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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

**Withdrawer**

JET 5/24/2005

**File Folder** USSR- START 2/2

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**Box Number** 36

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
11571	PAPER	USSR <b>P 1/4/2010 F06-114/11</b>	1	ND	B1
11575	CABLE	SOVIET FREEZE PROPOSAL <b>R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11</b>	4	ND	B1
11572	PAPER	START AND SOVIET PIPELINE <b>D 7/15/2008 NLRRF06-114/11</b>	2	ND	B1 B3
11573	PAPER	START <b>D 7/15/2008 NLRRF06-114/11</b>	1	8/2/1982	B1 B3
11574	PAPER	PRAVDA BERATES PRESIDENT REAGAN'S ARMS CONTROL SPEECH <b>R 1/4/2010 F06-114/11</b>	1	11/27/1982	B1
11576	CABLE	201659Z OCT 82 <b>R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11</b>	4	10/20/1982	B1
11577	CABLE	020115Z OCT 82 <b>R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11</b>	4	10/2/1982	B1
11578	CABLE	211854Z OCT 82 <b>R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11</b>	7	10/21/1982	B1
11579	PAPER	MOSCOW'S PUBLIC STANCE ON ARMS CONTROL <b>R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11</b>	1	10/28/1982	B1

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B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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11580	CABLE	131754Z AUG 82 <b>R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11</b>	6	8/13/1982	B1
11581	CABLE	061554Z AUG 82 <b>R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11</b>	2	8/6/1982	B1
11582	CABLE	290251Z JUN 82 <b>R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11</b>	5	6/29/1982	B1

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Despite Soviet insistence on long-range cruise missiles in arms control negotiations, they are developing \_\_\_\_\_

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ The Soviets will continue to develop such missiles to prevent the US from gaining a unilateral advantage either from a negotiating or from a military standpoint.

The Soviets began to develop long-range cruise missiles in the 1950s, but dropped them in favor of the range, speed, and accuracy of ballistic missiles. Resumed development coincided with the US decision in the late 1970s to deploy strategic cruise missiles.

[illegible]

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ Should the Soviets choose to make token deployments of these systems for negotiating purposes, they could do so ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ earlier using the systems' test launchers.

[illegible]

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NLRR F06-114/11 #11571

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SC/S PROFILE

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ID 8205357

RECEIVED 31 JUL 82 10

TO CLARK

FROM DUBERSTEIN, K

DOCDATE 09 JUL 82

CLARK

05 JUL 82

PRESIDENT

25 JUN 82

KEYWORDS: START

CONGRESSIONAL

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND MATERIAL TO CONGRESS RE START

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

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FILES WH

FOR ACTION

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
THE WHITE HOUSE **9 JUL 1982**  
WASHINGTON

July 9, 1982

TO: BILL CLARK

FROM: KEN DUBERSTEIN

For your files.



~~5356~~  
5357

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

July 5, 1982

Dear Member,

The President has provided his guidance to our Ambassador to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks in Geneva. I want to share with you President Reagan's letter to Ambassador Rowny, as well as other information that explains the Administration's views on arms control.

I hope the enclosed material will help you as you formulate your own views. To be successful, our negotiators need support from the Congress and from the public. For that reason, I am providing this material directly to you and to your colleagues.

Sincerely,



William P. Clark

Enclosures



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 25, 1982

Dear Ambassador Rowny:

You are about to undertake one of the most important tasks of our age -- the negotiation of an effective and equitable strategic arms reduction agreement. Your efforts in this endeavor are vital to the citizens of the United States and the Soviet Union, and to all mankind.

Despite more than a decade of intensive negotiations, nuclear weapons continue to accumulate, and the strategic relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States has steadily become less stable. A major reason for this has been the massive buildup of the Soviet Union's ballistic missile force over the past 15 years.

An historic opportunity now exists for both the United States and the Soviet Union to reverse this process, and to reduce substantially both the numbers and the destructive potential of nuclear forces. Such reductions to equal levels must immediately focus on the most destabilizing elements of the strategic balance if we are to promptly enhance deterrence and stability and thereby reduce the risk of nuclear war. Further, the achievement of this goal should greatly reduce the nuclear anxiety that has become such a conspicuous feature of public concern throughout the world.

I do not underestimate the monumental nature of the task of effectively reducing forces. But while the task is formidable, the importance of undertaking these negotiations is fully appreciated by the American and, I believe, by the Soviet people. We must learn from the shortcomings of earlier efforts for, as you are well aware, the American people will not accept an agreement unless it is equal and verifiable, and contributes to stability.

The proposals you take to Geneva represent a practical, phased plan which will protect the legitimate security interests of both sides. It is designed to enhance deterrence and to achieve stability by reducing nuclear forces on both sides to equal levels in a verifiable manner. Its provisions significantly reduce the forces of both the Soviet Union and the United States and, therefore, contain benefits for both sides, as well as for the rest of the world.

I know that you and your delegation will present these proposals clearly and persuasively, along with the fundamental considerations that lie behind them. And, I want the Soviet delegation to know that concerns and proposals put forward by them will be given careful consideration by us. For our part, the United States is ready to move forward rapidly toward an agreement reducing strategic nuclear arms, and I am confident that if our efforts are met with the same seriousness of purpose by the Soviet Union, we can seize the historic opportunity that lies before us.

As the two leading nuclear powers in the world, the United States and the Soviet Union are trustees for humanity in the great task of ending the menace of

nuclear arsenals and transforming them into instruments underwriting peace. I am convinced that this can be done if both nations fully accept the principle that the only legitimate function of nuclear arms is to deter aggression.

I wish you Godspeed in your efforts, and assure you that these negotiations will have my personal attention.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Ronald Reagan". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned to the right of the word "Sincerely,".

The Honorable Edward L. Rowny  
Chairman  
U.S. START Delegation  
Washington, D.C. 20451



## U.S. ARMS CONTROL POLICY

### BACKGROUND

Since the end of World War II, the U.S. has been the leader in serious disarmament and arms control proposals. Many of these have focused on controlling the spread of nuclear weapons. For example, in 1946 the U.S. submitted a proposal (the Baruch plan) for international control of nuclear weapons and nuclear energy. In 1955, President Eisenhower presented his "open skies" proposal, under which the U.S. and the Soviet Union would have exchanged blueprints of military establishments and provided for aerial reconnaissance. The Soviets rejected both plans.

Major arms control agreements to which we are a party include the Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963), which prohibits nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water; the Direct Communications Link or "hot line" (1963), improved in 1971, for use by the U.S. and U.S.S.R. during international crises; the Outer Space Treaty (1967), which bans placing nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in outer space; the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968), the purpose of which is to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons; the Seabed Arms Control Treaty (1971), which prohibits the emplacement of nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction on the seabeds and ocean floor beyond a 12-mile coastal zone; the Accidents Agreement (1971), which provides for U.S.-Soviet measures to reduce the likelihood of accidental nuclear war; the ABM Treaty (1972), which imposes limitations on defense against ballistic missile weapons; and the Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms (1972), which froze the number of strategic ballistic missile launchers on either side.

### U.S. PRINCIPLES

One of President Reagan's first official acts was to order an intense review of arms control policy, to learn the lessons of the past in order to achieve more lasting progress in the future. Four principles, which the Administration is working to put into practice, underlie the U.S. approach to arms control. We seek agreements that:

- Produce significant reductions in the arsenals of both sides;
- Result in equal levels of arms on both sides, since an unequal agreement, like an unequal balance of forces, can encourage coercion or aggression;



- Are verifiable, because when national security is at stake, agreements cannot be based upon trust alone; and
- Enhance U.S. and Allied security and reduce the risk of war, because arms control is not an end in itself but is a complement to defense preparations as an important means of underwriting peace and international stability.

#### U.S. NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVES

On November 18, 1981, President Reagan offered to cancel deployments of the Pershing II and Ground-Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) if the U.S.S.R. would eliminate its SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missiles. The U.S. is negotiating toward this end with the U.S.S.R. in Geneva. On May 9, the President announced a two-phased approach to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), which began on June 29, aimed at the following objectives:

- In the first phase, we will seek to reduce the number of ballistic missile warheads on each side by 1/3, to about 5,000. No more than half the remaining ballistic missile warheads will be on land-based missiles. We also will seek to cut the total number of all ballistic missiles to an equal level -- about half the current U.S. level.
- In the second phase, we will seek further reductions in overall destructive power of each side's arsenal including an equal ceiling on ballistic missile throw-weight below the current U.S. level.

#### CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

The U.S. is party to the two existing international arms control agreements affecting chemical and biological weapons. The first, the Geneva Protocol of 1925, prohibits the use in war of these weapons; the second, the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972, prohibits the production, development, and stockpiling and transfer of biological and toxin weapons. Both of these agreements contain a common and fundamental flaw. Neither incorporates adequate means to verify compliance. Soviet compliance with both has been brought into sharp question by events in Southeast and Southwest Asia and in Sverdlovsk in the USSR. Because of this, it is clear that effective verification provisions are essential to future agreement in these fields. The U.S. is committed to achieving a complete and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons development, production, stockpiling, and transfer, and to that end, we participate in the 40-nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva.

#### MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS (MBFR)

The MBFR talks between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, underway in Vienna since 1973, are concerned with the reduction and limitation of conventional forces in Central Europe and with associated



confidence building, stabilization, and verification measures. On June 10, 1982, the President announced in Bonn the new NATO initiative to seek common collective ceilings in the reductions area (the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg in the West, and East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia in the East) of about 700,000 ground forces and about 900,000 ground and air forces. The NATO initiative also includes measures to encourage cooperation and verify compliance.

#### VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE

Arms control agreements with a highly secretive adversary like the U.S.S.R. cannot be based simply on trust. We must have effective means of verification that enable us to know with confidence whether agreements are being honored. In practice, this means we must be able to monitor activities in the areas covered by such agreements in order to detect any violations; we must be able to do so early enough to permit us to assure Soviet compliance and take steps to offset the effects of any noncompliance. Agreements that cannot be effectively verified are not acceptable.

In the past, we have relied primarily on national technical means (NTM) of verification -- sophisticated data-collection methods (e.g., photographic, electronic, radar, seismic) operated unilaterally by the U.S. As arms control agreements, the systems they cover, and the possibilities of concealment become more complex, it will be essential to supplement NTM with some form of "cooperative" verification measures. The Reagan Administration has made clear that the U.S. will insist on verification procedures, including the possibility of measures beyond national technical means, if necessary, to ensure full compliance with any agreement.



## ARMS CONTROL AND NATO INF MODERNIZATION

### BACKGROUND

In order to sustain NATO's deterrent strategy in the face of the massive buildup of Soviet intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), NATO ministers agreed in December, 1979, to modernize the Alliance's INF, while pursuing U.S.-Soviet negotiations on arms control involving those forces. This decision was reconfirmed by NATO in May, 1982. In the absence of a full arms control agreement arising out of U.S.-Soviet INF negotiations, the U.S. will deploy 108 Pershing II's and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs), beginning in December, 1983. The new systems will be mobile and capable of dispersal in times of crisis, thus enhancing their survivability and reducing the danger of a Soviet preemptive attack. These deployments have not been forced in Europe but, rather, were arrived at through a process of genuine consultation and joint decision with our NATO partners. Modernization will not increase the risk of a nuclear war limited to Europe; on the contrary, the deployments will serve to reduce the risks of Soviet attack by reminding the Soviets that they cannot hope to limit a nuclear war to the territory of others.

### SOVIET DEPLOYMENT

The need for NATO modernization stems from the fact that in the mid-1970s, the Soviets began deploying the triple-warhead SS-20, exacerbating the threat to our European Allies and adding to an already destabilizing imbalance in INF.

- The Soviets currently deploy some 315 mobile SS-20's, with 945 warheads, in addition to 280 single-warhead SS-4 and SS-5 missiles, for a total of over 1,200 warheads on longer-range INF missiles (not counting refires). NATO has no similar systems deployed.
- This deployment gives the Soviets a capability to hit, accurately and in great number, targets located anywhere in Western Europe from locations deep within the U.S.S.R, far beyond the range of any of NATO's European-based systems.

If deterrence is to be maintained, the Alliance must move to redress the imbalance, either through negotiation or, in the event a concrete INF arms control agreement obviating the need for GLCM and Pershing II is not achieved, through modernization.

### U.S. ARMS CONTROL PROPOSAL

NATO's INF modernization has not set back the prospects of arms control but, in fact, has forced the Soviets to accept, in principle at least, the need to limit their own nuclear weapons.



As a result of NATO's demonstrated resolve to modernize its nuclear forces, the U.S.S.R. has been persuaded to put on the negotiating table, for the first time, nuclear forces that threaten the Allies. Without NATO modernization, there would be no prospect of reducing the Soviet nuclear threat to Europe.

We are now negotiating with the Soviets in Geneva on the basis of the President's November 18, 1981, proposal to cancel deployment of Pershing II's and GLCMs in exchange for elimination of all Soviet SS-20's, SS-4's, and SS-5's. We are focusing on longer-range INF missiles because they are the most destabilizing systems. The U.S. proposal, if carried out, would be a major step toward achieving stability at dramatically reduced levels of forces. During the first round of negotiations in Geneva, the U.S. tabled a treaty that embodied this proposal. Both sides have had a chance to set forth their respective positions and to ask questions about the position of the other side. The talks have been serious and businesslike; we intend to consider Soviet proposals and to negotiate in good faith.

#### SOVIET OBJECTIVES

Soviet proposals made thus far contain elements that cannot provide a basis for an equitable and verifiable agreement. They would permit the Soviets to keep intermediate-range nuclear missiles while prohibiting comparable U.S. systems. A Soviet proposal outlined earlier this year would not require destruction of a single SS-20 missile, but the proposal would force the cancellation of NATO's modernization program and the virtual elimination of U.S. nuclear-capable aircraft from Europe. The Soviet proposal, based on contrived claims that a balance exists in INF, includes U.K. and French systems and calls for reductions from an unequal starting point, which would give the U.S.S.R. an overwhelming advantage.

A so-called unilateral "moratorium" on further deployment of Soviet intermediate-range nuclear missiles announced by President Brezhnev allows the Soviets to retain all of their currently deployed INF missiles but calls for a halt in the NATO deployment preparations, thus prohibiting NATO from fielding comparable systems. Since this "moratorium" was declared, the Soviets have continued to deploy new SS-20 missiles and construct facilities for still more of them. The Soviet objective clearly is to forestall NATO deployment without sacrificing Soviet INF superiority. NATO must remain committed to modernization of its INF if it is to convince the Soviets that they have no alternative to serious negotiations toward reducing the nuclear threat.



## START PROPOSAL

### BACKGROUND

On May 9, 1982, President Reagan announced a new proposal to reduce substantially the nuclear arsenals of both the U.S. and the Soviet Union to equal levels and to reduce the threat of nuclear war. The negotiations, beginning on June 29, are called START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) -- to emphasize the President's goal of nuclear weapons reductions and to signify a break from the unratified SALT II Treaty.

The President's initiative has opened the door to a more constructive relationship with the U.S.S.R. Such a relationship, however, can be built only on reciprocity and mutual restraint. Arms control is an important instrument for securing such restraint. Equitable and verifiable agreements, when combined with sound foreign and defense policies, can play a critical role in enhancing deterrence and ensuring a stable military balance.

### U.S. ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVES

The President has outlined the objectives of U.S. arms control policy:

- Substantial Reductions. We seek to reduce the number and destructive potential of nuclear weapons, not just to cap them at high levels as in previous agreements.
- Equality. We seek agreements that will lead to mutual reductions to equal levels in both sides' forces. The U.S. will accept nothing less.
- Security. We seek agreements that will enhance U.S. and Allied security and reduce the risk of war.
- Verifiability. We will carefully design the provisions of arms control agreements and insist on measures to ensure that both sides comply. Otherwise, neither side will have the confidence needed to accept the deep reductions we seek.

### START NEGOTIATIONS

To enhance deterrence and ensure a stable nuclear balance, the President's proposal focuses, in the first phase of negotiations, on significant reductions in ballistic missile warheads and deployed ballistic missiles. This would halt and reverse the destabilizing growth in ballistic missile warhead numbers that



would have been permitted under the flawed and thus unratified SALT II Treaty. In this first phase, we will seek to reduce the number of ballistic missile warheads by at least one-third, to about 5,000. No more than half the remaining ballistic missile warheads will be on land-based missiles. We also will seek to cut the total number of all ballistic missiles to an equal level, about one-half the current U.S. level.

In the second phase, we will seek further reductions to equal ceilings on other elements of strategic forces, particularly ballistic missile throw-weight. Throw-weight is an important measure of the size and destructive potential of ballistic missiles. First-phase reductions will reduce the current disparity in ballistic missile throw-weight, and lay the groundwork for the second-phase reductions to achieve an equal throw-weight ceiling below current U.S. levels.

#### RELATIONSHIP TO SALT

The President's START proposal has built upon the experience of the SALT process. It is U.S. policy to take no action that would undercut existing agreements, provided the Soviets exercise equal restraint. We believe that this policy can contribute to a positive atmosphere for START negotiations. However, the Reagan Administration will not pursue ratification of SALT II for three broad reasons:

- First, the Treaty has specific flaws. These include the perpetuation and codification of dangerous, destabilizing asymmetries, illustrated by a unilateral Soviet advantage of 308 modern, heavy ICBMs. It contains several ambiguities, particularly with respect to provisions for verification. It permitted force expansion and did not achieve force reductions -- it is possible that the Soviet ICBM forces alone could have grown to more than 8,000 warheads under SALT II.
- Because of these and other shortcomings, SALT II never achieved the broad national support that a treaty of this importance must have. Even before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, there was a divisive debate on the merits of the Treaty. Attempting to ratify SALT II now would only reopen that controversial debate -- at a time when a broad consensus behind the President's proposal is needed and when we should focus our full attention on achieving substantial reductions.
- Finally, formalizing the SALT II Treaty would make achievement of the President's goals for START more difficult by establishing unacceptable precedents for a future agreement. For example, Soviet Backfire bombers are not included in an equal treatment of bombers, and heavy

missiles are treated in a manner inconsistent with our plans for START. These and other provisions would have to be changed later in START. While our policy of not undercutting the general limitations of SALT II would not impede progress toward START, codifying them most certainly would.

#### A REASONABLE APPROACH

The main threat to the strategic balance has been the massive Soviet buildup of ballistic missile forces. Because of their large size, increasing accuracy and short flight times, these missiles (and particularly land-based ICBMs) pose a significant threat to U.S. deterrent forces. The President's START proposal attempts to reduce the threat of nuclear war by enhancing deterrence and securing a stable nuclear balance.

The President's approach is reasonable and equitable. It would lead to significant reductions to equal levels on both sides and thus to a more stable nuclear balance, which should be in the interest not only of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., but of the entire world. The President has emphasized our intention to negotiate in good faith and to consider all serious proposals from the Soviets.



# STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS TALKS (START) -- PROPOSED REDUCTIONS

On May 9, the President announced a bold, new proposal to reduce significantly the risks posed by large nuclear arsenals. He has proposed a phased approach to reductions focused on the most destabilizing elements of nuclear forces. The initial phase would reduce the total number of ballistic missile warheads by one-third, to about 5,000, would limit the number of warheads carried on ICBMs to one-half that number, and would cut the total number of ballistic missiles to an equal level about one-half of the current US level. In a second phase, we would seek further reductions in the overall destructive power of each side's arsenal to equal levels, including a mutual ceiling on ballistic missile throw weight below the current US level. We will also treat bombers and other strategic systems in an equitable manner. The proposed reductions, coupled with effective verification, will substantially reduce the nuclear threat and will make a major contribution to the stability of the nuclear balance.

The significant reductions proposed by President Reagan are shown in the following comparison:

## FIRST PHASE

	<u>Approximate Current Levels</u>	
	<u>US</u>	<u>USSR</u>
Ballistic Missile Warheads (Land-Based and Sea-Based)		
o Proposed ceiling of 5,000	7,200	7,500
Land-Based Ballistic Missile Warheads		
o Proposed ceiling of 2,500	2,150	5,900
Ballistic Missiles (Land-Based and Sea-Based)		
o Proposed ceiling of 850, approximately one-half current U.S. levels	1,600	2,350

## SECOND PHASE

### Missile Throw Weight

o Proposed ceiling below current U.S. levels	2 MKG	5 MKG
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United States Department of State

# THE NUCLEAR FREEZE

April 1982



## The Nuclear Freeze

In recent months, a proposal for a U.S.-Soviet nuclear weapons freeze has attracted widespread attention. A resolution supporting such a freeze has been submitted to Congress, and versions have been placed on the November ballot in several states. While the wording of different versions varies, and some call for eventual reductions in arms levels, the basic idea is this:

The President should immediately propose that the United States and the Soviet Union adopt a mutual freeze on the testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons and missiles and new aircraft designed primarily to deliver nuclear weapons, subject to strict verification.

The U.S. Government recognizes that the proposal represents the best of intentions: to reduce the likelihood of nuclear war and encourage more rapid progress in a critical and exceptionally complex area of arms control. We all share these objectives. But, after carefully reviewing the proposal, we have concluded that a freeze at existing nuclear levels would have adverse implications for international security and stability and would frustrate attempts to achieve the goal on which we all agree: the negotiation of substantial reductions in the nuclear arsenals of both sides.

### What Kind of Arms Control Agreements Do We Seek?

Four principles underlie the U.S. approach to arms control. We seek agreements that:

- *Produce significant reductions* in the arsenals of both sides;
- *Result in equal levels of arms on both sides*, since an unequal agreement, like an unequal balance of forces, can encourage coercion or aggression;
- *Are verifiable*, because when our national security is at stake, agreements cannot be based upon trust alone; and
- *Enhance U.S. and allied security and reduce the risk of war*, because arms control is not an end in itself but an important means toward securing peace and international stability.

These four principles were highlighted by the President in his speech of November 18, 1981. They are the foundation for the U.S. position in the current Geneva negotiations between the United States and the U.S.S.R. on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF). They also form the basis for our approach to strategic arms negotiations with the Soviet Union, negotiations we will call START—*Strategic Arms Reduction Talks*.

### What Are the Drawbacks of a Freeze Proposal?

While the Administration shares the genuine and deeply felt convictions that have given rise to the freeze proposal, we believe the proposal does not constitute sound defense or effective arms control policy, and thus we cannot support the freeze itself. A freeze would be dangerous to security, stability, and the cause of peace for the following reasons:

- *A freeze at existing levels would lock the United States and our allies into a position of military disadvantage and vulnerability.* The freeze would prevent us from correcting existing dangerous deficiencies in our nuclear forces caused by the sustained Soviet buildup. The substantial improvements in the Soviet force of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), for example, have given the Soviet Union the means to destroy a large part of our ICBM force. In addition, there are about 600 Soviet intermediate-range nuclear missiles capable of striking our NATO allies. These missiles are not offset by any comparable U.S. systems. In this case, a freeze would prevent us from restoring the balance.

- *A freeze is not good enough.* We do not want to cap deployments at current levels; we want significant reductions in the nuclear arms of both sides, reductions that will lead to a stable military balance. The United States has already offered a bold new arms control initiative at the negotiations in Geneva on land-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles. We proposed a "zero option" under which the United States would cancel the planned deployment of Pershing II missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles in exchange for the elimination of comparable Soviet intermediate-range nuclear missiles. Our objective in negotiating strategic arms control agreements is also to achieve significant reductions.

- *A freeze would make significant arms control more difficult.* The Soviets would have little incentive to agree to reductions in strategic and intermediate-range nuclear arms if they knew they could simply freeze the existing military situation. This has already been demonstrated in the area of intermediate-range forces, where the U.S.S.R. initially refused our offers to negotiate while steadily deploying some 300 SS-20 missile systems. The Soviets agreed to come to the negotiating



# Introduction of Strategic Weapons by the U.S. and U.S.S.R. 1972-1982

ICBM—Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

SLBM—Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile

SSBN—Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile Submarine

ALCM—Air-Launched Cruise Missile






table only when it became clear that we and our NATO allies were determined to take steps to counter those SS-20 deployments.

- *A freeze would cast serious doubt on American leadership of the NATO alliance.* In 1979, in the face of continuing Soviet deployments, the members of the alliance agreed to begin deployment in 1983 of U.S. Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles and to seek a U.S.-U.S.S.R. arms control agreement to reduce intermediate-range nuclear forces. A freeze now would, in effect, be a unilateral decision by the United States to withdraw from this joint allied undertaking.

- *A freeze on all testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons would include important elements that cannot be verified.* The practical result is that the United States would live up to a freeze in all its aspects, while there would be considerable doubt that the Soviets would also live up to it. We simply cannot afford to base our national security on trust of the Soviets.

### **A Freeze and the Soviet Buildup**

During the past decade, the Soviet Union has mounted a sustained buildup across the entire range of its nuclear forces. Soviet modernization efforts have far outstripped ours, particularly in the development and deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles, which now pose a major threat to a large part of our land-based ICBM force. In the last 10 years, the Soviets introduced an unprecedented array of new strategic weapons into their arsenals, including the SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19 ICBMs, the Typhoon and Delta submarines and several new types of submarine-launched missiles, and the Backfire bomber. During this same period, the United States exercised restraint and only introduced the Trident missile and submarine and the cruise missile.

This trend has been harmful to the security interests of the United States and its allies and to global stability. It is not just a question of numbers. As their military capability has grown, the Soviets have increasingly resorted to the use of military force directly, or through proxies such as Cuba, to intervene in areas farther and farther from their borders. The increased assertiveness of Soviet behavior—the invasion of Afghanistan, pressure on Poland, support for insurgency in Central America—reflects growing Soviet confidence in their military capabilities.

**ICBMs.** Since 1972, the Soviets have developed and deployed at least 10 different variants of three new types of ICBMs. In the same period, the United States deployed no new types of ICBMs and only one variant of the existing Minuteman. In 1986, we plan to begin deployment of the MX, the first new U.S. intercontinental ballistic missile in 16 years.

**Sea-Based Forces.** The commissioning of the first U.S. Trident submarine in 1982 marked the end of a 15-year period during which the United States did not build any new ballistic missile-firing submarines. In this same period, the U.S.S.R. added over 60 missile-firing submarines in four new or improved classes. The Soviets are now deploying two new types of missile submarines—the Typhoon and the Delta III—while we are building only the Trident.

**Bombers.** When the first B-1 bomber becomes operational in 1985, it will have been nearly a quarter of a century since the last U.S. heavy bomber was produced. In contrast, the Soviets have produced more than 250 modern Backfire bombers that have inherent intercontinental capabilities. The Soviets also have improved their large air defense system designed to counter our bomber force. A freeze would not constrain these Soviet air defenses.

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The chart on pages 4 and 5 compares the introduction of new strategic weapons by the United States and the U.S.S.R. and shows the momentum of the Soviet buildup over the last decade. As the chart shows, the Soviets introduced 12 new or improved nuclear weapons systems, while the United States only introduced three, and they upgraded or expanded every area of their nuclear arsenal.

Moreover, in most significant measures used to judge strategic forces—total number of systems, total number of ballistic missiles, total destructive potential—the Soviets now surpass the United States. Soon they could equal and surpass us in number of warheads, the one area where the United States has traditionally had an advantage.

The President entered office with a mandate to correct these trends. The modernization program he announced in October 1981 is designed to restore the strategic balance and prevent nuclear war. In so doing, it will give the Soviet Union a strong incentive to negotiate with us to achieve genuine arms reductions.

### Conclusion

The Reagan Administration is committed to equitable and verifiable arms control aimed at substantial reductions in military forces. While the freeze proposal reflects the desire of people everywhere to reduce the threat of nuclear war, it would not promote reductions, equality, or verifiability. Rather, it would accomplish the opposite. A freeze at existing levels would lock in existing nuclear inequalities while making further progress in arms control difficult, if not impossible. For these reasons, our goal in arms control must be the negotiation of substantial reductions in the nuclear arsenals of both sides. We can do better than a freeze.



# US-USSR STRATEGIC FORCE COMPARISON

## TOTAL ACTIVE INVENTORY

### Ballistic Missiles

	<u>1962</u>		<u>1972</u>		<u>1982</u>	
	<u>US</u>	<u>USSR</u>	<u>US</u>	<u>USSR</u>	<u>US</u>	<u>USSR</u>
ICBMs	78	40	1054	1500	1053	1398
SSBNs/SLBMs	9/144	38/100	41/656	57/500	33/544	70/950
Warheads	222	140	3700	2000	7200	7500
Throw-weight (Klbs)	400	500	3000	7000	4000	11,000

### Nuclear-Capable Bombers

Bomber	1700	160	500	150	347	400
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START

23

11575

PRIORITY ANATO, TOKYO PRIORITY, CANBERRA PRIORITY,  
WELLINGTON PRIORITY, BEIJING PRIORITY  
PRIORITY MOSCOW, GENEVA PRIORITY

EXDIS/USSTART

E.O. 12065: RDS 1.3 -7/6/02 (BURT, RICHARD)

TAGS: PARM, NATO, START

SUBJECT: SOVIET FREEZE PROPOSAL

REF: A) GENEVA 6720 (NOTAL) B) STATE 13767 (NOTAL)  
C) STATE 140954 (NOTAL)

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE SOVIETS HAVE TABLED IN START A FORMAL PROPOSAL FOR A FREEZE ON STRATEGIC ARMS, WHICH ELABORATES ON BREZHNEV'S MAY 16 FREEZE PROPOSAL. THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT MADE THIS MOVE PUBLIC OR, TO OUR KNOWLEDGE, BRIEFED ALLIED GOVERNMENTS, BUT THEY COULD DO SO AT ANY TIME. ACTION ADDRESSEES SHOULD USE THE FOLLOWING TALKING POINTS TO INFORM HOST GOVERNMENTS OF THIS DEVELOPMENT, TO SHARE WITH THEM OUR ASSESSMENT, AND TO ENCOURAGE THEM PUBLICLY TO SUPPORT THE US POSITION OPPOSING THE FREEZE SHOULD THE SOVIETS MAKE PUBLIC THEIR DRAFT PROPOSAL. YOU SHOULD EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF KEEPING THIS INFORMATION CONFIDENTIAL IN THE ABSENCE OF A PUBLIC SOVIET ANNOUNCEMENT.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR E06-114/11 # 11575

BY KML NARA DATE 4/21/11

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3. BEGIN TALKING POINTS:

- THE SOVIET NEGOTIATOR AT THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS (START) IN GENEVA ON JULY 2 FORMALLY TABLED A DRAFT US-SOVIET JOINT STATEMENT ANNOUNCING AGREEMENT ON A FREEZE IN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS. THE DRAFT INCORPORATES THE PROPOSAL FOR A QUANTITATIVE FREEZE ON STRATEGIC ARMS AND FOR LIMITS ON THE MODERNIZATION OF SUCH WEAPONS WHICH PRESIDENT BREZHNEV MADE IN HIS SPEECH TO THE KOMSOMOL CONGRESS IN MOSCOW ON MAY 18. FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO REPEATED THIS PROPOSAL IN HIS JUNE 15 SPEECH TO THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT.

- THIS TACTIC PARALLELS THE SOVIET APPROACH IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (INF), WHERE THE SOVIET DELEGATION PROPOSED A MORATORIUM ON ADDITIONAL INF DEPLOYMENTS AT AN EARLY MEETING.

- THE SOVIET DRAFT PROVIDES FOR AGREEMENT "TO REFRAIN FROM A QUANTITATIVE BUILDUP OF DELIVERY VEHICLES OF NUCLEAR ARMS WHICH HAVE A STRATEGIC MISSION." THE DRAFT SPECIFICALLY INCLUDES ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS, HEAVY BOMBERS, GROUND- OR SEA-LAUNCHED LONG RANGE CRUISE MISSILES, AND OTHER NUCLEAR SYSTEMS CAPABLE OF REACHING TARGETS ON THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER PARTY BECAUSE OF THEIR DEPLOYMENT IN THIRD COUNTRIES OR ON AIRCRAFT CARRIERS.

- BY FOCUSSED ON MISSILE LAUNCHERS, THE SOVIET PROPOSAL WOULD NOT EXPLICITLY CONSTRAIN IMPORTANT MISSILE CHARACTERISTICS SUCH AS WARHEADS AND THROWWEIGHT.

- THE PROPOSAL COVERS MANY SYSTEMS NOW UNDER NEGOTIATION IN INF. IT WOULD COMPLETELY BLOCK PLANNED DEPLOYMENT OF US GROUND- AND SEA-LAUNCHED LONG-RANGE CRUISE MISSILES. (FOR NATO ADDRESSEES: IT IS IMPORTANT TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE SOVIET PROPOSAL WOULD INCLUDE INF SYSTEMS AND WOULD THEREFORE PRECLUDE NATO INF MODERNIZATION WITHOUT, HOWEVER, AFFECTING SS-20 DEPLOYMENTS.)

- WITH REGARD TO QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENTS, THE PARTIES WOULD AGREE NOT TO "DEVELOP, TEST, OR DEPLOY NEW KINDS OF ARMS WHICH HAVE A STRATEGIC MISSION" AND TO "LIMIT TO THE

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MAXIMUM EXTENT MODERNIZATION OF EXISTING KINDS OF SUCH ARMS." THE DRAFT PROVIDES NO DEFINITIONS TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN "NEW TYPES" AND MODERNIZED VERSIONS OF EXISTING SYSTEMS. IT DOES NOT DEFINE THE EXTENT OF MODERNIZATION WHICH WOULD BE PERMITTED, NOR DOES IT SPECIFY HOW THE PARTIES COULD DETERMINE WHETHER A NEW SYSTEM HAD A STRATEGIC MISSION.

- EACH PARTY WOULD BE ALLOWED TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF ITS STRATEGIC ARMS AT ITS OWN DISCRETION.

- VERIFICATION OF THE AGREEMENT WOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. COMPLIANCE QUESTIONS WOULD BE REFERRED TO THE DELEGATIONS TO THE STRATEGIC ARMS TALKS IN GENEVA. THE DRAFT IMPLIES THAT NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS WOULD BE ADEQUATE TO VERIFY THE FREEZE, INCLUDING THE LIMITS ON QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENTS, AND THAT THE DELEGATIONS COULD HANDLE COMPLIANCE QUESTIONS IN ADDITION TO THEIR NORMAL NEGOTIATING TASKS.

- THE FREEZE WOULD REMAIN IN FORCE FOR THE DURATION OF NEGOTIATIONS.

- THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE TALKS HAS TOLD THE SOVIET DELEGATION THAT THE SOVIET FREEZE PROPOSAL IS UNACCEPTABLE.

- THE US SIDE EMPHASIZED THAT A FREEZE AT EXISTING LEVELS WOULD IMPEDE THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A STABLE STRATEGIC BALANCE AT SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCED LEVELS OF ARMAMENT. THE US SIDE ALSO COMMENTED THAT A FREEZE WOULD CODIFY EXISTING SOVIET ADVANTAGES AND WOULD NOT DEAL WITH THE SOVIET DEPLOYMENT OVER THE LAST DECADE OF LARGE MODERN ICBMS WHICH HAVE GIVEN THE SOVIET UNION THE MEANS TO THREATEN THE US ICBM FORCE AND THUS UNDERMINE STABILITY.

- THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT THUS FAR MADE PUBLIC THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE TABLED THIS FORMAL PROPOSAL, BUT WE DO NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY. SHOULD THEY MAKE PUBLIC THEIR PROPOSAL, THE UNITED STATES WILL REPEAT ITS OBJECTIONS TO

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A NUCLEAR ARMS FREEZE, AS STATED WHEN BREZHNEV FIRST BROACHED THE IDEA. THE SOVIET PROPOSAL IS CLEARLY ONE-SIDED. IT WOULD CODIFY EXISTING SOVIET ADVANTAGES, BOTH IN INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES AND IN STRATEGIC SYSTEMS, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME BLOCKING US PROGRAMS DESIGNED TO RESTORE THE BALANCE. IT WOULD DIVERT EFFORTS FROM THE ACHIEVEMENT OF STABILIZING REDUCTIONS IN INF AND STRATEGIC ARMS. THE UNITED STATES WILL CONTINUE TO SEEK IN THE START AND INF NEGOTIATIONS BALANCED AND VERIFIABLE AGREEMENTS WHICH WILL PROVIDE INCREASED STABILITY AT SUBSTANTIALLY LOWER LEVELS OF ARMAMENT. WE BELIEVE THAT INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THIS POSITION IS ESSENTIAL TO MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS IN A MORE PRODUCTIVE DIRECTION.

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USSR-US  
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11/27/82

## 2. PRAVDA BERATES PRESIDENT REAGAN'S ARMS CONTROL SPEECH

Moscow's most considered response to the President--the Pravda editorial of November 25--was also its most critical. In the weeks to come, the Soviet emphasis seems more likely to be on propaganda than on efforts to negotiate. In the next START round the Soviets may probe the possibilities for an agreement on at least one confidence-building measure, while continuing to attack the US position on reductions.

\* \* \*

The Soviets began reacting to the President's speech even before he delivered it. Some days before the address, Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko criticized the US failure to ratify SALT II in a statement for Newsweek. Andropov himself was probably anticipating the President's speech when, on November 22, he reaffirmed Soviet interest in negotiations with the US, but warned that the USSR would not make concessions in advance. The Soviets apparently hoped to detract from the impact of the President's speech by publicizing fresh statements of their own.

Initial TASS coverage of the speech focused on the MX decision, calling it a dangerous new step in the arms race. It also highlighted US domestic criticism, and charged that the President used false data on the military balance to justify his decision.

Pravda's November 26 editorial commented in detail on the entire speech. It repeated Andropov's rejection of concessions in advance of negotiations and elaborated on the themes in the TASS coverage. Pravda went further, however, and introduced new themes, characterizing US positions in both START and INF as "absurd." It charged that MX deployment would violate SALT I and II limitations which, Pravda maintained, prohibit new silos for ICBMs. Pravda also criticized the President's treatment of confidence-building measures, charged that the US failed to consider Soviet proposals, and asserted that work on CBMs should not delay or substitute for reductions. Nevertheless, the editorial conceded that exchanges of more information on missile launchings would be useful.

An obscure passage in the editorial suggested that the USSR might not undertake any specific military program because of MX. Pravda said the USSR did not intend to respond to every new American weapons system, but warned that this did not mean the USSR would not find an effective answer to US plans to achieve military superiority.

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BY RW NARA DATE 1/4/10

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BY KML NARA DATE 4/24/11

PAGE 01 OF 02 USMISSION GENEVA 0438 DTG: 201659Z OCT 82 PSN: 025152  
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INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 6250  
USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 8373  
USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 10438

EXDIS  
MILITARY ADDRESSEE HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
FOR ACDA/DIRECTOR ROSTOW; SHAPE/FOR GEN ROGERS AND POLAD  
USSTART  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PARM, START  
SUBJECT: (U) ROWNY/KARPOV MEMCON, 19 OCTOBER 1982

1. THIS IS START MEMCON II-M-025. SECRET ENTIRE TEXT.
2. MEETING DATE: OCTOBER 19, 1982  
- TIME: 12 10-3:05 PM  
- PLACE: SOVIET MISSION

3. PARTICIPANTS:  
US: AMB. EDWARD L. ROWNY  
- MR. S. SEYMOUR, INT.  
USSR: AMB. V. P. KARPOV  
MR. N. V. BOROVSKIY, INT.

4. SUBJECT SUMMARY: EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY;  
THROW-WEIGHT; PARITY; DATA EXCHANGE.

5. KARPOV OPENED A LONG (THREE-HOUR) POST-PLENARY BY RE-ITERATING THAT EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY MUST BE THE BASIS FOR ANY FUTURE AGREEMENT. I SAID WE BELIEVED THAT AN AGREEMENT SHOULD BE BASED STRICTLY ON EQUALITY, AND HAD TAILORED OUR PROPOSAL ACCORDINGLY. I ASKED HIM TO SPECIFY WHAT THE SOVIETS HAD IN MIND WHEN THEY SPOKE ABOUT EQUAL SECURITY. KARPOV SAID THE SOVIETS MEANT THAT US "FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS" BASED IN EUROPE AND ON AIR-CRAFT CARRIERS AND "OTHER FACTORS" NEED BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. I REMINDED KARPOV THAT THE SO-CALLED "FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS" HAD NO PLACE IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS, AND WENT THROUGH THE "TERRITORIAL" ARGUMENT FOR HIM ONCE AGAIN. I SAID THAT THE US HAD ADDITIONAL SYSTEMS TO PROTECT ITS OWN SECURITY AND SECURITY OF ITS ALLIES BECAUSE OF THE OVERWHELMING ADVANTAGES THE SOVIETS HAD IN CONVENTIONAL AND INTERMEDIATE NUCLEAR FORCES. I SAID THAT WHEN THESE THREATS WERE REDUCED, THE US WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY REDUCE ITS COUNTERBALANCING DETERRENT FORCES. AT ANY RATE, THESE OTHER SYSTEMS HAD NO PLACE IN ANY BILATERAL AGREEMENT ON STRATEGIC ARMS. AS FOR "OTHER FACTORS," I TOLD KARPOV THAT THE REPEATED USE OF SUCH A FORMULATION WAS

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EVIDENCE THAT THE SOVIETS INTENDED TO MAKE SUBJECTIVE JUDGMENTS CONCERNING COMPENSATION WHENEVER IT SUITED THEIR PURPOSES TO DO SO. I URGED HIM TO BE SPECIFIC OR TO DROP THE TERM.

6. KARPOV SAID THAT THE US PROPOSAL WOULD NOT RESULT IN EQUALITY SINCE IT PREVENTED THE USSR FROM FIELDING THEIR FULL 2500 ICBM WARHEADS UNLESS IT COMPLETELY RESTRUCTURED ITS FORCES. HE SAID THAT BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD SPLIT THEIR BALLISTIC MISSILES EVENLY BETWEEN ICBMS AND SLBMS, THE 425 ICBMS WOULD ONLY PERMIT 1915 ICBM WARHEADS. HE DID THIS BY MULTIPLYING 110 (HEAVIES) X 10, FOR 1100. HE THEN ADDED 100 X 6 (MEDIUMS) AND THE REMAINING 215 FOR THE WARHEADS WHICH WOULD BE ON SINGLE WARHEAD MISSILES. I TOLD KARPOV THAT THE 110 HEAVY AND 210 HEAVY AND MEDIUM COLLATERAL CONSTRAINTS WERE FOR THE PURPOSE OF BRINGING DOWN THE LARGE SOVIET ICBM THROW-WEIGHT ASYMMETRY. I ASKED HIM IF HE HAD ANOTHER WAY OF REDUCING SOVIET ICBM THROW-WEIGHT BY A SIMILAR AMOUNT. HE DID NOT RESPOND. I ASKED HIM FURTHER IF HE WAS PROPOSING THAT THE 2500 NUMBER BE REDUCED TO 1915. KARPOV SAID, "NO." HE WAS ONLY USING THIS AS AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE LACK OF EQUALITY BUILT INTO THE US PROPOSAL.

7. NEXT KARPOV ADDRESSED PARITY, SAYING THAT BY SIGNING SALT II THE US HAD TACITLY AGREED THAT A CONDITION OF PARITY EXISTED AT THAT TIME. HE SAID THAT SINCE THE SOVIETS HAD NOT INCREASED THE NUMBER OF SYSTEMS SINCE 1979, THE SAME PARITY THAT HAD EXISTED THEN EXISTS NOW. I TOLD KARPOV THAT SALT II HAD NOT BEEN RATIFIED BY THE US PRECISELY BECAUSE IT WOULD CODIFY MAJOR INEQUALITIES BETWEEN THE TWO NATIONS. AS EXAMPLES I POINTED OUT THE UNILATERAL RIGHT WHICH SALT II PROVIDED THE SOVIETS BY ALLOWING THEM 308 HEAVIES; THE FACT THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD BE PERMITTED TO DEPLOY OVER 6000 ICBM WARHEADS AS COMPARED TO 2150 FOR THE US; THE LARGE ASYMMETRY IN ICBM THROW-WEIGHT; AND THE FACT THAT HUNDREDS OF INTERCONTINENTALLY-CAPABLE BACKFIRE BOMBERS WERE NOT INCLUDED IN THE AGGREGATE LIMITS. I TOLD KARPOV THAT UNLESS WE COULD AGREE ON THE CURRENT US-USSR STRATEGIC SITUATION, I DID NOT SEE HOW WE COULD PROCEED TO TALK ABOUT A FUTURE RELATIONSHIP.

8. AS TO OUR REQUEST TO EXCHANGE DATA ON THE CURRENT  
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INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 6251  
USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 8374  
USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 GENEVA 10438

EXDIS  
STRATEGIC SITUATION KARPOV SAID HE WOULD GIVE ME A PRE-  
LIMINARY PERSONAL REACTION. HE SAID THE SOVIETS BELIEVED  
IN EXCHANGING DATA ONLY ON PARAMETERS WHICH THEY WOULD  
AGREE TO FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE TREATY. I TOLD KARPOV  
THAT THE REASON WE WERE ASKING FOR AN EXCHANGE OF DATA  
WAS TO LET THE FIGURES SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES AS TO THE  
CURRENT US-SOVIET STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP. KARPOV ANSWERED  
THAT THE SOVIETS ONLY SAW TWO PARAMETERS NECESSARY ON  
WHICH WE WOULD LATER NEED TO EXCHANGE DATA: THE NUMBER  
OF SNDVS, AND THE TOTAL NUMBER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. KARPOV  
SAID THAT THE US INSISTED ON SELECTIVELY SINGLING OUT  
CURRENT ICBMS AS THE MAIN DESTABILIZING FACTOR. WHEREAS  
FUTURE ALCMS WERE SUCH A FACTOR. HE ASKED WHEN WE WOULD  
RESPOND TO THEIR CLAIM THAT THE US PROGRAM FOR 4000 ALCMS  
WOULD PROVE DESTABILIZING. I SAID THAT THE SOVIETS HAD  
FAILED TO ENGAGE US IN A DIALOGUE ON WHICH WERE THE MORE  
DESTABILIZING SYSTEMS AND IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT NOT ALL  
SYSTEMS AS THEY CLAIMED, WERE EQUALLY DESTABILIZING. I  
ASKED KARPOV WHEN THE SOVIETS WOULD ADDRESS THE THREE CON-  
CERNS WHICH WE HAD HIGHLIGHTED IN OUR PLENARY STATEMENT  
ON OCTOBER 7. THESE WERE, FIRST, THAT BALLISTIC MISSILES  
PRESENT A FIRST STRIKE THREAT WHILE SLOW-FLYING SYSTEMS  
ARE NOT SUITABLE FOR THIS ROLE AND ARE PRIMARILY RETALIA-  
TORY WEAPONS. SECOND, THAT REDUCING RELIANCE UPON ICBMS  
WILL SERVE TO IMPROVE STABILITY AND THUS STRENGTHEN THE  
SECURITY OF BOTH COUNTRIES. AND THIRD, A FUNDAMENTAL  
DESTABILIZING ASYMMETRY EXISTS BETWEEN THE FORCES OF THE  
TWO COUNTRIES IN BALLISTIC MISSILE THROW-WEIGHT, LARGELY  
BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE IN THE SOVIET ICBM FORCE OF MORE  
THAN 300 HEAVY MISSILES; WE DID NOT KNOW HOW THE SOVIET  
UNION PROPOSED TO DEAL WITH THIS ASYMMETRY. KARPOV  
SAID HE WOULD REPLY TO THESE QUESTIONS AT A LATER DATE.

9. IN CLOSING, I TOLD KARPOV THAT HE WOULD MOVE OUR  
NEGOTIATION FORWARD BY ADDRESSING CRISIS STABILITY, AND  
NOT SIMPLY ARMS CONTROL STABILITY. FURTHER, I TOLD HIM  
I DID NOT KNOW WHAT HE WAS REFERRING TO WHEN HE  
SAID THAT THE FORCES OF THE TWO SIDES WERE CONVERGING.  
FINALLY, I SAID THAT BEFORE WE COULD TALK ABOUT A FUTURE  
BALANCE WE HAD TO AGREE ON THE PRESENT STRATEGIC RELA-  
TIONSHIP. KARPOV SAID HE WOULD ALSO REPLY TO ME ON THESE  
THREE POINTS LATER.  
ROWNY

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BY ~~KML~~ NARA DATE 4/21/11

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AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0000

~~SECRET~~ STATE 278374

EXDIS/USSTART  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PARM, INF  
SUBJECT: INSTRUCTIONS FOR ROUND TWO OF START

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES GUIDANCE TO THE U. S. DELEGATION FOR THE SECOND ROUND OF STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS (START) WITH THE USSR BEGINNING OCTOBER 6. IT SUPPLEMENTS INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE FIRST ROUND, WHICH REMAIN IN EFFECT. GUIDANCE IS PROVIDED SEPTEL FOR A REVIEW OF ISSUES CONNECTED WITH ARTICLE XI OF THE ABM TREATY.

3. THE OVERALL OBJECTIVE FOR THE SECOND ROUND IS TO FURTHER ELABORATE AND PROMOTE U. S. PROPOSALS FOR A START AGREEMENT. SPECIFICALLY, THE U. S. DELEGATION SHOULD:

-- -- INTRODUCE AND MAKE AN EFFECTIVE CASE FOR |  
ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS OF THE U. S. POSITION;

-- -- REINFORCE AND SEEK SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF POSITIONS |  
WE HAVE ALREADY TABLED, EMPHASIZING KEY PRINCIPLES ON  
WHICH OUR PROPOSALS ARE BASED;

-- -- RESPOND TO SOVIET PROPOSALS, ATTACKING THE |  
WEAK POINTS OF THEIR POSITIONS;

-- -- PRESS FOR FURTHER DETAILS AND CLARIFICATIONS |  
OF SOVIET POSITIONS; AND

-- -- SEEK TO IDENTIFY AREAS OF SIMILARITY BETWEEN |  
U. S. AND SOVIET POSITIONS.

4. THE DELEGATION IS AUTHORIZED TO CONFIRM THAT, AFTER CAREFUL STUDY DURING THE RECESS, THE U. S. GOVERNMENT HAS CONCLUDED THAT THE SOVIET PROPOSAL PRESENTED DURING THE FIRST ROUND DOES NOT PROVIDE AN ACCEPTABLE BASIS FOR AN AGREEMENT. WITH RESPECT TO SPECIFIC SOVIET PROPOSALS, THE DELEGATION IS AUTHORIZED TO RESPOND ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES:

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-- -- THE SOVIET PROPOSAL IS NOT BASED ON UNITS OF ACCOUNT THAT ACCURATELY REFLECT STRATEGIC CAPABILITY (I.E., BALLISTIC MISSILES, THEIR WARHEADS, AND THEIR THROW-WEIGHT).

-- -- THE 1800 LIMIT IS TOO HIGH, AND LINKAGE OF REDUCTIONS TO SO-CALLED FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS IS UNWARRANTED AND UNACCEPTABLE.

-- -- THE SOVIET-PROPOSED LIMIT ON "NUCLEAR CHARGES" REFLECTS A RECOGNITION THAT LAUNCHERS/DELIVERY VEHICLES DO NOT ADEQUATELY REFLECT STRATEGIC CAPABILITY. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THAT LIMIT SHOULD BE EXPRESSED IN TERMS OF BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS, AND SHOULD NOT INCLUDE CRUISE MISSILE/BOMBER WEAPONS.

-- -- WE CANNOT ACCEPT THE BAN ON DEPLOYMENT OF CRUISE MISSILES WITH A RANGE GREATER THAN 600 KM.

-- -- WE CANNOT ACCEPT A LIMIT ON OHIO/TYPHOON-CLASS SUBMARINES TO 4-6 UNITS OR A PROHIBITION ON MODERNIZATION OR REPLACEMENT OF MISSILES FOR THOSE SUBMARINES. REGARDING A BAN ON NEW TYPES OF SSBNS WITH MORE THAN 16 LAUNCH TUBES, THE DELEGATION MAY SEEK CLARIFICATION OF THIS PROPOSAL, INCLUDING WHAT IS MEANT BY NEW TYPES OF SSBNS.

-- -- REGARDING THE PROPOSED ICBM MODERNIZATION CONSTRAINTS (E.G., RESTRICTIONS ON INCREASING SILO VOLUME, BAN ON NEW OR RELOCATED FIXED ICBM LAUNCHERS, LIMIT ON NEW TYPES OF ICBMS), THE DELEGATION SHOULD AVOID A RESPONSE PENDING FURTHER GUIDANCE.

-- -- REGARDING THE PROPOSED PROHIBITIONS ON EARTH-

ORBITING NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, OCEAN FLOOR-BASED BALLISTIC OR CRUISE MISSILE LAUNCHERS OR MISSILES, AND BALLISTIC MISSILES ON WATERBORNE VEHICLES OTHER THAN SUBMARINES, WE BELIEVE THESE ISSUES SHOULD BE HANDLED AT A LATER STAGE.

-- -- WE WOULD LIKE SOVIET CLARIFICATION OF THE PROPOSED BAN ON MANEUVERING, SELF-GUIDED, AND PENETRATING WARHEADS, INCLUDING THE REASONS FOR THE PROPOSAL. (THE DELEGATION SHOULD AVOID SIGNALING A POSITIVE U.S. INTEREST IN THIS PROPOSAL.)

-- -- WE NOTE SOVIET INTEREST IN CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES, AND PLAN TO ADDRESS THIS QUESTION AT A LATER DATE. (FYI. FURTHER GUIDANCE ON THIS SUBJECT WILL BE PROVIDED.)

-- -- WE AGREE ON THE NEED FOR COOPERATIVE VERIFICATION MEASURES, BUT THE US POSITION IS THAT COOPERATIVE MEASURES SHOULD SUPPLEMENT NTM, NOT JUST ENHANCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF NTM.

5. CONSTRAINING RECONSTITUTION CAPABILITIES. THE DELEGATION IS AUTHORIZED TO PROPOSE THE CONSTRAINTS ON NON-DEPLOYED BALLISTIC MISSILES OUTLINED IN THE SECTIONS OF NSDD-53 ENTITLED "LIMITS APPLIED AT ICBM COMPLEXES," "NON-QUANTITATIVE CONSTRAINTS ON NON-DEPLOYED BALLISTIC MISSILES," "QUANTITATIVE CONSTRAINTS ON NON-DEPLOYED BALLISTIC MISSILES," AND "DATA EXCHANGE". THE DELEGATION MAY POINT OUT THAT, WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN CONSTRAINTS ON NON-DEPLOYED

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MISSILES, COOPERATIVE MEASURES TO SUPPLEMENT NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS, WILL BE REQUIRED TO ENSURE EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE. (PENDING FURTHER GUIDANCE, THE DELEGATION SHOULD NOT DISCUSS FURTHER OUR APPROACH TO VERIFYING CONSTRAINTS ON NON-DEPLOYED MISSILES.) IN PRESENTING THE MATERIAL CONTAINED IN THE SECTION OF NSDD-53 ENTITLED "NON-QUANTITATIVE CONSTRAINTS ON NON-DEPLOYED BALLISTIC MISSILES," THE DELEGATION SHOULD BE GUIDED BY THE FOLLOWING:

-- -- REGARDING THIRD CONSTRAINT IN SECTION, LAUNCHERS ASSOCIATED WITH DEPLOYED MISSILES RETIRED TO ACHIEVE 850 LIMIT MUST BE DISMANTLED OR DESTROYED.

-- -- REGARDING FOURTH CONSTRAINT, ALL NON-DEPLOYED MISSILES MUST BE STORED AT DESIGNATED STORAGE AREAS

(EXCEPT FOR THE SMALL QUANTITY PERMITTED AT ICBM COMPLEXES AND MISSILE TEST SITES) AND ARE BANNED FROM ALL OTHER LOCATIONS. STORAGE AREAS MUST BE LOCATED A SPECIFIED DISTANCE FROM ICBM COMPLEXES.

6. THE DELEGATION IS AUTHORIZED TO PROPOSE THE DEFINITIONS, COUNTING RULES, AND OTHER MEASURES CONTAINED IN THE INTERAGENCY PAPER "DEFINITIONS AND TYPE/COUNTING RULES FOR START" DATED OCTOBER 1, 1982.

7. NEW HEAVY MISSILES. DURING THE FIRST ROUND, THE DELEGATION PROPOSED A BAN ON "NEW HEAVY MISSILES." IF THE SOVIETS ASK WHETHER THE PROPOSAL APPLIES TO ALL NEW HEAVY MISSILES OR TO "NEW TYPES" OF HEAVY MISSILES, THE DELEGATION SHOULD POINT OUT THAT, UNDER THE US PROPOSAL WHICH CALLS FOR A SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION OF HEAVY MISSILES IN PHASE ONE AND THEIR COMPLETE ELIMINATION IN PHASE TWO, WE CAN SEE NO JUSTIFICATION FOR PRODUCING ADDITIONAL HEAVY MISSILES UNDER THE AGREEMENT. (FYI. THE US POSITION IS TO BAN "NEW TYPES" OF HEAVY MISSILES, BUT WE SEE NO NEED TO CLARIFY OUR POSITION AT THIS STAGE. END FYI.)

8. DEFINING THROW-WEIGHT. THE DELEGATION SHOULD INDICATE TO THE SOVIETS THAT WE CONSIDER BALLISTIC MISSILE THROW-WEIGHT TO BE THE SUM OF THE WEIGHTS OF THE REENTRY VEHICLES (RVS), POST-BOOST VEHICLE (INCLUDING ITS FUEL) OR SIMILAR DEVICES FOR RELEASING OR DISPENSING RVS, AND ANY PENETRATION AIDS, INCLUDING THEIR RELEASE DEVICES. THE DELEGATION SHOULD INDICATE TO THE SOVIETS THAT THE US WILL PROPOSE AT A LATER DATE A METHOD OF DETERMINING THROW-WEIGHT. THE DELEGATION MAY INDICATE TO THE SOVIETS, THAT WE ARE CONSIDERING COUNTING RULES AND THE POSSIBILITY OF SPECIFYING IN THE AGREEMENT A COLLATERAL CONSTRAINT OR UNDERSTANDING DESIGNED TO PREVENT THE CIRCUMVENTION OF THE COUNTING RULE THROUGH THE TESTING OR DEPLOYMENT OF MISSILES THAT HAVE THE POTENTIAL TO CARRY MORE THROW-WEIGHT THAN THE MAXIMUM DEMONSTRATED VALUE FOR MISSILES OF THAT TYPE.

9. DEFINING HEAVY BOMBERS. THE DELEGATION SHOULD PROPOSE THAT, FOR EXISTING TYPES OF AIRCRAFT, THE SYSTEMS TO BE COVERED SHOULD BE SPECIFIED IN THE AGREEMENT (BEAR, BISON, BACKFIRE, AND BLACKJACK FOR THE USSR; AND B-52 AND B-1 FOR THE U.S.). FOR FUTURE TYPES, A FUTURE BOMBER AIRCRAFT TYPE WOULD BE ACCOUNTABLE IN

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START IF IT COULD CARRY OUT THE MISSION OF A HEAVY BOMBER IN A MANNER COMPARABLE TO THE EXISTING HEAVY BOMBERS PROPOSED FOR INCLUSION IN THE AGREEMENT BY THE US. THE DELEGATION MAY INDICATE TO THE SOVIETS THAT WE ARE CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITY OF SPECIFYING IN THE AGREEMENT CRITERIA THAT WOULD HELP CLASSIFY FUTURE AIRCRAFT AS HEAVY BOMBERS.

10. SCHEDULE OF REDUCTIONS. THE DELEGATION SHOULD STATE THAT THE US FAVORS A PHASED APPROACH TO ACHIEVING THE FORCE REDUCTIONS PROPOSED BY THE U.S. FOR THE FIRST PHASE OF START, WITH EQUAL INTERMEDIATE CEILINGS IMPOSED AT TWO-YEAR INTERVALS DURING A SPECIFIED PERIOD. THE REDUCTIONS WOULD BE CARRIED OUT IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGREED DISMANTLING AND DESTRUCTION PROCEDURES, WHICH THE U.S. WILL ADDRESS AT A LATER DATE. THE DELEGATION IS AUTHORIZED TO PRESENT THE FOLLOWING ILLUSTRATIVE SCHEDULE, WHICH DEMONSTRATES HOW REDUCTIONS FROM CURRENT FORCE LEVELS COULD BE ACHIEVED WITHIN 8 YEARS OF ENTRY INTO FORCE (EIF). (FYI. SINCE THE INTERMEDIATE CEILINGS ARE SENSITIVE TO THE FORCE LEVELS PREVAILING AT THE TIME OF EIF, WE WOULD NOT WANT TO COMMIT OURSELVES TO A PARTICULAR REDUCTION SCHEDULE AT THIS TIME. THE DELEGATION SHOULD BEAR THIS IN MIND IN PRESENTING THE ILLUSTRATIVE SCHEDULE. END FYI.) IF THE SOVIETS CRITICIZE THE CEILINGS ON DEPLOYED BALLISTIC MISSILES ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE FIRST TWO INTERMEDIATE CEILINGS ARE ABOVE THE CURRENT US LEVEL, THE DELEGATION SHOULD POINT OUT THAT US DEPLOYED MISSILES WOULD ALSO BE REDUCED DURING THIS PERIOD AS A RESULT OF THE REQUIRED REDUCTIONS IN BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS.

DATE	BALLISTIC MISSILE	ICBM WARHEADS	DEPLOYED BALLISTIC MISSILES	HEAVY ICBMS	HEAVY/ MEDIUM ICBMS
EIF PLUS 2	7000	5000	2000	260	670
EIF PLUS 4	6400	4200	1650	210	510
EIF PLUS 6	5700	3400	1250	160	360
EIF PLUS 8	5000	2500	850	110	210

11. DURATION. THE DELEGATION IS AUTHORIZED TO INDICATE THAT WE FAVOR AN AGREEMENT OF LONG DURATION AND THAT WE ARE CONSIDERING A NUMBER OF ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES. WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN SOVIET VIEWS ON THE QUESTION OF DURATION.

12. FLIGHT-TEST DATA. THE DELEGATION SHOULD POINT OUT THAT SOVIET PRACTICES IN THIS AREA ARE A MATTER OF CONCERN AND RAISE SERIOUS PROBLEMS FOR EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS AGREEMENTS. FOR THIS REASON, WE CONSIDERED IT IMPORTANT IN THE OPENING ROUND TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF TELEMETRY ENCRYPTION. THE U.S. RECOGNIZES, HOWEVER, THAT ENCRYPTION IS NOT THE ONLY MEANS OF DENYING ACCESS TO FLIGHT-TEST DATA, AND WILL, AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME, MAKE FURTHER DETAILED PROPOSALS REGARDING ACCESS TO FLIGHT-TEST DATA UNDER A START AGREEMENT. DAM  
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EXDIS

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FOR ACDA/DIRECTOR ROSTOW; SHAPE/FOR GEN. ROGERS AND POLAD  
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PARM, START

SUBJECT: (U) SOVIET PLENARY STATEMENT, OCTOBER 21, 1982

1. THIS IS START II-020. SECRET--ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SOVIET STATEMENT DELIVERED AT  
OCTOBER 21, 1982 PLENARY.

3. BEGIN TEXT:

-- KARPOV STATEMENT, OCTOBER 21, 1982

MR. AMBASSADOR,

--  
-- THE PROPOSALS ON QUANTITATIVE REDUCTIONS  
OF THE STRATEGIC ARMS OF THE USSR AND THE U.S., TABLED  
BY THE USSR DELEGATION AT THESE NEGOTIATIONS, CONSTITUTE  
ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENTS OF THE SOVIET SIDE'S  
APPROACH TO RESOLVING THE QUESTIONS INVOLVED IN LIMITING  
AND REDUCING STRATEGIC ARMS.

-- IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE PROPOSALS, WHICH ARE  
AIMED AT LOWERING THE LEVEL OF NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION  
IN FULL ACCORD WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND  
EQUAL SECURITY, WOULD BE A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO  
STRENGTHENING STRATEGIC STABILITY AND REDUCING THE  
THREAT OF OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR, AND THIS CANNOT BUT  
SERVE THE INTERESTS OF BOTH OUR STATES.

-- AT TODAY'S MEETING THE USSR DELEGATION INTENDS TO  
PRESENT ITS CONSIDERATIONS ON THIS QUESTION, WITHOUT  
REGARD FOR THE ONGOING EXCHANGE OF VIEWS BETWEEN THE  
DELEGATIONS.

--  
-- II  
-- AS YOU KNOW, THE SOVIET UNION IS IN FAVOR OF HAVING  
THE FUTURE ACCORD PROVIDE FOR MUTUAL OBLIGATIONS ON  
STAGE-BY-STAGE REDUCTION TO 1800 UNITS BY THE YEAR 1990  
OF THE AGGREGATE NUMBER OF STRATEGIC DELIVERY VEHICLES,  
THAT IS: ICBM LAUNCHERS, SLBM LAUNCHERS AND HEAVY  
BOMBERS. WE HAVE ALSO PROPOSED THAT STAGE-BY-STAGE  
REDUCTION TO AGREED EQUAL LEVELS OF THE AGGREGATE NUMBER

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OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON STRATEGIC DELIVERY VEHICLES, AS WELL AS OF THE AGGREGATE NUMBERS OF STRATEGIC DELIVERY VEHICLES EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS BE CARRIED OUT BY THE SAME DATE. IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WE COULD AGREE UPON THE SPECIFIC FIGURES FOR THE SCOPE OF REDUCTIONS OF MIRVED STRATEGIC DELIVERY VEHICLES AND ON AN APPROPRIATE LEVEL FOR THEM. TODAY I WOULD ONLY LIKE TO EMPHASIZE THAT UNDER THE SOVIET APPROACH IT IS ASSUMED THAT THIS LEVEL MUST BE LOWER THAN THE LIMIT PROVIDED FOR IN THE SALT II TREATY FOR THIS CATEGORY OF ARMS.

- THUS, IF ONE TAKES AN OBJECTIVE VIEW OF THINGS, ONE CANNOT FAIL TO RECOGNIZE THAT IN TERMS OF THE SCOPE OF QUANTITATIVE REDUCTIONS OF STRATEGIC ARMS, THE SOVIET SIDE IS PROPOSING MAJOR, SIGNIFICANT, AND FAR-REACHING REDUCTIONS.

- INDEED, FOR THE SOVIET UNION ALONE THIS WOULD MEAN REDUCTION OF THE OVERALL LEVEL OF ITS STRATEGIC DELIVERY VEHICLES BY 700 UNITS, THAT IS, BY ALMOST ONE-THIRD. FOR THE U.S., TOO, THERE WOULD BE QUITE SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS, THAT IS, ITS STRATEGIC DELIVERY VEHICLES WOULD BE REDUCED BY ALMOST 500 UNITS. ONE SHOULD ALSO EMPHASIZE THE FACT THAT THE REDUCED LEVELS WE ARE PROPOSING WOULD BE 450 UNITS LOWER THAN THE CORRESPONDING LEVEL ESTABLISHED UNDER THE SALT II TREATY, AND REDUCTIONS TO THAT LEVEL WERE NOT IMPLEMENTED ONLY BECAUSE THE U.S. REFUSED TO RATIFY THE TREATY.

- HENCE IT IS CLEAR THAT AT THE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS, TOO, THE USSR IS ADVOCATING THAT THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION PROCESS WHICH BEGAN WITH THE CONCLUSION OF THE FIRST SOVIET-U.S. AGREEMENTS IN THIS AREA BE CONTINUED AND DEVELOPED SO THAT THE FUTURE ACCORD WILL BE A MAJOR STEP IN THIS DIRECTION.

- PRECISELY SUCH AN OPPORTUNITY IS CREATED BY THE PROPOSALS FOR QUANTITATIVE REDUCTIONS, TABLED BY THE SOVIET SIDE, WHICH ARE DICTATED FROM BEGINNING TO BT

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END BY THE INTERESTS OF LOWERING THE LEVEL OF NUCLEAR  
CONFRONTATION AND PREVENTING THE RISK OF OUTBREAK OF  
NUCLEAR WAR.

III

MR. AMBASSADOR, IN THIS CONTEXT I WOULD ALSO LIKE  
ONCE AGAIN TO DIRECT YOUR ATTENTION TO THE EXISTENCE  
OF U. S. FORWARD-BASED NUCLEAR SYSTEMS AS A FACTOR WHICH  
HAS AN IMPACT ON THE STRATEGIC SITUATION.

IT IS SELF-EVIDENT THAT SINCE THEY ARE CAPABLE  
OF REACHING TARGETS ON THE TERRITORY OF THE USSR,  
ESSENTIALLY THESE SYSTEMS CONSTITUTE AN ADDITION  
TO THE STRATEGIC POTENTIAL OF THE U. S., IN A SITUATION  
WHERE THE USSR HAS NO COMPARABLE SYSTEMS.

IT IS ALSO CLEAR THAT WITH REDUCTIONS -- AND QUITE  
SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS AT THAT -- OF ICBM LAUNCHERS,  
SLBM LAUNCHERS AND HEAVY BOMBERS, FROM THE STANDPOINT  
OF THE STRATEGIC RELATION BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE  
U. S. THE RELATIVE WEIGHT OF U. S. FORWARD-BASED NUCLEAR  
SYSTEMS WOULD INCREASE GREATLY.

THE SPECIFIC FIGURE FOR THE LEVEL OF REDUCTIONS  
OF STRATEGIC DELIVERY VEHICLES PROPOSED BY THE SOVIET  
SIDE IS DICTATED BY PRECISELY THIS OBJECTIVE FACT.  
UNDER PRESENT CONDITIONS, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE  
EXISTENCE OF A LARGE NUMBER OF U. S. FORWARD-BASED  
NUCLEAR SYSTEMS CAPABLE OF REACHING OUR TERRITORY,  
THIS LEVEL CANNOT BE LOWER.

NATURALLY, IN THE INTERESTS OF STRENGTHENING  
STRATEGIC STABILITY AND MAINTAINING PARITY BETWEEN  
THE USSR AND THE U. S., THE NEW ACCORD MUST NOT ALLOW  
THE POSSIBILITY OF CIRCUMVENTING IT THROUGH AN INCREASE  
IN U. S. FORWARD-BASED NUCLEAR SYSTEMS WHICH IN WESTERN  
EUROPE ALONE NUMBER MANY HUNDREDS OF NUCLEAR DELIVERY  
VEHICLES. PRECISELY FOR THIS REASON THE SOVIET APPROACH  
PROVIDES THAT THE PROPOSED LEVEL OF REDUCTIONS TO  
1800 UNITS COULD BE CARRIED OUT ON THE UNDERSTANDING  
THAT THE U. S. AT LEAST DOES NOT BUILD UP ITS OTHER  
NUCLEAR SYSTEMS CAPABLE OF REACHING SOVIET TERRITORY.

THERE IS A SIMILAR INTERDEPENDENCE WITH RESPECT  
TO THE QUESTION OF FURTHER MEASURES TO LIMIT STRATEGIC  
ARMS. IN PROPOSING THAT NEGOTIATIONS ON FURTHER  
LOWERING THE LEVELS OF STRATEGIC DELIVERY VEHICLES

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AND THE WEAPONS ON THEM BE HELD FOLLOWING CONCLUSION OF THE ACCORD CURRENTLY UNDER NEGOTIATION, THE SOVIET SIDE BELIEVES THAT THE SPECIFIC AMOUNTS OF SUCH FURTHER REDUCTIONS WOULD DEPEND ON HOW THE QUESTION OF U.S. FORWARD-BASED NUCLEAR SYSTEMS, INCLUDING THOSE IN EUROPE, IS SOLVED.

- IN OTHER WORDS, EVEN THOUGH U.S. FORWARD-BASED NUCLEAR SYSTEMS ARE NOT A SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION AT THESE NEGOTIATIONS, THE FACT THAT THE U.S. HAS THEM AT ITS DISPOSAL CANNOT BUT BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN WORKING OUT APPROPRIATE SOLUTIONS TO THE QUESTIONS OF LIMITING AND REDUCING STRATEGIC ARMS.

-- IV

- AN IMPORTANT FEATURE OF THE SOVIET APPROACH, WHICH ALSO FORMS THE FRAMEWORK FOR THE PROPOSALS ON QUANTITATIVE REDUCTIONS OF STRATEGIC ARMS, IS ITS COMPREHENSIVE NATURE WHICH PROVIDES FOR THE NEED TO COVER ALL SUCH ARMS AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE SIDES BY THE AGREED MEASURES TO REDUCE, BAN, OR LIMIT THESE ARMS.

- SUCH AN APPROACH ENSUES FROM THE OBJECTIVE FACT THAT THERE ARE ABSOLUTELY NO GROUNDS FOR DIVIDING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS INTO SOME ARTIFICIAL CATEGORIES BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF THEIR ALLEGEDLY UNEQUAL IMPACT ON THE STABILITY OF THE STRATEGIC SITUATION.

- THE FACT IS THAT THE COMBAT CAPABILITIES OF STRATEGIC ARMS ARE CONSTANTLY CONVERGING, AND INCIDENTALLY U.S. MILITARY PROGRAMS GRAPHICALLY DEMONSTRATE THAT. THUS, THERE ARE NO GROUNDS EVEN TO RAISE THE QUESTION OF DIVIDING STRATEGIC DELIVERY VEHICLES INTO THOSE WHICH ARE SUPPOSEDLY "MOR" OR "LESS" DESTABILIZING, OR EVEN SOME WHICH ALLEGEDLY HAVE A STABILIZING ROLE ALTOGETHER. GIVEN GREATER SCRUTINY, SUCH AN APPROACH IS ESSENTIALLY TANTAMOUNT TO ATTEMPTS TO DECLARE THE BUILDUP OF CERTAIN TYPES OF STRATEGIC ARMS TO BE LITTLE SHORT OF USEFUL IN TERMS OF SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF REDUCING THE RISK OF

OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR. ONE WOULD THINK THERE IS NO NEED TO EXPLAIN IN DETAIL THAT SUCH A POINT OF VIEW IS VERY, VERY FAR FROM MEETING THE OBJECTIVE OF LIMITING STRATEGIC ARMS AND STRENGTHENING STRATEGIC STABILITY, AND, TO PUT IT BLUNTLY, IS CONTRADICTORY BT

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TO THAT OBJECTIVE AND AMOUNTS TO GRANTING DISPENSATION  
TO CONTINUE THE ARMS RACE WITH ALL ITS NEGATIVE  
CONSEQUENCES.

- AN OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS CONFIRMS THAT THE COMPRE-  
HENSIVE APPROACH OF THE USSR IS EQUITABLE.

- IF WE CONSIDER THE SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS OF  
VARIOUS TYPES OF STRATEGIC ARMS -- ICBMS, SLBMS,  
HEAVY BOMBERS OR CRUISE MISSILES -- WE CANNOT BUT  
ADMIT THAT THEY DEMONSTRATE THAT FROM A PRACTICAL  
STANDPOINT SUCH ARMS ARE EQUALLY DANGEROUS IN TERMS  
OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF THEIR USE IN THE EVENT A  
NUCLEAR WAR WERE UNLEASHED. THE COMBINATION OF CHARAC-  
TERISTICS WHICH EACH TYPE OF STRATEGIC ARMS HAS DOES  
NOT PERMIT ONE TO PLACE ONE TYPE OF SUCH ARMS OR  
ANOTHER INTO A SPECIAL, DESTABILIZING CATEGORY. MORE-  
OVER, U. S. MILITARY PROGRAMS ARE AIMED AT GIVING ALL  
TYPES OF STRATEGIC ARMS THE ABILITY TO BE USED TO  
DELIVER A FIRST STRIKE. IT IS PRECISELY FOR THIS  
PURPOSE THAT STEALTH TECHNOLOGY IS BEING DEVELOPED  
FOR HEAVY BOMBERS AND LONG-RANGE CRUISE MISSILES,  
CRUISE MISSILES ARE BEING GIVEN INCREASED ACCURACY,  
THE WARHEAD YIELD AND THE FIRING ACCURACY OF SLBMS  
IS BEING INCREASED, ETC.

- THIS IS WHY ALL STRATEGIC ARMS -- WITHOUT ANY  
EXCEPTIONS AND WITHOUT DELAYING THEIR CONSIDERATION  
UNTIL SOME UNSPECIFIED FUTURE TIME -- MUST BE SUBJECT  
TO LIMITATIONS AND REDUCTIONS, IF AT THESE NEGOTIATIONS  
WE ARE TO STRIVE FOR EFFECTIVE SOLUTIONS WHICH WOULD  
RESULT IN LOWERING THE LEVEL OF NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION  
WHILE MAINTAINING A BALANCE IN THE SECURITY INTERESTS  
OF THE TWO SIDES. OTHERWISE, THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY  
AND EQUAL SECURITY WOULD INEVITABLY BE VIOLATED, AND  
THE BASIS FOR COMPARISON OF THE STRATEGIC POTENTIALS  
OF THE SIDES WOULD BE LIQUIDATED. THIS IS PRECISELY  
WHY SUCH AN APPROACH CANNOT CREATE THE CONDITIONS  
NECESSARY FOR A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE ACCORD ON EFFECTIVE  
LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS. MOREOVER, THE U. S.  
PROPOSALS BASED ON SUCH AN APPROACH TAKE ON A CLEARLY  
ONE-SIDED CHARACTER: THEY ARE AIMED NOT AT REACHING  
A JUST AND EQUITABLE ACCORD, BUT AT UPSETTING  
ESTABLISHED PARITY AND AT ENSURING OBVIOUS UNILATERAL

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ADVANTAGE FOR THE U.S., AS WE SPECIFICALLY STATED AT THE LAST MEETING OF THE DELEGATIONS.

- MR. AMBASSADOR, SUCH IS THE RESPONSE OF THE USSR DELEGATION TO ONE OF THE QUESTIONS RAISED IN THE U.S. DELEGATION'S STATEMENT AT THE OCTOBER 7, 1982, MEETING.

--  
V

- AS WE HAVE REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED HERE, THE SOVIET PROPOSAL ON QUANTITATIVE LIMITATIONS OF STRATEGIC ARMS ENSURES EQUALITY BETWEEN THE SIDES AT ALL STAGES OF REDUCTIONS. THIS WAY THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES WOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, AND EQUAL SECURITY IN A SITUATION WHERE THE LEVEL OF NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION WAS GRADUALLY LOWERED WOULD BE ENSURED. PRECISELY SUCH DEVELOPMENT OF THE STRATEGIC RELATION BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE U.S. WOULD BE ONE OF THE MAIN FACTORS IN THE CONSISTENT STRENGTHENING OF STRATEGIC STABILITY.

--  
VI

- OUR PROPOSALS ON BANNING THE DEPLOYMENT OF LONG-RANGE CRUISE MISSILES, REGARDLESS OF BASING MODE, AND ON PROHIBITING THE DEVELOPMENT, TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF ASBMS GO HAND IN HAND WITH THE PROPOSALS OF THE SOVIET SIDE ON QUANTITATIVE REDUCTIONS OF STRATEGIC ARMS.

- THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE PROPOSALS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE GENERAL APPROACH PROPOSED BY THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO CREATE A SOLID BARRIER TO A FUTURE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE IN NEW AND PREVIOUSLY NON-EXISTENT DIRECTIONS, AND IT WOULD MAKE SURE THAT THE FUTURE ACCORD IS STABLE AND EFFECTIVE.

--  
VII

- MR. AMBASSADOR, THE USSR DELEGATION BELIEVES IT ADVISABLE THAT IN ORDER TO ENSURE A MORE PURPOSEFUL DISCUSSION OF THE ABOVE-MENTIONED PROVISIONS ON THE QUANTITATIVE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS, THESE PROVISIONS BE CONSIDERED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE DOCUMENT ON THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF AN ACCORD BETWEEN

THE USSR AND THE U.S., THE DRAFT OF WHICH WAS TABLED AT THE OCTOBER 7, 1982, MEETING.

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PAGE 01  
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BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH - ANALYSIS - OCTOBER 8, 1982

1. MOSCOW'S PUBLIC STANCE ON ARMS CONTROL

The Soviets opened the current rounds in START, INF, and MBF by taking a sharp public line. Gromyko at the UNGA and Brezhnev in a "peace" statement earlier this week likewise accentuated the alleged dangers of US nuclear and defense policies. Moscow appears to be trying to maximize domestic US and Allied pressure on Washington by asserting that present US positions hold no hope of producing agreements.

\* \* \*

Nothing in the individual Soviet statements represents a departure from the previous line. Coming together over a relatively short time, however, they accentuate the negative in the Kremlin's opening public posture for the current rounds of negotiations. Sensing a continued firm US stance, Moscow is attempting to shift public pressure, and the obligation to move first, onto Washington. But the Kremlin's present posture does not preclude eventual concessions, which historically have been preceded by a show of unbending inflexibility.

Moscow's most pressing goal is to upset NATO's INF deployment timetable. The stiff statements in Geneva by Soviet START and INF negotiators reflect a concerted effort to create the impression that negotiations are stalled and that Washington is at fault. For now, the Kremlin seems to be betting that West European public opinion, especially in the FRG, eventually will blame the US for lack of progress and create enough pressure at least to delay the INF deployment schedule.

Moscow probably regards its opening position in START as its strong suit for public relations purposes. Soviet commentators already have urged European audiences to press the US for movement on START, which would then set the stage for progress in the INF talks. Central Committee official Falin's disclosure last week that Moscow is proposing a 25 percent cut in existing strategic nuclear weapons probably marked the beginning of a more concentrated effort to sell the Soviet START position to informed public opinion.

Moscow will continue to pitch much of its public campaign to popular concerns in West Germany. It probably sees in Genscher's retention of the foreign affairs portfolio a sign that there will not be a sudden discontinuity in West German arms control policies. The Kremlin probably believes that between now and the elections next March, the new coalition in Bonn will not want to be seen by the electorate as insensitive to the advantages of detente.

On INF, Moscow will argue that it has already made adjustments in its original position to meet US concerns but that the US has held stubbornly to its one-sided "zero" outcome proposal. Tough Soviet statements do not, however, preclude a gaudy new initiative as the German elections approach, designed to encourage "accommodationist" sentiment in the FRG.

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BY KML NARA DATE 4/24/11



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START  
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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 GENEVA 08375

EXDIS  
MILITARY ADDRESSEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
FOR ACDA/DIRECTOR ROSTOW; SHAPE/FOR GEN ROGERS AND POLAD  
USSTART  
E. O. 12356: DECL: 8/12/02 (ROWNY, E. L.) OR-0  
TAGS: PARM START  
SUBJECT: (U) END-OF-ROUND REPORT: START

1. THIS IS START-091. SECRET--ENTIRE TEXT.

2. OUR PRIMARY OBJECTIVE DURING THE OPENING ROUND OF START WHICH ENDED ON AUGUST 12 WAS TO SET FORTH THE US PROPOSAL AS OUTLINED BY PRESIDENT REAGAN ON MAY 9 IN EUREKA. WE EXPLAINED THE MAJOR CRITERIA ON WHICH OUR PROPOSAL IS BASED: STABILITY, EQUALITY, REDUCTIONS, AND EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION. WE POINTED OUT THAT THE SOVIET BUILDUP OF HIGHLY ACCURATE ICBMS CAPABLE OF A DISARMING FIRST STRIKE AGAINST US ICBMS HAS BROUGHT ABOUT A DE-STABILIZING SITUATION. IT IS OUR INTENTION IN START TO ENCOURAGE FORCE STRUCTURES IN BOTH THE US AND THE USSR WHICH ARE MORE STABILIZING. WE MADE IT CLEAR THAT WE ARE NOT SEEKING IDENTICAL FORCE STRUCTURES, BUT RATHER EQUALITY IN THE MOST SIGNIFICANT MEASURES OF STRATEGIC CAPABILITY. WE REJECTED THE SOVIET CONCEPT OF "EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY" AS A BASIS FOR START AGREEMENT BECAUSE THEY USE IT TO JUSTIFY SOVIET CLAIMS TO A RIGHT TO A GREATER STRATEGIC CAPABILITY THAN OURS. THROUGHOUT, WE STRESSED THAT OUR PROPOSAL CALLS FOR SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS TO EQUAL AND VERIFIABLE LEVELS.

3. ONCE WE HAD LAID OUT THE US CRITERIA, WE PRESENTED THE DETAILED ELEMENTS OF THE US PROPOSAL:

- A PHASED APPROACH; HIGHEST PRIORITY ON THE MOST DESTABILIZING STRATEGIC SYSTEMS--NAMELY, BALLISTIC MISSILES.
- FIRST PHASE
- 5,000 WARHEADS ON DEPLOYED BALLISTIC MISSILES,
- NO MORE THAN 2,500 OF WHICH WOULD BE ICBM
- WARHEADS.

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PAGE 02 OF 02 USMISSION GENEVA 8375 DTG: 131754Z AUG 82 PSN: 044750

- --- 850 AGGREGATE CEILING ON DEPLOYED ICBMS AND SLBMS.
- --- THREE COLLATERAL CONSTRAINTS:
  - ---- NO MORE THAN 110 HEAVY ICBMS;
  - ---- A BAN ON NEW HEAVY MISSILES;
  - ---- NO MORE THAN 210 HEAVY AND MEDIUM ICBMS.
- --- IF THE SOVIETS ACCEPTED SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS IN BALLISTIC MISSILES AND COUNTED THE BACK-FIRE, WE COULD AGREE TO EQUAL NUMBERS OF HEAVY BOMBERS IN THE FIRST PHASE.
- --- CEILING OF APPROXIMATELY 200 KG ON THE MASS OF REENTRY VEHICLES ON NEW BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS AND LIMITS OF 10 WARHEADS ON ICBMS AND 14 ON SLBMS.
- --- EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION IS ESSENTIAL INCLUDING, WHENEVER NECESSARY, GOING BEYOND NTM.
- --- STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF DATA EXCHANGE AND PROPOSED A BAN ON ALL ENCRYPTION OF TELEMETRY DURING FLIGHT-TESTING.

4. THE SOVIETS PRESENTED THREE SETS OF PROPOSALS:
- -- FIRST, A FREEZE ON THE NUMBERS AND MODERNIZATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS, WHICH WE REJECTED.
  - -- SECOND, PHASED REDUCTIONS IN ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS AND HEAVY BOMBERS TO A LEVEL OF 1,800 BY THE YEAR 1990. (THEY CONDITIONED THEIR PROPOSAL ON NO INCREASE IN SO-CALLED "FBS.") THEY SAID THEY WOULD REDUCE THE AGGREGATE LEVEL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON SYSTEMS LIMITED BY THEIR PROPOSAL, BUT

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EXDIS

- REFUSED TO SPECIFY THE NUMBER PENDING "RESOLUTION"  
- OF THE CRUISE MISSILE ISSUE. THEY ALSO CALLED  
- FOR A BAN ON ALL CRUISE MISSILES AND ASBMS OVER  
- 600 KM.  
- -- THE REDUCTIONS WOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY RESTRIC-  
- TIONS ON MODERNIZATION, FOCUSING MAINLY ON SEA-  
- BASED SYSTEMS. THEIR PROPOSAL WOULD PREVENT MOST  
- OF OUR PROGRAMS BUT ALLOW MOST OF THEIRS TO GO  
- AHEAD.  
- -- THIRD, A SERIES OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES |  
- AS PART OF A START AGREEMENT.  
- -- SECOND PHASE  
- --- A DIRECT AND EQUAL LIMIT ON BALLISTIC MISSILE  
- THROW-WEIGHT BELOW THE CURRENT US LEVEL.  
- --- CONSIDER, IN THE SECOND PHASE, REDUCTIONS IN  
- HEAVY BOMBERS AND OTHER CONSTRAINTS ON SLOW-  
- FLYING SYSTEMS.

5. THE SOVIETS DID NOT CALL FOR COMPENSATION FOR BRITISH AND FRENCH FORCES IN START. THEY DID, HOWEVER, INDICATE THEY WOULD, UNDER SOME CIRCUMSTANCES, SEEK COMPENSATION FOR CHINESE NUCLEAR FORCES. WE TOLD THEM THAT THIRD COUNTRY FORCES WOULD NOT BE INCLUDED OR COMPENSATED FOR. AS IN THE PAST, THE SOVIETS SAID THERE SHOULD BE A NON-CIRCUMVENTION AND NON-TRANSFER PROVISION. WE RESPONDED IN POST-PLENARY THAT WE WOULD NOT CHANGE EXISTING PATTERNS OF COOPERATION WITH OUR ALLIES.

6. IT IS EVIDENT THAT THERE ARE CONSIDERABLE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE US AND THE SOVIET POSITIONS. WE TOLD THE SOVIETS THAT THE BASIC DEFICIENCY OF THEIR APPROACH IS THAT IT CONTAINS NO OBJECTIVE AND COHERENT CONCEPT FOR ENHANCING THE STABILITY OF THE US-SOVIET STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP. IN CONTRAST TO OUR APPROACH, THEIRS PROVIDES NO INCENTIVE TO MOVE AWAY FROM RELIANCE UPON DESTABILIZING SYSTEMS. WE TOLD THE SOVIETS THEY FAIL TO RECOGNIZE: (1) THE DESTABILIZING NATURE OF ICBMS, (2) THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN FAST-FLYING AND SLOW-FLYING SYSTEMS, (3) THE IMPORTANCE OF BALLISTIC MISSILE THROW-

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WEIGHT AS A MEASURE OF STRATEGIC CAPABILITY, AND (4)  
THE CURRENT ASYMMETRIES IN DESTRUCTIVE CAPABILITY CANNOT  
BE ALLOWED TO CONTINUE.

7. THE SOVIET PROPOSAL CALLS FOR REDUCTIONS OF ONLY 20  
PERCENT FROM THE HIGH AGGREGATE LEVEL OF SALT II (2250).  
MOREOVER, BY FAILING TO USE PROPER UNITS OF ACCOUNT, THEIR  
REDUCTIONS WOULD NOT HAVE A MAJOR IMPACT ON THE DESTRUCTIVE  
CAPABILITIES OF STRATEGIC FORCES. FINALLY, THE SOVIET  
PROPOSAL WOULD NOT CHANNEL MODERNIZATION IN A WAY THAT  
PROMOTES STABILITY AND REDUCES THE RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR.

8. WE TOLD THE SOVIETS THAT OUR PROPOSAL, BY CONTRAST,  
PROMOTES STABILITY AND REDUCES THE RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR  
THROUGH SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS TO EQUAL LEVELS IN THE  
MOST SIGNIFICANT MEASURES OF STRATEGIC CAPABILITY. WE  
SAID BOTH NATIONS WOULD STAND TO BENEFIT FROM THE US  
PROPOSAL. UNDER OUR PROPOSAL WE WOULD BOTH HAVE TO  
REDUCE BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS BY ABOUT ONE-THIRD.  
THE US WOULD HAVE TO REDUCE ITS DEPLOYED BALLISTIC  
MISSILES BY ABOUT ONE-HALF. THE SOVIETS WOULD HAVE TO  
REDUCE MORE DEPLOYED BALLISTIC MISSILES AND MORE ICBM  
WARHEADS, BUT THIS SIMPLY REFLECTS THE FACT THAT THE  
SOVIETS HAVE BUILT UP MORE. WE WILL HAVE TO REDUCE  
MORE SLBM WARHEADS, BUT THE ONGOING SOVIET PROGRAMS TO  
DEPLOY NEW MIRVED SLBMS ON DELTA AND TYPHOON CLASS  
SUBMARINES WILL ALLOW THE SOVIETS TO BUILD UP TO THE  
2,500 LEVEL.

9. ALTHOUGH THERE ARE SOME TENTATIVE SIGNS OF SIMILARITY  
IN OUR POSITIONS, THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US ARE SERIOUS  
AND FUNDAMENTAL. IN CONTRAST TO THE EARLY ROUNDS OF  
SALT, HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS CAME PREPARED TO GET INTO  
SPECIFICS EARLY IN THE TALKS. THE SOVIET DELEGATION  
ADOPTED A BUSINESSLIKE TONE AND, FOR THE MOST PART,

AVOIDED POLEMICS. AS A RESULT, WE ARE CONSIDERABLY  
FURTHER ALONG IN UNDERSTANDING EACH OTHER'S POSITION THAN  
WE WERE AT AN EQUIVALENT STAGE IN THE SALT NEGOTI-  
ATIONS. I ATTRIBUTE THIS TO THREE REASONS. FIRST, THE  
SOVIETS, IN MY OPINION, WANT (AND MAY NEED) AN AGREEMENT.  
SECOND, THEY WERE CAUGHT OFF-GUARD BY THE BOLDNESS AND  
APPEAL OF OUR START PROPOSAL OUTLINED BY THE PRESIDENT  
IN EUREKA ON MAY 9. AND THIRD, KARPOV AND I KNOW  
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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 GENEVA 08375

EXDIS  
EACH OTHER AND HAVE DEBATED MOST OF THE ISSUES IN SALT II.

10. WE HAVE PROPOSED TO THE SOVIETS A SOUND AND EQUITABLE APPROACH TO ACHIEVING A STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION AGREEMENT. WE HAVE SPELLED OUT, IN DETAIL, THE ADVANTAGES OF THE US PROPOSAL. WE HAVE POINTED OUT THAT OUR PROPOSAL REQUIRES SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS IN THE MORE DESTABILIZING SYSTEMS. WE HAVE ADOPTED MEANINGFUL UNITS OF ACCOUNT AND CALLED FOR EQUAL QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE LIMITS ON BALLISTIC MISSILES. WE TOLD THE SOVIETS WE HAVE SERIOUS PROBLEMS WITH THEIR PROPOSAL AND AT THE CLOSE OF THE ROUND WE STRONGLY URGED THEM TO REEVALUATE THEIR POSITION.

11. IN CONCLUSION, I THINK THERE ARE THREE COURSES OF ACTION WE MUST PURSUE SIMULTANEOUSLY IF WE ARE TO PRESERVE OUR SECURITY AND MOVE TOWARD A SATISFACTORY START AGREEMENT. FIRST, AND MOST IMPORTANT, WE NEED TO KEEP OUR DEFENSE PROGRAMS INTACT. NOTHING WILL IMPRESS THE SOVIETS MORE THAN THE KNOWLEDGE THAT WE HAVE THE WILL AND RESOLVE TO FUND THE PROGRAMS WE NEED FOR FORCE MODERNIZATION. THEREFORE, ONLY WHEN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP IS CONVINCED THAT WE WILL MATCH THEM WILL THEY SIGN AN AGREEMENT. SECOND, WE NEED A SUSTAINED PUBLIC INFORMATION CAMPAIGN WHICH KEEPS BEFORE THE PUBLIC THE FACT THAT OUR PROPOSAL IS BETTER THAN THEIRS. THE SOVIETS MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO RECOVER THEIR TRADITIONAL PROPAGANDA EDGE. THIRD, WE NEED TO MAINTAIN A FIRM, REASONABLE AND PATIENT POSTURE AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE.

12. THE US POSITION IS A REASONABLE ONE. IT SEEKS TO REDUCE THE RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR BY FOCUSING FIRST ON THE MOST DESTABILIZING WEAPONS. THE SOVIET POSITION, BY CONTRAST, WOULD SIMPLY PRESERVE CURRENT DESTABILIZING SOVIET ADVANTAGES. THE ESSENCE OF ANY NEGOTIATION IS TO BUILD ON COMMON GROUND. NEVERTHELESS, IT IS ENTIRELY PREMATURE TO BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE PRESENTED US WITH SUFFICIENT POSITIVE POINTS FOR US TO BEGIN MAKING CONCESSIONS. EXPERIENCE IN PAST ARMS CONTROL

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TALKS HAS SHOWN THAT WHEN THE US SEEKS POINTS OF  
COMPROMISE PREMATURELY THE SOVIETS SIMPLY DIG IN THEIR  
HEELS AND THEN RAISE THEIR DEMANDS. DURING THE NEXT  
ROUND, WHICH OPENS IN GENEVA OCTOBER 6, I THINK WE SHOULD  
CONTINUE TO ELABORATE, IN A FIRM AND PATIENT MANNER, THE  
US POSITION AND TO DEMONSTRATE HOW IT BENEFITS BOTH  
OUR NATIONS. BUT IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS MY SUCCESS WILL  
DEPEND ON THE MAINTENANCE OF OUR DEFENSE PROGRAMS AND  
ON HOLDING OUR CURRENT ADVANTAGE IN THE PUBLIC RELATIONS  
ARENA. ROWNY  
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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 09536

EXDIS  
USSTART  
USINF  
NOFORN/WNINTEL  
E. O. 12356: DECL: 8/6/02  
TAGS: MNUC, PARM  
SUBJECT: MIL' SHTEYN COMMENTS ON START AND INF

1. (S) SUMMARY: THE USA INSTITUTE'S MIL' SHTEYN HAS ASSERTED TO US THAT: 1) THE SALT II LIMIT OF ONE NEW ICBM TYPE SHOULD BE RETAINED IN START, 2) THE USSR COUNTS UNCOMPLETED SS-20 BASES AS OPERATIONAL, THUS THE U. S. IS WRONG IN CLAIMING THAT SINCE BREZHNEV'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE UNILATERAL MORATORIUM THE USSR HAS DEPLOYED MORE SS-20S CAPABLE OF HITTING EUROPE. END SUMMARY.

2. (C) ON AUGUST 6 USA INSTITUTE DEPUTY DIRECTOR RADOMIR BOGDANOV, DEPARTMENT CHIEF LT. GENERAL (RET.) MIKHAIL MIL' SHTEYN, AND SECTOR CHIEF YURIY DAVYDOV RECEIVED VISITING DEPARTMENT OFFICERS KALNER AND MODISSETT AND THE EMBASSY'S ARMY ATTACHE AND POLITICO-MILITARY OFFICER. THE DISCUSSION FOCUSED ON POLAND (REPORTED SEPARATELY) AND START/INF ISSUES.

4. (C) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS ON THE SOVIET VIEW OF START/INF ISSUES, MIL' SHTEYN MADE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS OF INTEREST:

- THE SALT II LIMIT OF ONE NEW ICBM TYPE IS ONE
- OF THE "POSITIVE ELEMENTS" OF SALT II WHICH
- SHOULD BE PRESERVED IN START.
- SINCE BREZHNEV'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE UNILATERAL

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BY KML NARA DATE 4/21/11



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DTG: 061554Z AUG 82 PSN: 035365

EXDIS

- MORATORIUM ON DEPLOYMENTS OF SS-20S CAPABLE
- OF STRIKING EUROPE, NO NEW SS-20S HAVING THIS
- CAPABILITY HAVE BEEN DEPLOYED AND NO NEW BASES
- FOR SUCH MISSILES HAVE BEEN CONSTRUCTED. THUS
- RICHARD BURT'S ASSERTIONS TO THE CONTRARY ARE
- "WRONG." (COMMENT: IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION
- WHETHER THE USSR CONSIDERED UNCOMPLETED SS-20
- BASES AS OPERATIONAL, MIL' SHTEYN RESPONDED
- AFFIRMATIVELY. MOMENTS LATER HE ASKED THAT THIS
- REMARK "BE FORGOTTEN.")
- THE USSR IS FOR PRESERVING THE ABM TREATY.
- (COMMENT: MIL' SHTEYN PRESSED TO LEARN THE U. S.
- POSITION AT THE ABM TREATY REVIEW BUT EMBOFF
- DEFLECTED THE QUESTION.)
- START AND INF TALKS MUST BE CLOSELY LINKED.

COMMENT  
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EXDIS

5. (S/NF/WN) MIL' SHTEYN'S ASSERTION ABOUT ONE NEW ICBM TYPE IS THE FIRST INDICATION WE HAVE HEARD HERE THAT THE USSR MIGHT STILL BE WILLING TO FOREGO THE DEPLOYMENT OF MORE THAN ONE NEW ICBM. THIS WOULD MEAN CHOOSING BETWEEN THE TWO ICBMS NOW UNDER DEVELOPMENT, THE NEW MEDIUM OR THE NEW SMALL MOBILE.

EXDIS

6. (C) MIL' SHTEYN'S EXPLANATION OF SOVIET SS-20 DEPLOYMENTS IS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH BREZHNEV'S UNILATERAL MORATORIUM ANNOUNCEMENT LAST MARCH OR WITH THE SUBSEQUENT CAREFULLY WORDED U. S. STATEMENTS. THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT BEEN AS EXPLICIT PUBLICLY AS MIL' SHTEYN WAS PRIVATELY. IF THE SOVIETS PERCEIVE THE CREDIBILITY IN EUROPE OF THEIR PROPAGANDA ON THE MORATORIUM TO ERODE FURTHER, HOWEVER, THEY MIGHT GO  
NOTE: RAISED TO EXDIS PER SSO MEMO 7/29/71.  
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E. O. 12065: RDS-3 06/28/88 (GREY, R.)  
TAGS: PARM, START  
SUBJECT: START INSTRUCTIONS

1. (~~SECRET~~-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. THE FOLLOWING IS GUIDANCE FOR THE US DELEGATION FOR THE INITIAL ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE USSR ON STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS (START), BEGINNING JUNE 29, 1982.

3. THE PRIMARY US OBJECTIVES FOR THE ROUND ARE:

-- TO MAKE CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS THAT THE US GOAL IN STRATEGIC ARMS NEGOTIATIONS IS TO ENHANCE DETERRENCE AND TO ACHIEVE STABILITY THROUGH SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS IN BALLISTIC MISSILES, ESPECIALLY ICBMS.

-- TO EMPHASIZE THE BASIC DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SLOW-FLYING, CLEARLY SECOND-STRIKE SYSTEMS AND THE MORE DESTABILIZING BALLISTIC MISSILES. THE CLEAR AND PRIMARY FOCUS OF THE START NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE TO

ACHIEVE A SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION IN THE DESTRUCTIVE CAPABILITY OF BALLISTIC MISSILES, ESPECIALLY ICBMS, BY REDUCING THE NUMBER OF SUCH MISSILES, THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS THEY CARRY, AND THEIR OVERALL DESTRUCTIVE POTENTIAL.

-- TO PROPOSE A PHASED APPROACH TO THE START NEGOTIATION, AND TO SET FORTH ELEMENTS OF THE US POSITION.

-- TO OBTAIN A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF THE SOVIET APPROACH.

4. THE DELEGATION SHOULD SET FORTH THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES WHICH UNDERLIE THE US APPROACH TO START:

-- AN AGREEMENT SHOULD PROVIDE FOR EQUALITY.

-- AN AGREEMENT SHOULD PROVIDE FOR SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS ON EACH SIDE TO EQUAL CEILINGS BELOW CURRENT

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LEVELS OF FORCES.

-- AN AGREEMENT SHOULD PROMOTE STABILITY BY PLACING SPECIAL LIMITATIONS ON ICBMS, WHICH ARE THE MOST DESTABILIZING SYSTEMS.

-- AN AGREEMENT SHOULD PROVIDE FOR EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION, USING COUNTING RULES, COLLATERAL CONSTRAINTS, NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS, AND COOPERATIVE MEASURES WHERE APPROPRIATE, AND SHOULD INCLUDE DISCLOSURE OF DATA BY EACH SIDE ON ITS FORCES.

5. THE US DELEGATION SHOULD PROPOSE A PHASED APPROACH TO START. THE FIRST PHASE SHOULD FOCUS ON BALLISTIC MISSILES. THE DELEGATION SHOULD SEEK SOVIET AGREEMENT TO THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS OF THE US POSITION FOR THE FIRST PHASE OF THE NEGOTIATION:

-- A LIMIT OF 5000 WARHEADS ON DEPLOYED BALLISTIC MISSILES ON EACH SIDE.

-- LIMIT ICBM WARHEADS TO NO MORE THAN ONE-HALF OF THIS TOTAL.

-- A LIMIT OF 850 DEPLOYED BALLISTIC MISSILES (ICBMS, SLBMS, AND ASBMS).

-- A COMBINED LIMIT OF 210 DEPLOYED HEAVY AND MEDIUM ICBMS.

-- A SUBCEILING OF 110 DEPLOYED HEAVY ICBMS (THE SAME PROPORTION AS IN CURRENT SOVIET FORCES).

-- A BAN ON NEW HEAVY MISSILES DURING THE FIRST PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS. A BAN ON ALL HEAVY MISSILES IN THE SECOND, PHASE.

-- A LIMIT ON THE WEIGHT OF RVS ON NEW MISSILE SYSTEMS TO APPROXIMATELY 200 KG.

-- A LIMIT ON THE NUMBERS OF RVS THAT COULD BE TESTED OR DEPLOYED TO 10 ON ICBMS AND 14 ON SLBMS. WITH RESPECT TO THIS PROVISION THE DELEGATION IS AUTHORIZED TO GRANDFATHER THE SS-18.

-- AGREED RULES GOVERNING THE PHASING OF REDUCTIONS TO ESTABLISH EQUAL INTERMEDIATE CEILINGS AT AGREED INTERVALS.

-- EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO ASSURE VERIFICATION OF THE ABOVE LIMITATIONS.

6. THE DELEGATION SHOULD EXPLAIN THAT WE HAVE EXPRESSED THESE LIMITS IN TERMS OF DEPLOYED BALLISTIC MISSILES AND THEIR WARHEADS BECAUSE THESE ARE IMPORTANT MEASURES OF MILITARY CAPABILITY, AND ARE APPROPRIATE UNITS OF ACCOUNT FOR STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS. THE DELEGATION SHOULD INDICATE THAT, TO FACILITATE MONITORING OF THOSE LIMITS, COUNTING RULES AND DEFINITIONS SHOULD BE DEVELOPED THAT ASSOCIATE DEPLOYED MISSILES, WARHEADS, AND LAUNCHERS. THE DELEGATION SHOULD INDICATE THAT WE WILL BE PROPOSING SPECIFIC COUNTING RULES AND DEFINITIONS AT A LATER DATE.

7. THE DELEGATION SHOULD INDICATE TO THE SOVIETS THAT WE INTEND IN THE NEGOTIATIONS TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEMS POSED BY NON-DEPLOYED MISSILES. THE DELEGATION SHOULD

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POINT OUT THAT NON-DEPLOYED MISSILES HAVE THE POTENTIAL TO AUGMENT THE STRATEGIC CAPABILITY PROVIDED BY DEPLOYED MISSILES. PENDING FURTHER GUIDANCE, THE DELEGATION CAN USE DISCRETION TO DISCUSS THE PROBLEMS NOTED ABOVE, (E.G., RECONSTITUTION, REFIRE, RAPID

RELOAD, BREAKOUT). HOWEVER, DELEGATION SHOULD NOT DISCUSS SPECIFIC PROPOSALS FOR RESOLVING THESE PROBLEMS, OR TAKE ACTIONS WHICH PREJUDICE INTERNAL USG RESOLUTION OF THIS ISSUE.

8. THE DELEGATION SHOULD MAKE CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS THAT THE FIRST PHASE LIMITS ON BALLISTIC MISSILES AND BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS SHOULD RESULT IN A SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION IN TOTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE THROW-WEIGHT. THE US INTENDS TO NEGOTIATE DIRECT LIMITS ON THROW-WEIGHT AT EQUAL AND FURTHER REDUCED LEVELS (BELOW THE CURRENT US LEVEL) AS A MAJOR PORTION OF THE SECOND PHASE OF START NEGOTIATIONS. THE US APPROACH IS THEREFORE TO USE INDIRECT MEANS IN THE FIRST PHASE, AND DIRECT MEANS IN THE SECOND PHASE, TO REDUCE, AND THEN ELIMINATE, THE SOVIET ADVANTAGE IN BALLISTIC MISSILE THROW-WEIGHT.

9. THE DELEGATION SHOULD DECLARE THE US INTENT IN THE SECOND PHASE: (1) TO SEEK DIRECT REDUCTIONS IN BALLISTIC MISSILE THROW-WEIGHT TO EQUAL LEVELS BELOW THE CURRENT US LEVELS; (2) TO CONSIDER FURTHER REDUCTIONS IN BALLISTIC MISSILE FORCES; AND (3) TO CONSIDER REDUCTIONS AND OTHER CONSTRAINTS ON SLOW-FLYING SYSTEMS. THE SECOND PHASE OF THE ONGOING START NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BEGIN PROMPTLY AFTER COMPLETION OF THE FIRST PHASE.

10. THE AGREEMENT SHOULD PROVIDE FOR SUBSTANTIAL DISCLOSURE OF BASELINE DATA BY EACH SIDE ON ITS SYSTEMS LIMITED BY THE AGREEMENT. THIS DATA SHOULD INCLUDE AT A MINIMUM MISSILE CHARACTERISTICS -- LAUNCH-WEIGHT, THROW-WEIGHT, MAXIMUM NUMBER OF RVs, NUMBER OF STAGES, PROPELLANT TYPE (WHETHER LIQUID OR SOLID), AND DIMENSIONS. IT SHOULD ALSO INCLUDE THE LOCATIONS OF EACH MISSILE TYPE, AND THE NUMBER AT EACH LOCATION. AT A MINIMUM, DATA WOULD BE DISCUSSED AND AGREED BY THE DELEGATIONS AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE, PREFERABLY PRIOR TO COMPLETION OF THE FIRST PHASE, AND UPDATED TWICE A YEAR THEREAFTER.

11. THE DELEGATION SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION IS ESSENTIAL TO AN AGREEMENT. THIS MAY REQUIRE AGREED MEASURES, INCLUDING MEASURES THAT GO BEYOND NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. THE AGREEMENT SHOULD INCLUDE PROVISIONS PROHIBITING INTERFERENCE WITH AGREED

VERIFICATION MEASURES OR WITH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS, AND PROHIBITING CONCEALMENT MEASURES WHICH IMPEDE VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT BY AGREED VERIFICATION MEASURES OR BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. ALL ENCRYPTION OF TELEMETRY DURING FLIGHT-TESTING OF SYSTEMS LIMITED BY THE AGREEMENT SHOULD BE PROHIBITED. THE US WILL PROPOSE ADDITIONAL VERIFICATION MEASURES DURING THE COURSE OF

THE NEGOTIATION. (FYI: GUIDANCE ON ADDITIONAL MEASURES TO ENSURE ACCESS TO RELEVANT FLIGHT-TEST DATA, AND OTHER VERIFICATION MEASURES, WILL BE PROVIDED AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME. END FYI.)

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12. THE DELEGATION SHOULD AVOID PROVISIONS WHICH DISTINGUISH BETWEEN FIXED AND MOBILE ICBMS AT THIS TIME. IF THE SOVIETS RAISE THE QUESTION OF MOBILE ICBMS, THE DELEGATION SHOULD INDICATE THAT THAT ISSUE IS UNDER REVIEW IN WASHINGTON.

13. THE DELEGATION SHOULD NOT PROPOSE BOMBER LIMITS. IF THE SOVIETS PROPOSE BOMBER LIMITS, THE DELEGATION MAY ADVISE THE SOVIETS THAT THE US IS PREPARED TO DISCUSS EQUAL LIMITS ON THE NUMBER OF HEAVY BOMBERS, BUT THE INITIAL PHASE SHOULD FOCUS ON THE MORE DESTABILIZING BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS. THE DELEGATION IS AUTHORIZED TO ACCEPT, IN THE FIRST PHASE, A LIMIT ON HEAVY BOMBERS AT ROUGHLY CURRENT US LEVELS (NO LESS THAN 350) WITH THE BACKFIRE BOMBER INCLUDED AND THE FB-111 NOT INCLUDED. FURTHER REDUCTIONS OF BOMBERS OR DISCUSSION OF OTHER CONSTRAINTS ON SLOW-FLYING SYSTEMS (BOMBERS AND CRUISE MISSILES) SHOULD BE DEFERRED TO THE SECOND PHASE. THE DELEGATION SHOULD OPPOSE SPECIAL LIMITS ON ALCMS, AND ALCM CARRIERS SHOULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO RESTRICTIONS BEYOND THOSE APPLYING TO OTHER HEAVY BOMBERS. IF THE SOVIETS RAISE QUESTIONS CONCERNING ALCMS, OTHER BOMBER ARMAMENTS, OR REDUCTIONS IN THE NUMBER OF BOMBERS, THE DELEGATION SHOULD TAKE THE POSITION THAT SUCH LIMITS ON BOMBERS RAISE COMPLEX ISSUES, INCLUDING THE DEFENSES THEY FACE AND THEIR CONVENTIONAL ROLE, AND SHOULD BE DEFERRED.

14. IF THE SOVIETS RAISE THE QUESTION OF SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES, THE DELEGATION SHOULD TAKE THE POSITION THAT SLOW-FLYING SYSTEMS DO NOT POSE THE SAME THREAT AS BALLISTIC MISSILES, AND DISCUSSION OF LIMITS ON SUCH SYSTEMS SHOULD BE DEFERRED TO THE SECOND PHASE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

15. IF THE SOVIETS RAISE THIRD COUNTRY FORCES, THE DELEGATION SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT THESE ARE BILATERAL TALKS, AND SUCH FORCES ARE NOT AN APPROPRIATE SUBJECT FOR THIS NEGOTIATION. SUCH FORCES WILL NOT BE INCLUDED OR COMPENSATED FOR IN ANY AGREEMENT, AND CANNOT BE USED

TO JUSTIFY UNEQUAL LIMITS ON US AND SOVIET FORCES.

16. IF THE SOVIETS RAISE THE QUESTION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE START AND INF NEGOTIATIONS, THE DELEGATION SHOULD RESPOND THAT OBVIOUSLY THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE TWO NEGOTIATIONS IS CLOSELY RELATED. THE US CONSIDERS THE INF NEGOTIATIONS TO BE WITHIN THE START FRAMEWORK, AND HAS CLOSELY COORDINATED ITS APPROACH TO THE START AND INF NEGOTIATIONS.

17. IF THE SOVIETS RAISE THE QUESTION OF THE STATUS OF THE SALT II AGREEMENT, THE DELEGATION SHOULD ADVISE THE SOVIETS THAT SALT II IS NOT AN ACCEPTABLE BASIS FOR AN EQUAL AND VERIFIABLE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION AGREEMENT. THE US DOES NOT INTEND TO FORMALIZE THE HIGH CEILINGS AND SERIOUS INEQUALITIES OF THE SALT II AGREEMENT. THE TWO DELEGATIONS SHOULD FOCUS INSTEAD ON A NEW, EQUITABLE AGREEMENT THAT WOULD SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCE STRATEGIC FORCES ON BOTH SIDES. IF NEEDED, THE DELEGATION MAY ADVISE THE SOVIETS THAT US POLICY CONTINUES TO BE TO TAKE NO ACTIONS THAT WOULD UNDERCUT EXISTING STRATEGIC ARMS AGREEMENTS AS LONG AS THE SOVIET UNION SHOWS EQUAL RESTRAINT. THE DELEGATION SHOULD NOT EXPAND UPON OR INTERPRET THIS STATEMENT

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WITHOUT FURTHER GUIDANCE.

- 18. IF THE SOVIETS RAISE ISSUES NOT COVERED BY THESE INSTRUCTIONS, THE DELEGATION SHOULD SEEK GUIDANCE FROM WASHINGTON.

19. THE DELEGATION SHOULD INFORM THE SOVIETS THAT IN THE US VIEW THE NEGOTIATION SHOULD BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL, BUT MAKE CLEAR OUR OBLIGATIONS TO KEEP OUR ALLIES AND THE CONGRESS INFORMED.

20. THE DELEGATION SHOULD ADVISE THE SOVIETS EARLY IN THE ROUND THAT IN THE US VIEW THIS ROUND SHOULD LAST NO MORE THAN SIX WEEKS. AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME, THE CHAIRMAN SHOULD PROPOSE TO THE SOVIETS TO RESUME NEGOTIATION IN SEPTEMBER OR OCTOBER. HE SHOULD ADVISE

THE SOVIETS THAT THE US ENVISIONS SUBSEQUENT ROUNDS OF APPROXIMATELY TWO MONTHS' DURATION, WITH PERIODS BETWEEN ROUNDS FOR CONSULTATIONS IN CAPITALS. HAIG  
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