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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
11594	PAPER	FORD AND BREZHNEV AT VLADIVOSTOK, NOVEMBER 23-24, 1974 ***R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11***	16	ND	B1
11595	PAPER	FORD AND BREZHNEV AT ~~VLADIVOSTOK~~ Helsinki, JULY 30-AUGUST 2, 1974 ***R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11***	13	ND	B1
11596	PAPER	CARTER AND BREZHNEV AT VIENNA, JUNE 15-18, 1979 ***R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11***	29	ND	B1

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VLADIVOSTOK:
November 1974

~~TOP SECRET~~/NODIS

FORD AND BREZHNEV AT VLADIVOSTOK, NOVEMBER 23-24, 1974

The Vladivostok meeting between President Gerald R. Ford and Soviet leader Leonid I. Brezhnev took place only 5 months after the Moscow summit, primarily because Brezhnev was eager to establish contact with the new U.S. President. The summit was more ad hoc than the three previous ones and focused almost entirely on the strategic arms limitations talks (SALT). The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Cyprus, and the Middle East were dealt with briefly but nothing of substance on any of these issues was achieved. Mutual and balanced force reduction (MBFR) was mentioned only in the prenegotiated joint communiqué. Due in part to the groundwork laid by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger during his October trip to Moscow and to Soviet hopes of establishing a constructive relationship with the new U.S. President, a breakthrough on SALT did take place at Vladivostok. The two sides reached agreement in principle and the resulting SALT accord provided the basis for the SALT II treaty signed by President Jimmy Carter and Brezhnev in Vienna in June 1979. It met the demands of the U.S. Congress and the Defense Department for equal aggregates and involved significant Soviet concessions, including abandonment of their previous demand that Forward Based Systems (FBS), such as U.S. weapons based in Western Europe, had to be included in the U.S. total. Ford and Kissinger returned home feeling triumphant and claiming that they had put a cap on the arms race. Their hopes were dashed, however, by the subsequent inability of the two sides to agree upon whether such weapons as the Soviet Backfire bomber and U.S. cruise missiles were to be included in the totals agreed upon at Vladivostok.

Initiative: Sizing Up a New President

In early August, following President Richard Nixon's resignation, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and the new U.S. President, Gerald Ford, immediately sent letters to their Soviet counterparts pledging that U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union would continue unchanged under the new administration. Ford also assured Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev that the channels of communication established under Nixon remained open and reaffirmed the former President's invitation to the General Secretary to visit the United States the following year.

Kissinger, for his part, urged that there be no loss of momentum in the negotiations on SALT, CSCE, and MBFR and indicated his intention to return to Moscow for further negotiations that fall.[1]

Brezhnev's reply suggested that "a working meeting" between the two heads of state before the end of the year, perhaps on neutral ground, would help detente, adding that experience had shown how useful and valuable such personal contacts were. During their June discussions in Moscow, Brezhnev and Nixon had talked about holding an interim summit before the Soviet leader's scheduled visit to the United States in 1975. Moreover, as Kissinger subsequently pointed out to the President, Brezhnev's emphasis on the continuation of personal contact also reflected the Soviet leader's own personal stake in detente.[2]

In advice to Ford at this time, and before the President met with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko in mid-September, Kissinger indicated his support for an interim "working" summit if there was concrete business for the two leaders to negotiate. Kissinger wished to use the Soviet desire for a summit as a lever to gain Soviet concessions on several outstanding issues.[3]

Ford's agreement to attend a summit meeting at Vladivostok in November, however, was conveyed to the Soviet Union without prior Soviet concessions or assurances that the meeting would produce concrete results. On September 20, Ford and Kissinger discussed the Vladivostok meeting with Gromyko. The three agreed on the importance of making progress on SALT during Kissinger's visit to Moscow in October, so that Ford and Brezhnev could announce "agreement in principle" at Vladivostok and conclude a SALT agreement when Brezhnev visited the United States the following June.[4]

The forthcoming summit meeting at Vladivostok was announced publicly on October 26, Kissinger's last day in Moscow. The British, French, and West German Foreign Offices, notified 6 hours before the public announcement, were told that Washington did not expect any major announcement to result from the summit, which was for the purpose of getting acquainted.[5]

Preparations: Coming Closer Together on SALT

U.S. preparations for the Vladivostok summit between September 20 and November 23 focused primarily on SALT. In briefing the new President following Nixon's resignation, Kissinger warned Ford that a breakdown in SALT would jeopardize detente and the entire range of U.S.-Soviet relations. He also

argued that it was misleading to talk about strategic superiority, pointing out that, according to U.S. intelligence projections, at the end of an unrestricted arms race with the Soviet Union both sides would still be essentially in strategic equilibrium. Such an arms race, according to Kissinger, would also mean greatly increased U.S. defense expenditures. The Secretary projected that the Soviets would be more inclined to make concessions now than the previous June, when they were focusing on Nixon's precarious political position. Kissinger, who knew how deep divisions within the U.S. Government had hindered previous SALT negotiations, advised that a new SALT proposal should be sent directly to Brezhnev to circumvent the Soviet bureaucracy.[6]

During the September meeting with Gromyko, Ford warned the Soviet Foreign Minister that lack of progress on SALT would affect the military budget request he would submit in December and noted the desirability of concluding an agreement before the 1976 election. Gromyko responded that his government wanted to find a solution and was prepared to discuss all of this in detail when Kissinger came to Moscow.[7]

On October 9, Kissinger gave Soviet Ambassador to the United States Anatoliy F. Dobrynin the new U.S. SALT proposal for discussion during the Secretary's visit to Moscow. This proposal was based on equal aggregates, equality in the total number of strategic missile launchers possessed by each side, as the Defense Department and Congress insisted. It called for a phased reduction in the total number of strategic launchers -- ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles), SLBMs (submarine launched ballistic missiles), and heavy bombers. The numerical limits of the 1972 SALT agreement would remain in effect until October 1977. Beginning in October 1977, each side would agree to reduce its total number of launchers to no more than 2,350 by 1982 and to 2,200 by the end of 1983. Before 1982, the total number of such launchers could not exceed 2,500 with a sublimit of 300 for modern large ICBMs; by the end of 1983, the sublimit would be 250 for heavy systems including both heavy missiles and heavy bombers. There would also be a limit of 1,320 ICBMs and SLBMs with MIRVs (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles). The total deployment of new strategic launchers, including replacement or modernization, would be limited to 175 in any 1 year. Finally, as in the 1972 SALT agreement, building new ICBM silos would be prohibited.[8]

On October 24, Kissinger arrived in Moscow for 3 days of pre-Vladivostok negotiations with Brezhnev which were the most important preparations made for the summit. The first day was devoted primarily to Soviet complaints about U.S. trade

restrictions and U.S. policy towards CSCE and the Middle East. No solutions were reached but, while defending U.S. policy, Kissinger's tone was reassuring throughout.[9]

The next 2 days of discussions were devoted almost exclusively to SALT. During these meetings, Kissinger painted a bleak picture of a period of unrestrained U.S.-Soviet competition in strategic arms, arguing that at the end of such a race neither side would be decisively ahead. He pointed out that the design of Soviet strategic forces was such that, whatever Soviet intentions, they represented a very grave threat to U.S. land-based forces and that the United States was prepared to do whatever was necessary for its own defense.

After discussing the U.S. proposal of October 9, Brezhnev offered a Soviet counterproposal that the upper limit on strategic launchers be 2,000 for the United States and 2,400 for the Soviet Union. In addition, Gromyko insisted that the Soviet Union had to be compensated in these totals for Forward Based Systems (FBS) and for British and French nuclear weapons. Kissinger responded that it would be quite impossible for the United States to agree to such an inequality in total numbers with no inequality in its favor in other areas such as MIRVs. He suggested that the United States might be willing to agree not to go above 2,200, although it had to have the right to do so. Kissinger also reminded Brezhnev that the United States would have twice as many warheads on one Trident submarine as the combined total of British and French warheads. He warned that the United States would not make a more forthcoming proposal and added that there would be serious consequences in the United States if the U.S. press saw this trip as a failure.[10]

The next day, Brezhnev proposed a total of 2,200 strategic launchers for the United States and 2,400 for the Soviet Union by the end of 1985. Kissinger was able to extract agreement that the 2,200 figure would include only U.S. launchers and not those of its Allies. Brezhnev also proposed that the United States be limited to 10 Trident submarines between 1977 and 1985, with the Soviet Union limited to 10 of the Typhoon class. Brezhnev accepted the U.S. proposal that the prohibition on building new silos continue, although both sides would be free to modernize and improve existing ones. He also accepted the proposed limit of 1,320 MIRVs. Brezhnev insisted, however, that the missiles carried by the proposed U.S. B-1 bomber should have a range of no more than 3,000 kilometers and that each missile be included in the U.S. total. Kissinger told Brezhnev that this counterproposal provided a serious basis for discussion but that it would receive a most unfavorable reception if given to the U.S. bureaucracy in its

current form. He suggested that points be clarified in private meetings between himself and Dobrynin and that discussions be kept entirely in this channel until after Vladivostok. Brezhnev agreed, on the condition that there would be no fundamentally new proposals, adding that he did not want his first meeting with the President to begin with a dispute. Kissinger promised that there would be no surprises at Vladivostok and that he would do his utmost to make the summit meeting a success.[11]

On his last day in Moscow, Kissinger met privately with Brezhnev, with only State Department Counselor Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Gromyko, and an interpreter present. Brezhnev restated a proposal, made secretly to Nixon in June, that each side pledge that in the event of a nuclear attack on either or on the allies of either by any third power it would use military power in support of the other. Brezhnev added that they could even name the third power -- an obvious reference to China. Kissinger's response was noncommittal. He promised to discuss this with Ford, but also pointed out that such a proposal did not make sense if the arms race continued.[12]

On November 13, Kissinger advised Ford that the Soviet counterproposal, received in written form on November 8, provided a basis for constructive negotiations at Vladivostok. He urged Ford to insist upon equal aggregates for political reasons, even though the United States would not even be able to reach the 2,200 level without retaining obsolete systems. He also argued that they should accept no limit on bomber-launched missiles without a corresponding Soviet concession. Kissinger suggested a U.S. counterproposal with a limit of 2,400 on total launchers and 1,320 on MIRVed missiles for the last 2 years of the agreement (1984-1985), with the United States agreeing to stay 200 below the launcher limit (2,200) through 1983 and the Soviets agreeing to stay 200 below the MIRV limit (1,120) during this same period. He also proposed a sublimit of 250 new strategic bombers, 312 new SLBMs on Trident-type submarines (13 ships), and 180 new heavy ICBMs. This would simplify the proposal by eliminating all reference to heavy MIRVs or bomber armaments. Kissinger warned Ford that time would be short at Vladivostok and advised that he not get bogged down in details but concentrate on getting agreement on basic numbers. Ford approved the proposal and Kissinger presented it to Dobrynin the same day.[13]

The following day Kissinger sent Ford, who was due to leave for the Far East on November 17, a briefing book for Vladivostok containing comprehensive background material on major U.S.-Soviet issues which might be raised during the summit. He also forwarded a 25-page memorandum which briefed

the President on Brezhnev's personality and policies and then laid out the major U.S. objectives for the summit. Kissinger pointed out that, since the Soviet leader had sought this meeting, much of the burden for its success would be on him. The Secretary added, however, that Soviet internal political considerations might limit Brezhnev's ability to bargain and he might not be able to pay too high a price for a SALT agreement. Kissinger emphasized that the main objective at Vladivostok, besides establishing a personal relationship with Brezhnev, was to obtain a SALT agreement, publicly signed by the two leaders, which would settle the question of limits on strategic launchers and MIRVs and, if possible, set sublimits on new SLBMs on Trident-type submarines, new bombers, and new heavy ICBMs.

After noting that there was no set agenda for the Vladivostok talks, Kissinger's memorandum summarized the other major issues which might arise during the summit. On the Middle East, he advised that the President appear willing to consult more frequently with the Soviets and to reconvene the Geneva Conference, without making any actual commitment. The memorandum then reviewed some of the CSCE disputes and proposed that the President promise to work for conclusion of the Conference by the spring of 1975. The memorandum cautioned Ford not to offer or agree to any specific MBFR proposals at Vladivostok because the United States had not worked out such proposals with its Allies. The paper also discussed several other issues, including Peaceful Nuclear Explosions, Environmental and Chemical Warfare, and various bilateral economic issues. On the latter, it was suggested that the President tell Brezhnev of his hope that passage of the Trade Bill would lead to increased U.S.-Soviet trade. Ford was also to point out that the administration had been forced to accept the Jackson-Vanik amendment to attain most-favored-nation status for the Soviet Union.[14]

In the meantime, the State Department and the Soviet Embassy negotiated the wording of the joint communiqué to be issued on the last day of the summit. Kissinger's briefing memorandum had explained that the Vladivostok communiqué would be more general than those for previous summits, unless there was agreement on SALT. The draft communiqué, agreed to prior to the summit, reflected the limited anticipations of the two sides. It anticipated no new development on any issue, with the exception of SALT, which was not covered in the presummit draft. Only the Soviet wording on the Cyprus question, which called for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the island, caused any controversy and this phrase was omitted from the final communiqué.[15]

Discussions: A Significant Breakthrough

On November 23, Ford and Kissinger flew from South Korea via Tokyo to Vozdvizhenka airport near Vladivostok, where they met Brezhnev and Gromyko who had come more than 4,000 miles from Moscow by train. In contrast to the previous Nixon-Brezhnev summits, there was little pomp or ceremony at Vladivostok -- partly because of the brevity of the summit and partly because of its location. During the 2-day summit, Ford and Brezhnev spent almost 12 hours in face-to-face discussions. During the evening discussions at the Okeanskaya sanatorium on the first day, the two delegations were relatively large. Ford and Kissinger were accompanied by U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union Walter J. Stoessel and Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, as well as three State Department aides. The Soviet Delegation was somewhat larger (11 in all) and included not only Gromyko, Dobrynin, and the Soviet interpreter Viktor Sukhodrev but also representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the General Staff, and the Central Committee of the Communist Party. On the morning of the second day, Ford, Kissinger, and a Russian-speaking State Department aide, Alexander Akalovsky, met alone with Brezhnev, Gromyko, Dobrynin, and the Soviet interpreter. They were joined by other members of the U.S. Delegation during the afternoon session.

The initial conversations took place during the 1 1/2 hour train ride from the airport to the Okeanskaya Sanatorium, a health resort on the outskirts of Vladivostok. After initial friendly banter, the two sides agreed on the order of discussions: first SALT and then the Middle East. Ford emphasized the importance of reaching agreement on SALT during 1975 so that it would not become an issue in the 1976 election and warned that if another candidate were elected the policy of detente might be undercut.[16]

The first session at the Okeanskaya Sanatorium began at 6:15 that evening and lasted until 12:30 a.m. During this session, which was so productive that the dinner originally scheduled was cancelled, Brezhnev and Gromyko complained that the U.S. position, as reflected in its latest proposal, had stiffened since Kissinger had been in Moscow. Ford replied that Congress and the American people would not accept an agreement with unequal numbers and noted that he had deferred his decision on the defense budget until after the summit. Kissinger pointed out that without an agreement, the United States could continue to MIRV its missiles indefintely. After some haggling over Trident submarines, Brezhnev and Ford agreed that no new silos should be built and that only new ICBMs which fit into existing silos would be permitted.

After a break, Brezhnev repeated his Moscow proposal that each side be allowed to build 2,400 strategic launchers by 1985, but that the President give the Soviets a letter promising that the United States would actually only build 2,200 during that period. Ford and Kissinger repeated that the American people would not accept less than numerical equivalence and argued that their proposal, which offered offsetting inequalities through 1983 and then equivalence in both launchers and MIRVs by 1985, was one the U.S. Congress and American people would accept. Kissinger also pointed out that the United States would only be able to reach this figure by keeping some obsolete systems and reminded Brezhnev that a Presidential letter would not be binding on Ford's successors. When Brezhnev and Gromyko complained about U.S. FBS, Ford stated that it was his understanding that they had agreed at Moscow not to include FBS in a SALT agreement. Nevertheless, he offered to give up the U.S. nuclear submarine base in Rota, Spain in 1984.

After leaving the room to consult his colleagues in Moscow, Brezhenv returned and suggested to Ford that they agree in principle upon 2,400 launchers and 1,320 MIRVs for each side and that these ceilings could be reached at any time before 1985, thus dropping the interim (1977-1983) period. He pointed out that this meant that the President could tell the American people he had reached an agreement on the basis of full equality for both sides. Kissinger then reminded Brezhnev that the United States had also proposed limiting strategic bombers such as the B-1, Trident-type submarines, and MIRVed heavy missiles. After some further haggling, the two sides agreed to resume discussion of sublimits in the morning.[17]

The second day of negotiations began at Okeanskaya Sanatorium at 10:10 a.m. and lasted nearly 6 hours. Ford began the discussion of sublimits by offering to count any aircraft-carried ballistic missile with a range over 700 kilometers as part of the 2,400 aggregate, i.e., as one launcher. Brezhnev countered that each bomber carrying missiles with a range of up to 600 kilometers should be counted as one launcher, that those carrying missiles with a range from 600 to 3,000 kilometers should be counted according to the number of missiles they carried and that all bomber-carried missiles with a range of over 3,000 kilometers should be banned. Ford expressed serious objections to the last restriction but suggested that, if it were accepted, the Soviet Union should accept a limit of 200 on its MIRVed heavy missiles.

After leaving the room for consultations, Brezhnev returned and proposed that bomber-carried missiles with a range exceeding 600 kilometers count as individual launchers, but

that there be no limit on their maximum range nor any restrictions on heavy MIRVed missiles. Ford and Kissinger consented to this and the Vladivostok "agreement in principle" on SALT was complete. It was agreed that the U.S. and Soviet SALT Delegations, which had been negotiating in Geneva, should work out the details and that Kissinger would iron out any further difficulties when he returned to the Soviet Union in the spring. The final SALT II Treaty could then be signed when Brezhnev came to the United States in the summer of 1975. The two sides decided to issue a separate statement on SALT in addition to the joint communiqué, explaining that equivalence had been reached but without revealing the figures until the President had a chance to brief congressional leaders.

While Brezhnev and Ford left the room, Kissinger and Gromyko, agreeing that the two leaders would not have time to discuss Cyprus, settled the dispute over the wording on this item in the previously negotiated joint communiqué. After their return, Brezhnev and Ford held a secret meeting, attended only by Kissinger and Scowcroft on the U.S. side and Gromyko, Dobrynin, and A.M. Aleksandrov, Brezhnev's Special Assistant, on the Soviet side. No record of this meeting has been found.

When the full conference reconvened, discussions turned to the Middle East. Brezhnev talked about the need for U.S.-Soviet cooperation and argued that a solution could be found at a reconvened Geneva Conference, adding that the fundamental issue was Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories. Ford responded that he agreed that there should be U.S.-Soviet cooperation in the Middle East but that the groundwork had to be laid before the Geneva Conference met. He suggested, and Brezhnev agreed, that Kissinger and Dobrynin should exchange ideas as to how to prevent another Middle East war.

The final portion of the summit dealt with CSCE and, very briefly, the Trade Bill. On CSCE, Ford agreed upon March or April as a tentative date for the final stage of the Conference and promised to urge the French and Germans to move on some of the disputed issues. Ford then pointed out that his administration had strongly supported the Trade Bill and declared that he had never authorized the mention of any required number of applications for emigration from the Soviet Union, much less the 60,000 that Senator Jackson had recently proclaimed. Brezhnev responded that no one who wanted to leave was being harassed but also claimed that the total number of applications was far below 60,000. After exchanging mutualcompliments and agreeing that their meeting had been extremely useful and productive, the two leaders and their associates concluded the summit.[18]

Before leaving Vladivostok, Kissinger briefed waiting reporters on the results of the summit and gave them copies of the previously negotiated joint communiqué and the newly drawn up joint statement on SALT which contained the basic details of the Ford-Brezhnev agreement without the figures. He announced that this marked the breakthrough they had been seeking since 1972 and that it offered a very strong possibility of a signed agreement in 1975. The Secretary declared that they hoped to look back on Vladivostok as a turning point which put a cap on the arms race -- a cap substantially below the capabilities of both sides -- and as the first step in further arms reduction.[19] Kissinger then returned to Tokyo (briefly) that same day and went on to Peking, while Ford flew back to Washington.

Results: Disappointing Aftermath

Back in Washington, in speaking to the press and before the National Security Council, Ford and Kissinger defended the Vladivostok accord as a "cap on the arms race". In support of this contention, they pointed out that the overall total agreed to was below what the Soviet Union already possessed. They emphasized privately that the very lowest U.S. intelligence estimates as to what the Soviets would build in the future without a SALT agreement were considerably above the Vladivostok figures for both MIRVs and strategic launchers. They also maintained that the Soviet Union had made major concessions at Vladivostok and that the United States had gotten a far better agreement than had seemed possible before the summit. Kissinger suggested that this was because Brezhnev had been trying to strengthen detente by getting off in the right direction with a new President who might be in power for the next six years. He argued that such an accord could only have been reached at the summit, noting that the Soviet Delegation at Geneva could never have agreed to equal aggregates with no compensation for FBS. The Secretary also claimed that the United States had a "largely fool-proof" method of verification of the new accord and that such verification was not dependent upon the good faith of either side.[20]

Public and congressional reaction to Vladivostok was mixed. The New York Times criticized the accord for allowing both sides to go ahead with their planned arms build-ups, although it admitted that if the administration's claim that this was the best that could be obtained from the Soviets was true the world might have to make the best of "a bad agreement". Harris polls in December 1974 showed that although 77 percent of those polled favored substantially limiting the

number of U.S. and Soviet nuclear missiles, the public was divided 35 to 34 percent on whether or not the Vladivostok accord was a breakthrough. The polls did show, however, that Vladivostok had improved public opinion of Ford's foreign policy.[21]

Senator Henry Jackson criticized the administration for not getting a more substantial reduction to aggregates of 1,700 for both sides and Senator Barry Goldwater complained that the new accord was "just another ploy by the Russians to try to fool some of our detente-happy people."[22] On the other hand, Senator Edward Kennedy (acting for himself and Senators Charles Mathias and Walter Mondale) introduced a Senate resolution which supported the new SALT accord but also urged the President to negotiate further arms limitations and reductions, including lower aggregate and MIRV ceilings than agreed to at Vladivostok.[23]

The administration's hopes for continued progress in U.S.-Soviet relations received their first setback on December 20, when Congress passed the Trade Bill with the Jackson-Vanik Amendment and limitations on credits to the Soviet Union. Brezhnev subsequently notified Ford that Moscow refused to accept a trading relationship with the United States based upon these discriminatory restrictions.[24] Nevertheless, subsequent Ford-Brezhnev exchanges indicated that neither leader had wavered in his determination to follow through on Vladivostok and to transform their understanding there into a concrete, signed SALT agreement.[25]

It was not disputes over trade discrimination but rather over some of the "gray" areas of strategic arms limitations not decided at the summit that caused the prospects of a signed SALT agreement in 1975 to dim and finally to disappear altogether. On January 29, 1975, the National Security Council met to discuss instructions to the U.S. SALT Delegation for talks scheduled to begin in Geneva on January 31. Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson was advised that his primary objective was to achieve an understanding before Brezhnev's arrival in June. Nevertheless, the NSC, which anticipated potential disputes with the Soviets over verification, cruise missiles, and the Backfire bomber, also told Johnson to be "hard-nosed" on including the Backfire in the Soviet aggregate and warned that cruise missiles might have to be the subject of a separate agreement.[26]

Primarily over these two issues, the Geneva negotiations were to bog down. No agreement on SALT II was reached during 1975, despite high hopes in both Washington and Moscow. Brezhnev's long-planned visit to Washington in June for another summit had to be postponed, although he and Ford did agree to meet in Helsinki for the final session of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in late July.

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Appendix

U.S.-SOVIET MEETING
OKEANSKAYA SANATORIUM, NEAR VLADIVOSTOK
NOVEMBER 23, 1974

PARTICIPANTS

United States

Gerald R. Ford, President of the United States
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Ambassador to the Soviet Union
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department of State
Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
William G. Hyland, Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
Alexander Akalovsky, Bureau of Political Military Affairs, Department of State

Soviet Union

L.I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party
A.A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs
A.F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the United States
A.M. Aleksandrov, Assistant to the General Secretary
G.M. Korniyenko, Member of the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Oleg Sokolov, U.S.A. Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
General Mikhail M. Kozlov, Soviet General Staff
Mr. Makarov, Assistant to Gromyko
Mr. Detinov, Member of the CPSU Central Committee Staff
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Counselor, Second European Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interpreter)

NOTES

1. Telegram 174035 to Moscow, August 9, 1974. (Lot 81 D 286) (S/Nodis); Letter from Kissinger to Gromyko, August 9, 1974. (Kissinger Files) (C).

2. Letter from Brezhnev to Ford, August 11, 1974, attached to Memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, August 13, 1974. (Lot 81 D 286) (S/Sensitive/Eyes Only); Memorandum of Conversation by Lodal, June 28, 1974, 10:45 a.m.-12:15 p.m. (Lot 81 D 286) (S/Nodis); Memorandum from Kissinger to Ford, August 11, 1974. (Lot 81 D 286) (S/Nodis).

3. Memorandum from Kissinger to Ford, August 14, 1974. (Lot 81 D 286) (S/Sensitive/Syes Only); Memorandum from Kissinger to Ford, n.d., (circa September 19, 1974) (Lot 81 D 286) (S/Sensitive).

4. Memorandum of Conversation by Stoessel, September 20, 1974. (Lot 81 D 286) (TS/Sensitive/Exclusively Eyes Only). There is no document in the State Department files recording the Ford-Brezhnev agreement to meet at Vladivostok but the meeting had been arranged by the time Gromyko met with Ford on September 20.

5. Memorandum from Eagleburger to Kissinger, October 19, 1974. (Kissinger Files) (S/Sensitive).

6. Memorandum from Kissinger to Ford, August 15, 1974, attached to Memorandum from Sonnenfeldt and Lodal to Kissinger, August 15, 1974. (Kissinger Files) (S/Sensitive/Eyes Only; Minutes of NSC Meeting, September 14, 1974 (Lot 81 D 286) (TS/Sensitive/Nodis).

7. Memorandum of Conversation by Stoessel, September 20, 1974. (Lot 81 D 286) (TS/Sensitive/Exclusively Eyes Only).

8. Note from Kissinger to Dobrynin, October 9, 1974, attached to Memorandum from Lodal and Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, October 15, 1974. (Lot 81 D 286) (S/Sensitive).

9. Memorandum of Conversation by Clift, October 24, 1974, 11:00 a.m.-2:00 p.m. (Kissinger Files) (TS/Nodis/Sensitive); Memorandum of Conversation by Rodman, October 24, 1974, 6:30-9:30 p.m. (Kissinger Files) (S/Nodis).

10. Memorandum of Conversation by Rodman, October 25, 1974, 11:05 a.m.-1:28 p.m. (Kissinger Files) (S/Nodis); Memorandum of Conversation by Clift, October 25, 1974, 7:30-10:00 p.m. (Lot 81 D 286) (TS/Sensitive/Nodis).

11. Memorandum of Conversation by Clift, October 26, 1974, 7:10-10:20 p.m. (Lot 81 D 286) (TS/Sensitive/Exclusively Eyes Only). On November 5, Brezhnev wrote Ford, confirming the use of the Kissinger-Dobrynin channel to work out the details of a new SALT agreement for their meeting at Vladivostok. Letter from Brezhnev to Ford, November 5, 1974. (Lot 81 D 286) (U).

12. Memorandum of Conversation by Sonnenfeldt, October 26, 1974, 4:30-6:45 p.m., attached to Memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Scowcroft, November 8, 1974. (Lot 81 D 286) (S/Sensitive/Exclusively Eyes Only).

13. Note from Vorontsov to Sonnenfeldt, November 8, 1974, attached to Memorandum from Lodal, Sonnenfeldt and Hyland to Kissinger, November 8, 1974. (Lot 81 D 286) (S/Sensitive/Eyes Only); Memorandum from Kissinger to Ford, November 13, 1974. (Kissinger Files) (S/Sensitive); U.S. Counterproposal, November 13, 1974 (Kissinger Files)(U).

14. Memorandum from Kissinger to Ford, n.d., attached to Memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, November 14, 1974. (Lot 81 D 286) (S/Sensitive/Eyes Only).

15. Letter from Sonnenfeldt and Hyland to Kissinger, November 16, 1974 (Kissinger Files). (LOU).

16. Memorandum of Conversation by U.S. Rapporteur Alexander Akalovsky, November 23, 1974, 2:30 p.m. (Kissinger Files) (S/Sensitive/Nodis).

17. Memorandum of Conversation by Akalovsky, November 23, 1974, 6:15 p.m. (Kissinger Files) (S/Sensitive/Nodis).

18. Memorandum of Conversation by Akalovsky, November 24, 1974, 10:10 a.m. (Kissinger Files) (S/Sensitive/Nodis); Memorandum of Conversation by Akalovsky, November 24, 1974, 2:05 p.m. (Kissinger Files) (S/Sensitive/Nodis).

19. Department of State Bulletin, vol. LXXI (July 7-December 30, 1974) pp. 898-905.

20. Transcript of December 3 Backgrounder on the Vladivostok SALT Agreement, attached to Memorandum from Leigh to Anderson, February 27, 1975. (Kissinger Files) (LOU); Minutes of NSC Meeting, December 2, 1974. (Lot 81 D 286) (TS/Sensitive/Nodis).

21. The New York Times, November 29, 1974; Chicago Council on Foreign Relations copy of Louis Harris and Associates Study # 22436, December 1974. (PA/OAP); Chicago Tribune, December January 17, 1975, attached to Memorandum from Vest to Kissinger, February 6, 1975. (Lot 81 D 286) (C).

22. Transcript of Bruce Morton Interview of Senator Jackson, CBS Morning News, November 26, 1974, contained in Draft Telegram to Kissinger in Peking, November 26, 1974. (Lot 81 D 286) (U); Alan Platt, The U.S. Senate and Strategic Arms Policy, 1969-1977 (Boulder, Colorado: 1978) p. 62.

23. Senate Resolution 20, 94th Congress, 1st Session, January 17, 1975, attached to Memorandum from Vest to Kissinger, February 6, 1975. (Lot 81 D 286) (C).

24. Letter from Brezhnev to Ford, December 25, 1974, attached to Memorandum from Kissinger to Ford, December 26, 1974. (S/S-I, #7425272) (S/Sensitive).

25. Letter from Ford to Brezhnev, January 21, 1975, attached to Letter from Brezhnev to Ford, January 27, 1975 (Lot 81 D 286) (U).

26. Minutes, NSC Meeting, January 29, 1975. (Lot 81 D 286) (TS/Sensitive); National Security Decision Memorandum 285, February 6, 1975. (Lot 81 D 286) (TS/Sensitive).

HELSINKI: JULY 1975

18

~~TOP SECRET~~

FORD AND BREZHNEV AT HELSINKI, JULY 30-AUGUST 2, 1975

The 1975 Helsinki summit between President Ford and Soviet Party Chairman Brezhnev took place on July 30 and August 2, 1975, immediately prior to and following the ceremonies closing the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The United States gave top priority to two issues:

-- Strengthening cooperation between the great powers
-- Concluding a SALT II agreement

The results of the Ford-Brezhnev meeting were unsatisfactory. No substantive progress was made on SALT although the atmosphere which surrounded meetings of the two leaders was frank and cooperative. Public reaction to the meeting was strongly negative and contributed to the subsequent deterioration in U.S.-Soviet relations during the remainder of the Ford administration and weakened the President's political position.

Initiative: Resuscitating Detente

President Ford's decision to attend the Helsinki heads of government meeting and sign the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was an effort to revitalize the policy of cooperation with the Soviet Union he had inherited from the Nixon administration and carried forward at the Vladivostok summit. This policy was under mounting attack in the United States, particularly from within the Republican Party, and appeared to be losing some of its attraction to the Soviet leadership. In December 1974, shortly after the conclusion of the Vladivostok summit, Congress amended the bill granting most-favored-nation (MFN) trading status to the Soviet Union by tying freer emigration from the U.S.S.R. to improved trade relations (the Jackson-Vanik amendment). Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev heatedly protested this "interference" in Soviet internal affairs in a letter to the White House.[1] In February 1975 Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko met in Geneva to smooth over differences between the two states over trade, arms control, and the Middle East. The meeting was satisfactory and President Ford subsequently wrote Brezhnev that the United States would look favorably on the Soviet Government's request for a summit meeting which would coincide with the CSCE heads of government gathering.[2]

Ford's decision to attend the Helsinki meeting was calculated to please both the Soviet Union and U.S. European Allies. The Soviets had been pressing for a conference on European security since 1954 and hoped to utilize such a process to secure Western recognition of the permanence of the boundries the U.S.S.R. had created in Eastern and Central Europe at the end of World War II. By 1974 they were pressing for a summit meeting to crown the CSCE process. The NATO Allies had agreed to the conference only after securing Soviet concessions on the Berlin question and other German issues. The NATO Allies utilized the CSCE to win public Soviet commitments to respect the right to self-determination of other European states and to conform with Western practices on human rights issues. While the Helsinki accords were not treaty commitments, they constituted a useful psychological tool to force better Soviet behavior in Europe. In exchange, the West reaffirmed its de facto recognition of Eastern Europe's existing borders while inserting a clause in the Helsinki document which stressed that border modification could only be the result of peaceful change.[3]

President Ford's decision to attend the Helsinki Conference and meet with Brezhnev was confirmed with the Soviet Union in May and the dates for both the CSCE heads of government meeting and the summit conference were finalized at a July 10 meeting between Kissinger and Gromyko. The decision was publicly announced on July 20, 1975. The President and his policy of detente had in the meantime been embroiled in a series of damaging controversies which climaxed when the White House declined to receive exiled Soviet writer Aleksander Solzhenitsyn on the publicly-stated grounds that such a meeting might damage U.S.-Soviet relations. Announcement of Ford's decision to meet with Brezhnev at Helsinki ignited a new wave of attacks on the policy of detente. Traditional opponents of closer cooperation with the Soviet Union were joined by usual supporters such as The New York Times, which argued that a Presidential appearance at Helsinki would appear to give Western approval to Soviet claims that the Eastern European borders established during and after World War II were sacrosanct.[4]

The Ford administration sought to counter domestic criticism of both the summit and CSCE by pointing out that the United States was participating with 34 other nations in the Helsinki meeting and that the CSCE Final Act was not legally binding. In a meeting with leaders of U.S. ethnic groups of East European origin, Ford reiterated U. S. refusal to grant de jure recognition to the political solution imposed by Soviet

arms on Eastern Europe between 1940 and 1945. The President stressed that the United States and its NATO Allies had won a useful tool in efforts to improve the lot of the peoples of Eastern Europe by extracting Soviet pledges to respect basic human and political rights.[5]

Preparations: SALT and the Future of Detente

Arms control, particularly the Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty (SALT) Talks, dominated both East-West relations and U.S. preparations for the Helsinki summit. Other issues of importance were: Soviet cooperation with ongoing U.S. efforts to secure withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Sinai Peninsula as the first step toward a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East; the related issues of trade and freedom of emigration from the Soviet Union; limiting Soviet involvement in Portugal's internal affairs following the April 1974 revolution; implementation of the CSCE Final Act; and revitalization of the stalled Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) Talks.[6]

The Ford administration hoped to sign a SALT II agreement with the Soviet Union in the fall of 1975 during a previously agreed-upon Brezhnev visit to the United States. Gromyko, at a May 10 meeting with Kissinger at Geneva, outlined new Soviet proposals which raised U.S. hopes for a swift solution to outstanding difficulties. On the critical issue of verification of the number of missiles and warheads each side possessed, the Soviets suggested that all missiles that had been tested with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV) should be counted as MIRVed and included in the ceiling of 1320 missiles established by SALT I. The Soviets also proposed that each side should have the right to replace existing MIRV systems at a later date with new MIRV systems on a one-to-one basis and single warhead missiles with new single warhead missiles. The Soviet proposal was close to previous U.S. projects for verification. Linked to the verification proposal, however, was a second Soviet plan which called for limiting cruise missile deployment. The Soviet plan would have limited deployment of mobile cruise missiles with a range of more than 600 kilometers to bomber aircraft. It banned ship, submarine, or mobile transporter launched cruise missiles with a range greater than 600 kilometers together with all intercontinental range land-based cruise missiles. The Soviets rejected U.S. efforts to define their recently developed "Backfire" bomber as a strategic weapon, and thus to include it in the strategic arms talks.[7]

Kissinger advised President Ford that the Soviet proposals represented a significant step toward an agreement on SALT II and that a meeting between the President and Soviet General Secretary might accelerate progress toward an agreement.[8] A note containing the U.S. response to the Soviet proposals of May 1975 was presented at the end of July. The United States indicated substantial agreement with Soviet proposals on verification. It favored a ban on ballistic missiles in space, in seabeds, and on ocean floors, as well as those with a range of over 600 kilometers deployed on surface ships. The United States further suggested that these areas of basic agreement together with a number of other technical matters be referred to the two nations' negotiating teams at Geneva for final resolution. The U.S. note also stated it was willing to accept "substantial parts of the Soviet position on cruise missiles," including a ban on the deployment of cruise missiles with a range greater than 600 kilometers which were "carried on aircraft other than heavy bombers," and a ban on the development of intercontinental cruise missiles. The United States sought modifications in Soviet proposals on submarine and surface launched cruise missiles. Finally, the U.S. note reiterated the position that the Backfire bomber must be considered in the strategic arms talks.[9]

In the guidance memorandum Secretary Kissinger forwarded to President Ford on July 29, 1975, two objectives dominated U.S. strategy for the Helsinki summit: 1) progress in SALT negotiations and 2) reaffirmation of the commitment of both sides to improve U.S.-Soviet relations as a matter of basic policy. Kissinger advised the President that he should underline his government's insistence that U.S.-Soviet cooperation was a "two-way street." Movement toward solution of such key issues as SALT, the MBFR talks, and the implementation of the CSCE Final Act was the best means to calm U.S. public suspicions that the Soviet Union was exploiting detente, thereby preserving the basis for U.S.-Soviet cooperation.[10]

While no formal agenda was prepared for the Ford-Brezhnev talks, the State Department prepared briefing material on the following substantive issues:

--CSCE implementation
--MBFR talks
--The Middle East peace process
--The strategic balance in the Indian Ocean
--The Portugese situation
--U.S.-Soviet trade
--Emigration from the Soviet Union

The briefing material provided President Ford outlined U.S. policy in the following manner. The United States viewed the CSCE Final Act as a set of guidelines for the future conduct of East-West relations; it established standards of behavior that could be translated into practice. The President should press Brezhnev to break the deadlock over MBFR. If the Soviet Union raised the Middle East question, the United States would seek to reassure Soviet leaders that it was not seeking to expel their influence from the area. Soviet cooperation, preferably by nonintervention in U.S. peacemaking efforts, was welcome. The President was also prepared to discuss the strategic balance in the Indian Ocean area, and to note that the United States had no desire to start a regional arms race, but would counter continued development of Soviet bases in the region through construction of a facility at Diego Garcia island. Similarly, the United States would urge Soviet restraint and nonintervention in Portugese internal affairs which had taken an increasingly radical course since the April 1974 revolution, thereby offering the Portugese Communist Party an enticement to attempt to seize power. In addition to SALT, other arms control issues were being discussed by the great powers, and the President was prepared to state that the United States was ready to sign the just completed treaty limiting peaceful nuclear explosions to a 150 kiloton threshold and, with only a few details remaining before completion of an environmental warfare agreement, the United States was ready to work out a common strategy for its presentation and ultimate signature. Finally, on the troubled and intertwined issues of trade and emigration, the President was to promise that he would seek revision of the Jackson-Vanik amendment to permit the Soviet Union to enjoy most favored nation trading status. However, Ford was to explain candidly that prospects for disentangling the two issues were limited and that progress toward full trade status was likely to be slow.[11]

Discussions: Progress on Detente and Deadlock on SALT

President Ford arrived at Helsinki on the afternoon of July 29, 1975 after state visits to the Federal Republic of Germany and Poland. The Presidential party included Secretary of State Kissinger, U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union Walter Stoessel, Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs Brent Scowcroft, and State Department Counselor Helmut Sonnenfeldt. The President's schedule was arranged to provide time for two lengthy morning meetings with the aging and recently ill Brezhnev, immediately before and after the CSCE ceremonies, which were scheduled for the afternoon of July 30 through August 1. The Brezhnev party included Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and his senior foreign affairs advisers.

The first negotiating session between President Ford and Secretary Brezhnev took place at the residence of the U.S. Ambassador to Finland on the morning of July 30, 1975 and lasted approximately 3 hours.[12] At the request of the Soviet Union, the participants deferred discussion of SALT until the second meeting. President Ford then made a statement in which he stressed the United States commitment to detente and indicated his expectation to remain in office for a second term to see the process of cooperation continued. Noting that detente had serious critics in the United States, Ford stated that further progress on SALT and the successful implementation of the CSCE agreements would silence them. The President also pointed out that a projected Brezhnev visit to the United States in the fall of 1975 would depend on progress on a SALT agreement.

Brezhnev responded by underlining his desire to reach an accord on SALT and stated that the Soviet Union would be fully prepared to devote itself to the issue at the second session of the summit after a more detailed study of the latest U.S. proposals. Brezhnev also introduced the idea of extending the CSCE process to other areas of the globe, noting that Ford had stated that detente was not only for Europe but for the rest of the world as well.

The Soviet General Secretary raised the issue of the Middle East. He indicated that the United Nations was not a suitable forum for settling the Arab-Israeli problem. Brezhnev stressed that the Soviet Union wanted to know more about U.S. plans for a Middle East solution and added that without U.S.-Soviet accord on a solution the suspended Geneva Conference on the Middle East would collapse. In response to a Ford request for Soviet suggestions and recommendations, Brezhnev replied that his government's position was that Israel must surrender territory occupied since June 1967, and that the Palestinian rights and Israel's "free and secure" existence must be guaranteed. Prodded by Gromyko, Brezhnev then noted Soviet concern that the step-by-step method of returning occupied lands was in danger of becoming divorced from the larger issue of a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East.

President Ford agreed that the United Nations was not a suitable forum for settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The President added that the United States wanted to avoid a clash between the great powers and to find a means of bringing together the parties to the dispute. According to the memorandum of conversation, Ford then complimented the Soviet Union for its "very helpful actions." Ford stressed that the "step-by-step" approach which the United States was employing

had reached a stage "where either it will achieve another success, or else there is a possibility of a comprehensive proposal . . . that would encompass all of the issues that have festered there for years." Kissinger added the United States believed that "after the next step we will have reached the point where a comprehensive approach will be required." After further comments on the complexity of the Middle East problem, Kissinger reiterated the need for a U.S.-Soviet accord on common policy for the region and warned against the danger of being drawn into a confrontation by "volatile" peoples who had no loyalty to either of the great powers.

Brezhnev insisted that an agreed-upon forum existed in the proposed Geneva Conference and the time had come for the United States to give up its step-by-step diplomacy, which was not producing a comprehensive solution, in favor of a conference of all the parties which could settle the entire matter.

The talks also dealt with the intertwined issues of Soviet emigration policy and most-favored-nation trading status. President Ford praised Brezhnev for his frank discussions with a U.S. Senatorial delegation on matters relating to trade and economics. Ford stressed the close connection between a satisfactory settlement of the issue of Jewish emigration and his Administration's efforts to secure a favorable trade bill from the Congress. Brezhnev introduced statistics on Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union to show that the number of Jews wishing to leave had declined precipitously from a high point of 33,000 in 1973, because those who wished to leave had now departed. He claimed that the Soviet Union had met 98.4 percent of all requests for emigration submitted since 1945 and that those cases which had been denied permission to emigrate involved security matters. Fewer Soviet Jews wished to emigrate to Israel and the Soviet Union could not forceably expel Jewish citizens who wished to remain in the Soviet Union to meet the demands of the U.S. Congress.

President Ford did not challenge the Soviet presentation but instead stressed the need for creating a favorable perception of the Soviet Union and the detente process by further progress on the basic issues of SALT and CSCE and by making it clear that the possibility for emigration from the Soviet Union existed.

Brezhnev concluded the meeting by noting statements by U.S. Defense Secretary James Schlesinger which implied that the United States might launch a preventive nuclear strike against the Soviet Union. President Ford assured the Soviet leader that he made U.S. policy and that the policy was detente.

Both Ford and Brezhnev participated in the largely ceremonial concluding sessions of the CSCE between July 30 and August 1 and signed the Final Act. In their speeches to the conference prior to the August 1 signing ceremony, the U.S. President and the Soviet General Secretary underlined their commitment to detente and the implementation of the CSCE accords. Thus, their second 3-hour meeting on the morning of August 2 on the key issue of SALT negotiations began in a favorable atmosphere. This second meeting, however, was less productive. Brezhnev, who had recently recovered from an illness, appeared fatigued to U.S. officials and apparently ill-prepared to discuss the substance of SALT. President Ford's memoirs indicate that the Soviets refused to back away from the position that the Backfire bomber was not a strategic weapon. A heated exchange ensued between Ford and Brezhnev over the truthfulness of Soviet claims that Backfire was not a strategic weapon. A "theatrically outraged" Brezhnev insisted that the United States could not doubt the word of the Secretary General of the Soviet Communist Party. The Soviets also insisted on linking concessions on verification to an agreement on cruise missiles which would severely limit both their range and their deployment. No progress was made toward resolving the impasse over the issue of arms limitations. In an intriguing aside, Brezhnev appeared to offer a deal in which the Soviets would sell oil to the United States at below world market prices in exchange for a favorable grain sales arrangement. U.S. officials were very interested in an offer which might undercut the OPEC cartel and later dispatched Assistant Secretary of State Charles Robinson to Moscow for talks on the possible trade. The deal was never consumated.[13]

Results: A Domestic Setback for the President and Detente

U.S. leaders were pleased with the outcome of the first summit session. Kissinger's briefing paper for an August 6, 1975 cabinet meeting noted that Brezhnev had made a "rather strong and sometimes emotional" commitment to detente and that the Soviet position on the Middle East was generally conciliatory and they would await the outcome of U.S. efforts at step-by-step diplomacy before pressing for the convening of a Geneva meeting. The second meeting on SALT indicated that substantial disagreements existed between the two sides which could only be resolved through hard negotiations.[14]

The Helsinki summit did little to rebuild U.S. public support for the policy of detente. Although President Ford claimed "progress" in the SALT negotiations at a postsummit meeting with the press, he admitted that failure to reach an accord on this issue was "disturbing." Moreover, the summit at

Helsinki was part of what Ford later termed a "Soviet propaganda victory" at the CSCE. Ford repeatedly defended the U.S. decision to sign the Final Act and participate in the Helsinki meetings, but he admitted that U.S. public opinion had concluded that the Soviets had gained an advantage over the United States, securing Western recognition of existing European frontiers, recognition of the legitimacy of Eastern European Communist governments, and the Soviet Union's forced incorporation of the three pre-World War II Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into the U.S.S.R. Ford faced a torrent of domestic criticism including charges that the United States had "sold out" the peoples of Eastern Europe at Helsinki which helped to lay the groundwork for a major challenge to his renomination. Kissinger was called to testify before hostile congressional committees. He told his staff he believed that Defense Secretary Schlesinger, who opposed substantive concessions on cruise missiles to the Soviet Union, was leaking information designed to undercut administration policy.[15]

The policy of detente yielded at least one benefit for diplomacy. Shortly after the summit, Kissinger secured a second pullback of Israeli forces in the Sinai. The Soviet Union did not interfere with the final round of intense diplomacy and did not attack the agreements in official statements.

Overall relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, however, deteriorated during the remainder of the Ford administration. Soviet assistance to one of the factions in Angola's civil war provoked public criticism from Kissinger and seemed to strengthen the case of critics who claimed that detente was a one-way policy. One of the leading critics of the policy, former California Governor Ronald Reagan challenged President Ford for the Republican nomination, claiming that by pursuing detente U.S. foreign policy was becoming subservient to the Soviet Union.

Negotiations on a SALT II Treaty continued into 1976. The two sides were unable to overcome their differences on either cruise missiles or the Backfire bomber. A Kissinger visit to Moscow in January 1976 failed to break the arms control logjam or produce any give over Angola. The onset of the U.S. Presidential election campaign led to a suspension of the talks, and following President Ford's defeat the conclusion of a SALT II agreement was left to the incoming Carter administration.

In spite of its initial propaganda triumph at CSCE, the Soviet Union soon found the "Helsinki process" was an encumberment to both its foreign and domestic policies. The

Western states pressed for full compliance with the CSCE agreements and utilized subsequent CSCE review meetings to highlight repeated Soviet violations in a number of areas, including human rights. Meanwhile, Eastern European and Soviet dissidents, aided by the Western press, spotlighted Soviet repressive practices. This coverage undercut Soviet hopes of attaining an unencumbered most-favored-nation trading status with the United States.[16]

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Appendix

U.S.-SOVIET MEETING AT HELSINKI
JULY 30-AUGUST 2, 1975

PARTICIPANTS

United States

Gerald Ford, President of the United States
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department of State
Walter J. Stoessel, Ambassador to the Soviet Union
William G. Hyland, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
Alexander Akalovsky, Bureau of Political Military Affairs, Department of State
Peter W. Rodman, National Security Council Staff

Soviet Union

L.I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party
A.A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs
G.M. Korniyenko, Member of the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
A.M. Aleksandrov, Assistant to the General Secretary
V.M. Sukhodrov, Counselor, Second European Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interpreter)
A. Vavilov, U.S.A. Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

NOTES

1. Telegram SECTO 420 to Aswan, March 13, 1975. (A/OPR/FAIM Kissinger Files) (S/Nodis). Memorandum from Secretary of State Kissinger to President Ford, December 29, 1974, with attached communication from First Secretary Brezhnev for Ford. (A/OPR/FAIM Kissinger Files) (S/Sensitive)).

2. Letter from Ford to Brezhnev, February 26, 1975. (A/OPR/FAIM Kissinger Files) (S).

3. "CSCE Background Paper," July 1975. (S/S-I Files, Lot 75 D 738, briefing books) (U).

4. The New York Times, July 21, 1975. Washington Post, July 25, 1975. Gerald Ford, A Time to Heal (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), pp. 297-301.

5. President Ford's July 25 statement is in Department of State Bulletin, August 11, 1975, pp. 204-206.

6. Memorandum of conversation between Kissinger and his senior staff, March 29, 1975 (Sonnenfeldt Files, Lot 81 D 286, "USSR--January-March 1975) (S/Sensitive/Exclusively Eyes Only). Memorandum from Kissinger to Ford, "Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe," undated, (A/OPR/FAIM Kissinger Files). (S/Sensitive).

7. Memorandum of conversation between Kissinger and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, July 10, 1975. (Sonnenfeldt Files, Lot 81 D 286, "USSR--June-July 1975") (TS/Sensitive/Exclusively Eyes Only).

8. Memorandum from Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Scowcroft to Ford, July 11, 1975. Sonnenfeldt Files, Lot 81 D 286, "USSR--June-July 1975") (S/Sensitive). Memorandum from Hyland to Kissinger, July 17, 1975. (A/OPR/FAIM Kissinger Files) (S/Sensitive).

9. Memorandum from Sonnenfeldt and Lodal to Kissinger, July 25, 1975. (Sonnenfeldt Files, Lot 81 D 286, "USSR-June-July 1975") (TS/Sensitive).

10. Memorandum from Kissinger to Ford, July 29, 1975. (Stoessel Files, Lot 82 D 307, "Helsinki") (S/Sensitive).

11. Memorandum from Kissinger to Ford, July 29, 1975, op. cit. The briefing books for the Helsinki summit are in S/S-I Lot 75 D 538.

12. Memorandum of conversation between Ford and Brezhnev, July 30, 1975. (Sonnenfeldt Files, Lot 81 D 286, "USSR--June-July 1975") (S).

13. No memorandum of conversation for the second Ford-Brezhnev meeting was located. Information on this meeting is taken from Ford, A Time to Heal, pp. 303-304 and "Talking Points for the Secretary" op. cit. Ford appears to have gotten the chronological sequence of his meetings with Brezhnev confused, placing the discussions on SALT at the first meeting instead of the second. Information on the oil-grain trade off was supplied by Helmut Sonnenfeldt in an interview with James Miller and David Mabon, September 26, 1985. Sonnenfeldt also confirmed the harsher tone of the second Ford-Brezhnev meeting and described Brezhnev's theatrical manner.

14. "Taking Points for the Secretary at the Cabinet Meeting," August 6, 1975. (A/OPR/FAIM Kissinger Files) (TS/Sensitive).

15. Ford Question-and-Answer session with reporters aboard Air Force One, August 2, 1975, in Department of State Bulletin, September 1, 1975, pp. 308-311. Ford, A Time to Heal, pp. 306-307. Memorandum of a conversation between Kissinger and his senior staff, Sept. 8, 1975, (Sonnenfeldt Files, Lot 81 D 286, "August-Sept-1975") (TS/Nodis).

16. Arkady Shevchenko, Breaking with Moscow (New York: Knopf, 1985), pp. 264-267. Briefing Paper for September 1975 Kissinger-Gromyko meeting, undated, (A/OPR/FAIM Kissinger Files) (S). Memorandum from Kissinger to Ford, Sept. 25, 1975, ibid.

VIENNA: JUNE 1979

CARTER AND BREZHNEV AT VIENNA, JUNE 15-18, 1979

The only U.S.-Soviet summit conference held during the Carter administration opened in Vienna on June 15, 1979, and continued through June 18, with five plenary meetings as well as a private meeting between President Jimmy Carter and Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev. The convening of the summit was linked to the completion of complex and difficult negotiations on the strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT II), which began in the Nixon and Ford administrations and was pursued to completion by the Carter administration. The State Department prepared briefing papers on a wide range of issues that might be discussed at the Vienna conference, and Department and White House working groups coordinated the planning. Discussions at the summit focused on the following subjects:

1. SALT II
2. SALT III and other arms control issues
3. International issues
4. Bilateral and trade issues.

The major achievement at Vienna was the signing of the SALT II Treaty on strategic arms. Many other issues were discussed and positions clarified, but little movement toward specific agreements resulted. Subsequently, the Soviet Union reacted negatively to the NATO two-track decision in mid-December 1979 to deploy intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Western Europe while simultaneously pursuing arms control talks with the Soviet Union. The invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet armed forces later that month removed all hopes for progress toward a rapprochement in U.S.-Soviet relations. President Carter asked the Senate to delay further consideration of the SALT II Treaty; the agreement still has not been ratified.

Initiative: Linkage with SALT II

The Carter administration inherited a legacy of five U.S.-Soviet summits from the Nixon and Ford administrations. In his inaugural address President Carter expressed hope for "the elimination of all nuclear weapons from this earth,"[1] and his administration attempted from the outset to negotiate a SALT II Treaty with the Soviet Union to supersede the limited

1972 SALT I agreement on offensive nuclear arms, due to expire in October 1977. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance visited Moscow in late March 1977 to initiate an arms control dialogue with the Soviet leadership. Believing arms control agreements should not merely codify or limit the arms race but should result in substantial arms reductions, President Carter instructed Secretary Vance to propose drastic cuts in the number of each country's nuclear delivery vehicles. The Soviet leadership rejected this U.S. initiative as a radical departure from the understandings reached with President Ford at Vladivostok in November 1974 and as very one-sided in favor of the United States.[2]

Despite the failure of the Vance mission, the Carter administration resumed the SALT talks with the Soviet Union in Geneva in May 1977. These protracted negotiations included regular sessions in Geneva between Paul Warnke, Chairman of the U.S. SALT Delegation, and his Soviet counterpart, Vladimir Semenov, as well as several meetings between Secretary Vance and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in Washington, Geneva, and Moscow and occasional meetings in Washington between President Carter and Gromyko and Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin. These talks gradually resolved many of the outstanding substantive and technical issues between the two sides.[3] Each side stated in September 1977, shortly before the expiration of the SALT I interim agreement, that it would adhere to the provisions of that treaty during SALT II talks if the other exercised similar restraint.[4]

During the negotiations the Soviet Union accepted a basic framework of 2,250 total missile launchers for each side beginning in 1981, 1,320 of which could contain multiple (MIRVed) warheads. Each side agreed to sublimits of 1,200 for MIRVed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles and 820 for land-based ICBMs. The Soviets also dropped their previous insistence on a range limit for the testing and deployment of air-launched cruise missiles and later dropped the limit on testing of ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs and SLCMs). The United States reciprocated by accepting a prohibition on the flight testing and deployment of air-launched cruise missiles and a strict definition of a 600-kilometer limit on GLCMs and SLCMs in the protocol of the treaty, which would be in force through December 1981. The two sides also resolved the modernization question. Each could test and deploy one new ICBM, with defined characteristics, if the aggregate number of ICBMs was limited to 1,200.[5]

Throughout these negotiations Brezhnev let it be known on several occasions that he favored a "well prepared" summit

meeting with President Carter to confirm and sign a SALT II agreement. Progress in resolving the major arms control questions in SALT by early fall of 1978 raised President Carter's hopes that a summit meeting could take place in late 1978 or early 1979.[6]

Difficulties in U.S.-Soviet relations nonetheless delayed agreement on a summit meeting until the spring of 1979. Differences arose during 1978 over the issue of encryption of telemetry in missile tests. Warnke and Semenov had reached an understanding at Geneva in which the Soviet Union agreed to ban the encoding of electronic signals from its missile tests that impeded U.S. ability to verify Soviet compliance with the SALT II accord. Vance supported this understanding. But other U.S. officials, especially Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner, advocated an outright ban on all telemetry encryption. Gromyko informed U.S. officials that the SALT I agreement allowing for national technical means of verification was also adequate for the SALT II agreement, and the United States was raising an "artificial" issue with its insistence on a prohibition of encryption.[7]

Secretary Vance believed that although both nations were groping toward the same end, the Soviets emphasized the permissibility of encryption unless it impeded verification while the United States was trying to stress its restriction. New compromise language for an agreement was worked out between Gromyko and Vance in Geneva in late December 1978, but during these meetings new instructions from Washington required the Secretary to reserve the U.S. right to challenge telemetry encryption under the treaty. The loss of U.S. monitoring capabilities in Iran in early 1979 following the revolution in that country made U.S. concerns on the verification issue more urgent. President Carter sent letters to President Brezhnev stating his administration's opposition to the encryption of telemetry and suggesting possible solutions to the impasse.[8]

The Soviet Backfire bomber issue also remained unresolved. The Soviets insisted that the Backfire bomber had only medium-range capability and therefore was not a strategic weapon, but seemed willing to meet U.S. concerns on its range and payload capabilities by making a separate statement outside the treaty framework that it would not significantly increase the annual production rate and the range/payload of this aircraft. The details of this arrangement were not confirmed in writing during these discussions, however, and the issue would resurface as the subject of considerable discussion at the summit meeting.[9]

Other U.S. concerns were Soviet activities in Southern Africa (Namibia, Angola, and Rhodesia) and growing Soviet military presence in Ethiopia, South Yemen, Vietnam, and Cuba. Regarding the latter, the Carter administration in the fall of 1978 sought clear assurances from the Soviets that the Mig-23s, which U.S. intelligence had learned were being delivered to Cuba, did not have a nuclear capability and that only a limited number of a nonnuclear-capable ground attack version would be sent to Cuba.

After considerable negotiations, the Soviet Union said that it would not object to the Carter administration issuing of a public statement that indicated the non-nuclear capabilities of the Mig-23s in Cuba, provided the statement did not imply that the Soviet Union had agreed not to increase the number of these airplanes in Cuba. Though not entirely satisfied, the President stated on November 30 and December 7 that he had received Soviet assurances that it had not violated the 1962 U.S.-Soviet understanding that the Soviet Union would not deploy nuclear weapons or nuclear delivery systems in Cuba. Carter also affirmed that his administration would continue to monitor Soviet actions there very carefully.[10]

Throughout his discussions with Soviet officials, Vance emphasized that the Soviet Union's focus on selective detente limited to strategic arms was inadequate. U.S. leaders warned that Soviet restraint and cooperation on regional questions were required to persuade Senators that overall detente was working so that they would give their consent to a SALT II agreement.[11]

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union reacted negatively to the growing rapprochement between the United States and the People's Republic of China. The joint U.S.-China announcement on December 15, 1978, of full diplomatic relations commencing on January 1, 1979, followed by Chinese Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping's visit to the United States, presaged the possibility of U.S. arms sales to China. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski in particular believed the Soviet leadership faced a serious dilemma--whether to try to foster detente with the United States or move in other directions--and he felt that the exploitation of the China relationship would elicit a Soviet response one way or the other. Though Brezhnev had written President Carter immediately after the joint announcement that he hoped the U.S. relationship with China would not preclude an early SALT agreement, he soon reversed these private assurances through the Soviet news media. President Carter's subsequent statements that the United States would not sell arms to China failed to convince Soviet leaders who continued to express publicly their displeasure at the

prospect of increasingly friendly relations between their two major rivals.[12]

Though some State Department officials believed that the U.S. decision to establish normal diplomatic relations with China seriously complicated U.S.-Soviet relations and delayed the summit meeting, Brzezinski believed that too many SALT issues (telemetry ecryption and the Backfire, for example) remained unresolved to conclude a SALT II treaty at a summit. It took in fact almost weekly meetings, about 25 in all, between Vance and Dobrynin from January to June 1979 as well as ongoing negotiations between the SALT delegations in Geneva to resolve the outstanding SALT questions. The continuing progress on SALT II gradually convinced both sides that the major issues on strategic arms had been resolved and that a summit meeting of the heads of government was desirable in the near future.[13]

A last detail in these discussions was agreement on the site for the summit. Because the last meeting between the heads of the two governments held in either nation had taken place at Vladivostok, protocol required that this summit be held in the United States. Soviet officials apparently claimed, however, that Brezhnev's poor health precluded a long journey to the United States, and the two sides agreed instead on Vienna. A more neutral meeting place like Vienna had certain advantages for constructive discussions. As Brzezinski later observed, the Vienna site permitted the summit to take place with less fanfare and fraternization than would have been the case if it had been held in the United States.[14]

Finally, on May 11 the two governments announced that a summit meeting would be held June 15-18, 1979, in Vienna to "confirm and sign the treaty on the limitation of strategic offensive arms" and "discuss other issues of mutual interest."[15]

Preparations: Many Issues, Few Prospects for Agreements

Several months before the formal announcement of the Vienna meeting, Carter administration officials began to prepare briefing papers on a wide range of issues that might be discussed at a summit conference. Department of State and National Security Council (NSC) officials organized an interdepartmental working group to coordinate the planning for a summit meeting. In March 1979, the Department also organized its own working group. Robert Barry, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (EUR), served as chairman of the Department's working group of 16-20 officials,

most of whom were Soviet specialists, arms control experts from the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), and public affairs officials from the Bureau of Public Affairs, EUR, Voice of America, and the International Communications Agency. (The public affairs input declined when it was decided to hold the summit outside the United States.) This working group handled overall planning, including the preparation of briefing, "issues," and talking points papers. Barry, who also served on the NSC working group, acted as liaison with the White House on the preparations. Marshall Shulman, Special Adviser to the Secretary on Soviet Affairs, worked closely with Barry and the Department's working group and met frequently with Vance and Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher in discussing the agenda and planning for the summit. Department principals also consulted regularly with the American Embassy in Moscow concerning these preparations.[16]

The Department of State and NSC working groups agreed on an agenda comprising four main subject areas:

1) The overall relationship, including the possibility of annual summit meetings and regular meetings at the Foreign Minister-Secretary of State level, and a dialogue between the two Defense Ministers or their Chiefs of Staff;

2) SALT II and other arms control issues, including SALT III, mutual balanced and force reduction (MBFR) talks, anti-satellite weapons (ASAT), comprehensive test ban (CTB), chemical and radiological weapons, Indian Ocean, and nuclear non-proliferation;

3) International and regional issues, including the Middle East peace process, Iran, Southern Africa, Horn of Africa, Southeast Asia, Afghanistan, Persian Gulf, Cuba, and global development issues; and

4) Bilateral and trade issues, including most-favored-nation (MFN) status, agreement on a new U.S. consulate in Tashkent, reciprocity in media and commercial representation, human rights, cultural exchange agreement, and parliamentary exchanges.[17]

Subsequent meetings between Vance and Dobrynin or their deputies resulted in agreement on an agenda for the summit. Dobrynin objected only to the inclusion of human rights and reciprocity in media and commercial representation. Regarding other arms control issues, such as gray areas, ASAT, CTB, and MBFR, he noted that "so far we are not encouraged by the position of the U.S. side at the negotiations and in the course of bilateral exchanges on these issues."[18] His comment foreshadowed the inconclusive result of the discussions on these issues at the Vienna summit.

The two sides also agreed to negotiate in advance the communique to be issued at the conclusion of the summit. Following Soviet presentation of its draft communique on May 25, EUR prepared a counterdraft, with contributions from the Office of the Legal Advisor, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Policy Planning Staff, and regional bureaus. This counterdraft incorporated some of the Soviet language but, "in contrast to the rather bland Soviet text," set forth the U.S. "maximum realistic positions on key issues." The draft was given to the Soviets on June 1.[19] On the following day representatives from the Soviet Embassy met with Barry and David Aaron and Reginald Bartholomew from the NSC to devise an agreed text.

Discussions on the communique revealed that the Soviet Union sought a general declaration of principles expressing in rather abstract terms the two nations' commitment to peaceful coexistence as they had done at the Moscow summit in 1972, while the United States preferred to emphasize the specific and concrete. The Soviets complained about the U.S. draft communique dropping references to "peaceful coexistence," "non-intervention in each other's internal affairs," strategic parity, and "complete equality" as the principles guiding SALT, and to abjuring efforts "to achieve military supremacy." Similarly, the Soviets objected to U.S. language on a U.N. role in the Middle East peace process and to the "commitment to freedom of movement" in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) context. They also rejected the selective references to South Asia on nonproliferation matters, and to specific references to Indochina, Iran, and Afghanistan. When willing to engage in specifics, the Soviets wanted to spell out U.S.-Soviet differences on the Middle East and South Africa. This contradicted the U.S. desire for more positive language in the communique.[20] The disagreements on the communique foreshadowed the differences on the same issues that Carter and Brezhnev would express to each other at the summit.

Carter administration officials' desire for a constructive summit meeting prompted them to recede from their initial maximum positions and to meet the Soviets more than halfway on the communique. The agreed items in the communique worked out in time for the opening of the summit were clearly more general than specific. The communique included the Soviet emphasis on the principles guiding the SALT process and mentioned other arms control issues mainly in terms of agreement to continue talks on them. It also referred only to the importance of increasing cooperation on international and regional issues and did not cite any third country by name as a special concern.

Likewise, on bilateral issues it mentioned only positive developments on a range of cultural, academic, scientific, and technical exchange programs and the importance of working toward the elimination of obstacles to mutually beneficial trade relations. Other U.S. concerns, such as annual summit meetings and biannual meetings at the Secretary of State-Foreign Minister level, which Vance had vigorously promoted within the Department and at the White House, and advance notification of all strategic missile tests were deferred for subsequent discussion at the summit.[21]

In early June, Brzezinski and Vance sent papers to President Carter on U.S. objectives at the Vienna meeting. Brzezinski's memorandum, which was not submitted to the State Department in advance, divided the objectives into agreements/understandings and positions. Brzezinski had little hope for specific outcomes beyond the signing of the SALT II Treaty, agreement in principle to reduce missile launchers to 1,800 in SALT III, a possible preliminary agreement on ASAT, agreement on a framework for a Phase I agreement on MBFR and other arms control issues, and Soviet agreement in the communique to freer flow of information and to greater equality and reciprocity in media and commercial representation. He perceived the summit mainly as an opportunity "to convey our perspectives and positions clearly and firmly to the Soviets so they know where we (and they) stand. This may, at a minimum, heighten their sensitivity to our concerns and possible actions and reduce the chances of miscalculation." Here Carter noted in the margin, "Too Timid. We should have clear goals and strive for them." He wrote similar comments elsewhere on Brzezinski's memorandum.[22]

There had been too many ups and downs in Soviet-American relations since his inauguration more than 2 years earlier for the President to be overly sanguine about major breakthroughs at the summit. Nevertheless, he thought that his face-to-face meetings with Brezhnev would enable them to clear the air and begin to search, on a human level, for common ground in confronting the major problems affecting their peoples.[23]

Secretary Vance's memorandum, like Brzezinski's, also forecast only modest specific accomplishments. Vance, however, described much more fully the political psychology of the Soviet leadership, including Brezhnev. Because the Secretary believed that the Soviet leaders "attach great weight to the personal element of political relationships," he impressed upon Carter that "Brezhnev and his entourage will be heavily influenced by your personal style and their perception of your motivations." Despite their competitive tactics on many issues, Vance was convinced that Brezhnev and other Soviet

leaders were deeply committed to the stability and respectablility that went with a smooth U.S.-Soviet relationship. Thus, he urged that "a major objective of this Summit should be to reinforce the incentives for the Soviet leaders to adhere to the general course they have taken away from the Cold War, while at the same time nudging them towards a more realistic understanding of what modifications in their behavior are essential if this course is to prosper." More specifically, he emphasized, "the primary focus of your exchanges with Brezhnev should be to reaffirm the basic framework of US-Soviet relations, which is based on substantial common interest in strategic stability, mutual acceptance of the status quo in the developed world, and avoidance of confrontation in dealing with the Third World."

The Secretary singled out bilateral trade as an issue where Brezhnev might be most tractable. Brezhnev, he noted, had his own domestic constituency. His promises to segments of the Soviet elite to gain access to American technology and even consumer goods gave the United States potential leverage at the summit. Vance believed that trade with the Soviet Union had been constricted by linking it narrowly to Jewish emigration under the Jackson-Vanik amendment (section 402) of the Trade Act of 1974. According to Vance, the Soviet Government had recently begun to allow many more people to emigrate. If President Carter received positive assurances from Brezhnev of further Soviet improvement of the emigration process, then Carter would be willing to grant MFN status to the Soviet Union. Congress, Vance predicted, would not disapprove his action.[24]

Vance and Treasury Secretary Michael Blumenthal probed Dobrynin on this proposal in May and early June. The Soviet Ambassador had expressed Soviet objections to any linkage between trade and emigration, but held open the prospect of major progress on this issue in Vienna.[25] "If we can resolve the impasse over MFN," Vance argued optimistically in his memorandum, "we will have restored the economic option to our tools for dealing with Moscow, and we will have strengthened the hand of those in the USSR who favor detente as a path to modernizing the economic and social system."[26]

Expectations of a trade agreement resulted in a State Department plan that Blumenthal and Juanita Kreps, Secretary of Commerce, be present at the summit. Brzezinski, however, knew that Vance did not believe in linkage and was probably not serious about linking MFN to other issues. In any event, Brzezinski feared that the raising of the trade issue at the summit would deflect attention from what he considered to be more fundamental geopolitical questions. He wanted the

discussions with Brezhnev limited to "two simple themes--arms cuts and regional restraint," and prevailed upon Carter to leave Blumenthal and Kreps at home.[27]

Vance also stressed Brezhnev's frail health as a limiting factor at the summit. At his worst the Soviet leader "would show the symptoms of growing senility." Even if at his best, Brezhnev could only endure two short negotiating sessions each day. In consequence, "actual negotiation on central issues is unlikely." Finally, Vance proffered advice on what the President should advance at each negotiating session in order to convey most effectively U.S. positions and concerns.[28]

Discussions: Verbal Stalemate

Carter and Brezhnev had morning and afternoon plenary sessions on June 16 and 17 and a brief private meeting on June 18 immediately followed by a final plenary meeting on bilateral matters. They held the first two plenary sessions at the U.S. Embassy and the second two at the Soviet Embassy. The two leaders had their private meeting at the U.S. Embassy and then moved to the Soviet Embassy for the final plenary meeting. Vance, Brzezinski, one of Brzezinski's aides (Aaron or Bartholomew), Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, JCS Chairman Gen. David Jones, George Seignious, who had replaced Warnke as ACDA Director in early 1979, Ralph Earle, head of the SALT Delegation, Ambassador to the Soviet Union Malcolm Toon, and personal advisers Hamilton Jordan and Jody Powell accompanied President Carter at the plenary meetings; while Gromyko, Dobrynin, Brezhnev's assistant A.M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, Defense Minister D.F. Ustinov, K.U. Chernenko, G.M. Korniyenko, W.V. Ogarkov, L.M. Zamyatin, and the head of the SALT delegation, V.P. Karpov, sat in with Brezhnev. Each leader also had his own interpreter. Except for Gromyko, who regularly participated in the discussions, Carter and Brezhnev did almost all the talking at these plenary sessions; but because each session was only $1^1/_2$ to 2 hours in length, presumably out of deference to Brezhnev's uncertain health, the two leaders had only about 10 hours of direct talks. The requirement for translation of each leader's remarks further constricted the time available for full exploration of the issues. Prospects for substantive achievements beyond SALT II were unlikely in this short period. Even their introductory meetings on June 15 and short luncheons and dinners together following the sessions on June 16 and 17 did not allow for more than pleasant, informal conversation and toasts.[29]

Shortly after the delegations arrived in Vienna, Vance and Gromyko sat down on the afternoon of June 15 to discuss

unresolved items for possible inclusion in the communique, but they made very little progress. Vance pressed for inclusion of annual summit meetings and frequent meetings at other levels, including between their military and defense leaders, a statement on "no victor in a nuclear war," advance notification of military exercises, prohibition on destruction of objects in outer space, the convening of a Second U.N. Special Session on Disarmament, and a U.N. role in the Middle East. Gromyko acceded, however, only to mention of more regular meetings and a continuation of the ASAT talks, a statement that "nuclear war would be a disaster for all mankind," and the holding of a Second Special Session to be followed by a world disarmament conference, which the Soviets had earlier proposed.[30]

Carter and Brezhnev first met that evening when they paid their respects to Austrian President Kirchschlaeger. Following the formal greetings the leaders of the two superpowers had a brief, private conversation during which they agreed that success at the summit was necessary for themselves and for the rest of the world. "If we do not succeed," Brezhnev said, placing his hand on Carter's shoulder, "God will punish us." They talked again briefly that night at the opera.[31]

The subject of the first plenary meeting on the following morning was the general state of U.S.-Soviet relations. Though President Carter was the host, selected in advance by a flip of the coin, and was supposed to speak first, Brezhnev interjected that he would speak first and proceeded to read a prepared statement.[32]

Brezhnev conceded that there were problems in U.S.-Soviet relations but the two nations had been Allies during World War II. The two leaders needed to engage in frank and constructive discussions in trying to resolve their disagreements. "If we have good relations and mutual understanding between our countries," he stressed, "there will be peace, there will be no nuclear war, and jointly we will always be able to prevent that. And that we must do, I want to repeat and emphasize--we must." He said that his thinking on U.S.-Soviet relations had always proceeded from the principle of peaceful coexistence between nations with different social and economic systems. It was not necessary to exacerbate their differences and risk a nuclear war that neither would win.[33] Pointing across the table at Vance, Brezhnev remarked, "He is the only one who does not want that." (Brezhnev's comment was probably intended for Brzezinski, not Vance, but he had confused the two.)[34]

The Soviet leader also focused on the complete equality between the two nations underlying their better relations, and emphasized that the Soviet Union had no hostile intentions

toward the United States. He thought President Carter felt the same way, but he could not understand why the United States persistently built up its military forces which triggered an arms race.

Carter responded that it was his highest goal to restructure U.S.-Soviet relations on a stable basis. He quoted Brezhnev's remark the previous day that God would not forgive them if they failed. He felt that often differences arose because of lack of understanding and of regular consultations. When he added that he sometimes had the impression that the two Foreign Ministers did not share the same objectives as their leaders, Gromyko protested: "That is a very bold statement." Carter conceded that competition would remain, but they needed a full discussion of the potentially destabilizing aspects of this competition. Neither side could dominate the other, and the arms race resulted in much waste of human and natural resources and the development of unnecessary capabilities.

Brezhnev, who frequently interrupted to indicate his agreement with Carter, at this point interjected that Carter had already approved a greatly increased military budget for the coming year, so he did not know whether he should believe Carter's statement. Carter replied that he understood that the Soviet Union had steadily increased its expenditures for weapons of all kinds during the past 15 years and at a faster rate than that of the United States. Both nations, he urged, should exercise greater restraint.

After a few further frank but amicable exchanges, during which Carter stressed the importance not only of SALT II but preparation for SALT III and further progress on MBFR, CTB, and other arms control issues, Brezhnev stood up abruptly and announced that it was time for lunch. Though the session was not scheduled to end for another half hour, Brezhnev's action resulted in early adjournment.[35]

The focus of the second plenary meeting that afternoon was SALT II. In his opening statement Brezhnev emphasized the difficulties and compromises required in negotiating the SALT II agreement. He did not like everything in the treaty but felt it met the interests of both sides. After mentioning the requirement of unilateral statements by both sides, he handed over the Soviet statement on the Backfire bomber. He pointed out that the statement was a gesture in good will because the Backfire did not relate to arms covered in the treaty. If the United States in the same spirit should state that the production rate was 30 per year, he added, no rebuttal would be made by the Soviets. He then remarked that it should be clear that until the agreement entered into force, it could not be

binding on either side. He was confident the Supreme Soviet would ratify the treaty, but he expressed concern about its opponents in the United States.

General Secretary Brezhnev further declared that Soviet military doctrine was defensive only and did not envisage first use of nuclear or any other weapons, and he invited a similar statement from President Carter. Such a public statement, he predicted, would be a rebuff to opponents of the treaty and those demanding amendments to it. He made clear that only the treaty as signed could go into force.

He then raised the question of the MX. The Carter administration had announced its decision to produce and deploy this new missile only a week before the opening of the summit. Brzezinski especially worked assiduously to win the President's endorsement of the MX and for Soviet acceptance of one new missile system for each side in the SALT II treaty. He firmly believed that the administration's commitment to the MX was required to help to neutralize hard-line opposition to the treaty and in any case was necessary to counter the Soviets' growing superiority in land-based missiles.[36] Frankly, Brezhnev stated, he did not see how the MX decision promoted the arms control objectives of the treaty. He added that the multiple protective shelters basing mode for deployment of the MX could not be verified and would preclude reaching agreement on SALT III.

Brezhnev continued that SALT III would have to take into account additional concerns, especially long-range SLCMs and GLCMs limited only until the end of 1980 in the protocol of SALT II, U.S. forward-based systems in Europe, and the nuclear missile potential of NATO and China. How, he asked, were these countries to be associated with the process of limiting strategic arms? He thought that frequent references in the West to gray areas were very vague. He asserted that Soviet medium-range missiles and aircraft could not reach the United States, while U.S. weapons could strike Soviet territory. These were not simple questions, but SALT III would have to resolve which systems were gray and black.

President Carter first responded by congratulating Brezhnev on his success in negotiating the SALT II agreement over many years with three U.S. Presidents. Because he believed the Soviet side had prevailed in these lengthy negotiations, he suggested that it was time for Brezhnev to be more generous to the Americans. Brezhnev responded, "I am ready."

The United States, Carter continued, had no intention of deploying more than 20 cruise missiles during the term of the

treaty. Regarding Minuteman launchers, the President handed Brezhnev a copy of the agreed statement. He also stated that despite U.S. problems with the Backfire bomber, the United States had agreed to exclude it from the treaty. He understood that the Soviet side would not exceed the production rate of 30 per year. Soviet agreement on this matter was the basis on which he agreed to sign the treaty. He also stated that the United States had the right to produce comparable aircraft.

Carter then raised the issue of encryption of telemetry in missile tests. Gromyko said that the two sides had gone over this question hundreds of times and that the Soviets had agreed that there would be no encryption of information related to the parameters envisaged by the treaty. Any questions on the matter would be taken up by the Standing Consultative Commission. Brezhnev read a statement affirming Gromyko's interpretation. Following a brief exchange of the interpreter's choice of words, Carter remarked that he understood that encryption of information regarding the parameters envisaged by the treaty must not impede national technical means. He added that his administration had proposed discussion of these parameters, but the Soviets had refused.

The President went on say that he was prepared to act as if the treaty was in force in accordance with international law pending ratification, if the Soviets would do the same. Both Brezhnev and Gromyko replied, however, that this was not general practice in Soviet treaties, and they would not agree to accede to the provisions of SALT II until it entered into force. Carter repeated that he would like to treat the agreement as well as the Threshold Test Ban Treaty as binding until ratification, and regardless of the Soviet decision he intended to take no action not consistent with the SALT Treaty. Brezhnev responded that their disagreement was clear, and they should go on to the next issue.

Carter stated that they could agree to a joint agreement on non-first use of nuclear weapons, and Brezhnev confirmed that they could work on it. Carter argued that the MX was not nearly as formidable as the Soviet SS-18 or SS-19 missiles, and he recalled that he had already informed Brezhnev in a personal message that the MX would not be excluded from verification by national technical means. Finally, the extension of the protocol was a matter for negotiation, not presumption, at this time. Its terms were not to be assumed to set a precedent. He suggested they defer other issues, such as intermediate-range and forward-based systems and China, to the next meeting on SALT III and other arms control issues.[37]

In his opening remarks the following morning Carter argued that SALT II did not go far enough in limiting the arms race, and he outlined steps the two might explore together in curtailing it in their approach to SALT III. Because he thought improved verification increased mutual trust, he hoped they might agree to the elimination of all encryption of telemetry, notification of all missile flight tests and massive bomber exercises, the improvement of monitoring stations, and on-site inspection in certain circumstances. He also indicated the United States was prepared to agree to large reductions in the number of missile launchers and warheads and in throw-weight, and to explore the prospect of an immediate moratorium on the construction of new missile launchers and warheads. Prior to SALT III, they might look into the possibility of five percent reductions each year provided the reductions were balanced.

Carter explained that he wanted agreements not only to reduce the number of nuclear weapons but to make the remaining ones less vulnerable. Ustinov interrupted to ask if it was not inconsistent to try to reduce the number of weapons while improving the quality of the remaining ones. Carter replied that making missiles less vulnerable to attack was an improvement only in a defensive sense, and he cited as a possibility an agreement making nuclear submarines immune from antisubmarine activities in certain ocean waters.

He thought the two leaders could explore the possibility of further constraints on the modernization of weapons systems, a process started with the SALT II Treaty, and a prohibition on the testing of missiles in a depressed trajectory because they reduced the warning time of attacking missiles. He also wanted to proceed with a comprehensive test ban agreement, if necessary even without the participation of Great Britain, which objected to verification provisions. The United States would do everything possible to induce other nations, especially France, Britain, and China, to join in substantial reductions of nuclear weapons deployed. He argued that the absence of cooperation from other nations should not be allowed to interfere with their bilateral arms control efforts.

The two nations, Carter continued, should also agree to sell nuclear fuel or technology only to nations that had signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and had agreed to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. He indicated his readiness to sign a partial agreement with the Soviet Union on antisatellite (ASAT) systems that would prohibit the damage to or destruction of the other's satellites, and to announce publicly that neither side planned

to test antisatellite missiles or systems. Finally, he suggested that Defense Secretaries Brown and Ustinov could meet separately on MBFR to see if they could break the impasse on a definition of what constituted a soldier and other data that obstructed progress on these talks at Vienna.

Brezhnev's presentation recited well-known Soviet positions on the reduction of nuclear weapons stockpiles and the comprehensive test ban. Regarding the latter, he hoped the United States could persuade the British to change their inflexible position. He also reminded Carter that on non-proliferation he had already written him about U.S. plans to supply nuclear reactors to China but had not received a satisfactory reply. He blamed Pakistan for working on nuclear weapons and claimed that its argument of defense against India was a pretext. He believed Indian leaders' arguments, however, that they were reluctant to sign the NPT when Western nations were providing military support to China, which had territorial claims against India.

After Brezhnev reviewed Soviet initiatives on MBFR, Gromyko added that the Western nations cited force levels in Europe for the Soviet Union and its allies more than 150,000 men (Ustinov said it was 180,000) higher than the actual situation. Carter reiterated that separate talks between Brown and Ustinov might be able to resolve this question at least for their two nations.[38] (The two met that afternoon but made no progress on MBFR. During that meeting Ustinov also deferred for later discussion Brown's invitation for him to visit the United States as well as for exchanges of military personnel.)[39]

Gromyko also expanded Brezhnev's remarks on the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction. He thought prospects for an agreement on radiological weapons were encouraging. Negotiations on chemical weapons, however, were going badly. He thought they had to resolve the question of verification. Moreover, for such an agreement to be effective, all the major powers had to accede to it. He further complained that agreements on ASAT, conventional arms transfers, and Indian Ocean arms control were impossible on the basis of the current U.S. positions, though the Soviets were prepared to continue the discussions.

Following Carter's short elaboration of the U.S. position on these regional issues, Brezhnev suggested that the two sides explore naval affairs, such as an agreement prohibiting their ships from cruising thousands of miles from their own territory. He mentioned that the United States had not responded to a Soviet proposal requiring the withdrawal of U.S. and Soviet ships carrying nuclear weapons from the

Mediterranean. He also said that he was willing to discuss advance notifications of strategic exercises of their military forces. He concluded by reading a paper which reiterated what he had stated on the Backfire bomber the previous day and added that the Soviet Union could not be bound by any U.S. unilateral interpretation of that statement.

Carter replied that it had been agreed before Vienna that the production rate of the Backfire would not exceed 30 a year, but he had still not received that confirmation. When he directly asked for that confirmation, Gromyko argued that it had been agreed before the summit that Carter would state that it was his understanding that the Soviet Union would not produce more than 30 a year, and the Soviets would not rebut that statement. Vance also engaged in the argument, making it clear that the United States required an affirmative, not merely a nonnegative, statement from Brezhnev on the production rate. The General Secretary finally interrupted to state explicitly that the Soviet Union would not produce more than 30 Backfires each year. Carter then confirmed that Brezhnev's statement resolved the issue.

Carter pointed out in conclusion that Brezhnev had not responded to his several specific suggestions for SALT III, but he saw areas of agreement in Soviet willingness to halt production of nuclear weapons and reduce stockpiles, to adhere to nonproliferation and IAEA safeguards, and to move forward on CTB and MBFR.[40]

The fourth plenary meeting on international issues convened late the same afternoon. The exchanges were wide-ranging, covering all contentious geographical areas. Brzezinski has written that in terms of substance this was the best session.[41] Carter reviewed at some length U.S. vital interests in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula, and his concerns on Cuban activity in Africa sponsored and supported by the Soviet Union. He expressed his deep concern over Vietnam's incursions into Kampuchea and the Soviet Union's use of Vietnamese ports and facilities. He hoped, moreover, that the two sides would cooperate in supporting efforts of the peoples of Namibia and Zimbabwe-Rhodesia to select governments of their own choice.

Carter also reviewed U.S. efforts to resolve differences in the Middle East, beginning with the U.S.-Soviet call to bring together all parties at Geneva. That initiative had failed because of opposition from Syria and other parties, but Sadat's dramatic trip to Jerusalem had resulted in progress between Israel and Egypt. He hoped that Security Council members,

including the Soviet Union, would approve a U.N. force to supervise Israel's proposed withdrawal from the Sinai.

Carter also expressed U.S. support for the independence of Iran and Afghanistan and and his concerns about possible Soviet interventions in these nations. He also tried to assure Brezhnev that U.S. recognition of the People's Republic of China was not directed at the Soviet Union. He concluded, "I hope you agree with everything I said."

Before responding on international issues, Brezhnev referred briefly to SALT III. That agreement, he stressed, should include not only the nuclear systems of the two superpowers but their allies as well, and all the factors determining the strategic situation needed to be taken into account in the follow-on negotiations.

Regarding international issues he argued that the Soviet Union had no intentions to expand into Africa and Asia, and he complained at the loose talk in the United States of its vital interests on the other side of the globe. He conceded that the political situation in Europe had improved considerably under detente, although he complained that the United States should adhere to all the provisions of the Helsinki agreement and not just selectively to those that provided a pretext for interfering in the internal affairs of other states.

Brezhnev proposed that the members of the CSCE should sign a treaty on no-first-use of nuclear or conventional arms. President Carter no longer responded to this issue, perhaps because several of his advisers agreed that "it would be a serious mistake to write a new non-first use pledge into the communique without first discussing it with our allies."[42]

President Carter, Brezhnev continued, had already received his letters containing his opinions on the Middle East. He insisted that the U.S. policy was anti-Arab, and the Egypt-Israel treaty had actually increased the dangers of conflict in the Middle East. He argued that Israel, protected by Egypt, was waging a war in Lebanon that at any time could turn into a serious conflict. He was also resolutely opposed to the use of U.N. forces in the Sinai. A firm Middle East peace, he maintained, could only come about with the full liberation of Arab lands and creation of an independent Palestinian state.

Not surprisingly, Brezhnev condemned Chinese "aggression" in Vietnam and praised the Vietnamese people's "heroic" rebuff to the invaders. He asserted that the Soviet Union was merely fulfilling its treaty obligations to Vietnam and denied the

known fact that the Union had military bases in Vietnam. He added that he was pleased with events in Kampuchea whose people had "revolted and finally freed themselves from a regime of rapists and killers imposed by Peking."

Brezhnev stated that the Soviet Union supported national independence movements in Africa but sought no economic or strategic advantages there. He also asserted that the social revolution in Afghanistan was entirely internal, even claiming that the Soviet leadership first heard about the revolution from foreign broadcasts and the wire services. Regarding Cuba, he reemphasized that the Soviet Union complied strictly with the 1962 understandings and denied that the Soviets were using Cubans to interfere in other areas. Cuba was an independent nation and provided assistance to other legitimate governments threatened by aggression. "Perhaps those in the U.S. who were so vociferous concerning the Cuban actions," he remarked, "have forgotten that during the American War of Independence the ranks of General Washington's army contained foreign units."

Because their time was exhausted, Carter merely noted their differences on international issues and handed the Soviet leader a memorandum, which he had written following the plenary meeting on SALT III, containing a list of items that he wanted included in the follow-on arms control negotiations.[43]

Only Brezhnev and Carter and their interpreters attended the private meeting the following morning. Brezhnev made a short statement complaining about the Carter administration's human rights policies, which the Soviet Union regarded as its internal matter, but spent almost all his time at this meeting talking about the U.S.-China relationship. Obviously preoccupied with this question, he emphasized that he did not object to normal diplomatic relations between the United States and China but would view anything more than that "with grave concern." He also objected to any linkage between human rights and trade.

Carter in turn again raised the question of encoding of missile data. He emphasized that the United States had to monitor Soviet tests and might want to conduct overflights of Turkey for this purpose. Though he did not elaborate on the prospect of such overflights, Turkey had indicated to the Carter administration that it was willing to permit such overflights only if the Soviet Union agreed to them. In his response Brezhnev equated overflights of Turkey with Soviet flights over Cuba. He thought that the encryption issue should be discussed at the SALT III talks, though he said he would investigate the matter further.

Carter also raised human rights directly. He urged the Soviet leader to continue a more liberal emigration policy, and he asked for the release of Anatoly Shcharansky and other dissidents. Brezhnev reminded Carter of his previous statement on human rights but added that Shcharansky had been convicted in a Soviet court of espionage, and he was bound to support the laws of his nation.[44]

The final plenary session lasted only 1/2 hour because both leaders had agreed that they did not want to delay the signing ceremony for the SALT II agreement. After Carter had expressed his gratitude for the summit meeting and his hope for further progress on issues in the future, Brezhnev quickly reviewed the bilateral contacts in cultural, political, scientific, and other areas. Despite some difficulties he believed that they brought the two nations closer together and were mutually beneficial.

Brezhnev singled out trade as a special area of concern and repeated his objections to any linkage between emigration policy, a purely internal affair, and trade. After noting the progress on the trade question at the 1972, 1973, and 1974 summits, he complained about subsequent U.S. discriminatory legislation. While the U.S. Government had recently begun to examine the possibilities of normalizing trade with the Soviet Union, he emphasized that this was entirely an internal matter of the United States. He pointed out, however, that his nation's long-term agreements with several European nations could serve as a model for U.S.-Soviet economic cooperation. The Soviet Union, he noted, had an enormous market that would interest U.S. firms.

He also claimed that the United States had raised "artificial obstacles" on air travel and maritime shipping. Carter noted that their time was up, but he promised to look into these problems and would respond through Secretary Vance.[45]

The signing ceremony was impressive and dignified. Following the signing, Carter and Brezhnev shook hands and embraced. Carter was convinced that their personal feelings for each other were genuinely warm, and he was determined to continue his search for peace and understanding.[46]

Results: The Unraveling of Detente

President Carter flew back to Washington on the afternoon of June 18 and addressed a joint session of Congress that same evening. His speech, which emphasized the advantages of SALT

II for enhancing U.S. national security and international stability, opened what proved to be a lengthy debate over the merits of detente with the Soviet Union in general and the SALT II accord in particular.[47]

Carter, Vance, and Brzezinski were well aware that the struggle for obtaining Senate advice and consent to the treaty would be long and difficult. Indeed, in his June 18 speech to Congress, Carter conceded, "SALT II will undoubtedly become the most exhaustively discussed and debated treaty of our time, perhaps of all time."[48] Many Republican Senators, including possible Presidential hopefuls for the 1980 election, had already indicated that they would oppose the treaty, and it was likely that the Republican Party would make the treaty a partisan issue. Several Democratic Senators also had strong reservations about the treaty, particularly its verification provisions.

Carter administration officials were sensitive to these domestic political concerns but believed that the treaty was fundamentally sound, would withstand the many criticisms from the political right, and finally be consented to by the Senate.[49] They had already taken several actions which they thought would enhance prospects for the treaty. Carter, for instance, had regularly consulted with the Joint Chiefs and received their endorsement of the agreement. Their Senate testimony, he felt, might be persuasive. Moreover, when Warnke, whom some in the administration had regarded as too dovish, resigned as ACDA Director, the President, disregarding Vance's strong reservations, appointed Seignious, a retired Army general, as his replacement. The decision on the MX just before the summit, administration principals believed, would neutralize some of the opposition which was concerned about the Soviet Union's growing superiority in land-based missiles.[50]

Their preoccupation with encryption of telemetry before and at the summit was in part a response to the critical importance Americans attached to verification. For the same reason Carter had raised with Brezhnev at Vienna the prospect of overflights of Turkey to monitor Soviet missile tests. Domestic concerns about the Soviet Backfire bomber also probably helped to steel Carter administration officials at the summit to insist upon an affirmative statement from Brezhnev on its production rate.

Despite these measures the treaty debate intensified in the summer and fall. The revelation in late August of the existence of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba, even though it had been there many years, was politically harmful to the Carter administration. As Vance later wrote, "in the political climate of late 1979, a rational separation of the brigade

issue and SALT was not possible." Although the administration took several steps to defuse the issue, it lingered as a problem during the ratification debate.[51]

The treaty, already in trouble, was dealt a decisive blow with the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in late December 1979. This Soviet action confirmed the worst U.S. fears regarding Soviet behavior, and Carter asked the Senate to delay consideration of the treaty until his administration could assess the Soviet actions and intentions.[52] (The Senate to date has not voted on the SALT II accord.)

Analysts have advanced various explanations for the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan. From the Soviets' perspective strong opposition to the SALT II treaty in the United States, the Carter administration's promotion of the MX, and the NATO announcement only a few weeks before the Soviet intervention of its decision to deploy Pershing and cruise missiles in Western Europe made even arms control with the United States very uncertain.[53] Growing Soviet leaders' concerns that detente was already dying and that they therefore had little to lose from the West if they acted decisively in Afghanistan may have influenced their decision for intervention. It is likely, however, that the Soviet leaders decided to intervene primarily because of their perception of the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan and their security interests in that country. Whatever the specific reasons, the Soviets almost certainly underestimated the damaging consequences that ensued, such as the grain embargo, Carter Doctrine, and strongly negative Third World reactions.[54]

With the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan and the United States response, including the grain embargo, the fragile fabric of "detente," which was already in danger of coming apart at the time of Vienna summit, began to unravel rapidly in the final year of the Carter administration.

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Appendix

U.S.-SOVIET MEETING
AT VIENNA
JUNE 15-18, 1979

PARTICIPANTS

United States

Jimmy Carter, President of the United States
Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State
Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
General David Jones, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
George Seignious, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Hamilton Jordan, Assistant to the President
Jody Powell, Assistant to the President
Malcolm Toon, Ambassador to the Soviet Union
Ralph Earle, II, Chief of the U.S. Delegation at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
David L. Aaron, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Reginald Bartholomew, National Security Council Senior Staff
William D. Krimer, Interpreter
Dimitri Arensburger, Interpreter

Soviet Union

Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party
Andrei A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs
D.F. Ustinov, Minister of Defense
K.U. Chernenko, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party
Marshal N.V. Ogarkov, First Deputy Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
A.M. Aleksandrov, Assistant to the General Secretary
L.M. Zamyatin, Section Chief of the Central Committee of the Communist Party
G.M. Korniyenko, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Anatoliy Dobrynin, Ambassador to the United States
V.G. Komplektov, Member of the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
V.P. Karpov, Chief of the U.S.S.R. delegation at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
V.M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

NOTES

[1]Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter, 1977 (Washington, 1977), I, p. 3.

[2]The Arms Reduction Initiative of March 1977 (Office of the Historian), RP 1399, January 1984 (S/Nodis).

[3]Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy (New York, 1983), pp. 56-63, 99-107; Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New York, 1982), pp. 220-223, 229-233. Extensive documentation on Vance's and Carter's meetings with Gromyko and Dobrynin is in the Gelb Files, Lot 81 D 101. Leslie H. Gelb was Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, from January 1977 to July 1979.

[4]Documents on Disarmament, 1977 (Washington, 1979), pp. 577-578.

[5]Vance, Hard Choices, pp. 106-107; Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981 (New York, 1983), pp. 325-329. A survey of the SALT II negotiations is Strobe Talbott, Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II (New York, 1979).

[6]Telegram 9138 from Moscow, April 27, 1978 (S/Nodis), and telegram 30031 from Moscow, December 7, 1978 (C/Nodis); Carter, Keeping Faith, pp. 221-222, 232.

[7]The Warnke-Semenov understanding is contained in Secto 12102 from Moscow, October 21, 1978 (S/Nodis). Also see telegram 643 from Moscow, January 14, 1978 (S/Nodis); telegram 28629 from Moscow, November 22, 1978 (S/Nodis); Brzezinski, Power and Principle, pp. 329-330; and Vance, Hard Choices, pp. 107-109, 134.

[8]Ibid., pp. 109-112; Brzezinski, Power and Principle, pp. 329-330. Carter's letters to Brezhnev, September 2, 1978, and March 27, 1979 (TS), on the encryption issue, and Brezhnev's response, March 11, 1979 (S/Nodis), are in the Shulman Files, Lot 81 D 109.

[9]Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 328; Vance, Hard Choices, pp. 107, 134-135.

[10]Ibid., pp. 132-133.

[11]Telegram 9138 from Moscow, April 27, 1978.

[12]Vance, Hard Choices, pp. 109-122; Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 201; author's memorandum of conversation with Brzezinski, September 24, 1985, PA/HO Files (C).

[13]Vance, Hard Choices, pp. 133-135. Documentation on these Vance-Dobrynin meetings, most of which is contained in a comprehensive "blue book" detailing the final stages of SALT II from November 1978 to June 1979, is in the Shulman Files, Lot 81 D 109. For Brezhnev's oral message to Carter, December 19, 1978, and his letter to Carter, December 27, 1978 (S), and Carter's reply to Brezhnev, January 17, 1979, see ibid.

[14]Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 331.

[15]Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter, 1979 (Washington, 1980), I, p. 839. (Hereafter Public Papers: Carter, 1979.)

[16]Memorandum from Shulman to Vance, January 26, 1979, Shulman Files, Lot 81 D 109 (C); memorandum from William T. Shinn, Jr. to Shulman and Barry, March 12, 1979, ibid. (C/Secret attachment); memorandum from Shulman to Peter Tarnoff, March 29, 1979, ibid. (C); memorandum from Barry to Shulman, April 4, 1979, ibid. (S); memorandum from Barry to Arnold Raphel, May 11, 1979, ibid. (C); State 121668, May 12, 1979 (S/Nodis); telegram 11933 from Moscow, May 14, 1979 (S/Nodis); telegram 12125 from Moscow, May 15, 1979 (S); State 123220, May 15, 1979 (S/Exdis).

[17]Memorandum from Tarnoff to George Seignious, Shulman, and all bureau heads (except Public Affairs), May 17, 1979, S/S-I Files, Lot 80 D 110 (C). The minutes and other papers of the NSC working group were not available for this study.

[18]Memorandum of conversation with Soviet Embassy representatives by Barry on Summit Arrangements, May 14, 1979 (C/Nodis); State 131893 (Tosec 40062), May 24, 1979 (S/Nodis).

[19]Memorandum from Aaron to Shulman, May 23, 1979, with attachments received from Dobrynin on May 23, 1979, Shulman Files, Lot 81 D 109 (S/Eyes Only); State 136109 (Tosec 40157), May 26, 1979 (S/Nodis); State 136110 (Tosec 40158), May 26, 1979 (S/Nodis). The State Department counterdraft is in State 136108 (Tosec 40156), May 26,

1979 (S/Nodis).

[20]Preliminary Soviet Comments on US Communique Draft, attachment to Barry and Shulman to Vance, June 1, 1979, Shulman Files, Lot 81 D 109 (C); memorandum of conversation by Barry, June 3, 1979, of Communique Negotiating Session II, June 2, 1979, ibid. (S); State 146853, June 7, 1979 (S/Nodis); memorandum from Shinn to Marshall Brement, June 12, 1979, Shulman Files, Lot 81 D 109 (S).

[21]Shulman wrote "keep," "why not include," "why do we drop this," in the margin in several places next to the listing of Soviet counter proposals to the U.S. counterdraft communique contained on Barry's memorandum of conversation, June 3, 1979, of Communique Negotiating Session II, June 2, 1979; State 146853, June 7, 1979 (S/Nodis).

[22]Memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter, May 24, 1979, Shulman Files, Lot 81 D 109 (S); note from Jack [Perry] to Shulman, May 29, 1979, ibid. (U); Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 240.

[23]Ibid., pp. 240-241; cf. Vance, Hard Choices, p. 138. Brzezinski recalled that Carter naturally wanted a politically successful summit and retained lingering hopes for a breakthrough on arms control issues there. Author's memorandum of conversation with Brzezinski, September 24, 1985.

[24]Memorandum from Vance to Carter, June 8, 1979, S/S-I Files, Lot 80 D 110 (S).

[25]State 107269, April 28, 1979 (C/Nodis); State 131859 (Tosec 40058), May 23, 1979 (S/Nodis); memorandum of conversation by Shulman between Vance and Dobrynin, June 6, 1979, Shulman Files, Lot 81 D 109 (S/Sensitive).

[26]Memorandum from Vance to Carter, June 8, 1979.

[27]Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 341.

[28]Memorandum from Vance to Carter, June 8, 1979.

[29]For the recollections of three U.S. participants at the Vienna summit, see Carter, Keeping Faith, pp. 243-261; Vance, Hard Choices, pp. 138-139; and Brzezinski, Power and Principle, pp. 341-344.

[30]Memorandum of conversation by William D. Krimer

(interpreter), June 26, 1979, on Vance-Gromyko Discussion of Joint Communique, June 15, 1979, Shulman Files, Lot 81 D 109 (S/Nodis); Carter; Keeping Faith, pp. 242-243. Cf. the Joint U.S. - U.S.S.R. Communique issued at the end of the summit, June 18, 1979, printed in Public Papers: Carter, 1979, pp. 1081-1087.

[31]Carter apparently quoted Brezhnev's remark, "...God will punish us" (Bog nas nakazhet), incorrectly as "...God will not forgive us," at the first plenary meeting the following morning. Note from Jack [Perry] to Peter [Tarnoff], undated, Shulman Files, Lot 81 D 109 (U). Carter repeated this incorrect version in his memoirs, Keeping Faith, pp. 245-246.

[32]Ibid. p. 246, says: "Because I was acting as host, I requested that Brezhnev make the opening statement;" but the memorandum of conversation by Krimer, June 16, 1979, of First Plenary Meeting, June 16, 1979, Shulman Files, Lot 81 D 109 (S/Nodis) indicates that Carter said he would speak first, and Brezhnev nonetheless announced that he would speak first and proceeded to read his prepared statement.

[33]Ibid.

[34]Memorandum of conversation reconstructed from Toon's notes, typed June 21, 1979, of First Plenary Meeting, June 16, 1979, ibid. (S/Nodis).

[35]Memorandum of conversation by Krimer, of First Plenary Meeting, June 16, 1979.

[36]For the fullest discussion of the MX decision in the SALT context, see Brzezinski, Power and Principle, pp. 331-338. Also, author's memorandum of conversation with Brzezinski, September 24, 1985. Brezhnev earlier conveyed his concerns on the MX in his letter to Carter, April 15, 1979, and Carter attempted to allay these concerns in his reply to Brezhnev, April 30, 1979, both in the Shulman Files, Lot 81 D 109.

[37]Memorandum of conversation reconstructed from Toon's notes, typed June 21, 1979, of Second Plenary Meeting, June 16, 1979, ibid. (S/Nodis).

[38]Memorandum of conversation by Krimer, June 20, 1979, of Third Plenary Meeting, June 17, 1979, ibid. (S/Nodis).

[39]Memorandum of conversation by Brig. Gen. Carl R. Smith, June 21, 1979, of Meeting Between Brown/Jones and Ustinov/Ogarkov, June 17, 1979, ibid. (S/via Alpha Channel).

Both Krimer and Brzezinski believed in retrospect that there was a chance for a breakthrough on MBFR, but neither could recall the details of how this might have occurred. Krimer remembered Carter responding enthusiastically to Brezhnev's presentation but thought Carter's advisers, especially Harold Brown, persuaded Carter at the lunch just before the afternoon defense talks not to moderate the U.S. position. Brzezinski regretted that he had not taken more interest in this question. Author's memoranda of conversation with Krimer, September 18, 1985, PA/HO Files, and with Brzezinski, September 24, 1985.

[40]Memorandum of conversation by Krimer, of Third Plenary Meeting, June 17, 1979.

[41]Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 342.

[42]Memorandum from Shulman to Vance, June 17, 1979, Shulman Files, Lot 81 D 109 (S).

[43]Memorandum of conversation by Dimitri Arensburger (interpreter), June 17, 1979, of Fourth Plenary Meeting, June 17, 1979, ibid. (S/Nodis). For Brezhnev's letter to Carter, March 19, 1979, on the Middle East, see ibid. Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 253, contains the text of the note Carter wrote to Brezhnev at the summit.

[44]Ibid., pp. 258-260. No memorandum of this private conversation was found for this study, although Krimer later recalled that he was the U.S. interpreter for this meeting and wrote one. Author's interview with Krimer, September 18, 1985. For background of U.S. talks with Soviet and Turkish officials on possible overflights of Turkey, see State 133017 (Tosec 40090), May 24, 1979 (S) and memorandum of converation by Shulman of conversation with Christopher and Dobrynin, May 25, 1979, Shulman Files, Lot 81 D 109 (S/Sensitive).

[45]Memorandum of conversation by Krimer, of Fifth Plenary Meeting, June 18, 1979, Shulman Files, ibid. (S/Nodis).

[46]Carter, Keeping Faith, pp. 260-261.

[47]Public Papers: Carter, 1979, I, pp. 1087-1092.

[48]Ibid., p. 1088.

[49]See especially Vance, Hard Choices, pp. 349-358, 364-367.

[50]See especially Brzezinski, Power and Principle, pp. 331-338; and Carter, Keeping Faith, pp. 218, 222-225, 262,

264-265.

[51]Vance, Hard Choices, pp. 358-364.

[52]Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter, 1980-81 (Washington, 1981), I, p. 12.

[53]For the texts of the NATO communiques of December 12 and 14, 1979, announcing the decisions on missile deployment and arms control, see American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1977-1980 (Washington, 1983), pp. 494-499.

[54]For a recent, detailed treatment of Soviet motivations regarding Afghanistan, see Raymond L. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, 1985), Ch. 26.