in Europe and Asia. Realizing that they cannot redress their own weaknesses in the near future, their short-term strategy is to join with other threatened regions of the world to generate collective strength. Their long-term aim is the capability of surviving independently.

Let us examine first the Chinese view of the Soviets and then the elements of both their short- and long-term strategy.

MOSCOW AS SEEN FROM PEKING

Chinese officials know that the superbly equipped 45 Soviet divisions along their northern border, backed up by a modern air force, can seize Chinese territory. We gave our estimate that the U.S.S.R. is capable of seizing Manchuria in about a month and all of China north of the Yangtze in about two months. Chinese leaders disagreed with our estimate of how long it would take and of how far the Soviets could go. The Chinese leaders believe their policy of "scorching the earth" during retreat and of subsequent protracted insurgency -- "People's War" -- would make any Soviet conquests even more difficult than Afghanistan to hold. They believe that Moscow has enough respect for that Chinese capability and would judge the rewards of conquest to be so little that Europe would seem a much more tempting target for Moscow.

Peking believes that in Europe Moscow's forces could reach the Rhine in two days and the British Channel in two weeks. (They concede that this Soviet capability against the NATO forces makes more believable our estimate of Soviet capability against the less sophisticated Chinese forces.) They believe that the fruits of victory in Europe would be so juicy -- linkage to Moscow of a European industrial capacity as great as that of the U.S. and control of the Mediterranean and eastern Northern Atlantic -- that Europe has a much higher priority in Moscow's strategy.

Nevertheless, because of Moscow's desire to avoid losses in a nuclear war, even though the U.S.S.R. could win such an exchange, Peking judges that the Kremlin will seek first to Finlandize NATO Europe. Finlandization would be pursued by use of both carrot and stick. The stick would be applied by ever-increasing Soviet tactical nuclear superiority in Europe as Soviet SS-20 missiles -- with warheads as large as U.S. ICBMs -- were deployed at the rate of one each week. The stick also would be applied by threatening the loss of Europe's Mideast oil. The seizure of Afghanistan and current Soviet efforts to help both Iran and Iraq in their war are increasing Soviet penetration of the Mideast. Soviet encirclement of that oil by forces located in Ethiopia, Mozambique, South Yemen and Afghanistan is being further tightened. The Treaty of Friendship just signed with Syria, the fanning of the Iran-Iraq war to gain influence and position within each country, Soviet pressures on Pakistan, increasing rapprochement with India, the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, and the recent movement of Soviet forces into Vietnam all contribute to the tighter encirclement. The carrot would be the promise to guarantee oil deliveries if European

NATO nations weaken their ties to Washington and strengthen their ties with Moscow.

CHINA'S SHORT-TERM STRATEGY

PRC leaders are prepared to be patient on the Taiwan issue in order to implement their short-term strategy for survival against "Soviet hegemonism" -- but they insist that the U.S. must recognize the Taiwan issue as an internal affair, in accordance with the Shanghai Communique. On the assumption that the U.S. continues to support a "patient internal solution," China favors the following short-term political-military measures:

--Greater U.S./PRC cooperation to stabilize Pakistan in the face of Soviet pressures. This would require: covert assistance to the Afghanistan rebels with the aim of keeping Soviet forces fully preoccupied to Pakistan's north; assistance for the million Afghan refugees in Pakistan, and modernization of Pakistan's armed forces.

--Continued Chinese deterrence of Vietnam's aggressive intentions. China has already "taught Vietnam a lesson": (1) by its limited invasion after Hanoi attacked Cambodia, thus forcing Hanoi to move forces from Cambodia to Vietnam's northern border; and (2) by supplying Pol Pot's resistance movement in Cambodia against Hanoi's puppet regime. Peking has made it clear to Hanoi that China will not stand by if Thailand is invaded. Thai leaders conclude that for the present their survival rests on China's deterrence of Hanoi. Increasing U.S. military strength under Reagan should gradually bring the U.S. into an effective triangular relationship with Thailand and China.

--Use the momentum of the U.S. election outcome to galvanize NATO to increase its defense budgets (although cuts are now being made).

--Extending NATO's defensive zone to include the Persian Gulf oil zone and to provide a collective approach to checkmating the Soviet strategy of capitalizing on the Iran-Iraq war.

--Increasing PRC and U.S. efforts to establish friendly positions that offset Soviet/Cuban/East German clientization of African states. Peking is prepared to use its special influence with African leaders Mugabe in Zimbabwe and Nyerere in Tanzania in this effort. The Chinese leaders feel the U.S. should use its political influence with many African states and accelerate its establishment of bases in Egypt, Kenya, Somalia, and Oman in the Arabian peninsula.

-- prompt moves by the U.S. to reverse the Soviet/Cuban strategy to cut off North America from South America. The Marxist government of Grenada is providing bases for Soviet forces. Moscow and Havana are sending equipment and advisers to the Sandinistas in Nicaragua for the future invasion of other Central American nations listed in Castro's strategic plan.

--Japan must increase its defensive budgets. Deputy Foreign Minister Zhang Wen Gin worries about a return of the martial spirit there: "We don't want to see a resurgence of a 'greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in Tokyo.'" But on balance, an increase in Japan's forces -- especially air and naval forces -- is welcomed.

CHINA'S VIEW OF LONG-TERM STRATEGY

First and foremost, the non-Soviet strategic nuclear forces must regain parity with the Soviet Union. Peking expects the U.S. to do more under President-elect Reagan. Peking is already doing all it can afford to do. (We asked Vice Premier Geng Biao, China's de facto defense minister, why China, which already has deployed missiles with enough range to hit any Soviet target, continues to spend treasure on acquiring a still longer range missile instead of deploying more of its present missiles against Soviet targets. He cleverly replied: "Our scientists want to go all the way -- it's a requirement of science. France is developing its own long-range missiles and you don't worry that they will aim them at you. We accept your assurance that you are not targeting yours against us. Similarly, you can be sure we

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will never use ours first." (The Reagan administration should keep in mind that Peking might be persuaded to deploy its longer range -- potentially anti-U.S. missiles -- in trade-off for help in resisting Soviet strategy.)

The U.S., U.K. and France must collectively regain in Europe parity with Moscow in tactical nuclear weapons.

The five major world blocs that are the targets of "Soviet hegemonism" -- PRC, U.S., Europe, Japan and the Third World -- must concert their policies, their defense and their intelligence, if they are to survive the period of Soviet military superiority in the '80s.

The modernization of NATO non-nuclear forces in Europe must continue until realistic deterrence of conventional war is restored.

China is prepared, when conditions are ripe, to consider permitting U.S. forces to operate from PRC bases in the common defense.

The U.S. should join in Europe's current effort to provide conventional lethal weapons to permit China to reduce the Soviet advantage along its border. Present U.S. policy permits only non-lethal equipment to be provided. The theory has been that giving such equipment would demonstrate to Moscow that its aggression has forced the U.S. to retaliate. By withholding the more important lethal weapons, we would supposedly deter Moscow from still further aggression for fear that we would then provide such weapons. As a consequence, we have deprived ourselves of the optimum deterrent which China could provide against the Soviet Union if it had our lethal weapons.

China recognizes that its oil production can provide a critical contribution. According to Oil Minister Yea Den Sher, China's oil production presently is increasing slowly while its consumption is increasing rapidly with industrialization. Soon China will cease to be an exporting nation. It realizes that it can only achieve rapid increases in production by making full use of Western oil companies and their technology. Some service contracts have been given to permit such companies to assist in the development of China's land reserves, and a number of companies have gathered seismic data in China's territorial seas, but in both cases progress has been very slow. Deputy Foreign Minister Zhang candidly provides an important reason for this: "Frankly, you Americans generally come on like bulldozers and we are not ready to move without careful reflection." Nevertheless, China's leaders at all levels unanimously agree that cooperation must develop more quickly. Such cooperation could provide great increases in the oil available to the non-Soviet world, a strategic alternative to Middle East oil, and could provide a source of dollars for China to go forward with its "Four Modernizations" -- industry, agriculture, defense and science/technology.

All of the foregoing elements of long-term strategy -- strengthening nations around the Soviet perimeter -- are designed to make China, by the year 2000, capable of surviving independently of the West.

THE IMPACT OF A REAGAN ADMINISTRATION

Although our meetings were completed on Oct. 31, we discussed the consequences of the re-election of President Carter or the election of Governor Reagan. While the Chinese leaders were concerned about Reagan's statements regarding Taiwan, it was quite clear that they believed that the non-Soviet world will have a better prospect of deterring and surviving Soviet objectives with the military capability and the will for peace with honor that a Reagan administration will generate.

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AMEMBASSY OSLO 061
AMEMBASSY PARIS 107
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 070
AMEMBASSY ROME 270
AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1510
ZEN/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI POUCH
AMEMBASSY SOFIA 045
AIT TAIPEI
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 765
AMEMBASSY WARSAW 087
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E.O. 12065: N/A
TAGS: PEPR, UR

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PAGE 01

BEIJING 2599
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DTG:161019Z MAR 1 PSN:041 40
TOR: 075/1324Z CSN:HCE550

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SUBJECT: PRC MEDIA COMMENTARY ON THE RECENT BREZHNEV PROPOSALS

1. SUMMARY: PRC MEDIA'S FIRST COMMENT ON THE SOVIET LEADER'S PROPOSALS FOR "CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES" (CBMS) PRESENTS A SWEEPING REJECTION OF ALL BREZHNEV INITIATIVES. THE MARCH 14 XINHUA COMMENTARY DERIDES BREZHNEV SUGGESTIONS/PROPOSALS FOR CBMS IN THE FAR EAST AS PLAIN "HYPOCRISY." THE COMMENTARY PAINTS THE SOVIETS AS ON THE DEFENSIVE AND UNPRECEDENTEDLY ISOLATED OWING TO INTERNAL PROBLEMS, A TOUGHER WESTERN STANCE, AND RAGAN ADMINISTRATION POLICIES VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIETS. THE COMMENTARY, HOWEVER, EXPRESSES CONCERN LEST SOME WESTERN EUROPEANS FALL FOR THE SOVIET DANGLED "BAIT." END SUMMARY.

2. A XINHUA COMMENTARY OF MARCH 14 DERISIVELY REJECTS THE KREMLIN'S RECENT PEACE INITIATIVES AS "BAIT FOR THE WEST." MOSCOW'S CURRENT DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE, IN PARTICULAR BREZHNEV'S ALLEGED "LIP SERVICE" TO DETENTE, PEACE AND COOPERATION, ETC., AND HIS ADOPTION OF A SEEMINGLY LESS-CONFRONATIONAL POSTURE, IS VIEWED AS A SOVIET EFFORT TO BLAME OTHERS FOR MOSCOW'S CURRENT INTERNATIONAL PLIGHT, AND TO JUSTIFY SOVIET ACTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN, MOSCOW'S SUPPORT FOR VIETNAMESE AGGRESSION AGAINST KAMPUCHEA, AND ITS STANCE VIS-A-VIS POLAND.

3. FINDING LITTLE POSITIVE IN THE BREZHNEV PROPOSALS FOR CBMS, XINHUA ASSERTS THAT THE MEANING OF SUCH PROPOSALS IS "OPEN TO DOUBT IN VIEW OF THE ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY OF RECONNAISSANCE SATELLITES." THE COMMENTARY ALSO CONTAINS AN EXPLICIT REJECTION OF BREZHNEV'S CALL FOR SIMILAR CBMS NEGOTIATIONS IN THE FAR EAST, A PROPOSAL XINHUA TERMS "PURE HYPOCRISY." IT NOTES THAT THE BREZHNEV ENVISIONED CBMS NEGOTIATIONS IN THE FAR EAST WOULD IMPLICITLY INCLUDE CHINA AS A PARTY. CHIDING THE SOVIETS, XINHUA MAINTAINS THAT THE SOVIETS SHOULD SEEK TO BUILD CONFIDENCE THROUGH ACTS RATHER THAN MERE WORDS.

4. IN A SIMILAR FASHION, XINHUA DISMISSES THE SOVIET LEADER'S PROPOSAL FOR A MORATORIUM ON DEPLOYMENT OF NEW MEDIUM RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES IN EUROPE AND CITES THE DISPARITY BETWEEN WESTERN AND SOVIET MISSILE LEVELS. THE SOVIETS' EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO ENTERTAIN NEGOTIATIONS ON AFGHANISTAN AND THE PERSIAN GULF ARE CHARACTERIZED AS ATTEMPTS TO LEGALIZE THE SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN AND DOMINATION OF THE PERSIAN GULF. OTHER BREZHNEV PROPOSALS ARE DERIDED AS "MERE PROPAGANDA" INTENDED TO RESTRICT THE ADVERSARY, SAFEGUARD THE SOVIET POSITION AND SOW

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DISCORD BETWEEN WESTERN EUROPE AND THE U.S.
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INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS 04

AMEMBASSY ANKARA 034

AMEMBASSY BERLIN 066

USMISSION USBERLIN 046

AMEMBASSY BONN 392

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 146

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AMCONSUL HONG KONG 6017

AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 02

AMEMBASSY LONDON 871

AMEMBASSY MADRID 029

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 2794

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AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 00

AMEMBASSY OSLO 062

AMEMBASSY PARIS 1079

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 071

AMEMBASSY ROME 271

AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1511

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AIT TAIPEI

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AMEMBASSY WARSAW 088

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5. THE COMMENTARY MAINTAINS THAT BEREZHNEV'S ADOPTION OF

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BEIJING 2599
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A LOW-POSTURE, HIS DROPPING OF SOVIET PRECONDITIONS (RE U.S.-SOVIET TALKS AND TALKS ON LIMITING INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE) AND HIS EMPHASIS ON DIALOGUE ARE PROMPTED BY SOVIET INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL PROBLEMS AND MOSCOW'S UNPRECEDENTED ISOLATION IN THE WORLD. ACCORDING TO XINHUA THIS ISOLATION STEMS FROM MOSCOW'S ACTIONS AND POSITIONS VIS-A-VIS AFGHANISTAN, VIETNAM AND POLAND. IT POINTEDLY NOTES THAT THE WEST THOUGHENED UP ITS ATTITUDE TOWARD MOSCOW FOLLOWING THE AFGHAN INCIDENT AND APPROVINGLY STATES THAT THE U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIETS HAS BECOME FIRMER SINCE THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION TOOK OFFICE. THESE FACTORS ARE SAID TO EXPLAIN BREZHNEV'S LESS ARROGANT ATTITUDE AND ABSENCE OF BAOSTING OF SOVIET ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN HIS CPSU SPEECH.

6. THE SEEMINGLY NEW BREZHNEV ATTITUDE AND PEACE PROPOSALS, ACCORDING TO XINHUA, REPRESENT ONLY A TACTICAL RATHER THAN FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN SOVIET STRATEGY AND POLICY AND ARE DESIGNED AS "BAIT" FOR WESTERN EUROPE IN PARTICULAR. THE COMMENTARY CONCLUDES BY NOTING THAT A SIMILAR BREZHNEV LETTER CAMPAIGN TWO YEARS AGO ON THE PROBLEM OF THE U.S. NEUTRON BOMB WAS NOT WITHOUT SOME SUCCESS AND ADDS THAT ONE CAN ONLY "WAIT AND SEE" WHETHER THIS BAIT WILL BE SWALLOWED.

7. COMMENT: THIS COMMENTARY CONSTITUTES THE FIRST PRC COMMENTARY ON THE BREZHNEV PROPOSALS AND INCLUDES A STRONG REBUFF TO MOSCOW'S PROPOSED NEGOTIATIONS ON CBMS IN THE EAST ASIA. ITS EXPRESSION OF CONCERN LEST SOME WESTERN EUROPEAN LEADERS TAKE HOLD OF THE SOVIET "BAIT" INDICATES BEIJING'S CONCERN WITH THE DURABILITY OF THE CURRENT WESTERN EUROPEAN HARD LINE STANCE. THE COMMENTARY, ON THE OTHER HAND, PRAISES CURRENT U.S. POLICY AND SUGGESTS NO CONCERN THAT THE TOUGH STANCE MAY SLIP.

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INFO AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU 2169
AMCONSUL HONG KONG 6078
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 1542

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BEIJING 2767

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 3/20/11 (ROY, J. STAPLETON) OR-M
TAGS: PINT, PEPR, CH
SUBJECT: REPORTED DEBATE ON FOREIGN POLICY
REF: STATE 65337

1. ~~C~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: MEDIA ARTICLES WHICH PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR A RECENT FBIS ANALYSIS OFFER NO PERSUASIVE EVIDENCE THAT CHINA'S CURRENT POLICY TOWARD THE U.S. AND USSR IS THE SUBJECT OF A SENIOR LEVEL POLICY DEBATE. IT IS POSSIBLE, HOWEVER, THAT SUCH ISSUES ARE BEING MORE ACTIVELY DISCUSSED BY INFORMED CHINESE WHO PLAY NO DIRECT ROLE IN THE PRC'S POLICY PROCESS. THE DISCUSSION, WHICH MAY HAVE BEEN PROMPTED BY UNCERTAINTY OVER U.S. POLICY TOWARD TAIWAN, SEEMS TO REVOLVE AROUND HOW HARD LINE CHINA SHOULD BE IN DEALING WITH THE SOVIETS AND TO WHAT EXTENT BEIJING SHOULD COMPROMISE WITH THE U.S. OVER TAIWAN. POLITICALLY ATTUNED CHINESE OFFICIALS AND DIPLOMATS WE HAVE TALKED TO OVER THE PAST SEVERAL DAYS SEEM TO BE UNAWARE OF INCREASED ATTENTION TO THE ISSUE. END SUMMARY.

3. WE HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED THE FULL TEXT OF THE ANALYSIS REFERRED TO IN REPTTEL BUT OFFER SOME PRELIMINARY COMMENTS ON THE MEDIA ARTICLES THAT PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR THE FBIS JUDGMENTS.

4. WE SEE NO PERSUASIVE EVIDENCE THAT INDICATES CHINA'S CURRENT POLICY TOWARD THE U.S. AND THE USSR IS THE SUBJECT

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BEIJING 2767

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OF A SENIOR LEVEL POLICY DEBATE. THE SPORADIC APPEARANCES OF SIMILAR ARTICLES OVER THE LAST TWO YEARS SUGGESTS THAT THIS ISSUE IS THE SUBJECT OF CONTINUING EXAMINATION BY CHINESE SCHOLARS AND SPECIALISTS WHO ARE SEVERAL STEPS REMOVED FROM ANY DIRECT ROLE IN FORMULATING PRC FOREIGN POLICIES. THE DEBATE MAY WAX AND WANE AS DEVELOPMENTS OCCUR THAT PROVIDE FUEL FOR THE ARGUMENT. THE PUBLICATION OF SUCH MEDIA ITEMS AT THIS TIME MAY WELL REFLECT INCREASED ATTENTION TO THE SUBJECT OCCASIONED BY THE U.S. ELECTION CAMPAIGN AND THE DECISION OF THE DUTCH TO SELL SUBMARINES TO TAIWAN. PERSUASIVE EVIDENCE THAT THIS DISCUSSION HAS PENETRATED POLICY CIRCLES, HOWEVER, IS LACKING.

5. THE TWO MOST INTRIGUING ARTICLES ARE THE PEOPLE'S DAILY COMMENTARY ON ZHOU ENLAI'S 1927 LETTER AND THE GUANGMING DAILY ITEM ON QING DYNASTY BORDER DEFENSE. BOTH DO LITTLE TO CONCEAL THAT THEIR MESSAGES HAVE CONTEMPORARY APPLICATION AND SEEM TO REFLECT DIFFERENCES OVER HOW HARD LINE CHINA SHOULD BE IN DEALING WITH THE SOVIETS AND OVER THE EXTENT TO WHICH BEIJING SHOULD COMPROMISE WITH THE U.S. OVER THE TAIWAN ISSUE.

6. ON THE OTHER HAND, DESPITE THE CONSIDERABLE STATURE OF ITS AUTHORS, THE FEBRUARY ARTICLE ON WANG JIAXIANG SEEMS TO BE PART OF AN ONGOING EFFORT TO EDUCATE CADRE ON THE IMPORTANCE OF HUMILITY, SELFLESSNESS AND PARTY DISCIPLINE, REGARDLESS OF THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF A PARTICULAR VIEWPOINT. WANG IS AN OBJECT LESSON IN CORRECT PARTY STYLE. HIS POSITIONS ON FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES APPEAR TO BE INCIDENTAL TO THIS CENTRAL POINT, ALTHOUGH IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT THE ARTICLE'S ELABORATION AT SOME LENGTH ON WANG'S MODERATE FOREIGN POLICY VIEWS HAS IMPLICATIONS FOR SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS. IN ANY CASE, ON THE BASIS OF A LIMITED AND HIGHLY AMBIGUOUS DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE IN THE CHINESE MEDIA, IT WOULD SEEM PREMATURE TO CONCLUDE THAT A FULL-SCALE LEADERSHIP DEBATE HAS MATERIALIZED.

7. MOREOVER, THE PRESENT WOULD SEEM TO BE A PARTICULARLY UNPROFITABLE TIME FOR A MAJOR DEBATE ON THE SINO-SOVIET-U.S. TRIANGLE. MOSCOW'S AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR IN AFGHANISTAN AND ITS SUPPORT FOR VIETNAM IN INDOCHINA WOULD SEEM TO DISCOURAGE OPEN ADVOCACY OF CONCILIATORY GESTURES AT THIS TIME. A HARD PRC LINE AGAINST THE SOVIETS ON ALL MAJOR INTERNATIONAL ISSUES AND PRC SUPPORT FOR THE TOUGHENED U.S. STANCE, INCLUDING THAT IN EL SALVADOR, CONTINUES UNABATED.

8. OVER THE PAST COUPLE OF DAYS EMBASSY OFFICERS HAVE

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RAISED THESE ARTICLES SEPARATELY WITH TWO POLITICALLY ATTUNED SENIOR OFFICIALS AT THE INSTITUTE OF STRATEGIC STUDIES. BOTH SEEMED UNAWARE OF THEM BUT DISMISSED THE IDEA THAT THERE WAS ANY SERIOUS POLICY LEVEL DISCUSSION OF SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS UNDERWAY. WHILE THESE OBSERVERS COULD BE DISSEMBLING, THEY APPEARED GENUINELY NOT TO HAVE FOCUSED ON THE ARTICLES.

9. OTHER DIPLOMATS HERE HAVE NOT ATTACHED ANY SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE TO THE ARTICLES. ON MARCH 18, AN EMBASSY OFFICER DISCUSSED THESE MEIDA ITEMS WITH A RANKONG SOVIET DIPLOMAT WHO SPECIALIZES IN SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS. COMMENTING ON THE GUANGMING ARTICLE, THE DIPLOMAT SAID IT APPEARED TO REPRESENT A DEBATE OVER WHETHER CHINA'S DEFENSE PRIORITY SHOULD BE LOPSIDEDLY ORIENTED TOWARD THE USSR. HE WAS INCLINED TO BELIEVE THE ARTICLE HAD BEEN APPROVED AT HIGH LEVELS. ALTHOUGH A CHINESE MEDIA OFFICIAL HE RECENTLY QUERIED ON THIS SCORE SAID HE WAS UNSURE WHETHER THIS PARTICULAR ARTICLE WOULD REQUIRE SENIOR CLEARANCE OR NOT. SURPRISINGLY, THE SOVIET DIPLOMAT HAD NOT NOTICED THE ARTICLE ON WANG XIAXING. NONETHELESS, HE SAID THAT OFFICIAL CHINESE DEALINGS WITH THE SOVIET EMBASSY REMAINED AS CHILLY AS BEFORE AND HE ANTICIPATED NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE.

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I. ALEKSANDROV ARTICLE ON U.S.-PRC RELATIONS

TAKE 1--ALEKSANDROV ARTICLE

LD262220 MOSCOW TASS INTERNATIONAL SERVICE IN RUSSIAN 2114 GMT
26 JUN 81

("FULL TEXT" OF I. ALEKSANDROV ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN MOSCOW PRAVDA
27 JUNE: "ESCALATION OF RECKLESSNESS")

(TEXT) MOSCOW, 27 JUN (TASS)--THE WORLD PUBLIC IS FOLLOWING WITH ALARM THE BUILD-UP OF DANGEROUS TRENDS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN-CHINESE RELATIONS--A FACTOR WHICH IS EXERTING AN INCREASING NEGATIVE INFLUENCE ON THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION. THE TALKS WHICH RECENTLY TOOK PLACE IN BEIJING BETWEEN U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE A. HAIG AND THE LEADERS OF THE PRC HAVE SHOWN THAT WASHINGTON AND BEIJING ARE COORDINATING A POLICY AIMED AT EXACERBATING TENSION, DESTABILIZING THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, INTENSIFYING CONFRONTATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND THE SOCIALIST COMMUNITY AND JOINTLY WAGING AN UNDECLARED WAR ON AFGHANISTAN AND KAMPUCHEA.

THE HALLMARK OF THE TALKS, JUDGING BY WHAT HAS BEEN PUBLISHED, WAS HOSTILITY ON THE PART OF BEIJING AND WASHINGTON TO THE USSR AND TO THE CAUSE OF WORLD PEACE. THE VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA ON THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, A. HAIG SAID AFTER THE TALKS, "HAVE NEVER BEEN SO CLOSE AS AT THE PRESENT TIME." ZWE HAVE MANY IDENTICAL OR SIMILAR VIEWS. PRC FOREIGN MINISTER HUANG HUA SAID, ECHOING HIS WORDS. THE CHINESE SIDE, ACCORDING TO HAIG, EVALUATED HIGHLY THE MEASURES TAKEN BY THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION TO INCREASE U.S. MILITARY POWER AND STRENGTHEN AMERICA'S TIES WITH ITS ALLIES IN THE MILITARY BLOCS. THIS AROUSED THAT VIOLENT OPPONENTS OF DETENTE, SENATOR G. JACKSON, TO SUCH ECSTASY THAT HE DECLARED: "NO COUNTRY IN THE WORLD IS SO STAUNCH A SUPPORTER OF NATO AS CHINA!"

WHAT WE ARE CLEARLY CONFRONTED WITH IS A NEW AND HIGHLY DANGEROUS STAGE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHINESE-AMERICAN PARTNERSHIP. THIS IS EXPRESSED ABOVE ALL IN SUBSTANTIAL EXPANSION OF ITS MILITARY ASPECTS.

THE WASHINGTON ADMINISTRATION HAS ANNOUNCED ITS DECISION TO REMOVE CHINA FROM THE LIST OF "UNFRIENDLY COMMUNIST COUNTRIES" AND TO PLACE IT IN THE CATEGORY OF "FRIENDLY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES." APPROPRIATE AMENDMENTS ARE TO BE INSERTED INTO AMERICAN LEGISLATION. THIS STEP WILL NOT ONLY ALLOW CHINA TO ACQUIRE FROM THE UNITED STATES MILITARY HARDWARE AND TECHNOLOGY WHOSE EXPORT, ACCORDING TO SPECIAL RESTRICTIONS, IS BANNED TO "UNFRIENDLY COUNTRIES," BUT WILL ALSO PROVIDE IT WITH ACCESS TO CREDITS ON FAVORABLE TERMS. IT SEEMS THAT HOPES ARE BEING ENTERTAINED IN BEIJING THAT THIS WILL HELP TO OVERCOME THE DIFFICULTIES LINKED WITH THE SEVERE LACK OF FOREIGN CURRENCY.

EXPRESSING THEIR WILLINGNESS TO PROVIDE BEIJING WITH THE MEANS FOR CONDUCTING A MODERN WAR, INCLUDING OFFENSIVE WEAPONS, THE PRESENT WASHINGTON LEADERS HAVE GONE MUCH FURTHER IN THEIR DANGEROUS INSTIGATION THAN THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION, WHICH THEY CRITICIZED BEFORE THE ELECTION FOR ITS EXCESSIVE PRO-CHINESE TILT.

FILE under
CHINA

28

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-11410 #11408

BY RW NARA DATE 3/28/11

THE COORDINATION OF "PARALLEL ACTIONS" BY THE TWO STATES ON THE BASIS OF "COMMON STRATEGIC INTERESTS" WAS INITIATED DURING THE VISIT BY BROWN, THE ERSTWHILE U.S. DEFENSE SECRETARY, TO BEIJING IN JANUARY 1980. AT THE TIME, BROWN HINTED AT THE POSSIBILITY OF THE SALE TO CHINA OF "DUAL PURPOSE" HARDWARE, THAT IS, HARDWARE WHICH COULD BE USED BOTH FOR CIVIL AND MILITARY NEEDS. WHEN 6 MONTHS LATER GENG BIAO, THE PRESENT CHINESE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, ARRIVED IN WASHINGTON TO RETURN THE VISIT, THIS POSSIBILITY WAS MADE REALITY. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT APPROVED AROUND 500 LICENSES FOR THE SALE OF DUAL-PURPOSE TECHNOLOGY TO CHINA (HELICOPTERS, TRANSPORT PLANES, TRUCKS AND RADAR). HOWEVER, IT WAS EMPHASIZED THAT WHAT WAS INVOLVED WAS MERELY SHIPMENTS OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT, NOT LETHAL WEAPONRY.

HENCEFORTH CHINA HAS OPEN ACCESS NOT ONLY TO RESTRICTED AND HIGHLY SOPHISTICATED TECHNOLOGY SUCH AS A SYSTEM FOR THE GUIDANCE OF STRATEGIC MISSILES OR MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES, BUT ALSO TO VARIOUS TYPES OF MILITARY HARDWARE, FROM ANTITANK MISSILES TO FIGHTER-BOMBERS. NEVERTHELESS, THE STATE DEPARTMENT AVOIDS CALLING THINGS BY THEIR PROPER NAMES MAINTAINING THAT THE UNITED STATES IS NOT EXPORTING OFFENSIVE WEAPONS AT ALL SINCE, ACCORDING TO AMERICAN LAW, THEY SHOULD NOT, SUPPOSEDLY, BE USED FOR PURPOSES OF AGGRESSION BUT THE PENTAGON'S CLIENTS HAVE SHOWN MORE THAN ONCE IN PRACTICE OF WHAT LITTLE VALUE SUCH RESERVATIONS ARE. AND THE LATEST EXAMPLE OF THAT IS THE ISRAELI RAID ON BAGHDAD.

ONE MAY SAY THAT HAIG CARRIED OUT HIS MISSION IN BEIJING LIKE A GENERAL IN CIVILIAN CLOTHES. HIS MEETING WITH DEFENSE MINISTER GENG BIAO WAS DEVOTED TO THE SALE OF ARMS AND ALSO TO THE EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE DATA. (ZHANG ZHUNTSE), DEPUTY CHIEF OF CHINESE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, PARTICIPATED IN THESE TALKS.

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TAKE 2--73 OF 26 JUN (ALEKSANDROV ARTICLE)

/// IN THESE TALKS.

LD262240

(TEXT) NEWS HAS JUST REACHED THE PRESS THAT THE UNION BETWEEN THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES OF THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA HAS HAPPENED EVEN BEFORE "FULL NORMALIZATION" OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO STATES. AN ADDITIONAL INCENTIVE FOR THIS WAS THE OVERTHROW OF THE ANTI-PEOPLE'S, MONARCHIST REGIME IN IRAN, AS A RESULT OF WHICH THE CIA WAS DEPRIVED OF ITS ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE STATIONS ON THE BORDERS OF THE SOVIET UNION. ON THE BASIS OF A SECRET UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND BEIJING TWO TRACKING STATIONS WERE BUILT IN NORTH WEST CHINA WITH AMERICAN EQUIPMENT, WHICH WAS RUN BY CHINESE PERSONNEL UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF INSTRUCTORS FROM THE CIA. THE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION RECEIVED FROM THEM, THE NEW YORK TIMES WRITES, IS BEING USED JOINTLY BY THE ESPIONAGE CENTERS OF THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA.

AS A RESULT OF HIS PRESENT TRIP, HAIG ACCORDING TO HIS STATEMENT, REACHED AGREEMENT ON "EXTENDING ACTIVE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES." A CHINESE MILITARY DELEGATION WILL VISIT WASHINGTON IN AUGUST TO DISCUSS SPECIFIC QUESTIONS OF SUCH COOPERATION.

THOSE WHO ARE PLACING CONTEMPORARY WEAPONS IN THE HANDS OF THE CHINESE HEGEMONISTS OBVIOUSLY SUPPOSE THAT THEY ARE ACQUIRING AN OPPORTUNITY TO INFLUENCE BEIJING'S POLICY AND TO GUIDE ITS EXPANSIONISM BASICALLY IN A NORTHERLY DIRECTION. A PROFOUND DELUSION! THE DANGER OF CHINA'S MILITARIZATION -- AND THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION HAS NOW EMBARKED ON THIS ROAD -- LIES IN THE FACT THAT THE AMERICAN WEAPONS NOW IN CHINESE HANDS WILL BE TURNED PRIMARILY AGAINST THE COMPARATIVELY SMALL NEIGHBORING STATES, AMONG WHOM, INCIDENTALLY, ARE AMERICA'S ALLIES. THEY ARE, AS IT WERE NUDGING CHINA TOWARD IMPLEMENTING ITS TERRITORIAL CLAIMS IN SOUTH EAST AND SOUTH ASIA.

EVEN IN COUNTRIES NUMBERED AMONG THE FRIENDS OF THE UNITED STATES APPREHENSION IS BEING EXPRESSED OVER THE RESULTS OF HAIG'S VISIT TO BEIJING, WHICH ARE ALIEN TO THE INTERESTS OF PEACE. IN JAPAN FOR INSTANCE, SUCH SENTIMENTS ARE BEING EXPRESSED NOT ONLY BY THE PUBLIC BUT EVEN BY OFFICIAL CIRCLES. IN AN EDITORIAL, "THE DANGEROUS NATURE OF AMERICAN-CHINESE MILITARY COOPERATION," THE NEWSPAPER MAINICHI WRITES: "A MILITARILY STRONG CHINA POSES A THREAT TO ALL THE SURROUNDING COUNTRIES OF SOUTH EAST AND SOUTH WEST ASIA." THE JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTRY HAS EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER DELIVERIES OF U.S. ARMS TO CHINA.

WASHINGTON'S PERSISTENT BLACKMAILING OF THE COUNTRY OF HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI TO RID ITSELF OF ITS NUCLEAR ALLERGY AND EMBARK ON THE PATH OF BECOMING A MILITARY POWER IS BEING MORE AND MORE ACTIVELY SUPPORTED BY BEIJING. THERE IS REASON TO EXPECT THAT THE PARTIES TO THE AMERICAN-CHINESE DEAL WILL NOW TRY STILL HARDER TO PUSH JAPAN ONTO THE PATH OF MILITARISM.

THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP HAS BEEN SAYING SINCE THE YEAR OF MILITARISM.

FOREIGN OBSERVERS NOTE THAT THE DECISION TO SELL OFFENSIVE WEAPONS TO CHINA IS IN KEEPING WITH THE SHARP TOUGHENING OF U.S.M POLICY IN ASIA. THE MAIN COMPONENTS OF THIS THREAT POLICY ARE THE EXPANSION OF MILITARY AID TO PAKISTAN, WITH THE OBJECT OF TURNING IT INTO A REGIONAL GENDARME AND, IN PARTICULAR, INTO A BASE FOR CONTINUING AGGRESSION AGAINST AFGHANISTAN; THE SETTING UP OF "RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCES" IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AND OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD; AND THE KNOCKING TOGETHER OF A NEW MILITARY GROUP IN SOUTH EAST ASIA, HOSTILE TO VIETNAM, LAOS AND KAMPUCHEA. THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP DECLARES IT SUPPORT FOR THE AMERICAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AND THE FAR EAST AND WELCOMES THE WIDENING OF THE NETWORK OF U.S. MILITARY BASES AND STRONGPOINTS IN THOSE REGIONS.

NEITHER THE UNITED STATES NOR CHINA CONCEAL THE FACT THAT THEIR AIM IS TO DRIVE A WEDGE BETWEEN THE COUNTRIES OF INDOCHINA AND THEIR NEIGHBORS, THE STATES OF SOUTH EAST ASIA; TO SURROUND VIETNAM WITH SOMETHING IN THE NATURE OF A "CORDON SANITAIRE"; AND TO ATTEMPT ONCE AGAIN TO BRING THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE TO THEIR KNEES. D. HOLDRIDGE, U.S. ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, IS NOW CYNICALLY ARGUING THE NEED "JOINTLY WITH OTHER COUNTRIES TO FIND WAYS OF INTENSIFYING THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND, IF NECESSARY, MILITARY PRESSURE ON VIETNAM."

ANOTHER POINT IN THE BEIJING TALKS WAS THE SO-CALLED KAMPUCHEAN PROBLEM. THE STATEMENT CHIEF PUBLICLY STATED THAT, BUT FOR MINOR DIFFERENCES OF NUANCE IN THE U.S. AND CHINESE APPROACHES TO THIS ISSUE, THE SIDES WERE AGREED THAT A "UNITED FRONT" SHOULD BE SET UP IN KAMPUCHEA TO FIGHT VIETNAM. ITS FRAMEWORK IS TO BE PROVIDED BY THE POL POT GANGS, WHICH RECEIVE CHINESE AND AMERICAN WEAPONS VIA THE TERRITORY OF THAILAND. ALL THIS MEANS THAT THE ENEMIES OF PEOPLE'S KAMPUCHEA ARE CREATING A HOTBED OF MILITARY DANGER IN THE AREA OF THE THAI-KAMPUCHEAN BORDER AND ARE CONDUCTING ACCELERATED PREPARATIONS FOR ARMED CONFLICT. PLANS ARE BEING HATCHED IN AMERICAN-CHINESE CIRCLES TO SEIZE PART OF THE TERRITORY OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KAMPUCHEA AND TO SET UP SOME KIND OF "LIBERATED ZONE" THERE, INTO WHICH A PUPPET "GOVERNMENT" WOULD IMMEDIATELY BE TRANSFERRED.

KMORE)

27 JUN 0029Z JA/CH

THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP HAS BEEN SAYING SINCE THE YEAR OF MILITARISM.

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TAKE 3 OF 3--73 OF 26 JUN (ALEKSANDROV ARTICLE)

/// IMMEDIATELY BE TRANSFERRED.

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(TEXT) THE RESULTS OF THE AMERICAN-CHINESE TALKS IN BEIJING SHOW THAT THE CHINESE LINE TOWARD A MILITARY SETTLEMENT OF THE "KAMPUCHEA QUESTION" HAS RECEIVED WASHINGTON'S APPROVAL. THE ASEAN COUNTRIES AND SOME OTHER STATES ARE NOW BEING DRAWN INTO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THAT COURSE WITH THE UNITED STATES. THERE ARE PLANS TO USE THE AUTHORITY OF THE UNITED NATIONS AS A COVER FOR INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF KAMPUCHEA. FOR THIS PURPOSE, HAIG AND HUANG HUA DISCUSSED THE QUESTION OF HOW THE SO-CALLED INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON KAMPUCHEA WHICH IS BEING CONVENED NEXT MONTH IN NEW YORK COULD UNDERTAKE "SANCTIONS" AGAINST THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KAMPUCHEA AND THE SRV.

THE DANGEROUS MILITARY-POLITICAL MANEUVERINGS SET IN MOTION BY SHORTSIGHTED ADVENTURISTS ARE FRAUGHT WITH A SERIOUS THREAT TO THE ENTIRE WORLD. IF WASHINGTON EXPECTS TO EXPLOIT THE BLATANT ANTI-SOVIETISM OF THE PRESENT CHINESE LEADERSHIP TO THE ADVANTAGE OF THE UNITED STATES IN ITS GLOBAL ANTI-SOVIET STRATEGY, BEIJING HAS ITS OWN AX TO GRIND: TO CAUSE A CLASH BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE USSR, SO AS TO DOMINATE THE WORLD AFTER A NUCLEAR CONFLICT WHICH, ACCORDING TO ITS CALCULATIONS, WOULD REDUCE AMERICA AND EUROPE TO ASHES WHILE SPARING, PERHAPS, A FEW DOZEN--OR A COUPLE OF HUNDRED -- MILLIONS OF CHINESE. AFTER ALL, THERE ARE ALREADY TWICE AS MANY OF THEM AS THE POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE PUT TOGETHER.

NO, THE ARCHITECTS OF U.S. AND CHINESE POLICY, WHO SEE EYE TO EYE WHEN IT COMES TO THEIR MILITANT ANTI-COMMUNISM AND ANTI-SOVIETISM, ARE FAR FROM BEING OF THE SAME MIND IN THEIR GLOBAL CLAIMS. EACH OF THE SIDES STRIVES TO TIE DOWN THE OTHER, TO TETHER IT MORE FIRMLY TO ITS POLICY, AND AT THE SAME TIME TO LEAVE ITSELF FREEDOM OF ACTION. THE FACTS SHOW THAT UNTIL NOW THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN MORE SUCCESSFUL IN THESE TACTICS. IT DETERMINES THE PACE AND CONTENT OF THE COLLUSION.

IN TAKING A COURSE TOWARD A MILITARY AND STRATEGIC ALLIANCE WITH IMPERIALISM, THE BEIJING RULING CLIQUE HAS IN ESSENCE RESORTED TO CONCESSIONS ON THE TAIWAN QUESTION. AS A. HAIG DECLARED AT A BEIJING PRESS CONFERENCE, THE CHINESE SIDE "RECEIVED WITH UNDERSTANDING" THE U.S. INTENTION TO CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE RELATIONS WITH TAIPEI. FOR ALL ITS VERBAL "THUNDER AND LIGHTNING," THE PRC LEADERSHIP HAS EFFECTIVELY ASSENTED TO A SITUATION OF "TWO CHINAS," WHICH IS AN INSULT TO THE PRESTIGE AND SOVEREIGNTY OF A GREAT POWER.

THUS, CHINA IS PLAYING THE SHAMEFUL ROLE OF JUNIOR PARTNER AND ASSISTANT TO THE U.S. IMPERIALISTS, A ROLE WHICH THE PRESENT BEIJING LEADERS HAVE READILY ASSUMED. ONE GETS THE IMPRESSION THAT NO SERIOUS THOUGHT IS BEING GIVEN IN BEIJING TO THE CONSEQUENCES OF THIS DANGEROUS GAMBLE WITH THE FATE OF THEIR OWN PEOPLE.

APART FROM THE INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF HAIG'S VISIT TO CHINA, MANY OBSERVERS NOTE ITS SIGNIFICANCE FOR DENG ZIAOPING AND HIS ADHERENTS ON THE PLANE OF DOMESTIC POLITICS. THE TIMING OF THE TRIP IS REMARKABLE IN ITSELF. THE U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE ARRIVED IN BEIJING ON THE EVE OF THE SIXTH PLENUM OF THE CCP CENTRAL COMMITTEE, AT WHICH IMPORTANT ORGANIZATIONAL AND POLITICAL DECISIONS ARE EXPECTED TO BE TAKEN. THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION HAS UNEQUIVOCALLY SHOWN ITS INTEREST IN STRENGTHENING THE POSITION OF DENG XIAOPING IN THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP AND THEREBY CONSOLIDATING BEIJING'S PRESENT FOREIGN POLICY.

TAKEN AS A WHOLE, THE RESULTS OF HAIG'S TALKS WITH THE BEIJING LEADERS CAN BE VIEWED AS AN ESCALATION OF AN IMPRUDENT POLICY. THE SOVIET UNION CANNOT REMAIN INDIFFERENT TO THE DANGEROUS NEW TURN TAKEN BY SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS, IN PARTICULAR TO THE PLANS FOR PROVIDING CHINA WITH MODERN AMERICAN ARMS, MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY. THESE ACTIONS BY WASHINGTON AND BEIJING CANNOT BE SEEN AS OTHER THAN HOSTILE TO OUR COUNTRY.

THE RULING CIRCLES OF THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA SHOULD REALIZE THAT THE AMERICAN-CHINESE ASSOCIATION ON AN ANTI-SOVIET BASIS WILL BE DUTY TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN THE USSR IN THE OVERALL CONTEXT OF SOVIET-AMERICAN AND SOVIET-CHINESE RELATIONS. THE SOVIET UNION WILL TAKE SUCH MEASURES AS WILL BE DICTATED BY THE SITUATION AS IT EVOLVES. NO ONE SHOULD ENTERTAIN ANY DOUBT THAT THE SOVIET PEOPLE, POSSESSED OF STRONG NERVES AND POWERFUL MEANS FOR CURBING AGGRESSION, WILL NOT SUBMIT TO PROVOCATIONS AND WILL BE ABLE TO STAND UP FOR ITSELF AND DEFEND THE INTERESTS OF ITS FRIENDS AND ALLIES.

WASHINGTON AND BEIJING HAVE STARTED A DANGEROUS GAME. IT DEMANDS NOT ONLY CONDEMNATION BUT ALSO VIGILANCE AND A RESOLUTE REBUFF FROM ALL PEOPLES, FROM ALL RESPONSIBLE POLITICAL FORCES WHO VALUE PEACE, SECURITY AND NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE.

KENDALL)

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