And we owe you much. And we must continue to learn from each other, and help each other.

Yes, we have so much to be thankful for -- peace, prosperity and freedom. But if we are to assure that these values are preserved for our children and theirs, we must accept the mandate to summon the same vision which inspired Churchill, Adenauer and DeGaulle.

Today, I would like to share with you my vision -- my confidence -- as to how that mandate can be fulfilled. How shall we keep the peace and introduce greater stability in a world which allows our values to prosper?

Let us first try to learn from our experience when we were most successful in building democratic values and economic prosperity in our societies. While the world has witnessed great turmoil in the past 40 years, one fact stands out: for at least 25 years -- the period from 1950 to 1975 -- we were able to contain the expansion of the Soviet Union and deter both nuclear and conventional aggression against the West.

Now scholars may cite many reasons why this happened, but Soviet altruism is usually not among them. To me, it seems fundamental that the Soviet Union has had a solid respect for the sort of countervailing strength which makes adventurism futile and dangerous. Consider the situation in Iran after World War II, or that in Cuba in 1962, or other occasions when the West was willing to take a stand and possessed the might, unity and resolve to resist encroachment. So when we look to the future we must never forget that, at bottom, it is our collective strength, including adequate military force, which deters aggression. To

act as if this were not true would be frivolous and irresponsible.

In fact, it was the loss of the West's superior strategic power which proves the point. For when rough strategic parity was reached a decade or so ago, a very fundamental change occured in Soviet behavior. There was no increase in the likelihood of nuclear conflict, and the probability of such conflict is not likely to increase in the forseeable future. No, the problem was not nuclear war, but a pattern of increased risk-taking by the Soviet Union once it was no longer inferior in strategic power. At first, these were cautious risks, such as using surrogate Cuban forces in Angola.

But when the West proved unable to respond, the Soviet authorities accelerated their efforts. Soviet officers, even general officers, were sent to Ethiopia, as South Yemen was brought under Soviet sway. They backed the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea. Then, still meeting no effective Western resistance, they were encouraged to use their own forces in Afghanistan. And since 1979, we in the United States have watched the way they exploited a revolution in Nicaragua to create yet another surrogate, and supplied it with military power much greater than that of its neighbors.

Some might conclude that these experiences suggest that our fundamental security problem could be solved by a return to Western strategic superiority. And this may be true in theory -- but only in theory. For it seems to me that it would be unwise -- in fact, irresponsible -- for the West to seek its security solely in an inexorable program of building offensive weapons

with the aim of regaining strategic superiority over the Soviet Union. We must find better, safer paths to our security, paths fully consistent with the values we are determined to defend.

In the short term, of course -- say the next decade or two -- we have no choice but to make sure that our strategic forces are adequate to deter aggression and political blackmail. For the United States this means that we must maintain modern, ready strategic systems in each leg of the triad of land, air and sea-based forces, just as Britain and France must insure the modernization of their independent nuclear forces. Given the leadership and popular understanding of this issue in all three countries, I am confident that we will maintain a stable nuclear deterrence throughout the next generation.

If we look further into the future, however, there are grounds for concern. For the fact is that the sort of offensive nuclear attack systems now in development in the USSR cannot help but threaten future stability. I am thinking in particular about Soviet testing of highly accurate, mobile intercontentinal ballistic missiles with multiple, independently-targeted nuclear warheads. If the Soviets go forward to develop and deploy such systems, they could alter fundamentally the balance of offensive weapons on which strategic deterrence has rested. For it will be impossible to verify with precision the number and location of such weapons.

How can we solve the dilemma this prospect creates? Speaking theoretically, I see three possibilities.

The first would be to conclude a fair and verifiable agreement with the Soviet Union to reduce offensive weapons

drastically and preclude the development of destabilizing systems such as heavy, MIRVed, land-based missiles. We shall surely press that case in Geneva. But thus far, we have heard nothing new from the Soviet side, despite our forthcoming and flexible posture.

A second possibility would be for the West to keep building offensive systems, and in fact to step up our current modernization effort to keep up with constantly accelerating Soviet deployments. I am not speaking here of regaining superiority, but merely of keeping up with the relentless growth of Soviet deployments. But is this really an acceptable alternative? It seems to me that it is likely to be both politically uncertain over the long term, and also militarily questionable. Even if this course could be sustained by the West, it would produce a less stable strategic balance than the one we have today. We need a better guarantee of peace than that.

Fortunately, there is a third possibility. That is, to develop a defense against an overwhelming Soviet advantage in destabilizing offensive weapons -- an advantage which we could face a decade from now. It was this consideration which lay behind my Strategic Defense Initiative. To be blunt, it is a matter of pure military necessity; I see no other way to counter mobile, mirved, highly accurate strategic weapons. I believe that modern technology can produce non-nuclear means to defeat weapons of mass destruction. Research on such technologies will take time and it will be for my successors to reach decisions

with our Allies as to whether such systems are both feasible and desirable.

For now, we must sustain a prudent research program. Not that we are alone in investigating the potential of defensive technologies. The Soviet authorities have long recognized the value of defensive arms and have invested heavily in them for more than twenty years. In fact, their investment in defensive systems matches their gigantic investment in offensive weapons.

As we in the United States proceed with our prudent research program, we will be careful to comply with all existing treaty constraints. We will also consult in the closest possible fashion with our Allies. And, when the time comes -- if and when systems which would enhance stability can be identified -- we must surely discuss and negotiate with the Soviet Union regarding their introduction. We have no notion of unilateral deployment which might undermine stability. The whole point of our research effort is to find the means of maintaining a stable and safe deterrence. This will remain central in our judgments, just as we will always keep in mind the inextricable link of North American and European security.

At the conventional level there is also much to be done to assure effective deterrence under NATO strategy. Here again, I am optimistic that our technological edge will enable us to continue to avoid any kind of war in Europe. In fact, new types of conventional arms are at hand which will greatly strengthen the capacity of defenders to discourage any thought of a military attack by others. The West is far ahead in this area.

In sum, there is every basis for confidence that the West can keep the peace in the future by maintaining an effective military deterrence. But surely we can aspire to more than maintaining a state of highly armed truce in international politics.

We in the United States have always thought so. During the 1970's we went to great lengths to maintain a unilateral restraint in our strategic weapons programs and in our broader discourse with the Soviet Union. We hoped that the Soviet Union would emulate this restraint and refrain from seeking one-sided advantages. We even codified such "rules of conduct" in a Declaration signed in 1972.

But our hopes were shattered in dozens of places, from Angola to Nicaragua. And in its military building programs, the Soviet Union wilfully departed from any semblance of balance. Through all of this we in the West hoped against hope that something would change. But while we did nothing to counter Soviet expansionism, nothing did change, and today we still see over 100,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan.

There were, of course, other relevant factors in the 1970's. In the United States, our energies were sapped by internal struggles of immense proportion which made all but impossible effective reaction to Soviet adventurism. And in the wake of Vietnam, we had lost the political strength to maintain a sound military balance.

The question before us today is whether we have learned from the mistakes of the past and can undertake a serious relationship with the Soviet Union, a relationship based <u>both</u> on stable

military deterrence and efforts to reduce tensions to the greatest degree possible.

Surely we have no illusions that convergence of the two systems is likely. It is not, now or for the foreseeable future. We are in for an extended period of competition. In that competition of ideas it is up to us in the West to step up to the question of whether or not we can make available the resources, ideas, examples and assistance programs to compete with the Soviet Union in the Third World. We have much in our favor, not least the experience of many of those states which have tried Marxism and are looking for our help in shaping an alternative. We see one such case in Mozambique.

I am sure we will be up to the task. For the reality is that we do not aspire to impose our system on anyone, nor do we profess to have pat answers for all the world's ills. But our ideals of freedom and democracy stir hearts everywhere. Our economic systems have proven their ability to meet the needs of our people, while our adversaries have rewarded the enforced sacrifice and suffering of their people with economic stagnation, the dead and corrupt hand of state and party bureaucracy, and ultimately an inability to satisfy either material or spiritial needs.

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We in the West have much to be thankful for -- peace, prosperity and freedom. If we are to preserve these for our children, and for theirs, today's leaders must demonstrate the same resolve and sense of vision which inspired Churchill, De Gasperi Adenauer, and DeGaulle. Their challenge was to rebuild a democratic Europe under the ~~threat~~ shadow of Soviet power. Our task, in some ways even more daunting, is to keep the peace with an ever more powerful Soviet Union, to introduce greater stability in our relationship with it, and to coexist in a world in which our values can prosper.

The leaders and people of postwar Europe had learned the lessons of their history from the failure of their predecessors. They learned that aggression feeds on appeasement, and that weakness itself can be provocative. We, for our part, can learn from the success of ~~this~~ our predecessors. We know ~~generation~~ that both conflict and aggression can be deterred, and that democratic nations are capable of the resolve, the sacrifices and the consistency of policy needed to sustain such deterrence.

From the creation of NATO in 1949 through the early 1970's, Soviet power was effectively deterred and Soviet ambitions effectively limited. The strength of Western economies, the vitality of our societies, the wisdom of our diplomacy, all contributed to such restraint; but certainly

the decisive factor must have been the countervailing power -- ultimately military and above all nuclear power -- which the West was capable of bringing to bear in the defense of its interests.

It was in the early 1970's that the United States lost that superiority over the Soviet Union in strategic nuclear weapons which had characterized the ~~entire~~ postwar era. In Europe the effect of this loss was not quickly perceptible. But seen globally, Soviet conduct changed markedly, and dangerously. First in Angola in 1975, then, when the West failed to respond, in Ethiopia, in South Yemen, in Kampuchea and ultimately in Afghanistan, the Soviet Union began courting more risks, and expanding its influence through the indirect and direct application of Soviet military power. Today we see similar Soviet efforts to profit from and stimulate regional conflicts in Central America.

The ineffectual Western response to ~~the~~ Soviet adventurism of the late 1970's had many roots, not least in the crisis of self-confidence within the American body politic wrought by the Viet-Nam experience. But just as Soviet decision making in the earlier postwar era had taken place against the background of overwhelming American strategic power, so the decisions of ~~this era~~ the late 1970's were taken in Moscow, as in Washington and throughout Europe, against the background of growing Soviet and stagnating Western nuclear strength.

One might draw the conclusion from the events of ~~the last decade~~ that the West should reassert that nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union upon which our security and our strategy rested ~~in~~ through the postwar era. That is not my view. I am certain that we cannot and should not seek to build our peace and freedom perpetually upon the basis of expanding nuclear arsenals.

In the short run we have no alternative but to compete with the Soviet Union in this field, not in the pursuit of superiority, but merely of balance. It is thus essential that the United States maintain a modern and survivable nuclear capability in each leg of ~~its~~ the strategic triad -- sea, land and air based. It is similarly important that France and Britain maintain and modernize their strategic capabilities. In all these countries, our publics appreciate the need for nuclear deterrence, and will support its sustenance.

The Soviet Union, however, has not been content to sustain, either through arms control or unilateral choice, a stable nuclear balance. It has chosen instead to build nuclear forces clearly designed to preempt their opponent in the event of conflict, to strike first, and thus to disarm their adversary. ~~They are beginning to deploy~~ the Soviet Union is now moving toward deployment of new mobile MIRVed missiles which have these capabilities, plus the ability to avoid detection, monitoring, or arms control verification. ~~Such a force structure undermines deterrence.~~ In taking these various steps the Soviet Union is undermining stability and the basis for mutual deterrence

One can imagine several possible ~~approaches to the solution to this problem~~ responses to the continued Soviet build up of nuclear forces. On the one hand we can ask the Soviet Union to reduce its offensive systems and to deal, through arms control measures, with the particular problems posed by ~~this~~ the new ~~MIRVed~~ mobile ICBM. ~~And~~ We shall surely press that case in Geneva. Thus far, however, notwithstanding our own imaginative and flexible ideas in those talks, we have heard nothing new from the other side.

A second possibility, as I have mentioned, is for us in the West to build offensive systems. In the short term there is no alternative to doing so. But there is a third, longer term possibility, which is to offset the continued Soviet offensive build-up in destabilizing weapons by developing defenses against these weapons. It is to investigate this possibility that I launched in 1983 a new research program -- the Strategic Defense Initiative. The state of modern technology may soon make possible for the first time the ability to use non-nuclear systems to defeat ballistic missiles. ~~And while~~ It will take time, and will be for my successors to reach decisions with our Allies as to the desirability and feasibility of deployment, It is essential now that a prudent research program be sustained. The Soviets themselves have long recognized the value of defensive systems and have invested heavily. Indeed, they have spent as much on defensive systems as they have on offensive systems for more than 20 years.

As we proceed with this ~~prudent~~ research program, we will remain within existing treaty constraints. We will also consult in the closest possible fashion with our Allies. And when the time for decisions on the possible production and deployment of such systems comes, we must ~~surely~~ and will discuss and negotiate these issues with the Soviet Union. We, for our part, have no ~~notion~~ intention of unilateral deployment.

Both for the short and long term I am confident that the West can maintain effective military deterrence. This is the fundamental requirement in East-West relations. But surely we can aspire to more than maintaining a state of higly armed truce in international politics. We in the United States have thought so. During the 1970's we went to considerable length ~~at unilateral~~ to unilaterally restrain ~~in~~ our strategic weapons programs ~~and in our broader discourse~~ out of the conviction that the Soviet Union would adhere to certain rules in its conduct.-- rules such as neither side seeking to gain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other. Those efforts of the early 1970's resulted in some improvements in Europe, the Berlin Quadripartite Agreement being the best example. But the hopes for a broader and lasting moderation ~~of~~ the East-West competition foundered in Angola, Ethiopia, Afghanistan and Nicaragua.

The question before us today is whether we have learned from those mistakes and can undertake a serious relationship with the Soviet Union based upon stable military deterrence and the reduction of tensions in other areas. I believe we can. I believe we have learned that successful cooperation with the Soviet Union must be accompanied by successful competition in areas -- particularly Third World areas -- where the Soviets are not yet prepared to act with restraint. I believe we have learned the importance of conducting our trade with the Soviet Union within the broader framework of our security interests, avoiding decisive dependence upon Soviet energy sources, curtaining preferential credit arrangements, and bringing our regulations in restraint of trade in militarily relevant goods and technologies up to date. I believe that we can confront the Soviet Union with greater success, more permanent success than we have in the past.

~~The question before us today is whether we have learned from those mistakes and can undertake a serious relationship with the Soviet Union based upon stable military deterrence and the reduction of tensions in other areas.~~ It is in this belief that I have directed the Secretary of State to engage with the Soviet Union on an extended agenda of problem solving, ~~with the Russians.~~ In this effort we have focussed our effort into four areas. These are: arms control, regional problems, bilateral areas and human rights. The Secretary will be meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko on this agenda next week in Vienna and we hope for a serious Soviet effort to make progress.

Yet even as we embark upon new efforts to sustain a productive dialgue with the Soviet Union, we are reminded of the obstacles imposed by our so fundamentally different concepts of humanity, of human rights, of the value of a human life. The murder of Major Nicholson by a Soviet soldier in East Germany, and the Soviet Union's obdurate refusal to accept responsibility for this act is only the latest reminder.

And we owe you much. And we must continue to learn from each other, and help each other.

But now, after the Economic Miracle, after decades of prosperity, now I am told that Europe is changing somehow. I hear words like "Europessimism" and "Europaralysis." I am told that Europe seems to have lost the sense of confidence that dominated that postwar era. I cannot believe this is so--but if there is something of a "lost" quality these days, I suspect it is connected to the fact that some [redacted], in the past few years, have begun to question the ideals and philosophies that have guided the West for centuries. Some [redacted] have even come to question the moral and intellectual worth of the West.

I wish to speak, in part, to that questioning today. And there is no better place to do it than Strasbourg--where Goethe studied, where Pasteur taught, where Hugo first knew ~~for~~ inspiration. This has been a lucky city for questioning and finding valid answers. It is also a city for which some of us feel a very sweet affection. You know that our statue of Liberty was a gift from France, and its sculptor, F.A. Bartholdi, was a son of France. I don't know if you have ever studied the face of the Statue, but immigrants entering New York Harbor used to strain to see it, as if it would tell them something about their new world. It is a strong, kind face; it is the face of Bartholdi's mother; and she was a woman of Alsace. And so, among the many things we

Americans thank you for, we thank you for her.

I believe that some of the doubts about the West are directly connected to the performance of the West's economies. Five years ago it was fashionable to say "the U.S. economy is finished." And now some are saying it of Europe. In the past few years, Europe's dynamism has slowed somewhat. And I believe we can agree on some reasons for this-- and some solutions.

I believe that we in the West --all of us, to varying degrees--have been so preoccupied with providing economic security that we have inadvertently engaged in policies that have reduced economic opportunity. We know that those policies are: massive growth in public expenditure, both in volume and as a percentage of GNP-- and a bias against entrepreneurship. The last is the key problem, I believe, because a bias against entrepreneurship is a bias against individual freedom-- and where there is no freedom, prosperity perishes.

Have we forgotten some bracing truths? Freedom of economic action--from freedom of invention to freedom of investment, is the one system designed by man that succeeds in raising up the poor. When men and women are encouraged and allowed to start their own businesses, and create wealth and jobs, they not only add to the sum total of happiness in their communities-- they add to the sum total of economic energy in their country, and sum total of economic strength in the West.

All of us in the West should honor the entrepreneur for his-- and her-- contributions to the common good, the common welfare. To invest one's time and money in an enterprise is a profoundly faithful act, for it is a declaration of faith in the future. Entrepreneurs take risks that benefit us all-- and they deserve rewards.

I believe that all of us are at a unique time in the world's history in that we both know what to do and have the means to do it. Shouldn't all economic policies be rigorously judged by their effects on economic growth? Isn't there a great deal we can do-- and do together--to strengthen incentives and remove the impediments to growth? We can lower tax rates on our people, to let them enjoy more fruits of their labor. We an work to restrain the spending of our governments. We can eliminate regulatory burdens and reduce tariff barriers. I do not pretend that America is necessarily an economic model for others. But I can tell you that we have seen great growth from efforts-- growth which has given new life to investment in smaller high-tech firms, which, themselves, become vessels for change, opportunity, and progress.

My friends, pro-growth policies in one country enhance the economic well-being of all the world's citizens, for when we increase the supply and the demand for goods and services in one country, all the markets of the world are enhanced. And I

believe we must realize that if our young people feel powerless, part of the solution is returning to them a chance at economic power.

Europe's economic growth will be accelerated by further development of European unity. Tomorrow will mark the 35th anniversary of of the European Coal and Steel Community, the first block in the creation of a united Europe. The purpose was to tie French and German -- and European- industrial production so tightly together that war between them "becomes not merely unthinkable but materially impossible." Those are the words of Robert Schumann; the Coal and Steel Community was the child of his genius. And if he were here today I believe he would say: We have only just begun!

I am here to tell you America remains, as she was 40 years ago, dedicated to the unity of Europe. We continue to see a strong and unified Europe not as a rival but as an even stronger partner. Indeed, John F. Kennedy, in his ringing "Declaration of Interdependence" in Philadelphia 23 years ago, explicitly stated this objective as a key tenet of post-war American policy, a policy which foresaw the New World and the old as twin pillars of a large democratic community. We Americans still see European unity as a vital force in that historic process. We favor the expansion of the European Community; we welcome the entrance of Spain and Portugal into that Community, for their presence makes for a stronger Europe, and a stronger Europe is a stronger West.

The economic summit we have just concluded in Bonn has reaffirmed once again the importance of Western economic cooperation. Such cooperation is itself a crucial component of Western security, for without a sound structure to which all Western countries contribute, we cannot hope to maintain indefinitely the common defense. For that reason I welcome the impetus achieved in Bonn a few days ago for a new round of multilateral trade negotiations beginning next year; stops aimed at liberalizing trade and reducing protectionist pressures are building blocks which can't help but erect the twin pillars of transatlantic cooperation John Kennedy's vision embraced more than two decades ago.

If reality is on the side of economic freedom, morality is surely on the side of democracy. But I wonder, too, if all of us still have complete faith in this fact. It seems to me the dilemma is both political and perceptual. Forty years ago, we in the West knew what our adversary was. But some of us in the West today seem confused about what is right and what is wrong, what is a decent system and what is not, which philosophies should be resisted by man and which encouraged.

This terrible moral confusion is reflected even in our language. Some speak of "East-West" tensions as if the West and the East were equally responsible for the threat to world peace today. Some speak of "the Superpowers" as if they are moral

equals--two huge predators composed in equal parts of virtue and of vice. Some speak of the "senseless spiral of the arms race" as if the West and the East are equally consumed by the ambition to dominate the world. Some speak as if the world were morally neutral-- when in our hearts, most of us know it is not.

Let us look at the world as it is. There is a destabilizing force in the world--and it is not the democracies of the West. There is a counterforce possessing enormous military power that has as its stated objective the replacement of Western democracy by a worldwide communist system.

The central cause of the tension of our time is the conflict between democracy and authoritarianism. The evidence of this is all around us, all around you. One is is free, democratic, and peace-loving; the other is subjugated to repression and fear. America shares with the peoples of these countries a vision of a political order in which respect for human rights and democratic ideals become the norm; a vision of the adoption of a new economic system that brings economic growth and prosperity for all the people, not just for the expansive military-industrial complex.

Let me make it clear here that we do not seek to destablilze or undermine any government, nor do we deny any nation's legitimate interest in security. But we do assert that we share the basic aspirations of all of the peoples of Europe--freedom,

prosperity and peace. When families are divided , and people not allowed to maintain normal human and cultural contacts, this creates international tension. Only in a system in which all feel secure, and sovereign, can there be a lasting and secure peace.

For this reason we support and will encourage all movement toward the social, humanitarian and democratic ideals shared in Europe. While we have no intention of challenging political boundaries, we cannot accept any dividing line between repression and freedom. And, we can solve the problem, like others, by peaceful means. The Helsinki process can be instrumental in achieving the peaceful reconciliation of these differences--but we have to recognize that the heart of the Helsinki agreement is the commitment to openness and human rights.

Let us not forget the human cost of the artificial division of Europe--the families split apart, the once-free individuals turned into tools of the State, the scarcity and want -- the whole litany of limits. Let us not forget the sadness that followed the end of the Prague Spring, the death of the democratic yearnings that followed the invasion of Hungary, the oppression of the Solidarity movement in Poland. Let us not forget that while those in the West dissatisfied with current policies demonstrate openly, the human rights monitors of the Helsinki Agreement languish in jails, Gulags, or psychiatric hospitals.

In 1961, in Berlin, a city half free and half communist, 30,000 people a week were fleeing from one side to the other. I would ask the young people of Europe: which side were these people fleeing from, and why? And which regime had to build a wall and imprison the people so they would not flee.

Over the past decade, we have witnessed a massive and sustained military build-up by the Soviet Union. There is no justification for this build-up -- and the Soviets know it. In 1979, we in the NATO countries were forced to deploy a limited number of longer-range I.N.F. missiles to offset the Soviet build-up of SS-20 missiles -- a build-up that had led to an enormous and widening military imbalance which threatened the peace. It was not an easy decision and it was not made without political cost. Many of the leaders of Europe were as brave as the great leaders of World War II in resisting pressures to keep NATO from redressing the balance. And on this day I thank them.

When the Soviets left the negotiating table it was said this would usher in a new Ice Age. But we in the West were patient and united--and in time the Soviets returned to the table. Now new talks have begun in Geneva, and we are hopeful that they will yield fair and verifiable agreements that could lead to significant reductions in the size of their nuclear arsenal and ours.

We will meet with the Soviet Union in good faith. We pray

that the Soviets will adopt the same attitude. We will make it clear, as we have in the past, that the United States continues to have peaceful intentions--and only peaceful intentions--toward the Soviet Union.

We do not go to the bargaining table expecting the Soviets to suddenly change their system of their intentions in a magnanimous gesture of good will. But we hope to encourage the Soviets to see that it is in their own interests to stop trying to achieve a destabilizing superiority over the West--for the cost of their effort is great, and we will not allow it to succeed.

We must stay united and firm in defense of our precious values, values won at such sacrifice by earlier generations and by members ours. But we must also remember another profound truth. That is, in this nuclear age, we can do so only if we preserve the peace. Preserving the peace and defending democracy must be integral parts of the same effort.

The United States is conducting a steady, sustained effort to engage the USSR in realistic negotiations with the aim of solving problems in the relationship, reducing tension, and lowering the high levels of offensive nuclear weapons. But tensions can be lowered only if both sides are prepared for fair, reciprocal, verifiable agreements. The United States is ready for such agreements and will not be deterred from making every feasible effort to obtain them.

The United States seeks no unilateral advantages, but at the same time it will not permit the Soviet Union to gain any. We do not seek to undermine or change the Soviet system, but we will resist attempts to use force against us or our allies.

In arms control the single most important objective we should seek today is the lowering of the unacceptable level of offensive nuclear weapons. Drastic reductions of these weapons would create a more stable strategic environment, and that is our primary goal in the Geneva negotiations. We are pleased that the Soviet government has accepted this objective, the reduction of nuclear weapons and their eventual elimination.

But let me pause for a moment and ask you to look beyond the often esoteric doctrines of nuclear strategy and the anti-humanist, even horrible ideas implied in such terms as Mutual Assured Destruction. Can we not imagine a future free from the catastrophic terror or warfare? Do we, the leaders of this generation, not have the awesome responsibility to provide something better, something safer for our children and our children's children? Should we not use the gifts of our technological genius to seek a world in which generations need not rely on ever greater, ever more frightening arsenals of death? That is the simple yet compelling idea behind our present strategic research, no more, and certainly no less: the practical quest for a community no longer menaced by the dark and

pervasive shadow of nuclear aggression. Such a quest remains part of the unfinished business of genuine peace, the peace which began 40 years ago when the guns in Europe were finally stilled.

There is one area of defense that I want to speak about today because it is misunderstood by some of our friends. Ever since the Soviet Union came into possession of the secrets of nuclear technology, we in the west have had no choice but to rely upon the threat of nuclear retaliation in order to deter war. Deterrence on this basis has worked for 40 years now, and for the foreseeable future, it will remain the foundation of our common security. But we have hoped for a better way. I believe we may find it in emerging technologies aimed at enhancing deterrence through defensive means-- non-nuclear means. The United States has begun to investigate the feasibility of these new technologies in a broad-based research program we call the Strategic Defense initiative-- or SDI.

This research program is an ambitious undertaking, and we cannot yet say which technologies will prove feasible. With it comes the possibility that we may one day be able to rely far less on the threat of nuclear retaliation to keep the peace, and to increase our dependence on non-nuclear means which threaten no one.

Can the potential benefits of these technologies be any clearer? Certainly not to the Soviets, for they are doing the

same kind of research. And we do not fear this-- we welcome it.

This research is not an attempt to achieve nuclear superiority-- it is an attempt to achieve greater security. This research is not an attempt to abrogate existing arms control treaties-- it is being carried out in full compliance with such treaties. SDI is not destabilizing -- in fact, as the Soviets have long pursued such research, it would be destabilizing if the West did not. The results of the research will not "decouple" America from Europe-- if it bears fruit, it will enhance the security system that will protect all of the West.

We all want peace; we all want to protect the world. But we have a better chance of preserving the peace if we in the West see the world as it is and deal honestly with its hard realities.

There are those in the West who call for disarmament, a thoroughly laudable and understandable desire. But I think it important to point out that some people forget it is true arms control we desire-- and not just signing ceremonies. If we really care about arms control, we must care about compliance in arms control agreements. I think it is important that all of us show interest in this manner, for arms control means nothing unless both sides comply.

We have much to do-- and we must do it together. We must

remember anew that the road to peace does not run through Munich. We must remain unified in the face of attempts to divide us. We must remain strong in spite of attempts to weaken us. And we must remember that our unity and our strength are not a mere impulse of like-minded allies, not a mere geopolitical calculation. Our unity is the natural result of our shared love for liberty.

I am here today to reaffirm to the people of Europe the constancy of the American purpose. We were at your side through two great wars; we have been at your side through 40 years of a sometimes painful peace; and we are at your side today. It is not mere sentiment that dictates this, though sentiment we feel. We are here because, like you, we have not veered from the ideals of the West -- the ideals of freedom, liberty, and peace. Let no one -- no one -- doubt our purpose.

We must together, and today, agree on what we want for Europe. Forty years after WWII we must declare what we want the Europe of 40 years from now to be. And I will tell you: we want it to be united and we want it to be free.

The United States is committed not only to the security of Europe--we are committed to the recreation of a larger and more genuinely European Europe. The United States is committed not only to a partnership with Europe-- the United States is committed to an end to the division of Europe. I tell you

nothing is so written in the history of man on Earth as this: Europe will be restored.

I will tell you of the Parliament of Europe I hope an American President will address 40 years from now. This room will hardly be big enough for all the delegates form all the lost countries. Here, the boisterous Polish delegation, there the delegation from Hungary debating the finer points of freedom, there the Czechs and the Bulgarians.

A Europe restored will make for a more peaceful world; and God knows it will make for a happier one. And this is not a dream; we can make it into reality, if we work together with commitment and trust and patience.

All of us in this room want to preserve and protect our own democratic liberties -- but don't we have a responsibility to encourage democracy throughout the world? And not because democracy is "our" form of government but because we have learned that democracy is, in the last analysis, the only peaceful form of government. It is, in fact, the greatest Conflict Resolution Mechanism ever devised by man.

Democracy is the forced submission of rulers to the peaceful desires of the people. And only in an atmosphere of democracy can man peacefully resolve his differences through the ballot, through a free press, through free speech and free political parties and the right to redress injustice.

More and more of the countries of the world are turning to democracy--turning each day, turning at great price, turning with great effort. In the past 10 years alone _____countries that did not know political freedom, for whatever reason, have become democratic.

It is freedom that is new again, democracy that is the new idea; and we know why because their newness is eternal. All the other systems -- all the isms -- reek with feebleness and age.

As we seek to encourage democracy, we must remember that each country must struggle for democracy within its own culture; emerging democracies have special problems and require special help. Nearly 3 years ago in Westminster, I spoke of the need for democratic governments to come together and spread the democratic word throughout the world. Soon after, the Council of Europe brought together delegates from four continents, and I congratulate these European Members of Parliament for what is now known as the "Strasbourg Initiative."

But I believe we need more. I believe we need a formal community to which nations can look for help as they try to strengthen their institutions. I believe we should begin a democratic forum in which practical training, moral encouragement and financial support can be given to pro-democratic political, labor, business and civic organizations. I believe we must help

those who strive to improve living conditions in countries with a high level of poverty. Whether this forum is begun here in Strasbourg, or elsewhere, let us begin. And let us use as our byword a simple phrase-- but one that carries within if all the best of our past and the promise of our future: Freedom Works!

And as we work, we will remember those who have for now, but only for now, lost out on the long fight for freedom.

The force of the democratic ideal does not stop short because there are arbitrary borders, some with barbed wires and control towers. Here in Western Europe, you have created a Europe for yourselves in which there is a free flow of people, of information, of goods and of culture. It is the natural bent of all Europeans to move freely in all directions. sharing and partaking of each other's ideas and culture. It is my hope, our hope, that in the 21st century-- which is only 15 years away-- all Europeans, from Moscow to Lisbon can travel without a passport and the free flow of people and ideas will include the other half of Europe. It is my fervent wish that in the next century there will once again be one, free Europe.

There are those who say the West lacks energy -- the moral and spiritual energy to carry forth these hopes and plans. But that it not true.. As Churchill said, "we have not come this far becasue we are made of sugar candy."

I do not believe those who say the people of Europe are these days paralyzed and pessimistic. But if this is so, then all I can say as an objective friend who has observed you for over 40 years is: Europe, beloved Europe, you are greater than you know. You are the treasury of centuries of Western thought and Western culture, you are the father of Western ideals and the mother of Western faith.

Europe, you have been the power and the glory of the West, and you are a moral success. In fact, in the horrors after World War II, when you rejected totalitarianism, when you rejected the lure of new "Superman," and a "New Communist Man," you proved that you were -- and are -- a moral triumph.

You are a Europe without illusions, a Europe firmly grounded in the ideals and traditions that made her greatness, a Europe unbound and unfettered by communism or fascism. You are, today, a New Europe on the brink of a new century -- a democratic continent with much to be proud of.

We have much to do. The work ahead is not unlike the building of great cathedral. The work is slow, complicated, and painstaking. It is passed on with pride from generation to generation. It is the work not only of leaders but of ordinary people. The cathedral evolves as it is created, with each generation adding its own vision -- but the initial spark of vision remains constant, and the faith that drives the vision

persists. The results may be slow to see, but our children and their children will trace in the air the emerging arches and spires and know the faith and dedication and love that produced them. My friends, Europe is the Cathedral, and it is illuminated still.

And if you doubt your will, and your spirit, and your strength to stand for something, think of those people 40 years ago -- who wept in the rubble, who laughed in the streets, who paraded across Europe, who cheered Churchill with love and devotion, and who sang the "Marseillaise" down the boulevards. May I tell you: spirit like that does not disappear; it cannot perish; it will not go away. There's too much left unsung within it.

Thank you, all of you for your graciousness on this great day. Thank you, and God bless you all.

Jack Matlock 83

NOTE FROM: ROBERT MCFARLANE
SUBJECT: Insert to speech
Rosie please print out the following memo to Ben Elliott

MEMORANDUM FOR BEN ELLIOTT

FROM: BUD MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: REVISIONS TO STRASBOURG SPEECH

SUBJECT: REVISIONS TO STRASBOURG SPEECH

Ben this memo forwards revisions to the 2:00pm Saturday version of the Strasbourg speech. That draft is satisfactory up to the middle of page 6 at which point the following text commences. The prose can be substantially improved. The substance must stay as it is.

Yes we have so much to be thankful for--Peace, prosperity and freedom. Our mandate is to summon the same vision which inspired Churchill, Adenauer and DeGaulle to assure that these goals are preserved for our children and theirs. Today I would like to share with you my vision--my confidence--as to how that mandate can be fulfilled. How shall we keep the peace with the Sovi Union, introduce greater stability into our relationships with her and coexi in a world in which our values can prosper?

It seems to me that the beginning of wisdom is to induce lessons from th successful periods we have known in the past. While the world has known grea turmoil in the past 40 years it is not trivial that for ast least 25 years--the period from 1950 -1975 we were able to contain the expansion of t Soviet Union and deter either nuclear or conventional military aggression by her against the west. It is useful to consider why that was so. Scholars

assert may reasons but none of them include Soviet altruism. For my part it seems fundamental that the Soviet Union has had a solid respect for opposing force whether one consider the situation in Iran after the War or in Cuba in 1962 or other confrontations in which the West was willing to take a stand and disposed of superior might and resolve. Other factors surely contributed to this extended period of deterrence--allied cohesion, the quality of our diplomacy, the strength of our economies. But as we look to the future it seems to me fundamental that it was, at bottom, our collective power--foremostly our military power that deterred andsto believe otherwise is frivilous.

Indeed it was the loss of superior strategic power which proved the point. For when that condition--of approximate strategic parity--was reached approximately ten years ago, a very fundamental change occured in Soviet behavior. It did not involve any increase in the likelihood of nuclear conflict, nor is this probability likely to increase in the foreseeable future. Instead the Soviet Union's greater willingness to take risks, now that it was no longer inferior in strategic power was manifested fairly cautiously through the use of surrogate Cuban forces in Angola. Absent any apparent ability for the West to respond, they accelerated their effort, using Soviet

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ability for the West to respond, they accelerated their effort, using Soviet Generals in Ethiopia. Later they moved into South Yemen, supported Vietnam's takeover in Kampuchea and finally, absent any signal of western resolve, they were encouraged to use their own forces in Afghanistan. Since 1979 we in the US have watched their steady buildup of their surrogate Nicaragua's strength with all that implies for the rest of Central America.

The implication of my remarks thus far is that a return to superior strategic power would solve all our problems. While in many respects that might be true, it seems to me fundamental that to rely solely on an inexorable program of offensive building is irresponsible and unwise. In the short term--for at least the next 10-15 years--there is no choice. It is essential that we in the US maintain modern ready strategic nuclear forces in each leg of the triad just as it is essential that the UK and France assure the modernization of their own independent nuclear forces. And given the leadership and popular understanding of the issue in both those countries there is every basis for confidence that we can maintain stable nuclear deterrence throughout the next generation. But there is reaons for us all to be concerned over the kind of forces now in development in the USSR and here I speak in particular about their testing of MIRVed, highly accurate, mobile ICBMs. If the Soviets go forward with deployment of these systems--given the

difficulty of verifying the number and location of them--they will have altered fundamentally the offensive balance on which strategic deterrence has rested. One can imagine the theoretical possibility of the west simply adding more to its own offensive arsenal in an effort to keep up. But in truth, that is politically unlikely just as it is militarily uncertain.

One can imagine several possible approaches to the solution to this problem. On the one hand we can ask the Soviet Union to reduce its offensive systems to include this new mirvd mobile ICBM. And we shall surely press that case in Geneva. Thus far, however, notwithstanding our own rather imaginative and flexible ideas, we have heard nothing new from the other side.

A second possibility as I have mentioned is for us in the West to keep building offensive systems. And in the short term there is no alternative to doing so.

But there is a thirde possibility which is to compensate for the overwhelming Soviet advantage by developing a defense against it. It was this motive which inspired my strategic defense initiative. That is, it was a matter of pure

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inspired my strategic defense initiative. That is, it was a matter of pure military necessity--we don't see any other way to counter mobile mirved systems. But it is more than that. We believe that the state of modern technology will soon make possible for the first time, the ability to use non-nuclear systems to defeat ballitic missiles. And while it iwll take time and be for my successors to reach decision with our allies as to the desirability and feasibility of deployment, it is essential that a prudent research program be sustained. Indeed the Soviets have long recognized the value of defensive systems and have invested heavily--as much as they ahve in offensive systems for more than 20 years. And if we do, it is not beyond the realm of imagination that 20 years hence our children will be thanking us for setting in motion the elimination of nuclear weapons, for as surely as cheaper non-nuclear defense makes possible their defeat, their value and utility will decline and real reductions will become intrinsically logical.

As we proceed with this prudent program, we will remain within existing treaty constraints. We will also consult in the closest possible fashion with our allies. And when the time comes, we must surely discuss and negotiate these systems with the Soviet Union. Surely we have no notion of unilateral deployment which would present obvious problems for stability.

The point of this effort is to maintain stable deterrence. We can and we shall do so, always keeping in mind the inextricable link of the United States and European security. That will not change.

Similarly at the conventioan level, there is much to be done to assure effective deterrence under NATO strategy 14/3. But here again, I am optimistic that our technological edge will enable us to do so. Indeed systems are at hand which will truly revolutionize certain kinds of warfare and the west is far ahead in their development.

In short, there is every basis for confidence that the west can maintain effective military deterrence. This is the fundamental requirement in East-West relations. But surely we can aspire to more than maintaining a state of highly armed truce in international politics. We in the United States have thought so. During the 1970's we went to considerable length at unilateral restraint in our strategic weapons programs and in our broader discourse out of conviction that the Soviet Union would adhere to certain rules in it s conduct. Rules such as neither side seeking to gain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other--as I have said, that premise was shatered in dozens

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E01

the expense of the other--as I have said, that premise was shatered in dozens of places from Angola to Nicaragua. Similarly in its military building programs it has willfully departed from any semblance of balance. Through all of this we in the west hoped against hope without doing anything about it, that something would change--but in the end, there was no change--only 100,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan. To be fair there were factors I have ignored, which were essential if we were to hold up the western side of of the bargain, and we did not. In the US our energies were sapped by internal struggles of immense proportion which made all but impossible effective reaction to Soviet adventurism. And in the wake of Vietnam, we had lost the political strength to maintain the military balance.

The question before us today is whether we have learned from those mistakes and can undertake a serious relationship with the Soviet Union based upon stable military deterrence and the reduction of tensions in other areas. I believe we can. And it is in this belief that I have directed the Secretary of State to engasge with the Soviet Union on an extended agenda of problem solving with the Russians. In this effort we have focussed our effort into four areas. These are: arms control, regional problems, bilateral areas and human rights. The Secretary will be meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko on this agenda next week in Vienna and we hope for a serious Soviet effort to make progress.

E N D  O F  N O T E

LOOK AT THE NOTE

NOTE FROM: ROBERT MCFARLANE
SUBJECT: Speech Insert Continued

Surely we have no illusions that convergence of the two systems is likely. It is not, now or for the foreseeable future. We are in for an extended period of competition. In that competition of ideas it is up to us in the West to step up to the question of whether nor not we can make available the resources, ideas, examples and assitance programs to truly compete with the Soviet Union in the Third World. We have much in our favor, not least the experience of many of those states which have tried marxism for twenty years and are looking for our hlep in shaping an alternative. Mozambique is such a case. Will we be up to it.

As we enter this competition we will do so in close cooperation with our allies and friends. This is no question of US-Soviet condominium--what a stupid thought. It is annoying that it even comes up occasionally in European lexicon.

ctionAnd over time we will surely succeed in some areas--those where the Soviets see the greatest self interest. This will inlcude non-strategic trade. And we are ready for this but I stress non-strategic. We in the west went farin 1983 to codify the threshold of self interest when we agreed to avoid excessive dependence on Soviet sources for our natural gas and other energy requirement, when we agreed to cease preferential credit arrangements with them and when we agreed to establish a viable COCOM threshold that all could support. We must maintain and improve these safeguards so that within them we can all have the confidence to conduct a sensible trading relationship with the Soviet Union without our own friends being suspicious. We are ready for such a relationship. Indeed Secretary Baldridge will lead the US-delegation to the Joint US-Soviet trade council later this month.

On the bilatera agenda there is much we can do beyond trade. But I must say that before we do so there is an outstanding problem before us. It concerns the brutal murder of Major Nicholson. Here is an oportunity for us to test Soviet good will and integrity. And today I would like to propose a number of specific actions which we could all take which oculd foreclose a repetition of this brutal act. (Enter Rick Burt's proposal).

And in the area of arms control we are prepared for truly significant reductions. US negotiators will return to Geneva prepared to discuss specific balanced outcomes in both the START and INF areas as they were in the openins session. We hope the Soviet Union will enter with the same attitude.

E N D  O F  N O T E

NSC
April 29, 1985
1430 hrs

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: TO EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
STRASBOURG, FRANCE
WEDNESDAY, MAY 8, 1985

Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. It is an honor to be with you on this day.

We mark today the anniversary of the liberation of Europe from tyrants who had seized this continent and plunged it into a terrible war. Forty years ago today, the guns were stilled and peace began -- a peace that has endured to become the longest of this century.

On this day 40 years ago, they swarmed onto the boulevards of Paris, rallied under the Arc de Triomphe, and sang the "Marseillaise" in the free and open air. In Rome, the sound of church bells filled St. Peter's square and echoed through the city. On this day 40 years ago, Winston Churchill walked out onto a balcony in Whitehall and said to the people of Britain, "this is your victory" -- and the crowd yelled back, "no, it is yours," in an unforgettable moment of love and gratitude. Londoners tore the blackout curtains from their windows, and put floodlights on the great symbols of English history. And for the first time in six years Big Ben, Buckingham Palace, and St.

Paul's Cathedral were illuminated against the sky.

Across the ocean, a half million New Yorkers flooded Times Square and, being Americans, laughed and posed for the cameras. In Washington, our new president, Harry Truman, called reporters into his office and said, "the flags of freedom fly all over Europe."

On day 40 years ago, I was at my post at the Army Air Corps installation in Culver City, California. And as I passed a radio I heard the words, "ladies and gentlemen, the war in Europe is over," and like so many people that day I felt a chill, as if a gust of cold wind had just swept past, and even though, for America there was still a war on the Pacific Front- I realized: I will never forget this moment.

This day can't help but be emotional, for in it we feel the long tug of memory; we are reminded of shared joy and shared pain and the terrible poignance of life. A few weeks ago in California an old soldier touched on this. With tears in his eyes he said, "it was such a different world then. It's almost impossible to describe it to someone who wasn't there but, when they finally turned the lights on in the cities again, it was like being reborn."

If it is hard to communicate the happiness of those days, it is even harder to remember Europe's agony.

So much of it lay in ruins. Whole cities had been destroyed. Children played in the rubble and begged for food.

By this day 40 years ago, 40 million lay dead, and the survivors composed a continent of victims. And to this day, we wonder: how did this happen? How did civilization take such a terrible turn? After all the books and the documentaries, after all the histories, and studies, we still wonder: how?

Hannah Arendt spoke of "the banality of evil" -- the banality of the little men who did the terrible deeds. We know what they were: totalitarians who used the state, which they had elevated to the level of "God," to inflict war on peaceful nations and genocide on innocent peoples.

We know of the existence of evil in the human heart, and we know that in Nazi Germany that evil was institutionalized -- given power and direction by the state, by a corrupt regime and the ~~jack-boots~~ those who did its bidding. And we know, we learned, that early attempts to placate the totalitarians did not save us from war. In fact, they guaranteed it. There are lessons to be learned in this and never forgotten.

But there is a lesson too in another thing we saw in those days: perhaps we can call it "the commonness of virtue." The common men and women who somehow dug greatness from within their souls-- the people who sang to the children during the blitz, who joined the resistance and said 'No' to tyranny, the people who hid the Jews and the dissidents, the people who became, for a moment, the repositories of all the courage of the West -- from a child named Anne Frank to a hero named Raoul Wallenberg.

These names shine. They give us heart forever. And the glow from their beings, the glow of their memories, lit Europe in her darkest days.

Who can forget the days after the war? They were hard days, yes, but we can't help but look back and think: life was so vivid then. There was the sense of purpose, the joy of shared effort, and, later, the incredible joy of our triumph. Those were the days when the West rolled up its sleeves and repaired the damage that had been done. Those were the days when Europe rose in glory from the ruins.

Old enemies were reconciled with the European family. Together, America and Europe created and put into place the Marshall Plan to rebuild from the rubble. Together we created

the Atlantic Alliance, an alliance which proceeded not from transient interests of state but from shared ideals. Together we created the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, a defense system aimed at seeing that the kind of tyrants who had tormented Europe would never torment her again. NATO was a triumph of organization and effort, but it was also something new, very different. For NATO derived its strength directly from the moral values of the people it represented. It was infused with their high ideals, their love of liberty, their commitment to peace.

But perhaps the greatest triumph of all was not in the realm of a sound defense or material achievement. No, the greatest triumph of Europe after the war is that in spite of all the chaos, poverty, sickness, and misfortune that plagued this continent --in spite of all that, the people of Europe resisted the call of new tyrants and the lure of their seductive ideologies. Europe did not become the breeding ground for new extremist philosophies. Europe resisted the totalitarian temptation. Instead, the people of Europe embraced democracy, the strongest dream, the dream the fascists could not kill. They chose freedom.

Today we celebrate the leaders who led the way-- Churchill and Monnet, Adenauer and Schuman, de Gasperi and Spaak, Truman and Marshall. And we celebrate, too, the free political parties

that contributed their share to greatness: the Liberals and the Christian Democrats, the Social Democrats and Labour and the Conservatives. Together they tugged at the same oar, and the great and mighty ship of Europe moved on.

If any doubt their success, let them look at you. In this room are they who fought on opposite sides 40 years ago, and their sons and daughters. Now you govern together and lead Europe democratically. You buried animosity and hatred in the rubble. There is no greater testament to reconciliation and to the peaceful unity of Europe than the men and women in this room.

In the decades after the war, Europe knew great growth and power. You enjoyed amazing vitality in every area of life, from fine arts to fashion, from manufacturing to science to the world of ideas. Europe was robust and alive, and none of this was an accident. It was the natural result of freedom, the natural fruit of the democratic ideal. We in America looked at Europe and called her what she was: an Economic Miracle.

And we could hardly be surprised. When we Americans think about our European heritage we tend to think of your cultural influences, and the rich ethnic heritage you gave us. But the industrial revolution that transformed the American economy came from Europe. The financing of the railroads we used to settle

the West came from Europe. The guiding intellectual lights of our democratic system--Locke and Montesquieu, Hume and Adam Smith--came from Europe. And the geniuses who ushered in the modern industrial-technological age came from--well, I think you know, but two examples will suffice. Alexander Graham Bell, whose great invention maddened every American parent whose child insists on phoning his European pen pal rather than writing to him--was a Scotsman. And Guglielmo Marconi, who invented the radio--thereby providing a living for a young man from Dixon, Illinois, who later went into politics-- I guess I should explain that's me--now you know it's Marconi's fault--Marconi was born, as you know in Italy.

Tomorrow will mark the 35th anniversary of of the European Coal and Steel Community, the first block in the creation of a united Europe. The purpose was to tie French and German -- and European- industrial production so tightly together that war between them "becomes not merely unthinkable but materially impossible." Those are the words of Robert Schuman; the Coal and Steel Community was the child of his genius. And if he were here today I believe he would say: We have only just begun!

I am here to tell you America remains, as she was 40 years ago, dedicated to the unity of Europe. We continue to see a strong and unified Europe not as a rival but as an even stronger

partner. Indeed, John F. Kennedy, in his ringing "Declaration of Interdependence" in the freedom bell city of Philadelphia 23 years ago, explicitly positioned this objective among the key tenets of post-war American policy, a policy which foresaw the New World and the Old as twin pillars of a larger democratic community. We Americans still see European unity as a vital force in that historic process. We favor the expansion of the European Community; we welcome the entrance of Spain and Portugal into that Community, for their presence makes for a stronger Europe, and a stronger Europe is a stronger West.

Yet despite Europe's Economic Miracle which brought so much prosperity to so many, despite the visionary ideas of John Kennedy and the European leaders who preceded him, despite the enlargement of democracy's frontiers within the European community itself, I am told that a more doubting mood is upon Europe today. I hear words like "Europessimism" and "Europaralysis." I am told that Europe seems to have lost the sense of confidence that dominated that postwar era. I cannot believe this is so--but if there is something of a "lost" quality these days, I suspect it is connected to the fact that some, in the past few years, have begun to question the ideals and philosophies that have guided the West for centuries. Some have even come to question the moral and intellectual worth of the West.

I wish to speak, in part, to that questioning today. And there is no better place to do it than Strasbourg--where Goethe studied, where Pasteur taught, where Hugo first knew inspiration. This has been a lucky city for questioning and finding valid answers. It is also a city for which some of us feel a very sweet affection. You know that our statue of Liberty was a gift from France, and its sculptor, F.A. Bartholdi, was a son of France. I don't know if you have ever studied the face of the Statue, but immigrants entering New York Harbor used to strain to see it, as if it would tell them something about their new world. It is a strong, kind face; it is the face of Bartholdi's mother; and she was a woman of Alsace. And so, among the many things we Americans thank you for, we thank you for her.

The Statue of Liberty - made in Europe, erected in America - helps remind us not only of the past ties but present realities. ~~It is to those realities.~~ It is to those realities we must look in order to dispel whatever doubts may exist about the course of history and the place of free men and women within it. The fact of the matter is, we live in a complex, dangerous, divided world, yet a world which can provide all of the good things we require, spiritual and material, if we but have the confidence and courage to face history's challenge.

Some of the doubts about the West are directly connected to the performance of the West's economies, others relate to our relationship with the USSR and others relate to our resolve to meet international commitments to support the democratic way of life.

We in the West have much to be thankful for -- peace, prosperity and freedom. If we are to preserve these for our children, and for theirs, today's leaders must demonstrate the same resolve and sense of vision which inspired Churchill, Adenauer, DeGasperi and DeGaulle. Their challenge was to rebuild a democratic Europe under the shadow of Soviet power. Our task, in some ways even more daunting, is to keep the peace with an evermore powerful Soviet Union, to introduce greater stability in our relationship with it, and to coexist in a world in which our values can prosper.

The leaders and people of postwar Europe had learned the lessons of their history from the failures of their predecessors. They learned that aggression feeds on appeasement and that weakness itself can be provocative. We, for our part, can learn from the success of our predecessors. We know that both conflict and aggression can be deterred, that that democratic nations are capable of the resolve, the sacrifices and the consistency of policy needed to sustain such deterrence.

From the creation of NATO in 1949 through the early 1970's, Soviet power was effectively deterred and Soviet ambitions effectively limited. The strength of Western economies, the vitality of our societies, the wisdom of our diplomacy, all contributed to such restraint; but certainly the decisive factor must have been the countervailing power -- ultimately, military, and above all, nuclear power -- which the West was capable of bringing to bear in the defense of its interests.

It was in the early 1970's that the United States lost that superiority over the Soviet Union in strategic nuclear weapons which had characterized the postwar era. In Europe, the effect of this loss was not quickly perceptible. But seen globally, Soviet conduct changed markedly and dangerously. First in Angola in 1975, then, when the West failed to respond, in Ethiopia, in South Yemen, in Kampuchea and ultimately in Afghanistan, the Soviet Union began courting more risks, and expanding its influence through the indirect and direct application of Soviet military power. Today, we see similar Soviet efforts to profit from and stimulate regional conflicts in Central America.

The ineffectual Western response to Soviet adventurism of the late 1970's had many roots, not least in the crisis of self-confidence within the American body politic wrought by the

Vietnam experience. But just as Soviet decision-making in the earlier postwar era had taken place against the background of overwhelming American strategic power, so the decisions of the late 1970's were taken in Moscow, as in Washington and throughout Europe, against the background of growing Soviet and stagnating Western nuclear strength.

One might draw the conclusion from these events that the West should reassert that nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union upon which our security and our strategy rested through the postwar era. That is not my view. I am certain that we cannot and should not seek to build our peace and freedom perpetually upon the basis of expanding nuclear arsenals.

In the short run, we have no alternative but to compete with the Soviet Union in this field, not in the pursuit of superiority, but merely of balance. It is thus essential that the United States maintain a modern and survivable nuclear capability in each leg of the strategic triad -- sea, land and air based. It is similarly important that France and Britain maintain and modernize their strategic capabilities. In all these countries, our publics appreciate the need for nuclear deterrence, and will support its sustenance.

The Soviet Union, however, has not been content to sustain,

either through arms control or unilateral choice, a stable nuclear balance. It has chosen, instead, to build nuclear forces clearly designed to preempt their opponent in the event of conflict, to strike first, and thus to disarm their adversary. The Soviet Union is now moving toward deployment of new mobile MIRVed missiles which have these capabilities, plus the ability to avoid detection, monitoring, or arms control verification. In taking these various steps, the Soviet Union is undermining stability and the basis for mutual deterrence.

One can imagine several possible responses to the continued Soviet build-up of nuclear forces. On the one hand, we can ask the Soviet Union to reduce its offensive systems and to deal, through arms control measures, with the particular problems posed by its mobile ICBM. We shall surely press that case in Geneva. Thus far, however, notwithstanding our own imaginative and flexible ideas in those talks, we have heard nothing new from the other side.

A second possibility would be for the West to keep bulding offensive systems, and in fact to step up our current modernization effort to keep up with constatly accelerating Soviet deployments. I am not speaking here of regaining superiority, but merely of keeping up with the relentless growth of Soviet deployments. But is this really an acceptable

alternative? It seems to me that it is likely to be both politically uncertain over the long term, and also militarily questionable. Even if this course could be sustained by the West, it would produce a less stable strategic balance than the one we have today. We need a better guarantee of peace than that.

Fortunately, there is a third possiblity, in the long-term. That is to offset the continued Soviet offensive build-up in destabilizing weapons by developing defenses against these weapons. It is to investigate this possibility that in 1983 I launched a new research program -- the Strategic Defense Initiative.

The state of modern technology may soon make possible for the first time the ability to use non-nuclear systems to defeat ballistic missiles. It will take time, and will be for my successors to reach decisions with our Allies as to the desirability and feasibility of deployment. It is essential now that a prudent research program be sustained. The Soviets themselves have long recognized the value of defensive systems and have invested heavily. Indeed, they have spent as much on defensive systems as they have on offensive systems for more than 20 years.

As we proceed with this research program, we will remain within existing treaty constraints. We will also consult in the closest possible fashion with our Allies. And when the time for decisions on the possible production and deployment of such systems comes, we must and will discuss and negotiate these issues with the Soviet Union. We, for our part, have no intention of unilateral deployment.

Both for the short and long term I am confident that the West can maintain effective military deterrence. This is the fundamental requirement in East-West relations. But surely we can aspire to more than maintaining a state of highly armed truce in international politics.

We in the U.S. have thought so. During the 1970's we went to great lengths to restrain unilaterally our strategic weapons programs out of the conviction that the Soviet Union would adhere to certain rules in its conduct--rules such as neither side seeking to gain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other. Those efforts of the early 1970's resulted in some improvements in Europe, the Berlin Quadripartite Agreement being the best example. But the hopes for a broader and lasting moderation of the East-West competition foundered in Angola, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, and Nicaragua.

The question before us today is whether we have learned from those mistakes and can undertake a serious relationship with the Soviet Union based upon stable military deterrence and the reduction of tensions in other areas. I believe we can. I believe we have learned that successful cooperation with the Soviet Union must be accompanied by successful competition in areas-- particularly Third World areas--where the Soviets are not yet prepared to act with restraint. I believe we have learned the importance of conducting our trade with the Soviet Union within the broader framework of our security interests, avoiding decisive dependence upon Soviet energy sources, curtailing preferential credit arrangements, and bringing our regulations in restraint of strategic trade in military relevant goods and technologies up to date.

These are the reflexions which have molded our policy toward the Soviet Union. That policy embodies the following basic elements:

--While we maintain a stable deterrence to preserve the peace, the United States will make a steady, sustained effort to reduce tensions and solve problems in its relations with the Soviet Union.

--The United States is prepared to conclude fair, reciprocal, verifiable agreements for arms reduction, above all with regard

to offensive nuclear weapons.

--The United States seeks no unilateral advantages, and of course can accept none on the Soviet side.

--The United States will insist upon compliance with past agreements both for their own sake and to strengthen confidence in the possibility of future accords.

--The United States will proceed in full consultation with its allies, recognizing that our fates are intertwined and we must act in unity.

--The United States does not seek to undermine or change the Soviet system nor to impinge upon the security of the Soviet Union. At the same time it will resist attempts by the Soviet Union to use or threaten force against others, or to impose its system on others by force.

Ultimately, I hope the leaders of the Soviet Union will come to understand that they have nothing to gain from attempts to achieve military superiority or to spread their dominance by force, but have much to gain from joining the West in mutual arms reduction and expanding cooperation ~~with the West~~.

It is in this belief that I have directed the Secretary of State to engage with the Soviet Union on an extended agenda of problem solving ~~with the Russians~~.

Yet even as we embark upon new efforts to sustain a productive dialogue with the Soviet Union, we are reminded of the obstacles imposed by our so fundamentally different concepts of humanity, of human rights, of the value of a human life. The murder of Major Nicholson by a Soviet soldier in East Germany, and the Soviet Union's refusal to accept responsibility for this act is only the latest reminder.

If we are to succeed in reducing East-West tensions, we must find means to ensure against the thoughtless and arbitrary use of lethal force in the future--whether against individuals like Major Nichlson, or against whole groups, such as the passengers on a jumbo jet.

Therefore, I propose that the United States and the Soviet Union take three bold practical steps:

First, I propose that the United States and the Soviet Union make a regular practice of exchanaging observers at military exercises and locations. We now follow this practice with many other nations, to the equal benefit of all parties.

Second, as I believe it is desirable for the two leaders of America and the Soviet Union to meet and tackle problems, I am also convinced that the military leaders of our nations could

benefit from this type of contact. One of the most durable and successful ventures in US-Soviet relations has been the annual meetings of our two navies. These reviews have let our naval professionals gain an appreciation of each other's concerns and develop a pattern of solving problems. I therefore proposed that we institute regular, high-level contacts between the military leaders of our two countries, to develop better understanding and to prevent potential tragedies from occuring.

As a third step, I urge that the Conference on Disarmament in Europe act promptly and conclude agreement on the concrete confidence-building measures proposed by the NATO countries. As I have said previously, the US is prepared to agree to new commitments on non-use of force in the context of Soviet agreement to concrete confidence-building measures.

These proposals are certainly not cure-alls for our current problems, and will not in themselves compensate for the deaths which have occured. But as terrible as past events have been, it would be more tragic if we were to make no attempt to prevent even larger tragedies from occuring through lack of contact and communication.

We have much to do -- and we must do it together. We must remember anew that the road to peace does not run through Munich.

We must remain unified in the face of attempts to divide us. We must remain strong in spite of attempts to weaken us. And we must remember that our unity and our strength are not a mere impulse of like-minded allies, not a mere geopolitical calculation. Our unity is the natural result of our shared love for liberty.

Surely we have no illusions that convergence of the two systems is likely. It is not, now or for the foreseeable future. We are in for an extended period of competition. In that competion of ideas it is up to us in the West to step up to the question of whether or not we can make available the resources, ideas, examples and assistance programs to compete with the Soviet Union in the Third World. We have much in our favor, not least the experience of many of those states which have tried Marxism and are looking for our help in shaping an alternative. We see one such case in Mozambique.

I am sure we will be up to the task. For the reality is that we do not aspire to impose our system on anyone, nor do we profess to have pat answers for all the world's ills. But our ideals of freedom and democracy stir hearts everywhere. Our economic systems have proven their ability to meet the needs of our people, while our adversaries have rewarded the enforced sacrifice of their people with economic stagnation, the dead and

corrupt hand of state and party beuracracy, and ultimately an inability to satisfy either material or spiritual needs.

I am here today to reaffirm to the people of Europe the constancy of the American purpose. We were at your side through two great wars; we have been at your side through 40 years of a sometimes painful peace; and we are at your side today. It is not mere sentiment that dictates this, though sentiment we feel. We are here because, like you, we have not veered from the ideals of the West -- the ideals of freedom, liberty, and peace. Let no one -- no one -- doubt our purpose.

The United States is committed not only to the security of Europe--we are committed to the recreation of a larger and more genuinely European Europe. The United States is committed not only to a partnership with Europe-- the United States is committed to an end to the artificial division of Europe.

Let me make it clear here that we do not seek to destabilize or undermine any government, nor do we deny any nations legitimate interests in security. But we do assert that we share the basic aspirations of all of the peoples of Europe--freedom, prosperity and peace. When families are divided, and people are not allowed to maintain normal human and cultural contacts, this creates international tension. Only in a system in which all

feel secure, and sovereign, can there be a lasting and secure peace.

For this reason we support and will encourage all movement toward the social, humanitarian, and democratic ideals shared in Europe. The question is not one of state boundaries, but of insuring the right of all nations to conduct their affairs as their peoples desire. The problem of a divided Europe, like others, must be solved by peaceful means. Let us rededicate ourselves to pressing for the full implementation of the Helsinki Final Act in all its aspects.

All of us in this room want to preserve and protect our own democratic liberties -- but don't we also have a responsibility to encourage democracy throughout the world? Only in an atmosphere of democracy can man peacefully resolve his differences through the ballot, through a free press, through free speech and free political parties and the right to redress injustice.

More and more of the countries of the world are turning to democracy--turning each day, turning at great price, turning with great effort. In the past 10 years alone _____countries that did not know political freedom, for whatever reason, have become democratic. As we seek to encourage democracy, we must remember that each country must struggle for democracy within its own

culture; emerging democracies have special problems and require special help. Those nations whose democratic institutions are newly emerged and whose confidence in the process is not yet deeply rooted need our help. They should have an established community of their peers, other democratic countries to whom they can turn for support or just advice.

In my address to the British Parliament in 1982. I spoke of the need for democratic governments to come together and spread the democratic word throughout the world. Soon after, the Council of Europe brought together delegates from four continents, and I congratulate these European Members of Parliament for what is now known as the "Strasbourg Initiative."

I would hope that this initiative could be continued, gathering not only Europe's own, but all the emerging democracies to craft a sense of common purpose to help move the world forward to social justice, human dignity, economic growth and political democracy. In the three years since my speech at Westminster, we in our country have engaged in a broad bipartisan effort to strengthen and promote democratic ideals and institutions. Following a pattern first started in democratic West Germany, two years ago, the United States Congress approved the National Endowment for Democracy. This organization subsequently established institutes of labor, business, and political parties

dedicated to programs of cooperation with democratic forces around the world. I can report to you that the Endowment is off to a fine start. I would encourage other European democracies to create similar organizations to foster democracy.

The force of the democratic ideal does not stop short because there are arbitrary borders, some with barbed wires and control towers. Here in Western Europe, you have created a Europe for yourselves in which there is a free flow of people, of information, of goods and of culture. It is the natural bent of all Europeans to move freely in all directions. sharing and partaking of each other's ideas and culture. It is my hope, our hope, that in the 21st century-- which is only 15 years away-- all Europeans, from Moscow to Lisbon can travel without a passport and the free flow of people and ideas will include the other half of Europe. It is my fervent wish that in the next century there will once again be one, free Europe.

I do not believe those who say the people of Europe today are paralyzed and pessimistic. And I would say to those who think this: Europe, beloved Europe, you are greater than you know. You are the treasury of centuries of Western thought and Western culture, you are the father of Western ideals and the mother of Western faith.

Europe, you have been the power and the glory of the West, and you are a moral success. In fact, in the horrors after World War II, when you rejected totalitarianism, when you rejected the lure of new "Superman," and a "New Communist Man," you proved that you were -- and are -- a moral triumph.

You in the West are a Europe without illusions, a Europe firmly grounded in the ideals and traditions that made her greatness, a Europe unbound and unfettered by a bankrupt ideology. You are, today, a New Europe on the brink of a new century -- a democratic community with much to be proud of.

We have much to do. The work ahead is not unlike the building of great cathedral. The work is slow, complicated, and painstaking. It is passed on with pride from generation to generation. It is the work not only of leaders but of ordinary people. The cathedral evolves as it is created, with each generation adding its own vision -- but the initial spark of vision remains constant, and the faith that drives the vision persists. The results may be slow to see, but our children and their children will trace in the air the emerging arches and spires and know the faith and dedication and love that produced them. My friends, Europe is the Cathedral, and it is illuminated still.

And if you doubt your will, and your spirit, and your strength to stand for something, think of those people 40 years ago -- who wept in the rubble, who laughed in the streets, who paraded across Europe, who cheered Churchill with love and devotion, and who sang the "Marseillaise" down the boulevards. May I tell you: spirit like that does not disappear; it cannot perish; it will not go away. There's too much left unsung within it.

Thank you, all of you for your graciousness on this great day. Thank you, and God bless you all.