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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

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**File Folder** SPEECHES [PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS TO EUROPEAN  
PARLIAMENT IN STRASBOURG 5/8/85] (12/12)

**FOIA**

F06-114/10

**Box Number** 35

YARHI-MILO

3519

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
11552	PAPER	INSERT FOR STRASBOURG SPEECH [ 101 - 103 ]	3	ND	B1
	<b>R</b>	<b>1/2/2008</b>	<b>NLRRF06-114/10</b>		

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The Strasbourg Speech: Handling the East-West Theme

Re pp. 11-15:

This theme needs to be developed more logically, and certain key elements which are now missing should be added. The illustrations of the Soviet threat can be in vivid language, of course, but sweeping statements such as the Soviet Union being the most destabilizing influence in the world should be avoided.

(This is true, but stating it in a speech in Europe will reinforce the damaging stereotype that the President sees every issue in the world solely in the U.S.-Soviet context.) We must encourage Western unity and support, not divisive debates on abstract statements.

When the case has been made regarding the Soviet threat and the necessity for Western firmness and unity, it is essential to present our policy as one which combines deterrence with a search for a more stable peace. The transition can be made with a paragraph along the following lines:

We must stay united and firm in defense of our precious values, values won at such sacrifice by earlier generations and by many members of ours. But we must also remember another profound truth. That is, in this nuclear age, we can do so only if we preserve the peace. Preserving the peace and defending democracy must be integral parts of the same effort.

Then, the following points will follow logically:

-- The US is making a steady, sustained effort to engage the USSR in realistic negotiations with the aim of solving problems in the relationship, reducing tension, and lowering the high levels of offensive nuclear weapons.

-- Tensions can be lowered only if both sides are prepared for fair, reciprocal, verifiable agreements. U.S. is ready for such agreements and will not be deterred from effort to obtain them.

-- US seeks no unilateral advantages. At same time, it can allow none on the Soviet part.

-- US does not seek to undermine or change Soviet system; at same time it must resist attempts to use force against US and its Allies.

-- In arms control, most important objective is lowering level of offensive nuclear weapons and creating more stable strategic environment. That is aim of Geneva negotiations.

-- Pleased that Soviet Govt has accepted goal of radical reductions of nuclear weapons and eventually their complete elimination. It is now time to translate that professed intent into concrete, balanced and verifiable agreements.

-- As for the US, we will spare no effort at Geneva and elsewhere to achieve such agreements.

-- Role of SDI in this. (But I recommend avoiding the acronym and speaking instead of "defensive systems," and "our research program"; such terms evoke positive feelings. SDI is a neutral and emotion-free term (for Europeans, at least), and is usually translated "Star Wars," which we should not encourage.)

-- Importance of compliance with agreements.

-- Conclude by making point that we must show both firmness and unity in negotiations, but at the same time reasonable flexibility.

-- Stress US commitment to consult Allied Governments every step of the way, since we know that this must be an Allied effort, even when the U.S. is the negotiator.



Re Eastern Europe (p. 18):

The first two paragraphs do not convey the essence of our policy. It would be much better to use language similar to that in the President's statement of February 8, 1985, concerning the anniversary of the Yalta Declaration. The basic points are:

-- The artificial division of Europe is unnatural and destabilizing.

-- When families are divided, and people are not allowed to maintain normal human and cultural contacts, this creates international tension.

-- To point this out is not to impinge on the security interests of any country in Europe.

-- The question is not one of borders. It has to do with one country imposing its system on others by force.

-- We must not be deluded in ever accepting that one country's security gives it the right to subjugate another. Such practices undermine the security of all in the long run.

-- Only a situation in which all feel secure, and sovereign, can be lasting and secure in the long run.

-- This problem, like others, must be solved peacefully.

-- Full implementation of the Helsinki Final Act, in all its aspects, can play a key role.

It might be better to move this presentation to an earlier point in the speech, perhaps just after the discussion of U.S.-Soviet relations above. It fits in the general East-West context, and also provides a firm foundation for the excellent concluding preroration on European unity.

NOTE: The central message of the Strasbourg speech should convey our policy on East-West relations. It should, therefore, occupy more space than some of the other themes, particularly the economic ones. There will be several other speeches during the European trip where these economic themes should have a more central role. Therefore, cuts elsewhere in the Strasbourg draft should permit adequate expansion of the East-West themes to make them comprehensive and coherent.

1005 200

THE WHITE HOUSE  
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

February 5, 1985

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

Forty years ago this week, the leaders of the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union met at Yalta, to confer on the approaching end of World War II and on the outlines of the postwar world. The agreements they reached, including the Declaration on Liberated Europe, committed all three governments to the reconstruction of a democratic continent.

Since that time Yalta has had a double meaning. It recalls an episode of cooperation between the Soviet Union and free nations, in a great common cause. But it also recalls the reasons that this cooperation could not continue -- the Soviet promises that were not kept, the elections that were not held, the two halves of Europe that have remained apart.

Why is Yalta important today? Not because we in the West want to re-open old disputes over boundaries. Far from it. The reason Yalta remains important is that the freedom of Europe is unfinished business. Those who claim the issue is boundaries or territory are hoping that the real issues, democracy and independence, will somehow go away. They will not.

There is one boundary which Yalta symbolizes that can never be made legitimate, and that is the dividing line between freedom and repression. I do not hesitate to say that we wish to undo this boundary. In so doing, we seek no military advantage for ourselves or for the Western alliance. We do not deny any nation's legitimate interest in security. But protecting the security of one nation by robbing another of its national independence, and national traditions, is not legitimate. In the long run, it is not even secure.

Long after Yalta, this much remains clear: the most significant way of making all Europe more secure is to make it more free. Our forty-year pledge is to the goal of a restored community of free European nations. To this work we recommit ourselves today.

# # #



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# # #

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LOOK AT THE NOTE

NOTE FROM: ROBERT MCFARLANE  
SUBJECT: Speech Insert Continued

Surely we have no illusions that convergence of the two systems is likely. It is not, now or for the foreseeable future. We are in for an extended period of competition. In that competition of ideas it is up to us in the West to step up to the question of whether or not we can make available the resources, ideas, examples and assistance programs to truly compete with the Soviet Union in the Third World. We have much in our favor, not least the experience of many of those states which have tried marxism for twenty years and are looking for our help in shaping an alternative. Mozambique is such a case. Will we be up to it.

As we enter this competition we will do so in close cooperation with our allies and friends. This is no question of US-Soviet condominium--what a stupid thought. It is annoying that it even comes up occasionally in European lexicon.

And over time we will surely succeed in some areas--those where the Soviets see the greatest self interest. This will include non-strategic trade. And we are ready for this but I stress non-strategic. We in the West went far in 1983 to codify the threshold of self interest when we agreed to avoid excessive dependence on Soviet sources for our natural gas and other energy requirements, when we agreed to cease preferential credit arrangements with them and when we agreed to establish a viable COCOM threshold that all could support. We must maintain and improve these safeguards so that within them we can all have the confidence to conduct a sensible trading relationship with the Soviet Union without our own friends being suspicious. We are ready for such a relationship. Indeed Secretary Baldrige will lead the US-delegation to the Joint US-Soviet trade council later this month.

On the bilateral agenda there is much we can do beyond trade. But I must say that before we do so there is an outstanding problem before us. It concerns the brutal murder of Major Nicholson. Here is an opportunity for us to test Soviet good will and integrity. And today I would like to propose a number of specific actions which we could all take which could foreclose a repetition of this brutal act. (Enter Rick Burt's proposal).

And in the area of arms control we are prepared for truly significant reductions. US negotiators will return to Geneva prepared to discuss specific balanced outcomes in both the START and INF areas as they were in the opening session. We hope the Soviet Union will enter with the same attitude.

END OF NOTE



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NOTE FROM: ROBERT MCFARLANE  
SUBJECT: Insert to speech  
Rosie please print out the following memo to Ben Elliott

MEMORANDUM FOR BEN ELLIOTT

FROM: BUD MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: REVISIONS TO STRASBOURG SPEECH

SUBJECT: REVISIONS TO STRASBOURG SPEECH

Ben this memo forwards revisions to the 2:00pm Saturday version of the Strasbourg speech. That draft is satisfactory up to the middle of page 6 at which point the following text commences. The prose can be substantially improved. The substance must stay as it is.

Yes we have so much to be thankful for--Peace, prosperity and freedom. Our mandate is to summon the same vision which inspired Churchill, Adenauer and DeGaulle to assure that these goals are preserved for our children and theirs. Today I would like to share with you my vision--my confidence--as to how that mandate can be fulfilled. How shall we keep the peace with the Soviet Union, introduce greater stability into our relationships with her and coexist in a world in which our values can prosper?

It seems to me that the beginning of wisdom is to induce lessons from the successful periods we have known in the past. While the world has known great turmoil in the past 40 years it is not trivial that for at least 25 years--the period from 1950 -1975 we were able to contain the expansion of the Soviet Union and deter either nuclear or conventional military aggression by her against the west. It is useful to consider why that was so. Scholars

assert many reasons but none of them include Soviet altruism. For my part it seems fundamental that the Soviet Union has had a solid respect for opposing force whether one consider the situation in Iran after the War or in Cuba in 1962 or other confrontations in which the West was willing to take a stand and disposed of superior might and resolve. Other factors surely contributed to this extended period of deterrence--allied cohesion, the quality of our diplomacy, the strength of our economies. But as we look to the future it seems to me fundamental that it was, at bottom, our collective power--foremost our military power that deterred and to believe otherwise is frivolous.

Indeed it was the loss of superior strategic power which proved the point. For when that condition--of approximate strategic parity--was reached approximately ten years ago, a very fundamental change occurred in Soviet behavior. It did not involve any increase in the likelihood of nuclear conflict, nor is this probability likely to increase in the foreseeable future. Instead the Soviet Union's greater willingness to take risks, now that it was no longer inferior in strategic power was manifested fairly cautiously through the use of surrogate Cuban forces in Angola. Absent any apparent ability for the West to respond, they accelerated their effort, using Soviet

ability for the West to respond, they accelerated their effort, using Soviet Generals in Ethiopia. Later they moved into South Yemen, supported Vietnam's takeover in Kampuchea and finally, absent any signal of western resolve, they were encouraged to use their own forces in Afghanistan. Since 1979 we in the US have watched their steady buildup of their surrogate Nicaragua's strength with all that implies for the rest of Central America.

The implication of my remarks thus far is that a return to superior strategic power would solve all our problems. While in many respects that might be true, it seems to me fundamental that to rely solely on an inexorable program of offensive building is irresponsible and unwise. In the short term--for at least the next 10-15 years--there is no choice. It is essential that we in the US maintain modern ready strategic nuclear forces in each leg of the triad just as it is essential that the UK and France assure the modernization of their own independent nuclear forces. And given the leadership and popular understanding of the issue in both those countries there is every basis for confidence that we can maintain stable nuclear deterrence throughout the next generation. But there is reason for us all to be concerned over the kind of forces now in development in the USSR and here I speak in particular about their testing of MIRVed, highly accurate, mobile ICBMs. If the Soviets go forward with deployment of these systems--given the



difficulty of verifying the number and location of them--they will have altered fundamentally the offensive balance on which strategic deterrence has rested. One can imagine the theoretical possibility of the west simply adding more to its own offensive arsenal in an effort to keep up. But in truth, that is politically unlikely just as it is militarily uncertain.

One can imagine several possible approaches to the solution to this problem. On the one hand we can ask the Soviet Union to reduce its offensive systems to include this new mobile ICBM. And we shall surely press that case in Geneva. Thus far, however, notwithstanding our own rather imaginative and flexible ideas, we have heard nothing new from the other side.

A second possibility as I have mentioned is for us in the West to keep building offensive systems. And in the short term there is no alternative to

doing so.

But there is a third possibility which is to compensate for the overwhelming Soviet advantage by developing a defense against it. It was this motive which inspired my strategic defense initiative. That is, it was a matter of pure

E01

inspired my strategic defense initiative. That is, it was a matter of pure military necessity--we don't see any other way to counter mobile mobile systems. But it is more than that. We believe that the state of modern technology will soon make possible for the first time, the ability to use non-nuclear systems to defeat ballistic missiles. And while it will take time and be for my successors to reach decision with our allies as to the desirability and feasibility of deployment, it is essential that a prudent research program be sustained. Indeed the Soviets have long recognized the value of defensive systems and have invested heavily--as much as they have in offensive systems for more than 20 years. And if we do, it is not beyond the realm of imagination that 20 years hence our children will be thanking us for setting in motion the elimination of nuclear

weapons, for as surely as cheaper non-nuclear defense makes possible their defeat, their value and utility will decline and real reductions will become intrinsically logical.

As we proceed with this prudent program, we will remain within existing treaty constraints. We will also consult in the closest possible fashion with our allies. And when the time comes, we must surely discuss and negotiate these systems with the Soviet Union. Surely we have no notion of unilateral deployment which would present obvious problems for stability.



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The point of this effort is to maintain stable deterrence. We can and we shall do so, always keeping in mind the inextricable link of the United States and European security. That will not change.

Similarly at the conventional level, there is much to be done to assure effective deterrence under NATO strategy 14/3. But here again, I am optimistic that our technological edge will enable us to do so. Indeed systems are at hand which will truly revolutionize certain kinds of warfare and the west is far ahead in their development.

In short, there is every basis for confidence that the west can maintain effective military deterrence. This is the fundamental requirement in East-West relations. But surely we can aspire to more than maintaining a state of highly armed truce in international politics. We in the United States have thought so. During the 1970's we went to considerable length at unilateral restraint in our strategic weapons programs and in our broader discourse out of conviction that the Soviet Union would adhere to certain rules in its conduct. Rules such as neither side seeking to gain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other--as I have said, that premise was shattered in dozens

E01

the expense of the other--as I have said, that premise was shattered in dozens of places from Angola to Nicaragua. Similarly in its military building programs it has willfully departed from any semblance of balance. Through all of this we in the west hoped against hope without doing anything about it, that something would change--but in the end, there was no change--only 100,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan. To be fair there were factors I have ignored, which were essential if we were to hold up the western side of the bargain, and we did not. In the US our energies were sapped by internal struggles of immense proportion which made all but impossible effective reaction to Soviet adventurism. And in the wake of Vietnam, we had lost the political strength to maintain the military balance.

The question before us today is whether we have learned from those mistakes and can undertake a serious relationship with the Soviet Union based upon stable military deterrence and the reduction of tensions in other areas. I believe we can. And it is in this belief that I have directed the Secretary of State to engage with the Soviet Union on an extended agenda of problem solving with the Russians. In this effort we have focussed our effort into four areas. These are: arms control, regional problems, bilateral areas and human rights. The Secretary will be meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko on this agenda next week in Vienna and we hope for a serious Soviet effort to make progress.

END OF NOTE

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FYI: KIMMIT  
MEMO TO: Matlock, Raymond, Rentschler, Steiner, Sestanovich  
FROM: Ty Cobb  
SUBJECT: NSC draft of the Strasbourg speech, 28 April

This is a fast moving train. This is the version Jim, Doug and I produced Sunday afternoon. Need your comments by 1030 Monday. Only specific comments, suggestions please.

Sir, you may want to show this to McFarlane.  
Ty Cobb is spearheading the NSC effort and  
will continue to revise.

Doug Doan

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Insert for Strasbourg Speech

[begin insert after last SDI paragraph, page 13]

The Strategic Defense Initiative is part of a security system that will continue to protect the democratic world. And we will take special care to work cooperatively with the Soviet Union and outline our concepts, so that Moscow will not misinterpret our intentions. We will indeed do all we can to communicate and work cooperatively with the Soviet Union, not just in the future, but now, to minimize the chances of conflict. For hostility can exact a terrible price, as we saw just a few short weeks ago, with the killing in East Germany of Major Nicholson.

The responsibility for that sad event remains as clear as ever: it lies with a system founded by force and maintained by military power. Nothing will return Major Nicholson to his family and his country, but decency requires that we continue to press the USSR for just compensation to his family and a formal apology. Moreover, we will continue to seek assurances that force will not be used against members of American, French, or British military liaison missions, just as our nations do not use force against Soviet personnel.

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- 2 -

But the most fitting memorial to Major Nicholson that we could create would be to set in place measures that affect entire armies and nations -- measures that would lessen the piercing but unspoken fear of war through miscalculation that exists on each side of this divided continent. Today I propose that the United States and the Soviet Union take three bold and practical steps:

First, I propose that the United States and the Soviet Union make a regular practice of exchanging observers at military exercises and locations. We now follow this practice with many other nations, to the equal benefit of all parties.

Second, as I believe it is desirable for the two leaders of America and the Soviet Union to meet and tackle problems, I am also convinced that the military leaders of our nations could benefit from this type of contact. One of the most durable and successful ventures in US-Soviet relations has been the annual meetings of our two navies. These reviews have let our naval professionals gain an appreciation of each other's concerns and develop a pattern of solving problems. I therefore propose that we institute regular, high-level contacts between the military leaders of our two countries, to develop better understanding and to prevent potential tragedies from occurring.

As a third step, I urge that the Conference on Disarmament in Europe act promptly and conclude agreement on the concrete

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

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~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 3 -

confidence-building measures proposed by the NATO countries. As I have said previously, the US is prepared to agree to new commitments on non-use of force in the context of Soviet agreement to concrete confidence-building measures.

I look forward to meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev, and I would like to use that meeting in part to move forward with these three initiatives. They are certainly not cure-alls for our current problems, and will not in themselves compensate for the Major's death. But as terrible as the events of March 24 were, it would be more tragic if we were to make no attempt to prevent even larger tragedies from occurring through lack of contact and communication.

(1904M)

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~



NSC  
April 28, 1985  
1700 hrs

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: TO EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT  
STRASBOURG, FRANCE  
WEDNESDAY, MAY 8, 1985

Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. It is an honor to be with you on this day.

We mark today the anniversary of the liberation of Europe from tyrants who had seized this continent and plunged it into a terrible war. Forty years ago today, the guns were stilled and peace began -- a peace that has endured to become the longest of this century.

On this day 40 years ago, they swarmed onto the boulevards up Paris, rallied under the arc de triomphe, and sang the "Marseillaise" in the free and open air. In Rome, the sound of church bells filled St. Peter's square and echoed through the city. On this day 40 years ago, Winston Churchill walked out onto a balcony in Whitehall and said to the people of Britain, "this is your victory" -- and the crowd yelled back, "no, it is yours," in an unforgettable moment of love and gratitude. Londoners tore the blackout curtains from their windows, and put floodlights on the great symbols of English history. And for the first time in six years Big Ben, Buckingham Palace, and St. Paul's Cathedral were illuminated against the sky.

Across the ocean, a half million New Yorkers flooded Times Square and, being Americans, laughed and posed for the cameras. In Washington, our new president, Harry Truman, called reporters into his office and said, "the flags of freedom fly all over Europe." He added: "And it's my birthday too!"

On day 40 years ago, I was at my post at the Army Air Corps installation in Culver City, California. And as I passed a radio I heard the words, "ladies and gentlemen, the war in Europe is over," and like so many people that day I felt a chill, as if a gust of cold wind had just swept past, and I realized: I will never forget this moment.

- even though, for America, there was still a war on the Pacific front -

This day can't help but be emotional, for in it we feel the long tug of memory; we are reminded of shared joy and shared pain and the terrible poignance of life. A few weeks ago in California an old soldier touched on this. With tears in his eyes he said, "it was such a different world then. It's almost impossible to describe it to someone who wasn't there but, when they finally turned the lights on in the cities again, it was like being reborn."

If it is hard to communicate the happiness of those days, it is even harder to remember Europe's agony.

So much of it lay in ruins. Whole cities had been destroyed. children played in the rubble and begged for food.

By this day 40 years ago, 40 million lay dead, and the survivors composed a continent of victims. And to this day, we wonder: how did this happen? How did civilization take such a terrible turn? After all the books and the documentaries, after all the histories, and studies, we still wonder: How?

Hannah Arendt spoke of "the banality of evil" -- the banality of the little men who did the terrible deeds. We know what they were: totalitarians who used the state, which they had elevated to the level of "God," to inflict war on peaceful nations and genocide on innocent peoples.

We know of the existence of evil in the human heart, and we know that in Nazi Germany that evil was institutionalized -- given power and direction by the state, by a corrupt regime and the jack-boots who did its bidding. And we know, we learned, that early attempts to placate the totalitarians did not save us from war. In fact, they guaranteed it. There are lessons to be learned in this and never forgotten.

But there is a lesson too in another thing we saw in those days: perhaps we can call it "the commonness of virtue." The common men and women who somehow dug greatness from within their souls the people who sang to the children during the blitz, who joined the resistance and said 'no' to tyranny, the people who hid the Jews and the dissidents, the people who became, for a



moment, the repositories of all the courage of the west -- from a child named Anne Frank to a hero named Raoul Wallenberg.

These names shine. They give us heart forever. And the glow from their beings, the glow of their memories, lit Europe in her darkest days.

Who can forget the days after the war? They were hard days, yes, but we can't help but look back and think: life was some vivid then. There was the sense of purpose, the joy of shared effort, and, later, the incredible joy of our triumph. Those were the days when the West rolled up its sleeves and repaired the damage that had been done. Those were the days when Europe rose in glory from the ruins.

Old enemies were reconciled with the European family. Together, America and Europe created and put into place the Marshall Plan to rebuild from the rubble. Together we created the Atlantic Alliance, the first alliance in the world which proceeded not from transient interests of state but from shared ideals. Together we created the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, a defense system aimed at seeing that the kind of tyrants who had tormented Europe would never torment her again. NATO was a triumph of organization and effort, but it was also something new, very different. For NATO derived its strength directly from the moral values of the people it represented. It was infused with their high ideals, their love of liberty, their

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commitment to peace.

But perhaps the greatest triumph of all was not in the realm of a sound defense or material achievement. No, the greatest triumph of Europe after the war is that in spite of all the chaos, poverty, sickness, and misfortune that plagued this continent --in spite of all that, the people of Europe resisted the call of new tyrants and the lure of their seductive philosophies. Europe did not become the breeding ground for new extremist philosophies. Europe resisted the totalitarian temptation instead, the people of Europe embraced democracy, the strongest dream, the dream the fascists could not kill. They chose freedom.

Today we celebrate the leaders who led the way-- Churchill and Monnet, Adenauer and Schumann, de Gasperi and Spaak, Truman and Marshall. And we celebrate, too, the free political parties that contributed their share to greatness: the Liberals and the Christian Democrats, the Social Democrats and Labour and the Conservatives. Together they tugged at the same oar, and the great and mighty ship of Europe moved on.

If any doubt their success, let them look at you. In this room are ~~the sons and daughters of soldiers~~ <sup>those</sup> ~~and their sons and daughters.~~ who fought on opposite sides 40 years ago. Now you govern together and lead Europe democratically. You buried animosity and hatred in the rubble. There is no greater testament to reconciliation and to

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the peaceful unity of Europe than the men and women in this room.

In the decades after the war, Europe knew great growth and power. You enjoyed amazing vitality in every area of life, from fine arts to fashion, from manufacturing to science to the world of ideas. Europe was robust and alive, and none of this was an accident. It was the natural result of freedom, the natural fruit of the democratic ideal. We in America looked at Europe and called her what she was: an Economic Miracle.

And we could hardly be surprised. When we Americans think about our European heritage we tend to think of your cultural influences, and the rich ethnic heritage you gave us. But the industrial revolution that transformed the American economy came from Europe. The financing of the railroads we used to settle the West came from Europe. The guiding intellectual lights of our democratic system--Locke and Montesquieu, Hume and Adam Smith--came from Europe. And the geniuses who ushered in the modern industrial-technological age came from--well, I think you know, but two examples will suffice. Alexander Graham Bell, whose great invention maddened every American parent whose child insists on phoning his European pen pal rather than writing to him--was a Scotsman. And Guglielmo Marconi, who invented the radio--thereby providing a living for a young man from Dixon, Illinois, who later went into politics-- I guess I should explain that's me--now you know it's Marconi's fault--Marconi was born and bred, as you know in Italy.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: TO EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT  
STRASBOURG, FRANCE  
WEDNESDAY, MAY 8

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We mark today the anniversary of the liberation of Europe from tyrants who had seized this continent and plunged it into a terrible war. Forty years ago today, the guns were stilled and peace began -- a peace that has become the longest of this century.

On this day 40 years ago, they swarmed onto the boulevards of Paris, rallied under the Arc de Triomphe, and sang the "Marseillaise" in the free and open air. In Rome, the sound of church bells filled St. Peter's square and echoed through the city. On this day 40 years ago, Winston Churchill walked out onto a balcony in Whitehall and said to the people of Britain, "this is your victory" -- and the crowd yelled back, in an unforgettable moment of love and gratitude, "No, it is yours." Londoners tore the blackout curtains from their windows, and put floodlights on the great symbols of English history. And for the first time in six years Big Ben, Buckingham Palace, and St. Paul's Cathedral were illuminated against the sky.

Across the ocean, a half million New Yorkers flooded Times Square and laughed and posed for the cameras. In Washington, our new president, Harry Truman, called reporters into his office and said, "the flags of freedom fly all over Europe."



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On that day 40 years ago, I was at my post at the Army Air Corps installation in Culver City, California. Passing a radio I heard the words, "ladies and gentlemen, the war in Europe is over." I felt a chill, as if a gust of cold wind had just swept past, and -- even though, for America, there was still a war on the Pacific Front -- I realized: I will never forget this moment.

This day can't help but be emotional, for in it we feel the long tug of memory; we are reminded of shared joy and shared pain. A few weeks ago in California an old soldier, with tears in his eyes said, "It was such a different world then. It's almost impossible to describe it to someone who wasn't there but, when they finally turned the lights on in the cities again, it was like being reborn."

If it is hard to communicate the happiness of those days, it is even harder to remember Europe's agony.

So much of it lay in ruins. Whole cities had been destroyed. Children played in the rubble and begged for food.

By this day 40 years ago, 40 million lay dead, and the survivors composed a continent of victims. And to this day, we wonder: how did this happen? How did civilization take such a terrible turn? After all the books and the documentaries, after all the histories, and studies, we still wonder: How?

Hannah Arendt spoke of "the banality of evil" -- the banality of the little men who did the terrible deeds. We know they were totalitarians who used the state, which they had



elevated to the level of "God," to inflict war on peaceful nations and genocide on innocent peoples. -

We know of the existence of evil in the human heart, and we know that in Nazi Germany that evil was institutionalized -- given power and direction by the state and those who did its bidding. And we also know that early attempts to placate the totalitarians did not save us from war. In fact, they guaranteed it. There are lessons to be learned in this and never forgotten.

But there is a lesson too in another thing we saw in those days: perhaps we can call it "the commonness of virtue." The common men and women who somehow dug greatness from within their souls -- the people who sang to the children during the blitz, who joined the resistance and said 'No' to tyranny, the people who hid the Jews and the dissidents, the people who became, for a moment, the repositories of all the courage of the West -- from a child named Anne Frank to a hero named Raoul Wallenberg.

They give us heart forever. The glow of their memories lit Europe in her darkest days.

Who can forget the hard days after the war? We can't help but look back and think: life was so vivid then. There was the sense of purpose, the joy of shared effort, and, later, the incredible joy of our triumph. Those were the days when the West rolled up its sleeves and repaired the damage that had been done, the days when Europe rose in glory from the ruins.

Old enemies were reconciled with the European family. Together, America and Europe created and put into place the Marshall Plan to rebuild from the rubble. Together we created

the Atlantic Alliance, which proceeded not from transient interests of state but from shared ideals. Together we created the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, a defense system aimed at seeing that the kind of tyrants who had tormented Europe would never torment her again. NATO was a triumph of organization and effort, but it was also something new, very different. For NATO derived its strength directly from the moral values of the people it represented, from their high ideals, their love of liberty, their commitment to peace.

But perhaps the greatest triumph of all was not in the realm of a sound defense or material achievement. No, the greatest triumph of Europe after the war is that in spite of all the chaos, poverty, sickness, and misfortune that plagued this continent, the people of Europe resisted the call of new tyrants and the lure of their seductive ideologies. Europe did not become the breeding ground for new extremist philosophies. Europe resisted the totalitarian temptation. The people of Europe embraced democracy, the dream the fascists could not kill. They chose freedom.

Today we celebrate the leaders who led the way-- Churchill and Monnet, Adenauer and Schuman, de Gasperi and Spaak, Truman and Marshall. And we celebrate, too, the free political parties that contributed their share to greatness: the Liberals and the Christian Democrats, the Social Democrats and Labour and the Conservatives. Together they tugged at the same oar, and the great and mighty ship of Europe moved on.

If any doubt their success, let them look at you. In this room are they who fought on opposite sides 40 years ago, and their sons and daughters. Now you govern together and lead Europe democratically. You buried animosity and hatred in the rubble. There is no greater testament to reconciliation and to the peaceful unity of Europe than the men and women in this room.

In the decades after the war, Europe knew great growth and power, amazing vitality in every area of life, from fine arts to fashion, from manufacturing to science to the world of ideas. Europe was robust and alive, and none of this was an accident. It was the natural result of freedom, the natural fruit of the democratic ideal. We in America looked at Europe and called her what she was: an Economic Miracle.

And we could hardly be surprised. When we Americans think about our European heritage we tend to think of your cultural influences, and the rich ethnic heritage you gave us. But the industrial revolution that transformed the American economy came from Europe. The financing of the railroads we used to settle the West came from Europe. The guiding intellectual lights of our democratic system -- Locke and Montesquieu, Hume and Adam Smith -- came from Europe. And the geniuses who ushered in the modern industrial-technological age came from -- well, I think you know, but two examples will suffice. Alexander Graham Bell, whose great invention maddened every American parent whose child insists on phoning his European pen pal rather than writing to him -- was a Scotsman. And Guglielmo Marconi, who invented the radio -- thereby providing a living for a young man from Dixon,



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Illinois, who later went into politics-- I guess I should explain that's me -- so blame Marconi. Marconi, as you know, was born in Italy.

Tomorrow will mark the 35th anniversary of the European Coal and Steel Community, the first block in the creation of a united Europe. The purpose was to tie French and German -- and European -- industrial production so tightly together that war between them "becomes not merely unthinkable but materially impossible." Those are the words of Robert Schuman; the Coal and Steel Community was the child of his genius. And if he were here today I believe he would say: We have only just begun!

I am here to tell you America remains, as she was 40 years ago, dedicated to the unity of Europe. We continue to see a strong and unified Europe not as a rival but as an even stronger partner. Indeed, John F. Kennedy, in his ringing "Declaration of Interdependence" in the freedom bell city of Philadelphia 23 years ago, explicitly made this objective a key tenet of post-war American policy; it saw the New World and the Old as twin pillars of a larger democratic community. We Americans still see European unity as a vital force in that historic process. We favor the expansion of the European Community; we welcome the entrance of Spain and Portugal into that Community, for their presence makes for a stronger Europe, and a stronger Europe is a stronger West.

Yet despite Europe's Economic Miracle which brought so much prosperity to so many, despite the visionary ideas of the European leaders, despite the enlargement of democracy's

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frontiers within the European community itself, I am told that a more doubting mood is upon Europe today. I hear words like "Europessimism" and "Europaralysis," that Europe seems to have lost the sense of confidence that dominated that postwar era. If there is something of a "lost" quality these days, is it connected to the fact that some, in the past few years, have begun to question the ideals and philosophies that have guided the West for centuries? That some have even come to question the moral and intellectual worth of the West?

I wish to speak, in part, to that questioning today. And there is no better place to do it than Strasbourg -- where Goethe studied, where Pasteur taught, where Hugo first knew inspiration. This has been a lucky city for questioning and finding valid answers. It is also a city for which some of us feel a very sweet affection. You know that our statue of Liberty was a gift from France, and its sculptor, F.A. Bartholdi, was a son of France. I don't know if you have ever studied the face of the Statue, but immigrants entering New York Harbor used to strain to see it, as if it would tell them something about their new world. It is a strong, kind face; it is the face of Bartholdi's mother, a woman of Alsace. And so, among the many things we Americans thank you for, we thank you for her.

The Statue of Liberty - made in Europe, erected in America - helps remind us not only of the past ties but present realities.

It is to those realities we must look in order to dispel whatever doubts may exist about the course of history and the place of free men and women within it. We live in a complex,

dangerous, divided world, yet a world which can provide all of the good things we require, spiritual and material, if we but have the confidence and courage to face history's challenge.

We in the West have much to be thankful for -- peace, prosperity and freedom. If we are to preserve these for our children, and for theirs, today's leaders must demonstrate the same resolve and sense of vision which inspired Churchill, Adenauer, DeGasperi and Schuman. Their challenge was to rebuild a democratic Europe under the shadow of Soviet power. Our task, in some ways even more daunting, is to keep the peace with an evermore powerful Soviet Union, to introduce greater stability in our relationship with it, and to coexist in a world in which our values can prosper.

The leaders and people of postwar Europe had learned the lessons of their history from the failures of their predecessors. They learned that aggression feeds on appeasement and that weakness itself can be provocative. We, for our part, can learn from the success of our predecessors. We know that both conflict and aggression can be deterred, that democratic nations are capable of the resolve, the sacrifices and the consistency of policy needed to sustain such deterrence.

From the creation of NATO in 1949 through the early 1970's, Soviet aggression was effectively deterred. The strength of Western economies, the vitality of our societies, the wisdom of our diplomacy, all contributed to Soviet restraint; but certainly the decisive factor must have been the countervailing power --



ultimately, military power -- which the West was capable of bringing to bear in the defense of its interests.

It was in the early 1970's that the United States lost that superiority over the Soviet Union in strategic nuclear weapons which had characterized the postwar era. In Europe, the effect of this loss was not quickly perceptible. But seen globally, Soviet conduct changed markedly and dangerously. First in Angola in 1975, then, when the West failed to respond, in Ethiopia, in South Yemen, in Kampuchea and ultimately in Afghanistan, the Soviet Union began courting more risks, and expanding its influence through the indirect and direct application of military power. Today, we see similar Soviet efforts to profit from and stimulate regional conflicts in Central America.

The ineffectual Western response to Soviet adventurism of the late 1970's had many roots, not least in the crisis of self-confidence within the American body politic wrought by the Vietnam experience. But just as Soviet decision-making in the earlier postwar era had taken place against the background of overwhelming American strategic power, so the decisions of the late 1970's were taken in Moscow, as in Washington and throughout Europe, against the background of growing Soviet and stagnating Western nuclear strength.

One might draw the conclusion from these events that the West should reassert that nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union upon which our security and our strategy rested through the postwar era. That is not my view. We cannot and should not seek

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to build our peace and freedom perpetually upon the basis of expanding nuclear arsenals.

In the short run, we have no alternative but to compete with the Soviet Union in this field, not in the pursuit of superiority, but merely of balance. It is thus essential that the United States maintain a modern and survivable nuclear capability in each leg of the strategic triad -- sea, land and air based. It is similarly important that France and Britain maintain and modernize their independent strategic capabilities.

The Soviet Union, however, has not been content to sustain, either through arms control or unilateral choice, a stable nuclear balance. It has chosen, instead, to build nuclear forces clearly designed to strike first, and thus to disarm their adversary. The Soviet Union is now moving toward deployment of new mobile MIRVed missiles which have these capabilities, plus the ability to avoid detection, monitoring, or arms control verification. In doing this, the Soviet Union is undermining stability and the basis for mutual deterrence.

One can imagine several possible responses to the continued Soviet build-up of nuclear forces. On the one hand, we can ask the Soviet Union to reduce its offensive systems and to deal, through arms control measures, with the particular problems posed by its strategic programs, including its MIRVed mobile ICBM. We shall press that case in Geneva. Thus far, however, we have heard nothing new from the other side.

A second possibility would be for the West to step up our current modernization effort to keep up with constantly

accelerating Soviet deployments, not to regain superiority, but merely to keep up with Soviet deployments. But is this really an acceptable alternative? Even if this course could be sustained by the West, it would produce a less stable strategic balance than the one we have today. We need a better guarantee of peace than that.

Fortunately, there is a third possibility, in the long-term. That is to offset the continued Soviet offensive build-up in destabilizing weapons by developing defenses against these weapons. In 1983 I launched a new research program -- the Strategic Defense Initiative.

The state of modern technology may soon make possible for the first time the ability to use non-nuclear systems to defeat ballistic missiles. It will take time. The Soviets themselves have long recognized the value of defensive systems and have invested heavily in them. Indeed, they have spent as much on defensive systems as they have on offensive systems for more than 20 years.

As we proceed with this research program, we will remain within existing treaty constraints. We will also consult in the closest possible fashion with our Allies. And when the time for decisions on the possible production and deployment of such systems comes, we must and will discuss and negotiate these issues with the Soviet Union. We, for our part, have no intention of unilateral deployment.

Both for the short and long term I am confident that the West can maintain effective military deterrence. But surely we



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can aspire to more than maintaining a state of highly armed truce in international politics.

During the 1970's we went to great lengths to restrain unilaterally our strategic weapons programs out of the conviction that the Soviet Union would adhere to certain rules in its conduct -- rules such as neither side seeking to gain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other. Those efforts of the early 1970's resulted in some improvements in Europe, the Berlin Quadripartite Agreement being the best example. But the hopes for a broader and lasting moderation of the East-West competition foundered in Angola, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, and Nicaragua.

The question before us today is whether we have learned from those mistakes and can undertake a stable and peaceful relationship with the Soviet Union based upon effective deterrence and the reduction of tensions. I believe we can. I believe we have learned that fruitful cooperation with the Soviet Union must be accompanied by successful competition in areas -- particularly Third World areas -- where the Soviets are not yet prepared to act with restraint.

These are the reflexions which have molded our policy toward the Soviet Union. That policy embodies the following basic elements:

-- While we maintain deterrence to preserve the peace, the United States will make a steady, sustained effort to reduce tensions and solve problems in its relations with the Soviet Union.

-- The United States is prepared to conclude fair, equitable, verifiable agreements for arms reduction, above all with regard to offensive nuclear weapons.

-- The United States seeks no unilateral advantages, and of course can accept none on the Soviet side.

-- The United States will insist upon compliance with past agreements both for their own sake and to strengthen confidence in the possibility of future accords.

-- The United States will proceed in full consultation with its allies, recognizing that our fates are intertwined and we must act in unity.

-- The United States does not seek to undermine or change the Soviet system nor to impinge upon the security of the Soviet Union. At the same time it will resist attempts by the Soviet Union to use or threaten force against others, or to impose its system on others by force.

Ultimately, I hope the leaders of the Soviet Union will come to understand that they have nothing to gain from attempts to achieve military superiority or to spread their dominance by force, but have much to gain from joining the West in mutual arms reduction and expanding cooperation.

I have directed the Secretary of State to engage with the Soviet Union on an extended agenda of problem solving.

Yet even as we embark upon new efforts to sustain a productive dialogue with the Soviet Union, we are reminded of the obstacles imposed by our so fundamentally different concepts of humanity, of human rights, of the value of a human life. The

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murder of Major Nicholson by a Soviet soldier in East Germany, and the Soviet Union's refusal to accept responsibility for this act is only the latest reminder.

If we are to succeed in reducing East-West tensions, we must find means to ensure against the arbitrary use of lethal force in the future -- whether against individuals like Major Nicholson, or against groups, such as the passengers on a jumbo jet.

Therefore, I propose that the United States and the Soviet Union take three practical steps:

First, that our two countries make a regular practice of exchanging observers at military exercises and locations. We now follow this practice with many other nations, to the equal benefit of all parties.

Second, I am convinced that the military leaders of our nations could benefit from more contact. I therefore propose that we institute regular, high-level contacts between Soviet and American military leaders, to develop better understanding and to prevent potential tragedies from occurring.

Third, I urge that the Conference on Disarmament in Europe act promptly and agree on the concrete confidence-building measures proposed by the NATO countries. The United States is prepared to agree to new commitments on non-use of force in the context of Soviet agreement to concrete confidence-building measures.

These proposals are not cure-alls for our current problems, and will not compensate for the deaths which have occurred. But as terrible as past events have been, it would be more tragic if



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we were to make no attempt to prevent even larger tragedies from occurring through lack of contact and communication.

We in the West have much to do -- and we must do it together. We must remain unified in the face of attempts to divide us and strong in spite of attempts to weaken us. And we must remember that our unity and strength are not a mere impulse of like-minded allies, but the natural result of our shared love for liberty.

Surely we have no illusions that convergence of the two systems is likely. We are in for an extended period of competition of ideas. It is up to us in the West to answer whether or not we can make available the resources, ideas, examples and assistance to compete with the Soviet Union in the Third World. We have much in our favor, not least the experience of those states which have tried Marxism and are looking for an alternative.

We do not aspire to impose our system on anyone, nor do we have pat answers for all the world's ills. But our ideals of freedom and democracy and our economic systems have proven their ability to meet the needs of our people. Our adversaries reward the enforced sacrifice of their people with economic stagnation, the corrupt hand of state and party bureaucracy, which ultimately satisfy neither material nor spiritual needs.

I want to reaffirm to the people of Europe the constancy of the American purpose. We were at your side through two great wars; we have been at your side through 40 years of a sometimes painful peace. We are at your side today because, like you, we

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have not veered from the ideals of the West -- the ideals of freedom, liberty, and peace. Let no one -- no one -- doubt our purpose.

The United States is committed not only to the security of Europe--we are committed to the re-creation of a larger and more genuinely European Europe. The United States is committed not only to a partnership with Europe-- the United States is committed to an end to the artificial division of Europe.

We do not deny any nation's legitimate interest in security. We share the basic aspirations of all of the peoples of Europe -- freedom, prosperity and peace. But when families are divided, and people are not allowed to maintain normal human and cultural contacts, this creates international tension. Only in a system in which all feel secure, and sovereign, can there be a lasting and secure peace.

For this reason we support and will encourage movement toward the social, humanitarian, and democratic ideals shared in Europe. The issue is not one of state boundaries, but of insuring the right of all nations to conduct their affairs as their peoples desire. The problem of a divided Europe, like others, must be solved by peaceful means. Let us rededicate ourselves to the full implementation of the Helsinki Final Act in all its aspects.

As we seek to encourage democracy, we must remember that each country must struggle for democracy within its own culture; emerging democracies have special problems and require special help. Those nations whose democratic institutions are newly

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emerged and whose confidence in the process is not yet deeply rooted need our help. They should have an established community of their peers, other democratic countries to whom they can turn for support or just advice.

In my address to the British Parliament in 1982. I spoke of the need for democratic governments to spread the message of democracy throughout the world. I expressed my support for the Council of Europe's effort to bring together delegates from 28 nations for this purpose. I am encouraged by the product of that conference, the "Strasbourg Initiative."

We in our country have launched a major effort to strengthen and promote democratic ideals and institutions. Following a pattern first started in the Federal Republic of Germany, the United States Congress approved the National Endowment for Democracy. This organization subsequently established institutes of labor, business, and political parties dedicated to programs of cooperation with democratic forces around the world. I hope other democracies will join in this effort and contribute their wisdom and talents to this cause.

Here in Western Europe, you have created a multi-national democratic community in which there is a free flow of people, of information, of goods and of culture. West Europeans move freely in all directions. sharing and partaking of each other's ideas and culture. It is my hope, our hope, that in the 21st century -- which is only 15 years away -- all Europeans, from Moscow to Lisbon, can travel without a passport and the free flow of people and ideas will include the other half of Europe. It is my



fervent wish that in the next century there will once again be one, free Europe.

I do not believe those who say the people of Europe today are paralyzed and pessimistic. And I would say to those who think this: Europe, beloved Europe, you are greater than you know. You are the treasury of centuries of Western thought and Western culture, you are the father of Western ideals and the mother of Western faith.

Europe, you have been the power and the glory of the West, and you are a moral success. In the horrors after World War II, you rejected totalitarianism, you rejected the lure of new "Superman," and a "New Communist Man." You proved that you were -- and are -- a moral triumph.

You in the West are a Europe without illusions, a Europe firmly grounded in the ideals and traditions that made her greatness, a Europe unbound and unfettered by a bankrupt ideology. You are, today, a New Europe on the brink of a new century -- a democratic community with much to be proud of.

We have much to do. The work ahead is not unlike the building of great cathedral. The work is slow, complicated, and painstaking. It is passed on with pride from generation to generation. It is the work not only of leaders but of ordinary people. The cathedral evolves as it is created, with each generation adding its own vision -- but the initial ideal remains constant, and the faith that drives the vision persists. The results may be slow to see, but our children and their children will trace in the air the emerging arches and spires and know the

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faith and dedication and love that produced them. My friends,  
Europe is the Cathedral, and it is illuminated still.

And if you doubt your will, and your spirit, and your strength to stand for something, think of those people 40 years go -- who wept in the rubble, who laughed in the streets, who paraded across Europe, who cheered Churchill with love and devotion, and who sang the "Marseillaise" down the boulevards. Spirit like that does not disappear; it cannot perish; it will not go away. There's too much left unsung within it.

Thank you, all of you, for your graciousness on this great day. Thank you, and God bless you all.