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File Folder SOVIET LEADERSHIP TRANSITION-CPPG JULY 20, 1982
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3501

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
11482	PAPER	THE SOVIET POLITICAL SUCCESSION: INSTITUTIONS, PEOPLE, AND POLICIES PAR 7/18/2008 F06-114/10	30	ND	B3 B6
11501	MEMO	AGENDA CRISIS PRE-PLANNING GROUP R 11/28/2011 F2006-114/10	1	11/11/1982	B1
11487	PAPER	PROSPECTS FOR BREZHNEV'S RETIREMENT PAR 7/18/2008 F06-114/10	6	7/6/1982	B1 B3 B6
11489	MEMO	PIPES TO CLARK RE PREPARATIONS FOR THE COMING SOVIET SUCCESSION CRISIS R 6/25/2009 NLRRF06-114/10	1	3/18/1982	B1
11490	PAPER	CPPG ISSUE PAPER SOVIET LEADERSHIP TRANSITION	7	ND	B1
11493	MEMO	BREMER TO CLARK RE CPPG MEETING: SOVIET LEADERSHIP TRANSITION R 11/28/2011 F2006-114/10	2	7/19/1982	B1
11496	PAPER	CPPG ISSUE PAPER SOVIET LEADERSHIP TRANSITION	7	ND	B1
11498	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO EAGLEBURGER RE CPPG MEETING: SOVIET LEADERSHIP TRANSITION R 11/28/2011 F2006-114/10	1	7/13/1982	B1

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
11499	MEMO	CPPG ISSUE PAPER (FORMAT) R 11/28/2011 F2006-114/10	4	ND	B1
11505	MEMO	DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE RE TASKING FOR THE SENIOR INTERAGENCY GROUP-INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY TO EXAMINE US-EC RELATIONS R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10	1	ND	B1
11500	MEMO	BURT RE MEETING OF CPPG WORKING GROUP OF SOVIET LEADERSHIP TRANSITION R 11/28/2011 F2006-114/10	2	7/27/1983	B1
11502	MEMO	HANDWRITTEN NOTES R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10	3	ND	B1
11504	MEMO	NORTH TO PIPES RE CPPG PAPER ON SOVIET TRANSITION R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10	1	11/4/1982	B1

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The Soviet Political Succession: Institutions, People, and Policies (U)

An Intelligence Assessment

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SOV 82-10063X
April 1982

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The Soviet Political Succession: Institutions, People, and Policies

An Intelligence Assessment

*Information available as of 20 April 1982
has been used in the preparation of this report.*

This report was prepared by
Office of Soviet Analysis,

Comments and queries are welcome and may be
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SOV 82-10063X
April 1982

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The Soviet Political Succession: Institutions, People, and Policies (U)

Key Judgments

Sickness and death among the aging Soviet leadership have propelled succession to the top of Moscow's political agenda. Following party secretary Suslov's death in January, President Brezhnev moved quickly to bolster the status of his protege, Konstantin Chernenko, at the expense of Andrey Kirilenko, the man who previously had been best placed to become the next party chief. Behind-the-scenes opposition to Chernenko's advancement has developed and has made Brezhnev's own position more vulnerable. This opposition—together with the reported illnesses of both Brezhnev and Kirilenko—indicates that succession maneuvering is intensifying and increasingly preoccupying Soviet leaders. []

In the three past successions, the key to victory in the power struggle has been control of the party Secretariat and its powerful staff. This, in turn, has led to control of the provincial party apparatus and to some influence over the economic ministries, the security apparatus, and the military command. Only Stalin succeeded in winning complete control over the regime's entire machinery. Short of this, however, a strong and reasonably stable leadership has been possible when the General Secretary, basing himself in the Secretariat, has had sufficient strength to dominate the Politburo, the party's chief policymaking institution. []

Precedent would suggest that Brezhnev's successor will be chosen from the senior secretaries who hold membership in the Politburo. This had formerly led us to believe that the succession would come in two stages, with an older interim successor, such as Kirilenko (75) or Chernenko (70) being replaced in a few years by one of the younger members of the leadership. Several factors—the death of king-maker Suslov, the possible incapacitation of Kirilenko, the apparent lack of Politburo support for Chernenko, and the weakened condition of Brezhnev—have made it equally likely, however, that a more dramatic change could occur, pushing a younger member of the leadership quickly to the top without an interim phase. Any such change would require the strong support of the military and KGB and probably would be prompted by a shared belief that Soviet problems—especially in the economic area—require vigorous action and leadership sooner rather than later. []

Whoever ultimately comes out on top, the succession process is politicizing policy differences within the leadership. The post-Brezhnev leadership will have to grapple with complex and increasingly urgent political and

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economic issues, none of which lend themselves to easy solutions. Some notable policy differences already have emerged between senior secretaries Kirilenko and Chernenko that probably represent viewpoints shared by others in the leadership and within the bureaucracy:

- On foreign policy issues, Kirilenko has been equivocal in his support of Brezhnev's overtures to the United States, less optimistic than Brezhnev about the prospects for resolving Sino-Soviet differences, and less tolerant than most leaders about East European deviations from Moscow's guidance and direction. Although Chernenko has a shorter track record than Kirilenko on foreign policy issues, he has been far more enthusiastic in his support of improved relations with the United States and of arms limitation, and well ahead of his colleagues in warnings about the consequences of nuclear war.
- On domestic issues, Kirilenko has been fairly consistent in his advocacy of a strong defense posture, strict cultural and ideological discipline, and the preferential development of heavy industry, while Chernenko has stressed the need to improve the lot of the Soviet consumer and called for greater intraparty "democracy."

Conflict over these issues could lead to some important policy shifts:

- The most immediate changes are likely to be made in economic policy, with some reallocation of resources away from agriculture likely after Brezhnev leaves. Even the defense budget, virtually sacrosanct since the early 1960s, probably will come under some attack. Given the momentum of current weapon programs and the need for a new leader to obtain the support of the military and security services, however, reductions in the growth of military spending seem unlikely in the near term.
- Concern over declining growth rates also will intensify efforts to improve efficiency and could bring changes in the economic management structure, although changes that seem politically feasible probably would not significantly improve the economic situation.
- Departures in the foreign policy arena seem less imminent. Soviet strategy already has shifted to reflect a more pessimistic consensus about the prospects for improved relations with the United States, and this new direction appears unlikely to change, barring major US initiatives in the

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immediate post-Brezhnev period. As the pessimism about Soviet-US relations becomes increasingly self-fulfilling, Soviet leaders may become even more inclined to pursue policies in the Third World that the United States would find disturbing and perhaps threatening to its interests.

Despite the likelihood of some policy change, no leader who succeeds Brezhnev—whether selected from his contemporaries or a younger group of Politburo members—initially will have the power to push through a comprehensive package of domestic and foreign policy programs. We know less about the policy preferences of the younger group than those of the seniors, however, and are less able to predict what Soviet policy might be after a younger leader has had time to consolidate his position as party chief. As Politburo members, these younger leaders have been participants in the policymaking process for some time, a factor that may lessen the likelihood of radical policy shifts when they assume more responsible posts, but their future policy preferences undoubtedly will be strongly influenced by the environment at the time.

We are even less able to gauge the policy inclinations of the generation of Soviet leaders who will come to the fore in the late 1980s. Although these leaders could respond to increased domestic and international pressures by attempting to liberalize the Soviet system, we believe a more likely response would be a return to some form of neo-Stalinist orthodoxy. This would be more consistent with the Russian and Leninist tradition than significant, liberalizing reforms.

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Preface

The leadership of the Soviet Communist Party has changed only three times in 65 years, and each time under dramatically different domestic and international conditions. This is the first time in Soviet history that an entire generation of leaders is departing history's stage more or less together. Accordingly, precedents are fragile and the uncertainties great. The Politburo does not yet know who next will wear Lenin's mantle, nor do we. But this paper will help the reader better understand the process, the people, the political dynamics, and the possible outcomes of the struggle for power in the Kremlin—and the implications for the United States.

The first section discusses the institutional and historical setting in which the political struggle takes place. We then analyze current indications of succession maneuvering and speculate about Brezhnev's role in trying to prearrange the succession. The policy issues that will play an important role in Kremlin politicking and the policy views of the leading contenders, Konstantin Chernenko and Andrey Kirilenko, are explored next. (Although Kirilenko is now reported to be in poor health and could eventually be eliminated from contention, his views have such strong institutional backing that other leaders undoubtedly will pick up the banner if he falls.) Finally, the paper looks at likely areas for policy change in the post-Brezhnev era and some of the institutional factors that could affect new policies.

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The Soviet Political Succession: Institutions, People, and Policies (U)

Institutions and Their Role in Soviet Succession

Three institutions—the Politburo, the party Secretariat, and the Council of Ministers—will play key roles in the coming succession struggle. Although the distribution of power often shifts among these institutions and their respective members during a succession, officials based in the party Secretariat, and especially its nominal head, the General Secretary, have historically had the upper hand in this contest.

The Succession Process

The death or ouster of the party leader in the USSR in all three previous successions (1924, 1953, 1964) led to a prolonged power struggle. While the initial appointment of a successor is made quickly, the new General Secretary needs several years to consolidate his position. His colleagues in the Politburo do not as a rule readily submit to his attempts to assume the power and authority of his predecessor. Lacking a constitutional basis for his claims, he is forced to build support gradually—and since Stalin—through political means. Stalin overcame these obstacles in the late 1920s, as did Khrushchev in the late 1950s and early 1960s and—in more limited measure—Brezhnev in the 1970s. It took several years (an average of about five) to resolve each of the three succession crises.

While the new General Secretary maneuvers to consolidate power, the leadership often has trouble making decisions on complex policy matters. Policy lines tend to become fouled with political ones, and institutions just below the top leadership temporarily exercise increased influence on policy. If the party boss fails to consolidate power quickly, the Secretariat may become an arena of acute conflict, as in the 1964-67 period, or there may be an increase in the strength and assertiveness of the government in relation to the party apparatus, such as occurred in the early post-Stalin years. The political arena is widened even

further by the enhanced activity of institutional “interest groups” in the military, the economic bureaucracy, the scientific establishment, and the creative intelligentsia.


The Central Committee and the Politburo: Arenas of Conflict

By statute, the supreme organ of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) is the party congress, held at least every five years. Between congresses, that role is assigned to the party Central Committee, which theoretically is responsible for electing the General Secretary. In practice, however, the Central Committee has been used since the 1920s primarily to legitimize the regime’s decisions and actions. Its membership has become much too large and unwieldy—it now has over 300 full (voting) members and about 150 candidate (nonvoting) members—to serve as an effective decisionmaking institution, and it rarely meets more than twice a year.

The Politburo, in fact, provides the real forum for the struggle. It is the most important decisionmaking organ in the Soviet political system. Although nominally elected by the Central Committee, it is a self-appointed group of oligarchs who are empowered by party statute to “direct party work between plenums of the Central Committee.” With this authority its members collectively are best placed to speak in the name of the Central Committee. The Politburo, thus, formulates national and foreign policies, issues directives to all other institutions, and approves appointments to leading positions in these institutions.

Bureaucratic as well as political considerations dictate the size and composition of the ruling group. Since Stalin, membership generally has ranged from 12 to 16 full (voting) members and from six to nine candidate (nonvoting) members. Most of these slots have been allocated on almost an ex officio basis to men (only one woman has ever served on the Politburo)

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Brezhnev's office in the Kremlin.

who hold top positions in the party Secretariat, the Council of Ministers, and key regional party and state organizations. For some jobs—General Secretary, Premier, and President—on the other hand, Politburo membership is a prerequisite. Considerable room for political maneuvering, nonetheless, exists concerning the status of the slots (full or candidate), the number of party secretaries on the Politburo, and the representation of the military, police, and Foreign Ministry.


The power and influence of individual Politburo members vary widely despite the formal appearance of equality, and personal clout depends primarily on executive position in the ruling institutions. The General Secretary, the Premier, and the President, as head of their respective organizations, have more influence, for example, than lower ranking officials in their organizations, that is, other secretaries or deputy premiers. Since Khrushchev's triumph in 1957, party secretaries have usually been in a stronger position within the Politburo than government officials with comparable responsibilities. Moscow-based leaders, as regular participants in Politburo proceedings, have more influence on national policy than their colleagues who work outside of Moscow and do not attend all sessions.

Under Brezhnev, Politburo meetings have apparently become routine decisionmaking sessions, not the political free-for-alls that occurred under Khrushchev. They normally have been held once a week, usually on Thursday, and typically consider only three or four major questions during a four-hour session, leaving lesser issues to phone or buckslip coordination. Issues are usually placed on the agenda in advance, with the necessary documents properly coordinated and given to the members prior to the meeting. The discussion normally focuses on whether to take the action proposed in the documents and is not a wide-ranging debate of many different options. If new information or issues arise as a result of this discussion, final resolution will often be deferred until the new point can be properly staffed out. Consensus decisionmaking appears to be the rule, with formal votes rarely taken.

Despite its vast authority, the Politburo lacks its own administrative apparatus. It has to rely on the party Secretariat to execute commands to the party. To carry out state policy, the Politburo depends on the Council of Ministers: for economic affairs on its Presidium, and for security affairs on its specialized ministries (Foreign Affairs, Defense, and the KGB).

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Central Committee building [redacted]

Consequently, the struggle for power in the Politburo has in the past become a battle for influence within and among the institutions that implement Politburo policies. Stalin used his position in the party Secretariat to achieve political preeminence, but in the 1930s he relied on the security organs to establish a personal dictatorship over the Politburo and all other Soviet institutions. Stalin's rule so weakened the party's bureaucratic machinery that the institutional pecking order was not self-evident in the early post-Stalin years. Leaders in three different institutions—the party (Khrushchev), the government (Malenkov), and the police (Beriya)—sought to gain primacy, with Khrushchev and the party winning out after four years. Brezhnev, too, used the party as his institutional base, although he had to share power and the spotlight with Premier Kosygin for a time. [redacted]

Institutional Interest Groups


The power struggles described above have gone through various stages—from collective leadership to triumvirates to individual political preeminence to personal dictatorship. Several institutions have played

an active role in this process, among them the military, the security organs, the government economic bureaucracy, and, most importantly, the Central Committee Secretariat. [redacted]

The Military. While providing the backbone for the nation's and the party's security, military professionals have been indoctrinated from the regime's beginnings to stand aside from higher politics and historically have not been well positioned to become major players in the power struggle. Only twice, in fact, has a professional officer been elected to the Politburo—Marshal Zhukov in 1957 and Marshal Grechko in 1973. [redacted]

Like that of other key institutions, the military's influence has varied directly with its own cohesion and inversely with the unity of the political leadership. Succession struggles particularly have given the high command more leeway for engaging in high politics. While the military has not initiated important leadership changes, its support is essential; for example, the

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Ministry of Defense. ☐

military threw its support to Khrushchev during his fight with the antiparty group in 1957 and probably acquiesced in the coup against him in 1964. ☐

Marshal Zhukov's experience, however, probably still serves as an object lesson for a military professional who gets heavily involved in Politburo politicking. He supported Khrushchev in 1957 and ordered military aircraft to bring Khrushchev's supporters in the Central Committee to Moscow. Khrushchev paid off this political debt by elevating Zhukov to full membership on the Politburo. Such dependence on a military leader, nevertheless, made the leadership nervous, and Khrushchev ousted him three months later, ostensibly for attempting to reduce political controls over the military. ☐

The party, moreover, has never been entirely comfortable with the presence of this large, disciplined, hierarchical organization in its midst. Various checks and controls have been developed to deal with it. The KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), for example, have their own military forces. More importantly, the party has penetrated the military by creating two oversight bodies—the Central Committee's Administrative Organs Department, which must

approve all military promotions, and the Defense Ministry's Political Directorate, which has representatives in the armed forces and provides for troop indoctrination. The party also uses the KGB's Third Chief Directorate to surveil military activities. ☐

More recently, the party leadership has placed a civilian—Dmitriy Ustinov—at the head of the military establishment. Although he has been closely involved with the Soviet military industrial complex for over 40 years and obtained general officer rank during the war, he has not been a line officer, and his appointment may have been opposed by the professional officer corps. He appears to be highly regarded by his Politburo colleagues and almost certainly is influential in Politburo discussions on security policy. Ustinov's position provides the leadership with an effective means of controlling the military. On the other hand, as a key "civilian" member of the Politburo, he is in a favorable position to ensure that military interests are promoted. Ustinov also can authoritatively use his position as civilian head of the military to vote its stock on sensitive political issues—without raising some of the fears such actions by a professional officer like Zhukov would prompt. ☐

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Dmitriy Fedorovich Ustinov
Career Highlights



Service ©

1938-41	Director, Bolshevik Factory, Leningrad
1941-43	Minister of the Armaments Industry (known as People's Commissariat for Armaments 1941-46)
1953-57	Minister of Defense Industry
1957-63	Deputy Chairman, Council of Ministers
1963-65	First Deputy Chairman, Council of Ministers; Chairman, Supreme National Economic Council
1965-76	Candidate member, Politburo; Secretary, CPSU Central Committee
Mar 1976-date	Member, Politburo
Apr 1976-date	Minister of Defense

[redacted]

In spite of the party's obvious desire to check and control the military, the Soviet leadership under Brezhnev has given the military a near monopoly in defining the security threat to the USSR and in determining the programs required to deal with this threat. This deference reflects the party's need for the military's expertise, its confidence in the high command, and the considerable congruence of views between the two organizations on national security policy. The military, as a result, has been rather successful in protecting its principal political interest—obtaining the resources to carry out its missions [redacted]


The Security Organs. The KGB has been entangled in high-level politics at critical junctures. It became an active participant in the 1964 conspiracy to remove Khrushchev, and without its help the coup almost certainly would have failed. Stalin used the police to eliminate his rivals and decimate the professional officer corps in the military. [redacted]

The KGB's potential clout in higher leadership politics stems largely from its role in providing leadership security and its control of leadership communications. It is in a good position to know about the political maneuvering or conspiracies under way. A strong leader can use it as an instrument of blackmail by exploiting privileged information the KGB acquires through performance of its duties. Realizing its potential for harm, Brezhnev placed three political cronies in key security positions—making use of this organization against him difficult and perhaps giving him some ability to keep tabs on his colleagues. It was used in this manner by Khrushchev in the immediate post-Stalin years. [redacted]

The political leadership, nevertheless, has been remarkably successful in preventing heads of the KGB from using it for their personal advantage. Beriya attempted to do so in March-June 1953 in the advent of Stalin's death but failed and was executed. Subsequent chiefs until Andropov's appointment in 1967 were denied Politburo status while they held this position. Andropov, moreover, is a political appointee, not a career police official. If he has any hopes of becoming a contender for Brezhnev's mantle, Andropov would probably have to assume an interim position that has little to do with the KGB's stock in trade. [redacted]

The Presidium of the Council of Ministers. The Council of Ministers Presidium is primarily responsible for managing the Soviet economy. It oversees the activity of more than 60 ministries responsible for particular sectors of the economy. This responsibility could make the Presidium and some of its attendant ministries influential in the Kremlin power struggle. For this potential to be realized, however, its leaders must be strongly represented in the Politburo while the central party apparatus is weak. [redacted]

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KGB headquarters


The leaders of this vast economic bureaucracy have for the most part been unsuccessful in translating this potential into real and enduring power. Only twice in the post-Stalin era has this group of leaders had considerable clout in the leadership. After Stalin's death they initially appeared to be more powerful than party officials in the Politburo—so much so that Malenkov may have chosen to take the Premiership over the top party post as his base of power. Khrushchev, nevertheless, overcame this early weakness and inflicted a severe defeat on the government bureaucracy in 1957 by abolishing most of their economic ministries and expelling its senior members from the Politburo.

The economic bureaucracy regained some of its status and power in the aftermath of the Khrushchev coup. As active participants in the conspiracy, its leaders were able to get agreement on reestablishment of the central ministries in Moscow and on an economic

reform package. More importantly, its leader, Premier Kosygin, received equal billing with Brezhnev, and two of his deputies joined him in the Politburo. This power, nonetheless, proved fleeting, as Brezhnev used his base in the Secretariat to gain preeminence over Kosygin, and the reform was eventually undermined.

The Secretariat and the General Secretary. The real key to victory in the power struggle until now has been control of the party Secretariat and its powerful staff. The Secretariat, consisting of a General Secretary and usually from seven to 10 secretaries, participates in the elaboration of policy alternatives, oversees the implementation of Politburo directives and party policy generally, and maintains control of personnel appointments (the *nomenklatura*) in the party and all other institutions. It is assisted in its work by several thousand party officials organized into some two dozen departments, each of which is supervised by a

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Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers.

secretary. These departments monitor the activity of government ministries, the military, the security organs, and other institutions. One of them, the General Department, provides staff support for Politburo activity.

In past successions, control of the Secretariat has been converted into control of the provincial party apparatus and varying degrees of influence over the economic ministries, the security apparatus, and the military command. Only Stalin, after 1937, succeeded in winning complete control over the regime's entire machinery. Short of this, a strong and reasonably stable leadership has been possible when the General Secretary, basing himself in the Secretariat, has had sufficient strength to dominate the Politburo.

The General Secretary's power and authority are neither constitutionally defined nor definitively established by historical precedent. They vary according to his capacities and ambitions and the strength of the forces supporting him on the one hand, and the influence of those opposing him on the other.

While he must maneuver politically to expand his authority, his position gives him some advantages in the contest with his colleagues. He is the nominal head of the party Secretariat and, through it, the party apparatus. This gives him an extra measure of status in party meetings. It very likely places him in the chair at meetings of the Secretariat and gives him more influence in determining the agenda and proceedings of that body than other secretaries have.

This position in the Secretariat is likely to give him added clout in the Politburo as well. Despite its collective character, the Politburo needs a chairman to direct its activities, arrange its agenda, and preside over its meetings. The General Secretary, as the leading administrative officer in the Secretariat, is the most logical choice for this role. No one else is as centrally placed or has the breadth of responsibility in party work to perform this function.

Brezhnev capitalized on this position at an early stage in his tenure as party boss. He sets the time of Politburo meetings and determines the agenda, based on recommendations from other members and institutions. He controls the flow of documents to his colleagues concerning issues to be discussed. He has the authority to invite non-Politburo members to its sessions. Most important, he sums up the results of Politburo meetings and states the consensus on the issue under discussion.

The Players

The position of General Secretary, thus, is the highly coveted prize in the succession struggle. While it will be filled by a Politburo member, none of Brezhnev's colleagues have as yet established a very strong claim to the post. Precedent, to be sure, suggests that Brezhnev's successor will be chosen from the senior secretaries who hold membership in the Politburo—criteria met only by Andrey Kirilenko, Konstantin Chernenko, and the most recent addition, agriculture secretary Mikhail Gorbachev—but age, health, and experience in various ways make each of these men less than an ideal candidate. Kirilenko is 75 and reportedly very ill; he has been absent from leadership functions during the last month. Chernenko is 70 and

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Vladimir Vasil'yevich Shcherbitskiy
Career Highlights



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1948-52	Second Secretary, Dneprodzerzhinsk City Party Committee (Ukraine)
1952-54	First Secretary, Dneprodzerzhinsk City Party Committee
1954-55	Second Secretary, Dnepropetrovsk Oblast Party Committee (Ukraine)
1955-57	First Secretary, Dnepropetrovsk Oblast Party Committee
1957-61	Secretary, Central Committee, Communist Party of the Ukraine
1961-63	Chairman, Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers
1961-63	Candidate member, Presidium (now Politburo)
1963-65	First Secretary, Dnepropetrovsk Oblast Party Committee
1965-72	Chairman, Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers
1965-71	Candidate member, Presidium (now Politburo)
Apr 1971-date	Member, Politburo
May 1972-date	First Secretary, Central Committee, Communist Party of the Ukraine

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has served only a short time as a party secretary. Gorbachev, 51, has narrow responsibilities, and agricultural performance of late has not provided him with a strong campaign platform. []

The lack of ideal candidates for the post could lead the Politburo to turn to other leaders, such as KGB Chairman Yuriy Andropov or Defense Minister Dmi-

Yuriy Vladimirovich Andropov
Career Highlights




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1940-44	First Secretary, Komsomol, Karelia; worked behind German lines organizing partisan bands
1944-47	Second Secretary, Petrozavodsk City Party Committee (Karelia)
1947-51	Second Secretary, Central Committee, Communist Party of Karelia
1953	Chief, Fourth European Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Oct 1953-57	Charge d'Affaires, Counselor of Embassy, and then Ambassador, Budapest
Jul 1957-62	Chief, Department for Liaison with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries, CPSU Central Committee
Nov 1962-67	Secretary, CPSU Central Committee
May 1967-date	Chairman, KGB
Jun 1967-73	Candidate member, Politburo
April 1973-date	Member, Politburo

[]
try Ustinov, who under other circumstances probably would not be considered. Both Andropov and Ustinov are handicapped by poor health and by the rest of the leadership's desire to keep the institutions they head firmly under control. In a field of poorly qualified candidates, however, both have the advantage of past experience in the Secretariat and expertise in key

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The leadership lineup at Suslov's bier: Brezhnev, Chernenko, Tikhonov, Kirilenko, Andropov (right to left)

Sovfoto ©

areas—Andropov in foreign affairs and security matters and Ustinov in economic management and defense. If either should relinquish his present post and move back to the Secretariat, he would become a prime candidate for the top party post.

Among the Politburo's second-rank leaders, three regional party chiefs—Viktor Grishin (Moscow), Grigoriy Romanov (Leningrad), and Vladimir Shcherbitskiy (Ukraine)—are possibilities. Of the three, Shcherbitskiy recently has been the most visible and may be angling for a position in the Secretariat. A fourth regional leader, Kazakh party chief Dinmukhanamed Kunayev, is disqualified by his ethnic origin.

The remaining Politburo members—Premier Nikolay Tikhonov, Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko, and Party Control Committee Chairman Arvid Pelshe—appear to be completely out of the running. Tikhonov and Gromyko are handicapped by a total lack of experience in the party apparatus, and Pelshe by his age (82) and Latvian nationality.

The Current Political Scene

Jockeying within the Politburo has intensified significantly since the death of ideology secretary Mikhail Suslov in January. Suslov was not an aspirant for the top party post but a key stabilizing force in leadership politics, working to maintain the existing balance of power and preserve a role for himself as power broker in the post-Brezhnev succession. His death triggered an immediate shakeup in leadership rankings that was beneficial to Brezhnev's protege, Chernenko, and damaging to Kirilenko, the party secretary who had been best placed to succeed Brezhnev.

The impact of Suslov's death was first reflected in the announcement of the funeral commission membership, which listed Kirilenko out of sequence and last among the full members of the Politburo on the commission. When Suslov was lying in state, Chernenko stood next to Brezhnev and ahead of Premier Tikhonov and Kirilenko, both of whom previously had outranked him. At the funeral and subsequent leadership appearances, Tikhonov was back in his usual

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Brezhnev's family, including his wife, Viktoriya (left front), daughter, Galina (standing, fourth from left) and son, Yuri (standing, fifth from left).

position next to Brezhnev, but Chernenko continued to outrank Kirilenko, standing in the number-three spot Suslov had held—status that makes him the unofficial “second secretary.”

This boost for Chernenko was followed by some indirect sniping at Brezhnev that would seem to require high-level support, possibly from elements in the leadership who believe he is positioning Chernenko to become his successor. Numerous rumors linking people close to Brezhnev with various corruption scandals have been planted with Western correspondents in Moscow.

According to one set of rumors, Brezhnev's son, Yuri, was about to lose his job as First Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade because of unspecified charges of corruption. Another set of rumors had Brezhnev's daughter, Galina, being questioned by authorities in connection with jewel scandals involving her alleged lover and the head of the state circus. When Brezhnev failed to sign the obituary of KGB First Deputy Chairman Tsvigun in January, still other rumors surfaced, suggesting that Tsvigun had committed suicide because he and Brezhnev were at loggerheads over a corruption case.

Brezhnev's Position

This sniping is probably troublesome and embarrassing to Brezhnev, but it is not particularly threatening. Such attacks, in fact, are risky and may reflect the desperation of those who oppose Brezhnev's recent moves.

Brezhnev has clearly demonstrated that he still controls events. He has strengthened Chernenko's position, attacked Kirilenko's, and made some key personnel changes. For example, he has promoted two cronies to first deputy chairmen of the KGB, moves that indicate he has not lost control of that organization. He also removed the trade union chief, who may have had the support of Suslov (he had served in Rostov, Suslov's old bailiwick) and Kirilenko (who presided over his installation), and replaced him with an official Kirilenko had indirectly criticized.


Although there are no signs that Brezhnev is considering retiring, a serious deterioration in his health could convince his Politburo colleagues that some form of retirement was necessary and make his leadership subject to challenge. It may have been Brezhnev's perception of this vulnerability that led him to block Kirilenko's move into Suslov's former position as unofficial second secretary—status that would have increased Kirilenko's ability to mount a challenge to his leadership—by giving the position to Chernenko, a trusted protege who is dependent on Brezhnev.

Kirilenko: An Heir Presumptuous?

Kirilenko, indeed, could well have posed a challenge to Brezhnev if left unchecked. Certainly no other

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contender could match his credentials for Brezhnev's post, which even include on-the-job experience as Acting General Secretary during Brezhnev's absences. Kirilenko has primary responsibility for the supervision of nonmilitary heavy industry, ranks second only to Brezhnev as the party spokesman on general economic matters, and has considerable experience in international Communist party affairs.

setbacks for Kirilenko, beginning in 1979, when his protege, Yakov Ryabov, was demoted from party secretary to first deputy chairman of Gosplan. Other moves that seemed designed to damage his image as the likely successor included the deletion of his picture from a newspaper photo of the 1979 May Day lineup and, more recently, the low-key treatment given his 75th birthday. Following the further blows to his prestige after Suslov's death, Kirilenko disappeared from public view.

In recent years Brezhnev, [redacted] seemed to find Kirilenko's status, as a leader uniquely qualified and positioned to become the next party chief, increasingly disquieting. In an apparent effort to counter him, he engineered a series of rapid promotions for his longtime associate and General Department chief Chernenko—to party secretary in 1976, to candidate member of the Politburo in 1977, and to full member in 1978. Chernenko's rise was followed by a series of slights and political

Chernenko Broadens His Base

Despite Brezhnev's support, Chernenko's duties until recently had been confined primarily to running the Central Committee's General Department, a post he has held since 1965. Although the position is important—he oversees the Politburo's decisionmaking ma-

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Andrey Pavlovich Kirilenko
Career Highlights

1939-41 Secretary, then second secretary, Zaporozh'ye Oblast Party Committee (Ukraine)
1941-42 Member, Military Council, 18th Army of the Southern Front
1944-47 Second Secretary, Zaporozh'ye Oblast Party Committee
1947-50 First Secretary, Nikolayev Oblast Party Committee (Ukraine)
1950-55 First Secretary, Dnepropetrovsk Oblast Party Committee (Ukraine)
1955-56 First Secretary, Sverdlovsk Oblast Party Committee (RSFSR)
1956-57 Member, RSFSR Bureau, CPSU Central Committee
1957-61 Candidate member, Presidium (now Politburo)
1961-66 Member, RSFSR Bureau
Apr 1962-date Member, Presidium (now Politburo)
1962-66 First Deputy Chairman, RSFSR Bureau, CPSU Central Committee
Apr 1966-date Secretary, CPSU Central Committee

Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko
Career Highlights

1941-43 Secretary, Krasnoyarsk Kray Party Committee (RSFSR)
1945-48 Secretary, Penza Oblast Party Committee (RSFSR)
1948-56 Chief, Propaganda and Agitation Department, Central Committee, Communist Party of Moldavia
1956-60 Sector chief, Propaganda Department, CPSU Central Committee
1960-65 Chief of Secretariat, Presidium, USSR Supreme Soviet
Jul 1965-date Chief, General Department, CPSU Central Committee
Mar 1976-date Secretary, CPSU Central Committee
Oct 1977-78 Candidate member, Politburo
Nov 1978-date Member, Politburo

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chinery, serving in effect as its chief executive officer—his responsibilities never have been commensurate with those of other senior secretaries. Chernenko, unlike Kirilenko, has had virtually no experience in economic management, having served in staff positions under Brezhnev for more than 25 years, and until recently he had only limited involvement in foreign affairs. []

In an effort to bolster Chernenko's credentials as a senior secretary, Brezhnev has been trying for some time to expand his responsibilities—chiefly by involving him more in foreign affairs. Since Chernenko's election to the Secretariat in 1976, Brezhnev has involved him in his annual summer meetings in the Crimea with East European leaders and included him on the delegation to the Soviet-US summit in Vienna in 1979. Despite these efforts, Chernenko seldom appeared in any capacity that suggested independent authority in the area of Soviet-East European relations and reportedly played only a supporting role at the Soviet-US summit, taking a back seat to other Politburo members on the delegation. []

Recently, however, Chernenko's involvement in foreign affairs has been on the increase. Late last year Brezhnev reportedly went so far as to loan some of his own foreign policy advisers to a "brain trust" Chernenko was assembling, and *Pravda* identified a foreign policy aide to Chernenko, making him the only party secretary other than Brezhnev to have a publicly identified assistant. Chernenko received the Yugoslav Ambassador in October 1981, was the ranking leader at meetings with visiting Nicaraguan officials in October and November 1981, and met with a Greek Communist Party delegation in January 1982. In the short period since Suslov's death, Chernenko already has played a prominent role in interparty relations, heading the Soviet delegation to the Congress of the French Communist Party in February and participating in talks with Polish leader Jaruzelski last month. []

More important, in terms of his succession prospects, there are signs that Chernenko may now have some direct involvement in personnel appointments—an area previously thought to be dominated by Brezhnev, Suslov, and Kirilenko. Reports of Chernenko's association with cadre matters began to surface with his

promotion to full member of the Politburo in November 1978, when a Soviet source claimed that Chernenko was taking over Kirilenko's function of maintaining ties between the Central Committee and regional party leaders. While there never was any evidence to support that claim, Chernenko did head a major effort to get party and government officials at the middle and lower levels to carry out leadership decisions—an assignment that implied dissatisfaction with the way Kirilenko was supervising economic management. The first tangible evidence of Chernenko's involvement in personnel appointments came last month, when he and Ivan Kapitonov, the junior cadres secretary, presided over the replacement of trade unions chief Shibayev. (In 1976, when Shibayev was installed, the presiding secretaries were Kirilenko and Kapitonov.) []

Infighting Will Intensify

Chernenko, despite his recent success, by no means has a lock on the succession. While he will attempt to improve his position further, it is unlikely that Brezhnev will name him as heir apparent. Brezhnev may believe that Chernenko would protect his historical legacy, but he is well aware that conferring such power—even on a friend—could endanger his own position. []

With Brezhnev gone, Chernenko's rivals could probably defeat him unless he obtains additional help. Among those who will make the decision—the Politburo minus Brezhnev—Chernenko appears to have few strong supporters and reportedly commands little respect from such leaders as Ustinov and Gromyko. The current behind-the-scenes sniping at Brezhnev suggests, moreover, that by tipping his hand in Chernenko's favor, Brezhnev may have crystallized the opposition to Chernenko's candidacy. If, as presently seems to be the case, Kirilenko's apparent illness eliminates him from contention, other Politburo members of similar views are likely to contest Chernenko's claim. []

This political infighting is not likely to lead to significant policy changes while Brezhnev remains on the scene. The debate over policy, nonetheless, will probably become more heated. []

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Issues Become Politicized

Whoever ultimately comes out on top, the succession process will significantly politicize policy differences within the leadership. Various contenders will seek to exploit issues facing the Politburo for personal and factional advantage. (Chernenko, in particular, has seemed out of step with other leaders on a number of issues and may have to shift his position to gain support.) Given the seriousness and complexity of the problems a new leadership will have to deal with, moreover, debate and conflict over policy is likely to be particularly sharp and intense. []

Domestic Issues

Along with Brezhnev's title, the new General Secretary will inherit a difficult and increasingly complex economic situation. Economic growth has fallen to less than 2 percent a year for the past three years, leading to reductions in the increments allocated to consumption and investment. Although partly the result of past planning failures, this decline in growth has been largely attributable to the decreasing availability of low-cost resources (chiefly fuels) and a series of harvest failures—factors in the regime's recent decision to invest heavily in energy and agriculture despite a cutback in overall investment. Such decisions, if coupled with the usual increments to defense, leave little room for increases critically needed in ferrous metallurgy, machine building, transport, and other sectors. We expect a further deterioration in the Soviet energy, labor, and hard currency positions that will exacerbate the economic squeeze. As a result, in the next few years it will be increasingly apparent to the Soviet leaders that they will have to choose among the conflicting goals of long-term growth, consumer satisfaction, and military power. []

Heavy Industry Versus Consumer Goods. The slowing economic growth rate will sharpen the debate over both the level of capital investment and sectoral investment priorities. The decision, announced last November, to cut the capital investment goal for the current five-year plan means that sectors such as machine building, which some leaders believe are important for longer term growth, will suffer at the expense of near-term priorities. As the full dimensions

of the economic predicament become clear, the demands of rival claimants for shrinking resources will intensify and reinforce the tendency of contenders to stake out independent positions designed to appeal to one or another interest represented in the leadership. Differences in investment priorities already have emerged between one group (represented by Kirilenko, Shcherbitskiy, and others) that has advocated the priority development of heavy industry, and another (represented by Chernenko) that has called for increasing the availability of consumer goods, and both will be marshaling support for their views. []

Kirilenko's commitment to the preferential development of heavy industry is long standing and probably stems from his experience as party leader in two centers of heavy industry and his current oversight responsibilities. He has continued to favor this sector even at times when the consumer sector has been receiving greater public attention and rhetorical support from the leadership. Recently, for example, he has said little about the decision, so heavily promoted by Brezhnev and Chernenko, to assign a priority growth rate to the production of consumer goods in the new five-year plan. Kirilenko also has been cool toward Brezhnev's much-publicized calls for a Soviet "food program" and in the past has resisted diversion of existing resources from the industrial sector to agriculture. []

Kirilenko's investment preferences, moreover, seem to be shared by Shcherbitskiy and may have substantial support among other leaders, such as Tikhonov, whose statements have indicated similar priorities. In the past there has been a working alliance between the military, the defense industries, and proponents of heavy industry such as Kirilenko. This suggests that Ustinov would support this faction. High-level differences over the current investment strategy were suggested in February 1982 by an unusual *Pravda* article that criticized the five-year plan just adopted for providing inadequate resources to the machine-building industry—a sector Kirilenko has championed in the past. []

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Chernenko has emerged as the leadership's leading advocate of investment in consumer goods. In his Lenin Day speech in April 1981, in fact, he argued, perhaps with Polish developments in mind, that the priority growth rate assigned to consumer goods in the present five-year plan should be considered just a beginning. In what appeared to be a direct retort to warnings from Suslov about the excesses of "consumerism," he said that if popular needs were ignored for the sake of production, not only the people, but production too, would suffer. []

Chernenko's attitude toward investment priorities is consistent with his effort to cultivate the image of a leader attuned to popular aspirations through calls for commissions to study public opinion, more intraparty "democracy," and greater attention to letters from the rank and file. Kirilenko, although not insensitive to popular needs, has shown little appreciation for Chernenko's approach and reportedly blocked his recent effort to set up a new institute for sociological research, arguing that the party already had adequate means for divining public opinion. []

Although consumer advocates (such as Malenkov, Khrushchev's opponent in the post-Stalin succession) traditionally have not fared well politically, Chernenko could find common cause with such leaders as agriculture secretary Gorbachev and party leaders from republics not dominated by heavy industry, such as Kazakh party chief Kunayev. His "populist" approach also has drawn strong support from Georgian party leader Shevardnadze, who began promoting the idea of public opinion studies long before Chernenko. []

Defense Spending. Concern about the domestic economy also could impel one or another leader to propose some reduction in the rate of growth of military spending, if not an absolute cut as Khrushchev did in the late 1950s. The argument could reasonably be made that the military budget of the past two decades has improved the Soviet position vis-a-vis the Western alliance to the point that the country can afford some redirection of resources to urgent internal needs without jeopardizing defense requirements. []

Judging from their previous public statements, Chernenko would seem more inclined to push for a slower pace of military growth than Kirilenko or most other leaders. He has stressed, for example, the economic benefits to be derived from arms limitation. Kirilenko has more consistently used rhetoric that suggests he favors an undiminished defense effort. This, of course, would evoke military support for Kirilenko or someone with like views, especially if Chernenko were the alternative. Kirilenko's support for investment in non-military heavy industry, however, conceivably might lead him to favor some redistribution of resources away from defense. In a succession environment, however, no new leader, unless he perceives an existing consensus, is likely to advocate cuts in the defense budget that would antagonize the military establishment. []

Regional Competition. In addition to these sectoral clashes, the battle for resources is likely to heighten conflict between various regions of the country and their representatives in the Politburo. Succession politics has typically given regional leaders more influence on national policy, and contending factions will exploit this situation. The difficult political decisions regarding resource distribution will be complicated,

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moreover, by an underlying economic dilemma: the European part of the Soviet Union has a well-developed infrastructure but is short on labor and natural resources; parts of Siberia, where the natural resources are located, are low on labor resources and lacking in infrastructure; and the Central Asian area has ample labor resources but a limited technical base. []

In the debate over regional investment priorities, some leaders will urge more attention to the economic interests of the Russian Republic (RSFSR)—a position already taken by Suslov and an assistant to Kirilenko. While there are "objective" reasons for following such a course (Soviet oil and gas reserves, for example, are concentrated there), these arguments also could be advanced as part of a larger appeal to Russian nationalism—a traditional refuge of Soviet leaders in difficult times. The new emphasis some leaders recently have placed on RSFSR economic projects, such as the program to develop central Russia's non-black-earth zone, could be viewed in this context. Several regime spokesmen also have advanced a solution to the country's manpower problem that involves migration of workers from the labor-rich Muslim republics to underpopulated areas of the Russian Republic. Such proposals would be strongly supported by local officials in the RSFSR, who are now heavily represented on the Central Committee. []

Leaders of other republics, several of whom hold candidate or full membership on the Politburo, can be expected to argue for more investment in their own areas, where consumer and ethnic discontent seem most likely to converge and cause problems for the regime. Already the Central Asians are pressing hard for the construction of new industrial facilities and for the costly diversion of Siberian rivers to provide irrigation for the southern republics. []

Although party cadres in the non-Russian republics have less political influence than those in the RSFSR, their representation on the Politburo has grown in recent years, and they could play a significant role in the succession. Chernenko, who thus far has exhibited no strongly pro-Russian bias, already seems to be drawing support from some of these leaders. []

It would be difficult to devise an economic program that would appeal to all non-Russian cadres, however, since the interests of the various national republics are diverse and not entirely compatible. In any event, the strategy of wooing the non-Russians would be risky. Anyone attempting it would have to exercise care to avoid charges of such faults as "bourgeois nationalism," incurred by former KGB chief Beriya when he made overtures to the minorities after Stalin's death. []

Efficiency and Productivity. The economic dilemma that Brezhnev's successor will inherit has been heightened by the regime's failure to deal effectively with such underlying problems as labor productivity and chronic inefficiencies in economic management. Concern over declining growth rates will prompt some debate in the post-Brezhnev Politburo over new approaches to these problems. []

Kirilenko has demonstrated more openness than Chernenko to new ideas in the area of economic management. He was one of the few Soviet leaders to associate himself with the establishment of the Soviet Union's first Western-style business management school and was the first Politburo member to endorse the concept of production associations—a mode of rationalizing industrial management that aroused some resistance from the ministerial bureaucracy. He also has gone further than other Soviet leaders in endorsing the Hungarian economic reform. []

Chernenko, on the other hand, has tended to stress nonsystemic solutions to Soviet economic problems, calling for improvements in the quality of leadership at all echelons of the party and state bureaucracies. He also has attacked excessive party interference in economic management—an apparent criticism of Kirilenko's interventionist approach. []

¹ Hungary's New Economic Mechanism (NEM) is the only experiment in economic decentralization being carried out in the Soviet Bloc. As in the other Communist countries, Hungarian central authorities formulate state plans and set macroeconomic goals. Under the NEM, however, the Hungarians rely heavily on indirect economic regulators and market forces rather than on binding plan targets and administrative controls to guide microlevel economic processes. []

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
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Kirilenko meets with construction workers in Rostov Oblast.

Sovfoto ©



Brezhnev and then President Carter sign SALT II agreement.

UPI ©

On the issue of labor productivity, Kirilenko seems to favor a combination of exhortation, as exemplified by the annual "socialist competition" campaigns, and wage bonuses. Chernenko, on the other hand, has rarely addressed the issue, hinting only that an improvement in the availability of consumer goods would make wage incentives more meaningful. ☐

Foreign Policy Issues

Foreign policy issues also could become a bone of contention in the post-Brezhnev Politburo. Although these issues will be determined largely by the international situation at the time, a successor regime today would face a number of serious foreign challenges, including the US effort to bolster its military capabilities; improved relations between China and the United States; a situation in Afghanistan that is proving more troublesome than the leadership expected; and a crisis in Poland, a pivotal country in the Soviet empire. Political trends in such areas as Central America, the Middle East, and Europe, nonetheless, will continue to give the Soviet leadership opportunities to pursue policies hostile to US interests. ☐

Soviet-US Relations. Brezhnev has made detente a cornerstone of his foreign policy, even against the opposition of some powerful members of the Politburo, and his departure undoubtedly will bring further

review of its relative merits. Indeed, enthusiasm about the pursuit of improved Soviet-US relations has been on the wane in the Politburo since 1974, when the US Congress passed the Jackson-Vanik Amendment linking trade to an increase in Jewish emigration, and US policy has been actively debated in Moscow since Washington's unexpectedly severe reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. ☐

Unlike Chernenko, Kirilenko always has been equivocal in his support of Brezhnev's overtures to the United States, coupling even his most positive statements on detente with warnings about the unchanging nature of US "imperialism." From Kirilenko's perspective, the chief justification for pursuing detente probably has been its potential economic benefit. The Soviet-US relationship almost certainly has been a disappointment in that regard, however, and his recent statements suggest he believes Moscow should be shifting its focus to Western Europe. In a 1980 speech he said that detente still had some support among "sober politicians" in the United States and "especially in Europe, where by no means everyone is disposed to take the path of Washington-imposed adventure." ☐

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Chernenko has been far more enthusiastic than Kirilenko and most other leaders in his support of improved relations with the West, particularly the United States, and of arms limitation. In his Supreme Soviet election speech in 1979, for example, he went further than any leader other than Brezhnev in stressing the importance of what would have been the next step in strategic arms limitation talks (SALT III). Kirilenko, by contrast, coupled his endorsement of the SALT II treaty with calls for "vigilance and more vigilance" against Western intrigues. In another round of leadership speeches in 1980, Chernenko seemed to be the leader most concerned about the freeze in relations with the West following the invasion of Afghanistan. He also has been well ahead of his Politburo colleagues in warnings about the consequences of nuclear war, noting in his April 1981 Lenin Day speech that it posed a threat to "all civilization."

Although various shades of opinion are still discernible among Soviet leaders, many, judging by their statements, seem to believe the prospects for improved Soviet-US relations are remote—an assessment that could lead them to endorse efforts to counter, distract, or embroil US policy.

claims the KGB has concluded that the United States will pursue a policy of confrontation for the foreseeable future, and Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov, chief of the Soviet General Staff, openly said as much in a book published last month. Brezhnev also adopted a pessimistic tone in his speech to the Party Congress last year.

Chernenko's views on arms limitation and relations with the United States thus seem outside the current mainstream of Politburo opinion and may require some modification if he is to gain the support he needs once Brezhnev goes. As economic growth declines and resources become increasingly scarce, other members of the leadership, possibly even Kirilenko, may become more amenable to US proposals for arms control, however, seeing them as a way of avoiding the cost of arms they may perceive as necessary to counter the emergence of new US weapons.

Soviet-East European Relations. Economic considerations will be increasingly important in leadership debate over policy toward Eastern Europe as well. The leadership remains committed to maintaining control over its East European empire. The Politburo, however, faces a dilemma. Subsidization of Eastern Europe may now be too costly for the Soviets, but allowing Eastern Europe to become economically dependent on the West—as in the case of Poland—is politically dangerous. Continued economic shortages in Eastern Europe, however, could increase popular discontent there to perilously high levels. The Politburo, therefore, is likely to vacillate between courses designed to counter whichever danger seems more pressing at a given time. Its basic inclination, however, will be to require the East Europeans to place more emphasis on discipline and control to fill the void left by declining Soviet and Western economic support.

Triangular Politics? Those leaders who believe there is virtually no prospect for US-Soviet cooperation, especially on arms control issues, might favor playing the China card and normalizing relations with Beijing. That option appears to have been left open, at least by recent leadership statements. After Premier Tikhonov told a Japanese newspaper in February that he saw no favorable signs in US-Soviet relations and alluded to possible "concrete steps" that might be taken to improve Sino-Soviet relations, Brezhnev opened the door even wider last month, offering to resume border talks and establish new economic, scientific, and cultural ties.

Full normalization of relations would be difficult to achieve, however, because those Soviet leaders who have been most suspicious of US motives appear to be equally suspicious of the Chinese. Kirilenko, in particular, has shown his pique toward the Chinese on several occasions. Exasperated by what he considered Chinese intransigence in the Sino-Soviet border negotiations, he reportedly once told a delegation of foreign Communists that the talks were likely to continue for ten thousand years.

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In February 1982 Premier
Tikhonov alluded to "concrete
steps" to improve Sino-Soviet
relations.

Der Spiegel ©

Other Options. Soviet leaders have other options, however, for keeping the United States engaged while gaining a respite during which they could realign their policies. Some of these already are being implemented and seem unlikely to be affected by the succession:

- They are giving more attention to the Caribbean and Central America as sensitive areas for US policy and as a distraction from their own actions in Poland and Afghanistan. Soviet support for Nicaragua has expanded in recent months, and arms and additional MIG-23s have been sent to Cuba.
- They could focus more effort on Sudan, Pakistan, Zaire, and Greece, with the aim of generating regional pressures on them and causing discontent with US aid and security commitments.
- They are seeking to promote unrest in southern Africa by opposing Western efforts to reach a solution to the Namibian problem. ☐

Increased domestic problems and a desire to impose greater discipline at home could reinforce arguments of leaders who might urge a more aggressive stance in these areas. Other leaders, however, might be more

sensitive to the effect such actions could have on relations with the West. Even those who have been least supportive of Brezhnev's overtures to the United States must be aware of the need for Western technology and credit arrangements and probably would be reluctant to put relations with Western Europe at risk. ☐

Policy Implications

If Brezhnev leaves the scene soon, conflict over these issues, heightened by political jockeying in the post-Brezhnev period and the complexity of the country's problems, could lead to significant policy shifts. The most immediate changes are likely to be made in economic policy, where the current investment strategy already seems to have aroused opposition within the leadership. ☐

Economic Policy

Some reallocation of resources almost certainly will be undertaken after Brezhnev goes, with agriculture—in the absence of its principal patron—becoming a likely target for cuts. A persuasive case can be made that agriculture has not productively used the massive infusions of capital that Brezhnev insisted upon and that other sectors, such as heavy industry, can provide a greater return on each ruble invested. These other sectors also will be affected by the fortunes of their sponsors, however, making the beneficiaries largely unpredictable. Nonmilitary heavy industry, for example, probably would fare better in a Kirilenko or Shcherbitskiy regime than it would under Chernenko. ☐

Under the current economic constraints, even the defense budget, virtually sacrosanct since the early 1960s, probably will come under some attack. A number of factors make it unlikely however that in the near term any new leadership will make even symbolic reductions in the growth of the defense budget. These include:

- The poor state of US-Soviet relations.
- The political commitment of most Soviet leaders to a strong defense.

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- The challenge of planned US defense programs.
- The increased influence of the defense establishment in a succession environment.
- The momentum of weapon development and production programs that are under way.

Indeed, the military could come away from a power struggle with an even higher rate of growth of defense spending. ☐

Over the long term, as the post-Brezhnev leadership struggles to prepare its 12th Five-Year Plan (1986-90), there may be greater pressure to reduce the growth in military spending in order to free up the labor and capital resources urgently needed in key civilian sectors. In this connection, the cost-avoidance benefits of arms control agreements could assume greater importance. Even in the mid-to-late 1980s, however, we consider absolute reductions in the defense effort to be unlikely. ☐

Concern over declining growth rates will intensify efforts to improve efficiency and could be sufficient to overcome bureaucratic opposition to changes in the economic management structure. Although no new ideas can be expected from the government bureaucracy, which has been even less innovative than the party in dealing with economic problems, changes may be enacted along lines previously proposed by Brezhnev and other party leaders. At the center, the multitude of functionally related and overlapping ministries might be placed under more centralized management and direction. This effort could also be accompanied by some decentralization of operational authority—especially in the agricultural sector, where the importance of local conditions is becoming increasingly recognized. (It is in this area that the Hungarian model is being most closely studied and emulated on an experimental basis.) ☐

Foreign Policy

Although foreign policy issues also will come under review, international conditions make departures in this area seem less imminent than in the domestic arena. Soviet foreign policy strategy already has shifted to reflect a more pessimistic consensus about the prospects for improved relations with the United

States, and this new direction appears unlikely to change, barring major US initiatives, in the immediate post-Brezhnev period. ☐

Soviet leaders probably will wish to continue the arms limitation talks with the United States while at the same time focusing most of their attention on relations with Western Europe. A new arms control agreement would enable the Soviets to regulate or slow US weapons programs, thereby facilitating Soviet planning, reducing weapons costs, and, in significant areas, minimizing the possibility of technological surprise. In an effort to improve economic relations with Western Europe and further split the Western alliance, they probably will take a harder position against the United States on matters of less concern to the Europeans, while displaying a carrot-and-stick attitude on European questions. The need for trade with Western Europe and Moscow's own economic stringencies also will continue to be the primary constraints on Soviet behavior in Eastern Europe. Although full normalization of Sino-Soviet relations does not seem at hand, the Soviets are already trying to exploit US-Chinese difficulties and will leave the door open to improved relations with Beijing. It still seems doubtful, however, that a new Soviet leadership would offer terms the Chinese would find attractive. ☐

As the pessimism about Soviet-US relations becomes increasingly self-fulfilling, Soviet leaders may become even more inclined to pursue policies in the Third World that the United States would find disturbing and perhaps threatening to its interests. They could increase the level of their political and military commitment, within the limits of their own economic constraints, to clients such as Angola, Ethiopia, and Vietnam and demonstrate greater willingness to involve themselves directly in areas that risk confrontation with the United States. They might, for example, abandon their current counseling of caution to their Syrian and Palestinian clients and support greater risk-taking by the Palestinians in Lebanon—a move that could provoke an Israeli military attack, threaten Syria's position, and bring in Soviet forces. The Soviets could also adopt a more direct role in Central America. ☐

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Limitations on the Successor

Although the dimensions of Soviet economic problems increase the probability of shifts in that area, no leader likely to succeed Brezhnev will initially have the power to push through a comprehensive package of domestic and foreign policy programs. The new General Secretary's colleagues, acting in their own political interests, will attempt to restrict his power and probably prevent him from becoming Chief of State—a post Brezhnev acquired only after 13 years as party leader. As in the early days of the Brezhnev era, the General Secretary is likely to be sharing the spotlight, particularly in foreign affairs, with the President and Premier. His national security role also could be diminished, with the chairmanship of the Defense Council—a military planning group of top political, military, and defense industry officials—possibly going to another leader. []

In the past, it usually has taken a new General Secretary about five years to consolidate his power. Brezhnev's reluctance to give broad national authority to any other party secretary, however, may mean that his successor will need more time to accomplish this than previous party chiefs. Both Chernenko and Kirilenko, moreover, are in their 70s—considerably older than former leaders have been at the time they assumed office (Stalin was 42, Khrushchev was 59, and Brezhnev was 57)—and even the perception that a party chief's tenure could be short must make the consolidation of power more difficult. []

Longer Range Uncertainties

The conventional wisdom has been that the man who replaces Brezhnev is likely to be only an interim successor and that by the mid-1980s he and other top officials probably will be replaced by a somewhat younger group already in the Politburo—regional party leaders Grishin (67), Shcherbitskiy (63), and Romanov (59). On the other hand, with former power-broker Suslov dead, Kirilenko possibly incapacitated, and Brezhnev physically weakened, such a scenario could be dramatically foreshortened. The rest of the senior leadership, led by Ustinov, Andropov, Tikhonov, and others, all too aware of the costs of continued drift—especially for the economy—could agree to elevate one of its own or one of the younger generation directly without an interim phase “to get the country moving again.” []

Under either scenario, the policy preferences of the younger Politburo members are more difficult to predict. The more parochial concerns of these younger leaders color their pronouncements on domestic issues as well as their foreign policy statements, which often contain tougher language, more assertiveness, and greater hostility toward the West than those of their more senior colleagues. []

These leaders have not been members of the Politburo's inner circle. They have not been heavily involved in developing national security options (they are not, for example, members of the Defense Council) or, for that matter, in formulating five-year plans. As Politburo members, they have been participants in the policymaking process for some time, a factor that may lessen the likelihood of radical policy shifts when they assume more responsible posts, but their future policy preferences undoubtedly will be strongly influenced by the environment at the time of their promotion. []

We are even less able to gauge the likely policy inclinations of the generation of Soviet leaders who will come to the fore in the late 1980s. Their current positions in the Central Committee apparatus and regional party organizations provide for little involvement in foreign policy. While they have some discretionary authority in implementing the Politburo's domestic policies in their areas, their influence on this policy is minimal. []

Although these younger leaders are better educated and less tainted with the Stalinist past, they are not likely to hold views much different from their elders. The selection process that has placed them on the fringe of the Politburo is controlled by the current leadership and discourages the development of heretical or deviant political opinions. While it is possible that some officials might, nonetheless, come to power who favor moderate change, most are likely to be predisposed to pursue a mixture of authoritarian and moderate policies similar to that now followed by Brezhnev and company. []

Domestic and international conditions, of course, could force these new leaders to seek new policy directions. Economic problems will probably become

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more severe and the international environment perhaps more dangerous. Conceivably, some officials might respond to such pressures by attempting to liberalize the Soviet system, although it is difficult to imagine that any Soviet leadership would go as far in this direction as, for example, the Yugoslavs.

A more likely response probably would be a return to some form of neo-Stalinist orthodoxy. Such an approach would require more internal repression. Discipline, order, and self-sacrifice would be required. Economic self-sufficiency (autarky) might be adopted, with trade and commerce with the West reduced to a minimum. Nationalism, generally Slavic and particularly Russian, would be used to heighten patriotism and legitimize this effort. Abroad, Soviet leaders might be more willing to use military power in areas where they believe the USSR holds an advantage over the West.

Such a course would inherently carry considerable domestic risk. Some in the leadership might not readily accept it and there might be significant, if passive, popular resistance. A turn in this direction, nevertheless, is more consistent with the Russian and Leninist tradition than genuine reform and might be easier for the regime to pursue.

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Interlocking Directorate of the Soviet Leadership

Party					Government	
Politburo	Date of Birth	Date of Election	Other Party Position	Secretariat	Council of Ministers	Presidium of Supreme Soviet
Full member						
Brezhnev	12/19/06	6/29/57		Brezhnev-General Secretary		Brezhnev-Chairman
Andropov	6/15/14	4/27/73			Andropov-KGB	
Chernenko	9/24/11	11/28/78		Chernenko-Politburo Administration		
Gorbachev	3/2/31	10/21/80		Gorbachev-Agriculture		
Grishin	9/18/14	4/09/71	Moscow party boss			Grishin
Gromyko	7/18/09	4/27/73			Gromyko-Ministry of Foreign Affairs	
Kirilenko	9/08/06	4/25/62		Kirilenko-Industry		
Kunayev	1/12/12	4/09/71	Kazakhstan party boss			Kunayev
Pelshe	2/07/99	4/08/66	Party Control Committee			
Romanov	2/07/23	3/06/76	Leningrad party boss			Romanov
Shcherbitskiy	2/17/18	4/09/71	Ukraine party boss			Shcherbitskiy
Tikhonov	5/14/05	11/28/78			Tikhonov-Chairman	
Ustinov	10/30/08	3/06/76			Ustinov-Ministry of Defense	
Candidate member						
Alilyev	5/10/23	3/06/76	Azerbaijani party boss			
Demichev	1/03/18	11/01/64			Demichev-Ministry of Culture	
Kiselev	8/12/17	10/21/80	Belorussian party boss			Kiselev
Kuznetsov	2/13/01	10/03/77				Kuznetsov-1st Deputy Chairman
Ponomarev	1/17/05	5/19/72		Ponomarev-Non-ruling Communist parties		
Rashidov	11/06/17	10/31/61	Uzbek party boss			Rashidov
Shevardnadze	01/25/28	11/28/78	Georgian party boss			
Solomentsev	11/07/13	11/23/71			Solomentsev-RSFSR Premier	
				Kapitonov-Cadres		
				Dolgikh-Industry		
				Zimyanin-Propaganda, Ideology		
				Rusakov-Ruling Communist parties		

National Security Council The White House

31

Package # _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	_____
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>✓ M</u>	_____
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>I</u>
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Staff Secretary	_____	_____	_____
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____

I Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch

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COMMENTS

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Central Intelligence Agency



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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

6 July 1982

PROSPECTS FOR BREZHNEV'S RETIREMENT

SUMMARY

This speculative essay argues that Brezhnev's political position has become untenable, and that events are moving rapidly to a denouement. It contends that Brezhnev's defenses have grown weaker at the same time that the incentives for moving against him have grown stronger. While the timing of his departure cannot be predicted, his retirement or "elevation" to a purely honorific post may be announced at the next plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, which could take place as early as this month. Even if Brezhnev formally continues in his current offices, de facto power is in the process of passing to others. This may, in fact, have occurred already in large part. Brezhnev's decline is profitting Andropov more than any other leader, but Chernenko's prominence in recent months suggests that he may also play an important role in the post-Brezhnev leadership, which will contain strong elements of collegiality.

SOVA-M-82-10103

*This memorandum, deliberately speculative in nature, provides an individual assessment of Brezhnev's current prospects. The author's conclusions on [redacted] the likelihood of his ouster in the short term are somewhat forward of the general consensus within the Office of Soviet Analysis (SOVA). The paper has, however, been discussed within SOVA and is considered a reasonable--if not fully agreed upon--hypothesis. [redacted] Questions and comments may be directed to Chief, [redacted] Office of Soviet Analysis, [redacted]

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Prospects for Brezhnev's Retirement

An assessment of the prospects for Brezhnev's retirement depends on the judgment of how much power he currently exercises, and on whether other Politburo members have a sufficiently strong desire to remove him. The evidence, although inconclusive, suggests a growing disparity between Brezhnev's formal authority and his actual power, a decrease in his ability to protect himself from attack, and the presence of stronger incentives than heretofore for other Politburo members to move against him. [redacted]

Brezhnev's Political Position

On the surface, Brezhnev remains the preeminent party and state leader. Although he has missed several recent meetings at which protocol required his presence, he continues to perform many of the official functions of his job such as giving speeches, making policy pronouncements, and presiding over important meetings. [redacted]

Brezhnev's public prominence, however, constitutes virtually the only evidence that he continues to play a significant role in the leadership, and it is not necessarily a valid indicator of how much influence he wields behind the scenes. We cannot ascertain [redacted]

[redacted] whether he is now an independent actor, a figurehead who is articulating policies worked out within the Politburo as a whole, or a leader whose preferences cannot be ignored but who is "propped up" and manipulated by a small group of aides and close associates. [redacted]

[redacted]

His reliance on the few people who have regular access to him and enjoy his confidence--specifically, his personal staff and Chernenko--certainly reduces his ability to exercise independent influence, and may to some extent make him their creature or puppet. [redacted]

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

[REDACTED] other Politburo members--including Chernenko, Andropov, Gromyko, and Tikhonov--are expanding their roles and receiving a greater share of the limelight than previously. And recent appointments to key KGB positions suggest that Brezhnev may not have effective control over the security apparatus. (C)

At the same time, unflattering rumors about Brezhnev and his family persist. These, and the appearance of indirect public criticism of Brezhnev, indicate a breakdown in party discipline and an erosion in the leader's prestige. [REDACTED]

Heretofore, most Politburo members presumably saw an advantage in Brezhnev's continuation in office. They may have collectively believed that his remaining made their own positions secure, while projecting the appearance of leadership unity at a time of serious economic and foreign policy problems. Inability to agree on a replacement for Brezhnev may also have been a key restraining factor. Finally, even those eager to see him leave may have believed that his poor medical prognosis counseled waiting for nature to take its course rather than taking the risk of attempting to oust him. [REDACTED]

The system, however, cannot function indefinitely with an impaired and inactive party head, and the arguments for moving against Brezhnev have become more compelling in recent months. The emergence of Chernenko and Andropov as the leading contenders to succeed Brezhnev has destroyed the equilibrium in the leadership. Other leaders, increasingly aware that Brezhnev's remaining time is limited, now have a greater incentive to make deals to protect their interests once he is gone. Under these circumstances, their awareness that derogatory rumors have tarnished Brezhnev's image, embarrassment at his poor performance in carrying out even the ceremonial and mechanical aspects of his job, and cognizance that his political defenses have weakened, could combine to galvanize Brezhnev's peers into action. Conceivably, lack of confidence in Brezhnev's ability to perform adequately in a summit with President Reagan could give a sense of urgency to the need to resolve the succession. [REDACTED]

Political opportunism will count for more than past loyalties in determining where various leaders line up. Even Chernenko would abandon Brezhnev if he concluded that allegiance to his chief had become a political liability, and saw the opportunity to strike a bargain that offered him some promise of a share of power in the post-Brezhnev leadership. Chernenko has recently been involved in a wide range of activities, and apparently has important responsibilities in several key areas of party work. Although originally dependent on Brezhnev, by now he may have established himself as someone in a position to claim a significant share of the spoils, should he choose to cooperate in a move against Brezhnev. [REDACTED]

The Mechanics of Removing Brezhnev

In the final analysis, Brezhnev serves at the pleasure of the Politburo. Any move to replace him would have to involve several key Politburo figures, and would require the acquiescence of a majority of the Politburo membership. In securing the compliance of the Politburo as a whole and ensuring the secrecy of the proceedings, the support of the security forces and military would be important, if not essential.

If Brezhnev has not already effectively retired in place, he would perhaps be able to block a move to oust him, provided that he learned about a conspiracy before the Politburo as a whole had made a decision. He or Chernenko could call a Politburo meeting and, if he were healthy, he could perhaps dominate the proceedings through his powers as chairman. Alternatively, he could call a meeting of the Central Committee, where he probably enjoys greater support than on the Politburo. Khrushchev prevented his removal in 1957 by such an action. []

Even if Brezhnev still has considerable power, however, his ability to prevent the emergence of opposition appears to be reduced. With the recent appointment as KGB head of the relatively unknown Fedorchuk, who was promoted over Brezhnev's long-time crony Tsinev, the KGB's commitment to Brezhnev is no longer assured. The loyalty and effectiveness of the KGB, which [] is [] in an excellent position to detect conspiracies, is necessary to any Soviet leader's security. (S)

Moreover, Politburo members under Brezhnev have enjoyed greater physical and career security than in the past, and consequently have less reason to fear opposing the party leader. Police terror has dissipated as a credible political weapon, and Brezhnev's power of appointment and removal from office has always been constrained to some degree. If he discovered that powerful figures such as Ustinov and Andropov were in league against him, it is not certain that he could marshal Politburo support for their removal. In any event, once the Politburo acted, it would be too late for Brezhnev to reverse the outcome. []

The Modalities of Retirement

Brezhnev is not likely to step down voluntarily. [] he was considering this course in order to ensure Chernenko's succession. But Brezhnev's desire to cling to office is probably as strong as that of past Communist leaders. In over twenty successions in Communist states since 1917, not once has a party leader relinquished power of his own volition. []

If Brezhnev is forced out, however, other leaders might prefer that his retirement appear voluntary, in order to minimize

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the unsettling effect of the succession on the Polish and other East European regimes. The belief that Brezhnev continues to command considerable respect among rank-and-file party members in the Soviet Union could also impel other leaders to retire Brezhnev with full honors. [redacted]

Under these circumstances, there is a strong possibility that Brezhnev will be kicked upstairs, retaining his prestige but not his power. If confronted with the option of retiring in disgrace or elevation to a senior statesman position, Brezhnev would probably make the same choice that Ulbricht made in 1971. The East German leader yielded his party post, but was allowed to retain the presidency briefly until his death. [redacted]

Another possibility is that the Politburo would allow Brezhnev formally to retain both the Presidency and the General Secretaryship, while relinquishing the substance of power to the man chosen to be his ultimate successor as party head. This could either be done informally with no public announcement, or by the creation of a new position for the intended heir. This situation, however, would not be tenable for very long. [redacted]

Recent Developments

Several developments suggest that the Politburo may have acted around 24 June to expand Andropov's responsibilities, and perhaps to arrange for his succession to Brezhnev. [redacted]

- On Thursday, 24 June, the day the Politburo usually holds its regular weekly meeting, Andropov represented the leadership at a Kremlin award ceremony that Brezhnev did not attend. The ceremony was a manufactured event that could have been canceled or delayed if Brezhnev was indisposed. [redacted]

-- [redacted] Andropov had formally assumed Suslov's portfolio within the secretariat. [redacted]

[redacted] and indicated that the question had only recently been decided. [redacted] preparations were underway to ensure Andropov's orderly succession to Brezhnev, and word to this effect was being passed to East European Communist Parties. [redacted]

- Brezhnev did not meet as scheduled [redacted]

during [redacted]

visit to Moscow, [redacted]

[redacted] that Brezhnev had been in a bad state [redacted] and said that the truth of this statement would probably be born out [redacted]

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On 3 July, TASS announced that Brezhnev had departed Moscow that day for a rest. Brezhnev usually vacations in the Crimea about this time every year, so his departure does not necessarily have any political significance. Absence from Moscow, however, may increase his isolation. [redacted] have said that Brezhnev might not hold summit meetings with bloc party heads this summer, as he has in the past. If Brezhnev's Politburo peers have decided to remove him, they might do so while he is out of town. Khrushchev's absence from Moscow facilitated his ouster in 1964. [redacted]

A Politburo decision to retire Brezhnev would require the calling of a plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee.

[redacted] claimed to have heard that a plenum would be held sometime between [redacted] [redacted] that a plenum may not take place for some time. [redacted]

Several months ago Brezhnev called for two plenums this year--one for agriculture and one for management issues. The one dealing with the farm program has been held, and it is conceivable that the next plenum will deal only with management reform. Considering Brezhnev's political circumstances, however, there is a strong possibility that the next plenum--whenever it takes place--will be the occasion for his retirement or a major change in his formal status. [redacted]

RECEIVED 18 MAR 82 16

TO CLARK

FROM PIPES

DOCDATE 18 MAR 82

White House Guidelines, August 23, 1987
By CXS NARA, Date 8/6/02Succession
crisis
in vrn
actionPipes

KEYWORDS: USSR

BREZHNEV, LEONID I

SUBJECT: PREPARATIONS FOR UPCOMING SOVIET SUCCESSION CRISIS

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 18 MAR 82 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

STEARMAN

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~~MEMORANDUM~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

March 18, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: RICHARD PIPES *RP*SUBJECT: Preparations for the Coming Soviet Succession
Crisis

There are numerous indications that the struggle for succession in Russia has gotten underway: it may break into the open at any time. An interregnum in the Soviet Union always presents great opportunities for the West because the successor government, requiring time to consolidate its power, is amenable to compromises in its foreign policy. (S)

In view of this fact, we should not be caught unprepared when Brezhnev goes but prepare an agenda of objectives and actions we may want to pursue in such an eventuality. I recommend that we convene as soon as possible at NSC an inter-agency crisis management sub-group to deal with this problem. (S)

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize the formation of a crisis management sub-group at NSC to discuss and recommend actions to be taken when Brezhnev is forced for political or health reasons to relinquish office. (S)

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

7/6

cc: Bill Stearman
Norman Bailey*To be addressed by
CPPG.**JP*~~SECRET~~

Classified/Extended by WPClark
Review March 18, 2002
Reason: NSC 1.13(f)

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR *F06-114/10 #11489*BY *CN* NARA DATE *6/25/09*

*Soviet
successes*

*For Meeting on
Friday*

*July
16
1982*

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL
HIS COMPLETE SPEECHES
1897—1963

Edited by
ROBERT RHODES JAMES

Volume
VIII
1950—1963

CHELSEA HOUSE PUBLISHERS
in association with
R. R. BOWKER COMPANY
New York and London

1974

Art and politics. They have two things in common. The first is the controversial difference of opinion between those engaged in them. The controversies in the field of art are at least as vigorous as those in politics. The second is the search for truth. Tireless and impartially successful.

About people who go in for novel forms of art. If they have had a thorough grounding and have proved themselves the masters of line and colour they have a right to express themselves. But one views with some suspicion people who have had no sort of artistic training and go in for the most extraordinary performances in the hope of obtaining notoriety and even profit. It is a broad question whether any measure of regimentation is compatible with art. On the whole I find myself on the side of the disciplinarians. Of course one may go too far, but no large organization can long continue without a strong element of authority and respect for authority. There must be in any really healthy, effective body a sense of collective security.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

May 11, 1953

House of Commons

Mr. Eden had been obliged to undergo a major operation. It was not wholly successful, and subsequent complications required a further operation. His health never fully recovered. In his absence, Churchill assumed responsibility for foreign affairs, assisted by Lord Salisbury, who became acting Foreign Secretary on June 30.

The House has already shown its deep concern and regret for the severe illness of the Foreign Secretary, whose condition, though continually improving, involves his absence for several months from the office in which he has unsurpassed experience.

The Prime Minister has always to watch the course of foreign affairs with close attention, and there are many and recent precedents for his taking charge of the Foreign Office in such circumstances. My knowledge, such as it is, is not mainly derived from books and documents about foreign affairs, but from living through them for a long time. I hope, with the assistance of the Minister of State and of the two Under-Secretaries, to discharge these duties until the Secretary of State has recovered. It is only if I find the burden more than I can bear that I shall ask for relief, but, naturally, I shall be grateful for any consideration which the House will give me.

This afternoon, we have to survey a field so vast and varied that it is not possible to do more in the space which I could rightly claim than to deal with the salient features, and even for that a severe process of selection and compression is required. My right hon. and learned Friend the Minister of State [Mr. Selwyn Lloyd], who will speak to-morrow, will be able to supplement the account that I can give to-day.

Let me, first of all, touch factually upon some of the more rapidly moving scenes as they present themselves to us at this moment. Our immediate aim is, of

course, the conclusion of a truce in Korea. I doubt very much whether there could be any agreement at the present time on a united Korea. Terrible injuries have been done to each other by the North and South Koreans, but, even if both sides only stood still where they are now, and ceased fire and tried to replace the foreign troops in the country by Korean forces—even if only that happened, time might once more prove to be a healer, especially in ravaged countries when given a revival of prosperity and help in repairing the really fearful damage. Therefore, I should be very content with even a truce or a cease-fire for the moment.

We all desire a settlement of the prisoners of war dispute at Panmunjom. The wonder is that it has been kept alive so long. There is only one vital point, namely, that a prisoner of war cannot and should not be forcibly repatriated against his will. That issue has involved many months of wearisome discussion, but it is now no longer an obstacle. The question of the conditions governing the exchange of prisoners has really been reduced to terms which no longer involve any difference of principle. All that now remains is methods and procedure. Both sides have made numerous concessions, and the United Nations representatives have themselves suggested at least half-a-dozen alternatives.

It is obvious that, if at any time, there is a wish among the Communists to reach an agreement as between rational human beings, the matter could be instantly, or almost instantly, settled. It has also been made plain—abundantly plain—that, if there is no wish to settle, endless and inexhaustible variants can be proposed. So far as we are concerned, we readily accepted the idea that Switzerland or Sweden or India or Pakistan should take over the task of handling in an honourable manner the 40,000 or 50,000 prisoners who fear to go home.

Now, a proposal has been made by the Communists that five Powers—Poland, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland, Sweden, and India—shall all deal together with the problem. This involves much complication, but, at the same time, the claim that all the prisoners concerned shall be moved from their present camps to other distant countries has been dropped. I must remind the House, as I have done several times, that the United States, as mandatory for the United Nations, has borne nineteen-twentieths of the burden in blood and treasure. The matter is not one which we have either the right or the responsibility to decide, but it is our duty, without separating ourselves from our great ally, to express our opinion frankly and plainly to them as occasion offers. I certainly feel that this new proposal requires patient and sympathetic examination, and there is no reason known to me at present to assume that it may not form the basis of an agreement, provided always that it is put forward by the Communists in a spirit of sincerity.

During the last few weeks, we have watched with much anxiety the deterioration of the position in Indo-China. I am glad to say that, so far as my information goes, it is less serious than was at one time assumed, and that the measures taken by the French, together with the approach, or, indeed, the arrival, of the rainy season, will probably give a lull of several months. I ought to say that, in my opinion—I am venturing to offer my opinion—the sudden advance of elements of the Vietminh forces, or their foraging parties, towards the Siamese frontier ought not to lead us to conclude that it is a Soviet-inspired move inconsistent with the new attitude of the

Soviet Government. This may unhappily prove to be the case, but also it might well have arisen from local circumstances and impulses, and from plans made many months ago and now, perhaps, reversed. We should at least not be over hasty in drawing a conclusion in an adverse sense.

Now I come to Egypt, a long way nearer to our scenes of activity, and here I think it will be well to trace the recent sequence of events. Within a week of the evacuation of Abadan, the Wafd Government of Egypt announced that they would repudiate one-sidedly—unilaterally, if you prefer it—the Treaty of 1936 which remains valid in its present form until at any rate 1956. It may well be that they did not realize what a weak position that put them in juridically and internationally, and, indeed, in common decency. We undoubtedly retain the legal advantages which go to a nation affronted by an act of bad faith.

When this happened eighteen months ago, the then Prime Minister, now Leader of the Opposition, and the then Foreign Secretary, although in the midst of the election, gave very stiff orders to the British troops on the Canal to defend themselves and make preparations to protect British civilians from outrage and massacre. A kind of guerrilla war immediately broke out, and this is what we inherited when, on 25 October 1951, we became responsible.

By the end of January 1952, these attacks upon our Forces, which had been heavily strengthened under the decision and in accordance with the decisions of the late Government, with which we were in full accord, were brought to an end by a rather rough episode in Ismailia. There were some shocking mob murders in Cairo, but there was no more fighting. At the end of July of last year an officer of the Egyptian Army, with a band of military associates, expelled King Farouk and made himself, or was made, without any electoral foundation, dictator of Egypt. Power has since rested with the military junta.

One of the disadvantages of dictatorship is that the dictator is often dictated to by others, and what he did to others may often be done back again to him. There has followed a period of tension in Egypt during which the new dictator and his comrades have found it convenient, or necessary, to gain as much popularity as possible by the well-known process of 'taking it out of the British.' This process was confined to wordy warfare until about the beginning of last month, April, since when a number of minor acts of violence causing the loss of several lives has taken place.

In November of last year, General Neguib and the ruling junta in Cairo asked us to begin negotiations with them on our evacuation of the Canal Zone and of the important and very costly base which has been established there wholly at our expense during and after the war. We were quite ready to talk over the whole position with General Neguib or his representatives, in a friendly manner. Naturally, we do not wish to keep indefinitely 80,000 men at a cost of, it might be, over £50 million a year discharging the duty which has largely fallen upon us, and us alone, of safeguarding the interests of the free nations in the Middle East, and also of preserving the international waterway of the Suez Canal.

If agreeable arrangements can be made to enable this latter service and also the solid maintenance of the strategic base to be discharged by agreement with Egypt, it would mean a great saving of our men and money. This, let me point out, is not an

Imperialist or Colonial enterprise by the British, but it is for purposes with which every member of N.A.T.O. from the North Cape to the Caucasus and also the countries of the East and Middle East are directly concerned.

It was the Egyptian monarchy which, in 1951, denounced the 1936 Treaty, and it was the Egyptian dictatorship which in November last sought the Conference. We have not accepted the repudiation of the Treaty, but we have willingly agreed to the Conference. However, before meeting the Egyptian delegates, we thought it better to come to an understanding between the United States as the leading world Power about the indispensable minimum conditions for preserving these international objects I have described.

These conditions, while fully respecting Egyptian sovereignty, must enable the base to be maintained in such a condition that in the event of a Third World War it could, if needed, function effectively in good time throughout the Middle East. After careful and thorough discussions with the American authorities, both military and civil, under the Truman Administration, we reached conclusions on the necessary conditions.

I do not propose to describe in detail this afternoon these conditions. Suffice it to say that if accepted in good faith they would render possible the reduction of the British Forces in the Canal Zone from 80,000 to a small fraction of that number. There would be left technical personnel discharging their functions with the goodwill of the Egyptian monarchy, republic, oligarchy, dictatorship, or whatever it may turn out to be.

It was agreed with Mr. Truman's Administration that we should act together to carry forward this policy. When, after the Presidential election, President Eisenhower came into power all this matter was reviewed. I am not authorized to state this afternoon the form of agreement which was reached. In March, however, we proposed to the Egyptians that the British and United States delegates should meet them and discuss the position. The Egyptians, however, did not wish to meet us both together in the discussion, and the United States deferred to their wish while holding themselves ready at any time to join the discussions if invited by Neguib.

We, the British, therefore went into conference with the Egyptians on 27 April, a fortnight ago. We had intended some time ago to ask Field-Marshal Slim to join with our Ambassador in presenting our case, which is largely military technique. His need to be in Australia made it necessary for us to substitute another military authority. In General Robertson we have found a representative of the highest professional knowledge and of varied political experience in the administration both of the Middle East and earlier of the British Zone in Germany. It was in these circumstances that negotiations began.

We did not, let me repeat, seek these negotiations. We complied with the Egyptian desire for them. They asked for them and they have now—to quote the violent outpourings of General Neguib reported in to-day's newspapers—washed their hands of them. Let me here say that I have hitherto had no personal communication with General Neguib, as is stated in some newspapers this morning, and nothing in the nature of an ultimatum has come from Her Majesty's Government or their delegation. It is more likely that the outburst springs from a desire to impress Mr. Foster Dulles,

who has arrived in Cairo to-day. If, at any time, the Egyptians wish to renew the discussions we are willing, and if they would renew them both with us and with the United States, that would be still better. In the meanwhile, no action so far as I can see is called upon from us.

Of course, if the boastful and threatening speeches of which there has been a spate in the last few months, and, in some instances, even in the last few hours, were to be translated into action and our troops in the Canal Zone were to be the object of renewed attacks by saboteurs or even by the Egyptian Army, which is being aided and trained by Nazi instructors and staff officers in unusual numbers, and our soldiers were being killed, we should have no choice—I am sorry to say this to the House, but we must face facts—but to defend ourselves. I am advised that we are entirely capable of doing this without requiring any physical assistance from the United States or anyone else. Our hope is that negotiations will be resumed. In the meanwhile, we may await the development of events with the composure which follows from the combination of patience with strength.

I come now to the main position in Europe. The dominating problem is, of course, Germany. If our advice had been taken by the United States after the Armistice with Germany, the Western allies would not have withdrawn from the front line which their armies had reached to the agreed occupation lines unless and until agreement had been reached with Soviet Russia on the many points of difference about the occupation of enemy territories, of which the occupation of the German Zones was, of course, only a part. Our view was not accepted and a wide area of Germany was handed over to Soviet occupation without any general settlement among the three victorious Powers.

After the interrupted Potsdam Conference, which the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition attended in two different capacities—with my entire contentment, at any rate so far as his first capacity was concerned—the Russia of Stalin took a very hostile line to the Western allies. Stalin found himself resisted from a very early stage by the firmness and tenacity of the late Ernest Bevin, who marshalled and rallied democratic sentiment strongly against this new movement of Russian Soviet ambitions. All the tragic and tremendous events of the last eight years followed in remorseless succession. As the result, the immense and formidable problem of Germany now presents itself in an entirely different aspect.

The East of Germany—more than one-quarter of her population and one-third of her territory—has fallen into great misery and depression and has a powerful and well armed, Soviet-organized, Communist German military force of over 100,000 men. The question of the German-Polish frontier was specifically reserved at Potsdam for the general peace treaty which, to put it mildly, seems no nearer now than it was then.

We, with the United States, and France, have entered into a new and remarkable relationship with Western Germany. The policy of Her Majesty's Government is to adhere most faithfully in the spirit as well as in the letter of our agreements with Western Germany. Dr. Adenauer may well be deemed the wisest German statesman since the days of Bismarck. I have greatly admired the perseverance, courage, composure, and skill with which he has faced the complex, changing, uncertain, and unpredictable situations with which he has been ceaselessly confronted. Strong as is

our desire to see a friendly settlement with Soviet Russia, or even an improved *modus vivendi*, we are resolved not in any way to fail in the obligations to which we have committed ourselves about Western Germany. Dr. Adenauer is visiting us here in a few days, and we shall certainly assure him that Western Germany will in no way be sacrificed or—I pick these words with special care—cease to be master of its own fortunes within the agreements we and other N.A.T.O. countries have made with them.

Then there is France. As I have urged for several years, there is no hope for the safety and freedom of Western Europe except by the laying aside for ever of the ancient feud between the Teuton and the Gaul. It is seven years since, at Zürich, I appealed to France to take Germany by the hand and lead her back into the European family. We have made great progress since then. Some of it has been due no doubt to the spur to resist the enormous military strength of Soviet Russia, but much is also due to the inspiring and unconquerable cause of United Europe. We have Strasbourg and all that it stands for, and it is our duty to fortify its vitality and authority tirelessly as the years roll on.

We have the Organization for European Economic Co-operation, which has done such beneficent work in consolidating the material strength and sense of unity of European countries; we have the European Payments Union and there is also the European Coal and Steel Community, on which I believe we have observers. Finally, we have, or rather we sincerely hope before long to have, the European Defence Community, so long delayed but also so intensely needed. This will form an essential component of a progressively developing North Atlantic Organization.

The military position of France is one which may well, however, cause serious anxiety in the English-speaking world. This is not mainly because of its effect in Europe—since whatever our fate there we are in the line together; it is not mainly because of that—it is rather because of its effect on the French position and policy in the far-reaching regions they are seeking to defend.

The Americans invite the French to bring their case in Indo-China before U.N.O. where probably a favourable vote at the moment could be found. The French, as I understand from my own observation, hesitate to do so because they know that thereafter their system in Indo-China would be brought under the continuous survey of U.N.O. As most of the members of U.N.O. have no colonies they are apt to take a rather detached view about those who have. Hence the French hesitation to invoke the machinery of U.N.O.

But surely if France wishes to preserve the authority and life of the French Union without any associations with U.N.O. she should take more effective steps herself. If, to-day, the French had the same military system that the Socialist Government set up in Great Britain—what may call the Shinwell system—namely, two years' military service and the power to send National Service men or conscripts abroad beyond Europe, they would, I believe, have had much less difficulty in maintaining their positions in Indo-China and could also have developed a far stronger army in defence of their own soil in line with their allies. The fact that they have hitherto found themselves unable to take these kinds of military measures has exposed them to great difficulty.

Where do we stand? We are not members of the European Defence Community, nor do we intend to be merged in a Federal European system. We feel we have a special relation to both. This can be expressed by prepositions, by the preposition 'with' but not 'of'—we are with them, but not of them. We have our own Commonwealth and Empire. One of the anxieties of France is lest Germany, even partitioned as she is now, will be so strong that France will be outweighed in United Europe or in the European Defence Community. I am sure they could do a lot, if they chose to make themselves stronger. But, anyhow, I have always believed, as an active friend of France for nearly fifty years, that our fortunes lie together.

Certainly we have, since the end of the war, guaranteed five times under the various N.A.T.O. and E.D.C. agreements, under the Dunkirk Treaty and the Brussels Treaty, to help, to the utmost of our strength, defend France against aggressive attack. Quite a lot—five times; and not as a result of any party decisions, but with the general assent of the British nation. We also declared our abiding interest in building up the strength and integrity of the European Defence Community. We have offered close links with its institutions and its forces. This ought to restore the balance and remove fears that Western Germany will preponderate in the combined organization.

Let me, if I may, go into some detail for a few moments on our part in the European Defence Community. We accept the principle that there is a specially close relationship between ourselves and the E.D.C. In anticipation of the coming into effect of the E.D.C. Treaty we are already working out with the members of the Community the measures that will be necessary, both on the military and on the political side. On the military side we will ensure effective and continuous cooperation between our forces and those of E.D.C. In the air we shall be ready when the European Air Force is fully established to exchange officers for command and training and to co-operate in many other ways. There will also be close association between the armies and the navies. On the political side we intend to consult constantly and earnestly about problems of common concern. That is our policy as it was the policy of our predecessors.

I feel bound also to place on record from another angle what we have done so far. We have stationed our largest military force with the French on the Continent. We have the strongest armoured force which exists between the Elbe and the Rhine. We have very intimately associated all our air forces. We have placed our troops in Europe under the command of General Ridgway, the N.A.T.O. Commander-in-Chief. And should war come he can move our divisions about, after reasonable consultations such as we had in the late and preceding world wars, in accordance with strategic requirements or even tactical requirements.

What more is there, then, that we could give, apart from completely merging ourselves with the European military organization? We do our best for them. We fight with them under the orders of the Supreme Commander. On the Continent we share their fate. We have not got a divisional formation in our own island. No nation has ever run such risks in times which I have read about or lived through, and no nation has ever received such little recognition for it.

We shall continue to play a full and active part in plans for the political, military, and economic association of Western Europe with the North Atlantic Alliance. That is,

I think, a perfectly sober and reasonable statement of our position in regard to the European Defence Community.

I cannot, however, leave French problems, about which I have perhaps spoken with a frankness which I think my long friendship entitles me to do, without re-affirming our devotion to the life and fame of France. France was our enemy for centuries but our ally in the worst struggles we have either of us endured. No one should ever forget the glorious but fearful sacrifices made by France in the First World War when, with her then static population of thirty-nine million, she suffered the loss of two million of the flower of her race. We rejoice to see every revival of French strength and influence, and all the counsel which I venture to offer them as their oldest friend in Britain, springs from my admiration for the part they have played in the glory and the culture of Europe.

I move over these maps—because that is what one has to do in one's mind. When we consider the security of Europe we must not overlook a most important development in the last year—the new relationship between Yugoslavia, Greece,* and Turkey. These nations are on the right flank of the front in Europe, and their agreement greatly strengthens the whole system of allied defence. It also has reactions on the defence of the Middle East which are highly beneficial.

The inclusion of Turkey among the N.A.T.O. Powers has, of course, an important influence upon the Arab States and generally with the Moslem world. We trust that the wisdom of the Arab States may lead them to ever closer association with the Western allies, with whom they have so many ties of common interest and mutual security.

Another most important factor in the Middle East is the State of Israel. Ever since the Balfour Declaration of 1917 I have been a faithful supporter of the Zionist cause. I have, of course, had periods of deep pain when shocking crimes were committed against our officers and men by the extreme factions in this intense and complex Jewish community. But when I look back over the work they have done in building up a nation, in reclaiming the desert, in receiving more than half a million refugees hunted by terror from Europe alone, I feel that it is the duty of Britain to see that they get fair play and that the pledges made to them by successive British Governments are fulfilled.

Fortunately for them they have formed the best Army in the Levant and, as the House will remember, they successfully repulsed the combined attack which was made upon them by their neighbours and Egypt four years ago. It is very unfortunate that no peace has been made between them and the Arab States, with whom their fortunes are interwoven. Nothing that we shall do in the supply of aircraft to this part of the world will be allowed to place Israel at an unfair disadvantage.

We earnestly hope that the problem of Arab refugees will receive continuous attention and that the unfortunate and, particularly, peculiarly untimely, bickering which has broken out between Israel and Jordan will be brought to an end with mutual advantage to both sides. I had a lot to do with the interests and the formation of both these States more than thirty years ago, and I believe that they have both great services to render each other by living together as good neighbours.

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I had hoped very much that King Abdullah and Mr. Weizmann—two men I knew and honoured greatly—might have come together, but death has removed one and assassination the other. But perseverance and good neighbourliness is not a policy with which anyone can find fault. Therefore, I hope and trust that the Arab States will come to peace with Israel, and I earnestly pray that the great Zionist conception of a home for this historic people, where they live on the land of their ancestors, may eventually receive its full fruition.

The supreme event which has occurred since we last had a debate on foreign affairs is, of course, the change of attitude and, as we all hope, of mood which has taken place in the Soviet domains and particularly in the Kremlin since the death of Stalin. We, on both sides of the House, have watched this with profound attention. It is the policy of Her Majesty's Government to avoid by every means in their power doing anything or saying anything which could check any favourable reaction that may be taking place and to welcome every sign of improvement in our relations with Russia.

We have been encouraged by a series of amicable gestures on the part of the new Soviet Government. These have so far taken the form of leaving off doing things which we have not been doing to them. It is, therefore, difficult to find specific cases with which to match their actions. If, however, any such cases can be cited they will certainly be examined by Her Majesty's Government with urgency and sympathy. On this subject I will now, however, venture to make some general observations which, I hope, will be studied with tolerance and indulgence.

It would, I think, be a mistake to assume that nothing can be settled with Soviet Russia unless or until everything is settled. A settlement of two or three of our difficulties would be an important gain to every peace-loving country. For instance, peace in Korea, the conclusion of an Austrian Treaty—these might lead to an easement in our relations for the next few years, which might in itself open new prospects to the security and prosperity of all nations and every continent.

Therefore, I think it would be a mistake to try to map things out too much in detail and expect that the grave, fundamental issues which divide the Communist and non-Communist parts of the world could be settled at a stroke by a single comprehensive agreement. Piecemeal solutions of individual problems should not be disdained or improvidently put aside. It certainly would do no harm if, for a while, each side looked about for things to do which would be agreeable instead of being disagreeable to each other.

Above all, it would be a pity if the natural desire to reach a general settlement of international policy were to impede any spontaneous and healthy evolution which may be taking place inside Russia. I have regarded some of the internal manifestations and the apparent change of mood as far more important and significant than what has happened outside. I am anxious that nothing in the presentation of foreign policy by the N.A.T.O. Powers should, as it were, supersede or take the emphasis out of what may be a profound movement of Russian feeling.

We all desire that the Russian people should take the high place in world affairs which is their due without feeling anxiety about their own security. I do not believe

that the immense problem of reconciling the security of Russia with the freedom and safety of Western Europe is insoluble. Indeed, if the United Nations organization had the authority and character for which its creators hoped, it would be solved already.

The Locarno Treaty of 1925 has been in my mind. It was the highest point we reached between the wars. As Chancellor of the Exchequer in those days I was closely acquainted with it. It was based upon the simple provision that if Germany attacked France we should stand with the French, and if France attacked Germany we should stand with the Germans.

The scene to-day, its scale and its factors, is widely different, and yet I have a feeling that the master thought which animated Locarno might well play its part between Germany and Russia in the minds of those whose prime ambition it is to consolidate the peace of Europe as the key to the peace of mankind. Russia has a right to feel assured that as far as human arrangements can run the terrible events of the Hitler invasion will never be repeated, and that Poland will remain a friendly Power and a buffer, though not, I trust, a puppet State.

I venture to read to the House again some words which I wrote exactly eight years ago, 29 April 1945, in a telegram I sent to Mr. Stalin:

There is not much comfort [I said] in looking into a future where you and the countries you dominate, plus the Communist Parties in many other States, are all drawn up on one side, and those who rally to the English-speaking nations and their associates or Dominions are on the other. It is quite obvious that their quarrel would tear the world to pieces, and that all of us leading men on either side who had anything to do with that would be shamed before history. Even embarking on a long period of suspicions, of abuse and counter-abuse, and of opposing policies would be a disaster hampering the great developments of world prosperity for the masses which are attainable only by our trinity. I hope there is no word or phrase in this outpouring of my heart to you which unwittingly gives offence. If so, let me know. But do not, I beg you, my friend Stalin, underrate the divergencies which are opening about matters which you may think are small to us but which are symbolic of the way the English-speaking democracies look at life.

I feel exactly the same about it to-day.

I must make it plain that, in spite of all the uncertainties and confusion in which world affairs are plunged, I believe that a conference on the highest level should take place between the leading Powers without long delay. This conference should not be overhung by a ponderous or rigid agenda, or led into mazes and jungles of technical details, zealously contested by hoards of experts and officials drawn up in vast, cumbrous array. The conference should be confined to the smallest number of Powers and persons possible. It should meet with a measure of informality and a still greater measure of privacy and seclusion. It might well be that no hard-faced agreements would be reached, but there might be a general feeling among those gathered together that they might do something better than tear the human race, including themselves, into bits.

For instance, they might be attracted, as President Eisenhower has shown himself to be, and as *Pravda* does not challenge, by the idea of letting the weary, toiling masses of mankind enter upon the best spell of good fortune, fair play, well-being, leisure, and harmless happiness that has ever been within their reach or even within their dreams.

I only say that this might happen, and I do not see why anyone should be frightened at having a try for it. If there is not at the summit of the nations the will to win the greatest prize and the greatest honour ever offered to mankind, doom-laden responsibility will fall upon those who now possess the power to decide. At the worst the participants in the meeting would have established more intimate contacts. At the best we might have a generation of peace.

I have now finished my survey of the world scene as I see it and as I feel about it to-day. I express my thanks to the House for the great consideration with which I have been treated. I hope I have contributed a few thoughts which may make for peace and help a gentler breeze to blow upon this weary earth. But there is one thing I have to say before I end, and without it all the hopes I have ventured to indulge would be utterly vain. Whatever differences of opinion may be between friends and allies about particular problems or the general scale of values and sense of proportion which we should adopt, there is one fact which stands out overwhelmingly in its simplicity and force. If it is made good every hope is pardonable. If it is not made good all hopes fall together.

This would be the most fatal moment for the free nations to relax their comradeship and preparations. To fail to maintain our defence effort up to the limit of our strength would be to paralyse every beneficial tendency towards peace both in Europe and in Asia. For us to become divided among ourselves because of divergencies of opinion or local interests, or to slacken our combined efforts would be to end for ever such new hope as may have broken upon mankind and lead instead to their general ruin and enslavement. Unity, vigilance, and fidelity are the only foundations upon which hope can live.

“THE CROWN AND PARLIAMENT”

May 27, 1953

*Commonwealth Parliamentary Association Luncheon,
St. Stephen's Hall, Westminster*

In this hall of fame and antiquity, a long story has been unfolded of the conflict of Crown *versus* Parliament, and I suppose we are most of us within a hundred yards of the statue of Oliver Cromwell. But those days are done. The vehement, passionate moral and intellectual forces that clashed in tragic violence three hundred years ago are now united. It is no longer a case of Crown *versus* Parliament, but of Crown *and* Parliament.

In our island, by trial and error, and by perseverance across the centuries, we have found out a very good plan. Here it is. ‘The Queen can do no wrong.’ Bad advisers



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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July 19, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: CPPG Meeting: Soviet Leadership Transition

The attached discussion paper responds to Robert C. McFarlane's memorandum 90499 of July 13, 1982 to Larry Eagleburger in connection with Tuesday's CPPG on the Soviet leadership transition.

L. Paul Bremer, III
L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Discussion paper

cc: OVP - Mrs. Nancy Bearg Dyke
Treasury - Mr. David Pickford
Defense - Colonel John Stanford
OJCS - Major Dennis Stanley
CIA - Mr. Thomas B. Cormack

DECLASSIFIED

NLRRF06-114/10 #11493

BY KML NARA DATE 11/28/11~~TOP SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

*The key to Soviet behavior
lies inside Soviet Union.*

*Petate was an
effort to change
Soviet system
why not change
in the other
direction?*

McFarlane

1. Expand to include what are reasonable
or objectives toward Soviet Union
"NTOD as US-Sov. rel."
2. What other manifestations of collective
relationship we would like to see.
3. What steps we would take
pursuits.

- A. my planned units
- B. internal arrangements
- C. letter from President to successor - hood
statement.
- D. Major speech by President on US-Sov.
relations. - statements?
- E. Treatment of ambassadors with Aug.
no premature ~~statements~~ responses.
- F. Spend envoy?

Drafted:EUR/SOV:GLRueckert
7/19/82, 20821

Cleared:EUR/SOV:TWSimons
EUR:RBurt
P: DJohnson

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7/15
No. 90499
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NSC

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INFORMATION

*July 20th
meeting in
SW. recession*

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~/EYES ONLY

July 13, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE LAWRENCE S. EAGLEBURGER
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

SUBJECT: CPPG Meeting: Soviet Leadership Transition

Crisis pre-planning action to date has focused on the evolving Mid-East and Persian Gulf crises. In both cases the work of the CPPG has been helpful to the Interagency process as these situations developed.

There are significant indications that in the very near future we will be faced with a change of leadership in the Soviet Union. This event could generate the need for considerable coordination among the Government agencies represented on the CPPG. Like the Lebanon and Iran/Iraq situations, the more we are able to accomplish prior to the actual circumstance, the more effective we will be when it occurs.

The CPPG will address the Soviet leadership transition issue at a meeting in the White House Situation Room, tentatively set for Tuesday, July 20. In preparation for the meeting, would you convene on a "close hold" basis an Interdepartmental Group (IG) to develop a general concept plan for dealing with the transition issue. As in the past, the IG should include representatives at the Assistant Secretary (or equivalent) level from the office of the Vice President, the Departments of the Treasury and Defense, the JCS, DCI and NSC staff.

It is requested that the format at Tab A be used, as appropriate, in preparing the paper. Copies should be delivered to CPPG principals by COB Monday, July 19, 1982. CPPG principals will be contacted by Oliver North, NSC Staff, regarding a specific time for the meeting to discuss/decide the paper prepared by the IG.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRRF06-114/10#11498

BY KML NARA DATE 11/28/11

Bue
Robert C. McFarlane
Deputy Assistant to the President
For National Security Affairs

ATTACHMENT:

Tab A Format for Issue Paper

cc: Nancy B. Dyke, V.P. Office
Marc Leland, Treasury
Fred Ikle, Defense
Robert M. Gates, DCIVADM Thomas Bigley, OJCS
Richard Pipes, NSC
Oliver North, NSC~~TOP SECRET~~/EYES ONLY

Review on 7/13/2002

Classified and Extended by W.P.Clark

Reason: NSC 1.13(d)

cy 2 of 8 copies
NSC~~TOP SECRET~~

TAB
A

CPPG ISSUE PAPER (FORMAT)

- SITUATION - (Nature of Potential Crisis)
 - Parties involved.
 - International and Domestic political concerns.

- INTERESTS

- U.S. Interests
 - .. International
 - .. Domestic
- Soviet Interests
 - .. Known
 - .. Surmised
- Key Third Party Interests
 - .. Allied
 - .. Adversaries
 - .. Neutral/Non-Aligned

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FOL-114/10 #11499

BY KHL NARA DATE 11/28/11

- Current U.S. Objectives and Policy/Plans
 - Political
 - Economic
 - Military
 - International Agreements
 - Domestic/Legal Constraints
 - Informational/Media Policy and Plans
- Spectrum of U.S. Options
 - Intelligence Assets Available
 - Political/Diplomatic; Economic; Military Options Available

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Review on 5/21/2002

Classified and Extended by W.P.Clark

Reason: NSC 1.13(d)

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NSC

- .. Potential Impact (Domestic/International)
- .. Likely Effect On
 - ... Local Situation
 - ... Soviets
 - ... Adversaries
 - ... Allies
 - ... Non-Aligned/Neutrals

-- Resources/Assets Available

- .. Political Instruments
- .. Economic Measures
- .. Military Forces
 - ... U.S.
 - ... Allied
- .. Covert Action
 - ... DCI/Military/Third Party
- .. Informational Capabilities (VOA, ICA, etc.)

● For A Recommended Course of Action:

-- Timing Considerations

-- Coordination Requirements

- .. National
- .. International

-- Implications of Decision

- .. Degredation of Operational Capabilities (Military, Intel, Political) Elsewhere
- .. Political Impact
 - ... International
 - ... Domestic
- .. Economic Impact
 - ... Trade
 - ... Cash Flow
- .. Media Asset Coordination
 - ... Black
 - ... White
- .. Security, Requirements
 - ... International
 - ... Domestic
 - ... Coordination
- .. Legislative Coordination Requirements
 - ... Senate Sel. Committee on Intel (SSCI)
 - ... House Perm. Sel. Comm. on Intel (HPSCI)
 - ... Other?

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76
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

TO: Norman Bailey
Jim Rentschler
Richard Pipes ✓

FROM: Henry Nau

Can you meet briefly with me
in my office today at 3:00 or
3:30 p.m. to discuss the
attached paper?

7/20

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

7/20

Henry Han,

Presume Today an
NSSD to task the
SIG-IEP to do this
study. We need a
little more detail than
we have here.

Coordinate with Bailey,
Pipes & Rentschler. John

SECRET

DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SENIOR INTERAGENCY GROUP -
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY

SUBJECT: Tasking for the Senior Interagency Group -
International Economic Policy (SIG-IEP) to Examine
US-European Community (EC) Relations

The SIG-IEP is directed to conduct a full review of US-EC economic relations. It should consider our broad strategy and approach to the conduct of our economic relations with the EC, and include the following specific issues: steel; agriculture; the GATT Ministerial; the US-USSR grain agreement; and the December 29 and June 18 economic sanctions. The SIG-IEP should provide me with a set of options and recommendations by July 29, 1982.

W. R. [Signature] to [Signature] by July 22

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NLRRF06-114/10 #11505

BY CU NARA DATE 1/2/08



7/29 11500 98

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

July 27, 1982

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM TO: NSC - Mr. Richard Pipes
OSD - Mr. Richard Perle
Treasury - Mr. Richard Cornell
Mr. Mark Leland
OJCS - VADM Thomas Bigley
CIA - Mr. Robert Gates
OVP - Mr. Phillip Hughes

FROM: EUR - Richard Burt, Designate

SUBJECT: Meeting of CPPG Working Group on Soviet
Leadership Transition, July 30, 3:30-5:00 P.M.

As suggested at last week's CPPG meeting, I would like to chair a working session of the participants in that meeting to continue the discussion of the Soviet leadership transition. The meeting will be held on Friday, July 30, from 3:30 to 5:00 p.m., in room 6226 of the Department of State.

The purpose of the meeting will be to exchange agency views on the goals the U.S. should pursue in its initial approach to a post-Brezhnev leadership. This discussion will build upon the preliminary agency comments made at the July 20 CPPG Meeting. We will not be circulating any additional papers for the meeting, but participants are urged to provide comments on the paper circulated on July 19.

If the proposed time for the meeting poses a serious problem for any agency, please call Alexander Vershbow in the Office of Soviet Union Affairs (632-8040). Otherwise, I look forward to meeting with you on Friday.

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NLRRF06-114/10 #11500

BY KML NARA DATE 11/28/11

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
RDS-3 7/27/92

79
Drafted:EUR/SOV:AVershbow:rms
7/27/82, ext. 28040 (0367A)

Cleared:EUR/SOV:LCNapper *NA*
EUR/SOV:RECombs, Jr. *NA*
EUR:TMTNiles *T*

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 11, 1982

TO; JUDGE CLARK

FROM: RICHARD PIPES *RP*

SUBJECT: U.S. DELEGATION TO BREZHNEV FUNERAL

It seems to me the delegation should be powerful enough not to cause a visible contrast with other Allied delegations, but not so high-level as to send a wrong signal to Moscow. In particular, it should not include individuals clearly identified with detente or appeasement (as, for example, Averell Harriman, who was directly involved in the Yalta negotiations). My suggested list would be as follows:

Head of Delegation: Vice President George Bush

Members of Delegation:

Secretary of State, George P. Shultz

U.S. Ambassador to USSR, Arthur A. Hartman

Alexander M. Haig, Jr., former Secretary of State

Senator Howard H. Baker, Senate Majority Leader

Congressman Thomas P.O' Neill, Speaker of the House.

PRESERVATION COPY

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/10 #11501

~~TOP SECRET/EYES ONLY~~

BY KML NARA DATE 11/28/11

A G E N D A

CRISIS PRE-PLANNING GROUP
White House Situation Room
Thursday, November 11, 1982
8:00 A.M.

SOVIET LEADERSHIP TRANSITION

Chairman - Robert C. McFarlane

- I. Introduction.....Bud McFarlane
- II. Intelligence Update.....Bob Gates
 - A. Situation in USSR
 - B. Indicators of Military Activities
 - C. Situation in Satellite Countries
 - D. Transition/Succession Situation
- III. Diplomatic Situation.....Bob Blackwill
 - A. Diplomatic Assessment
 - B. Soviet Foreign Policy Activities
 - C. Guidance to U.S. Posts/Missions
- IV. U.S. Military Activities.....Dr. Ikle/Gen Gorman
 - A. Current U.S. Force Dispositions
 - B. Upcoming Activities Near USSR (Exercises/OPS)
- V. Discusisons of Issue Paper Actions.....Bud McFarlane
 - A. Messages/Statements
 - B. Funeral Delegation
- VI. Public Affairs Strategy.....Bud McFarlane
 - A. President's Veteran's Day Speech
 - B. Press Guidance/Statements

~~TOP SECRET/EYES ONLY~~
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

DO NOT REMOVE FROM SITUATION ROOM

Wana
82

(Rohrabacher/BE)
November 10, 1982
6:00 p.m.

PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: VETERANS DAY CEREMONIES
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 11, 1982

Good morning and welcome to the White House. This morning we are honoring an American patriot, Raymond Weeks of Birmingham, Alabama. For more than 50 years, Mr. Weeks has exemplified the finest traditions of American volunteerism by his unselfish service to his country. As director of the National Veterans Day celebration in Birmingham for the past 36 years, Raymond Weeks, a World War II veteran himself, has devoted his life to serving others: his community, the American veteran, and his Nation. He was the driving force behind the congressional action which, in 1954, established this special holiday as a day to honor all American veterans.

It is a pleasure for me to present Mr. Weeks the Presidential Citizens Medal, given to those who have made outstanding contributions to their country. Mr. Weeks, in honoring you we honor the ideals we hope to live up to. Your country is mighty grateful for all you've done.

[PIN MEDAL]
Ray, thank you so much.

It is fitting that we pay tribute to Mr. Weeks on this day when we remember the sacrifices of those who donned this country's uniform, and did their part to protect our freedom and independence. Words alone cannot express our gratitude to these brave men and women who took on the task of protecting our country from foreign threats and aggression.

President Coolidge once said: "The nation which forgets its defenders will be itself forgotten."

Nothing is more important to the soul of America than remembering and honoring those who gave of themselves so we might enjoy the fruits of peace and liberty. That is the spirit of this special day, and of this coming Saturday, when the Nation will dedicate the Vietnam Veterans Memorial -- a tribute long overdue. For too long, America closed its heart to those who served us with valor. It is time Vietnam veterans take their rightful place in our history, along with other American heroes who put their lives on the line for their country. Certainly, mistakes were made, but the reality of Vietnam today -- massive prison camps for torture and political indoctrination, hundreds of thousands of "boat people" sacrificing everything and risking a painful death to flee communist oppression -- all this suggests that the cause for which our Vietnam veterans fought was an honorable one.

This Saturday, America will bury the ingratitude and injustice of the past. We will move forward in the spirit of Abraham Lincoln who, in 1865, said: "Let us strive on to finish the work we are in; to bind up the nation's wounds; to care for him who shall have borne the battle, and for his widow, and his orphan -- to do all which may achieve and cherish a just and lasting peace, among ourselves, and with all nations."

And although we'll be putting the divisiveness of Vietnam behind us, we will not forget those still unaccounted for. Today I renew my pledge to the families of those listed as missing in

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action that this Nation will work unceasingly until full accounting is made. It is our sacred duty. And we will never forget them.

Along with Raymond Weeks, I may be one of the few people in this room who remembers when Veterans Day was called Armistice Day, commemorating the armistice that ended the First World War on the 11th hour of the 11th day of the 11th month in 1918. Armistice Day honored those who gave their lives in "the war to end all wars," a day of hope that they had not given their lives in vain.

But within a few years, and in spite of an impressive effort on the part of the Western democracies to limit arms and to outlaw war, aggressors rearmed and war came again. Ironically, Armistice Day was made a legal holiday in the United States in 1938, just one year before a second and more terrible conflagration swept across Europe.

Winston Churchill labeled it "the unnecessary war" because, he said, "There never was a war more easy to stop." And no man had more right to say that than Winston Churchill. He had fought the illusions that led to war; pleaded with his countrymen to recognize and arm against the expanding totalitarian war machines; pleaded with his countrymen to be strong and to have courage -- not because he wanted war, but because this was the only way to preserve peace. Yet for all this, Churchill was castigated as a warmonger.

Even after war broke out in Asia and in Europe, our own country was slow to take the steps necessary to defend itself.

Warning us of the impending crisis, a young Harvard student, John Fitzgerald Kennedy, wrote a book titled "Why England Slept." His thoughtful study holds as true now, 42 years later, as when it was first published. After describing how a dictatorship, with a controlled press and the power to silence political opposition, can carry on a vigorous arms program, he noted:

"In contrast, in a democracy the cry of 'war-monger' will discourage any politician who advocates a vigorous arms policy. This leaves armaments with few supporters."

Among the reasons for England's failure to rearm in time, Kennedy wrote: "Probably the most important . . . was a firm and widely held conviction that armaments were one of the primary causes of war." The Western democracies did not wake up till it was too late. It took Pearl Harbor to shake Americans from their complacency.

Today, in this era of much more dangerous weapons, it is even more important to remember that vigilance, not complacency, is the key to peace.

America needs courage and wisdom to meet the totalitarian challenge of the 1980's. If there is one service we can render on this Veterans Day to all who gave their lives for America, it is to remember this most fundamental truth: Strength, not weakness, maintains tranquility between nations, because once totalitarian powers achieve domination, peace depends on the goodwill of tyrants.

This Administration is committed to rebuilding our national defenses which were permitted to erode during the last decade.

The purpose of our program is not belligerency but respect; not conflict but deterrence; not war but peace. Those angry voices in the Soviet Union who are trying to frighten the American people know full well the United States has no desire to fight anyone. We demonstrated our goodwill during the last decade when we voluntarily cut back military spending in constant dollars by almost a third. We signed a strategic arms limitation agreement. We unilaterally postponed or cancelled many new weapons systems, leaving our troops with arms designed in the early 1960's, and our airmen in bombers often older than the pilots flying them.

Those who truly desire peace, and I put everyone in our Administration in that category, must ask themselves: Did the so-called era of detente make the world safer? Did it make conflict less likely? The answer, unfortunately, is: NO.

While we reduced our defense budget, the Soviets conducted one of the heaviest peacetime military buildups in the history of mankind, nearly doubling their military spending over the past 15 years. And while we substantially decreased the military's share of our country's spending, the Soviets continued to expand, until today the Kremlin's military takes 12 to 14 percent of their gross national product, two to three times the level of ours. With an economy two-thirds the size of our own, the Soviets produce, dollar for dollar, 50 percent more for defense than we do.

We can no longer afford to delay the rebuilding of our defensive capabilities if we are to maintain a credible deterrent. The danger of overwhelming Soviet military might is

Page 6

clear. They've demonstrated a willingness to project their power in Afghanistan, in Eastern Europe, in Africa and in Central America. Even while killing Afghani villagers, directing the repression of free trade unions in Poland and arming, through Cuba, guerrillas in Central America, they charge as rude or bellicose anyone who points out their transgressions.

Well, the United States of America will not be afraid to speak out or to protect its vital interests. But let me repeat: our goal is a stable balance of forces, a mutual reduction of nuclear weapons, and peace between the Soviet Union, the United States and all nations. The Soviets should recognize this, and negotiate with us in good faith.

Let the Soviets understand as well that we will never shirk from a peaceful competition of ideas. Perhaps this is the most dangerous threat to those who stand atop Lenin's tomb -- a threat because they know their system cannot tolerate the power of free discussion; their ideology is helpless unless backed by terror. But this competition should -- and must -- take place in a world at peace.

On this day of honor to American veterans, we have no need to impress the world with an awesome display of our military might. Our parades are a celebration of freedom, our banner is Old Glory, and we hold her high and proud. This is the legacy of the brave men and women we honor today.

Let us go forth together, having learned the lessons of history, and resolved not to permit another, in Churchill's words, "unnecessary war."

On this Veterans Day we will remain firm in our commitment to peace. Those who died in defense of our freedom will not have died in vain.

89

State election "direct under group to cardinali"
penetration et. + SIG/IG for 1000 or version.

Letter from Schultz to Key asked group members on
cardinals. North At. Council in Dallas Key
Mechanism for entry.

DECLASSIFIED/RE/ASED

NLRR FOL 714/10 #11502

BY CU NARA DATE 1/2/08

70
if Andropov becomes Party leader unknown way
become Prime Minister

Andropov not reformist, repressive. Resp. for
Mysla. Approves Gorbachev.

12 members.

Politburo - secret. no, no others.

Producers K. G. Gorbachev, Chernenko, Gorbachev, Andropov,

Chernenko int. Party appl. - no econ. management
« from after.

1. Main task will be to create appearance of calm & control.
2. US should not try to appear to take advantage of Soviet uncertainty & instability - find message we will respond positively & test their attitude. Resist promises for gestures to make immediate improvements in bilateral relations.
3. SU - unlikely drastic changes at once.
4. This may take private initiatives, press us to discuss.

Make clear we deal with USSR as country not with leaders.
Community in future etc.

Remember: UP rather than P - not too high.

Soviets may place limited power on what internally. No military move for us. Careful in doing anything that may appear menacing.

Ophelia

1. Influence mission - completely decided. but do so by staying high. ~~for~~
2. Position of diplomats to deal in agenda.
3. No military - no.

Presidential statements.

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POSSIBLE MEMBERS,
U.S. DELEGATION TO
BREZHNEV FUNERAL

✓ Head of Delegation: Vice President George Bush

Members of Delegation:

✓ Secretary of State George P. Shultz

✓ US Ambassador to USSR Arthur A. Hartman

~~W. Averell Harriman---respected senior figure from World War II period, former Ambassador to USSR, last met with Brezhnev in December of 1978.~~

General Maxwell Taylor---no direct USSR tie, but also symbol of earlier allied cooperation during World War II.

John Eisenhower or Milton Eisenhower, same qualifications as Taylor.

~~The Honorable William Verity---ARMCO head, Chairman, US-USSR Trade and Economic Council, represents desire for continuing limited economic and commercial relations.~~

~~David Rockefeller---Chairman, Board of Directors, Chase-Manhattan Bank, frequent visitor to USSR.~~

Frank Press---President, National Academy of Sciences, visited USSR in 1978.

William W. Scranton---Chairman, Parallel Studies Program with the Soviet Union, United Nations Association, former U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN.

Alexander M. Haig, Jr.---former Secretary of State.

Cyrus Vance---former Secretary of State.

Henry A. Kissinger---former Secretary of State.

William P. Rogers---former Secretary of State.

Dean Rusk---former Secretary of State.

Thomas Watson---former Ambassador to the USSR.

Malcolm Toon---former Ambassador to the USSR.

- 2 -

Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.---former Ambassador to the USSR.

- (R) Senator Howard H. Baker---Senate Majority Leader, has visited USSR.
- (D) Senator Robert Byrd---Senate Minority Leader, major visit to USSR in 1979.
- (R) Senator Charles H. Percy---Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, major visit to USSR in 1981, met with Brezhnev, Gromyko, Ustinov.
- (D) Congressman Clement J. Zablocki---Chairman, House Foreign Affairs Committee.
- (R) Senator Richard G. Lugar---Chairman of European Subcommittee, Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
- (D) Congressman Lee H. Hamilton---Chairman, European/Middle East Subcommittee of House Foreign Affairs Committee.
- (D) Senator Claiborne Pell---Senate Foreign Relations Committee, ranking minority member.
- (R) Congressman William S. Broomfield---House Foreign Affairs Committee.
- (D) Congressman Thomas P. O'Neill---Speaker of the House.
- (R) Congressman Robert Michel---House Minority Leader.

(0093A)
(Rev. 8/31/82)

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From Secretary Shultz to Gromyko

Please accept my condolences on the death of President Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev. I can appreciate your sense of loss at the death of a colleague who played such a leading role in your nation and in relations between our two nations. We hope to continue efforts to improve these relations in the future, and I look forward to working with you toward this end.

Sincerely yours,

George Shultz

(1207M)

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From President Reagan to Kuznetsov

Please accept my condolences on the death of President Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev. ~~President Brezhnev was one of the world's most influential leaders for nearly two decades.~~ May I ask you to convey our sympathies to the President's family.

~~I would also like to convey through you to the Soviet Government and people the strong desire of the United States to work toward an improved relationship with the Soviet Union.~~ I look forward to conducting relations with the new leadership in the Soviet Union with the aim of expanding the areas where our two nations can cooperate to mutual advantage.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

(1207M)

DECLASSIFIED /RE/ (CASE)
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CRS NARA, Date 8/6/02

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Statement by the White House Press Spokesman

The President has expressed his personal condolences to Mr. Kuznetsov, First Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., on the death of Soviet President Brezhnev. A high-level delegation will represent President Reagan at the memorial ceremonies in Moscow.

As leader of the Soviet Union for nearly two decades, President Brezhnev was one of the world's most influential figures. President Brezhnev played a very significant role in the shaping of U.S.-Soviet relations during his presidency.

~~President Reagan has conveyed to the Soviet Government the strong desire of the United States to continue to work for an improved relationship with the Soviet Union and to maintain an active dialogue between our societies on all important issues.~~ The President looks forward to a constructive relationship with the new leadership of the Soviet Union.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET/SENSITIVE

November 4, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD E. PIPES

FROM: OLIVER L. NORTH

SUBJECT: CPPG Paper on Soviet Transition

Tom Simons has called re the attached. I have not, as yet, been able to connect with him by return call.

Believe he may want to have a CPPG meeting to dust this off. If you agree that we need a CPPG, please so inform and I will take the appropriate action.

Attachment

Department of State Memorandum

SECRET/SENSITIVE
Declassify on: OADR

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NLRR FOI - 114/10 # 11504
BY CU NARA DATE 1/2/08