

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: Succession - USSR Eastern Europe (2)
Box: 36

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 5/25/2005

File Folder USSR-SUCCESSION EE 2/2

FOIA

F06-114/11

Box Number 36

YARHI-MILO

3611

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
11616	REPORT	USSR MONTHLY REVIEW PAR 7/15/2008 NLRRF06-114/11	53	ND	B1 B3 B6
11627	CABLE	USSR D 7/15/2008 NLRRF06-114/11	2	8/3/1982	B1 B3
11624	REPORT	SOVIET WEEKLY PAR 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11	2	8/4/1982	B1 B3
11617	MEMO	DOBRIANSKY TO CLARK RE WALL STREET JOURNAL ARTICLE ON SOVIET LEADERSHIP SUCCESSION R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11	1	9/27/1982	B1
11628	CABLE	USSR D 7/15/2008 NLRRF06-114/11	2	9/28/1982	B1 B3
11625	REPORT	SOVIET SUCCESSION R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11	1	11/8/1982	B1
11626	REPORT	SAME TEXT AS DOC #11625 R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11	1	11/8/1982	B1
11618	MEMO	PIPES TO CLARK RE ANDROPOV (SAME AS 18873)	1	11/8/1982	B1
11619	MEMO	CLARK TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE ANDROPOV (SAME AS 18874)	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-5 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 5/25/2005

File Folder USSR-SUCCESSION EE 2/2

FOIA

F06-114/11

Box Number 36

YARHI-MILO

3611

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
11620	MEMO	CASEY RE ANDROPOV (SAME AS 18875)	1	10/12/1982	B1
11621	COVER SHEET	ANDROPOV (SAME AS 18876)	1	ND	B1
11622	MEMO	PIPES TO PALMER RE ADDITIONS TO THE CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR BREZHNEV'S DEMISE <i>R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11</i>	1	11/8/1982	B1
11623	REPORT	THE SOVIET SUCCESSION <i>R 7/15/2008 NLRRF06-114/11</i>	44	2/17/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.



Directorate of
Intelligence

*Swiss
succession*

~~Secret~~



(1772)

~~PIES~~

B1, B3, B6

USSR Monthly Review (U)

July-August 1982

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
MLRR F06-114/11 # 116/6
BY GA DATE 7/15/05

~~Secret~~

SOV UR 82-007X
August 1982

Copy 010



Directorate of
Intelligence

~~Secret~~ 2

USSR Monthly Review

July-August 1982

The *USSR Monthly Review* is published by the Office of Soviet Analysis. This issue is a combined July-August volume; the next issue will appear in September. Comments and queries regarding the articles are welcome. They may be directed to the authors whose names are listed in the table of contents.

~~Secret~~

SOV UR 82-007X
August 1982

Contents

	<i>Page</i>
Leadership Succession in the USSR	1

**Perspective: Beyond Brezhnev—
Personalities and Policies** [REDACTED]

The advantage in the current succession struggle appears to have shifted at least twice in the past seven months—largely because of the impact that death and illness have had on the existing balance of power. The poor health of key Soviet leaders, in addition, complicates our efforts to declare a “projected winner.” The policy context in which the succession is occurring, however, will be as important in shaping future Soviet policies as the leader chosen. [REDACTED]

Brezhnev’s Political Standing [REDACTED]	5
---	----------

The promotion of KGB Chairman Yuriy Andropov to the party Secretariat and his replacement in the KGB by an apparent compromise candidate indicate that Brezhnev’s leadership is now much more vulnerable to challenge, especially if his health deteriorates. [REDACTED]



The Brezhnev Succession Process [REDACTED]	11
---	-----------

The succession to Brezhnev could be precipitated by the leader’s death or incapacitation or by his removal—three earlier Soviet successions followed from among these developments—or even by his resignation, for which there is no precedent. Regardless, the mechanics of selection and the pattern of events will provide clues to the underlying politics of the succession process [REDACTED]



Andropov in the Western Press

The emergence of Yuriy Andropov as the leading candidate to succeed Brezhnev has provided considerable speculation in the Western press about his personality and policy views. Much of the press commentary on Andropov, however, has tended to oversimplify those views and even to misread the man.

Policy Issues in the Succession

The succession process will significantly politicize policy differences within the Soviet leadership. Various contenders will seek to exploit issues facing the Politburo for personal and factional advantage. Given the seriousness and complexity of the problems a new leadership will have to face, debate and conflict over policy are likely to be particularly sharp and intense.

Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted
-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted
Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted
-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted
Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted
-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted
Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted
-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted
Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted
-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted

Other Topics

Ideological Atmospherics and the Polish Crisis

Despite some subtle points of difference, the two main succession contenders—Chernenko and Andropov—seem in agreement on a flexible position toward Eastern Europe that is at variance with the position of ideological hardliners. Recent articles in the party ideological journal have also taken a pragmatic position on the Polish crisis and provided a rationale for martial law.

Moscow and the Eastern Mediterranean Communist Parties [redacted] 29

Moscow has pressed the Cypriot, Greek, and Turkish parties to concentrate on "international" issues, such as the peace movement. In this way the USSR advances its own interests but neglects the parties' more parochial concerns, raising serious implications for their future strength and political effectiveness. [redacted]

[Redacted text block containing multiple lines of redacted content]

Briefs	Soviets Improve Hard Currency Payments Position [redacted]	37
	[redacted]	37
	Soviet Economic Aid to Eastern Europe [redacted]	38
	[redacted]	38
	New Soviet Ambassador to Iran [redacted]	38
	New Soviet Ambassador to PDRY [redacted]	39
	[redacted]	39
	Military Construction Unit Stages Strike [redacted]	39
Viewpoint	Prospects for Brezhnev's Retirement [redacted]	43

The evidence concerning a possible Brezhnev retirement, while inconclusive, does suggest a growing disparity between his formal authority and actual power, a lessened ability to protect himself, and greater incentives for other Politburo members to move against him. While the

[REDACTED]

timing of his departure cannot be predicted, his retirement or "elevation" to an honorific post may be announced at the next plenary of the CPSU Central Committee. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Prospects for Brezhnev's Rule and His Succession [REDACTED]

Andropov's election to the Secretariat in May 1982 was a turning point in Soviet politics, ending the prolonged stability that was based on Brezhnev's political strength. Now Brezhnev and his protege, Chernenko, are engaged in a political struggle with Andropov, and the outcome is uncertain. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Leadership Succession in the USSR

Perspective: Beyond Brezhnev— Personalities and Policies

Yuriy Andropov's election to the Secretariat in May strongly suggests that the succession process in the Kremlin has truly begun. The leadership of the Soviet Communist Party has changed only four times in 65 years, and each time under dramatically different domestic and international conditions. Accordingly, precedents are fragile and the uncertainties great. The advanced age and poor health of many members of the current Politburo—the oldest in Soviet history—have added an element of unpredictability, moreover, that was not present in past succession struggles.

In our estimation, the advantage in the present contest has shifted at least twice within the past seven months—due largely to the impact that death and illness have had on the existing balance of power. The death of senior secretary Mikhail Suslov in January enabled Brezhnev to push his protege, Konstantin Chernenko, forward at the expense of Andrey Kirilenko, who previously had been the leading contender. The subsequent illness of Kirilenko, in turn, seemed to give impetus to the anti-Chernenko forces, who threw their support to Andropov, the current front-runner. In short, the poor health of key Soviet leaders,

complicates our efforts to declare a "projected winner" in the current succession race.

The identity of the next party chief could have an important effect on Soviet actions, but probably more vital from the US perspective is the context in which the succession will occur. Even if we could positively identify the next leader, his present views, insofar as we could discern them, probably would give us at best a general sense of the direction Soviet policy would take in the immediate post-Brezhnev period. These views probably would be modified as he attempted to gain support and even further altered by the broader perspective of his new post and the exigencies of international events.

Whatever his personal policy preferences, no new leader will initially have the power to push through a comprehensive package of domestic and foreign policy programs. The new General Secretary's colleagues, acting in their own interests, will attempt to restrict his power and probably prevent him from becoming Chief of State—a post Brezhnev acquired only after 13 years as party leader. As in the early days of the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras, the General Secretary is likely to share the spotlight, particularly in foreign affairs, with the President and Premier.

Although the immediate post-Brezhnev period probably will be marked by a general continuity in policy, an examination of the range of views now being expressed in the leadership—the topic of one of the following articles—suggests that conflict over key issues, exacerbated by the succession struggle, could in time lead to some important shifts. The most pressing problems appear to be in economic policy, where the current investment strategy already seems to have aroused opposition within the leadership:

- Some reallocation of resources almost certainly will be undertaken after Brezhnev goes, with agriculture—in the absence of its principal patron—becoming a likely target for cuts. Previous cuts in investment may be restored. Even the defense budget, virtually sacrosanct since the 1960s, probably will come under some attack. Given the momentum of current weapon programs and a new leader's need to obtain the support of the military and security services, however, reductions in the growth of military spending seem unlikely in the near term.
- Changes in the economic management structure might be undertaken, despite bureaucratic opposition, because of concern over declining growth rates. An effort might be made to place functionally related and overlapping ministries under more centralized management, as Brezhnev and other party leaders have proposed, while at the same time decentralizing operational authority along lines recently approved for the agro-industrial sector.

Soviet foreign policy is less likely to be politicized than domestic policy, which has a more immediate impact on individual political fortunes. While the foreign policy pursued by a successor regime will be largely determined by the international environment at the time, some areas of debate already are evident among Brezhnev's likely heirs:

- Soviet leaders have shown varying degrees of enthusiasm for Brezhnev's efforts to improve relations with the United States, with some—notably Chernenko—appearing far more supportive than others, such as Kirilenko.

- The lessons of Poland seem to have been assessed differently by various leaders. Chernenko has pointed to the Polish leadership's loss of contact with the people, Andropov to its ideological deviations, and Kirilenko to its lack of vigilance against Western intrigues. The post-Brezhnev Politburo could well be at odds over how best to maintain Soviet control over Eastern Europe.
- Soviet leaders also could differ over how seriously to pursue an improvement in relations with Beijing. Although some leaders may be eager to "play the China card," others—Kirilenko among them—appear even more mistrustful of China than of the United States.

Given the advanced age of the present leadership, many members of the Politburo will be replaced in the late 1980s by a new generation of leaders whose policies are even more difficult to predict. Although they have discretionary authority in implementing the Politburo's domestic policies, these officials hold positions—in the Central Committee apparatus and regional party organizations—that provide little involvement in foreign policy.

What little evidence we have of this younger group's views—through speeches, articles, and limited contacts with foreigners—reveals no clearly dominant orientation. Although some appear to favor a more orthodox tack while others lean in the reformist direction, there is no apparent consensus regarding the direction future policies should take.

Their eventual policy course will be determined both by domestic politicking and by their perception of Soviet problems and opportunities. These policies, moreover, are likely to reflect a degree of political compromise and to defy easy characterization. Such a regime, for example, could undertake some decentralization of economic management, while at the same time tightening the enforcement of labor discipline—a move that would contain elements of both the reformist and orthodox approaches.



Brezhnev's Political Standing [REDACTED]

Two recent personnel changes—the promotion of KGB Chairman Yuriy Andropov to the party Secretariat in May 1982 and his replacement in the KGB by an apparent compromise candidate—indicate that Brezhnev has been unable to dictate key succession-related decisions. As a result, Brezhnev's leadership now seems much more vulnerable to challenge, especially if his health deteriorates. Although there is no evidence that his policies are under strong attack, Brezhnev and his proteges will have to be alert to protect their political positions. [REDACTED]

The impetus for the Andropov promotion may have come from the leadership's growing apprehension about the increased status of Brezhnev's principal protege, Konstantin Chernenko. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Andropov, and the leadership in general probably did not regard him as a threat—he seemed an unlikely successor to Brezhnev, especially in view of the strong position of senior secretary Andrey Kirilenko. In recent months, however, two developments—Chernenko's advancement by Brezhnev to fill the number-two spot in the Secretariat (vacant after Suslov's death in January) and the physical and political decline of Kirilenko—apparently mobilized the opposition to Chernenko. [REDACTED]

By transferring Andropov to the Secretariat, Chernenko's opponents have placed a major obstacle in his path and established a new leading contender to succeed Brezhnev. This development is notable also as the first major political setback for Brezhnev since he consolidated his position in the late 1960s—and one that may ultimately endanger that position. [REDACTED]

The Threat From Andropov

Brezhnev is likely to have recognized that opposition to Chernenko could increase his own vulnerability. Although Brezhnev may have seen merit in having an "alternative heir" in the Secretariat, Andropov probably would not have been his choice. [REDACTED]

Moreover, Brezhnev has always prevented the transfer of Politburo members into this key institution and kept those already in the Secretariat from amassing sufficient individual power to threaten him. Andropov has been on good terms with Brezhnev and supported his foreign policy line—factors that may have kept Brezhnev from fighting the promotion. [REDACTED]

Brezhnev, nevertheless, knows that Andropov—with his KGB connection and his potential appeal within the Politburo—could become a rallying point for those who believe the party's interests would be best served by his "retirement." Brezhnev may be relying on Chernenko, who now appears to have some oversight responsibility for the KGB, to protect his interests. His inability to install a candidate less well equipped to challenge him, however, suggests that Brezhnev's authority within the Politburo has eroded. [REDACTED]

The Uncertain Allegiance of Fedorchuk

The selection of Ukrainian KGB Chairman Vitaliy Fedorchuk to replace Andropov as KGB chief reinforces our impression that Brezhnev's power has waned. Brezhnev needed a strong protege in this post, one who would isolate Andropov from his previous associations and thus reduce Brezhnev's vulnerability to a potential coup. Several candidates would have met this need. [REDACTED]

If the Politburo wanted a career officer as chairman, the KGB's First Deputy Chairmen, Georgiy Tsinev and Viktor Chebrikov, should have been the two leading candidates. (Tsinev is known to have, and Chebrikov probably has, ties to Brezhnev.) Alternatively, Brezhnev could have advanced a political protege from the Politburo or from one of the principal regional party organizations to the KGB to guard his position. Fedorchuk, however, does not fall in either category. In fact, the new KGB head lacks both the political status within the party elite and the professional standing within the KGB that would have made

him a likely first choice on any list. His selection, thus, strongly suggests that he was a compromise choice. [REDACTED]

The selection of Fedorchuk probably was not totally objectionable to Brezhnev. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] As a career KGB official, however, Fedorchuk has had a long association with Andropov—one that was probably more direct than his association with Brezhnev. [REDACTED]

Thus, Fedorchuk is probably less useful to Brezhnev than other candidates for KGB chief might have been. Having career ties with both Brezhnev and Andropov reduces the certainty of his loyalty to Brezhnev in the event of a challenge, and his lack of influence in Moscow reduces his ability to prevent such a challenge. He probably will be unable to cut Andropov off from his KGB associations. Brezhnev's remaining time in office, moreover, is limited, and this gives Fedorchuk little incentive to protect him from a conspiracy in the Politburo. [REDACTED]

Implications

Taken together, the two appointments suggest that the Politburo is denying Brezhnev the power to designate his successor as party leader and possibly even to determine the timing of his departure. His authority in policy matters does not yet seem seriously affected—as demonstrated at the May plenum, when he won approval of the food program he had initiated, and by the recent movement on arms control negotiations. [REDACTED]

Nonetheless, Brezhnev may now feel under increased pressure to demonstrate that age and poor health have not reduced his effectiveness as party chief. Such pressure could lead him to undertake a more taxing schedule of activities; indeed, he did become more active in the period immediately following the plenum. Judging by his poor performance at recent public events, however, that strategy could ultimately prove self-defeating and could even endanger his life. [REDACTED]

More recent evidence, moreover, suggests that Brezhnev has been forced—because of his poor health or weakened political position—to play a less dominant role. In late June he failed to attend a ceremonial meeting of Moscow-based Politburo members, and he missed a scheduled meeting with Jordan's King Hussein. [REDACTED]

Although Brezhnev has been sidetracked by poor health in the past, his political strength has always carried him through even prolonged absences from duty. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] If his health has seriously affected his ability to function as party leader, he could be forced to yield to pressures to relinquish that position. His colleagues might make this more palatable to Brezhnev, however, by allowing him to retain his more ceremonial post as President and his membership in the Politburo. Such an arrangement would give him some influence, at least in the Politburo's selection of his successor as general secretary—and this influence would make his protege, Chernenko, a stronger contender than he would be if Brezhnev were no longer on the scene. [REDACTED]

Key Players in the Succession

Yuriy Andropov, 68, has been a Politburo member since 1973. In May 1982 he also became a member of the Secretariat—a status that he had previously held from 1962 to 1967—and relinquished his post as KGB chief. Andropov's career has given him considerable experience in both foreign and domestic affairs. During his 15 years as KGB chief, he was responsible for implementing Soviet policies on human rights and political dissent, as well as for the USSR's foreign intelligence apparatus. [REDACTED]

In 1944, Andropov began his party career as a second secretary of the Petrozavodsk City Party Committee. Three years later he was elected second secretary of the Karelian party Central Committee—a position he held until 1951, when he began working in the Central Committee apparatus in Moscow. Andropov moved to the Foreign Ministry in 1953 and that same year was posted to the Embassy in Budapest, where he advanced from Charge d'Affaires to Ambassador.



Yuriy Andropov

Sovfoto/Eastfoto ©

When he returned to Moscow in 1957 he became chief of the Central Committee's Department for Liaison with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries. After his appointment as KGB Chief in 1967, he was elected a candidate member of the Politburo. [REDACTED]

Andropov appears to be a "moderate" in the Soviet political context. Over the years he has generally been more supportive of Brezhnev's foreign policy, especially detente and arms control, than some other Soviet leaders. On the other hand, as KGB chief he was successful in neutralizing the dissident movement in the USSR by imprisoning or "hospitalizing" its major leaders or by allowing selected members to emigrate. [REDACTED]

Konstantin Chernenko, 70, has been a secretary of the CPSU Central Committee since March 1976 and a full member of the Politburo since November 1978. Chernenko began his party career in 1941, when he was elected a secretary of the Krasnoyarsk Kray Party Committee. Two years later he moved to Moscow, where he attended the Higher School of Party Organizers. After graduation in 1945, he was elected a secretary of the Penza Oblast (RSFSR) Party Committee. [REDACTED]



Konstantin Chernenko

Liaison ©

From 1948 to 1956 Chernenko was chief of the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Moldavian party Central Committee, serving briefly under Brezhnev, who was first secretary in Moldavia during 1950-52. He was transferred to Moscow as a sector chief at the national level in 1956—shortly after Brezhnev's promotion to CPSU secretary. In 1965 Chernenko became head of the General Department of the CPSU Central Committee, a position he still holds. He became a candidate member of the Politburo in 1977. [REDACTED]

Chernenko has ranked second only to Brezhnev in his support for improved relations with the United States and for arms limitation, and he has been well ahead of his colleagues in warning about the consequences of nuclear war. On domestic issues, he has stressed the need to improve the lot of the Soviet consumer and called for more attention to letters from the rank and file and for greater "democracy" within the party [REDACTED]

Andrey Kirilenko, 75, has been a member of the Politburo since 1962 and of the Secretariat since 1966. His association with Brezhnev goes back to the late 1930s when both were local party officials in the Ukraine. Kirilenko worked as an aircraft design engineer until he switched to party work in 1938. During the early years of World War II, he served on the



Andrey Kirilenko

Neues Deutschland ©



Dmitriy Ustinov

Sovetskiy Voin ©

Military Council of the 18th Army of the Southern Front, while Brezhnev was the Council's deputy chief. Kirilenko was first secretary of the Dnepropetrovsk Oblast Party Committee (Obkom) from 1950 to 1955 and of the Sverdlovsk Obkom during 1955-56.

In 1956 Kirilenko moved to Moscow to serve as a member of the RSFSR Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee. He became a candidate member of the Presidium (now Politburo) in 1957, probably as a reward for his support of CPSU First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev in his clash with the "antiparty group." In 1961 Kirilenko's career suffered an unexplained setback when he was removed from the Presidium. He made a quick comeback six months later, however, when he rejoined the Presidium as a full member and became a first deputy chairman of the RSFSR Bureau.

Kirilenko has primary responsibility for the supervision of nonmilitary heavy industry and has considerable experience in international Communist Party affairs. On foreign policy issues, he has been equivocal in his support of Brezhnev's overtures to the United States, less optimistic than Brezhnev about the prospects for resolving Sino-Soviet differences, and less tolerant than most leaders toward East European deviations from Moscow's guidance and direction. On domestic issues, Kirilenko has been fairly consistent in



his advocacy of a strong defense posture, strict cultural and ideological discipline, and the preferential development of heavy industry.

A veteran manager of the Soviet armaments and space programs, *Marshal Dmitry Ustinov*, now 73, became a full member of the Politburo in March 1976 and Minister of Defense one month later. He had previously served as the CPSU secretary for defense industry and a candidate member of the Politburo since 1965.

Ustinov graduated from the Leningrad Military Mechanical Academy in 1934. During World War II, he served as People's Commissar for Armaments (later Minister of the Armaments Industry); he held this position until 1953, when he became head of the newly created Ministry of Defense Industry. From 1957 until 1963 he was deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and probably also head of the Military-Industrial Commission (VPK), which coordinates Soviet defense industry production.

The Defense Minister has been associated with the military-industrial complex for more than 40 years and obtained general officer rank in the war, but he has not been a line officer, and his Ministry appointment may have been opposed by the professional

officer corps. His policies, however, have not diverged noticeably from those of his predecessor, Marshal Grechko, or from what might have been expected if a professional military officer still headed the Ministry. Ustinov has upheld the interests of the professional military without deprecating Brezhnev's commitment to detente and arms control. He also has been able to use his position as head of the military to vote its stock on sensitive political issues—without raising some of the fears that such actions by a professional officer might have raised. The military traditionally has had increased influence during succession periods, and Ustinov, who commands considerable respect from other leaders, will have a strong voice in the selection of the next party chief.



The Brezhnev Succession Process [REDACTED]

Since the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, the top leadership of the Soviet Union has changed only four times. Lenin was struck with an incapacitating illness in 1922, finally dying in 1924; Stalin died unexpectedly in 1953; Malenkov failed to consolidate his position, losing out to Khrushchev in 1955; and Khrushchev was removed by his colleagues in 1964. In each instance, the conflict among the remaining leaders over the succession led to considerable internal political turmoil. [REDACTED]

Current political conditions seem very different from those of the earlier succession periods; the stability and businesslike management style of the Brezhnev years has been well established. Nonetheless, the current period seems also to contain some uncertainties, and the top Soviet leaders may be increasingly concerned about the course of the Brezhnev succession. [REDACTED]

Brezhnev's health has been poor for some time, making death or incapacitation within the next year a real possibility. Recent political developments—opposition to Chernenko, the positioning of Andropov in the party Secretariat, the appointment of the low-ranking Vitaliy Fedorchuk as KGB chief, and persistent rumors that Brezhnev is too ill to go on—all suggest increased vulnerability to a coup. Conceivably Brezhnev might even take the unprecedented step for a Soviet leader and resign from one or more of his leadership posts, such as relinquishing the General Secretary post and retaining the Presidency. Alternatively, but less likely, Brezhnev might withdraw entirely from political life. [REDACTED]

Regardless of whether the succession is precipitated by death, removal, or retirement, the mechanics of selection and the pattern of events will provide clues

to the underlying politics of the succession process. This very process can determine the nature of the new leadership and how strong and secure that leadership becomes. [REDACTED]

The Main Participants

Although all major Soviet institutions are involved in a succession, only a few have a prominent role. Two bodies are publicly prominent in the succession, but in nearly all instances they have merely pro forma duties. The Communist Party Central Committee has de jure responsibility (under article 38 of the party statutes) for "electing" the party General Secretary. The Supreme Soviet "elects" its Presidium, including its Chairman—the Soviet President (under article 119 of the Constitution). [REDACTED]

The party Politburo—the highest decisionmaking organ in the Soviet political system—has the de facto power to select Brezhnev's successor unless the succession reaches truly crisis proportions. It is likely, therefore, that Brezhnev's 12 colleagues on the Politburo (the body now has 13 full or voting members and nine candidate or nonvoting members) will come to a consensus informally on leadership assignments. Indeed, informal meetings of the most powerful Politburo members are likely to precede any formal Politburo gathering. It is likely that party Secretaries Andropov and Chernenko, Premier Nikolay Tikhonov, Defense Minister Dmitriy Ustinov, Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko, party Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, and Moscow party secretary Viktor Grishin would first meet to develop a consensus and thereby prevent the occurrence of serious debate in the Politburo meeting itself. [REDACTED]

While only the Moscow-based leaders routinely attend Politburo meetings (usually held on Thursdays in the Council of Ministers building in the Kremlin), succession-related questions would probably require that the three full Politburo members from outside Moscow—Grigory Romanov (Leningrad), Vladimir

Shcherbitskiy (Ukraine), and Dinmukhamed Kunayev (Kazakhstan)—come to Moscow for the formal meeting, which could be convened on an urgent basis if needed. The other regional leaders and candidate Politburo members—Geydar Aliyev (Azerbaijan), Tikhon Kiselev (Belorussia), Eduard Shevardnadze (Georgia), and Sharaf Rashidov (Uzbekistan)—would be summoned for the deliberations as well. The Politburo might not even take a formal vote regarding Brezhnev's successor—formal votes are taken only occasionally when there are important disagreements.

If prior maneuvering and politicking created a consensus within the entire Politburo, the Central Committee would probably be summoned quickly to ratify the Politburo's decisions. With one major exception, discussed below, the decisions to promote, demote, or remove Politburo leaders have been presented to an obedient Central Committee by the winners of struggles previously resolved behind closed doors of the top leadership itself. Support among Central Committee members for individual leaders is unquestionably an important element in these struggles, but the Central Committee as a body has not been drawn in overtly.

The Process Delayed

It is possible, however, that serious disagreement could develop within the Politburo over a successor, drawing out the pattern of succession-related events. The convening of a Central Committee meeting, for example, might be delayed a few days as the leadership attempted to work out a deal. If the Politburo became so divided that it could not present a united slate for the Central Committee to approve, the decisionmaking process would then be thrown open to the more than 300 voting Central Committee members. (The Central Committee has about 319 full members and 151 candidate members.) Such a course is not likely in the Brezhnev succession, because it is in the leadership's interest to settle things beforehand, but it did happen in 1957 when a Politburo majority sought to remove Khrushchev from office. (The Central Committee backed Khrushchev against his opponents, and five full members of the Politburo were removed from office.)

If the succession process were precipitated by Brezhnev's death, at some point a public announcement would be made. The announcement could be delayed, especially if there were prolonged deliberations concerning the leadership assignments. When Stalin died, for example, the leadership apparently delayed an announcement of his death from two to possibly five days or more to give his heirs additional time to decide leadership questions and to inform the populace gradually that Stalin's rule had ended.

More recently (January 1982), the Politburo delayed the announcement of party Secretary Mikhail Suslov's death nearly 24 hours after the fact, though it had been known for five days that Suslov was dying. Given the political maneuvering that the death of Suslov—the second most important leader in the country—engendered, Brezhnev's heirs seem likely to seek extra time when the General Secretary departs.

The Soviet leadership took almost two weeks to decide on Stalin's immediate replacement. It probably will be able to move more rapidly when Brezhnev leaves the scene. In the case of Brezhnev's largely ceremonial Supreme Soviet post, there is a formal requirement that the entire 1,500-member Supreme Soviet name his successor. This might necessitate a delay of a day or two just to convene the meeting. The Politburo, however, may not believe it is essential to fill this post at the same time as a new General Secretary is selected. Vasiliy Kuznetsov, the current first deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium ("deputy President"), could act as Soviet President for a short period.

When Brezhnev Dies

If Brezhnev dies while in office, an urgent meeting of the Politburo will be convened. While Brezhnev's death would probably not be announced, the cancellation of a planned visit by a foreign visitor, the pilgrimage of regional Politburo leaders to Moscow, or the sudden return of out-of-town Politburo leaders could provide a tipoff of his demise. After the Politburo had decided on a course of action, Brezhnev's death

and the funeral plans would be announced. The new party chief might deliver the eulogy, and the leading members of the Politburo would receive protocol honors. The funeral commission, which is formed to make and oversee the funeral arrangements, is usually chaired by a Politburo member, but the commission does not necessarily reflect the rank order in the Kremlin. [REDACTED]

Should the succession remain unresolved by the time of the funeral, however, the protocol rankings could be ambiguous, and the leader selected to give Brezhnev's eulogy might not be his replacement. When Stalin died, for example, the most important Soviet leaders during the first days after the leader's death were not on the funeral commission, but all three (Beria, Malenkov, and Molotov) spoke at the funeral and headed the rank order. Khrushchev did not speak, but he did improve his ranking in the leadership at the ceremony. The indicators proved to be misleading, because soon after the funeral Beria was arrested and Khrushchev became the ranking member of the party secretariat. [REDACTED]

Brezhnev's Removal

If Brezhnev were removed by his Politburo peers, there would be little warning. Such a move would necessarily require great secrecy, and until a consensus developed among the key Soviet leaders to oust Brezhnev, the plotters would be at great risk. Those who moved against Khrushchev in October 1964—Brezhnev was probably the ringleader—were extremely secretive. Even with hindsight it seems there were no clear indications that Khrushchev's removal was imminent. [REDACTED]

In 1964 the conspirators at first attempted to present Khrushchev's ouster as a simple retirement at his request. If Brezhnev were removed from office, the scenario would probably be similar. In that event, Brezhnev would probably be forced into requesting his retirement for "health reasons." The Central Committee in plenary session would accept the resignation and ratify the plotters' choice for his successor. [REDACTED]

The KGB might not be the driving force behind any coup against Brezhnev—it apparently was not for the ouster of Khrushchev—but the cooperation of the

KGB would be essential for the successful implementation of a coup. It would probably at a minimum be called upon to play a supporting role, most likely providing logistic and communications support. [REDACTED]

The military would also play a role in the Brezhnev succession, especially if Brezhnev was removed by a coup. The military threw its support to Khrushchev during his fight with the antiparty group in 1957 and probably acquiesced in the coup against him in 1964. In the current situation, the support of Defense Minister Dmitriy Ustinov—both as a senior party official and military chief—would seem to be crucial. Once the plotters had gained his support, however, the military would be expected to go along with the ouster. The military chiefs have never been an independent force in Soviet politics, and their most likely role in any succession would be as an ally of a faction in the party leadership. [REDACTED]

A Brezhnev Resignation

It would be difficult to ascertain whether a Brezhnev resignation was genuine or forced on him by his colleagues. In recent Soviet history, high officials have not simply faded away; they have died in office or have been removed. Brezhnev could surprise us and throw in the towel. [REDACTED]

If Brezhnev were to resign, he might initially raise the possibility before the Politburo and perhaps even indicate his preferences for the succession at that time. The Politburo could then deliberate, perhaps for some weeks, over leadership assignments before acceding to Brezhnev's wish to remove himself from political life. While the Politburo worked out new arrangements, Brezhnev might even withdraw from most political activity without publicly resigning. [REDACTED]

As soon as a consensus was formed in the Politburo on Brezhnev's successors, a Central Committee plenum and Supreme Soviet session would be scheduled to

accept publicly Brezhnev's resignation and ratify the Politburo's selection of a new leader (or leaders). Brezhnev's resignation, therefore, might in the early stages of the process appear as an orderly leadership change—all the personnel decisions could be made behind the scenes and presumably under less time pressure than if Brezhnev were to die or be removed.

Postscript

Brezhnev's death, retirement, or ouster will trigger an institutional process that brings forth a new leader (or leaders) within a relatively short period. The power and influence of the new leader will be considerable from the start. The process of amassing decisive power and the ability to exercise it, however, will take much longer—probably several years. That process, moreover, will be largely invisible, involving the new leaders in the basic political bargaining, trade-offs, and compromises used to build personal allegiances and policy support. In this sense, the Brezhnev succession will only begin with the naming of his replacement.

Andropov in the Western Press

The emergence of Yuriy Andropov as the major contender to succeed Brezhnev has provoked considerable speculation in the Western press about his personality and policy views, but much of the press commentary has tended to oversimplify those views and even misread the man. Several articles have suggested that he is a "closet liberal" who favors reform and was really not involved in the suppression of dissidents. Andropov's "liberal" inclinations are reportedly demonstrated by his association with the Hungarian economic reforms in the 1960s and 1970s and by his personal ties to such urbane, knowledgeable, and articulate Soviets as Georgiy Arbatov.

While Andropov appears to be a "moderate" in the Soviet context and may be enlightened by Soviet standards, he was intimately involved in putting down the revolution in Hungary

His association with Western-oriented Soviet officials does not provide a good indication of the internal—especially economic—policies he would favor

Perceptions of Andropov

Yuriy Andropov appears more supportive of Brezhnev's foreign policies, especially detente and arms control with the United States, than some other Soviet leaders.

the dubious characterizations of Andropov in the Western press—for example, that he is a "closet liberal" or that his elevation to the Secretariat is a "favorable development" that presages "significant reform fairly quickly."

Andropov's role in the KGB has limited his contact with foreigners and reduced his visibility on the Soviet political scene. His few speeches and articles over the years contain little to differentiate his position from the current party line

-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----
Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----
-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----
Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----
-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----
Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----
-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----
Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----
-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----
Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----
-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----
Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----
-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----
Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----
-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----
Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----
-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----

A Reformer?

The notion of Andropov as a reformer stems from his association with Hungary, and by implication, with that country's economic reforms. Andropov's own role in Hungary from 1954 to 1957, however, was hardly reformist or progressive. He helped to implement a brutal Soviet repression of the revolution and worked to restore central control and Soviet orthodoxy in that country.

[redacted] While he may have supported Kadar's subsequent policies, they have been implemented very slowly by a regime that has demonstrated its absolute fealty to Moscow. [redacted]

Andropov's Views

Andropov is a complex figure in Soviet politics whose opinions and actions are not easily classified as "hard line" or "liberal." [redacted]

[redacted] Brezhnev has said of Andropov "that he is demanding of himself and others, and an uncompromising Communist." [redacted]

[redacted] He has repeatedly emphasized the need for internal discipline in the Soviet Union, asserting that the rights of citizens are linked to important duties and that criticism (in the context of intraparty "democracy") must be "publicly held and constructive." Such ideas set Andropov apart from Konstantin Chernenko, his principal rival for the top party post, who has cultivated the image of a leader more attuned to popular aspirations and who has called for more intraparty "democracy" in terms far less qualified than has Andropov. Moreover, Andropov acknowledges no basis for anti-Soviet activity in the USSR and finds its roots in Western influences and Western "psychological warfare." On the other hand [redacted]

[redacted] he may entertain the idea of limited changes in the current system of economic planning and management. [redacted]

Andropov would not countenance foreign influence on what he would perceive as purely internal Soviet affairs. He probably would also continue to support countries that are "moving" toward socialism. [redacted]

[redacted] He also gave an unusually forceful defense of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in a February 1980 speech. Andropov would probably, however, try to continue Brezhnev's foreign policies

toward the United States. He has, to judge from his speeches, been a key supporter of Brezhnev's "de-tente" and arms control policies, which he regards as serving Soviet interests well. [redacted]

In a more general sense Andropov appears confident about the course of world developments. He believes that world trends favor socialism and that "peaceful coexistence" (the terminology he uses) helps socialism and reduces the danger of war. He also supports the need for a strong Soviet military and sees it as promoting conditions for arms control negotiations with the United States. [redacted]

Policy Issues in the Succession

The succession process will significantly politicize policy differences within the Soviet leadership. Various contenders will seek to exploit issues facing the Politburo for personal and factional advantage. Given the seriousness and complexity of the problems a new leadership will have to face, moreover, debate and conflict over policy are likely to be particularly sharp and intense.

Economic Issues

Along with Brezhnev's title, the new General Secretary will inherit a difficult and increasingly complex economic situation. Economic growth has fallen to less than 2 percent a year for the past three years—compared with rates of about 4 to 5 percent during the 1960s and most of the 1970s. This decline in growth has been largely attributable to increasingly unfavorable economic conditions, such as decreasing availability of low-cost resources (chiefly fuels) and declining increments to the working-age population. The situation also has been exacerbated by a series of harvest failures.

With the Soviet energy, labor, and hard currency positions likely to worsen, the economic squeeze can be expected to tighten. As a result, in the next few years Soviet leaders will find their resource allocation choices—to meet the conflicting demands for capital investment, consumer satisfaction, and military power—increasingly difficult and painful.

The slowing economic growth rate thus far has had the effect of heightening differences within the leadership over sectoral and regional investment priorities. No leader appears to have formulated or advocated a comprehensive or clearly defined economic "reform" program, and there are no indications that the basic systemic changes required to make major improvements in the operation of the economy can be expected from Brezhnev's successor.

Heavy Industry Versus Consumer Goods. As the full dimensions of the economic predicament become clear, the demands of rival claimants for shrinking

resources will intensify and reinforce the tendency of contenders to stake out independent positions designed to appeal to one or another interest represented in the leadership. Differences in priorities already have emerged between one group (represented by Kirilenko, Shcherbitskiy, and others) that has advocated the priority development of heavy industry and another (represented mainly by Chernenko) that has emphasized the need to increase the availability of consumer goods; both will be marshaling support for their views.

Kirilenko has advocated the preferential development of heavy industry fairly consistently throughout his career—even at times when the consumer sector has been receiving greater public attention and rhetorical support from the leadership. Recently, for example, he has said little about the decision, so heavily promoted by Brezhnev and Chernenko, to assign a priority growth rate to the production of consumer goods in the current five-year plan.

Kirilenko's investment preferences, moreover, seem to be shared by Shcherbitskiy and may have substantial support among other leaders, such as Tikhonov, whose past statements have indicated similar priorities. High-level differences over the current investment strategy were suggested in February 1982 by an unusual *Pravda* article that criticized the five-year plan that had just been adopted for providing inadequate resources to the machine-building industry—a sector Kirilenko has championed in the past.

Chernenko, on the other hand, has often spoken out on the issue, emerging as the leadership's chief advocate of investment in consumer goods. In his Lenin Day speech in April 1981, in fact, he argued that the priority growth rate assigned to consumer goods in the present five-year plan should be considered just a beginning. In what appeared to be a direct retort to

warnings from Suslov about the excesses of "consumerism," he said that if popular needs were ignored for the sake of production, not only the people, but production too, would suffer [REDACTED]

Chernenko's attitude toward investment priorities is consistent with his effort to cultivate the image of a leader attuned to popular aspirations by calling for commissions to study public opinion, more intraparty "democracy," and greater attention to letters from the rank and file. Neither Kirilenko nor Andropov, however, has shown much enthusiasm for this approach. Kirilenko, for example, reportedly blocked Chernenko's efforts to set up a new institute for sociological research, and Andropov, as indicated by his statements, has defined the limits of "democracy" in the Soviet system much more narrowly than Chernenko [REDACTED]

Defense Spending. Concern about the domestic economy also could impel one or another leader to propose some reduction in the rate of growth of military spending, if not an absolute cut as Khrushchev did in the late 1950s. The argument could reasonably be made that the military budget of the past two decades has improved the Soviet position vis-a-vis the Western alliance to the point that the country can afford some redirection of resources to urgent internal needs without jeopardizing defense requirements. [REDACTED]

As indicated by previous public statements, Chernenko would seem more inclined to push for a slower pace of military growth than most other leaders. He has stressed, for example, the economic benefits to be derived from arms limitation. In a succession environment, however, no new leader, unless he perceives an existing consensus, is likely to risk antagonizing the military establishment and conservative forces within the party by proposing cuts in the defense budget. [REDACTED]

Regional Competition

In addition to these sectoral clashes, the battle for resources is likely to heighten conflict between various regions of the country and their representatives in the Politburo. Succession politics typically has given regional leaders more influence on national policy, and contending factions will exploit this situation [REDACTED]

In the debate over regional investment priorities, some leaders will urge more attention to the economic interests of the Russian Republic (RSFSR)—a position earlier taken by Suslov and an assistant to Kirilenko. While there are "objective" reasons for following such a course (Soviet oil and gas reserves, for example, are concentrated there), these arguments also could be advanced as part of a larger appeal to Russian nationalism—a traditional refuge of Soviet leaders in difficult times. Such proposals would be strongly supported by local officials in the RSFSR, who are heavily represented on the Central Committee. [REDACTED]

Leaders of other republics, several of whom hold candidate or full membership on the Politburo, can be expected to argue for more investment in their own areas, where consumer and ethnic discontent seem most likely to converge and cause problems for the regime. The Central Asians, for example, are pressing hard for the construction of new industrial facilities and for the costly diversion of Siberian rivers to provide irrigation water for the southern republics [REDACTED]

Management Reform. The economic dilemma that Brezhnev's successor will inherit has been heightened by the regime's failure to deal effectively with the underlying problem of chronic inefficiencies in economic management. Concern over declining growth rates will prompt some debate in the post-Brezhnev Politburo over new approaches to this problem. [REDACTED]

Kirilenko has demonstrated more openness than many leaders to new ideas in the area of economic management. He was one of the few Soviet leaders to associate himself with the establishment of the Soviet Union's first Western-style business management school and was the first Politburo member to endorse the concept of production associations—a mode of rationalizing industrial management that aroused some resistance from the ministerial bureaucracy. [REDACTED]

Chernenko and Andropov, by contrast, have said relatively little about management reform. Recently, however, Chernenko has spoken out strongly in favor of the new district agro-industrial associations

(RAPOs), approved at the Central Committee plenum in May. These organizations, which could bring some devolution of authority to the local level at the expense of the ministries in Moscow, have the support of many regional party leaders—a group whose support Chernenko is soliciting. Andropov, to judge from an article by a former assistant, may oppose this approach, preferring instead reforms that would rely on economic stimuli and improved central planning to increase efficiency. [REDACTED]

Foreign Policy Issues

Foreign policy issues also could become a bone of contention in the post-Brezhnev Politburo. Although these issues will be determined largely by the international situation at the time, a successor regime today would face a number of serious foreign challenges, including:

- The effort by the United States to bolster its military capabilities.
- Improved relations between China and the United States.
- A situation in Afghanistan that is proving more troublesome than the leadership expected.
- A crisis in Poland, a pivotal country in the Soviet empire.

Political trends in such areas as Central America, the Middle East, and Europe, nonetheless, will continue to give the Soviet leadership both problems to deal with and favorable opportunities to pursue policies hostile to US interests. [REDACTED]

Soviet-US Relations. Brezhnev has made detente a cornerstone of his foreign policy, and his departure undoubtedly will bring further review of its relative merits. Enthusiasm about the pursuit of improved Soviet-US relations, nevertheless, has been on the wane in the Politburo since 1974, when the US Congress passed the Jackson-Vanik Amendment linking trade to an increase in Jewish emigration. US policy has been actively debated in Moscow since Washington's unexpectedly severe reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. [REDACTED]

Chernenko has been far more enthusiastic than Kirilenko and most other leaders in his support of improved relations with the West, particularly the United States, and of arms limitation. In his Supreme

Soviet election speech in 1979, for example, he went further than any leader other than Brezhnev in stressing the importance of what would have been the next step in strategic arms limitation talks (SALT III). Kirilenko, by contrast, coupled his endorsement of the SALT II treaty with calls for "vigilance and more vigilance" against Western intrigues. Chernenko also has been well ahead of his Politburo colleagues in warnings about the consequences of nuclear war, noting in his April 1981 Lenin Day speech that it posed a threat to "all civilization." [REDACTED]

Andropov ranks somewhere behind Chernenko in his support for improved Soviet-US relations but has been a relatively strong supporter of Brezhnev's "detente" and arms control policies, which he regards as serving Soviet interests. His statements indicate, however, that he would not tolerate foreign interference in what he considers an internal Soviet matter, such as Jewish emigration policy. [REDACTED]

Although such shades of opinion are still discernible, the Politburo as a whole seems to believe the prospects for improved Soviet-US relations are more remote now than they have been in the past—an assessment that could lead it to endorse efforts to counter, distract, or embroil US policy. Chernenko's views on arms limitation and relations with the United States, thus, seem outside the current mainstream of Politburo opinion and may require some modification if he is to gain the support he needs once Brezhnev goes. As economic growth declines and resources become increasingly scarce, however, other members of the leadership, possibly even Kirilenko, may become more amenable to US proposals for arms control, seeing them as a way of avoiding the cost of arms they may perceive as necessary to counter the emergence of new US weapons. [REDACTED]

Soviet-East European Relations. Various Soviet leaders appear to have assessed the lessons of Poland differently. Chernenko, for example, seems to place the greatest blame on the Polish leadership's loss of contact with the people. Some leaders, such as Andropov, chastise the Poles for losing their ideological bearings, while still others, such as Kirilenko, point

14A

their fingers at alleged Western interference. The leadership as a whole, nonetheless, remains committed to maintaining control over Poland and the rest of its East European empire. [REDACTED]

Even if the Chinese were receptive to such overtures, however, full normalization of relations would be difficult to achieve. Those Soviet leaders who have been suspicious of US motives appear to have been at least equally suspicious of the Chinese. [REDACTED]


Soviet leaders, however, could well be at odds over how best to maintain that control. Subsidization of Eastern Europe may be viewed as an increasingly costly burden for the Soviets, but allowing Eastern Europe to become economically dependent on the West—as in the case of Poland—is politically dangerous. Continued economic shortages in Eastern Europe on the other hand could increase popular discontent there to perilously high levels. [REDACTED]

The Politburo, therefore, is likely to continue its vacillation between courses designed to counter whichever danger in Eastern Europe seems more pressing at a given time. Andropov, in particular, has shown a certain flexibility in that regard. After helping to implement Soviet repression of the Hungarian revolution in 1956, he is believed to have supported Hungarian efforts to rebuild the economy along lines significantly different from the Soviet model. The Politburo's basic inclination, however, will be to require the East Europeans to place more emphasis on discipline and control to fill the void left by declining Soviet and Western economic support [REDACTED]

Triangular Politics? Those leaders who believe there is virtually no prospect for US-Soviet cooperation, especially on arms control issues, might favor playing the China card and normalizing relations with Beijing. That option appears to have been left open, at least, by recent leadership statements—most recently by Brezhnev's speech in March that offered to resume border talks and establish new economic, scientific, and cultural ties. [REDACTED]

Other Topics

Ideological Atmospherics and the Polish Crisis



The ongoing crisis in Poland, the death of Moscow's chief ideologue Suslov, and a growing debate over domestic economic reform are all contributing to a public discussion of ideological policy in the USSR. Succession contenders Konstantin Chernenko and Yuriy Andropov recently staked out ideological positions suggesting some modest differences from one another, but more significant differences from the orthodox line associated with Suslov. Recent theoretical articles have also taken a pragmatic line—that is, they have:

- Attributed the threat of counterrevolution in the Warsaw Pact not only to a failure to maintain political vigilance but also to a failure to resolve social problems.
- Provided an ideological rationale for military rule in Poland.

The Succession Contenders Weigh In

Andropov and Chernenko have recently addressed a number of ideological issues that have implications for Eastern Europe. On the dangers of political pluralism and the legitimacy of the Soviet experience, both have taken positions that suggest definite limits to tolerable divergence from that model. They seem to differ somewhat on the seriousness of the threat to socialist regimes, but they both advocate ideological flexibility and acceptance of "national peculiarities" within the socialist community. These views place them more at odds with the orthodox ideological associates of Suslov than with one another.

Andropov, in his Lenin Day speech on 22 April, made an obvious effort to record his, as well as the leadership's, positions and to burnish his image as an ideologist. Mixing orthodox shibboleths with calls for ideological adaptability, he addressed two issues particularly applicable to Eastern Europe: political pluralism and different national models of Communism.

On pluralism, he noted the "essential difference" between capitalism, where pluralism manifests itself as a class struggle, and socialism, where class antagonism cannot arise. Because hostile political parties have no place under socialism, "pluralism" is an irrelevant concept. In East European countries, where several parties do exist, each can represent a different social base, but all must adhere to socialism. Western advocates of "pluralism" for Warsaw Pact countries really want "organized opposition to socialism," but this the USSR will not tolerate.

In tackling the delicate issue of "different roads to socialism," Andropov argued that diversity within socialism was inevitable. However, he warned that "decisive objections" arise when "the general laws of socialist construction are effectively rejected." Peculiarities are tolerable, but if debate is allowed to focus on "various models, various notions of the very essence of socialism" instead of on "its radical difference from capitalism," serious problems can ensue. Andropov strongly hinted his own support for the Brezhnev doctrine that there is no turning back from

the socialist path and reaffirmed that a Leninist vanguard party is essential. His remarks suggest a degree of toleration for divergence within the bloc—but only under the banner of the Communist Party.

Chernenko, at the same time that Andropov was drafting his speech, submitted an article to The CPSU ideological journal *Kommunist* addressing the same issues. His line was similar to Andropov's on the negative consequences of pluralism, but he seemed to evaluate differently the issue of the gravity of "contradictions inherent under socialism." Andropov's speech stressed the qualitative differences between "contradictions" under socialism and capitalism, and Chernenko (in remarks most likely drafted with Andropov's views in mind) argued that "the art of political leadership . . . lies in revealing" these contradictions and "outlining ways of overcoming them." Chernenko seemed to be implying that Andropov, then still head of the KGB, saw the solution of such problems simply in terms of increased control—a strategy which did not confront growing social problems.

The Advocates of Orthodoxy

The positions of both competitors contrast sharply with the orthodox views associated with Suslov and his supporters. Suslov's formulations (particularly those made in mid-1981 at the height of the "revisionist" threat in the Polish party) struck an inflexible note, warning that the "slightest deviation from Marxism-Leninism"—by which he meant the Soviet model—would have grave consequences.

Although Suslov died in January 1982, his adherents are still well entrenched in the Soviet ideological apparatus. Their voices have been muted since his death, but in the months preceding martial law, they made their viewpoint heard. In November 1981, in the most authoritative assessment of the general lessons of the crisis up to that time, Petr Fedoseyev (a Central Committee member and Suslov protege) asserted that the bloc must guard against "private property habits, nationalism, religious fanaticism, and petit bourgeois psychology."

"Where the struggle is not sufficiently resolute, views and convictions hostile to socialism imperceptibly penetrate the tiny pores of the way of life,

threatening to corrupt social institutions from within. . . . The current domestic political crisis in Poland was preceded . . . by a sharp deterioration in the ideological climate, the spread of narrow-minded, consumerist sentiments and nationalist prejudices, and the weakening of class vigilance." [Emphasis added.]

According to Fedoseyev, the basic problem in the East European countries was that their transition to socialism—without genuine revolution or civil war—had left "remnants of the exploiting classes and antiproletarian parties" unpurged. Those remnants were well placed to attack the foundations of the socialist system whenever it might be ideologically weakened. His exposition clearly implied the need for a thoroughgoing purge of all dissidents and a major effort to restructure Eastern Europe along Soviet lines—for example, to attack religion, further socialize agriculture, and intimidate intellectuals. The warning on the cost of ideological laxity and petit bourgeois consumerism clearly had implications not only for Eastern Europe, but for the USSR as well—and is implicitly critical of the policies associated with Brezhnev.

Coming to Grips With the Polish Crisis

Within the Soviet leadership, the dominant assessment of the situation in Poland to date has been far closer to the flexible approach associated with Brezhnev and his two most likely successors than to Suslovian orthodoxy. The March issue of *Kommunist* carried two articles on the Polish crisis—the first attempt since martial law to put the lessons of the Polish crisis into an ideological context. These summarized the dominant line:

- The crisis grew out of both internal and external factors.
- Martial law is ideologically justifiable as a necessity in the medium term.
- A degree of national divergence within the bloc may continue, but the party's leading role must be maintained.
- Any efforts to introduce concepts of pluralism or nonalignment are anathema and threaten the security interests of the Soviet Union.

The articles did not touch on certain equally critical issues:

- The long-term legitimacy of martial law in Poland.
- The degree of toleration for political reform within the Warsaw Pact.

These issues may be under debate within the leadership.

The article by Jaroslav Kase, chief editor of the Czechoslovak Communist theoretical journal, is the more broad ranging. Kase argued that "imperialism" has made use of dissidents and internal contradictions in Eastern Europe to discredit the Communist system but asserted that "the real danger of counterrevolution" only emerges when an internal foe "becomes organically linked with *severe and longstanding errors* committed in the building of socialism" [emphasis added]. Signs of such errors were visible in Hungary in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and in Poland in 1980-81. According to Kase, prevention of this danger requires not only ideological vigilance (an approach associated with ideological conservatives) but also a willingness to tackle problems (a more pragmatic approach like that advocated by Chernenko).

Contemporary anti-Communism, Kase cautioned, has become sophisticated and dangerous. In place of the restoration of capitalism, it seeks a "marketplace economy" (that is, market socialism) and bourgeois freedoms. Anti-Communists have shifted from political to economic demands and from cultivating the intellectuals to appealing to the workers, as in the case of the Solidarity movement in Poland. The call for "pluralism" signifies in Poland and elsewhere an attempt to weaken the Communist Party's leading role. Religion also plays a significant role in the assault on socialism, since it has now adapted to the modern world and has taken up social causes. Finally, the imperialist powers—the United States and Western Europe—themselves assist internal counterrevolution by applying economic pressure through entangling credits and threats of economic boycott.

Kase clearly sought to present a balanced retrospective assessment of a threat that could crop up elsewhere in the bloc. On the one hand, by focusing on the critical failure of Poland's political leadership, he seemed to agree with the pragmatists in suggesting that the problem is social and economic as well as

political and external. On the other, by arguing that ideological neglect and entanglement with the West contributed to the crisis, he provided ammunition for the more orthodox Leninist critics of Polish policies. The article strongly implied that the threat of anti-Communism would not disappear and might even grow stronger.

Addressing the idea that the martial law regime in Poland smacks of "Bonapartism"—an ideologically embarrassing accusation that surely troubled conservatives of the Suslov school—Kase counters rather weakly that Bonapartism is a "specific historic product of the bourgeoisie," and is therefore inapplicable to Poland. He ignores the question of martial law's longevity, an omission that suggests both sensitivity and uncertainty on this point. His balanced assessment of the causes of Polish unrest is close to the positions espoused by less ideologically rigid Soviet leaders like Andropov and Chernenko.

The other *Kommunist* article, by Polish party secretary Marian Orzechowski, agreed that "errors and deformation in the leadership of the party and state [that is, bad management] had resulted in weakening the link with the masses and prompted discontent and protest among them." Trying to strike a middle ground, he defended both the Polish program of "renewal"—as fully in accord with Marxism-Leninism and "our country's specific national nature"—and martial law. Reflecting concern over the threat of pluralism, he also rejected "interpretations [of the party rules approved in 1981] which disrupt the cohesion of the ranks and the effectiveness of action associated with unity and centralism" and asserted that any "factionalism" would be disastrous for the party. Instead, he called for "an ideologically and organizationally cohesive and morally pure party" capable of winning the allegiance of the masses. With Kremlin security concerns in mind, he warned that the desire for "Finlandization" was a "first step" in separating Poland from its allies and could not be permitted.

The two authors clearly attempted to provide a theoretical framework for interpreting the Polish crisis by attributing it primarily to leadership failures rather than to concessions to national peculiarities and by

187

defining some of the limits of reform (for example, in the party). They carefully skirted certain possibly contentious issues, however—the legitimacy of protracted military rule in a socialist state and the precise limits of toleration for reform.

Prognosis

Andropov and Chernenko have taken public positions that allow for the possibility of a degree of experimentation and accommodation in Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, these two leading contenders to succeed Brezhnev have emphasized the necessity of maintaining order and the supremacy of the existing regimes and have opposed any major departure from the general "laws of socialism" (that is, the Soviet model). The latter emphasis suggests that they would oppose any significant economic or political reform that threatened to diminish the party's control.

Despite their insistence on party supremacy, neither Andropov nor Chernenko appears particularly disturbed about the current continuation of the martial law regime—that is, Poland's domination by the military rather than the party. Neither seems to endorse the legitimacy of such a system, however, and both would clearly prefer a return to the normal pattern of party hegemony as soon as it is feasible.



Moscow and the Eastern Mediterranean Communist Parties

Moscow's insistence that Communist parties give first priority to Soviet goals, particularly those opposing NATO and US policies, threatens the attainment of other, local Communist goals in Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus.

Moscow's Options

The USSR's foreign policy options in the eastern Mediterranean are limited by a number of interrelated factors. The hostility between Greece and Turkey, symbolized by a divided Cyprus, invites Moscow to play each side against the other. Yet, in each country, a traditional suspicion of Soviet subversion thwarts such ploys. Moreover, the enduring identification of both sides with the West means that both Athens and Ankara continue to look to the United States for solutions even though the United States often is blamed for problems in the region.

The Communist parties in these three countries would, moreover, be of limited help in any Soviet effort to exploit tensions in the region. The Cypriot Party, one of Cyprus's largest parties, seeks political respectability through cooperation with the government and other responsible behavior; the Greek Party, far smaller in electoral strength, must contend with a government more vulnerable to pressures from the right than from the left; and the Turkish Party—small, illegal, and exiled—is of negligible political importance.

With little prospect of successful involvement in the internal politics of the region, Moscow has pressed the Cypriot, Greek, and Turkish parties with special single-mindedness to concentrate on "international" issues, such as the peace movement. In this way the USSR advances its own interests but neglects the parties' more parochial concerns, raising serious implications for their future strength and political effectiveness.

The Cypriot Communist Party, Partner in Government

Cyprus's status as a neutral/nonaligned country gives a certain legitimacy to the local Communists' propa-

ganda. The party (AKEL, the Progressive Party of the Working People) can, in obedience to Moscow, espouse principles and express criticism that rarely are in serious conflict with official government policy. Further, Cyprus's sad experience of invasion and military occupation by one NATO member, Turkey, in conflict with another NATO member, Greece, stands for some as an indictment of NATO and its leading member, the United States, as imperialistic and belligerent.

To be accepted as a responsible political force, the Communist Party has generally cooperated with the Cypriot Government but has done so as a "silent partner." In April of this year, however, it promulgated a program of formal political cooperation with the right-of-center Democratic Party (DEKO) of Cypriot President Kyprianou

The provisions of the "common program" suggest that DEKO made significant concessions to AKEL. Notably, the program advocates resolution of the Cyprus problem by means of: UN-sponsored negotiations between representatives of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities and, if that fails, recourse to an international conference under UN auspices—a Soviet proposal first advanced in 1974.¹ The program reaffirms Cyprus's nonalignment and its

¹ The Soviets advocate "internationalization" of the Cyprus problem as meaning establishment of an international conference in which the USSR and its allies would, for the first time, be given a direct role in determining Cyprus's future. Greek Prime Minister Papandreou's intention in promoting "internationalization," however, is to expand the role that Greece and other Western countries would play in negotiations.

**The Pro-Soviet Communist Parties
in the Eastern Mediterranean Countries**

	Mid-1981 Population (Estimate)	Communist Party Membership	Percentage of Vote; Seats in Legislature	Status
Cyprus	636,000	12,000 (estimate)	32.8 (1981); 12 of 35 Greek Cypriot seats	Legal
Greece	9,671,000	33,500 (estimate)	10.9 (1981); 13 of 300	Legal
Turkey	46,700,000	NEGL		Proscribed

This table is [REDACTED]

special tie to Greece but stresses the need for support from the socialist countries, appearing to slight the West. [REDACTED]

Should continued opposition by Papandreou indicate that the alliance is counterproductive to Soviet interests even before the election next year, Moscow may urge AKEL to make additional concessions to DEKO to allay concern in Athens about the extent of Communist power, or even to dissociate itself again from Kyprianou. Either way, the Cypriot Communist Party would see its progress toward political legitimacy at least temporarily checked by the USSR. [REDACTED]

***The Greek Communist Party, the Government's
Conscience on the Left***

In Greece, the Communist Party (KKE)² is smaller than in Cyprus in terms of electoral strength. It regularly reminds the Greek electorate of the dangers of rightwing government, condemning the United States for sustaining the military junta through the early 1970s and for trying—by means of the US bases in Greece and other aspects of military cooperation—to regain such control. [REDACTED]

² The pro-Soviet Communist Party is called by the Greeks the Party "of the Exterior" (KKE/Ext) to distinguish it from the tiny, Eurocommunist-oriented Party "of the Interior" (KKE/Int) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The KKE has also, since Papandreou's election last October, tried to serve as the Socialist Prime Minister's conscience, urging him to build on the leftwing rhetoric of his campaign and criticizing him for failing to distance himself from the United States and NATO. Disappointed that the new Prime Minister has not acted more in accordance with his campaign rhetoric about removing nuclear weapons from Greece and reducing the US presence there, Moscow encourages the KKE's criticism as a means of keeping pressure on the government. Because the Soviets want, however, to avoid driving Papandreou further to the right, they probably have advised the Greek Communists not to push him too far. Consequently, neither the KKE nor the Soviets have so far criticized Papandreou by name.

The AKEL-DEKO agreement has provoked the sharpest disagreement thus far between Papandreou and the Greek Communists.

[REDACTED]

The KKE strenuously criticized his public statements as interference in Cyprus's internal affairs but did not exercise its more potent options of mobilizing its supporters in labor, youth organizations, and the intelligentsia.

Indeed, as its public criticism has sharpened, the KKE has seemed in other ways to be trying quietly to reassure the ruling Socialists that it wants to maintain smooth relations. The day before Secretary Haig arrived in Athens in mid-May, for example, the party staged a demonstration to protest US and NATO policies on INF and other issues.

[REDACTED]

The restrained tone of Soviet criticism of Papandreou and Moscow's encouragement of—if not insistence upon—a degree of accommodation by the Communists to the Socialist government indicate that—at least for the moment—Moscow seeks only to prod Papandreou toward policies more amenable to Soviet interests, not to foment active opposition to his government. This accommodation almost certainly has entailed costs to the Greek Communist Party. It no doubt has discredited the KKE in the eyes of some who may be disillusioned with the performance of the Socialist government and are seeking a more principled leftist opposition.

[REDACTED]

The Turkish Communist Party, a Negligible Political Force

Within Turkey, where it is proscribed and its members hunted, the tiny Turkish Communist Party (TKP) can do little to promote Soviet interests. The exiled party is headquartered in East Germany and is heavily dependent on the Soviets and East Europeans for support.

[REDACTED]

Evidently, the Soviets have decided that it makes more sense to channel Turkish discontent toward a more attainable goal—the erosion of West European support for NATO policies—than to encourage futile efforts against the government in Ankara. Despite Moscow's desire to woo Papandreou and its recognition that the generals currently in power in Ankara are not favorably inclined toward the USSR, the Soviets still tend to avoid antagonizing the Turks. Ankara's promulgation in late April of new regulations concerning navigation in the Turkish Straits

204

reminded the Soviets of their stake in relations with the government that could deny their ships access to the Mediterranean Sea. [Redacted]

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

parties, accept the argument that the need to focus on the INF controversy and other Western policies is crucial. Nevertheless, by concentrating on the more general "peace" themes, local Communists may undercut or neglect their other, more parochial interests. Over the longer term, Moscow may have to ponder the precedents of the Yugoslavs, the Italians, and other proponents of national adaptations of Communism to determine the wisdom of neglecting Communist party interests other than its own. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Conclusion


The Soviets have always regarded other Communist parties to some extent as fodder for the USSR's crusades. While they seem to impose their priorities with special single-mindedness in the eastern Mediterranean, the parties there, like other pro-Soviet

Briefs

Soviets Improve Hard Currency Payments Position

Recently released trade and financial data indicate Moscow's effort to reverse the bad turn its payments position took last year paid some sizable dividends in the first quarter of 1982. A 50-percent jump in exports combined with a slight drop in imports sliced the trade deficit to \$1.3 billion, or only a third the size of the first quarter 1981 deficit. Larger sales to West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy accounted for 60 percent of the increase in exports. We believe that the export surge to these countries was due largely to stepped-up sales of oil. Increased sales to Iraq—presumably of machinery and equipment—accounted for another fourth of the rise in exports. Meanwhile, gross debt to Western banks, which was up \$2.5 billion in 1981, declined by \$1.5 billion in the first quarter, and the usual drawdown of assets in Western banks was held to less than \$2 billion compared with the \$3 billion fall in the first quarter of 1981.

-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted
 Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted
 -----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted
 Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted
 -----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted
 Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted
 -----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted
 Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted
 -----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted
 Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted
 -----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted
 Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted
 -----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted
 Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted
 -----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted
 Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted
 -----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted
 Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted
 -----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted
 Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted
 -----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted
 Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted
 -----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted



Soviet Economic Aid to Eastern Europe

Oleg Bogomolov, the influential director of the Economic Institute for the World Socialist System, told visiting Americans in late May that the Soviet Union was feeling the pinch from its economic assistance to its East European allies. He complained that Soviet planned oil deliveries to Eastern Europe are an increasing burden to the Soviet Union. He fixed the Soviet overall subsidy to Eastern Europe at \$7.5 billion in 1980 [redacted] mostly resulting from subsidized oil deliveries. His other comments suggest that the East Europeans would have to pursue conservation efforts strenuously for both oil and nonoil products because the USSR would not be increasing its economic support.



Bogomolov also explicitly repudiated any Soviet responsibility for the debts incurred by "our East European allies." He took issue with extensive borrowing from the West to modernize industry, arguing that such support often retarded the development of domestic industries. Officials of the USSR State Bank took a similar line with the visiting Americans, flatly asserting that the USSR would not pay any part of the interest on Poland's 1982 debt and expressing deep resentment toward American efforts to cut credits to the USSR. [redacted]

-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----
Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----
-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----
Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----
-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----
Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----
-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----
Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----
-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----
Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----
-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----

New Soviet Ambassador to Iran

Vil Konstantinovich Boldyrev has been named Soviet Ambassador to Iran. For the past four years (1978-82) he has been chief of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Middle Eastern Countries Department, which is responsible for relations with Iran, Afghanistan, and Turkey [redacted]

A candidate of philological sciences, Boldyrev specialized in Iranian studies and Farsi at Moscow State University. His first assignment was at the Embassy in Tehran (1956-60), where he rapidly advanced from attache to second secretary. While in Tehran, he served as the principal interpreter for then-Ambassador N. M. Pegov. Pegov, now head of the Cadres Abroad Department of the Communist Party's Central Committee, was also Boldyrev's chief later in New Delhi, where Boldyrev acted as a counselor. Within a year, he was promoted to minister-counselor. When he left New Delhi in 1974, he became deputy chief of the Foreign Ministry's South Asian Department, where he remained until his appointment to the Middle Eastern Countries Department. [REDACTED]

New Soviet Ambassador to PDRY [REDACTED]

Vladislav Petrovich Zhukov, who most recently served as Ambassador to the Sudan (December 1978-March 1982), has been appointed Chief of Mission in Aden. From 1973 to 1974 he was deputy chief of the Soviet delegation to the Geneva Middle Eastern Conference. As a first secretary and later as a counselor at the Embassy in Beirut (1966-71), Zhukov was the principal Soviet contact with the Palestine Liberation Organization and with the Lebanese Communist Party. His other assignments have included working as vice consul in Damascus (1956-62) and as a first secretary in Baghdad (1963-64). [REDACTED]


[REDACTED]

Military Construction Unit Stages Strike [REDACTED]

Members of a military construction unit staged a two-week strike at a Noril'sk mine-shaft construction site because of an administrative error regarding regional pay allowances. The allowance was omitted for the month of May, and officials assured the workers that they would receive their allowance and backpay at a future date. [REDACTED]

~~Secret~~

24A

Although the strikers are probably a civilian component of the construction group, any strike by a military unit is unusual. Both the unit commander in Moscow and the local construction management threatened disciplinary action ranging from reprimands by either trade union or party authorities to firing the strikers 

~~Secret~~

Viewpoint

The following two essays provide differing assessments of the instability in the Soviet leadership. In "Prospects for Brezhnev's Retirement," [redacted] argues that Brezhnev's political position has become untenable and that events are moving rapidly to a denouement. Brezhnev's decline profits Andropov most, [redacted] maintains, but Chernenko also may play an important role in the post-Brezhnev leadership. [redacted] in "Prospects for Brezhnev's Rule and His Succession," argues to the contrary, that Brezhnev's position, although weakened by Andropov's accession to the Secretariat, remains viable. [redacted] believes that a struggle is being waged between the Brezhnev-Chernenko duo and Andropov, with the outcome uncertain. [redacted]

Prospects for Brezhnev's Retirement

An assessment of the prospects for Brezhnev's retirement depends on the judgment of how much power he currently exercises and on whether other Politburo members have a sufficiently strong desire to remove him. The evidence, although inconclusive, suggests a growing disparity between Brezhnev's formal authority and his actual power, a decrease in his ability to protect himself from attack, and the presence of stronger incentives than heretofore for other Politburo members to move against him.

Brezhnev's Political Position

On the surface, Brezhnev remains the preeminent party and state leader. Although he has missed several recent meetings at which protocol required his presence, he continues to perform many of the official functions of his job such as giving speeches, making policy pronouncements, and presiding over important meetings.

Brezhnev's public prominence, however, constitutes virtually the only evidence that he continues to play a significant role in the leadership, and it is not necessarily a valid indicator of how much influence he wields behind the scenes. We cannot ascertain on the basis of Brezhnev's appearances and his reading of prepared statements whether he is now an independent actor, a figurehead who is articulating policies worked out within the Politburo as a whole, or a leader whose preferences cannot be ignored but who is "propped up" and manipulated by a small group of aides and close associates.

-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----
Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----
-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----
Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----
-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----
Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----
-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----
Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----
-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----
Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----
-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----
Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----
-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----
Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----
-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----
Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----
-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----
Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----
-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----
Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----
-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----

At the same time, unflattering rumors about Brezhnev and his family persist. These and the appearance of indirect public criticism of Brezhnev indicate a breakdown in party discipline and an erosion in the leader's prestige.

Heretofore, most Politburo members presumably saw an advantage in Brezhnev's continuation in office. They may have collectively believed that his remaining made their own positions secure, while projecting the appearance of leadership unity at a time of serious economic and foreign policy problems. Inability to agree on a replacement for Brezhnev may also have been a key restraining factor. Finally, even those

267

eager to see him leave may have believed that his poor medical prognosis counseled waiting for nature to take its course rather than taking the risk of attempting to oust him. [REDACTED]

The system, however, cannot function indefinitely with an impaired and inactive party head, and the arguments for moving against Brezhnev have become more compelling in recent months. The emergence of Chernenko and Andropov as the leading contenders to succeed Brezhnev has destroyed the equilibrium in the leadership. Other leaders, increasingly aware that Brezhnev's remaining time is limited, now have a greater incentive to make deals to protect their interests once he is gone. Under these circumstances, their awareness that derogatory rumors have tarnished Brezhnev's image, embarrassment at his poor performance in carrying out even the ceremonial and mechanical aspects of his job, and cognizance that his political defenses have weakened, could combine to galvanize Brezhnev's peers into action. Conceivably, lack of confidence in Brezhnev's ability to perform adequately in a summit with President Reagan could give a sense of urgency to the need to resolve the succession. [REDACTED]

Political opportunism will count for more than past loyalties in determining where various leaders line up. Even Chernenko would abandon Brezhnev if he concluded that allegiance to his chief had become a political liability and saw the opportunity to strike a bargain that offered him some promise of a share of power in the post-Brezhnev leadership. Chernenko has recently been involved in a wide range of activities and apparently has important responsibilities in several key areas of party work. Although originally dependent on Brezhnev, by now he may have established himself as someone in a position to claim a significant share of the spoils, should he choose to cooperate in a move against Brezhnev. [REDACTED]

The Mechanics of Removing Brezhnev

In the final analysis, Brezhnev serves at the pleasure of the Politburo. Any move to replace him would have to involve several key Politburo figures, and would require the acquiescence of a majority of the Politburo membership. In securing the compliance of the

Politburo as a whole and ensuring the secrecy of the proceedings, the support of the security forces and military would be important, if not essential. [REDACTED]

If Brezhnev has not already effectively retired in place, he would perhaps be able to block a move to oust him, provided that he learned about a conspiracy before the Politburo as a whole had made a decision. He or Chernenko could call a Politburo meeting and, if he were healthy, he could perhaps dominate the proceedings through his powers as chairman. Alternatively, he could call a meeting of the Central Committee, where he probably enjoys greater support than on the Politburo. Khrushchev prevented his removal in 1957 by such an action. [REDACTED]

Even if Brezhnev still has considerable power, however, his ability to prevent the emergence of opposition appears to be reduced. With the recent appointment of the relatively unknown Fedorchuk as KGB head, bypassing Brezhnev's long-time crony Tsinev, the KGB's commitment to Brezhnev is no longer assured. [REDACTED]

Moreover, Politburo members under Brezhnev have enjoyed greater physical and career security than in the past and consequently have less reason to fear opposing the party leader. Police terror has dissipated as a credible political weapon, and Brezhnev's power of appointment and removal from office has always been constrained to some degree. If he discovered that powerful figures such as Ustinov and Andropov were in league against him, it is not certain that he could marshal Politburo support for their removal. In any event, once the Politburo acted, it would be too late for Brezhnev to reverse the outcome. [REDACTED]

The Modalities of Retirement

Brezhnev is not likely to step down voluntarily. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Brezhnev's desire to cling to office is probably as strong as that of past Communist leaders.

In over 20 successions in Communist states since 1917, not once has a party leader relinquished power of his own volition. [REDACTED]

If Brezhnev is forced out, however, other leaders might prefer that his retirement appear voluntary to minimize the unsettling effect of the succession on the Polish and other East European regimes. The belief that Brezhnev continues to command considerable respect among rank-and-file party members in the Soviet Union could also impel other leaders to retire Brezhnev with full honors. [REDACTED]

Under these circumstances, there is a strong possibility that Brezhnev will be kicked upstairs, retaining his prestige but not his power. If confronted with the option of retiring in disgrace or elevation to a senior statesman position, Brezhnev would probably make the same choice that Ulbricht made in 1971. The East German leader yielded his party post, but was allowed to retain the presidency briefly until his death. [REDACTED]

Another possibility is that the Politburo would allow Brezhnev formally to retain both the Presidency and the General Secretaryship, while relinquishing the substance of power to the man chosen to be his ultimate successor as party head. This could be done either informally with no public announcement, or by the creation of a new position for the intended heir. This situation, however, would not be tenable for very long. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Brezhnev usually vacations in the Crimea in July, so his departure does not necessarily have any political significance. Absence from Moscow, however, may increase his isolation. If Brezhnev's Politburo peers have decided to remove him, they might do so while he is out of town. Khrushchev's absence from Moscow facilitated his ouster in 1964. [REDACTED]

A Politburo decision to retire Brezhnev would require the calling of a plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee. Earlier in June a Yugoslav correspondent in Moscow claimed to have heard that a plenum would be held this summer [REDACTED] a plenum may be held in September. [REDACTED]

Several months ago Brezhnev called for two plenums this year—one for agriculture and one for management issues. The one dealing with the farm program has been held, and it is conceivable that the next plenum will deal only with management reform. Considering Brezhnev's political circumstances, however, there is a strong possibility that the next plenum—whenever it takes place—will be the occasion for his retirement or a major change in his formal status [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Prospects for Brezhnev's Rule and His Succession [REDACTED]

Expectations about what will happen in the Brezhnev succession are necessarily shaped by our understanding of Soviet politics during Brezhnev's tenure as General Secretary. My own view is that Brezhnev dominated the Soviet leadership in the past decade, that his position grew even stronger after the 25th Party Congress in 1976, but that it now is in jeopardy. [REDACTED]

Brezhnev's increasing dominance in the 1970s was reflected in a substantial turnover in the core leadership (the Politburo and the Secretariat) and in the burgeoning Brezhnev personality cult. His power grew despite the manifest decline in his physical capacities and the economy's worsening performance in carrying out policies that were publicly attributed to him and, as I believe, largely originated with him. [REDACTED]

It is often said that Brezhnev ruled by consensus, but this judgment requires qualification. True, unlike Khrushchev, Brezhnev did not force radical organizational reforms on reluctant colleagues, but he made many difficult decisions and adopted strong policies that are not likely to have commanded a consensus. His response to the reduced growth of national income, for example, was not to make balanced reductions in the growth of consumption, defense, and investment, but to make deep cuts in investment growth. The series of decisions reducing growth of investment adopted between 1975 and 1981 adversely affected metallurgy, transportation, and machine building, and probably was vigorously opposed by responsible officials in those sectors. Similarly, his insistence on giving a large share of investment to agriculture, especially his concentration of large agricultural investment in the non-black-earth regions, probably was not a consensual decision. [REDACTED]

Brezhnev's power has also been evident in his leadership arrangements. In his first decade in office (1964-73) he brought a number of established figures into the Politburo, but he was careful thereafter to limit the access of ambitious younger leaders to residence

in Moscow and especially to places of power in the Secretariat. As his power continued to grow after 1976 he advanced cronies, such as Konstantin Chernenko and Nikolay Tikhonov, into the Politburo. His aim, it appears, was not only to protect his own position but in time to arrange the succession in favor of his septuagenarian protege, Chernenko. While this strategy enabled Brezhnev to increase his power despite his growing infirmities and the economy's poor performance, it had serious vulnerabilities:

- Production of a debilitated central leadership [REDACTED]
- Dependence on the central leadership's acquiescence in Brezhnev's choice of an heir presumptive. [REDACTED]

While Mikhail Suslov was alive, Brezhnev moved at a deliberate pace and with characteristic prudence. He did position Tikhonov to succeed Aleksey Kosygin as head of government and effected this even before Kosygin died. Brezhnev was more cautious, however, in advancing Chernenko, who had served during the past two decades as his direct subordinate. Having brought Chernenko into the Secretariat in 1976, and into the Politburo thereafter, Brezhnev allowed him to remain in the fourth-ranking position, after himself, Suslov, and Andrey Kirilenko. When Suslov's death opened a vacancy in the second-ranking post in the Secretariat, however, Brezhnev moved rapidly to assure that Chernenko filled it, despite Kirilenko's seniority. [REDACTED]

At this point the vulnerabilities in Brezhnev's strategy proved costly. Chernenko's credentials as heir presumptive were dubious. He has never been the responsible leader of a regional party committee or even of a government ministry. Almost his entire career has been as a staff official close to Brezhnev. Senior Politburo members have known him as a paper shuffler and as Brezhnev's armor bearer. Brezhnev's effort to establish him as the second-ranking member of the

202

Secretariat and the heir presumptive evidently provoked powerful resistance. Had Brezhnev not kept his younger proteges at a distance, he might have been better able then to advance one of them as a counterweight to Chernenko and thus appease Chernenko's opponents. Instead, Yuriy Andropov, the head of the KGB, evidently capitalized on the opposition to Chernenko to force his way into the Secretariat.

[Redacted]

Such information may have proved valuable in efforts to forge an ad hoc alliance against Chernenko. In addition, the rumors about Brezhnev's family that circulated last April suggest other ways in which such information could be employed. Inasmuch as violations of "Leninist norms"—nepotism, abuse of privilege, and "factionalism"—are widespread in the top leadership, opportunities for political blackmail doubtless are present. Of course, blackmail when the potential victims are so numerous can be a dangerous game.

[Redacted]

d-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted
--Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----
d-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted
--Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----
id-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted
--Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----
sd-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted
--Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----
ted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted
--Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----
ted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted
--Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----
ted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted
--Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----Redacted-----

Andropov's election to the Secretariat is a turning point in Soviet politics, putting in question the prolonged stability that was based on Brezhnev's political strength. The succession process, whose onset has been proclaimed by observers numerous times in the past, has now truly begun. A triad of senior secretaries has emerged made up of Brezhnev, Chernenko, and Andropov. It differs, however, from earlier triads such as those formed by Joseph Stalin—in 1949 when he brought Khrushchev into the Secretariat to balance Georgi Malenkov—or by Nikita Khrushchev—in 1963 when he brought Nikolai Podgorny into the Secretariat to balance Brezhnev. Brezhnev does not seem to have formed this triad to counterbalance one contender with another; it evidently resulted from Andropov's efforts. The new Secretariat—made up of five full Politburo members (Brezhnev, Chernenko, Andropov, Kirilenko, and Mikhail Gorbachev), two candidate Politburo members (Boris Ponomarev and V. I. Dolgikh) and three non-Politburo members (I. V. Kapitonov, M. V. Zimyanin, and K. V. Rusakov)—must redistribute the organ's tasks and powers in circumstances of intensified political struggle.

[Redacted]

Andropov's accession to the Secretariat may not have been the outcome of a political process simply. It is hard to conceive of a majority in the Politburo that would freely choose him for the post. The Brezhnev faction itself (Brezhnev, Tikhonov, Pelshe, Kunaev, and Chernenko) and allies like Ustinov and Gromyko had good reason to keep the knowledgeable police chief out of the Secretariat, as did ambitious provincial leaders like Romanov and Shcherbitskiy. Conceivably Andropov found allies among Kirilenko, Greshin, and Gorbachev who were willing to pay the price of accepting Andropov into the Secretariat in order to create a counterweight to Chernenko. Once Andropov decided to make his move in opposition to Chernenko, his 15-year service in the KGB provided him with useful information about his colleagues

[Redacted]

Andropov is now in a position to choose between two strategies: to lie low until Brezhnev's departure, when he would try to assert himself from his vantage point in the Secretariat, or to try immediately to enhance his powers in order to limit Chernenko's. The second strategy risks an early confrontation with Brezhnev, perhaps before Andropov is ready for it, and would probably produce intense conflict that could not readily be concealed from the outside world. The first, quiescent strategy risks permitting Chernenko to gain

control over the key levers of power, leaving Andropov in an inferior position. Although the strategy might permit short-term surface stability, it would probably lead to intense conflict once Brezhnev left the scene if Chernenko attempted to consolidate his power against strong, perhaps widespread, opposition. [REDACTED]

Prospects for the succession also have been radically affected by Andropov's promotion. For several years Chernenko has served as Brezhnev's alter ego. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Having now shown that he plans to make Chernenko his heir presumptive, Brezhnev cannot draw back easily even though his intent has provoked resistance. Ironically, just when he has finally shown a determination to arrange his succession, his ability to do so has been brought into question. Brezhnev is wed to Chernenko as his alter ego and heir presumptive both; Chernenko is unlikely to try to break free despite the tensions generated by such closeness and mutual dependence. [REDACTED]

Brezhnev's recognition that he needs an alter ego and that his own days as General Secretary are numbered (granted the number he has in mind may be as high as a thousand) might lead him to go far in conferring authority on Chernenko. In the past, such arrangements made in advance have eased the succession. In this instance, however, there is reason to question whether Chernenko, because of his poor qualifications and the opposition he has already provoked, could consolidate his position once Brezhnev departed. But Chernenko may never be put to the test. The Brezhnev-Chernenko duo's capacity to maintain its strength, or even to protect itself against opponents, is uncertain. The KGB cannot be relied on to protect Brezhnev against palace conspiracies because of Andropov's continuing ties to KGB personnel and the appointment of one of his regional subordinates (Fedorchuk) to replace him as KGB head. Perhaps Brezhnev's weakened political authority will encourage resistance to his measures and increased criticism of the economy's performance. Already individual leaders are withholding support from favored Brezhnev measures, such as decentralization in the food program. [REDACTED]

If this analysis is valid, key inferences follow:

- In the period ahead we may expect an increased drawing together of Brezhnev and Chernenko because of their mutual dependence, as well as the emergence of polarized factions supporting and opposing this duo.
- Leadership instability is now probable, perhaps leading to a weakening of Brezhnev's authority by attacks from an anti-Brezhnev faction or, less likely, to a Brezhnev counterstroke against Andropov. Brezhnev's capacity to engage in productive summitry consequently cannot be assumed.
- The likelihood that the Brezhnev succession will be initiated by his ouster or by a medical episode precipitated by a domestic political crisis is now substantially higher than before Andropov entered the Secretariat.
- If the Brezhnev-Chernenko duo were to survive and maintain its political strength, Chernenko's chances of succeeding to Brezhnev's post would improve, although his chances of subsequently consolidating power still would not be good. The outcome might be a prolonged succession lasting several years before the leadership once more became stable.
- Were Andropov to succeed Brezhnev, the element of uncertainty would be appreciably heightened.

[REDACTED]

In any event, the superannuated condition of the leadership will rapidly create vacancies in the succession that an able General Secretary would fill with his own people. A strong new general secretary would be in a position to address the regime's deep and long neglected problems. While he would probably not

29A

institute fundamental reforms in institutions and practices, he might substantially alter the country's foreign and domestic policies to enhance the regime's performance and strengthen his control over the machinery of rule. Whether Andropov or any other succession candidate has the capacity and political imagination to take control and make such changes is questionable, but the opportunity is there. Someone may try to seize it.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~Secret~~

31A

~~Secret~~

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRRF 06-114/11 # 11624

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

Pipes
11624
✓

BY KML NARA DATE 4/21/11



Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Current Analysis Series

FOIA(b)(1)


August 4, 1982

FOIA(b)(3)

SOVIET WEEKLY


Brezhnev Blames US for Lebanon Crisis

Brezhnev's letter to the President and a parallel TASS statement calling for UN action capped a week of more strident propaganda stressing US responsibility for the situation. The letter and the TASS statement both seemed to reflect Moscow's frustration over its inability to play a role in negotiations. Media attacks on the Habib mission may reflect Soviet concern that his negotiations eventually may lead to a US dialogue with the PLO and give new impetus to the Camp David process. In an effort to show support for the PLO and for Third World opposition to US and Israeli actions, Soviet Premier Tikhonov has scheduled an August 5 meeting with the Non-Aligned Movement's new committee on the Palestinian question.



Media Charge US Backed Kenya Coup Attempt

TASS reacted quickly to the abortive coup by accusing the US of training and arming the rebels. The TASS report also charged the US was attempting to undermine the OAU and block its summit meeting in Tripoli. (C)



~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

0012200-02

ally may
the Camp
the board
Secretary
the's

SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET

35
Secret
in
circulation

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~



Mrs. Gandhi's US Visit

The scanty Soviet media coverage of the visit accented Indo-US differences, particularly over US military equipment to Pakistan. Together with ample publicity given the visit to Moscow of the Indian defense minister a week earlier, treatment of Gandhi's visit appeared designed to reassure Soviet and world audiences that Gandhi's trip would not hurt India's relationship with Moscow. (C)

Grain Agreement

The Soviet media have been silent on the President's proposal to extend the agreement for one year, but a Soviet trade official said the US was acting as though extension was a matter for unilateral decision by the US. Though obviously not wanting to appear as the demandeur, Moscow probably will not reject the offer. (C)

No Mention of Summit

Soviet media have not reported the President's July 28 reply to a press conference question about a possible meeting with Brezhnev. (C)

Brezhnev's Former Protege Exiled to Havana

Konstantin Katushev lost his job as deputy premier in charge of CEMA affairs and was named ambassador to Cuba on July 30. His demotion, along with the ouster last week of Sergey Medunov from his job as party secretary in Krasnodar, will probably be seen by party bureaucrats as an indication that Brezhnev's ability to protect his clients is diminishing. (C)

Brezhnev Receives Husak

In the first of this year's meetings with communist leaders in the Crimea, Brezhnev saw Czechoslovakia's Husak on July 30.

The Soviet ambassador in Bucharest called on Ceausescu July 30 possibly to discuss Ceausescu's meeting with Brezhnev. (C)

Drafted: INR/SEE analysts:kmw
x29194

Cleared: INR/CA - Mr. Stoddard
x22402

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 27, 1982

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY (P)

SUBJECT: Wall Street Journal Article on Soviet Leadership Succession

Attached for your information is an insightful Wall Street Journal article (Tab I) on the Soviet leadership succession. The author, David Satter, asserts that Brezhnev's power base is waning and cites as evidence Brezhnev's inability to either promote or protect his loyalists. Specifically, the article maintains that with the death of Suslov, Brezhnev's influence has been seriously diminished. It also mentions that in January 1982, Boris Buryatia, the reported lover of Galina Churbanov -- Mr. Brezhnev's daughter -- was arrested and in July, Sergei Medunov, the First Party Secretary of the Krasnodar oblast and a close personal friend of Brezhnev's, was removed from his post. Both Buryatia and Medunov have a reputation for corruption and also, have been perceived as "symbols of the value of Mr. Brezhnev's protection." That is, until Suslov's death they were thought to be invulnerable because of Mr. Brezhnev's support.

I find Satter's analysis quite convincing -- especially, the implications he draws for the Soviet leadership succession. He maintains that the decline of Brezhnev's power base seriously attenuates Chernenko's leadership prospects and enhances Andropov's standing. Specifically, despite his nominal relinquishment of KGB chairmanship, Andropov continues to exercise close control of the security apparatus, as manifested by Vitaliy Fedorchuk's (a close crony of Andropov) appointment as Chairman of the KGB. Hence, Satter aptly points out, it is likely that "an anti-corruption campaign" would be exploited by Andropov as a means of demoting and eventually defeating potential political opponents. Ergo, a replay of the Khrushchev-Malenkov struggle is likely whereby Andropov would strive to portray Chernenko and other Brezhnevites as corrupt domestically and "too soft" internationally. If Andropov succeeds in this endeavor with the backing of the security forces and the military, it can be anticipated that whatever his personal predilections, he would have to pursue hardline domestic and foreign policies, at least until he sufficiently builds up his own influence.

Attachment:

Tab I Article from the Wall Street Journal, September 15

cc: Bailey, Blair, Boverie, Myer, Pipes, Sims

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR E06-114/11 # 11617

BY KML NARA DATE 4/21/11

INTERNATIONAL

Brezhnev's Power Base Weakening

Soviet Leader Unable To Protect Loyalists

By DAVID SATTIE

Special to THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

Although Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev remains formally in control, there are increasing signs that his hold on power is weakening as a subterranean struggle intensifies to determine which member of the ruling Politburo will eventually take his place.

President Brezhnev, who will be 76 years old in December, held talks with leaders of three Eastern European countries while vacationing in the Crimea last month and there isn't any hint in the official press that he isn't fully in command and carrying out his normal responsibilities.

In the Soviet system, however, the most important indicator of political strength isn't necessarily a leader's formal responsibilities but rather his ability to promote loyalists to high Communist Party positions and to protect those already in place.

In this respect, Mr. Brezhnev has suffered a series of defeats since the death in January of Soviet ideologist Mikhail Suslov, a party veteran who, for many years, was regarded as his most important source of political support. The latest apparent setback for Mr. Brezhnev came with the removal from his post of Sergei Medunov, the party leader in the Krasnodar area, the richest agricultural region in the Soviet Union. Although little known in the West, Mr. Medunov, a close personal friend of Mr. Brezhnev, was one of the Soviet Union's most powerful provincial officials. He also had a reputation for being one of the most corrupt.

By all indications, the death of Mr. Suslov upset the political equilibrium that had existed for years in the Soviet Politburo and a new balance hasn't been reestablished.

Chernenko Brezhnev's Choice

Mr. Brezhnev's own choice to succeed him as leader is, evidently Konstantin Chernenko, his administrative aide and close colleague for more than 30 years. But Mr. Brezhnev no longer seems to have the ability to determine promotions to the highest party posts.



After Mr. Suslov's death in January, party officials were instructed to direct ideological questions, which previously would have been decided by Mr. Suslov, to Mr. Chernenko, and it was assumed that Mr. Chernenko would take over Mr. Suslov's role after the Central Committee meeting in May.

The May meeting ended, however, with Yuri Andropov, the former head of the KGB security police, being moved up to the Secretariat, the party's principal administrative organ, where he was given the responsibility for ideology that had been expected to go to Mr. Chernenko.

In addition, Mr. Andropov appears to have won a victory in the choice of Vitaly Fedorchuk to succeed him as head of the KGB. Mr. Fedorchuk, an obscure Ukrainian career officer, was promoted over the head of Georgy Tsinev, the first deputy chairman of the KGB and a supporter of Mr. Brezhnev.

It is generally believed that, in light of Mr. Andropov's elevation, the struggle to be Mr. Brezhnev's successor has narrowed to a contest between Mr. Chernenko and Mr. Andropov, with Mr. Chernenko, who hasn't any independent power base such as the army or the KGB, counting heavily on Mr. Brezhnev's support.

More Evidence

If so, the removal of Mr. Medunov can only be a victory for Mr. Andropov because it is the latest piece of evidence suggesting that Mr. Brezhnev can't any longer protect those who have relied on him in the past.

The removal of Mr. Medunov appears to be consistent with a pattern established with the arrest in January of Boris Buryatia, the reputed lover of Galina Churbanov, Mr. Brezhnev's daughter. Like Mr. Medunov, Mr. Buryatia had a reputation for corruption. And like Mr. Medunov, he had been thought, until the death of Mr. Suslov, to be invulnerable because of Mr. Brezhnev's support.

Mr. Medunov and Mr. Buryatia, a reputed black-market operator, were conspicuous in their behavior. Mr. Buryatia, who has been implicated in a diamond theft, often wore diamonds. Their behavior made them symbols of the value of Mr. Brezhnev's protection; if stood to reason that if there was any weakening in Mr. Brezhnev's authority, they would be among the first to be affected.

There was an attempt to arrest Mr. Buryatia after diamonds taken in the Dec. 27 burglary of the Home of Irina Burgrimova, a Soviet lion tamer, were found in his possession. The arrest, however, was blocked by Mr. Suslov who, although an ascetic himself, always acted to protect the reputation of the party elite.

The KGB reportedly objected strongly to the ban on the arrest of Mr. Buryatia. Mr. Suslov died a short time later and Mr. Buryatia was arrested by the KGB on Jan. 28, the day of Mr. Suslov's funeral.

The Medunov Case

A similar pattern of longstanding protection coming to an unexpected end, in the wake of the death of Mr. Suslov, is reflected in the case of Mr. Medunov.

The Krasnodar region, where Mr. Medunov had been the absolute boss since 1973, includes the Black Sea resort city of Sochi, where millions of Soviet citizens take their vacations. It had become a place where bribery was virtually institutionalized, with officials taking large payments in cash to allocate hotel rooms or apartments, to provide jobs or to arrange promotions.

In December 1978, Pravda, the Communist Party newspaper, in an article about the Krasnodar region, said that it had received many letters, which complained of official wrongdoing, from residents of the area.

At least some of the complaints to Pravda were written by a group of Soviet war veterans in Sochi who were gathering information about official corruption. But no action was taken against Medunov and, according to Soviet sources, Sergei Afanasyev, the editor of Pravda, almost lost his job for raising in print the issue of corruption in the Krasnodar region.

The veterans who made the complaints faced various forms of retribution. Some lost their jobs. Others were placed in psychiatric hospitals or imprisoned.

The Mayor Sentenced

In November 1980, Mr. Medunov's direct subordinate, Vyacheslav Voronkin, the mayor of Sochi, was sentenced to 13 years in prison for massive corruption and bribetaking. Mr. Medunov remained untouched.

The situation finally changed this year. In announcing the removal of Mr. Medunov on July 24, Pravda said that he was being released from his post "in connection with his transfer to other work," making it clear that he had been removed and not promoted.

The ability to promote and protect loyalists is critical to building a power base in the bureaucratized Soviet system, and the removal of Mr. Medunov, like the arrest in January of Mr. Buryatia, suggests that, with Mr. Suslov gone, the Brezhnev power base has weakened at least to the extent that Mr. Brezhnev can't any longer offer unconditional protection to those with whom he has personal ties.

This doesn't mean that Mr. Brezhnev's position as leader is threatened. But if Mr. Andropov, with the backing of the KGB and other security forces, is able to assert his authority against that of Mr. Brezhnev regarding specific cases of corruption, he can undermine the self-confidence and sense of security of the Brezhnev loyalists as a whole.

This can only lessen the chances that Mr. Chernenko will succeed Mr. Brezhnev as leader because the Brezhnev loyalists are his only base of support.

Mr. Andropov currently is regarded as the second most powerful man in the Soviet Union. And, backed by the security forces, he has every incentive to use charges of corruption as a means of eliminating potential political opponents. The fate of Mr. Medunov and Mr. Buryatia are the first indications that, if there is a confrontation, the Brezhnev loyalists may lack the means to withstand a determined assault.

BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH - ANALYSIS - NOVEMBER 8, 1982

1. USSR: REPLACEMENT OF KIRILENKO KEY MOVE IN SUCCESSION STRUGGLE

Kirilenko's removal leaves key vacancies on the Politburo, the Secretariat, and the Defense Council. Vladimir Dolgikh seems the most likely candidate for Kirilenko's portfolio. Chernenko, however, may oppose Dolgikh's promotion in order to keep the number of senior secretaries down to four. Andropov, in contrast, could see in Dolgikh's elevation an opportunity to position himself to affect the Politburo's choice of Brezhnev's successor.

* * *

Kirilenko--who has been ill--seems certain to be dropped from the Politburo and Secretariat on November 15, which means that he will also quit his seat on the Defense Council.

His departure leaves only four senior secretaries on the Politburo--Brezhnev, Chernenko, Andropov, and Gorbachev. Brezhnev reportedly no longer actively chairs the weekly session of the CPSU Secretariat, leaving that chore to the senior secretary present.

The importance of chairing the Politburo and the Secretariat stems from the chair's ability to shape the agenda. Chernenko has had a double advantage in that he collaborates with Brezhnev in setting the agenda of the Politburo's weekly session, and since Suslov's death, he has acted as the Secretariat's chairman at many of its weekly sessions.

Kirilenko was in charge of party supervision of industry, especially in the RSFSR, and there probably will be strong incentives to place a new man in this important Secretariat post. Dolgikh, who is presently in charge of energy and mines, is young, competent, and the best qualified in the technical sense to assume overall responsibility for Soviet industry. Presumably, he would at some point be promoted to full member of the Politburo in recognition of that role, and thus would become one of the five senior secretaries who make policy decisions on both ruling bodies.

Chernenko (age 71) may oppose Dolgikh's promotion on the grounds that it would dilute his authority as one of the four senior secretaries. He may also feel that Dolgikh's youth (age 57), energy, and expertise would make him a formidable potential rival for top power.

Andropov, on the other hand, might have reason to regard Dolgikh as a potential ally in the Politburo. He probably favors Dolgikh because of the latter's demonstrated interest in progressive forms of industrial administration and his technical competence. Andropov's arguments in support of Dolgikh's promotion would be reinforced indirectly by the relatively poor performance of Soviet industry this year. Andropov can argue that the party cannot afford to procrastinate in appointing an overseer of industry.

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR E06-114/11 # 11625
BY KML NARA DATE 4/21/11

Soviet
in Lenin

BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH - ANALYSIS - NOVEMBER 8, 1982

1. USSR: REPLACEMENT OF KIRILENKO KEY MOVE IN SUCCESSION STRUGGLE

Kirilenko's removal leaves key vacancies on the Politburo, the Secretariat, and the Defense Council. Vladimir Dolgikh seems the most likely candidate for Kirilenko's portfolio. Chernenko, however, may oppose Dolgikh's promotion in order to keep the number of senior secretaries down to four. Andropov, in contrast, could see in Dolgikh's elevation an opportunity to position himself to affect the Politburo's choice of Brezhnev's successor.

* * *

Kirilenko--who has been ill--seems certain to be dropped from the Politburo and Secretariat on November 15, which means that he will also quit his seat on the Defense Council.

His departure leaves only four senior secretaries on the Politburo--Brezhnev, Chernenko, Andropov, and Gorbachev. Brezhnev reportedly no longer actively chairs the weekly session of the CPSU Secretariat, leaving that chore to the senior secretary present.

The importance of chairing the Politburo and the Secretariat stems from the chair's ability to shape the agenda. Chernenko has had a double advantage in that he collaborates with Brezhnev in setting the agenda of the Politburo's weekly session, and since Suslov's death, he has acted as the Secretariat's chairman at many of its weekly sessions.

Kirilenko was in charge of party supervision of industry, especially in the RSFSR, and there probably will be strong incentives to place a new man in this important Secretariat post. Dolgikh, who is presently in charge of energy and mines, is young, competent, and the best qualified in the technical sense to assume overall responsibility for Soviet industry. Presumably, he would at some point be promoted to full member of the Politburo in recognition of that role, and thus would become one of the five senior secretaries who make policy decisions on both ruling bodies.

Chernenko (age 71) may oppose Dolgikh's promotion on the grounds that it would dilute his authority as one of the four senior secretaries. He may also feel that Dolgikh's youth (age 57), energy, and expertise would make him a formidable potential rival for top power.

Andropov, on the other hand, might have reason to regard Dolgikh as a potential ally in the Politburo. He probably favors Dolgikh because of the latter's demonstrated interest in progressive forms of industrial administration and his technical competence. Andropov's arguments in support of Dolgikh's promotion would be reinforced indirectly by the relatively poor performance of Soviet industry this year. Andropov can argue that the party cannot afford to procrastinate in appointing an overseer of industry.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR EOL - 11/4/11 # 11626

BY KML NARA DATE 4/21/11

National Security Council The White House

Package # _____

82 NOV 8 P 3: 29

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	1	<i>[Signature]</i>	_____
Staff Secretary	_____	_____	_____
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____
<u>PIPES</u>	2	_____	A

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Succession
11622

47

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

November 8, 1982


PERSONAL

MEMORANDUM FOR MARK PALMER
Department of State, EUR/SOV
Room 6226

SUBJECT: Additions to the Contingency Plan for Brezhnev's
Demise

It appears to me that should the Russians send us a signal following Brezhnev's removal for natural or political causes that they are ready to sit down to talk seriously (whether in preparation for a summit with his successor/successors or for the sake of improving relations), we might include the following items on the agenda:

- Beginning of a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.
- Encouraging or at least allowing the Poles to seek compromise solutions to their crisis.
- Withdrawal of Vietnamese from Cambodia.
- Coming up with initiatives at the START, INF and MBFR talks.
- Discussing reductions in defense budgets.
- Substantially revising emigration quotas.
- Releasing political prisoners and stopping harrassment of dissidents.
- Stop the jamming of VOA and RFE/RL.
- Removing Cubans from Africa.
- Cessation of arms supplies to Central American guerrillas. (S)


Richard Pipes
Director, East European
and Soviet Affairs

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR E06-114/11 #11622

BY KNL NARA DATE 4/21/11

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

17 February 1984
FB 84-10013

JL
FD

Analysis Report

The Soviet Succession

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-714/11 #11073
BY CA DATE 7/15/88



Foreign Broadcast Information Service

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

451

This analysis report is based exclusively on material carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government components.

The Soviet Succession

Foreword

The announcement of the choice of Konstantin Chernenko as the new general secretary of the CPSU four days after the death of Yuriy Andropov on 9 February ended the longest interregnum in the history of the Soviet Union. Whether the unusual delay was caused by contention over the succession or by other factors is an open question, but there seems little doubt that the succession has placed new strains on the leadership.

The choice of Chernenko is a victory for the older members of the leadership, although indications are strong that Mikhail Gorbachev, Andropov's apparent choice for the succession, remains a force of political consequence. The victory of the old guard does not necessarily mean that Soviet policy will revert to pre-Andropov patterns. Chernenko is closely identified with the policies of Brezhnev, but he has established a record of his own in his writings and speeches.

Chernenko's past statements suggest that he will be receptive to change but will probably act cautiously. In domestic policy, his most characteristic theme has been the contention that the authorities must feed better information about popular concerns into the decisionmaking process. In foreign policy, Chernenko has had little opportunity to develop a personal position distinct from that of other Soviet leaders, and initial indications are that the succession is likely to have more atmospheric than substantive effect.

Contents

The Succession: Background of Conflict 1

 Post-Brezhnev Situation 1

 Leaderless Party 3

 Signs of Contention 4

Transition: Signs of Tension..... 6

 Gorbachev's Role 7

 Role of the Military 9

 Anomalies in Media Treatment 11

Chernenko: Career Ties and Bases of Support 12

 Regional Ties 14

 The Brezhnev Connection 15

 Role Under Andropov..... 16

 Personal Staff 17

Foreign Policy: Emphasis on Continuity 17

 Nonpolemical Treatment of the United States 18

 Focus on West Europe 21

 Snub for China 23

 Chernenko's Past Views 25

Domestic Policy: Continued Modest Reform..... 26

 Continuity for Andropov's Initiatives 27

 Personal Orientation Toward Reform 27

Media Behavior: Andropov and Brezhnev..... 28

Tables

 1. Media Behavior After Deaths of Brezhnev and Andropov 30

 2. Meetings With Foreign Leaders 34

 3. Full Names and Titles of Leaders..... 36

507

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~



Andropov funeral in Red Square, 14 February 1984.

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The Soviet Succession

The Succession: Background of Conflict

The question of a successor to General Secretary Andropov—frail and ailing almost from the time of his election in November 1982—must have been constantly on the agenda of the top party leadership for most of his tenure. Andropov himself apparently hoped to pass the torch to the next leadership generation and sought to position Secretary Gorbachev to succeed him. The old guard in the Kremlin, however, was not ready to relinquish power and rallied around Chernenko. The evidence surrounding the succession suggests that, although the election of Chernenko represents a clear victory for the Kremlin septuagenarians, younger leaders will exert considerable influence during the coming months and years.

Post-Brezhnev Situation

Chernenko's victory caps a remarkable political comeback. His political fortunes appeared to decline sharply after he was outmaneuvered by Andropov in the succession to Brezhnev. His public activities indicated that his area of responsibility had been reduced from general oversight of almost all major aspects of party affairs to specific oversight of the ideological apparatus. In contrast to his prominence during the Brezhnev period, he appeared in public infrequently and he disappeared from public view for extended periods in January, April, and May 1983. Chernenko's position nevertheless remained strong: He retained his protocol standing as number two in the party hierarchy and gave a major speech at the June 1983 Central Committee plenum.

During the same period, Andropov appeared to consolidate his position with remarkable speed. In May he was identified as chairman of the Defense Council, and in June he was elected chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet—a combination of offices Brezhnev took 13 years to acquire. In June he began to be recognized by most other senior Politburo members as “head” of the Politburo—a formula applied to Brezhnev only after he had been general secretary for five years. Chernenko's recognition of Andropov's authority was signaled when he nominated Andropov to the Supreme Soviet post and used the term Politburo “headed by” Andropov at the June plenum.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

5/17

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

As Chernenko's public role diminished, there were increasing indications that some of his functions were being taken over by the youngest member of the Politburo, 52-year-old Mikhail Gorbachev. By April there were signs that Gorbachev, who had supervised only agriculture under Brezhnev, was being given broader responsibilities. The first signal was the inclusion of his name along with other senior members of the leadership (Andropov, Ustinov, and Chernenko) among signers of the 13 April obituary of a general. On 22 April he delivered the annual Lenin Day speech, an honor that was given to Andropov in 1982 and Chernenko in 1981. After the June plenum he began to play a key public role in the sensitive area of cadres. On 21 June he supervised the election of a new party leader in Leningrad, on 24 June he nominated Vorotnikov to become premier of the RSFSR, and on 29 August he opened a meeting on the party election campaign. At the same time Gorbachev also became more actively involved in foreign affairs. In May he led a delegation to Canada, in July he helped to host Hungarian party leader Kadar, and in August he served as the senior party representative at a meeting of diplomatic and foreign trade officials.

Andropov's personal backing for Gorbachev seemed evident at a remarkable 15 August meeting of party veterans which was Andropov's last major public appearance.¹ According to the medical report issued after his death, Andropov began dialysis treatments in February 1983, and his remarks at the meeting suggest that he recognized that his physical condition meant he would have only a short time in office. He remarked poignantly that "with age, illness lies in wait for a person, and at times all this is accompanied by spiritual tribulations." He added that "age is age" and "withdrawing from activity in a pursuit one loves is not easy." In retrospect, it seems likely that these reflections, phrased in impersonal terms, applied to his own condition and expressed his own state of mind at the time.

The principal message of Andropov's address was that the older generation must transfer power to younger, more able leaders. He suggested that younger people were better qualified to carry out the tasks facing the country, stating that "each new generation is in some way stronger than the previous one, knows more, and sees farther." He even implied that older leaders could be an impediment to change, saying that they were often set in their ways and could

¹ Andropov last appeared in public three days later at a Kremlin meeting with a United States Senate delegation. According to Soviet media, Andropov also participated in a 28 September meeting with a delegation from the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. In contrast to normal practice, however, no photographs appeared in the press or on television, and no meeting location was disclosed.

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

“hamper the adoption of what is novel and unaccustomed.” A significant task facing the older generation, he said, is to ensure that “those who succeed us” maintain a continuity of goals.

The only other Politburo member to address this meeting was Gorbachev, who delivered the opening remarks. His prominence at the session, his recent rise in the leadership, and Andropov’s remarks all suggest that he was Andropov’s choice for the succession. Their close personal ties seemed apparent at the lying-in-state ceremonies for Andropov on 11 February. He appeared closer to the family than other leaders did, both in his interaction with members of the family in the receiving line (shown on Soviet television) and when he sat with them after other Politburo members had departed (reported by Western journalists).

Leaderless Party

The leadership situation began to change when Andropov dropped out of public view. During his absence major statements of Soviet policy continued to be issued in his name, other leaders kept a low profile, and the public image presented by the Soviet leadership was that Andropov remained in charge and would return to work. By October, however, it appeared that Andropov’s absence was starting to cause confusion or even tension within the leadership and that other leaders were maneuvering for succession:

- After a long period of reduced public activity, Chernenko resumed publishing articles in the press and meeting with foreign delegations in Moscow. He wrote a major article on ideological work in an October issue of *Kommunist* (No. 15), an article on foreign policy in the November issue of *Problemy Mira i Sotsializma* (*Problems of Peace and Socialism*), and an article on human rights that was distributed by the Novosti Press Agency and published in East Europe in early November.
- An article in *Izvestiya* on 15 November on an assassination attempt against Lenin appeared to criticize the way the leadership was handling Andropov’s prolonged absence and to suggest that more information should be made public about his condition.
- Soviet handling of the INF negotiations in mid-November seemed to reflect either lack of direction or conflicting instructions from the leadership.

52A

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

- An article by Fedor Burlatskiy in *Literaturnaya Gazeta* on 23 November appeared to warn allegorically that the Soviet political leadership should resist pressures from the military, perhaps with regard to the INF issue.
- The sensitive post of CPSU Central Committee Administrator of Affairs was left vacant from early September until 3 December.
- The announcement of the convening in December of the USSR Supreme Soviet slipped two days past the 30-day notice that is required "as a rule."

Signs of Contention

A new stage in the political conflict began in December, with contradictory indications emerging regarding the state of play behind the scenes. The leadership showed new decisiveness on a number of long postponed issues, suggesting that the contending leaders may have worked out a *modus vivendi* for dealing with essential common business.

The first signs of new decisiveness were the announcement on 1 December that a date had been set for the Supreme Soviet session—which had apparently been postponed until the last minute because of Andropov's illness—and the naming of a Central Committee Administrator of Affairs, filling a key post that had been vacant since September. A number of high-level personnel appointments were made at the 26-27 December Central Committee plenum, and there were numerous lower-level changes primarily in connection with the province (oblast) party elections in December and January.

At the same time, continuing signs of infighting suggested that the need for joint action in anticipation of the approaching succession had not stifled maneuvering among the leaders. An 8 December Politburo meeting sharply rebuked the two USSR ministries slated to conduct a major economic experiment. The rebuke reflected poorly on leaders of the heavy and defense industries, who played a large role in organizing the experiment. It could have been intended to embarrass leaders of the Council of Ministers—Tikhonov or Aliyev—or Defense Minister Ustinov. A week later a Central Committee decree sharply criticized the Moldavian party leadership. The decree appeared to be a veiled attack on Chernenko, who is closely associated with the republic.

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

The personnel changes at the December plenum suggested, however, that Andropov's supporters in the leadership continued to have the upper hand. The plenum promoted RSFSR Premier Vorotnikov to full membership in the Politburo and Yegor Ligachev, head of the cadres department, to the party Secretariat. Both men were brought to Moscow in the spring of 1983 when Andropov was at the height of his power. Mikhail Solomentsev, head of the Party Control Commission, was also promoted to full membership in the Politburo. His loyalties are less clear, however, and it is possible that his promotion was intended to balance Vorotnikov's. The plenum also promoted Viktor Chebrikov, head of the KGB, to candidate membership in the Politburo. Although Chebrikov was originally a protege of Brezhnev, he worked under Andropov for many years in the KGB.

Numerous lower-level personnel changes during December and January also affected members of the Central Committee. Most of them involved the replacement of regional party first secretaries during the party election campaign. During the campaign 19 new party leaders were elected—more than in any comparable election since Brezhnev's first year in office. Only three of these leaders were replaced before December. During this period a new USSR deputy premier and three new USSR ministers were appointed and several important regional officials were replaced.

Although most of the personnel changes cannot be linked to any single member of the top party leadership, more can be traced to Gorbachev than to any other Politburo member. Two recently promoted party officials worked under Gorbachev in the Central Committee's Agriculture Department. The first deputy head of the department, Ye. Kruchina, became Central Committee Administrator of Affairs on 3 December, and a sector chief from the department, Yu. Belov, was elected second secretary of Tajikistan on 30 January. The new first secretary of Volgograd Oblast, V. I. Kalashnikov, elected on 4 January, was Gorbachev's top agricultural deputy when he was first secretary of Stavropol Kray. As first secretary of Volgograd, Kalashnikov now heads one of the RSFSR's most important agricultural regions.

Gorbachev and Premier Tikhonov were shown special favor in Uzbekistan during this period. The republic premier went out of his way to ascribe importance to their December plenum speeches. Although the official information bulletin on the plenum listed Gorbachev and Tikhonov merely as discussants, the Uzbek premier was quoted in *Pravda Vostoka* on 31 December as pledging to the USSR Supreme Soviet that the tasks set out by both men in their plenum speeches would be carried out in Uzbekistan.

53A

In the weeks before Andropov's death there were also signs that Chernenko was reasserting his influence. Tikhonov and Chernenko signed two obituaries of economic officials in late January ahead of the other leaders. This placement departed from the normal practice of listing all full Politburo members except Andropov in alphabetical order, and it seemed to give Tikhonov and Chernenko special status as members of an inner group within the leadership. Chernenko's status was particularly enhanced by the obituaries, since his name would not normally have been expected to appear on the obituaries of officials in the economic sphere. Previously under Andropov, Chernenko had signed only obituaries of figures prominent in culture or ideology or those of high-level officials signed by the full Politburo. Chernenko also began to play a more active role in meeting foreign delegations in Moscow during December and January.

Chernenko received another boost on 23 January when the media announced that a new, expanded edition of his speeches and articles had been published. There was no protocol reason for reissuing his works at this time. The book was quickly reviewed in *Pravda* on 8 February. Although the appearance of the review was a favorable sign for Chernenko, it treated him only in his capacity as an ideologist and said nothing about his writings on other subjects. The review contrasts with those of other Chernenko works that appeared when Brezhnev was alive, which boosted Chernenko's expertise in a broad range of areas. In an apparent show of favor for Chernenko, the *Pravda* review was re-published the following day in the party dailies in Georgia and Moldavia. Chernenko's influence on the media in the week before Andropov's death also seemed shown by the appearance of a long article in *Pravda* on 3 February by his protege, B. P. Yakovlev, who heads the Central Committee's Letters Department.

Transition: Signs of Tension

The events surrounding Andropov's funeral and the election of the new general secretary suggest that Chernenko has only limited support within the leadership. In contrast to the smooth transition after Brezhnev's death 15 months ago, the Politburo this time seemed to have difficulty working out the new arrangement of power.

The initial public handling of Andropov's death closely paralleled that of Brezhnev's death. The announcement was made the following day, and the funeral plans were announced several hours later. The announcement of the

funeral plans stated that the funeral commission was headed by Chernenko, an indication that he was in a strong position for the succession. Andropov headed Brezhnev's funeral commission in 1982, and Khrushchev headed Stalin's in 1953.

The first departure from the pattern of the post-Brezhnev succession was the decision to delay holding a Central Committee plenum to elect a new leader until the third day after the announcement of Andropov's death. Plenums were convened much more promptly following the announcements of the death of Brezhnev and Stalin, when the new leadership arrangements were made known within 24 hours. The delay in holding the post-Andropov plenum may have stemmed from last-minute problems in getting Politburo agreement on the succession arrangements. Alternatively it could simply have been intended to allow time for all Central Committee members to travel to Moscow and participate in the meeting.

Gorbachev's Role

A deliberate effort to obscure the prominent role played by Gorbachev at the 13 February plenum is the strongest indication that the leadership transition was contentious. The "information report" on the meeting carried in Soviet media made no mention of Gorbachev's role at the plenum. Only two days later did the media reveal that Gorbachev had addressed the session. This disclosure was contained in a short report, carried by Moscow domestic radio on 15 February, which said a booklet had been published on the plenum containing the speeches of Chernenko, Tikhonov, and Gorbachev. Information reports on Central Committee plenums normally list all speakers, even when their remarks are not published in the press. There is no precedent for a speech delivered at a plenum being unmentioned in the official report and then released later. Similar booklets have routinely been issued after Central Committee plenums in the past, but they have contained only materials already published in the press.

The important role Gorbachev played in the succession and may play in the future was also suggested by the manipulations of leadership lineups after the 13 February plenum. When the leadership stood by Andropov's bier, Gorbachev stood next to Chernenko (Tikhonov stood on the other side), a change from Gorbachev's position below the seniors at the lying-in-state ceremonies on the 11th. The top leaders stood in their 13 February positions again on the following day when they came to pay their respects before the funeral.

54A



Gorbachev, Chernenko, Tikhonov (left to right) at lying-in-state. (Soviet television, 13 February)

Gorbachev's prominence was also highlighted when he took a place as a lead pallbearer. He walked in the first position on one side of the coffin while Chernenko took a similar position on the other side. These positions had been occupied by Andropov and Tikhonov at Brezhnev's funeral.

At the more formal leadership lineup in Red Square during the funeral, Gorbachev returned to the lower position he had occupied at the 7 November parade in Red Square. This indicates at least that his formal status in the pecking order had not been readjusted to accord with the greater prominence he assumed in the more informal settings. Nevertheless, the latter placements were surely not accidental and point toward an enhancement of Gorbachev's authority in the new leadership arrangements.

The selection of 78-year-old Premier Tikhonov to nominate Chernenko at the plenum symbolized victory for the older generation. Tikhonov is a Brezhnev associate from Dnepropetrovsk and the most obvious representative of the old guard in the leadership. The connection to Brezhnev and the suggestion that

Chernenko is a leader out of the same mold was implicit in Tikhonov's remark that Chernenko was a "true" associate of both Brezhnev and Andropov. The selection of one of Chernenko's most obvious supporters to nominate him, rather than a representative of the Andropov group in the leadership, also suggests that these two factions have not been fully reconciled. In November 1982 the selection of Chernenko to nominate Andropov conveyed the impression that the entire Politburo had closed ranks behind the new leader.

Relatively modest praise for Andropov in official statements after his death may indicate that the new regime is distancing itself from him. Both the formal party and state address to the people following the death announcement and the obituary, released on 10 February, were less generous in their assessments of Andropov's place in history than were comparable evaluations of Brezhnev 15 months ago. The address portrayed the accomplishments of Andropov's brief tenure in office more as the collective work of the party and state than of Andropov personally. The treatment of Andropov has nonetheless been correct, marked by accolades comparable to those he received while he was general secretary.

A possible sign of current tensions in the party appeared in an article published on the eve of Chernenko's election that portrayed Andropov in a much more favorable light than the official assessments of his regime. The article, which appeared in *Sovetskaya Rossiya* on 13 February, was written by the paper's first deputy editor Valentin Chikin, a strong advocate of reform under Andropov. The article praised Andropov's "constructive boldness which sometimes seemed surprising" and suggested that his successor should also be an innovative leader. Chikin has written in the past on the theme that the party needs a young, innovative leader. In a 21 January 1983 article he argued strongly for the infusion of new blood into the party's inner leadership and recalled Lenin's concern over the health and age of Central Committee members.

Role of the Military

The military may be less than enthusiastic about Chernenko's rise to power. Chernenko's handling of military concerns in his initial public statements as general secretary suggests no particular desire to curry favor with the armed forces. He made only a pro forma bow to military interests in his plenum speech, stating that Soviet defense capacity would be strengthened enough to maintain the military balance and to ensure that the Soviet Union had "the

55A

means to cool the hot heads of militant adventurists." In his eulogy at the funeral, he noted simply that Andropov had "done a good deal" to increase Soviet defense capability and that Soviet defenses were strong and "able to protect everything accomplished by the Soviet people." Andropov, by contrast, had used more urgent language in his speech to the November 1982 plenum. He had declared that Brezhnev "constantly paid attention" to ensuring that defense capabilities met present-day requirements and had said that peace could be defended "only by relying on the invincible might of the Soviet armed forces."



Ustinov speaking at Andropov funeral. (Soviet television, 14 February)

At the funeral, the military was given less symbolic importance than it had received when Brezhnev died. Defense Minister Ustinov shared the limelight with Gromyko as a supporting speaker, whereas in 1982 he had been the only Politburo member other than the general secretary to speak.

In public statements before he became general secretary, Chernenko had made no effort to identify himself with the military's institutional interests. In a February 1979 speech in Kishinev, for example, he combined reassurances that the armed forces had "everything necessary" to perform their mission with an expression of hope that

East-West arms accords would soon make it possible to divert resources from military to "creative" civilian use. In an October 1982 speech in Tbilisi, delivered two days after Brezhnev had told top military officers at an extraordinary publicized meeting that more needed to be done to strengthen Soviet defenses, Chernenko again asserted that the USSR was "strong enough."

Anomalies in Media Treatment

Anomalies in the media coverage of the ceremonies, which may or may not relate to leadership conflict, illustrate traditional Soviet concern about status and hierarchy. This concern becomes intensified at a time of leadership change and high public visibility.

The most striking anomaly was the handling of the attendance of Kazakh party First Secretary and Politburo member Kunayev at the lying-in-state ceremonies. On 11 February Moscow television (1237 GMT) showed the leadership paying its respects in the Hall of Columns. The announcer did not read Kunayev's name, and Kunayev was not visible in the television picture. Nevertheless, *Pravda's* front-page eight-column photograph of the leadership, published on 12 February, shows Kunayev standing next to Chernenko in the lineup.



Leadership lineup at lying-in-state. (Soviet television, 11 February)

56+



Doctored photo of lineup at lying-in-state, with Kunayev shown second from left. (Pravda, 12 February)

The apparent explanation is that Kunayev participated in a second lying-in-state ceremony on the 11th, but not in the one pictured in *Pravda*. In order to record Kunayev's presence during the afternoon using the photograph taken during the morning, *Pravda* doctored the picture to insert Kunayev. The tampering is evident: Only Kunayev has the right side of his face in shadow, and only he casts no shadow. The accompanying *Pravda* article describes the leadership appearance at the Hall of Columns as having taken place in the morning, and Kunayev's name is listed. Photographs published in *Izvestiya* and *Krasnaya Zvezda* on 12 February, which were taken from different angles, also were altered to insert Kunayev.

Ukrainian party First Secretary Shcherbitskiy evidently was not in Moscow on the 11th and was not mentioned in the reports on the lying-in-state ceremonies. He had arrived in Moscow by 13 February, when Soviet television showed him among the leaders present at the Hall of Columns.

Chernenko: Career Ties and Bases of Support

Chernenko's career has been spent largely in staff positions in the internal CPSU bureaucracy. He has never headed any party organization or had an opportunity to develop a regional base in classical fashion. Nevertheless, his

past positions in several widely separated regional posts and in the Central Committee headquarters have given him opportunities to establish wide contacts in the party and state apparat.



General Secretary Chernenko.

While it is difficult to fully identify the network of political supporters of a new general secretary, Chernenko probably starts out with more supporters in the central and local party apparat than did Andropov. Chernenko has been intimately involved in the inner workings of the leadership since 1960, assisting Brezhnev, managing Supreme Soviet and Central Committee business, and watching over the operations of the apparat. In the course of his long career he has established ties with several regional party organizations (most notably Krasnoyarsk, Moldavia, and Kirgizia) and with officials in several spheres of activity (the Central Committee and government bureaucracies and the ideological-

social sciences establishment). His close association with Brezhnev also makes him the natural patron of many Brezhnev cronies and appointees.

Some sense of Chernenko's concept of his potential political constituency could be seen in his unusual appeal to regional party secretaries in his 13 February plenum acceptance speech. He made "a special address" to the province first secretaries appealing to them to boost production, implement the Food Program, and improve living standards.

Although he has not had extensive foreign policy responsibilities, Chernenko has had considerable exposure to foreign affairs. He participated in the Helsinki talks in 1975 and has since expounded Soviet positions on the human rights provisions of the Helsinki agreements. In addition to visiting most bloc countries (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Cuba), he has visited Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, some African states, and—in April 1974—the United States. Under Brezhnev he took part in talks with a number of foreign leaders.

57*

Chernenko: Biographical Landmarks

1911	Born in Krasnoyarsk Region (24 September).
1929-30	Headed propaganda and agitation department of a Komsomol district committee in Krasnoyarsk.
1930-33	Served as secretary of a party cell in NKVD border guards unit while in Red Army.
1933-41	Held propaganda posts in Krasnoyarsk, rising to deputy head of the region's propaganda and agitation department.
1941-43	Served as secretary of Krasnoyarsk Region party committee.
1943-45	Studied at Central Committee's Higher School of Party Organizers.
1945-48	Served as secretary of Penza Province party committee.
1948-56	Headed Moldavian Republic Central Committee's Propaganda and Agitation Department.
1953	Graduated from Kishinev Pedagogical Institute.
1956-60	Headed mass agitation sector of Central Committee's Propaganda and Agitation Department.
1960-65	Headed secretariat of Presidium of USSR Supreme Soviet.
1965-82?	Headed Central Committee's General Department. (Although one official biography indicates that he left this post in 1976, others have suggested that he continued to hold it. It is unlikely that he still held the post after he took over responsibility for ideology in 1982.)
1976	Elected secretary of Central Committee (March).
1977	Elected candidate member of Politburo (October).
1978	Elected full member of Politburo (November).

Regional Ties

Born and raised in Krasnoyarsk, Chernenko became one of the kray secretaries in 1941 and has apparently maintained both personal and political ties with this region. He chose his home territory to launch the 1978-79 effort to raise the importance of letters to officials as a means of heightening official sensitivity to public attitudes. He was the guest of honor at a special conference on letters organized by Krasnoyarsk First Secretary Fedirko in July 1978—apparently the kickoff conference in a series of big regional meetings on the subject in 1978 and 1979. Chernenko again visited Krasnoyarsk in June 1982 to promote the May 1982 Central Committee plenum decisions.

Chernenko's tie with Krasnoyarsk may also involve a link with Politburo candidate member and Central Committee Secretary V. I. Dolgikh, who rose in Krasnoyarsk during the 1950's and 1960's to become kray first secretary in 1969. Dolgikh's promotion to CPSU secretary in 1972 reflected the patronage of Brezhnev and Kirilenko, however, and Dolgikh cannot be regarded as a client of Chernenko's.

Chernenko's eight years in Moldavia as Agitprop chief established ties with that republic which he has retained. He has been a Supreme Soviet deputy from Moldavia since 1966, periodically returning to deliver election speeches. Since the late 1970's, when Chernenko emerged as Brezhnev's obvious favorite, Moldavian leaders have played up his earlier career in Moldavia in speeches, articles, and histories. Moldavian First Secretary Bodyul publicly praised Chernenko as well as Brezhnev before being appointed USSR deputy premier in December 1980.

The Brezhnev Connection

Chernenko's most profitable contact in Moldavia was Brezhnev, who became republic party head in 1950. When Brezhnev became USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium chairman in 1960, he immediately picked Chernenko as chief of the Presidium's secretariat—that is, as his assistant. After Brezhnev became CPSU first secretary in late 1964, he selected Chernenko to head the Central Committee's General Department, which serves as secretariat for the Politburo. In that post Chernenko controlled the flow of party information. His effectiveness in protecting Brezhnev's interests gradually made him the party leader's most valued aide, especially when Brezhnev's health began to fail. After helping an ailing Brezhnev at the 1975 Helsinki conference, Chernenko was publicly favored by Brezhnev in March 1976 when he was promoted to CPSU secretary and awarded the coveted title of Hero of Socialist Labor. The award was presented by Brezhnev personally, even though Podgornyy, as Supreme Soviet Presidium chairman, should have presided over the ceremony.

At some point in the late 1970's Brezhnev began pushing Chernenko forward as his favorite deputy. Rapidly promoted to Politburo candidate member and then, in November 1978, to full Politburo member, Chernenko began gradually to displace Kirilenko as Brezhnev's chosen heir apparent. He traveled often with Brezhnev and sat in on Brezhnev's talks with foreign leaders, gaining experience in foreign relations and valuable public exposure.

Chernenko has promoted himself by cultivating an image of expertise and authority through the frequent publication of books, a practice unusual for Politburo members. He has written on a broad range of subjects, including party work, ideology, the socialist system, and East-West polemics on human rights. Included in the latter category are a 1976 booklet on the Helsinki talks entitled "One Year After Helsinki," a 1977 book on "Soviet Democracy," and a 1981 book on "CPSU and Human Rights." In 1979 he authored books on

58x

work with cadres and work with soviets, appearing to lay claim to authority in those fields. Like other Politburo members, he has also had collections of his speeches and articles issued in separate volumes. There were four such collections at last count.

Chernenko proved adept at political maneuvering under Brezhnev, gradually building up ties with regional party organizations and moving to extend his influence. Former Kirgiz official B. P. Yakovlev, who worked in Chernenko's General Department, became head of the Central Committee's Letters Department created in 1979 as part of Chernenko's letters campaign. Kirgiz leaders have actively boosted the campaign and Chernenko personally, especially during his August 1979 visit to Kirgizia. One of Chernenko's books heaped praise on Georgian innovations, and the Georgians reciprocated with high praise for the book and a lavish reception when he visited Georgia in October 1982.

Chernenko appeared to extend his influence to the trade unions in March 1982 when he supervised the removal of the trade union council chairman installed by Kirilenko and oversaw the appointment of the new trade union leader. Kirilenko's decline in 1980 and 1981 enabled Chernenko to move up in influence and ranking, and Suslov's death in early 1982 allowed him to expand his influence in the ideological sphere. By the time of Brezhnev's death in November 1982, he had risen to third place among the leaders, outranked only by Brezhnev and Premier Tikhonov.

Role Under Andropov

After losing out to Andropov upon Brezhnev's death, Chernenko remained number two in ranking in the Secretariat and was made responsible for managing the ideological apparatus. He also fell heir to Suslov's largely symbolic post of chairman of the Council of the Union's Foreign Affairs Commission.

He has played an active role in supervising the ideological sphere and has presided over a considerable shakeup of officials in this area. He delivered a long report on ideology at the June 1983 Central Committee plenum and injected himself into social science issues—for example, singling out the Institute of Sociological Research and the Central Mathematical Economics Institute for sharp criticism. Central Committee Propaganda Department head Tyazhelnikov was removed in late 1982, and social sciences supervisor Trapeznikov, a

notorious Stalinist, was sidelined and eventually removed as head of the Central Committee's Science Department in August 1983. Over the course of the year, new directors of the Institute of Philosophy, Institute of Sociological Research, and Institute of World Economics and International Relations were named. Chernenko also gained visibility as chairman of the Politburo's commission on educational reform created after the June plenum, presiding over several well-publicized sessions. In December the commission produced a draft school reform which is now the subject of nationwide public discussion.

Personal Staff

Key officials of Chernenko's staff have already begun to be identified. TASS, in reporting Chernenko's 14 February meeting with Vice President Bush, listed A. M. Aleksandrov and V. V. Pribytkov as assistants to the general secretary. Aleksandrov had been foreign affairs assistant to both Brezhnev and Andropov, while Pribytkov has long been Chernenko's personal assistant. Pribytkov, identified only as deputy head of the working youth sector of the Komsomol Central Committee in 1970, had been listed as a CPSU Central Committee official by late 1977 and soon was signing as editor of books written by Chernenko, a role usually performed by personal assistants. He was first publicly identified as Chernenko's assistant in the 27 October 1981 *Pravda*.

Foreign Policy: Emphasis on Continuity

As expected, Soviet leaders have emphasized foreign policy continuity during the succession period. Chernenko met after the funeral with more foreign leaders than Andropov had met in 1982 (19 versus seven).

Official Soviet statements issued in the wake of Andropov's death, speeches by Soviet leaders at the Central Committee plenum and at the funeral, and the pattern of media reporting on meetings between Soviet leaders and foreign delegations have all produced an impression of unchanged policy orientation and priorities. As in November 1982, the statements addressed foreign policy only in a general way. Chernenko's plenum speech, for example, recited standard litanies, pledging Soviet cooperation with the "socialist community," "solidarity" with the developing countries in repelling the "aggressive forces of imperialism," loyalty to "peaceful coexistence," and determination to preserve the East-West military balance.

59A

The continuity expressed in these statements may reflect considerable involvement in foreign policy by the other members of the Politburo during Andropov's long absence from public view. As early as last fall, major policy pronouncements issued in Andropov's name seemed to give unusual emphasis to collectivity. Statements published in September and November in Andropov's name contained repeated assertions that they represented the views of "the Soviet leadership."

Chernenko's meetings with 19 foreign delegation heads—six from NATO countries, six from the USSR's Warsaw Pact allies, and seven from other countries (India, Cuba, Nicaragua, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Madagascar, and Mongolia)—served to confirm recent Soviet foreign policy priorities. Premier Tikhonov, First Deputy Premiers Gromyko and Aliyev, and Defense Minister Ustinov met with most of the other visiting dignitaries.¹

Nonpolemical Treatment of the United States

Soviet actions and statements accompanying the succession suggest that the Kremlin assigns undiminished importance to relations with the United States and is open to a positive change in atmosphere. Chernenko decided to follow the precedent established at the time of Brezhnev's funeral and meet with Vice President Bush despite the increased strains in the current relationship. High-level Soviet statements issued since Andropov's death have avoided direct attacks on the United States and the Administration, although criticism of U.S. policies has continued to appear in Soviet media.

While Kremlin statements have manifested no optimism about prospects for bilateral relations and have criticized U.S. policy indirectly, all of them have avoided strident attacks. Chernenko complained in his plenum speech that "some leaders of capitalist countries" did not wish to recognize that peaceful coexistence is needed in the nuclear age "as never before," but nowhere did he specifically direct this criticism at the United States. The avoidance of the sort of harsh attacks that characterized Soviet statements in the wake of the KAL incident last fall is in keeping both with Andropov's moderate 25 January *Pravda* interview and with media behavior observed for more than two months after Brezhnev's death.

¹ Table 2 provides a detailed record of meetings between Soviet leaders and foreign delegation heads at the Andropov and Brezhnev funerals.



U.S. delegation at lying-in-state. (Soviet television, 13 February)

Restraint was most apparent in the Soviet report—carried by TASS and published in the press—on Vice President Bush's meeting with Chernenko on 14 February. It reported blandly that the two leaders had exchanged views on the international situation and bilateral relations on a "principled plane." According to TASS, Chernenko said that the USSR was ready to "develop equal cooperation between all countries and peoples" and that "a display by the American side of practical readiness" to adhere to the principles of equality and equal security, mutual respect for lawful interests, and noninterference in internal affairs would "make it possible to start" improving relations.

Despite its implied rebuke, this statement is noticeably more positive than the language used in the comparable report issued after the last high-level U.S.-Soviet meeting, Secretary of State Shultz's meeting with Gromyko last month. According to that report, published in the Soviet press on 19 January, Gromyko specifically charged the Administration with "militarism, striving to acquire dominant positions in the world, and open disregard of the lawful interests, social system, and way of life of other peoples."

60x



Soviet delegation, headed by General Secretary Chernenko, meets with U.S. delegation, headed by Vice President Bush.

The tone of Soviet authoritative statements and media commentary on the United States since Andropov's death thus far has followed the pattern established during the first two and a half months after Brezhnev's death. At that time, authoritative statements signaled an interest in improved ties by muting criticism of the Administration and expressing hope for increased cooperation. In his first major address after becoming general secretary, a speech on 22 November to a Central Committee plenum, Andropov said the USSR was committed to "joining efforts" with other states to limit arms, and he refrained from any direct attack on the Administration. Tikhonov, in an 18 November address to U.S. trade representatives, declared that the USSR favored "normal, even better, friendly relations with the United States." Central Committee officials also expressed public support at that time for a change in the climate of U.S.-Soviet relations but said that any improvement would depend on U.S. initiatives. Routine media commentary continued to attack U.S. policies and officials.

Focus on West Europe

Chernenko's meetings with leaders from France, Great Britain, West Germany, and Italy confirm that West Europe continues to be a major focus of Soviet concern. After Brezhnev's funeral, the West German delegation was the only West European one granted an audience with Andropov. Soviet treatment of the meetings also suggests that Moscow will continue to pursue a differentiated approach with respect to major West European states while emphasizing expanded trade ties with all of them.

France The decidedly upbeat TASS account of Chernenko's meeting with French Prime Minister Mauroy suggests that Moscow believes its best chance for improved economic and political relations lies with France. TASS quoted Chernenko as having told Mauroy that the Soviet people had "traditional good feelings" toward the French people, a sentiment not repeated in the TASS reports on Chernenko's meetings with the West German, British, and Italian leaders. Moreover,



French delegation at lying-in-state, with Prime Minister Mauroy at center left and Foreign Minister Cheysson at center right. (Soviet television, 13 February)

6017

paralleling Moscow's optimistic appraisals of future Soviet-French relations following Soviet First Deputy Premier Arkhipov's visit to Paris early this month, TASS reported Chernenko and Mauroy as expressing "mutual satisfaction" about recent developments in Soviet-French relations.

Great Britain The Soviets have apparently adopted a wait-and-see attitude toward Britain. Soviet coverage of Prime Minister Thatcher's talks with Chernenko was largely neutral and avoided direct criticism of British policies, including policy on INF.

West Germany Despite Moscow's frequently expressed unhappiness with West German assent to the deployment of new U.S. intermediate-range nuclear missiles in the FRG, Chernenko's meeting with Chancellor Kohl suggests continued Soviet interest in maintaining channels of communication with West German leaders. Soviet dissatisfaction with Bonn, however, was indicated by Chernenko's reported repetition of Soviet criticism of Bonn's support for the new missile deployments and of the "principled" Soviet opposition to them. The TASS report on the meeting did not refer to interest by either side in improving relations.

Italy The Soviet account of Chernenko's meeting with Italian President Pertini mixed hope for improved bilateral relations with criticism of Italy's stand on INF. On a positive note, Soviet media reported that the delegation had reaffirmed readiness to cooperate "in the cause of peace in Europe and outside it." But TASS also quoted Chernenko as charging that the basing of U.S. missiles in "some NATO countries, including Italy," had "seriously complicated" the international situation. Chernenko's admonishment of the Italians was balanced somewhat by his repetition of a phrase Andropov had used last November—the USSR "would not like to consider" the existing situation to be "irreversible."

In the final weeks before Andropov's death, Moscow repeatedly insisted that NATO demonstrate "readiness" to return to the situation existing before the start of INF deployments in November as a prerequisite for resuming the INF talks. None of the reports on Chernenko's meetings with West European delegation heads referred to this demand or offered any other indication of Soviet intentions regarding the interrupted INF and START talks.

Snub for China

The new regime's correct but cool treatment of the Chinese delegation to the funeral suggests dissatisfaction with the current state and rate of development of Sino-Soviet relations and an unwillingness to take new initiatives. At the same time, Moscow has not indicated any intention to discontinue ongoing efforts aimed at gradually improving relations, such as the biannual consultations between deputy foreign ministers.

Moscow apparently made a deliberate decision not to offer a positive gesture toward China when it chose Aliyev to meet with Politburo member and Vice Premier Wan Li—the highest level Chinese official to visit the Soviet Union since Zhou Enlai's mission in 1964 in the wake of Khrushchev's ouster. The Soviets not only failed to add the Chinese to the long list of delegations received by Chernenko but observed only the minimum of protocol in selecting Aliyev. As a Politburo member and first deputy premier, Aliyev has a rank equal to Wan Li's, but he lacks the stature of Gromyko, who met with Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua at the time of Brezhnev's funeral. He has no known previous experience in dealing with Sino-Soviet affairs.

The TASS account of the Aliyev-Wan Li meeting was also notably less enthusiastic about improving Sino-Soviet ties than was the comparable report on the Gromyko-Huang Hua conversation in 1982. According to the 15 February TASS release, Aliyev observed that the Soviet leadership had "invariably" supported an "improvement of relations" between the two states and that the Chinese side had endorsed "joint efforts" to improve ties. By contrast, in 1982 TASS had reported that the Soviet leadership attached "great significance" to the normalization of ties with the PRC and noted that both sides endorsed the continuation of a "political dialogue."

The new regime's treatment of the Vietnamese delegation to the funeral may also be perceived by Beijing as a calculated slight to Chinese interests. The Vietnamese delegation, like the Warsaw Pact delegations, was not reported to have met with any top-level Soviet official in 1982. This time the Vietnamese, headed as in 1982 by President Truong Chinh, were received personally by Chernenko—a gesture Beijing is likely to interpret as a sign of insensitivity to Chinese concern about Moscow's support for Hanoi.

At the same time, there are signs that Moscow will try to sustain the Sino-Soviet dialogue. Soviet media treatment of the Chinese delegation's activities at Andropov's funeral confirmed Soviet acceptance of China's "socialist"



PRC delegation at lying-in-state, with Vice Premier Wan Li in center. (Soviet television, 13 February)

credentials—a sensitive barometer of Moscow’s intentions toward China. Soviet television on 13 February showed the Chinese delegation paying its last respects to Andropov along with delegations from other communist states, and reports on the ceremonies generally included the Chinese at the end of the list of communist delegations. *Pravda*’s second edition on 13 February removed any doubts about China’s status among the communist countries by printing the condolence messages from the communist world in Russian alphabetical order, thereby placing the Chinese message ahead of those from Korea, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia.

Soviet endorsement of the Sino-Soviet dialogue came indirectly when Moscow reported Wan Li’s 13 February remarks supporting an improvement in relations and specifically endorsing a continuation of bilateral talks. A 14 February Soviet domestic radio newscast attributed to the Chinese vice premier the “hope” that “further consultations” would overcome the “obstacles” impeding better ties and result in a normalization of relations.

Chernenko's Past Views

Although Chernenko has not had any direct institutional responsibility for the execution of foreign policy, he has traveled more widely than most Soviet leaders and has undoubtedly had exposure to foreign affairs as Brezhnev's righthand man and as a member of the Politburo and Secretariat. In his role as party ideological spokesman he has made a considerable number of statements on major international issues.

Chernenko's public statements have duly reflected basic Soviet policy at the times they were made. Within that context, however, Chernenko has chosen to emphasize some themes and to ignore others. His pronouncements during the Andropov period seemed to focus more narrowly on the international ideological struggle than had been the case during Brezhnev's last years.

In statements on **East-West relations**, Chernenko has consistently endorsed detente and has appeared to be a firm supporter of the 1979 SALT II treaty. In the period of deteriorating U.S.-Soviet relations since 1979, he has frequently professed confidence that the Soviet Union and its allies were in a strong position and could afford to be steady, calm, and restrained in both rhetoric and action. Chernenko has stressed the urgency of the need for arms control but has not been a spokesman for Soviet policy on INF and START.

Although the need for restraint in foreign affairs is a recurring theme in Chernenko's public statements, one of his speeches stands out in this regard. Speaking in Tbilisi on 29 October 1982, just two days after Brezhnev had delivered one of his most strident attacks on Washington, Chernenko emphatically defended detente and discounted the notion that there was immediate danger or that Moscow should respond more assertively to what he portrayed as Washington's "threats and diktat." He depicted a situation in which Moscow could bide its time. "We are sufficiently strong and we can wait," he said; "sooner or later—and the sooner the better—reason will triumph and the military threat will be averted."

Concerning **international communist relations**, Chernenko has performed a careful balancing act in addressing the degree of orthodoxy that Moscow should demand from other communist parties and states. He has shown sensitivity to charges that Moscow is trying to impose the Soviet "model" on an international scale and has repeatedly urged respect for the experience of other communists. In a November 1983 article in *Problemy Mira i Sotsializma* (*Problems of Peace and Socialism*), for example, he strongly endorsed

637

the idea that each country must chart its own path to socialism and that "great diversity of solutions and forms" enriches the communist movement. This statement appeared to be more flexible than the position articulated by Andropov at the June plenum when he stressed that a "correct political line" was essential.

In the same article, however, Chernenko repeated his frequently expressed hostility toward "all kinds of 'reformers' of Marxism-Leninism" and insisted that the Soviet experience as well as that of other parties "shows unquestionably the untenable nature of any attempts to make the scientific theory of communism nationally or regionally exclusive." In an argument apparently aimed chiefly at the Eurocommunists (but one that potentially could be used against any unorthodox thinkers), he declared that Marxism-Leninism as a "science" did not lend itself "to division into 'eastern' or 'western,' nor can it be 'Africanized,' 'Europeanized,' and so on." In an article in the same journal 11 months earlier, Chernenko similarly played both sides of the street in supporting, on the one hand, respect for the independence of individual parties and, on the other, a need for disciplined adherence to Marxism-Leninism.

Like the Soviet leadership in general, Chernenko has said relatively little about the **Third World** or about the potential for East-West conflict in this area. As in his 13 February plenum speech, he has expressed broad support for the struggle of former colonial peoples against "imperialism" and has manifested little sensitivity to Western concerns about Soviet activities in support of anti-Western revolutionary movements. His rare remarks on this subject have asserted vaguely that the Soviet Union "firmly" supports the "generally accepted international norms" toward the Third World and that revolutions cannot be imposed from the outside.

Domestic Policy: Continued Modest Reform

On domestic policy issues, Chernenko indicated in his 13 February plenum speech that he intends to "move forward" along the main lines of existing policies. He stressed that he wants to improve the country's economic administration, to make the bureaucracy more responsive to the public, and to use a combination of discipline and incentives to increase production. These objectives are consistent with the policy preferences he has expressed in his speeches and writings over a period of several years.

Continuity for Andropov's Initiatives

Endorsing proposals for economic administrative change raised in Andropov's December plenum report, he declared that "the system of economic management, the whole of our economic machinery, needs a serious restructuring." He stated that the economic experiment to broaden rights of plant managers adopted last July was only a start, and he warned officials not to think they could use the experiment as an excuse to be passive and to continue to "work in the old way" until the experiment was completed. While recalling Andropov's injunction to cautiously test everything before acting, Chernenko insisted that this should not be used to justify procrastination. He warned that he expects economic leaders to show initiative and even to take risks to boost production and raise living standards.

Chernenko indicated an intention to continue Andropov's discipline campaign, saying there should be "no relaxing here," and endorsed Andropov's December call for squeezing more productivity out of workers. But he also called for more incentives for workers, for improvements in living conditions and social justice, and in general for more attention to the concerns of the public.

In one of the more striking aspects of his speech, Chernenko also put an old issue back on the agenda in insisting on a proper differentiation between the functions of the state and party bureaucracies. He complained that "not everything has been adjusted properly" and that party authorities have been drawn too much into managerial functions. Calling this "a major issue of political significance," he stated that officials in soviets, ministries, and plants should act more independently of party bodies and that party officials should not "substitute" for economic officials. It has long been party doctrine that party officials should not involve themselves directly in running the economy. Chernenko's strictures on this point appear to register concern that this rule has been observed more in the breach than in practice. While calling both sides to account, Chernenko was particularly sharp with state and economic officials, accusing them of "shifting on to party bodies" responsibilities they should handle themselves.

Personal Orientation Toward Reform

The strongest theme in Chernenko's speech was a commitment to continued change and experimentation—"moving forward without stopping." This is in

64 x

line with the image Chernenko has projected in his past public statements and writings on policy issues. In general, he has shown himself to be something of a gadfly with respect to flaws in the system and to be willing to tolerate trial and error in pursuit of remedies. Brezhnev seemed to recognize this characteristic when at an award ceremony in September 1981 he praised Chernenko for being "restless," always trying to do "more and better."

Chernenko's 13 February plenum speech dealt most extensively and most concretely with improvement of economic administration—the focus of attention during Andropov's regime. Although not often involved in economic policy in the past, in recent months Chernenko has addressed a number of economic questions, backing such Andropov goals as linking wages to productivity, speeding scientific progress, and enforcing discipline. In his October *Kommunist* article he delivered perhaps the strongest endorsement by a Politburo member of the economic experiment adopted in July to broaden the rights of plant managers in five ministries. This experiment, he said, was building "a model of the economic mechanism of the near future." He has also praised Leningrad's innovative economic and social planning—perhaps in an effort to court former Leningrad leader Romanov, who has frequently pushed economic changes.

More generally, Chernenko has associated himself with new ideas and innovations for some time. He has long waged a virtual one-man campaign to force party and government officials to pay more attention to workers' complaints and to public opinion in general. The basic lesson he has drawn publicly from the 1980-81 Polish upheaval is that the party leadership must know the people's attitudes and address their needs in order to prevent alienation and unrest. To this end, he has sponsored an expansion of public opinion research and sociological studies to provide the leadership with more realistic information for policy decisions. He has encouraged pragmatism, praising extensive innovations in Georgia which give public opinion a larger input to decisionmaking.

Media Behavior: Andropov and Brezhnev

A close examination of Soviet media behavior following Andropov's death reveals many similarities with their behavior in the hours between the time Brezhnev died and the announcement of his death to the Soviet people. In the Brezhnev case, however, the indications that something was amiss were somewhat clearer.

Less than four hours after Andropov's death, which occurred at 1650 Moscow time (1350 GMT) on 9 February, program changes began to appear in the media. The first noted change was the replacement of a television jazz program by a concert of classical music. The indications were not clear, however, since other programming—including broadcasts of the Olympic events—continued normally. Some 10 hours after his death, in the early morning in Moscow on the 10th, the national radio second program (Mayak) began to play only classical or subdued music. Although consistent airing of such music was a significant change from Mayak's usual musical fare, the program continued its normal schedule of news every half hour. Mayak had done the same thing in the hours following Brezhnev's death.

Soviet television provided another, albeit ambiguous, indicator when the national television first program (beamed to the European USSR) signed off for the night at 0019 GMT without broadcasting its usual preview of the schedule for the next program day. When Soviet television for the Far Eastern USSR came on the air on the morning of the 10th, again no program schedule was carried. By contrast, when Brezhnev died, a major change in programming was indicated. Soviet Far East television carried an early morning program preview that showed substantial changes from the previously announced schedule.

One major change in media behavior that was significant in 1982—the removal of references to Brezhnev in newscasts—did not occur following Andropov's death. Within 12 hours after Brezhnev's death, a Vremya television newscast omitted a previously broadcast news item about him that would normally have been repeated. Even more significantly, the newscast attributed an official message, addressed to the Angolan president, to the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium rather than to Brezhnev, as would have been usual. By contrast, following Andropov's death both radio and television continued to carry news reports referring to him until almost four hours before his death was announced.

In both cases Soviet radios departed from normal practice before the death announcement and linked up to broadcast identical programs of classical music. In Andropov's case, the linkup occurred only 15 minutes before the announcement. When Brezhnev died, the linkup of most Soviet radios came approximately an hour before the announcement.

A detailed chronology of significant Soviet media behavior following the deaths of Brezhnev and Andropov is presented in Table 1.

657

Table 1
Media Behavior After Deaths of Brezhnev and Andropov

Andropov		Time Elapsed After Death (hours)	Brezhnev	
Time (GMT)	Activity		Time (GMT)	Activity
	9 February 1984			10 November 1982
1350	Andropov dies.	0	0530	Brezhnev dies.
		1		
		2		
		3		
1715	Moscow television second program replaces jazz concert with classical music. ¹	4		
		5		
		6		
2035	National radio third program replaces jazz concert with classical music. ¹	7		
		8		
		9		
2305	National radio second program (Mayak) begins to broadcast only classical and subdued music, still airs news every half hour.	10		
	10 February 1984			
0005	Mayak replaces comedy program with classical music.	11	1630	Domestic radio and television replace militia concert with historical drama.
0019	National television first program (beamed to European USSR) signs off without normal preview of next program day.			
		12		

¹ Reported by Western journalists in Moscow. Not monitored by FBIS for technical reasons.

Table 1 (Continued)

Andropov		Time Elapsed After Death (hours)	Brezhnev	
Time (GMT)	Activity		Time (GMT)	Activity
		13	1800	Vremya television newscast omits item containing Brezhnev's name that had been broadcast earlier. It also reports an official greetings message signed by the CPSU Central Committee and the Supreme Soviet Presidium rather than by Brezhnev.
			1835	Local Moscow television replaces scheduled ice hockey match with classical music. ¹
0405	Mayak replaces comedy program with subdued music.	14 15		
		16 17 18	2335	Morning television preview for Soviet Far East departs from previously announced schedule, broadcasts unusual amount of classical music.
			11 November 1982	
1115	All domestic radio stations link up and broadcast classical music.	19 20 21 22		

¹ Reported by Western journalists in Moscow. Not monitored by FBIS for technical reasons.

627

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Table 1 (Continued)

Andropov		Time Elapsed After Death (hours)	Brezhnev	
Time (GMT)	Activity		Time (GMT)	Activity
1130	Radio and television announce <i>Andropov is dead.</i>	23 24 25 26	0709	Moscow radio first program (beamed to Moscow area) breaks with normal practice by continuing its linkup with the other four domestic radio services and broadcasting classical music.
			0730	Mayak links up with other radio services broadcasting classical music.
1800	Media carry address of the CPSU Central Committee, the Supreme Soviet Presidium, and the USSR Council of Ministers to party and people, obituary, medical report, appointment of funeral commission (chaired by Chernenko), and details of funeral arrangements.	27 28 29 30 31	0800	Media announce <i>Brezhnev is dead.</i>
			1200	Media carry address of the CPSU Central Committee, the Supreme Soviet Presidium, and the USSR Council of Ministers to party and people.

Table 1 (Continued)

Andropov		Time Elapsed After Death (hours)	Brezhnev	
Time (GMT)	Activity		Time (GMT)	Activity
			1210	Media broadcast obituary.
			1230	Media carry report on composition of funeral commission (chaired by Andropov).
		54		12 November 1982
			1112	National radio broadcasts report on Central Committee plenum and <i>election of Andropov as general secretary.</i>
	13 February 1984			
1044	Radio beamed to Soviet Far East announces that an information report will be broadcast at 1100 GMT.	93		
1100	Media carry report on Central Committee plenum and <i>election of Chernenko as general secretary.</i>	94		

Table 2
Meetings With Foreign Leaders ¹

Countries That Sent Delegations	Andropov Funeral		Brezhnev Funeral	
	Soviet Leader(s)	Other Leader	Soviet Leader(s)	Other Leader
Warsaw Pact Countries				
Bulgaria	Chernenko et al. ²	Zhivkov	— ³	Zhivkov
Czechoslovakia	"	Husak	—	Husak
GDR	"	Honecker	—	Honecker
Hungary	"	Kadar	—	Kadar
Poland	"	Jaruzelski	—	Jaruzelski
Romania	"	Ceausescu	—	Ceausescu
Other Communist Countries				
Afghanistan	Chernenko Gromyko	Karmal	Andropov Gromyko	Karmal
Angola	—	Luvualu	—	dos Santos
China	Aliyev Ilichev	Wan Li	Gromyko	Huang Hua
Cuba	Chernenko Gromyko Rusakov	Castro	Andropov Ustinov ⁴	Castro
DPRK	—	Pak	—	Pak
Ethiopia	—	Mengistu	—	Mengistu
Kampuchea	—	Heng Samrin	—	Heng Samrin
Laos	—	Souphanouvong	—	Souphanouvong
Mongolia	Chernenko Gromyko	Tsedenbal	—	Tsedenbal
Mozambique	Tikhonov Ilichev	Machel	Ustinov Ogarkov	Machel
Nicaragua	Chernenko Gromyko	Ortega	—	Ortega
PDRY	—	'Ali Nasir Muhammad	—	'Ali Nasir Muhammad
Vietnam	Chernenko Gromyko ⁵	Truong Chinh	—	Truong Chinh
Yugoslavia	Arkhipov ⁶	Spiljak	Andropov	Stambolic
Other Countries				
Canada	Chernenko Gromyko	Trudeau	Tikhonov Suslov	Trudeau
Cyprus	Tikhonov	Kiprianou	—	Kiprianou
Egypt	Kuznetsov	Salim	—	Salim

Table 2 (Continued)

Countries That Sent Delegations	Andropov Funeral		Brezhnev Funeral	
	Soviet Leader(s)	Other Leader	Soviet Leader(s)	Other Leader
France	Chernenko Gromyko	Mauroy	Tikhonov	Mauroy ⁷
FRG	Chernenko Gromyko	Kohl	Andropov Gromyko	Carstens
Great Britain	Chernenko Gromyko	Thatcher	Gromyko	Pym
Greece	Tikhonov	Papandreou	Tikhonov	Papandreou
India	Chernenko Gromyko	Gandhi	Andropov Gromyko	Gandhi
Indonesia	—	Mokhtar	Tikhonov	Malik
Italy	Chernenko Gromyko	Pertini	—	Fanfani
Japan	Gromyko	Abe	—	Suzuki ⁸
Madagascar	Chernenko Gromyko	Ratsiraka	—	Babeony
Malta	Tikhonov	Barbara	—	Barbara
Pakistan	—	Ziaul Haq	Andropov Gromyko	Ziaul Haq
Philippines	—	“Special Representative”	Gromyko	Imelda Marcos
Portugal	Tikhonov	Soares	—	Pereira
Turkey	Tikhonov	Ozal	Tikhonov	Ulusu
United States	Chernenko Gromyko	Bush	Andropov Gromyko	Bush

¹ As reported by Soviet media unless otherwise noted. See Table 3 for full names and official positions of leaders listed in this table.

² Chernenko, Tikhonov, Gromyko, Ustinov, and Rusakov met collectively with the leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries.

³ A dash indicates that no meeting between any Soviet leader and the head of the delegation listed for the country was reported in Soviet media.

⁴ Castro was received in a second meeting by Ustinov and Ogarkov.

⁵ In addition, Nguyen Co Thach was received by Gromyko.

⁶ According to Belgrade radio.

⁷ In addition, Cheysson was received by Gromyko.

⁸ Suzuki was not reported to have met with any Soviet leaders; Sakarauchi was received by Gromyko.

6 F 4

Table 3
Full Names and Titles of Leaders

Name	Position
Abe, Shintaro	Foreign Minister
Aliyev, Geydar A.	First Deputy Premier, CPSU Central Committee Politburo Member
Andropov, Yuriy V.	General Secretary of the CPSU
Arkipov, Ivan V.	First Deputy Premier
Babeony, E.	Chairman of the Military Committee of the Development of Madagascar
Barbara, Agatha	President of the Republic
Bush, George	Vice President
Carstens, Karl	President of the Republic
Castro Ruz, Fidel	First Secretary of the Cuban Communist Party, President of the Council of State and Council of Ministers
Ceausescu, Nicolae	President of the Republic, President of the State Council, General Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party
Chernenko, Konstantin U.	General Secretary of the CPSU
Cheysson, Claude	Foreign Minister
Fanfani, Amintore	Speaker of the Senate
Gandhi, Indira	Prime Minister
Gromyko, Andrey A.	First Deputy Premier, Foreign Minister, CPSU Central Committee Politburo Member
Heng Samrin	Chairman of the Council of State, General Secretary of the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party
Honecker, Erich	Chairman of the Council of State, General Secretary of the Socialist Unity Party
Huang Hua	Foreign Minister
Husak, Gustav	President of the Republic, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia
Ilichev, Leonid F.	Deputy Foreign Minister
Jaruzelski, Wojciech	Prime Minister, First Secretary of the Polish United Workers Party

697A

Table 3 (Continued)

Name	Position
Pym, Francis	Foreign Secretary
Ratsiraka, Didier	President of the Republic
Rusakov, Konstantin V.	CPSU Central Committee Secretary
Sakarauchi, Yoshio	Foreign Minister
Salim, Mamduh	Presidential Adviser
dos Santos, Eduardo	President of the Republic, Chairman of the MPLA-Labor Party
Soares, Mario	Prime Minister
Souphanouvong	President of the Republic, President of the Supreme People's Council
Spiljak, Mika	President of the Presidency of the Republic
Stambolic, Petar	President of the Presidency of the Republic
Suslov, Mikhail A.	CPSU Central Committee Secretary, Politburo Member
Suzuki, Zenko	Prime Minister
Thatcher, Margaret	Prime Minister
Tikhonov, Nikolay A.	Prime Minister, CPSU Central Committee Politburo Member
Trudeau, Pierre	Prime Minister
Truong Chinh	Chairman of the State Council, Vietnamese Communist Party Central Committee Politburo Member
Tsedenbal, Yumjaagin	General Secretary of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, Chairman of the Presidium of the People's Great Hural
Uluslu, Bulent	Prime Minister
Ustinov, Dmitriy F.	Defense Minister, CPSU Central Committee Politburo Member
Wan Li	Deputy Premier, Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Politburo Member
Zhivkov, Todor	President of the State Council, General Secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party
Ziaul Haq	President of the Republic, Chief Marshal Law Administrator

Table 3 (Continued)

Name	Position
Karmal, Babrak	General Secretary of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, Chairman of the Revolutionary Council
Kiprianou, Spyros	President of the Republic
Kohl, Helmut	Prime Minister
Kuznetsov, Vasiliy V.	Candidate Member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, First Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium
Luvualu, Pascual	MPLA-Labor Party Central Committee Politburo Member
Machel, Samora	President of the Republic, Frelimo Party Chairman
Malik, Adam	Vice President of the Republic
Marcos, Imelda	Ecology Minister, Wife of the President of the Republic
Mauroy, Pierre	Prime Minister
Mengistu Haile Mariam	Chairman of the Provisional Military Administrative Council, Chairman of the Commission for Organizing the Party of the Workers of Ethiopia
Mokhtar Kusumaatmaja	Foreign Minister
Muhammad, 'Ali Nasir	Prime Minister, President of the Supreme People's Council, General Secretary of the Yemeni Socialist Party
Nguyen Co Thach	Foreign Minister, Candidate Member of the Vietnamese Communist Party Central Committee Politburo
Ogarkov, Nikolay V.	First Deputy Defense Minister, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces
Ortega Saavenda, Daniel	Coordinator of the Junta of the Government, Member of the Leadership of the Sandinista National Liberation Front
Ozal, Turgut	Prime Minister
Pak Song-chol	Vice President of the Republic, Member of the Korean Workers Party Central Committee Politburo
Papandreou, Andreas	Prime Minister, Minister of National Defense
Pereira, Vasco	Foreign Minister
Pertini, Alessandro	President of the Republic

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

70

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~