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Roy Number

USSR-SUCCESSION EE 1/2

FOIA

36

F06-114/11

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BOX I	Number 36						KHI-MI	ILO
ID	Doc Type	Docu	ment Description		No of Pages	Doc Date	Restr	ictions
11598	PAPER		USSR: INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS IN THE SUCCESSION		3	5/3/1982	B1	
		P	1/4/2010	F06-114/11				
11599	PAPER	USSR:	CANDIDATS FOR 1/4/2010	THE SUCCESSION F06-114/11	4	5/4/1982	В1	
11600	PAPER		LEADERSHIP SUC 4/14/2011	CCESSION ISSUE F2006-114/11	11	5/20/1982	B1	B2
11601	MEMO	PIPES R	TO CLARK RE SO 4/14/2011	VIET SUCCESSION <i>F2006-114/11</i>	1	5/27/1982	B1	
11607	PAPER	SOVIET LEADERSHIP CHANGES: POLICY IMPLICATIONS		2	ND	В1		
		R	4/14/2011	F2006-114/11				
11608	MEMO	SAME R	TEXT AS DOC #11 4/14/2011	601 F2006-114/11	1	5/27/1982	B1	
11611	CABLE	USSR D	7/15/2008	NLRRF06-114/11	3	6/9/1982	B1	В3
11602	COVER SHEET	PIPES	RE SUCCESSION S	SOCIET LEADERSHIP	1	ND	B1	
11603	PAPER	ANDR <i>PAR</i>	OPOV IN THE WES 7/15/2008	STERN PRESS NLRRF06-114/11	5	6/14/1982	B1	В3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

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B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

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11609	PAPER	PAPER SAME TEXT AS DOC #11607		11607	2	ND	B1
		R	4/14/2011	F2006-114/11			
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11606	PAPER	CPPG ISSUE PAPER SOVIET LEADERSHIP TRANSITION			6	ND	B1
		R	4/14/2011	F2006-114/11			
11610	PAPER	SOVIET TRENDS: JUNE 1982		14	7/27/1982	B1	
		R	4/14/2011	F2006-114/11			
11612	CABLE	USSR			4	7/19/1982	B1 B3
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11615	CABLE	USSR			2	7/30/1982	B1 B3
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NEW FILE: SUCCESSION

RI

AM-BREZHNEU 3-5
BREZHNEU PROTEGE DISMISSED
BY KIRSTEN O. LUNDBERG

MOSCON (UPI) -- THE CHRIRMAN OF THE SOULET TRADE UNION CONGRESS
AND A PROTEGE OF PRESIDENT LEONID BREZHNEU, HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM HIS
POST, THE OFFICIAL TASS NEWS AGENCY SAID FRIDAY.

TASS GAVE NO EXPLANATION FOR THE FIRING OF ALEXEI SHIBAEV'S FIRING, SAYING HE WAS STEPPING DOWN "IN CONNECTION WITH HIS TRANSFER TO ANOTHER JOB."

BUT WESTERN AND SOUIET OBSERVERS SAW THE FALL OF THE 67-YEAR-OLD TRADE UNION CHIEF AS THE LATEST IN A SERIES OF INCIDENTS APPARENTLY AIMED AT DISCREDITING BREZHNEV THROUGH HIS FAMILY AND FRIENDS.

JUST A YEAR AGO, SHIBAEV WAS RUMORED AS A POTENTIAL MEMBER OF THE RULING POLITBURO.

SHIBREU'S APPOINTMENT IN 1976 TO HEAD THE SOUIET TRADE UNION CONGRESS WAS CLEARLY THE RESULT OF THE BREZHNEU'S BACKING.

A FORMER FIRST SECRETARY OF THE SARATOV REGIONAL PARTY ORGANIZATION, SHIBAEV'S APPOINTMENT CRICUMVENTED THE CONGRESS' RULE THAT THE CHAIRMAN BE CHOSEN FROM ONE OF THE ORGANIZATION'S 120 MILLION MEMBERS.

HE ENDORSED BREZHNEU OPENLY AT THE 23RD COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESS IN 1966, THE FIRST ONE CHAIRED BY BREZHNEU AFTER THE FALL OF NIKITA KHRUSHCHEU.

THE TRADE UNION CHIEF WAS ALSO SAID TO BE A FRIEND OF MIKHAIL SUSLOV. THE POLITBURO IDEALOGUE AND STAUNCH SUPPORTER OF BREZHNEV WHO DIED IN JANUARY.

SINCE SUSLOV'S DEATH, OBSERVERS HAVE NOTED A GROWING CAMPAIGN OF RUMORS AND DISMISSALS SEEMINGLY DIRECTED AGAINST BREZHNEV. TWO MEN WHO WERE CLOSE TO GALINA BREZHNEV, THE PRESIDENT'S DAUGHTER, RECENTLY WERE ARRESTED FOR DIRMOND SNUGGLING.

BREZHNEU'S SON, YURI, IS SAID ON BE ON HIS WAY OUT OF THE MINISTRY OF TRADE, WHERE HE HOLDS THE NO. 2 SPOT. A SATIRICAL MAGAZINE ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN LENINGRAD IN DECEMBER SEEMED TO LAMPOON BREZHNEU, TO WHOM THE ISSUE WAS DEDICATED.

THE JANUARY SUICIDE OF SEMYON TSUIGUN, THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE MOSCOW KGB, WAS THOUGHT TO BE CONNECTED TO THE INVESTIGATION OF GALINA BREZHNEU'S FRIENDS, SOUIET SOURCES SAID. TSUIGUN WAS MARRIED TO THE SISTER OF BREZHNEU'S WIFE, BUT BREZHNEU DID NOT SIGN HIS OBITUARY.

SHIBAEV IS SUCCEEDED BY STEPAN SHALAEV, 52, WHO WAS TRAINED AS A TIMBER ENGINEER. SHALAEV IN 1963 WAS CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE TIMBER, PAPER AND WOODWORKING INDUSTRY WORKERS UNION AND IN 1968 BECAME SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COUNCIL OF SOVIET TRADE UNIONS. IN 1980 HE BECAME MINISTER OF THE TIMBER, PULP-AND-PAPER AND WOODDWAKING INDUSTRY, TASS SAID.

UNOFFICIAL REPORTS SAID SHIBAEV WAS DISMISSED BECAUSE OF INCOMPETENCE AND A DRINKING PROBLEM.

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Top Secret

SOU. Success. Creadership

SPECIAL ANALYSIS

FOIA(b)(1)

EGRAPA (3)

USSR: Institutional Factors in the Succession

Moncavering in the Kremlin over the succession to Freshlent Breshnev electly is under way. The party, government, EdS, and military involved have percental interests at stake. Their influence in the succession will depend largely on the status and skilling of their representatives in the Politburo.

The Politburo, composed since Stalin's day of 12 to 16 full members and six to nine candidates, is the key forum in the succession struggle. Its members currently hold top positions in the Secretariat, Council of Ministers, important regional organizations, and the military and security organizations.

Despite the formal appearance of equality, the influence of individual leaders varies according to the importance of the institutions they represent. The general secretary, as the nominal head of the Secretariat, has usually been the dominant figure—a status that at times, such as the latter part of Brezhnev's tenure, has enabled him to direct its activities, prepare its agenda, and preside over its meetings.

During the three previous successions, control of the Secretariat has ultimately allowed its leaders to dominate the Politburo. The Secretariat, which is composed of the general secretary and usually from seven to 10 secretaries, directs a party apparatus of some 200,000 officials that monitors the activity of the government ministries, the military, security organs, and all other institutions.


This monitoring function gives the Secretariat the leading role in implementing party policy and dispensing political patronage. As a result, it provides the general secretary with a strong position in succession infighting.

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BY RW MARA DATE 1/4/10

Top Secret

3 May 1982



The recent depletion of the Secretariat, through the death of Suslov and the declining role of party Secretary Kirilenko, has made it necessary to fill key portfolios, possibly at a plenum later this month. This vacuum in the Secretariat's top ranks—from which all past party chiefs have been chosen—has opened up the succession process considerably.

Politburo members who head other key institutions now have increased opportunity to maneuver for position and influence. Moreover, the weakened position of the Secretariat may have made it less able to monitor and control the activities of other leading institutions.

The KGB

The KGB's involvement in high-level politics stems largely from its access to the leadership in fulfilling security and communications functions. Its professional leadership is proud of the status regained under Brezhnev and will seek to preserve it.

A strong political leader could use the KGB by exploiting the privileged information it acquires for blackmail. To protect his own position, Brezhnev placed cronies in key positions in the KGB. Although this maneuver may provide Brezhnev some ability to keep tabs on his colleagues, he does not appear to have used the KGB against political opponents.

Brezhnev's control over the KGB may be slipping.

While the political leadership has in the past been remarkedly successful in preventing KGB chiefs from using the organization for political advantage, they still played key roles in the successions of 1953 and 1964.

The Military

The military establishment will try to ensure the availability of resources and the maintenance of a clear chain of command during the succession. Professional

--continued

Top Secret

3 May 1982



military officers have less access than the KGB to the political leadership, however, and have generally avoided involvement in high-level political maneuvering.

Only two professional officers--Marshals Zhukov and Grechko--have ever been elected to the Politburo. Military support has nevertheless been essential in important leadership changes, as illustrated by Zhukov's help to Khrushchev during his fight with the "antiparty" group in 1957 and the military's apparent acquiescence in the coup in 1964 against Khrushchev.


Since 1976, the party leadership has had a civilian-Dmitriy Ustinov--at the head of the military establishment.
His position and leadership status will ensure that the
military's interests are protected and will enable the
party to control the military during a period of political
flux.

The Presidium of the Council of Ministers

The chief political concern of the Council of Ministers seems to be the protection of the economic bureaucracy from excessive party intervention and efforts to decentralize its authority. It presumably would oppose the leadership of someone--such as Kirilenko--who advocates forceful party intervention in economic affairs.

For the Council of Ministers to exert major influence in the struggle, however, its leaders would have to be strongly represented in the Politburo at the same time that the central party apparatus was weak. Such a situation last prevailed in the immediate post-Stalin period, when Premier Malenkov was briefly in ascendancy.

The Council of Ministers currently appears to be in a particularly weak position. Premier Tikhonov, one of Brezhnev's proteges, is the economic bureaucracy's sole representative on the Politburo. This minimal representation, combined with a strong party apparatus developed under Brezhnev, suggests that the Council of Ministers will play a minor role in the succession.



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
SPECIAL ANALYSES

FOIA(b)(1)

USSR: Candidates for the Succession

The deteriorating health of President Breshnev, the death of party ideologue Mikhail Suslov, and the political decline and illness of party secretary Kirilenko have combined to destroy the equilibrium of the leadership and cloud the succession picture. The prospects of some leaders have been strengthened while others apparently have been removed from serious contention. Uncertainty about the post-Brezhnev era has been heightened by the erosion of the party Secretariat, the pivotal institution in previous successions.

Party secretary Chernenko has profited most from recent events. His role in supervising appointments to party jobs has expanded, making it easier for him to place his supporters in important positions.



In addition, Chernenko has no background in economic management and limited experience in foreign affairs. Some of his views—on national security issues, investment in the consumer sector, and reforms to increase party responsiveness to public opinion—are out of the mainstream of Politburo opinion.

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4 May 1982

Key Players in the Succession



Left to right: party secretary Konstantin Chernenko, Premier Nikolai Tikhonov, President-General Secretary Brezhnev, Moscow party chief Viktor Grishin, party secretary Andrei Kirilenko.



KGB chief Yuriy Andropov.



Kingmaker: Defense Minister Dmitriy Ustinov.



Agriculture secretary Mikhail Gorbachev.



Ukrainian party boss Vladimir Shcherbitskiy



Leningrad party chief Grigoriy Romanov.

Confidential

Challenge From Andropov

KGB chief Andropov, in particular, appears to be attempting to prevent Chernenko from accumulating more power, and, in doing so, may be trying to undermine Brezhnev's authority.

Andropov's long experience in foreign policy, both as a secretary in the 1960s and as KGB chief, qualifies him to assume the responsibilities formerly exercised by Suslov.

Other Politburo members might be wary of a former KGB chief amassing too much power in the Secretariat. Andropov is not a career police official, however, and-at least until recently-he has taken pains to keep his organization out of politics.

Andropov is said to be pragmatic, with moderate views on economic reform and other policy issues, and he has good relations among intellectuals. Nevertheless, his earlier work under Suslov's guidance imbued him with a high regard for Soviet primacy in the international Communist movement, and his long years in the KGB have increased his preoccupation with internal control and the threat of Western ideological penetration. The considerable sentiment in party circles for a return to strong leadership to ensure internal discipline at a time of economic stringency could help Andropov's prospects.

Kingmaker Ustinov

The positions of other leaders in succession maneuvering will depend partly on their assessment of Brezhnev's staying power and his ability to influence the outcome. The support of Defense Minister Ustinov will be especially important, because of his institutional position.

Ustinov, who commands considerable respect from other leaders, will play the most important role. During Brezhnev's tenure, the military's prestige has increased along with the expansion of the USSR's international role. The military hierarchy's influence in policy deliberations has traditionally grown stronger during succession periods.

--continued

Pop Secret

4 May 1982



Moreover, Ustinov's associates on the Politburo probably are less suspicious of his ambitions and less resistant to his influence than would be the case if he were a professional military man. Ustinov has lengthy experience in managing the defense industry, and some limited experience in party organizational affairs. He himself could be returned to the Secretariat, where he served from the mid-1960s until the mid-1970s.

Other Candidates

At this stage, opposition to Chernenko probably is stronger than support for Andropov. The fact that both have liabilities as succession contenders could impel the leadership to turn to a third choice.

Moscow party head <u>Grishin</u> has had closer relations with other leaders in Moscow and greater exposure to foreign policy than any of the provincial party heads. Grishin, a blander figure who moved up in the protocol rankings on May Day, could be a compromise candidate acceptable to most other senior figures.

Agriculture secretary <u>Gorbachev's</u> age could give him an advantage. At 50, he is by far the youngest Politburo member. His narrow job experience may limit his role, but he recently has become more active in non-agricultural areas.

Although <u>Kirilenko</u> may retain considerable support within the Politburo, his health and loss of status are likely to prevent him from making a full political comeback. If he should lose his seat on the Politburo, it would create an opportunity for the head of one of the regional party organizations to move into the Secretariat, or for one of the regional party bosses to be promoted to the Politburo.

Ukrainian party boss <u>Shcherbitskiv</u> has been particularly prominent of late. His Ukrainian nationality, however, could rule him out as a successor in a period when the regime is moving toward closer identification with Russian nationalism.

Leningrad party chief Romanov probably has better ties with the military and with conservative ideologues than any other regional leader.

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- 8 -

FBIS TRENDS
19 MAY 1982
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CHERNENKO STRESSES NEED FOR NEW DIRECTION IN IDEOLOGY

Chernenko's most recent demonstration of authority in the sphere of ideology is a new article calling for a reappraisal of traditional interpretations of ideological principles. Writing in an April issue of the authoritative party journal KOMMUNIST (No. 6), he appeared to call into question the ideological legacy of Suslov and suggested that the party must deal more innovatively with the problems confronting it. While he acknowledged that many of his ideas are controversial, his persistent stress on the need for reform suggests that there is a constituency for his ideas in the party leadership.

Although Chernenko avoided making specific policy recommendations in his article, he made it clear that he favors new ideas in solving the country's problems. He asserted, for example, that "bold social experiment" is needed to achieve the party's goals and stressed the need to learn from previous "setbacks and errors." To lay the basis for such change, he suggested, there is an "urgent need" for the "further development" of the laws of socialism. Chernenko clearly favored moving away from traditional interpretations of party doctrine, and he repeatedly stressed the "creativity" and "flexibility" of Lenin's ideas while denouncing "dogmatic" positions. Chernenko came close to suggesting a fundamental reconsideration of ideological principles when he urged the reassessment of "seemingly indisputable theses" in the light of changing conditions. This, he suggested, will reveal "new trends" for the future.

While stressing the need for change, Chernenko also made an effort to establish his credentials as the chief guardian of the party's ideological heritage. Although he called for an interpretive reading of Marxism-Leninism, Chernenko stressed that the party must not deviate from its basic principles. He strongly rejected the idea of pluralism in a socialist society, warning that this can undermine the party's ideological foundations. He took a very traditional view on the subject of international communism and stressed that there are basic features and laws to which all socialist societies must conform.

Chernenko indicated that his reform ideas were subject to controversy. He opened his article, for example, with the statement that the problems he was discussing were bound to prompt "heated disputes" within a party. He also hinted at controversy when he stated that Lenin believed "clashes of ideas" within the party can be resolved only through practical experience. Chernenko appeared to suggest that one subject of dispute was his view on

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- 7 -

KGB chief Yuriy Andropov received an important boost recently when he was selected to deliver the keynote address on Lenin's birth anniversary and followed this up with an unusually strong showing in the May Day leadership lineup in Azerbaijan.*

According to the photograph in the 2 May BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY, Andropov's portrait hung in fourth place behind those of Brezhnev, Tikhonov, and Chernenko, and he was ranked ahead of Grishin.

(By contrast, Andropov stood in eighth place in the leadership lineup in Red Square.) Local rankings for Politburo members were not published in the papers of other republics.

Andropov's high standing in Azerbaijan may be explained by the fact that Azerbaijani First Secretary Aliyev earlier served as republic KGB chief, and thus was directly under Andropov before becoming first secretary in 1969. This was not the first time Aliyev showed favoritism to a member of the Politburo. In November 1979 Chernenko, for the first time, was ranked in fourth position in Azerbaijan, ahead of Kirilenko, before he moved up in the Moscow standings.

After almost two months' absence from the political stage, Kirilenko appears to have returned with new vigor. Although he made an unimpressive showing in the leadership ranking on May Day, appearing in fifth place, shortly afterward he was chosen to represent the Politburo in presenting a military award to the Black Sea city of Tuapse. This was the first time in over two years that Kirilenko was shown exercising responsibilities beyond his own sphere of economic management. The broad coverage given to the award ceremony in the 8 May PRAVDA gave Kirilenko a rare opportunity for national exposure. But the coverage was identical to that given Ustinov on 17 April and to Shcherbitskiy on 5 May, when they presented similar awards.

^{*} Other recent signs of Andropov's status are discussed in the TRENDS of 28 April 1982, pages 11-13.





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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Appraisal
USSR:
Leadership Succession
Issue(U)

20 MAY 1982

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Intelligence Appraisal

USSR:

Leadership Succession Issue(U)



FOIA(b) (2) FOIA(b) (3)

This is a Department of Defense Publication Produced by the Defense Intelligence Agency

USSR: LEADERSHIP SUCCESSION ISSUE (U)

Summary

(U) Several significant events that have occurred in the Soviet Union recently suggest a dynamic power struggle for the Party leadership has begun. Most Western observers had expected the inevitable succession struggle to be manifested in behind-the-scene maneuverings and thus be largely invisible to the West. However, the intensity and openness of recent events and the extraordinary flood of rumors, dispensed by Western and Soviet observers alike, suggest the succession struggle is already underway. Although General Secretary Brezhnev still maintains control of the Party and State apparatus, his paramount political position appears to have deteriorated enough so that contenders for leadership have been willing to risk more open confrontation. It is unlikely that Brezhnev will be directly challenged, as was Khrushchev when he was ousted in 1964. Instead, Brezhnev is expected to remain the prime power figure until his death or total incapacitation. For the moment, it is difficult to determine who will succeed him. In the final analysis, the succession issue will be determined by alliances forged by the competitors among major power groupings within the Party.

Discussion

- (C) Since the death of Politburo member and Party ideologue Mikhail Suslov on 26 January 1982, there has been a significant increase in events and rumors pertaining to succession involving various members of the senior Party leadership. Many of these incidents have been unprecedented in their deviation from accepted Soviet practice and normal procedures; others have been noteworthy for their open discussions of potential leadership rivalries and alliances. Some of the most revealing events include:
- A December 1981 issue of the Leningrad literary journal, Aurora, which although dedicated to Brezhnev, contained a biting and mocking satire thought to be addressing the General Secretary. The article states, "But this one is truly not human. He is living and does not plan to die, to everyone's surprise. . . But he'll die all right, that's for sure. They'll erect a huge memorial. . . " The story related a morbid joke wherein the storyteller's daughter tells him the great man is dead and he expresses elation. On learning that the death was a joke, the narrator says, "The joy was premature, but I think we shall not have long to wait. He will not disappoint us."
- -- The depiction of Lenin in his last days as a weak and feeble man in the new play at Moscow's Mkat Theater entitled, "Thus We Shall Triumph," has been interpreted by some Soviet sources as an analogy to Brezhnev.
- Reports have circulated concerning the involvment of Brezhnev's son and daughter in corruption. Brezhnev's daughter, Galina, has reportedly been questioned in connection with illegal trafficking in precious stones and foreign





currency. His son, Yuri, has allegedly been linked with corruption, and his expected promotion to Minister of Foreign Trade appears to be stalled for the time being.

OP SECRET

- The recent "high visibility" of Brezhnev's protege, Party Secretary Chernenko, who has been quite active in public appearances and "writings." indicates an attempt to move him into the heir apparent role. Conversely, the recent low profile of Kirilenko suggests his chances of becoming Brezhnev's successor have diminished.
- -- Rumors of suicide surrounding the death of KGB First Deputy Chairman Gen S.K. Tsvigun, an old Brezhnev ally as well as the latter's brother-in-law, have been reported.
- The appointment of Gen G. Tsinev as Tsvigun's replacement as KGB First Deputy Chairman and the selection of Gen Viktor Chebrikov as an additional First Deputy Chairman of the KGB are noteworthy. Both have close career ties to Brezhnev.

FOIA(b)(1) FOIA(b) (2)

The Media/Information Connection

- (U) Although reporting from Moscow is inconclusive, the foregoing events are unique enough to foster serious speculation. Judging by the first three, it would appear that an attempt is underway to embarrass Brezhnev and those immediately associated with him. While succession-related political infighting has long been expected, the appearance of such blatantly unfavorable publicity affecting the General Secretary is quite unusual. It is unlikely such deviation from accepted media practice would occur were Brezhnev's authority not perceived to be vulnerable.
- (U) A potential contender, or more probably a manipulator of succession-related events, is Party Secretary Mikhail Zimyanin. Significantly, the first three events can be linked either directly or indirectly to Zimyanin, who oversees press, propaganda, and cultural matters for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Zimyanin is believed to be a protege of Mikhail Suslov and, until recently, shared some responsibility with him for ideological matters. Several Western analysts consider Zimyanin a likely choice to succeed Suslov. Secretary Chernenko's recent rise in the leadership hierarchy may well have complicated Zimyanin's ambitions for this future role. It seems unlikely Zimyanin would see himself as a potential successor to Brezhnev. He would probably seek a significant position at the highest CPSU decisionmaking level similar to that formerly occupied by Suslov.

- (C) Some reports have described Zimyanin as a staunch conservative who may be involved with a "nationalist" faction attempting to determine the Brezhnev succession. This competitive group, consisting primarily of younger members of the leadership, endorses continued precedence of the Russian segment of the population over the non-Russians. Linked with strong anti-Semitic tendencies, this group favors an almost neo-Stalinist Russian centrism which downplays the nation's economic difficulties and tolerates little or no deviation in the internal social order. It reportedly advocates reduced East-West contacts as well as greater use of military power to promote Soviet interests in world politics.
- (U) A candidate likely to have Zimyanin's support is Leningrad First Secretary Romanov, a strong conservative on domestic issues and a proponent of ideological struggle as a concomitant of detente with the West. Although biographic information does not depict him as a Russian "nationalist," some reports have linked Romanov's name to that persuasion. Additionally, Leningrad has, in recent years, been the origin of much of the "nationalist" literature. While the <u>Aurora</u> article is not of this genre, it is interesting to note that <u>Aurora</u> is a Leningrad publication. Thus, it is not likely that Romanov would have been unaware of the article's satirization of Brezhnev. Its nature and content would have brought it to Party attention somewhere in the publication's censorship procedure.

Brezhnev's Role Vis-a-Vis Chernenko and Kirilenko

- (U) The expanded activity on the part of Party Secretary Chernenko since the death of Suslov appears to be another important factor. He is apparently meeting strong opposition while endeavoring to take over Suslov's position as "Second Secretary." In fact, the recent "slaps" at Brezhnev may actually be aimed at Chernenko as the heir apparent and closest Brezhnev protege. Chernenko's meteoric rise primarily attributal to Brezhnev's influence may be perceived by some as a threat, although he does not appear to have a broad or independent power base.
- (U) By recent actions and speeches, Chernenko portrays himself as a strong proponent of Brezhnev's approach to the West and one who is concerned with the current economic situation. Chernenko's increased activity over the last 2 years, most pronounced since Suslov's death, is likely an attempt to secure his power and position while Brezhnev is still alive and able to wield influence on his behalf. There is, however, a good possibility that once Brezhnev goes, Chernenko may not be able to retain his current position, much less improve it.
- (U) The future role, if any, of Party Secretary Kirilenko at this point is not known. It is apparent that Chernenko's rise coincides with the extremely low profile being maintained by Kirilenko, his potential rival for succession. Traditionally, Kirilenko has been closely associated with Brezhnev and his policies. He is said to be well respected within the Party and is considered a competent administrator with a broad base in Party affairs, industrial management, and foreign relations. Until about 2 years ago, Kirilenko was considered the most likely candidate to succeed Brezhnev at least as an interim leader. Since then, Brezhnev has apparently been grooming Chernenko for the role.

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(U) It is possible that Kirilenko is upset by this and is providing support to opposing interests while maintaining low visibility until the final outcome. However, we cannot dismiss the possibility that Kirilenko, cognizant of his advanced age or because of poor health, has chosen to step aside in favor of Chernenko. In fact, Kirilenko has been reported as extremely ill and unable to return to the political arena. If Kirilenko should succeed Brezhnev, it would most likely be for a short duration. By ceding seniority now, Kirilenko could be providing Chernenko with a stronger position from which to maneuver while keeping Brezhnev's policies or at least his legacy relatively intact.

CPSU Central Committee Department Heads

- (U) An important consideration in the leadership succession is the relationship of key figures in the Central Party bureaucracy to the various potential successors to Party leadership. Aside from the Politburo and Secretariat, and to some extent the Central Committee (in plenary session), the only other CPSU organ with a significant role to play in succession is the Central Committee apparatus composed of staff departments headed by long-time Party bureaucrats. Although none of the Central Party organs plays an institutional role in the working out of succession, it is the personal ties and relationships that major Party leaders (succession contenders) have built up with key figures in these Central Party institutions which affect the course and outcome of succession.
- (S) The staff departments of the Central Committee truly represent the "brains" of the Party. Not only do they administer the Party organization, but they also monitor and oversee the activities of the entire state apparatus, including the Ministry of Defense (MOD), Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), and KGB. Three of these departments are worth noting because of the role they play as Party control instruments over key national policy arenas:
- The Administrative Organs Department, headed by Nikolay Savinkin, controls all key positions within MOD, MVD, the state Procuracy and Ministry of Justice, and the KGB. It fills these posts with Party members of proven loyalty and reliability. In addition, this department is believed to exercise a role in national security policy formulation, serving in a staff support role for the Defense Council.
- The Organizational Party Work Department, headed by Ivan Kapitonov, controls the Party cadre system, managing the line Party and key government nomenklatura positions throughout the territorial and ministerial structure of Soviet Party-State administration. Because of the enormous "patronage" power of this department and the Administrative Organs Department it would be essential for potential succession contenders to coopt their chiefs and deputies or, as has been the case in the past, install their own men in these positions as a first step toward consolidating their regime.
- -- The International Department, headed by Boris Ponomarev, plays a central role in the formulation and coordination of Soviet foreign policy and national strategy. While ostensibly responsible only for liaison with nonruling

Communist parties, the department oversees all foreign activities of the USSR, orchestrating the various instruments of policy (legal and illegal) ranging from diplomacy to clandestine support for insurgent movements and terrorist groups, disinformation campaigns, and other covert action operations. Given Ponomarev's tenure in this position (appointed chief circa 1955), it is clear he is a seasoned party apparatchik and careerist, able to fashion new loyalties as the Party regime changed above and around him. Also, since his department does not dispense patronage or affect internal CPSU affairs, Ponomarev is an important figure to control once power is secured. He is not considered important to the gaining of power, other than in connection with the influence he wields because of Party connections fostered over the years. This personal dimension is the most important factor in shaping succession outcomes and, unfortunately, the least understood by Western analysts.

The KGB Equation

- (C) A key role for senior KGB officials in the succession struggle is assumed, but it is among the most difficult to define. Given the all-encompassing tentacles of this organization, it is unlikely the spate of "anti-Brezhnev" rumors would escape KGB attention without collusion at some level. Reports that KGB First Deputy Tsvigun's death was a suicide and that he had fallen into disfavor with Brezhnev may account for a confusing KGB association. Evidence on this issue is limited at best. Another option is possible. Several Western and Soviet sources have indicated that KGB Chief Yuri Andropov shares responsibility for leaking the adverse stories about Brezhnev's family.
- (C) Andropov has been closely linked with Brezhnev and his policies. Consequently, Andropov's status has risen steadily in recent years, especially since his appointment as KGB Chief in 1967 and his elevation to full member of the Politburo in 1973. Some rumors indicate Andropov has ambitions for the Party's top position or a role similar to that of Suslov. In the past, the promotion of Andropov to the number one or two position in the CPSU while retaining powers over the KGB would not have been likely. Since the days of Beria's excesses, the Party has been careful to limit the KGB's power and would most likely obstruct a direct ascendency from this organization. Andropov's early career, however, was in the Party rather than the secret police, and he could be trying to transition back to a "line" Party position to advance his influence.
- (C) Significantly, a recent intelligence report states that Andropov may be a candidate for the Secretariat (possibly to be announced at the Central Committee Plenum scheduled for 24 May). If Andropov is elevated to the Secretariat and vacates his position at the KGB, he will achieve a position of significant Party authority. Additionally, by leaving he KGB, he would largely divorce himself from the stigma and sensitivity normally associated with that organization.

(TS In any event, regardless of where Andropov's loyalties lie, it is apparent that Brezhnev's rapid promotion of two "loyal" KGB associates to First Deputy Chief rank (either as a potential replacement or a counter to Andropov) would underscore the Genral Secretary's appreciation of the importance of


20 May 82

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coopting principal figures within that powerful organization. Consequently, in any succession struggle the role of the KGB will be a substantial factor that any aspiring power seeker must take into consideration. As a minimum, the candidate must have assurances the KGB will not oppose him.

The Military: A Significant Player

- (U) Increasingly, the military has been included in the growing cloud of rumors, and its role will apparently become more active as the political maneuvering evolves. Loyalty of the powerful military elite has traditionally been a necessary element to securing control and consolidating power. At present, it is difficult to determine respective loyalites. However, examination of past rivalries and new reporting would suggest some cleavage may exist over the succession issue within the senior ranks of the military.
- (C) It is not known if there is a Brezhnev "military man." The best candidate would be Minister of Defense Ustinov. However, his rapid rise to the Minister of Defense position (from Central CPSU and military-industry origins rather than line military) may well have alienated certain senior professional military officers. Additionally, Brezhnev's elevation to Marshal of the Soviet Union, as well as his appointment of Ustinov, clearly asserted Party primacy over the military following the death of Marshal Grechko. This may well have precipitated discontent within the military, especially among the younger officers, such as Chief of the General Staff Ogarkov and Commander in Chief of the Warsaw Pact Kulikov.



20 May 82

DIA Intelligence Appraisal

FOIA(b) (1)



Is Brezhnev Losing Ground?

- (C) Although the current activity in Moscow appears intense, for the moment there is no concrete evidence to indicate that Brezhnev has lost effective control of the Party-State apparatus. To the contrary, the promotion of Gen Shkadov and the recent appointments of Tsinev and Chebrikov to replace Tsvingun as First Deputy Chairman of the KGB indicate Brezhnev's power base is intact and active. Recent reports that copies of the Aurora magazine have disappeared may be evidence that the senior echelon of the KGB is still backing Brezhnev in at least a pro forma manner, since it is the major organ responsible for such actions. There is other more persuasive evidence suggesting Brezhnev still retains power over the apparatus. The recent dismissal of Trade Union Chief Shibayev, presided over by Chernenko, would most likely require at least the tacit approval of Brezhnev. Reports that Timofeyev, head of the International Worker's Movement Institute and reportedly a Suslov protege, is supposedly in trouble indicate some action by Brezhnev as well.
- (C) Additionally, the following activities, if true, may reflect Brezhnev's continued political vitality:
- The reported dismissal of Deputy Minister of Culture N. I. Mokhov and head of the Ministry of Culture Theater Section Chausov
- -- Speculation that Minister of Culture and Candidate Politburo member Demichev is in trouble
- The removal and possible arrest of the Moscow City Department of Culture Deputy Chief Sakoldin.
- (C) All of these actions are associated with elements of the cultural apparatus headed by Zimyanin, who was implicated in the aforementioned apparent attempts to embarrass Brezhnev. This quick retaliation could be a measure of the strength of Brezhnev's control and his refusal to let go of the reins of power.

Outlook

(C) It is apparent that the Party leadership is maneuvering for high political stakes. Although it is impossible to identify all the major players and predict the final outcome, it is possible to postulate some developments. As such, a case could be made for a group within the Party that generally advocates a tougher

stand on domestic issues as well as tactics vis-a-vis the West. Many of the younger members of the top CPSU leadership have been identified with this philosophy, and a number of them are thought to be linked with Suslov in this regard.

- (C) Another group appears to be the "establishment" or older generation members of the Brezhnev regime. There are also other powerful elements that must figure into any struggle for Party leadership. Among these are the heads of the major departments (like Savinkin or Kapitonov) on the Central Committee whose personal fortunes will be tied to the succession outcome. The significance of Party leaders who control the KGB and the military cannot be discounted; any successor to Brezhnev must have support from key officials in these powerful organizations.
- (C) In the final analysis, the choice of the "heir apparent" will depend on the Central Party apparat, the alliances forged among the major power groupings and notably those controlling a major regional Party organization (i.e., Moscow, Leningrad), the KGB, and the military within the Party. Efforts will no doubt be made to portray the successor as possessing a clear political mandate for future Soviet policy. In this respect, we do not anticipate a significant change or lessening in the tensions between the Soviet Union and the US as a consequence of succession. The US can expect a continuation of the existing relationship and possibly, more foreboding, a younger leadership even less amenable to the interests of the US and more active in undermining them.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL

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the need for greater democratization of Soviet society when he stated that some people are already asking if there is not already "too much democracy."

The themes of Chernenko's article are remarkably similar to those set forth in Andropov's 22 April Lenin Day speech—a parallelism that seems to confirm the existence of a reform constituency in the party, if not indeed a rivalry for that constituency. Like Chernenko, Andropov stressed the "boldness and flexibility" of Lenin's teachings, that theory "cannot tolerate stagnation" but must be constantly developed. Andropov appeared to support Chernenko's ideas on greater democratization and stated that in solving any problem the views of "every person" must be heard.

Andropov's and Chernenko's statements also appeared to coincide on a number of subjects not normally addressed by the Soviet leadership. Both stated that the country's problems must not be blamed on vestiges of the past, rejected the idea of pluralism in Soviet society, and condemned the overreliance on administrative methods in solving the country's problems.

VETERAN REFORMER PETRENKO URGES NEW IDEAS ON PARTY'S ROLE

In another sign of increased political debate, a longtime advocate of party reform has publicly criticized traditional views of the party's leadership role in society and urged more innovative thinking about the party's relationship to other institutions. The author, Central Committee official F.F. Petrenko, has long sought to redefine and reduce the party's overwhelming role in society and to increase democracy within the party itself. His article, coming in the wake of other important reform-oriented articles, reinforces the impression that the approaching succession, particularly the growing influence of Chernenko, is encouraging new lobbying efforts on behalf of reformist ideas.*

Petrenko's article--a review of a 1981 symposium on "The Marxist-Leninist Party in the Political System of Socialist Society"--appeared in the April VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS (QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY). Judging by Petrenko's description, the book--which

^{*} Articles by I.N. Buzdalov in the March VOPROSY EKONOMIKI (QUES-TIONS OF ECONOMICS) and F.M. Burlatskiy in the April NOVYY MIR are discussed in the FBIS TRENDS of 5 May, pages 11-12 and in the FBIS Analysis Report FB 82-10014 of 19 May 1982, "Pressure for Reform in the Soviet Union: Burlatskiy Draws Lessons From China's Mistakes."

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criticizes efforts to make state and public organizations "independent" of the party and to give Marxist-Leninist parties a "democratic face"--appears to reflect conservative reaction to liberalizing trends in Poland. Petrenko uses the book as an occasion to criticize conventional thinking and press for innovation.

Petrenko's main argument is that the questions of the party's role in society and the "delimitation of party, state, and public functions" have not been well "studied" and require further thought. He writes that the 26th CPSU Congress called on scholars not to "prove the already proven" but to analyze political life of society "more deeply and boldly." He calls for "new ideas," for creatively debating and critically reassessing the "shortcomings and weaknesses that still occur in the activities of party organs in supervising state and public administration." He condemns the authors of the criticized book for seeming to feel that "inefficient administration simply cannot exist under socialism."

BACKGROUND Petrenko's criticisms reflect his longtime positions on democratization in society and within the party. As author of numerous books and articles on party work since 1960, Petrenko has been one of the boldest in suggesting limitation of party domination of other institutions and allowing more independence for government and public organizations. In a 19 October 1973 PRAVDA article he called for "more precise delimitation of the functions of the party from those of the state and public organizations" so that the latter can "use their rights and possibilities to the maximum" without "petty supervision" by the party. Leadership cadres of state and economic organs have improved, he argued, so that the party apparat no longer needs to intervene closely in their work.

He has also repeatedly argued the need for more freedom of discussion within the party and for more flexibility in thinking. In an April 1974 VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS article, he stated that new tasks must be decided by "free discussion of problems of theory and practice at all levels and in all units of the party" and that the 1968 Czechoslovak crisis showed the need for timely discussion of urgent problems before they develop into a "serious political crisis." He wrote that "all the greatest discoveries of Marxism-Leninism" resulted from rethinking old ideas and quoted Engels as declaring that "for dialectical philosophy nothing is set once and for all, absolute, and sacred."

Despite his record as a persistent gadfly, Petrenko has long held a prominent position in the establishment, even in the Central Committee apparat itself. From the mid-1960's through 1973, he was

FBIS TRENDS 19 MAY 1982

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repeatedly identified as a "responsible official of the Central Committee." Although not identified in any post since then, he has remained an oft-quoted authority on intraparty affairs and theory, including the sensitive subject of collectivity of leadership. His ability to survive the shifts in party sentiment—especially the post-Khrushchev conservative trend—is matched by few party intellectuals.

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OGARKOV REITERATES HARDLINE VIEWPOINT ON VICTORY DAY

Signs of pressure from within the Soviet military establishment for a harder line response to the United States reappeared in comment on the 9 May anniversary of the World War II victory in Europe. General Staff Chief Ogarkov, who has taken the lead over the past year in pessimistic assessments of U.S. policy, once more stood out from his fellow officers in stressing the dimensions of the "imperialist" threat.

Defense Minister Ustinov, apparently reflecting the consensus viewpoint of his colleagues on the Politburo, took a more moderate stance. While such publicly expressed differences should not be regarded as simply an in-house military quarrel, there is little evidence of support from civilian leaders for Ogarkov's position.

Ogarkov's article, appearing in IZVESTIYA, presented a consistently ominous interpretation of U.S. policy, charging that Washington carries out a systematic, calculated, multifaceted policy of confrontation against the USSR. Without differentiating between the United States and its allies, he accused "international imperialism" of waging economic war against socialist countries through trade sanctions and credit controls. He charged that under American leadership NATO has been conducting a wide-scale political-ideological campaign intended to frighten Western populations and to engender hostility toward the Soviet Union among its allies. Resurrecting a serious charge, he accused the United States of undertaking direct material preparations for war. And in what may be his most important point, he said the United States was seeking both "militarytechnical superiority" and "overall military superiority," apparently imputing to the Administration intentions to build better weapons than those available to the USSR, and more of them as well.

In a more balanced presentation, Defense Minister Ustinov, writing for PRAVDA, similarly charged the United States with pursuing a hostile policy toward the Soviet Union. But, unlike Ogarkov, he made no mention of economic or ideological warfare, citing only the traditional military threat. While Ogarkov appeared to give only pro forma endorsement to various arms control proposals put forward by Brezhnev over the past year, Ustinov identified several specific steps unilaterally taken by the Soviet Union as "important initiatives" demonstrating in practice the USSR's desire for peace. In remarkably mild language, the defense minister asserted that the



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SOVIETS

MOSCOW (UPI) -- POLITBURO MEMBER AND KGB CHIEF YURI ANDROPOV BUILT UP HIS POWER BASE IN THE SOVIET HIERARCHY MONDAY WITH HIS APPOINTMENT AS ONE OF 12 SECRETARIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE.

HEAVY INDUSTRY CHIEF VLADIMIR DOLGIKH ALSO WAS APPOINTED AN ALTERNATE MEMBER OF THE RULING POLITBURO BY THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE DURING ITS FIRST 1982 PLENUM, OR FULL MEETING.

BUT THE 470 MEMBERS AND ALTERNATES DID NOT APPOINT ANYONE TO FILL A POLITBURO VACANCY AFTER THE DEATH IN JANUARY OF FORMER PARTY IDEALOGUE MIKHAIL SUSLOV.

"THESE ARE TWO INDEPENDENT PEOPLE," SAID ONE WESTERN KREMLINGLOGIST.

BUT HE SAID ANDROPOV'S APPOINTMENT DID NOT MEAN HE WOULD NECESSARILY FILL SUSLOV'S SHOES AS THE PARTY'S TOP THEORETICIAN. "WE WILL HAVE TO WAIT AND SEE WHAT POSITION HE HOLDS IN THE SECRETARIAT," HE SAID.

WESTERN EXPERTS SAID THE TWO APPOINTMENTS COULD BE SEEN AS BADNEWS FOR POLITBURO MEMBER KONSTANTIN CHERNENKO, POINTED TO MOST OFTEN AS PRESIDENT LEONID BREZHNEV'S SUCCESSOR AND FREQUENTLY IN THE PUBLIC EYE IN RECENT MONTHS.

"IT LOOKS LIKE THE CHERNENKO ELEVATION IN STATUS HAS BEEN ACHIEVED AT A HEAVY PRICE," SAID THE WESTERN DIPLOMAT, MEANING NEITHER DOLGIKH NOR ANDROPOV ARE SEEN AS AUTOMATIC CHERNENKO SUPPORTERS.

THE OFFICIAL TASS NEWS AGENCY SAID THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE CONVENED FOR THE FIRST TIME IN SIX MONTHS TO DISCUSS THE SOVIET UNION'S FOOD INDUSTRY.

IT SAID BREZHNEV DELIVERED A REPORT, BUT THE CONTENTS WERE NOT DISCLOSED IMMEDIATELY. THE MEETING WAS CLOSED TO WESTERN JOURNALISTS.

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL

May 27, 1982

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM:

RICHARD PIPES W

SUBJECT:

Soviet Succession

Attached at Tab I is State's appraisal of the latest changes in the Soviet sweepstakes, emphasizing the head start of Andropov and Dolgikh. I would not attach too much importance to such prognoses: we are only in the first lap of a lengthy race and horses that lead as the gate opens have been known to come in last. (S)

Attachment:

Tab I

State's memorandum of May 25, 1982

CONFIDENTIAL Derivative from State Review May 27, 2002.

> DECLASSIFIED NLRR_FOLD-114/11 # 11401 BY KML NARA DATE 4/21/11



CONFIDENTIAL DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

May 25, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Soviet Leadership Changes: Policy Implications

Attached for your information is an analysis of recent Soviet Leadership Changes: Policy Implications.

L. Paul Bremer, III. Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As stated

CONFIDENTIAL

RDS-3, 5/25/02

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By NARA, Date 8/7/07

21

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Soviet Leadership Changes: Policy Implications

Promotion of Andropov to the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat, and elevation of CC Secretariat member Dolgikh to Candidate Politburo status (both moves announced at the May 24 CC Plenum) should have no immediate policy impact but are pregnant with implications for the succession sweepstakes. For example:

- -- As one of the few leaders with seats in both the Politburo and the Secretariat (apart from Brezhnev, the only others are Kirilenko, Chernenko and Gorbachev), Andropov now becomes a serious contender to succeed Brezhnev as CPSU General Secretary;
- -- Dolgikh, a relatively youthful (age 58) specialist in industrial management, may be on the way to full Politburo status, which would also make him eligible for a senior leadership position. In any event, Dolgikh's promotion is a boost for Soviet industrialists, who have been under-represented in the senior leadership since Kosygin's death.

At least one shoe has yet to fall: if tradition is followed, Andropov will give up his job as KGB Chairman. The official announcement from today's CC Plenum did not indicate who will replace Andropov in that important position.

These leadership changes tell us little about Brezhnev's political strength. Andropov's move into the Secretariat makes him a challenger to heir-presumptive Chernenko; but Brezhnev may have felt uncomfortable with having his personal protege Chernenko as the only likely successor. And it is conceivable that, at least in the initial period of succession, Andropov and Chernenko could each inherit a piece of Brezhnev's power. Be that as it may, Suslov's death created a key vacancy in the nine-man Secretariat. Andropov, who served in the Secretariat from 1962-67 and has held other Party positions, can be regarded as a logical replacement. So Andropov's promotion does not necessarily mark a setback for Brezhnev (of course, Andropov became KGB Chairman and a full Politburo member during

RDS-3 5/24/02

NLRR FOG-114/11 # 11607

BY KML NARA DATE 4/21/11

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Brezhnev's reign and presumably with Brezhnev's blessing).

Similarly, Dolgikh's promotion sheds little light on Brezhnev's current position. A Secretariat member since 1972, Dolgikh's rapid rise into the central Party leadrship almost certainly had Brezhnev's support. If, as rumored, Kirilenko (the senior Secretariat member responsible for industry) is ill, Dolgikh's elevation could be explained on the grounds that someone with enhanced authority was needed to assist Kirilenko in overseeing the industrial sector.

National Security Council The White House

Package # 3737

Succession

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CONFIDENTIA

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cc: Robinson Dobriansky

CONFIDENTIAL Derivative from State Review May 27, 2002.

> DECLASSIFIED NLRR F06-114/11 # 11608 BY KML NARA DATE 4/21/11

Washington, O.C. 20520

May 25, 1982

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THE WHITE HOUSE

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Attachment:

As stated

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RDS-3, 5/25/02

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Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By NAMA, Date Spire

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D. C. 20505

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

14 June 1982

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Andropov in the Western Press

Summary

The emergence of Yuriy Andropov as a major contender to succeed Brezhnev has provoked considerable speculation in the Western press about his personality and policy views. Several articles—particularly Hough in the Washington Post (see attachment)—have suggested that he is a "closet liberal" who favors reform and was really not involved in the suppression of dissidents. Andropov's "liberal" inclinations are demonstrated, it is argued, by his association with the Hungarian economic reforms in the 1960s and 1970s and by his personal ties to such urbane, knowledgeable, and articulate Soviets as G. A. Arbatov.

This characterization in our judgement is too simplistic and in some cases uninformed. While Andropov appears to be a "moderate" in the Soviet context and may be enlightened by Soviet standards, he was intimately involved in the suppression in Hungary

Western-oriented Soviet officials does not provide a good indication of the internal—especially economic—policies he would favor.

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Perceptions of Andropov. Yuriy Andropov appears to be a "moderate" in the Soviet political context. He appears more supportive of Brezhnev's foreign policy, especially detente and arms control with the US, than some other Soviet leaders.

the dubious

characterizations of Andropov in the western press--for example, that he is a "closet liberal," or that his elevation to the Secretariat is a "favorable development" that presages "significant reform fairly quickly."

Andropov's role in the KGB has limited his contact with foreigners, and reduced his visibility on the Soviet political scene. His few speeches and articles over the years contain little to differentiate his position from the current party

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A Reformer?. The notion of Andropov as a reformer stems from his association with Hungary, and by implication, with that country's economic reforms. Andropov's own role in Hungary, from 1954 - 1957, however, was hardly reformist or progressive. He helped to implement a brutal Soviet repression of the revolution and worked to restore central control and Soviet orthodoxy in that country.

While he may have supported Kadar's subsequent policies, they have been implemented very slowly by a regime that has demonstrated its absolute fealty to Moscow.

The Soviets are interested in Hungarian economic policies. Some Hungarian ideas have been incorporated in Brezhnev's food program, and Andropov might give further impetus to adopting Hungarian economic policies if he becomes party leader. These policies, however, are not entirely relevant to Soviet economic problems and would not be easy to implement quickly. Andropov's minimal experience in economic management, moreover, makes it unlikely that he would have great influence on economic policies. The opposition of entrenched Soviet bureaucracies to some of the Hungarian reforms, and to extensive reforms generally, probably would limit any inclination that Andropov might have to push hard in this area while trying to build his power base as well.

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In contrast to what some Western journalists imply, we think Andropov would be a tough, demanding leader. He has repeatedly emphasized the need for internal discipline in the Soviet Union, asserting that the rights of citizens are linked to important duties, and that criticism (in the context of intraparty "democracy") must be "publicly-held and constructive." Such ideas set Andropov apart from Konstantin Chernenko, his principal rival for the top party post, who has cultivated the image of a leader more attuned to popular aspirations and who has called for more intraparty "democracy" in terms far less qualified than has Andropov. Moreover, Andropov acknowledges no basis for anti-Soviet activity in the USSR and finds its roots in Western influences and western "psychological warfare." On the other hand,

he may entertain the idea of limited changes in the current system of economic planning and management.

Andropov would not countenance foreign influence on what he would perceive as purely internal Soviet affairs. He would also likely continue actively to support countries that are "moving" toward socialism.

unusually forceful defense of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in a February 1980 speech. Andropov would probably, however, try to continue Brezhnev's foreign policies toward the United States. He has, to judge from his speeches, been a key supporter of Brezhnev's "detente" and arms control policies, which he regards as serving Soviet interests well.

In a more general sense Andropov appears confident about the course of world developments. He believes that the "correlation of forces" favors socialism and that "peaceful coexistence," the terminology he uses, helps socialism and reduces the danger of war. He also supports the need for a strong Soviet military and sees it as promoting conditions for arms control negotiations with the US.

The selection of Yuri Andropov as Central Committee secretary is one of the most favorable developments to have occurred in the Soviet Union in recent years, it is yet another strong piece of evidence that the Soviet succession will bring significant reform fairly quickly

rather than after a long transitional period.

in the West as head of the secret police, which has been suppressing Arbatov continued in this post until 1967. The group included a dissidents. That is an important part of his responsibilities and of his personality. He has recently spoken out forcefully against a muitiand the second s the dissidents as Leonid Brezhnev.

the evolution of Soviet society. It we focus upon political struggies ... when he selected him as his chief long-term adviser. and trends within the Soviet Communist Party, Andropov is an ex- --- Andropov's most recent speech, on the anniversary of Lenin's

tremely interesting figure.

foreign policy responsibilities as well as internal security ones. Andropov's background suggests he was chosen predominantly for the first set For the 14 years before becoming KGB chief, Andropov worked in the foreign policy realm. From 1953 to 1957, he was ambassador to ... Hungary, and from 1957 to 1967 head of the Socialist Countries Department of the Central Committee.

- The key deputy chairmen of the KGB for internal security were Brezhnev cronies, and Androprov cannot have had much control over them. He surely spent much of his time in the KGB's foreign policy

anger to the transfer of the

Because of his ambassadorship in Hungary, he must have remained the leadership's special expert on that country, and it is difficult to? imagine the Soviet Union tolerating and increasingly approving the reforms that have been carried out in hungary it Andropov had not been pushing that line.

The second key fact about Andropov is that he is a protege of Otto Kuusinen, the old Soviet leader of Finnish extraction, From 1940 to 1951, Andropov did Komsomol and party work in the Karelo-Finnish republic under Knusinen, who, as he rose in influence in the Khru-

sacher period, took Andropov with him.

Kuusinen is known in the West as the man Stalin tried to install as Communist leader in Finland during the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940. But within the Soviet Union he was an important reformist figtre. As Comintern secretary in 1934, he argued against Smith in tavor! of the establishment of the Popular Front against Hitter. In 1945-1 1946, under the pseudonym of "N. Baltiisky," he wrote favorably about West European socialists at a time when this suggested; detente, and in one remarkable article in 1945 he even seemed to ad-• vocate, in an Aesopian way, independence for Poland.

• Once Stalin died, Kuusinen pecame an important adviser in Moscow, and in 1957 he was named a Central Committee secretary and a

full member of the Presidium.

•• - Essentially Kuusinen was a reformist, non-dogmatic ideologist, who served as a counterpoint to the more conservative Mikhail Su--slov. To head his full-time "group of consultants," he chose the 30year-old Fedor Burlatsky, an intellectual who had been the most outspoken advocate of democratization and de-Stalinization in the Soviet media in 1904-57:

When Kunsinen died, the group of consultants was divided into

two-one for the International Department and one for the Socialist Countries Department. The Kuusinen group essentially was given to the Socialist Countries Department, that is, to Andropov. Andropov soon replaced Burlatsky as its head with another of its members. Georgy, Arbatov, now the director of the Institute of the U.S.A. and Andropov, chairman of the KGB for 14 years, is primarily known! Canada.

number of important reformist intellectuals- notably Alexander; Bovin, now the Izvestia columnist, and Oieg Bogomolov, the directors party system, and, as a national leader, he would likely be as harsh on the institute that studies East European economic reform.

No leader accepts all the ideas of his advisers, but Andropov surely Yet the degree of success of the dissidents is not the whole story of was aware of Arbatov's public role of pushing detente since 1954

birthday, suggested that he is still thinking in these terms, its two. Two facts are crucial. First, the KGB has foreign intelligence and - major themes were the creative nature of Marxism-Leninism (a codeword for the need to modify it) and the absolutely central character of ; the question of peace and war. Andropov was forthright in stating that the Soviet Union must get on with solving its own problems.

Andropov is probably now the heir apparent, and, it this is the case. Arbatov may become his national security adviser. But all of the candidates have weaknesses in their packground, and the new leadership is likely to be collective and to resemble that of 1953-1957 in which important reform occured, including a limitation on the growth in military budgets. The Reagan administration should be prepared to respond.

The writer is a professor of political science at Duke University and a staff member of the Brookings Institution.

Succession ?

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Soviet Leadership Transition

NLRR FOLO-114/11 # 11606

SITUATION:

BY KML NARA DATE 4/21/11

No conceivable Soviet succession scenario is likely to precipitate a serious immediate crisis either within the USSR or in US-Soviet relations. It is conceivable that Brezhnev will step down, be kicked upstairs, or be replaced in a pre-planned move by the collective leadership. Under these circumstances, the potential for sharp near-term conflict among Brezhnev's successors would be minimal. The potential for a sharp struggle among the leadership would be somewhat higher in the event of Brezhnev's sudden death. However, in either case the overwhelming preoccupation of the Soviet leadership will be to project an image of calm and policy continuity. Even if a serious crisis is unlikely to result from Brezhnev's leaving office, we should be prepared to respond quickly and effectively to his passing from the scene, under whatever circumstances this occurs.

INTERESTS:

U.S. Interests: To underscore the continuity of our policy and U.S. leadership in world affairs and avoid actions which needlessly raise tensions or convey the counter-productive impression that we are seeking to take advantage of the Soviets at a time of uncertainty and potential instability; to convey to a successor leadership the message that if there are significant positive changes in Soviet policies there will be a significant positive response from us; and to test the willingness of a successor leadership to improve relations with the U.S. on the basis of our agenda. Pressures will build for unilateral U.S. gestures to improve the relationship: these should be firmly resisted.

Soviet Interests: To smooth the transition of power to Brezhnev's successors, ensure internal security, and avoid creating an atmosphere of crisis which could be exploited by external adversaries. The immediate period will be a time of internal adjustment as the new leaders maneuver for power, with consensus lacking for major new initiatives until their own positions are secure. Although the propaganda machine can be expected to project a "peace-loving" image, significant near-term changes in Soviet foreign and domestic policies will thus be unlikely.

Key third party interests:

(1) <u>U.S Allies</u>: We expect that our allies will wish to influence our policies toward the new leadership, and they

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will want us to act with restraint and to avoid any actions or statements which are likely to raise East/West tensions unduly, as they shape their own courses. The allies will welcome assurances of continuity in our own policy toward the Soviet Union. They may press for a return to detente and a quick summit invitation to the new Soviet leadership.

- (2) Soviet allies: Brezhnev's departure will have major political repercussions in Eastern Europe, since the current leaders throughout the area, with the exception of Poland, have close and longstanding personal ties with Brezhnev. We doubt that Brezhnev's ouster or death will precipitate widespread civil disorders in Poland or elsewhere in Eastern Europe, but his successors will seek to avoid any impression of political weakness in Moscow. Soviet allies and proxies in the developing world may well minimize activities which could provoke a U.S. response until the initial stage of the Soviet leadership transition has been completed. Vis-a-vis the Soviets, they will be looking for new opportunities to press individual claims on Soviet attention and resources, but such opportunities will probably be rare, at least at the outset.
- (3) <u>Neutral/Non-Aligned</u>: The NNA, like our allies, will be motivated by concerns for stability and avoidance of an atmosphere of East/West crisis.

CURRENT U.S. OBJECTIVES AND POLICY PLANS

Political: Our principal objective in the immediate post-Brezhnev period will be to make clear that we deal with the Soviet Union as a country and not with any particular leadership. We will want to emphasize that our approach to US-Soviet relations will continue to based on the principles of reciprocity and restraint. It would be advisable to emphasize points of continuity in our relations, such as negotiations on START and INF. To underscore our world leadership, our response should be authoritatively, at 'Presidential level.

Should Brezhnev die in office, we would expect that his death will be marked by a Soviet state funeral. We recommend that our delegation be headed by the Vice President, rather than the President, in view of the current strains in US-Soviet relations. The delegation should include Secretary Shultz and prominent, bipartisan Congressional, business, and scientific leaders. We would, of course, want to consult closely with our allies on level of representation at the funeral.

Economic: As part of our larger response we will wish to make clear that we are prepared for a major expansion of mutually beneficial economic relations, in the context of general upward movement based on <u>significant</u> changes in Soviet policy. At the same time, there will be no requirement for immediate decisions on East/West economic questions.

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Military: The Soviets may place some limited forces in Moscow and possibly other urban areas on increased readiness status as a contingency measure against domestic unrest. However, the Soviets will almost certainly avoid any unusual military activities which might provoke a U.S. reaction. We should avoid any military actions which could be seen as provocative by the Soviets or our allies, such as freedom of navigation manuevers, which should be examined carefully on a case by case basis. Any military actions that can be considered beyond normal and could possibly evoke an other than normal response should be reviewed carefully.

Domestic/Legal Constraints: U.S. Congressional and public opinion will undoubtedly favor a restrained U.S. response which emphasizes policy continuity and our willingness to respond favorably to new signs of moderation in Soviet international behavior.

Information/Media Policy and Plans: Our information policy should be geared to our broader political objective of avoiding actions or rhetoric which would appear designed to exploit the Soviet leadership transition or needlessly exacerbate East/West tensions and of testing the new leadership's professed constructive intentions. It should be keyed to the policy line announced by the President.

SPECTRUM OF U.S. OPTIONS

Intelligence Assets Available

Our ability to predict events before and during the Soviet political transition will be limited. We would want to make maximum use of Embassy Moscow's contacts. Our embassies in third countries, particularly those in Eastern Europe and where the Soviet Ambassador has Central Committee status will be additional sources of information. Of course, the resources of the intelligence community will have to be heavily targeted on the Soviet political transition as well as Soviet military activities. Another important source of information will be our allies with whom we would pursue an active program of intelligence sharing.

Political/Diplomatic; Economic; Military Options Available

We see three broad options for our initial response to the leadership transition:

(1) Embark on a concerted effort to influence the Kremlin leadership transition process. This course of action would almost certainly be futile in view of the closed nature of the Soviet decision-making process and our limited leverage over internal political developments in the Soviet Union. We lack precise enough information about the political beliefs and potential policies of various contenders to be able to predict with any certainty how they would behave once they had succeeded

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Brezhnev. Even if more precise judgements on this question were possible, an attempt to favor one candidate or group over another could redound to the disadvantage of those we favored. Moreover, such an effort on our part would appear provocative to the Soviets and to our allies and friends as well.

- Adopt a posture of willingness to deal, on the basis of the policy approach which we have outlined since the beginning of the Administration, with whichever leadership group emerges. We would underscore that we remain ready for an improvement in US-Soviet relations if the Soviet Union makes significant changes in policies of concern to us, and particularly policies affecting the prospects for peace. Announced by the President, this approach would stress our readiness for a reduction of tensions and progress in specific aspects of our relationship if the Soviets are prepared seriously to address the full range of our concerns. There are two possible variants: 1) a restatement of our agenda inviting new Soviet restraint in response; or 2) an elaboration of our agenda with new negotiating proposals in a few specific areas, as concrete tests u do with of the new leadership's intentions and acility. what's wary ust the first variant as our initial approach, although we believe the second variant should be kept under review as the Soviet succession process, which is likely to be prolonged, develops within the USSR.
- (3) Adopt a posture of watchful waiting. We do not favor this course, since it would dispense with the limited leverage on Soviet outcomes we do have, and since it would be seen as purely reactive and unworthy of our world leadership role.

Resources/Assets Available

Political: In addition to Presidential-level statements and communications, we would want to carry out an extensive diplomatic dialogue with the Soviets on all outstanding issues. For example, we should be prepared to continue with the START and INF negotiations without interruption. In those cases where we have active dialogue on specific regional issues, we should indicate willingness to continue if warranted by indications of Soviet seriousness. Depending upon the timing and circumstances of the transition, we might wish to consider an early Ministerial-level meeting between Secretary Shultz and the Soviet Foreign Minister. The agenda for such discussions will depend on the overall posture we adopt. We should consult closely with our Allies to ensure maximum policy coordination and unity during the transition period.

Economic: We should not change our approach to East/West economic issues solely as a response to the Soviet political transition. However, we should make clear to the new leadership that future economic relations will depend on Soviet actions across the full range of our relationship.

Military Forces: As noted above, U.S. and allied military

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forces should maintain their normal posture unless Soviet military activities dictate otherwise.

Informational Capabilities (VOA, ICA, etc): U.S. information agencies should continue their normal operations, including those which are critical of Soviet policies, such as the occupation of Afghanistan and support of martial law in Poland. However, these agencies should conduct their operations in accordance with our overall objective of avoiding actions or rhetoric which could appear designed to exploit the Soviet political transition or needlessly raise international tensions.

FOR A RECOMMENDED COURSE OF ACTION

Timing Considerations: We might have some advance warning of the impending transition, although our ability to predict such developments will be limited at best. It is also possible that Brezhnev will die or be ousted with no immediate warning. Thus, contingency planning for U.S. participation in a possible state funeral as well as certain other preparations to enable us to respond promptly to a leadership change should be undertaken. For example, we should agree to prepare draft Presidential statements which could be modified as necessary when the transition occurs. To do so, we need early consideration of what our overall posture should be. Draft condolence messages and an initial White House message also should be prepared. Illustrative texts of such messages are attached.

Coordination Requirements:

- l. <u>National</u>: At the time the actual transition takes place, it may be necessary to establish a working group in the State Department to coordinate U.S. participation in a possible state funeral and other aspects of our policy during the transition. It might also be necessary to establish a special SIG/IG mechanism to coordinate the longer-term USG response to the transition.
- 2. International: Among our first responses to a leadership change would be letters from Secretary Shultz to key allied and friendly foreign ministers providing our assessment of the situation and recommending close policy coordination. The North Atlantic Council in Brussels will be a key mechanism for continuous exchange of information and policy coordination with our European Allies. We will want to devote similar sustained attention to consultation with the Japanese and ANZUS allies, with the Chinese and with key third world countries.

Implications of Decision

Degradation of Operational Capabilities Elsewhere: It may be necessary to shift some intelligence collection assets from other priorities to effect required close monitoring of the

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Soviet transition and military posture. There need be no other degradation of operational capabilities elsewhere.

Political Impact:

- (1) <u>International</u>: Our ability to bring about a coordinated and restrained Western response to the transition will be a key in our ability to induce Soviet international restraint and to convince the new leadership that its interest lies in adopting a more moderate course.
- (2) Domestic: We will come under pressure to change our policy toward Moscow, both from those who would advocate an appeal to Soviet "doves", and those who would argue for an aggressive posture toward the Soviet Union during its leadership transition. However, as stated above, we believe the vast majority of the Congress and the American people will support a statesmanlike posture stressing the continuity of U.S. policy.

Economic Impact: We would not expect that existing trade and economic relationships, e.g. grain sales, would be affected by either the Soviet transition or our response to it.

Security Requirements: Certain domestic groups might seize upon a transition as a pretext for demonstrations or even violent activity against the Soviet diplomatic or commercial presence in the U.S. Should this happen, the Soviets might retaliate against our personnel and facilities in the Soviet Union. We should be prepared to take such measures as are necessary to fulfill our obligations to provide appropriate protection. We otherwise anticipate no increased security threat to our personnel and facilities in the Soviet Union as a result of the transition.

Legislative Coordination Requirements: As early as possible following the announcement of Brezhnev's death or ouster, we should brief the House and Senate leadership on our assessments of the succession. Secretary Shultz might wish to testify in open session before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and/or the House Foreign Affairs Committee on our approach to US-Soviet relations in the transition period. However, in our contacts with Congress, we should avoid public speculation on the details of the leadership struggle or premature judgments on the policies of the new leaders.

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT

From President Reagan to Kuznetsov

Please accept my condolences on the death of President
Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev. President Brezhnev was one of the
world's most important leaders for nearly two decades. I
regret that as President of the United States I did not
have the opportunity to meet personally with President
Brezhnev, and work directly with him toward improving
U.S.-Soviet relations. May I ask you to convey our
sympathies to the President's family.

I would also like to convey through you to the Soviet Government and people the strong desire of the United and impured States to work toward a more stable and constructive relationship with the Soviet Union. I look forward to constructive relations with the new leadership in the Soviet Union with the aim of expanding the areas where our two nations can cooperate to mutual advantage.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 78, 1997
NARA, Date

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From Secretary Shultz to Gromyko

Please accept my condolences on the death of President Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev. I can appreciate your sense of loss at the death of a colleague who played such a leading role in your nation and in relations between our two nations. We hope to continue efforts to improve these relations in the future, and I look forward to working with you toward this end.

Sincerely,

George Shultz

(1207M)





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Statement by the White House Press Spokesman

The President has expressed his personal condolences to Mr. Kuznetsov, First Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., on the death of Soviet President Brezhnev. A high-level delegation will represent President Reagan at the memorial ceremonies in Moscow.

As leader of the Soviet Union for nearly two decades,
President Brezhnev was one of the world's most important

and powerful figures. President Brezhnev played a verysignificant role in the shaping of U.S.-Soviet relations
during his presidency, and President Reagan regrets that
he did not have the opportunity to meet and work personally
with President Brezhnev on the problems and issues of
U.S.-Soviet relations.

President Reagan has conveyed to the Soviet Government the strong desire of the United States to continue to work an implical for a more stable relationship with the Soviet Union and to maintain an active dialogue between our societies on all important issues. The President looks forward to a constructive relationship with the new leaders of the Soviet Union.


White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NAS A, Data C. 7/1 L

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SOVIET TRENDS: JUNE 1982 (U)

Summary

(S/NF/NC/OC) Rivals Chernenko and Andropov appear to have struck a balance of power in the CPSU Secretariat, and reportedly they are sharing the chairmanship of that body. But Andropov is said to be canvassing within the Moscow elite for the eventual transfer of supreme authority.

- The small number of Moscow-based leaders (C) who have endorsed the national food program mandated by the May 24 Central Committee Plenum at various local party meetings suggests that there is only a shaky leadership consensus on the matter. Chernenko's Krasnoyarsk speech denounced the parochial mentality of rural bureaucrats opposed to change. Other sources indicated that stiff ministerial resistance to changes involving the rural bureaucracy forced the postponement of a Supreme Soviet session in July.
- (S) The Soviet press is becoming increasingly defensive about gerontocracy in the USSR, thus reminding readers that a turnover of aged leaders is likely soon and that generational change may lead to a degree of policy renewal.
- The Soviet press has taken the unusual step of cautiously raising the possibility of another bad crop. Leaks of data to Westerners have been spread to Soviet citizens by Western radio, ensuring broad awareness of dismal crop prospects. Food rationing is now widespread, and in some areas the norms have been reduced further.
- Moscow's foreign interests overcame domestic restraints in regard to several of the "binational spouses" who went on hunger strikes recently. In contrast, a new hunger strike by members of a Pentecostal family in the US Embassy

GRERRY

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Report 438-CA July 27, 1982

in Moscow and their relatives in Siberia stands little chance of success because Moscow sees few advantages in letting them go.

(C/NF) Jewish emigration figures for 1982 indicate a year-end total of about 3,000, the lowest annual figure since 1970, when significant Jewish emigration first was permitted. That sizable flow has now been virtually ended, and an upturn appears dependent on the restoration of an international climate favorable to emigration.

* * * * * *

Chernenko-Andropov Duumvirate

- (C) A balance of power between Konstantin Chernenko and Yuriy Andropov appears to have been struck in the CPSU Secretariat. Since his return to that body in May, Andropov reportedly has been handling the late Suslov's portfolio for ideology and foreign policy, but Chernenko also has some input in both areas. The pair are said to be sharing chairmanship of the Secretariat, which was Suslov's function for many years. Rumors of rivalry between the two persist; Andropov reputedly is canvassing within the Moscow elite for the eventual transfer of supreme authority.
- (LOU) Chernenko's ostensible preeminence in the circle around Brezhnev was clear in the first half of June when he:
 - --received a high award in the Kremlin from visiting Czechoslovak leader Husak;
 - --spoke to agro-industrial officials on the new national food program at a Central Committee conference; and
 - --addressed a plenum of the Krasnoyarskiy Kray party committee on the food program.
- (LOU) Chernenko's high profile was equally visible in such developments as:
 - --his man-of-the-hour pose in a photo of the Kremlin award ceremony carried in Pravda's weekly magazine, Ogonyok (No. 24);
 - --TASS's announcement of the publication of a second, revised and enlarged edition of his book, Questions of Work of the Party and State Apparatus; and
 - --linkage of his name to the sensitive theme of personnel assignment in Pravda's June 23 review of a new anthology of leadership writings and speeches.
- (C) Behind the scenes, however, Andropov seemed on the move. Czechoslovak visitors noted that although Chernenko was a member of the official Soviet delegation at their Kremlin talks, Andropov

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was seated on Husak's left (i.e., in a higher protocol position) at the official dinner. The guests seemed to have deduced from this anomaly that Andropov, not Chernenko, was the Soviet heir apparent.

- (S/NF/NC/OC) Certain middle-ranking Soviet officials in Moscow drew the same conclusion in private conversations. These sources described Andropov as a moderate who would not deviate "much" from Brezhnev's policies. Party Secretary Andrey Kirilenko, in their view, was out of the running because of severe health problems. But a Soviet diplomat later ventured that, after Brezhnev, it is likely that a troika of Andropov, Kirilenko, and Chernenko will rule in the short term.
- (LOU) Not everyone apparently accepts the story that Kirilenko's health suddenly took a turn for the worse early this year. A rare claim of Kirilenko's wartime achievements was made in the June 26 issue of the party daily <u>Socialist Industry</u>; the veteran aircraft industry executive Aleksey Shakhurin alleged that Kirilenko in 1941 headed a group of Zaporozhe obkom officials which directed the evacuation of a factory to the east even though the obkom building was under constant bombardment.
- (LOU) In any event, Andropov's emergence as counterweight to Chernenko was indicated at a leadership ceremony on June 24. All Moscow-based members of the Politburo and Secretariat except Brezhnev and Dolgikh were on that occasion awarded medals commemorating the 1500th anniversary of the founding of Kiev. In the absence of Brezhnev, who had received the same award in a Kremlin ceremony in May, it was Andropov rather than Chernenko who thanked Ukrainian leaders "on behalf of the award recipients."
- (C) Just a day later, Western diplomats were told that Andropov was wooing regional party bosses, economic ministers, and military chiefs in an attempt to win backing for his succession bid. L'Unita's Moscow correspondent cited Soviet contacts as envisioning a succession scenario with Andropov slated to become party General Secretary; Gromyko, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium; Dolgikh, premier; and Dobrynin, foreign minister. The contacts further averred that Defense Minister Ustinov had approved of this post-Brezhnev lineup.
- (C) Andropov's bandwagon in any event had gained enough momentum for the Soviet Ambassador to Prague to extol in dialogue with a Western diplomat Andropov's broad experience, sagacity, and demonstrated competence in questions of both internal and foreign policy, as well as ideology.

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- (LOU) If Chernenko and Andropov are rivals for power, as seems likely, their struggle presumably will be played out over policy issues, with Chernenko espousing an essentially conservative position on the major question of the party's role and Andropov taking a more flexible stance on domestic issues.
- (LOU) Party Secretary Ponomarev at an international conference in Sofia devoted to the 100th birthday of Georgi Dimitrov (Pravda, June 16) borrowed from the distinctive, party-style lexicon of Chernenko when he warned against "utopian arbitrary schemes or pragmatic, uninspired calculations" (emphasis supplied). A feature article in the June issue of the Minsk party journal asserted in similar doctrinaire fashion that hostile "ideologues" were attempting "to contrast the Communist party to the Soviet state, to deny the necessity of the CPSU's leading role in development of the country's economy, social-political development, to show that this is supposedly the prerogative only of the state and economic bodies." (Kommunist Belorussii, No. 6, 1982)
- (LOU) Significantly, Andropov has not followed Chernenko's example of castigating such anti-party vices as "pragmatism" or primary emphasis on monetary incentives. Andropov's Lenin Day speech on April 22 was, if anything, more flexible in tone on internal affairs than Chernenko's policy pronouncements. Thus, discord over economic management rights and methods could help to fuel a power conflict between Andropov and Chernenko.

Food Program Still Controversial

- (LOU) The small number of Moscow-based speakers fanning out to local plenums to discuss the national food program suggests there is only a shaky leadership consensus on the new scheme for integrating economic administration in the countryside.
- (LOU) Among the top leaders visiting regional towns and addressing party committee meetings on the food program adopted at the May Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee were Politburo members and Secretaries Chernenko and Gorbachev; Politburo candidates Dolgikh (Secretary for heavy industry), Solomentsev, and Kuznetsov; and Secretary (for culture) Zimyanin. Pravda ran summaries of all the speeches except that of Zimyanin.
- (LOU) Chernenko's speech in Krasnoyarsk, Siberia, was the only one with real political bite. It hit at selfish forces in rural bureaucracy that would likely survive the revamping of management organs under district agro-industrial associations (RAPOs). Chernenko explained that a "number" of separate agencies

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were still needed to cope with problems of specialization. But he went on to blast the mentality of officials in extant organizations as markedly parochial and harmful.

- (LOU) Editorial selectivity in the coverage of Chernenko's speech was almost certainly reflective of ongoing debate over the new agrarian line. <u>Izvestiya's version of the speech was about 400 words longer than Pravda's and included:</u>
 - --more praise of and stress on need for costly rural modernization;
 - --assurance that resources for improving living standards were available;
 - --confident word that a unified agro-industrial complex was being created and would be perfected;
 - --demand for a "principled, party evaluation" of any "deviation from all-people interests to the benefit of group and departmental interests," i.e., the party would monitor the state bureaucracy's implementation of the program;
 - --insistence that managing the human element would be of "decisive" importance in implementing the food program; and
 - --reference to "unity of the party's political and organizational work," i.e., need to involve the party bureaucracy in economic administration. (Politburo member Grishin and Party Secretary for personnel Kapitonov have lately been urging the same kind of "unity," or day-to-day involvement of party officials in management affairs.)
- (C) Privately, Soviet officials have indicated that "stormy debate" preceded the May plenum and that ministerial opposition to Brezhnev's scheme for the integration of agriculture-related industry in rural areas under the RAPOs was "enormous." The ministries were also reportedly irate over the work of a legislative commission formed to define the powers of RAPOs as well as of the Moscow-based commission to oversee the agro-industrial complex. Ministers argued that the legislation being proposed gave regional bodies excessive powers at their expense. That legislation was allegedly to have been adopted at a July session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The absence of any public announcement of a July session could mean that the dispute had forced a postponement.
- (LOU) The failure of such key leaders as Andropov, Kirilenko, and Tikhonov to deliver speeches propagandizing the food program

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could be reflective of ministerial opposition to a lessening of central control over local affiliates.

Generation Gap in the CPSU Asserting Itself

(LOU) The Soviet press is becoming increasingly defensive on the subject of gerontocracy in the USSR. The emphasis of course reminds Soviet readers that a sizable turnover of the aged Soviet leadership seems unavoidable within the next five years or so and that a change of generations might mean a certain degree of policy renewal.

(LOU) A June 14 <u>Pravda</u> article arguing that old-timers deserved respect implied increasing tension between Kremlin elders and new elites. The author was RSFSR People's Artist Aleksandr Shilov, who has done at least one portrait for <u>Ogonyok</u> of Brezhnev as an amiable executive. Shilov's article in praise of senior citizens described them in the glowing terms often used to extol Brezhnev: the piece clearly was meant as a rebuttal to those who have been implying that Brezhnev has overstayed his time at the helm. The cogent passage in "Displaying Beauty. Artist and the Times" reads:

"Both abroad and at home I am often asked why I make so many portraits of old people....

"The aged are our recent past, crammed with genuine heroism and romanticism, amazing deeds and enthusiasm, and desire to live. One has to value such a past and such people. Otherwise we would be consciously robbing ourselves. A man's face is truly the face of history.

"One of the classic writers has said: the person who has forgotten his mother is a criminal. Of course, this is not a matter of specifics, relating just to one's own mother. It concerns a son's or daughter's duty towards parents, the responsibility of the new generation towards the older one, continuity, the spiritual perfection of man, and gratitude.

"A man all by himself is in itself a sad thing. But a man deprived of attention even by those near to him and obligated to him—that is something unpardonable. One's youth is marked by hopes. But old age, even if it is brightened up by care and attention, always bears the hard—to—capture imprint of the sadness of someone who is on the way to departure. Creating portraits of the aged, I strive to touch the hearts of young people, who will also reach such a stage in life."

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(LOU) An appeal for understanding of the old guard was also made in a March 12 article carried by the CPSU daily <u>Soviet Russia</u>. Philosopher V. Olshanskiy's piece ran under the rubric "Department of Ideological Problems. Psychology of a Workforce." It said in part:

"Still another group of workers or officials [rabotniki] is composed of people advanced in years. The aging process leaves an imprint on a person's psychology.

"Concern about problems of health and longevity increases.
Anxiety comes to the fore. Aren't those around one now changing their attitude towards him? People insulate themselves and withdraw into themselves. Some become apprehensive and suspect that those around them are thinking of being rid of them—of pensioning them off or sending them to a home for the aged."

Olshanskiy argued that veteran cadres know how to pace themselves: "want of health and physical powers is often compensated for by great experience in life and one's profession, conscientiousness and sensible methods of work."

- (LOU) Yet as early as the mid-1970s, younger officials were already complaining about the deadwood accumulating in regime offices thanks to the Kremlin's slow-motion promotion policy. Pyotr Masherov, CPSU Politburo candidate and first secretary of the Belorussian CP, then 57, told a Minsk plenum held in July 1975 that, although the vast majority of experienced officials were doing good work, there were some harmful old fogeys:
 - "...another category of so-called 'leading figures' has also been defined. These people live by, and take excessive pride in, their former services rendered, and believe that no one can work better, see further and manage more skillfully than they can. Such leaders, as a rule, have become spoilt; they have grown accustomed to glory and all forms of honors and to being welcome anywhere, they can obtain anything, and 'unseat' and crowd others. Everything is permitted them, they say, and they can do anything. They have become accustomed to issuing commands and they love doing so, but they are reluctant to submit to authority and dislike doing so."

Masherov went on to compare the brainy and productive juniors with incompetent and dishonest seniors:

"...life does not stand still, and our ongoing forward movement throws up dozens of new, intelligent leaders who, on the

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basis of the creative mastering of modern management methods, are working at a qualitatively different level and are achieving great results. This is evoking among the 'long-standing leading figures' a feeling of unhealthy jealousy and envy. Frequently some of these leaders—not being subject to control, striving at all cost to remain among the leaders and having grown accustomed to the glory of being pacesetters—make a deal with their consciences and resort to various kinds of tricks, distortions of data and abuses, thereby besmirching the good deeds of the workforces which they head." (Sovetskaya Belorussiya, July 6, 1975)

(Masherov died in October 1980 as the result of an automobile accident; Pravda on May 30, 1982, reported the unveiling of a memorial plaque in his honor at the Vitebsk pedagogical institute, where he studied in the 1930s.)

- (S) In 1977, a Soviet colonel remarked to a Western diplomat that too many high-ranking civilian and military personnel of advanced ages and poor health continued to occupy important posts in the USSR. Such persons promised every year to retire after some important anniversary, birthday, or event but somehow or other never did and remained in their posts until close to death. He cited Malinovskiy, Grechko, and Zakharov as military examples.
- (C) Recent signs of friction among the varied age groups in the Soviet hierarchy have included, along with the Shilov and Olshanskiy articles:
 - --Gen. Mikhail Milshteyn of the USA-Canada Institute privately telling a US acquaintance in late February that he was worried about foreign policy "hardliners" in the 50-year-old age bracket; and
 - --the chief editor of <u>Soviet Russia</u>, 53-year-old Mikhail Nenashev, asserting in a signed lead article on April 18 that party officials under age 40 were prone to harshness, coerciveness, and arrogance.

(The remarks of course could be reactions to the growing outspokenness of younger officials rather than illustrations of basic attitudinal cleavages.)

(LOU) The most acute generational gap lies between Moscow potentates and regional officials. Eight of the 13 voting Politburo members are now age 70 or older. The Brezhnev-led Politburo has been dominated by men of 1900-09 vintage (Brezhnev, Gromyko,

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Kirilenko, Tikhonov, and Ustinov), with figures from the 1910-18 period (Andropov, Chernenko, Grishin, and Shcherbitskiy) coming up behind them. They, in turn, will have to rely initially on men mostly in their mid-60s who run the Party Secretariat and Council of Ministers.

(LOU) Promotion policies at the oblast level, on the other hand, have been more flexible. Party first secretaries there average around 58 years of age, and the heads of other provincial institutions are mostly in their early 50s. As the aged leaders at the center depart, some of these younger officials will likely be summoned to high office in Moscow (some are already Central Committee members). This group, born in the late 1920s and early 1930s, is already well represented in the General Staff of the Armed Forces, but only one (Gorbachev, age 51) sits on the Politburo and Secretariat.

(LOU) Not only will the new incumbents likely differ from their predecessors in operating style, but the younger party and military officials also seem to want a renewal of national unity and purpose. Knowledgeable observers describe many of them as dynamic hardliners, eager for a regime with more drive, imagination, and purpose. But some are also known to be less suspicious of Western forms than their elders. The diplomatic establishment reputedly contains many younger officials who favor better relations with the US, while younger industrial and farm managers want economic reform. What is not known is whether there are political reform elements in the youth section of the CPSU which favor a measure of institutional pluralism.

(C) Regime Prepares Public for Another Bad Harvest

The possibility of another bad grain crop-the fourth consecutive one-has cautiously surfaced in Soviet media, a departure from Moscow's usual reticence on such subjects. A survey of weather patterns and crop growth in Sel'skaya Zhizn' of June 18 provided regional data reflecting generally unfavorable prospects, written in dry language devoid of the usual self-congratulatory bombast. Several public lectures by the Znaniye Society also acknowledged that party programs in the past provided unrealistic and inflated promises for Soviet consumers. One such lecture promised that the new party program would take into account "major difficulties" still facing developed socialism, particularly in the food area.

Soviet authorities also seem to have deliberately leaked data on poor agricultural prospects to the West, suggesting that they

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intended that the Soviet public receive this information via Western radio broadcasts. One US correspondent reported access to a confidential Central Committee paper on widespread inefficiency in agriculture, including high losses of produce in storage and transportation. An official Canadian group traveling in the Ukraine received from local officials a pessimistic estimate that the new grain crop would be in the 180-185 mmt range.

Rationing has become widespread and increasingly institutionalized, although still locally administered and implemented as needed. Visitors to Irkutsk--an important Siberian administrative and industrial center--report a complex, three-tiered system of food sales: stores sell a basic monthly ration of meat and meat dumplings (2.3 kilograms) and butter (300 grams) for ration coupons obtainable at place of residence or work. In addition, meat and other products may be purchased at government stores, without coupons but in quantities limited by informal "purchase norms." Finally, customers can supplement their meager diet by paying extremely high prices at the peasant market, where stocks are now limited in quantity and of lower-than-usual quality.

Even so, some Soviet officials have privately voiced concern that the regime may not be able to maintain sufficient food reserves to cover even the formal system of rationing.

Soviet Emigration Applicants Resort to Hunger Strikes

- (U) Soviet authorities have now issued—or promised to issue—exit visas to 4 of the "binational spouses" whose protest fast began on May 10. Of the 10 persons married (or engaged) to foreign nationals of the US, FRG, and France, 4 abandoned the strike soon after it began and two were turned down on the grounds of national security. One of the two, Sergey Petrov, ended his fast July 22.
- (U) Moscow acceded to some of the hunger strikers even though it was clear that this would encourage other unsuccessful emigration applicants to resort to desperation tactics. The binational spouses had a strong case not only because family reunification is the only valid reason for emigration recognized by the USSR. Refusal to allow them to join their foreign spouses was also a particularly flagrant violation of Soviet commitments as a signatory of the CSCE Final Act because it directly affected the interests of other signatory states. It also was impairing Moscow's efforts to project the image of a responsible, acceptable partner in dealing with Western Europe, in contrast to a US portrayed as aggressively militarist.

- (C) Soviet authorities clearly treated the hunger strike as an embarrassment in bilateral relations. At the same time, they were careful to assert the overriding priority of Soviet national interests and sought to dampen the domestic efforts of an action taken for external reasons.
- (U) The conflicting pressures of foreign and domestic considerations evidently proved so acute that on July 9 the Soviet Bureau for Visas and Registration (OVIR)—the office in charge of emigration—held an unprecedented press conference to clarify the Soviet position. Deputy chief of the Moscow City OVIR Sergey Fadeyev defended the Soviet record in allowing binational spouses to emigrate but denied—that the USSR had violated its CSCE obligations by turning down Balovlenkov and Petrov on national security grounds.
- (C) By contrast, the new hunger strike by members of a Pentecostal family in the US Embassy and their relatives in Siberia stands little chance of success:
 - --It is not directed against the Soviets alone but is also being used to pressure the US to do more in finding a solution. Moscow does not like the negative press coverage it is getting in the West but can wait as long as the US is also uncomfortable.
 - -- The Pentecostals do not have relatives abroad.
 - --The crucial element of timing is now absent; there is no particular development at the moment which can be exploited to put pressure on Moscow. (The Pentecostals' first hunger strike early this year failed for essentially the same reason. The strikers might have succeeded had they been at death's door just before the start of the international anti-nuclear religious conference in Moscow on May 10. But their fast had ended three months earlier, and the authorities could safely disregard the quiet representations of some conference participants once they determined that the issue did not pose a threat to the conference.)
 - --Allowing the Pentecostals to emigrate would set an undesirable precedent by encouraging other religious believers to claim religious persecution as grounds for emigration.
- (C) If the experience gained during these and earlier hunger strikes has taught Soviet authorities anything, it is that rigid and unresponsive handling of binational emigration cases can

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quickly escalate into a major contretemps and inflict unnecessary damage on Soviet foreign interests. When policy-level officials focused on the binational strike, they probably discovered that the original decisions to reject the emigration applications—at least in some of the cases—were based not on valid reasons but on capricious application of the insensitive and arbitrary emigration procedures. This may account for the surprisingly flexible handling of the hunger strike once the cases were taken out of the hands of the emigration bureaucracy. Once again, authorities tried to make a pragmatic accommodation of external and domestic considerations while hoping they would not be triggering a new cycle of problems.

(LOU) Moscow's reduction of the emigration flow to a bare trickle has increased internal pressures and brought many unsuccessful emigration applicants to the point of despair. Already, unofficial sources report an increasing number of Soviet citizens announcing their determination to take actions ranging from fasting, to renunciation of Soviet citizenship, to self-immolation. Soviet authorities probably now feel obliged to adopt an unyielding attitude to keep this trend from getting out of hand, even if this causes embarrassment in the short term.

Jewish Emigration: The End of an Era

(C/NF) Jewish emigration remained stable at 200-300 per month during the first half of 1982. The total of 1,510 for this period raises the prospect of a total for 1982 equal to one-third of last year's low 9,127. This would be the lowest annual emigration level since Soviet authorities decided in 1970 to allow Jews to emigrate. The annual total jumped from about 1,000 in 1970 to about 14,000 in 1971. A total of about 255,000 Soviet Jews emigrated in the decade ending in 1981. Of these, almost half, about 125,000 have settled in the US.

(LOU) Prospects for an emigration upturn depend on the restoration of an international climate--specifically, in US-Soviet relations--which would provide Soviet authorities with sufficient incentive to overcome domestic constraints on emigration. These constraints include a growing labor shortage, anti-Semitism, and emigration pressures among non-Jews triggered by the Jewish example.

Prepared by D. Graves, x29204, I. Belousovitch, S. Ploss, A. Kapusta

Approved by M. Mautner x29536

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As the Soviets See Themselves



— И последний вопрос: как вы проводите свое свободное время?

"And the last question: how do you spend your free time?"

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USSR CHRONOLOGY

June 1-30, 1982

J	une	
	2	Brezhnev met with Czech leader Husak in USSR on official visit; spoke at Kremlin dinner in his honor.
	2	Husak presented K. Gottwald medal to Chernenko at ceremony attended only by Tikhonov, Gromyko, Kuznetsov, and Rusakov.
	2	Yakutsk City First Secretary Prokopyev elected obkom first secretary in place of the late G. I. Chiryayev, a full member of the CPSU Central Committee.
	3	Pravda announced retirement on pension of V. S. Tolstikov, ambassador to the Netherlands and formerly Leningrad party boss.
	4	Sergey Batovrin held unofficial press conference to announce existence of 11-member peace group.
	5	Zarya Vostoka published Shevardnadze's speech to a May 14-15 Georgian plenum proposing sweeping changes in integrating science and production in the republic; proposal included a coordinating council, headed by himself, over existing agencies in charge of research.
	5	Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Pataridze killed in auto accident.
	5	Stepan N. Mukha named chairman of Ukrainian KGB vice Vitaliy Fedorchuk, new chairman of USSR KGB.
	6	Komsomol'skaya Pravda article by A. Polekhin scored foreign charges of Vietnamese forced labor in USSR.
	8	Bulgarian leader T. Zhivkov paid unofficial 4-day visit to the Ukraine; Shcherbitskiy escorted him.

June	
11	Grishin, Romanov, Solomentsev, and Rashidov attended Alma-Ata ceremonies for 250th anniversary of union of Kazakhstan with Russia; Kunayev gave main report.
12	Pravda announced formation of a Commission on Questions of the Agro-Industrial Complex under the Presidium of the Council of Ministers USSR; the commission is chaired by Deputy Premier Z. N. Nuriyev and includes 14 ministers and chiefs of agencies involved in agro-industrial production.
13	Reuter cited Moscow sources as alleging that Brezhnev's need for rest precluded Crimean meetings this summer.
14	Ponomarev and Zimyanin arrived in Sofia for centenary celebration of Georgi Dimitrov's birth.
15	May plenum decisions discussed at local party meetings by: Chernenko at Krasnoyarsk Kray Party Committee plenum; Kuznetsov at Bashkir ASSR party plenum; and Solomentsev at Ryazan Oblast Party Committee plenum.
15	Ponomarev addressed Sofia meeting on Dimitrov's ideological legacy; complained of those who lump Soviets with Americans as responsible for war danger, and warned against "pragmatic, uninspired calculations" in Marxist theory.
15	Gromyko delivered speech at UNSSOD; announced Brezhnev's pledge of non-first use of nuclear weapons.
15	Estonian KGB chairman A. P. Pork retired at age 65, succeeded by Ivan Yefremovich Kortelainen.
15	Ukrainian MVD Minister Ivan Kh. Golovchenko (age 64) retired on pension; succeeded by MVD First Deputy Minister Ivan D. Gladush.
16	Gorbachev spoke on May CPSU plenum decisions at plenum of Yaroslavl Oblast Party Committee.

<u>June</u>	
17	Kapitonov spoke on May plenum decisions at plenum of Tambov Oblast Party Committee.
18	Sel'skaya Zhizn' crop report claimed bad weather in European USSR had slowed crop development.
18	Book on 18th Army eulogizing Brezhnev's wartime service reviewed by Marshal Moskalenko in Pravda .
18	V. Trapeznikov's article in Novoye Vremya attacked L'Unita's Moscow correspondent G. Chiesa for allegedly misreading Trapeznikov's May 7 Pravda article on the economy.
19-20	Haig-Gromyko talks in New York.
20	Brezhnev, accompanied by Grishin, voted at electoral district no. 35 of Kiyevskiy Rayon; Tikhonov voted at electoral district no. 18 of Leninskiy Rayon; Andropov also voted at electoral district no. 35.
20	Successful hunger striker Andrey Frolov left Moscow for the US.
21	Brezhnev and Ponomarev received Portuguese communist leader Cunhal in the Kremlin; Brezhnev blamed US for growing world tensions.
21	Bulgarian Prime Minister G. Filipov met on arrival by Tikhonov, Andropov, Gorbachev, and Rusakov; received on June 22 by Brezhnev and Tikhonov.
21	Politburo candidate member Kiselev and delegation of USSR Supreme Soviet deputies arrived in Brasilia on visit.
21	Pravda caption of photo of Vietnamese apprentice textile workers in Shakhty, Rostovskaya Oblast, claimed 738 Vietnamese now training in that city for future service in Vietnamese mills.
21	Gromyko gave 2-hour press conference in New York before departure for Moscow.

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June	
23	Pravda photo of Filipov's departure failed to show Andropov although he was listed in attendance.
23	Jordanian King and Queen arrive in Simferopol' for unofficial visit.
24	Moscow-based leaders (minus Brezhnev and Dolgikh) given Kiev anniversary medals; Andropov responded on behalf of recipients.
24	Joint Soviet-French space mission shown live on TV at blast-off.
24	Presidium of Academy of Sciences USSR endorsed May plenum decisions; ordered a joint session of the Academy of Sciences with the Agricultural Academy in September 1982.
24	Ponomarev saw off Babrak Karmal as latter ended vacation in USSR.
25	V. V. Kuznetsov and delegation departed for Belgrade to attend Yugoslav party congress; Kuznetsov spoke at Rijeka, Yugoslavia, ship-yard on June 28.
25	King Hussein of Jordan arrived in Moscow from the Crimea; received on June 26 by Tikhonov and Gromyko.
25	Andropov and Ponomarev received Indian communist leader Rao.
25	Dolgikh addressed Kirgiz republic plenum on May plenum decisions; toured environs.
28	King Hussein departed Moscow for Jordan with- out seeing Brezhnev.
28	Ponomarev spoke at Riga conference on nation- ality relations.
29	Pravda obituary of film-maker A. D. Golovnya signed by Andropov and Chernenko.

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- V -

June	
30	Literaturnaya Gazeta article by Leonid Zamyatin accused US of launching "ideological war" against the USSR.
30	Ustinov addressed military graduates; claimed military equipment is constantly improving.

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