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And we owe you much. And we must continue to learn from each other, and help each other.

Yes, we have so much to be thankful for -- peace, prosperity and freedom. But if we are to assure that these values are preserved for our children and theirs, we must accept the mandate to summon the same vision which inspired Churchill, Adenauer and DeGaulle.

Today, I would like to share with you my vision -- my confidence -- as to how that mandate can be fulfilled. How shall we keep the peace and introduce greater stability in a world which allows our values to prosper?

Let us first try to learn from our experience when we were most successful in building democratic values and economic prosperity in our societies. While the world has witnessed great turmoil in the past 40 years, one fact stands out: for at least 25 years -- the period from 1950 to 1975 -- we were able to contain the expansion of the Soviet Union and deter both nuclear and conventional aggression against the West.

Now scholars may cite many reasons why this happened, but Soviet altruism is usually not among them. To me, it seems fundamental that the Soviet Union has had a solid respect for the sort of countervailing strength which makes adventurism futile and dangerous. Consider the situation in Iran after World War II, or that in Cuba in 1962, or other occasions when the West was willing to take a stand and possessed the might, unity and resolve to resist encroachment. So when we look to the future we must never forget that, at bottom, it is our collective strength, including adequate military force, which deters aggression. To

act as if this were not true would be frivolous and irresponsible.

In fact, it was the loss of the West's superior strategic power which proves the point. For when rough strategic parity was reached a decade or so ago, a very fundamental change occurred in Soviet behavior. There was no increase in the likelihood of nuclear conflict, and the probability of such conflict is not likely to increase in the foreseeable future. No, the problem was not nuclear war, but a pattern of increased risk-taking by the Soviet Union once it was no longer inferior in strategic power. At first, these were cautious risks, such as using surrogate Cuban forces in Angola.

But when the West proved unable to respond, the Soviet authorities accelerated their efforts. Soviet officers, even general officers, were sent to Ethiopia, as South Yemen was brought under Soviet sway. They backed the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea. Then, still meeting no effective Western resistance, they were encouraged to use their own forces in Afghanistan. And since 1979, we in the United States have watched the way they exploited a revolution in Nicaragua to create yet another surrogate, and supplied it with military power much greater than that of its neighbors.

Some might conclude that these experiences suggest that our fundamental security problem could be solved by a return to Western strategic superiority. And this may be true in theory -- but only in theory. For it seems to me that it would be unwise -- in fact, irresponsible -- for the West to seek its security solely in an inexorable program of building offensive weapons

with the aim of regaining strategic superiority over the Soviet Union. We must find better, safer paths to our security, paths fully consistent with the values we are determined to defend.

In the short term, of course -- say the next decade or two -- we have no choice but to make sure that our strategic forces are adequate to deter aggression and political blackmail. For the United States this means that we must maintain modern, ready strategic systems in each leg of the triad of land, air and sea-based forces, just as Britain and France must insure the modernization of their independent nuclear forces. Given the leadership and popular understanding of this issue in all three countries, I am confident that we will maintain a stable nuclear deterrence throughout the next generation.

If we look further into the future, however, there are grounds for concern. For the fact is that the sort of offensive nuclear attack systems now in development in the USSR cannot help but threaten future stability. I am thinking in particular about Soviet testing of highly accurate, mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple, independently-targeted nuclear warheads. If the Soviets go forward to develop and deploy such systems, they could alter fundamentally the balance of offensive weapons on which strategic deterrence has rested. For it will be impossible to verify with precision the number and location of such weapons.

How can we solve the dilemma this prospect creates? Speaking theoretically, I see three possibilities.

The first would be to conclude a fair and verifiable agreement with the Soviet Union to reduce offensive weapons

drastically and preclude the development of destabilizing systems such as heavy, MIRVed, land-based missiles. We shall surely press that case in Geneva. But thus far, we have heard nothing new from the Soviet side, despite our forthcoming and flexible posture.

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For now, we must sustain a prudent research program. Not that we are alone in investigating the potential of defensive technologies. The Soviet authorities have long recognized the value of defensive arms and have invested heavily in them for more than twenty years. In fact, their investment in defensive systems matches their gigantic investment in offensive weapons.

As we in the United States proceed with our prudent research program, we will be careful to comply with all existing treaty constraints. We will also consult in the closest possible fashion with our Allies. And, when the time comes -- if and when systems which would enhance stability can be identified -- we must surely discuss and negotiate with the Soviet Union regarding their introduction. We have no notion of unilateral deployment which might undermine stability. The whole point of our research effort is to find the means of maintaining a stable and safe deterrence. This will remain central in our judgments, just as we will always keep in mind the inextricable link of North American and European security.

At the conventional level there is also much to be done to assure effective deterrence under NATO strategy. Here again, I am optimistic that our technological edge will enable us to continue to avoid any kind of war in Europe. In fact, new types of conventional arms are at hand which will greatly strengthen the capacity of defenders to discourage any thought of a military attack by others. The West is far ahead in this area.

In sum, there is every basis for confidence that the West can keep the peace in the future by maintaining an effective military deterrence. But surely we can aspire to more than maintaining a state of highly armed truce in international politics.

We in the United States have always thought so. During the 1970's we went to great lengths to maintain a unilateral restraint in our strategic weapons programs and in our broader discourse with the Soviet Union. We hoped that the Soviet Union would emulate this restraint and refrain from seeking one-sided advantages. We even codified such "rules of conduct" in a Declaration signed in 1972. *And these efforts brought some improvements in Europe, the Berlin Quadripartite Agreement.* But our hopes were shattered in dozens of places, from Angola to Nicaragua. And in its military building programs, the Soviet Union wilfully departed from any semblance of balance. Through all of this we in the West hoped against hope that something would change. But while we did nothing to counter Soviet expansionism, nothing did change, and today we still see over 100,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan.

There were, of course, other relevant factors in the 1970's. In the United States, our energies were sapped by internal struggles of immense proportion which made all but impossible effective reaction to Soviet adventurism. And in the wake of Vietnam, we had lost the political strength to maintain a sound military balance.

The question before us today is whether we have learned from the mistakes of the past and can undertake a serious relationship with the Soviet Union, a relationship based both on stable

military deterrence and efforts to reduce tensions to the greatest degree possible.

8

Fortunately, there is a third possibility. That is, to develop a defense against an overwhelming Soviet advantage in destabilizing offensive weapons -- an advantage which we could face a decade from now. It was this consideration which lay behind my Strategic Defense Initiative. To be blunt, it is a matter of pure military necessity; I see no other way to counter mobile, mirved, highly accurate strategic weapons. I believe that modern technology can produce non-nuclear means to defeat weapons of mass destruction. Research on such technologies will take time and it will be for my successors to reach decisions

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P13
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New p. 13

either through arms control or unilateral choice, a stable nuclear balance. It has chosen, instead, to build nuclear forces clearly designed to preempt their opponent in the event of conflict, to strike first, and thus to disarm their adversary. The Soviet Union is now moving toward deployment of new mobile MIRVed missiles which have these capabilities, plus the ability to avoid detection, monitoring, or arms control verification. In taking these various steps, the Soviet Union is undermining stability and the basis for mutual deterrence.

One can imagine several possible responses to the continued Soviet build-up of nuclear forces. On the one hand, we can ask the Soviet Union to reduce its offensive systems and to deal, through arms control measures, with the particular problems posed by its mobile ICBM. We shall surely press that case in Geneva. Thus far, however, notwithstanding our own imaginative and flexible ideas in those talks, we have heard nothing new from the other side.

Insert attachment

~~A second possibility, as I have mentioned, is for us in the West to build offensive systems. In the short term, there is no alternative in doing so.~~

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-- While we maintain a stable deterrence to preserve the
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-- The United States is prepared to conclude fair,
reciprocal, verifiable agreements for arms reduction, above all
with regard to offensive nuclear weapons.

-- The United States seeks no unilateral advantages, and of
course can accept none on the Soviet part.

-- The United States will insist upon compliance with past
both for their own sake and
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-- The United States will proceed in full consultation with
its Allies, recognizing that our fates are intertwined and we
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-- The United States does not seek to undermine or change
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Ultimately, I hope the leaders of the Soviet Union will come
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Fortunately, there is a third possibility. That is, to develop a defense against an overwhelming Soviet advantage in destabilizing offensive weapons -- an advantage which we could face a decade from now. It was this consideration which lay behind my Strategic Defense Initiative. To be blunt, it is a matter of pure military necessity; I see no other way to counter mobile, MIRVed, highly accurate strategic weapons. I believe that modern technology can produce non-nuclear means to defeat weapons of mass destruction. Research on such technologies will take time and it will be for my successors to reach decisions

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But our hopes were shattered in dozens of places, from Angola to Nicaragua. And in its military building programs, the Soviet Union wilfully departed from any semblance of balance. Through all of this we in the West hoped against hope that something would change. But while we did nothing to counter Soviet expansionism, nothing did change, and today we still see over 100,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan.

There were, of course, other relevant factors in the 1970's. In the United States, our energies were sapped by internal struggles of immense proportion which made all but impossible effective reaction to Soviet adventurism. And in the wake of Vietnam, we had lost the political strength to maintain a sound military balance.

The question before us today is whether we have learned from the mistakes of the past and can undertake a serious relationship with the Soviet Union, a relationship based both on stable

military deterrence and efforts to reduce tensions to the greatest degree possible.

Surely we have no illusions that convergence of the two systems is likely. It is not, now or for the foreseeable future. We are in for an extended period of competition. In that competition of ideas it is up to us in the West to step up to the question of whether or not we can make available the resources, ideas, examples and assistance programs to compete with the Soviet Union in the Third World. We have much in our favor, not least the experience of many of those states which have tried Marxism and are looking for our help in shaping an alternative. We see one such case in Mozambique.

I am sure we will be up to the task. For the reality is that we do not aspire to impose our system on anyone, nor do we profess to have pat answers for all the world's ills. But our ideals of freedom and democracy stir hearts everywhere. Our economic systems have proven their ability to meet the needs of our people, while our adversaries have rewarded the enforced sacrifice and suffering of their people with economic stagnation, the dead and corrupt hand of state and party bureaucracy, and ultimately an inability to satisfy either material or spiritual needs.

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Surely we have no illusions that convergence of the two systems is likely. It is not, now or for the foreseeable future. We are in for an extended period of competition. In that competition of ideas it is up to us in the West to step up to the question of whether or not we can make available the resources, ideas, examples and assistance programs to compete with the Soviet Union in the Third World. We have much in our favor, not least the experience of many of those states which have tried Marxism and are looking for our help in shaping an alternative. We see one such case in Mozambique.

I am sure we will be up to the task. For the reality is that we do not aspire to impose our system on anyone, nor do we profess to have pat answers for all the world's ills. But our ideals of freedom and democracy stir hearts everywhere. Our economic systems have proven their ability to meet the needs of our people, while our adversaries have rewarded the enforced sacrifice and suffering of their people with economic stagnation, the dead and corrupt hand of state and party bureaucracy, and ultimately an inability to satisfy either material or spiritual needs.

And we owe you much. And we must continue to learn from each other, and help each other.

Yes, we have so much to be thankful for -- peace, prosperity and freedom. But if we are to assure that these values are preserved for our children and theirs, we must accept the mandate to summon the same vision which inspired Churchill, Adenauer and DeGaulle.

Today, I would like to share with you my vision -- my confidence -- as to how that mandate can be fulfilled. How shall we keep the peace and introduce greater stability in a world which allows our values to prosper?

Let us first try to learn from our experience when we were most successful in building democratic values and economic prosperity in our societies. While the world has witnessed great turmoil in the past 40 years, one fact stands out: for at least 25 years -- the period from 1950 to 1975 -- we were able to contain the expansion of the Soviet Union and deter both nuclear and conventional aggression against the West.

Now scholars may cite many reasons why this happened, but Soviet altruism is usually not among them. To me, it seems fundamental that the Soviet Union has had a solid respect for the sort of countervailing strength which makes adventurism futile and dangerous. Consider the situation in Iran after World War II, or that in Cuba in 1962, or other occasions when the West was willing to take a stand and possessed the might, unity and resolve to resist encroachment. So when we look to the future we must never forget that, at bottom, it is our collective strength, including adequate military force, which deters aggression. To

act as if this were not true would be frivolous and irresponsible.

In fact, it was the loss of the West's superior strategic power which proves the point. For when rough strategic parity was reached a decade or so ago, a very fundamental change occurred in Soviet behavior. There was no increase in the likelihood of nuclear conflict, and the probability of such conflict is not likely to increase in the foreseeable future. No, the problem was not nuclear war, but a pattern of increased risk-taking by the Soviet Union once it was no longer inferior in strategic power. At first, these were cautious risks, such as using surrogate Cuban forces in Angola.

But when the West proved unable to respond, the Soviet authorities accelerated their efforts. Soviet officers, even general officers, were sent to Ethiopia, as South Yemen was brought under Soviet sway. They backed the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea. Then, still meeting no effective Western resistance, they were encouraged to use their own forces in Afghanistan. And since 1979, we in the United States have watched the way they exploited a revolution in Nicaragua to create yet another surrogate, and supplied it with military power much greater than that of its neighbors.

Some might conclude that these experiences suggest that our fundamental security problem could be solved by a return to Western strategic superiority. And this may be true in theory -- but only in theory. For it seems to me that it would be unwise -- in fact, irresponsible -- for the West to seek its security solely in an inexorable program of building offensive weapons

with the aim of regaining strategic superiority over the Soviet Union. We must find better, safer paths to our security, paths fully consistent with the values we are determined to defend.

In the short term, of course -- say the next decade or two -- we have no choice but to make sure that our strategic forces are adequate to deter aggression and political blackmail. For the United States this means that we must maintain modern, ready strategic systems in each leg of the triad of land, air and sea-based forces, just as Britain and France must insure the modernization of their independent nuclear forces. Given the leadership and popular understanding of this issue in all three countries, I am confident that we will maintain a stable nuclear deterrence throughout the next generation.

If we look further into the future, however, there are grounds for concern. For the fact is that the sort of offensive nuclear attack systems now in development in the USSR cannot help but threaten future stability. I am thinking in particular about Soviet testing of highly accurate, mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple, independently-targeted nuclear warheads. If the Soviets go forward to develop and deploy such systems, they could alter fundamentally the balance of offensive weapons on which strategic deterrence has rested. For it will be impossible to verify with precision the number and location of such weapons.

How can we solve the dilemma this prospect creates? Speaking theoretically, I see three possibilities.

The first would be to conclude a fair and verifiable agreement with the Soviet Union to reduce offensive weapons

drastically and preclude the development of destabilizing systems such as heavy, MIRVed, land-based missiles. We shall surely press that case in Geneva. But thus far, we have heard nothing new from the Soviet side, despite our forthcoming and flexible posture.

A second possibility would be for the West to keep building offensive systems, and in fact to step up our current modernization effort to keep up with constantly accelerating Soviet deployments. I am not speaking here of regaining superiority, but merely of keeping up with the relentless growth of Soviet deployments. But is this really an acceptable alternative? It seems to me that it is likely to be both politically uncertain over the long term, and also militarily questionable. Even if this course could be sustained by the West, it would produce a less stable strategic balance than the one we have today. We need a better guarantee of peace than that.

Fortunately, there is a third possibility. That is, to develop a defense against an overwhelming Soviet advantage in destabilizing offensive weapons -- an advantage which we could face a decade from now. It was this consideration which lay behind my Strategic Defense Initiative. To be blunt, it is a matter of pure military necessity; I see no other way to counter mobile, mirved, highly accurate strategic weapons. I believe that modern technology can produce non-nuclear means to defeat weapons of mass destruction. Research on such technologies will take time and it will be for my successors to reach decisions

with our Allies as to whether such systems are both feasible and desirable.

For now, we must sustain a prudent research program. Not that we are alone in investigating the potential of defensive technologies. The Soviet authorities have long recognized the value of defensive arms and have invested heavily in them for more than twenty years. In fact, their investment in defensive systems matches their gigantic investment in offensive weapons.

As we in the United States proceed with our prudent research program, we will be careful to comply with all existing treaty constraints. We will also consult in the closest possible fashion with our Allies. And, when the time comes -- if and when systems which would enhance stability can be identified -- we must surely discuss and negotiate with the Soviet Union regarding their introduction. We have no notion of unilateral deployment which might undermine stability. The whole point of our research effort is to find the means of maintaining a stable and safe deterrence. This will remain central in our judgments, just as we will always keep in mind the inextricable link of North American and European security.

At the conventional level there is also much to be done to assure effective deterrence under NATO strategy. Here again, I am optimistic that our technological edge will enable us to continue to avoid any kind of war in Europe. In fact, new types of conventional arms are at hand which will greatly strengthen the capacity of defenders to discourage any thought of a military attack by others. The West is far ahead in this area.

In sum, there is every basis for confidence that the West can keep the peace in the future by maintaining an effective military deterrence. But surely we can aspire to more than maintaining a state of highly armed truce in international politics.

We in the United States have always thought so. During the 1970's we went to great lengths to maintain a unilateral restraint in our strategic weapons programs and in our broader discourse with the Soviet Union. We hoped that the Soviet Union would emulate this restraint and refrain from seeking one-sided advantages. We even codified such "rules of conduct" in a Declaration signed in 1972.

But our hopes were shattered in dozens of places, from Angola to Nicaragua. And in its military building programs, the Soviet Union wilfully departed from any semblance of balance. Through all of this we in the West hoped against hope that something would change. But while we did nothing to counter Soviet expansionism, nothing did change, and today we still see over 100,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan.

There were, of course, other relevant factors in the 1970's. In the United States, our energies were sapped by internal struggles of immense proportion which made all but impossible effective reaction to Soviet adventurism. And in the wake of Vietnam, we had lost the political strength to maintain a sound military balance.

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