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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 5/25/2005

File Folder USSR-SUMMITRY 2/2

FOIA

F06-114/11

Box Number 36

YARHI-MILO

3613

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
11662	MEMO	CLARK TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE SUMMITRY <i>R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11</i>	6	ND	B1
11663	MEMO	CLARK TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE SUMMITRY <i>R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11</i>	1	ND	B1
11664	MEMO	CASEY TO CLARK RE SUMMITRY <i>R 7/15/2008 NLRRF06-114/11</i> DOCUMENT PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233	1	6/27/1983	B1
11665	MEMO	MATLOCK TO CLARK RE SUMMITRY: CASEY'S MEMO OF JUNE 27 <i>R 7/15/2008 NLRRF06-114/11</i> DOCUMENT PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233	2	7/7/1983	B1
11666	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #11665 <i>R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11</i>	2	7/7/1983	B1
11667	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE SHULTZ VISIT TO USSR <i>R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11</i>	1	ND	B1
11668	MEMO	CLARK TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE SUMMITRY <i>R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11</i>	6	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
11669	MEMO	DOBRIANSKY TO MATLOCK RE MEMO ON SUMMITRY <i>R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11</i>	1	6/24/1983	B1
11670	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO MATLOCK RE SUMMITRY <i>R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11</i>	1	6/16/1983	B1
11671	MEMO	COBB TO CLARK RE TURNING POINT IN SOVIET AMERICAN RELATIONS <i>R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11</i>	4	6/9/1993	B1
11672	MEMO	COBB TO CLARK RE SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS AT THE CROSSROADS <i>R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11</i>	8	6/9/1983	B1
11673	MEMO	SHORT-TERM POLICY OPTIONS <i>R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11</i>	3	ND	B1
11674	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #11668 <i>R 4/14/2011 F2006-114/11</i>	6	ND	B1

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DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/11 #11462

BY KML NARA DATE 4/21/11

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

Subject: Summitry

I have submitted papers to you earlier pointing out the dangers of summitry in the absence of assurance that substantial progress can be made on issues of primary importance to us, and believe that the considerations set forth in them remain valid. However, public and Congressional pressures are building for a summit meeting, and although the rationale is often fuzzy and the premises mistaken, this is a fact of life with which we must deal.

At this point it is clear that we are well on track in rebuilding our defense strength and in rallying our Allies on the most critical issues. Our economy is showing increasing signs of long-term recovery, and your position of leadership is strong and assured. Andropov, in contrast, is faced with a myriad of problems far more fundamental and intractable than ours. The basics, therefore, are moving unmistakably in our direction and our negotiating strength is stronger than it has been for many years. Our task is to manage the U.S.-Soviet relationship in a manner which will insure that these trends continue over the long term. In other words, we must insure the sustainability of our current policies.

This means, among other things, that we must deal with the summit issue in a manner so that pressures for a summit do not erode our ability to maintain our defense programs or allied unity, particularly on the INF deployment issue. Our goal should be more ambitious than mere damage limitation, however. We should aim to use the summit issue in a manner which enhances our leverage rather than weakening it (which would be the case if we were forced by ill-founded public, Congressional or allied opinion to enter into an inadequately prepared meeting without clear objectives.) I believe that this can be done, provided that we are clear in our own minds about our objectives, avoid raising false public expectations, and pursue a purposeful, well-coordinated negotiating track over the coming months.

U.S. Objectives

Our confrontation with the Soviet Union is and will continue to be a protracted one. Summitry, to the extent we choose to

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indulge in it, should be viewed as just one instrument in a long-term, sustained effort. Although it is possible that a major breakthrough can be achieved within a year in some area of primary interest to us, this is far from certain. There are two basic reasons for this: (1) Despite the favorable trends running in our direction, the Soviet leaders will continue to balk at offering proof that our policy of strength pays off, and are likely to continue for some time to try to undermine our strength and determination rather than making the hard choices required; and (2) Andropov, even with his accession to the titular chief of state role, ~~has probably not~~ *may have* consolidated his position to the degree that he can force painful decisions on powerful interest groups.

Therefore, if there is a summit within twelve months, our most important objective will be to impress upon Andropov that our will and capacity to confront him successfully is firm and unalterable in the absence of a significant modification of Soviet behavior. This could prepare the ground for more significant Soviet concessions in 1985.

A second objective should be to obtain significant progress (though not necessarily formal agreements) in several of the areas of primary interest to us: human rights, Soviet restraint in third countries, arms reduction and confidence-building measures, and bilateral relations--particularly those aspects which strengthen our capacity to communicate with the Soviet public at large and thus to build pressure for a gradual "opening" of Soviet society.

A third objective should be to demonstrate--both to the more pragmatic elements of the Soviet leadership and to our own public--that we are in fact serious negotiating partners and that we are not making unreasonable demands in order to block settlement of disputes. *This will probably require demonstrable progress on one of the major arms control negotiations, since both our public and the Soviet leadership view them as the given attitude both) both our public and the Soviet leadership*

The Agenda

The agenda for any summit will be effectively shaped by the content of negotiations prior to it. Our negotiations, therefore, should cover, persistently and systematically, those issues on our list, whether they seem amenable to progress or not. For it is important to keep hammering at the themes important to us, ~~whether or not there is a Soviet~~ *since* ~~response.~~ *for* If we drop any of them, the Soviets will automatically assume that we are not seriously interested in them and therefore there is little to be gained from accommodating us. Prospects in the various areas vary, of course, as do the appropriate channels we should use. The following examples are meant to be illustrative rather than comprehensive:

-- Human Rights: Here the Soviets can make concessions regarding specific persons if they choose, but they are unlikely to make any in overall procedure. In my view, we can

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aim realistically to obtain the release and emigration of Shcharansky and a number of other political prisoners, at least some improvement in Sakharov's position (e.g. medical treatment in Moscow), and increased Jewish emigration. We are likely to get the most from quiet diplomacy, backed up by publicity generated by private organizations and--as appropriate--support from allied and other governments. We should offer nothing in return for these Soviet actions, other than an improved atmosphere.

-- Third Areas: These promise to be among the most contentious and intractable issues we must manage. The Soviet aim will be to draw us into a form of geopolitical horse-trading based on an implicit recognition of spheres of influence. We must, of course, totally reject going down this path, since it ultimately would undermine our alliances and weaken the moral basis for our policies. Our leverage on these issues varies with the local situation; it is most powerful when political conditions in the area and the military balance act as a barrier to Soviet penetration and weakest when one or both of these barriers is absent. But while our most effective counter to Soviet adventurism must be defeating it on the spot, we should make it clear that irresponsible Soviet behavior is a major impediment to the whole range of U.S.-Soviet relations. "Linkage" in this general sense is a political fact of life, and we must not let the Soviets forget it.

It is difficult to say at this juncture what we can expect in this area from a summit, but as a minimum I believe we should insist upon credible assurance that there will be no further dramatic Soviet or surrogate military moves to tip the balance in a regional situation. We should, of course, continue to probe Soviet intentions in each individual situation and be prepared to use the implicit leverage of an upcoming summit to push the Soviets toward a solution we favor. Plans for a summit, for example, could be used to increase pressure on the Soviets to reduce sharply arms supplies to Central America.

-- Arms Reduction and CBM's: We should be able to make progress on some of the confidence-building measures we have proposed, but a real breakthrough in any of the three major arms reduction talks seems highly problematic, although possible. If we are to move toward a summit, however, we should use that process to pressure the Soviets to get more forthcoming proposals on the table, and should hold off agreeing to a summit until our positions have narrowed on ~~at least~~ some of the key issues. Presumably ~~both~~ ^B sides must be able to say after the meeting that some significant progress was achieved in this area. The recent Soviet proposals in START and MBFR may have been motivated in part by a desire to get this process moving.

-- Bilateral issues: Here, we can reasonably expect some limited progress. If the Soviets agree to a cultural and

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information exchange agreement which enhances our access to the Soviet public it will be in our interest. Establishment of a consulate in Kiev would provide us with a window on the largest Soviet minority nationality and enhance our ability to exploit the potential nationalities problem. We may be able to achieve some greater access to the Soviet media, though probably not an end to VOA jamming, as well as some minor improvements in the consular and travel areas. While none of these topics are likely to be suitable for extended discussion at a summit, the latter could provide some leverage for favorable results in negotiations preceding the meeting.

Is this Enough?

If the analysis above is accurate, it would seem that we can expect at this point only limited gains from a summit. So limited, in fact, that they might not justify the risk of public euphoria (some is inevitable, even if not encouraged) followed by a let-down and recriminations. For this reason, I believe we should continue to proceed cautiously and deliberately and avoid committing ourselves to a summit until our negotiations provide a clearer picture of how much give there is in Soviet positions. If, however, we are able to bring our positions in either INF or START within hailing distance, a summit would probably be useful.

There are other reasons for proceeding with caution. If heavy-handed Soviet interference should reappear in Poland, it would of course make it difficult for you to meet Andropov. Also, we would want to be sure that the trial of the Pope's would-be assassin in Italy is unlikely to produce persuasive evidence of a "Bulgarian connection," since you will not want to sit down with a man whom the public believes--rightly or wrongly--to have taken out a contract on the Pope.

I believe that the Soviets want a summit, since it enhances their stature--at home and in the rest of the world--to be seen dealing as equals with the President of the United States. It is also useful to Andropov personally in consolidating his power internally to be accepted by you as an equal partner. They will not abandon the store to us for the privilege of a meeting, but they will pay something (in human rights cases and in access to their population) if we negotiate these issues skillfully and avoid making them a public test of strength. But in order to squeeze the maximum out of them, we must position ourselves so that we will not be seen needing a summit more than they.

The Soviets clearly recognize the danger of appearing over eager, and I believe this was behind Gromyko's June 21 statement accusing us of having "no constructive goals" and implying that we must change our policies to make a summit possible. But their actions over the past few weeks have been more conciliatory than their words. They finally accepted the wording we insisted upon for the CSCE documents in Madrid. They released the Pentacostalists and have promised additional releases. They have made new, more forthcoming proposals in START and MBFR, and have accepted proposals to negotiate an exchanges agreement, new consulates, and several confidence-building measures which they had resisted earlier. And just last week they agreed to a long-term grain agreement on terms more favorable to us than the previous one. While there is a

logic to each of these in their own terms, the overall pattern is one designed to show that they are willing to deal seriously.

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How to Proceed

While we must be prepared to handle the question of a summit in public with the same coolness Gromyko has shown, we should continue to probe Soviet flexibility in diplomatic and private channels. And if we can speed up this process without becoming the demandeur, we should do so.

month. I believe that Secretary Shultz's testimony on the Hill last week and his recent approach to Dobrynin, coupled with Kampelman's conversations in Madrid and our proposals in the arms reduction talks in Geneva and Vienna provide an appropriate start to the process of setting an agenda for a possible summit. At this point, my judgment is that what we have put on the table is appropriate, but that we should go no further on any matter of substance until the Soviets respond with something of their own. We should press for significant progress in each of the areas we have outlined, utilizing both formal diplomatic channels, and--whenever appropriate and potentially useful--special channels such as that through Kampelman and his KGB interlocutor.

In fact, as we enter into a more intensive dialogue with the Soviets, we should give careful thought to establishing a private channel for frank discussion of sensitive issues of a broader nature than those handled by Kampelman. I believe that such a channel can be useful provided we manage it in a manner so that the heads of key agencies in our own government and our principal negotiators are aware of the messages passed, and that discussion is shifted to formal channels before firm commitments are made.

In preparing for a possible summit, timing will be a factor almost as important as substance. On the one hand, we need to make clear to the Soviets that we are prepared to deal if they are and to give impetus to their sluggish policy making. On the other, it is important not to appear to be in a hurry lest our negotiating position be weakened.

If we do not take a step to force the pace of negotiations, the scenario would look something like the following:

A. Continue diplomatic exchanges (Shultz/Dobrynin, Hartman/Gromyko) until late September.

B. You and Shultz meet with Gromyko in late September, when he comes here for the UN session.

C. Assuming these exchanges produce some progress, plan a Shultz visit to Moscow in December. (I think it important that he not go in October or November so as not to provide an excuse in Europe to delay scheduled INF deployments.)

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Although this scenario might provide enough evidence of the prospects for a summit to permit a go/no go decision by the end of the year (for a summit around March or April), it would do little to raise the visibility of our negotiations or to increase pressure on the Soviets for quick decisions. Also, a Shultz visit immediately following INF deployments might not be acceptable to the Soviets.

With these considerations in mind, Ambassador Hartman has recommended that Shultz propose a visit to Moscow in July or early August, provided he can be assured of a meeting with Andropov. Hartman argues that such a visit would exert pressure on the Soviets to respond promptly to our latest proposals, give us the opportunity to explain the implications of our latest START proposals to Andropov directly (Hartman believes he has not really grasped their potential), and demonstrate to our public and the Allies that we are negotiating seriously.

These are powerful arguments in favor of an early Shultz visit to Moscow, but I am concerned over the impact of our taking the initiative in suggesting a visit before we have any forthcoming responses from the Soviets to our latest proposals. Obviously, we must make a decision on this very soon if the trip is to be possible at all, and over the next few days I shall be reviewing the pros and cons and exploring possible alternative ways to speed up the diplomatic process.

Public Handling

Until we have decided whether to proceed to the summit and have nailed down the arrangements with the Soviets privately, we should hold strictly to our current position (that one could be useful in the future if properly prepared), and avoid speculation on whether and when one might be possible.

We should also consider approaching key Senators and Members of Congress privately to encourage them to avoid pressing publicly for a summit, which only erodes our negotiating position in arranging one. (Percy's comments during the Shultz hearing, for example, were distinctly unhelpful.)

As we proceed with those negotiations you approve, it will be absolutely essential to avoid premature leaks. Therefore we will probably need to develop special "close hold" procedures to avoid wide dissemination of our negotiating plans in the bureaucracy. I expect to have some specific suggestions for you shortly on this subject.

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11663 7
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NLRR E06-114/11 #11663

BY KML NARA DATE 4/21/11

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

Subject: Summitry

I have submitted papers to you earlier pointing out the dangers of summitry in the absence of assurance that substantial progress can be made on issues of primary importance to us, and believe that the considerations set forth in them remain valid. However, public and Congressional pressures are building for a summit meeting, and although the rationale is often fuzzy and the premises mistaken, this is a fact of life with which we must deal.

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U.S. Objectives

Our confrontation with the Soviet Union is and will continue to be a protracted one. Summitry, to the extent we choose to

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Declassify on: OADR

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 1, 1983

John

This seems to have a very high likelihood of giving the liberal press an excuse to suggest a deferral in deployment given the "sprit of turtle bay (the UN)."

Bud

cc: Jack Matlock

Secret Attachment

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

3/3/85

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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

FDB -
0930
DECLASSIFIED

NLRR Feb-14/11 #11664

BY CU NARADATE 7/15/83 27 June 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable William P. Clark
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Summitry

OR

As I told you on Sunday, after my quick reading, I like your memorandum on summitry. Reading it carefully again, I have two reservations and one suggestion. The reservations are in the paragraph on the critical issue of Third Areas on page 3. They are these:

1. The Soviets have little or no interest in drawing us into a form of geopolitical "horse-trading based on an implicit recognition of spheres of influence." They have their spheres of influence nailed down, they are presently targetting and expanding in other areas which we have shown little capacity to defend. For example, why would they give up the prospect in Central America in return for a free hand in Poland, which to all intents and purposes they already have.

2. We hardly have to make it clear that "irresponsible Soviet behavior is a major impediment to the whole range of U.S.-Soviet relations." They have been told that by at least five Presidents and in each case they have demonstrated that they were not willing to give up their efforts to expand their influence in the Third World in return for improved U.S.-Soviet relations.

Now for my suggestion. I agree that we don't want a summit without adequate preparation. I further believe that there is no way the Soviets would do a summit meeting in mid-1984 because they will do nothing to help President Reagan be reelected. But what they might find to be in their interest is a non-substantive meeting in New York at the UN. This would have to be informal with no White House hype to build up expectations, no intent to arrive at agreements, but merely an opportunity to get acquainted and talk about the agenda before the two countries. This would be sufficiently before the crunch period on deployment. It might serve Andropov's domestic purposes. The President would be showing flexibility and willingness to talk to the American public as well as the Europeans. If the Soviets were to decline the meeting that word would get out both at home and in Europe which would help the President. It could be an afternoon's talk followed by a small dinner or a small dinner followed by an evening's talk, perhaps with the Director General of the UN as host to minimize protocol problems.

William J. Casey

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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July 7, 1983

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Summitry: Casey's Memo of June 27

My reaction to Bill Casey's thoughtful comments are as follows:

(1) Meeting on fringes of UN: I think this has its dangers, but we must recognize that if Andropov decides to come to the UN, the President will have no alternative to meeting him. I doubt if Andropov would come without our encouragement, but if he should, we can minimize the negative fallout by making clear that (a) such a meeting is not a summit in the sense we have been using the term, but simply a courtesy due a major foreign chief of state coming to the U.S. on other business; and (b) such a meeting need not foreclose a proper, full-fledged summit if conditions make that desirable.

Whether we should encourage Andropov to come is a separate question, and at this point I would be inclined to advise against it since it would probably raise too many hopes and might well get in the way of INF deployments. However, we should keep the possibility of such a meeting in mind over coming weeks and say nothing publicly which would make it more difficult to manage it if future developments should increase the desirability. If at any point we decide for any reason that we want such a meeting, we should try to arrange it privately before issuing a public invitation.

(2) Soviet willingness to arrange Summit next year: I do not agree with Casey that there is "no way" the Soviets will agree to a summit in mid-1984. They, in fact, may be eager for one if Andropov's health holds. Their assessment of the likelihood of the President's reelection will be important, of course. Almost as important will be their assessment of the possibility of concluding any deal with the Reagan Administration, and one task of our diplomacy (public and private) over the coming months will be to make clear that we are willing to conclude mutually advantageous agreements.

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Declassify on: OADR

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NLRR 106-114/117 11665

BY CJ NARA DATE 7/15/08

Aside from these considerations, however, there is a deeper reason for the Soviets not rejecting a summit next year, even if they feel that it contributes to the President's reelection chances. This is that the Soviets prefer the known to the unknown and unpredictable; more importantly, they prefer an interlocutor who can deliver if a deal is struck to one who might be voted down by the U.S. Senate. Given their experience with Carter's vacillations--which they found maddening--they may well actually prefer a strong U.S. President to an unpredictable one. And they appreciate the fact that a President with strong anti-Communist credentials offers more long-term reliability as an interlocutor than one who is weak at home. In sum, paradoxical as it may seem, they may favor the President's re-election as the lesser of two "evils."

(3) Third Areas: Though they will never say so directly, I feel strongly that the Soviets do have a strong urge to indulge in geo-political horse trading. This is implicit in almost every frank conversation with them I can recall when dealing with "third area" questions. The fact is that they do not feel that they have "their" spheres of influence "nailed down." They know they are not there legitimately, but only because they have been able to force themselves on these areas. Therefore, legitimizing their position is of great importance to them. Since theirs are not true alliances (as ours are) they stand only to gain from the appearance of legitimacy. Conversely, we stand only to lose. For this reason, it is a policy we should reject. Any analysis of what they theoretically might accept in such a "trade off" session is not only beside the point, but dangerous.

(4) Linkage: I am not sure the Soviets have really taken on board the implicit linkage of their overall behavior and our ability to conclude major agreements. It is true that every postwar U.S. President has made the right noises (at times) on this point, but few have acted as if it is important, and this is what counts. In fact, the Carter Administration consciously and explicitly de-linked SALT-II from any other factor. (We did not even warn the Soviets regarding Afghanistan during the period between the Taraki coup in 1978 and the Soviet invasion in December 1979, which caused some Soviet officials to complain after sanctions were applied, "How were we to know it made any difference to you.?") Therefore, I consider it important to continue to make the linkage point, since I am not confident that it is really understood.

NON LOG

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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July 7, 1983

INFORMATION

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Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR E06-114/11 #11666

BY KML NARA DATE 4/21/11

Aside from these considerations, however, there is a deeper reason for the Soviets not rejecting a summit next year, even if they feel that it contributes to the President's reelection chances. This is that the Soviets prefer the known to the unknown and unpredictable; more importantly, they prefer an interlocutor who can deliver if a deal is struck to one who might be voted down by the U.S. Senate. Given their experience with Carter's vacillations--which they found maddening--they may well actually prefer a strong U.S. President to an unpredictable one. And they appreciate the fact that a President with strong anti-Communist credentials offers more long-term reliability as an interlocutor than one who is weak at home. In sum, paradoxical as it may seem, they may favor the President's re-election as the lesser of two "evils."

(3) Third Areas: Though they will never say so directly, I feel strongly that the Soviets do have a strong urge to indulge in geo-political horse trading. This is implicit in almost every frank conversation with them I can recall when dealing with "third area" questions. The fact is that they do not feel that they have "their" spheres of influence "nailed down." They know they are not there legitimately, but only because they have been able to force themselves on these areas. Therefore, legitimizing their position is of great importance to them. Since theirs are not true alliances (as ours are) they stand only to gain from the appearance of legitimacy. Conversely, we stand only to lose. For this reason, it is a policy we should reject. Any analysis of what they theoretically might accept in such a "trade off" session is not only beside the point, but dangerous.

(4) Linkage: I am not sure the Soviets have really taken on board the implicit linkage of their overall behavior and our ability to conclude major agreements. It is true that every postwar U.S. President has made the right noises (at times) on this point, but few have acted as if it is important, and this is what counts. In fact, the Carter Administration consciously and explicitly de-linked SALT-II from any other factor. (We did not even warn the Soviets regarding Afghanistan during the period between the Taraki coup in 1978 and the Soviet invasion in December 1979, which caused some Soviet officials to complain after sanctions were applied, "How were we to know it made any difference to you.?") Therefore, I consider it important to continue to make the linkage point, since I am not confident that it is really understood.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Mr. McFarlane

I will be available this afternoon for further discussion if you desire. You can see that, at this moment, I have not reached a final judgment on the desirability of a Shultz visit in July or August. I do have some ideas about how the demandeur aspect of the matter might be minimized. For example, if it is felt that it would be desirable to arrange such a visit, word could be passed informally (or perhaps through Kohl) that Shultz would be amenable to a Soviet invitation. I believe the mechanics need more careful consideration than I, at least, have been able to give them. And, of course, Shultz himself should be consulted. I am not sure he feels as strongly about the desirability of a visit as Hartman does--but you probably have a better feel for this than I do.

Another point not fully explored is the development of a close-hold mechanism to staff out our moves as we get more involved with the Soviets. We face an immediate problem in deciding how the terms of reference should be developed in case the Soviets respond favorably on the cultural agreement and consulates. It might be useful for us to discuss this matter before we proceed.

Jack

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NLRR EOL-114/11 #11667

BY KML NARA DATE 4/21/11

~~SECRET~~THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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~~SECRET~~NLRR F06-114/11 # 11668
BY KML NARA DATE 4/21/11

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

Subject: Summitry

I have submitted papers to you earlier pointing out the dangers of summitry in the absence of assurance that substantial progress can be made on issues of primary importance to us, and believe that the considerations set forth in them remain valid. However, public and Congressional pressures are building for a summit meeting, and although the rationale is often fuzzy and the premises mistaken, this is a political fact of life with which we must deal.

At this point it is clear that we are well on track in rebuilding our defense strength and in rallying our Allies on the most critical issues. Our economy is showing increasing signs of long-term recovery, and your position of leadership is strong and assured. Andropov, in contrast, is faced with a myriad of problems far more fundamental and intractable than ours. The basics, therefore, are moving unmistakably in our direction and our negotiating strength is stronger than it has been for many years. Our task is to manage the U.S.-Soviet relationship in a manner which will insure that these trends continue over the long term. In other words, we must insure the sustainability of our current policies.

This means, among other things, that we must deal with the summit issue in a manner so that pressures for a summit do not erode our ability to maintain our defense programs or allied unity, particularly on the INF deployment issue. Our goal should be more ambitious than mere damage limitation, however. We should aim to use the summit issue in a manner which enhances our leverage rather than weakening it (which would be the case if we were forced by ill-founded public, Congressional or allied opinion to enter into an inadequately prepared meeting without clear objectives.) I believe that this can be done, provided that we are clear in our own minds about our objectives, avoid raising false public expectations, and pursue a purposeful, well-coordinated negotiating track over the coming months.

U.S. Objectives

Our confrontation with the Soviet Union is and will continue to be a protracted one. Summitry, to the extent we choose to

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indulge in it, should be viewed as just one instrument in a long-term, sustained effort. Although it is possible that a major breakthrough can be achieved within a year in some area of primary interest to us, this is far from certain and, indeed, does not seem likely. There are two basic reasons for this: (1) Despite the favorable trends running in our direction, the Soviet leaders will continue to balk at offering proof that our policy of strength pays off, and are likely to continue for some time to try to undermine our strength and determination rather than making the hard choices required; and (2) Andropov, even with his accession to the titular chief of state role, has probably not consolidated his position to the degree that he can force painful decisions on powerful interest groups.

Therefore, if there is a summit within twelve months, our most important objective will be to impress upon Andropov that our will and capacity to confront him successfully is firm and unalterable in the absence of a significant modification of Soviet behavior. This could prepare the ground for more significant Soviet concessions in 1985.

A second objective should be to obtain significant progress (though not necessarily formal agreements) in several of the areas of primary interest to us: human rights, Soviet restraint in third countries, arms reduction and confidence-building measures, and bilateral relations--particularly those aspects which strengthen our capacity to communicate with the Soviet public at large and thus to build pressure for a gradual "opening" of Soviet society.

A third objective should be to demonstrate--both to the more pragmatic elements of the Soviet leadership and to our own public--that we are in fact serious negotiating partners and that we are not making unreasonable demands in order to block settlement of disputes.

The Agenda

The agenda for any summit will be effectively shaped by the content of negotiations prior to it. Our negotiations, therefore, should cover, persistently and systematically, those issues on our list, whether they seem amenable to progress or not. For it is important to keep hammering at the themes important to us, whether or not there is a Soviet response. Prospects in the various areas vary, of course, as do the appropriate channels we should use. The following examples are meant to be illustrative rather than comprehensive:

-- Human Rights: Here the Soviets can make concessions regarding specific persons if they choose, but they are unlikely to make any in overall procedure. In my view, we can

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aim realistically to obtain the emigration of the Pentacostalists, the release and emigration of Shcharansky, at least some improvement in Sakharov's position (e.g. medical treatment in Moscow), and increased Jewish emigration. We should continue to use the Kampleman channel for most of this, and are likely to get the most from quiet diplomacy, backed up by publicity generated by private organizations and--as appropriate--support from allied and other governments (e.g., the Stoessel mission). We should offer nothing in return for these Soviet actions, other than an improved atmosphere.

-- Third Areas: These promise to be among the most contentious and intractable issues we must manage. The Soviet aim will be to draw us into a form of geopolitical horse-trading based on an implicit recognition of spheres of influence. (For example, they promise to ease off arms supplies to Central America in return for a free hand in Poland.) We must, of course, totally reject going down this path, since it ultimately would undermine our alliances and weaken the moral basis for our policies. Our leverage on these issues varies with the local situation; it is most powerful when political conditions in the area and the military balance act as a barrier to Soviet penetration and weakest when one or both of these barriers is absent. But while our most effective counter to Soviet adventurism must be defeating it on the spot, we should make it clear that irresponsible Soviet behavior is a major impediment to the whole range of U.S.-Soviet relations. "Linkage" in this general sense is a political fact of life, and we must not let the Soviets forget it.

It is difficult to say at this juncture what we can expect in this area from a summit, but as a minimum I believe we should have credible assurance that there will be no further dramatic Soviet or surrogate military moves to tip the balance in a regional situation. We should, of course, continue to probe Soviet intentions in each individual situation and be prepared to use the implicit leverage of an upcoming summit to push the Soviets toward a solution we favor.

-- Arms Reduction and CBM's: We should be able to make progress on some of the confidence-building measures we have proposed, but a real breakthrough in any of the three major arms reduction talks seems highly problematic, although possible. If we are to move toward a summit, however, we should use that process to pressure the Soviets to get more forthcoming proposals on the table, and should hold off agreeing to a summit until our positions have narrowed on at least some of the key issues. Presumably both sides must be able to say after the meeting that some significant progress was achieved in this area.

-- Bilateral issues: Here, we can reasonably expect some limited progress. If the Soviets agree to a cultural and

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information exchange agreement which enhances our access to the Soviet public it will be in our interest. Establishment of a consulate in Kiev would provide us with a window on the largest Soviet minority nationality and enhance our ability to exploit the potential nationalities problem. We may be able to achieve some greater access to the Soviet media, and possibly a cessation of jamming of VOA, as well as some minor improvements in the consular and travel areas. While none of these topics are likely to be suitable for extended discussion at a summit, the latter could provide some leverage for favorable results in negotiations preceding the meeting.

Is this Enough?

If the analysis above is accurate, it would seem that we can expect at this point only limited gains from a summit. So limited, in fact, that they might not justify the risk of public euphoria (some is inevitable, even if not encouraged) followed by a let-down and recriminations. For this reason, I believe we should continue to proceed cautiously and deliberately and avoid committing ourselves to a summit until our negotiations provide a clearer picture of how much give there is in Soviet positions.

There are other reasons for proceeding with caution. If the Pope's spectacular success in rallying the Polish people and humiliating Jaruzelski results in heavy-handed Soviet interference in Poland, it would, to put it mildly, make it difficult for you to meet Andropov. Also, we would want to be sure that the trial of the Pope's would-be assassin in Italy is unlikely to produce persuasive evidence of a "Bulgarian connection," since you will not want to sit down with a man whom the public believes--rightly or wrongly--to have taken out a contract on the Pope.

I believe that the Soviets want a summit, since it enhances their stature--at home and in the rest of the world--to be seen dealing as equals with the President of the United States. It is also useful to Andropov personally in consolidating his power internally to be accepted by you as an equal partner. They will not abandon the store to us for the privilege of a meeting, but they will pay something (in human rights cases and in access to their population) if we negotiate these issues skillfully and avoid making them a public test of strength. But in order to squeeze the maximum out of them, we must position ourselves so that we will not be seen needing a summit more than they.

The Soviets clearly recognize the danger of appearing over eager, and I believe this was behind Gromyko's June 21 statement accusing us of having "no constructive goals" and implying that we must change our policies to make a summit possible.

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How to Proceed

While we must be prepared to handle the matter in public with the same coolness Gromyko has shown, we should do what we can in diplomatic and private channels to probe Soviet flexibility. And if we can speed up this process without becoming the demandeur, we should do so.

I believe that Secretary Shultz's testimony on the Hill last week and his recent approach to Dobrynin, coupled with Kampelman's conversations in Madrid and our proposals in the arms reduction talks in Geneva and Vienna provide an appropriate start to the process of setting an agenda for a possible summit. At this point, my judgment is that what we have put on the table is appropriate, but that we should go no further on any matter of substance until the Soviets respond with something of their own. We should press for significant progress in each of the areas we have outlined, utilizing both formal diplomatic channels, and--whenever appropriate and potentially useful--special channels such as that through Kampelman and his KGB interlocutor.

In fact, as we enter into a more intensive dialogue with the Soviets, we should give careful thought to establishing a private channel for frank discussion of sensitive issues of a broader nature than those handled by Kampelman. I believe that such a channel can be useful provided we manage it in a manner so that the heads of key agencies in our own government and our principal negotiators are aware of the messages passed, and that discussion is shifted to formal channels before firm commitments are made.

In preparing for a possible summit, timing will be a factor almost as important as substance. On the one hand, we need to make clear to the Soviets that we are prepared to deal if they are and to give impetus to their sluggish policy making. On the other, it is important not to appear to be in a hurry lest our negotiating position be weakened.

If we do not take a step to force the pace of negotiations, the scenario would look something like the following:

A. Continue diplomatic exchanges (Shultz/Dobrynin, Hartman/Gromyko) until late September.

B. You and Shultz meet with Gromyko in late September, when he comes here for the UN session.

C. Assuming these exchanges produce some progress, plan a Shultz visit to Moscow in December. (I think it important that he not go in October or November so as not to provide an excuse in Europe to delay scheduled INF deployments.)

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Although this scenario might provide enough evidence of the prospects for a summit to permit a go/no go decision by the end of the year (for a summit around March or April), it would do little to raise the visibility of our negotiations or to increase pressure on the Soviets for quick decisions. Also, a Shultz visit immediately following INF deployments might not be acceptable to the Soviets.

With these considerations in mind, Ambassador Hartman has recommended that Shultz propose a visit to Moscow in July or early August, provided he can be assured of a meeting with Andropov. Hartman argues that such a visit would exert pressure on the Soviets to respond promptly to our latest proposals, give us the opportunity to explain the implications of our latest START proposals to Andropov directly (Hartman believes he has not really grasped their potential), and demonstrate to our public and the Allies that we are negotiating seriously.

These are powerful arguments in favor of an early Shultz visit to Moscow, but I am concerned over the impact of our taking the initiative in suggesting a visit before we have any forthcoming responses from the Soviets to our latest proposals. Obviously, we must make a decision on this very soon if the trip is to be possible at all, and over the next few days I shall be reviewing the pros and cons and exploring possible alternative ways to speed up the diplomatic process.

Public Handling

Until we have decided whether to proceed to the summit and have nailed down the arrangements with the Soviets privately, we should hold strictly to our current position (that one could be useful in the future if properly prepared), and avoid speculation on whether and when one might be possible.

We should also consider approaching key Senators and Members of Congress privately to encourage them to avoid pressing publicly for a summit, which only erodes our negotiating position in arranging one. (Percy's comments during the Shultz hearing, for example, were distinctly unhelpful.)

As we proceed with those negotiations you approve, it will be absolutely essential to avoid premature leaks. Therefore we will probably need to develop special "close hold" procedures to avoid wide dissemination of our negotiating plans in the bureaucracy. I expect to have some specific suggestions for you shortly on this subject.

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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June 24, 1983

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR JACK F. MATLOCK

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY ²⁷

SUBJECT: Memorandum on Summitry

I fully concur with the major thrust of your memorandum.

With regard to specific Soviet intentions, I believe that any dramatic changes in the Soviet "policy mix" are unlikely. Also, Andropov's flexibility in the foreseeable future would be limited by the constituency which brought him to power.

Concerning possible areas for compromise, human rights and arms reductions seem to provide the most fertile ground. I believe that as INF deployment time approaches, the Soviets would dust off the "walk in the woods" approach. The most likely scenario would involve a partial U.S. GLCM deployment in exchange for a higher level of Soviet SS-20 deployment as compensation for British and French forces. I believe the area least likely to produce results would be Third World issues. Establishing a new code of accepted conduct for the U.S. and the USSR has always been the most intractable task of detente and is in my opinion unlikely in the current atmosphere. Therefore, I foresee no formal agreements in this area. However, I do sense that informally, the Soviets might indicate to us that for their own internal reasons they would eschew any highly visible Third World interventions.

I also envision a drift toward what might be termed "get back to basic security policy" -- as evidenced in Andropov's recent plenum address. Thus, some progress on bilateral relations and human rights might be thrown in by the Soviets as trade offs if an INF deal seems to be in the offing.

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BY KML NARA DATE 4/21/11

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June 9, 1983

TO: WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: TYRUS W. COBB

SUBJECT: A TURNING POINT IN SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS?

This memorandum summarizes the thrust of the accompanying paper reviewing the state of Soviet-American relations and suggests directions for a negotiating strategy. The paper concludes that this relationship has reached a critical crossroads and that the United States has a unique opportunity for seizing the initiative and setting the agenda for the superpower competition.

-- SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS AT THE CROSSROADS

---The dynamics of the ties have clearly shifted to the advantage of the Western Allies in general and the United States in particular.

The Kremlin recognizes that the forward momentum of the "Correlation of Forces" has been arrested and likely reversed. A combination of factors have contributed:

- Deteriorating economic conditions in the USSR; a stale leadership enmeshed in a continuing succession struggle; a gerontocracy unable to initiate bold new initiatives.
- In contrast, economic upturn in the USA; unemployment and inflation down, growth rates surging. Consumer confidence returns. President's popularity on upswing; dynamism at core of national leadership.
- Continuing dissension in the Eastern Bloc countries, worsening economic conditions. CEMA so divided it is unable to convene meeting.
- Williamsburg summit demonstrates new-found unity in Western Alliance on security issues. French cooperation with NATO improves, Japanese support for our politico-military stance solid. President Reagan's policies given strong vote of confidence. Conservative political trend prominent across Allied countries.
- Soviet hope of "psychological and political disarmament in Europe" clearly rejected. Moscow's two-track strategy for managing East-West relations in shambles (First, to maneuver USA back to a congenial bilateral relationship in which we give clear priority to arms control issues and broadly engage Moscow in a dialogue on regional security issues, and, secondly, to exploit differences between U.S. and NATO allies.)

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--- This suggests that the time is ripe to revise many of the characteristics of our approach to the Soviet relationship over the last decade:

- A nagging sense of pessimism; a feeling that we were dealing from a position of weakness as the correlation of forces shifted to the Soviet advantage.
- A frequent American preoccupation with minor issues and the abdication of the political high ground to the Soviets.
- An absence of a comprehensive strategy for dealing with the USSR over time; a lack of a coordination mechanism to supervise the implementation of our strategies.
- A lack of consistency in policy and a failure to follow initiatives through to their logical conclusion.

-- IS THE TIME PROPITIOUS FOR A NEW DYNAMISM?

- Moscow likely calculates that the Reagan administration has secured an enviable negotiating position vis-a-vis the USSR. The Kremlin is probably resigned to the fact that it must deal with this tenacious American regime for another six years.
- President Reagan's vote of confidence at Williamsburg and recent domestic political (MX, Adelman) and economic successes place him in excellent position to carry the initiative to the Soviets in US-USSR relations.
- Therefore, the United States needs to proceed with confidence and speed to capitalize on the momentum that has been generated. The thrust of our efforts, however, should not be on the development of major new initiatives but on the coordination and reiteration of proposals previously raised. SPECIFIC ATTENTION MUST BE DIRECTED TOWARD THE DEVELOPMENT OF A DETAILED PLAN OF IMPLEMENTATION.

-- SHOULD WE MOVE FORWARD WITH ANY NEW INITIATIVES AT THE PRESENT TIME?

- Moscow would be ecstatic if we were to offer to open up a series of negotiations on regional and arms control issues. There is no rationale for this at the present time. However, two minor initiatives should be favorably considered:
 - Drafting of a new Exchange Agreement. It could provide important benefits for us, but attention needs to be directed at the crucial question: How will the agreement be administered and how will reciprocity be insured?
 - Opening of a new Consulate in Kiev in exchange for New York. However, at this time we should only tell the Soviets that we are

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actively considering the resumption of negotiations for the establishment of Consulates General.

- These measures could be raised in the context of an American willingness to test the sincerity of Andropov's "quest" for better relations. While we do not want to be seen as "taking the first step", neither do we wish to appear intransigent before world public opinion.

-- IS A SUMMIT DESIRABLE? NECESSARY? AVOIDABLE?

- The disadvantages of a summit/high-level conclave between President Reagan and General-Secretary Andropov outweigh the advantages. However, the sophisticated nature of these rationales may fall on deaf ears, more simplistic questions ("What's wrong with talking?") may be more persuasive to public opinion.
- Momentum toward a summit meeting may be impossible to stem without unacceptable political costs. Therefore, United States should take the initiative and set the terms of such a meeting.
 - Conditions should not appear to be unrealistic or we will be accused of being intransigent and insincere.
 - If summit meeting/conclave appears inevitable, we should attempt to turn the thrust away from complex issues with which the Soviet propaganda machine has become comfortable. Focus on measures to provide greater strategic openness, need to open the books on military doctrine, defense spending, long-range plans.
 - Summit should be prepared with same thoroughness and care that went into Williamsburg. We should feel that past poor American performances at summits are not precedents, but serve as cautionary notes. This President could turn such a conclave into another personal triumph.

-- A LONG-RANGE STRATEGY FOR THE NEXT TWO YEARS: SHIFTING THE FOCUS

- We must shift the focus from the preferred Soviet agenda, arms control issues, to another plane. The theme should:
 - Be Designed to Place the Soviets on the Strategic Defensive
 - Consolidate previous proposals and minimize major new initiatives
 - Have as a primary objective the improvement of our access in areas of Soviet national security policy where we have little information, specifically the politico-military decision-making process and national security strategy and doctrine.

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--- The attached paper spells out such a program, designed to proceed from President Reagan's proposals in the realm of confidence-building measures and steps to reduce the risk of nuclear conflict. A program centered on this theme would respond directly to the criteria outlined above.

Prepared By:

TYRUS W. COBB

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June 9, 1983

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TO: WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: TYRUS W. COBB

SUBJECT: SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS AT THE CROSSROADS

PURPOSE: This memorandum reviews the current state of Soviet-American relations and suggests directions for a negotiating strategy for dealing with Moscow over the next two years. The paper concludes that this relationship is at a critical turning point and that the United States has a unique opportunity to seize the initiative and set the agenda for the superpower competition.

PROBLEMS WITH THE AMERICAN APPROACH

-- Over the past decade the American approach to dealing with the USSR has often been marked by:

- A nagging sense of Pessimism. Dominant feeling appears to have been that, as the Soviets claim, the correlation of forces was shifting to the advantage of the Socialist Camp and that we were negotiating from a position of weakness. The Post-Vietnam retraction, the rapid Soviet advances in strategic and conventional weaponry, the Iranian hostage crisis, and dissension in the Western Alliance System all contributed to a diminution of confidence.
- A frequent American preoccupation with minor issues and an abdication of the moral high ground to the Soviet Union. The USSR often galvanized world public opinion by pressing a series of intuitively attractive, albeit unrealistic, proposals that addressed growing global concerns over the danger of a nuclear conflict. American preoccupation with issues such as the Pentacostalists and the Shcharansky case, important as they are, has deflected considerable time and energy away from the critical issue-- the global competition between two opposing ideologies.
- An absence of a comprehensive strategy for dealing with the USSR over time. Most administrations did not develop a broad policy line for engaging the USSR until the latter part of the term and even then the "plan" was conceptual in nature. Conspicuously absent (and this criticism applies to NSDP-75) has been a comprehensive strategy for implementation of the broad directives contained in the policy paper and a lack of a coordinating mechanism to supervise the tactical steps needed to implement the strategy.
- A lack of consistency in policy and a failure to follow initiatives through to their logical conclusion. The former is largely a result

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of the changes in American administrations (four in the last decade) and the tardy attention given to foreign affairs. The present administration itself has suggested a number of promising initiatives, but has frequently failed to maintain the initial momentum, to coordinate follow-up action throughout the government, or to press the propaganda advantages conferred by the initial proposals.

THE GLOBAL "CORRELATION OF FORCES": A SOVIET PERSPECTIVE REVISED

- Throughout the 1960s and early 1970s the Kremlin stressed repeatedly that the shift in the "correlation of forces" had "forced the West to abandon its preference of dealing with the USSR from a position of strength and to pursue a policy of detente. As John Lenczowski correctly notes, they believed that their increased political and military strength had forced us into talks and negotiations. It was on the basis of these perceptions of U.S. weakness, he points out, that they made many of their geopolitical calculations.
- It would appear that a Soviet official would not be nearly so confident which direction the correlation is progressing today. In fact, an "objective analysis" would probably demonstrate that the shift is now in favor of the West. This is a result of a growing number of Soviet weaknesses that contrasts with a rejuvenated West. Consider the following:
 - POLITICAL: A continuing Soviet succession struggle as the ruling gerontocracy fails to adopt bold domestic initiatives required to revitalize a stagnant society and eradicate a growing sense of malaise. In the global arena the USSR remains isolated, regarded as enemy number one by the other major power centers. Her primary international strategy, of fracturing the Western Alliance, has suffered a severe setback.
 - ECONOMIC: Low rates of growth approaching stagnation have generated increasing frustration and consumer dissatisfaction. Traditional resource allocation priority to defense and heavy industry in question and regime will probably be forced to re-evaluate their choice between "guns or margarine".
 - MILITARY: The Soviet leadership can draw considerable satisfaction in the rapid modernization and expansion program that affords the USSR its one trump card in international politics. Still, Moscow must question the utility of the enormous resources devoted toward this buildup, given the unimpressive performance to date in Afghanistan.

IN THE WESTERN CAMP: RENEWED VITALITY AND STRENGTH:

- In contrast to the problems faced by the Soviet leadership, the Industrial Democracies have made significant strides in achieving economic growth, political cohesion and coordination of security policies. Kremlin analysts probably concede that the President has succeeded in significantly strengthening

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his position domestically and American influence in the Western Alliance system. In particular they would see:

- Renewed economic vitality: Inflation rate down, unemployment dropping. Growth projections show impressive rises. Consumer confidence returning.
- Domestic political successes: President Reagan has secured important victories over issues important to the Soviets---the Adelman confirmation, the MX vote, the limited success of various nuclear freeze proposals. Defense modernization program less than originally requested, but reverses post-Vietnam trends and gives impetus to rearmament pledges.
- President's success in rejuvenating the Western Alliance system. Has negated previous Soviet successes in splitting Allies away from the Americans. Kremlin appreciates that Williamsburg represents personal triumph for the President and a major step toward gaining Allied unity on national security issues. Moscow particularly vexed by Japanese endorsement of American politico-military positions, Tokyo's path toward upgrading its military, and France's movement toward reintegration into the NATO Alliance.
- A conservative political trend now dominates European and Japanese politics---Kohl in West Germany and Thatcher's impressive mandate indicate greater ideological cohesion in Alliance. French Socialist government's harsh anti-Soviet stance irritates Moscow.
- The foregoing does not suggest that the USSR is in any danger of collapse or that we can significantly affect the debilitating socio-economic trends. Nor does it argue that the USSR will cease to be a dangerous competitor in global politics. Indeed, given its ability to concentrate resources and talent on selected high-priority issues the Kremlin will continue to act as a formidable adversary in the superpower competition.
- It does suggest, however, that:
 - The Kremlin probably recognizes that the forward momentum of the "Correlation of Forces" has been arrested and likely reversed.
 - Moscow concedes that the Reagan administration has secured the most favorable negotiating position vis-a-vis the Soviets in the last decade. The USSR's leadership has abandoned its initial mildly optimistic expectations of this Administration and become resigned to the fact that it must deal with this tenacious American regime, most likely for the next six years.

TOWARD A COMPREHENSIVE NEGOTIATING STRATEGY:

- The United States now needs to proceed with confidence and speed to capitalize on the momentum that has been generated. The thrust of our efforts should not be on the development of major new initiatives but on the coordination and reiteration of proposals previously raised. Specific attention must be

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directed toward the development of a detailed plan of implementation.

The foreign policy bureaucracy must first review the initiatives already taken and ascertain their effectiveness and status. All past and future actions should be reviewed and new initiatives evaluated in the extent to which they:

--- SEIZE THE INITIATIVE FROM THE SOVIETS

--- OCCUPY THE MORAL "HIGH GROUND" IN THE GLOBAL COMPETITION

--- PROMOTE POSITIVE CHANGE WITHIN THE USSR

-- In the implementation of its negotiating strategy the United States should consider a demonstration of its willingness to test Andropov's sincerity, as expressed to Harriman, of his desire to move toward improved relations. Two initiatives are suggested because of the advantages accruing to the USA and the low profile nature of the proposals:

--- Propose the negotiation of a new Soviet-American Exchange Agreement. If properly fashioned it would allow us to present exhibits, publications and films in the USSR and lead to a greater access to Soviet media. At present the USSR enjoys the benefits of such an agreement with few of the drawbacks. The agreement should allow us to better control intelligence presence in this country, enforce reciprocity, and initiate a wider penetration of Soviet society.

--- Propose the opening up of a new Consulate in Kiev in return for a Soviet Consulate in New York. Although there are some causes for concern, the expansion of the Soviet presence in New York would not represent a significant increase in their intelligence-collecting capabilities. An American presence in Kiev could facilitate the extension of our ability to promote American policy in an important region.

-- As a second step the United States needs to consolidate proposals it has raised previously into a comprehensive and coherent program. We have suggested numerous initiatives designed to lessen tension between the superpowers, but the proposals have not been packaged coherently under a single, dominant theme. Further, they have not been coordinated so as to gain maximum impact and, in many cases, have not been followed through to completion.

--- THEME:

- We need to shift the focus from the preferred Soviet agenda, arms control issues, to another plane. The theme should

(1) Be designed to place the Soviets on the Strategic Defensive

(2) Consolidate previous proposals as much as possible and minimize the necessity for further initiatives

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- (3) Have as a long-range objective improvement of our access in areas of Soviet national security policy where we have little information; specifically, the politico-military decision-making process, force modernization projections, and military doctrine and strategy. Given the nature of our open society the USSR has ready access to most of this information on our side---we need to penetrate the Kremlin's national security policy process by opening up multiple and novel channels of access.
- (4) Mute public concerns that this Administration is overly bellicose in its foreign policy pronouncements and demonstrate its sincerity regarding the dangers of a nuclear conflict.

- This suggests that the theme of this program revolve around "Measures to Reduce the Risk of Nuclear Conflict". The thought is hardly novel, but what is needed now is a reaffirmation of our commitment to take immediate steps to reduce the dangers of accidental nuclear war and eliminate tensions in the superpower relationship.

---VEHICLE:

- A major Presidential address could serve as the vehicle for launching this program. However, it should not be undertaken until a fully-staffed, well-coordinated and comprehensive plan of implementation is in place.

REDUCING THE RISK OF NUCLEAR CONFLICT: A POLICY APPROACH

- The President must stress that he applauds the concern demonstrated in this country regarding the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the dangers inherent in an atomic exchange. He should firmly state that nuclear war would be horribly destructive and could mean the end of civilization as we know it; that there are far more nuclear weapons that can be reasonably employed; that the superpowers must move with haste toward the reduction of nuclear arsenals.
- In the speech the Chief Executive should support the yearnings expressed in the West European and American peace demonstrations and add that, indeed, it is vitaly necessary to "Wage Peace".
- However, he should stress, what is absent is the same type of concern and protest from inside the USSR. While the peace movements are in full swing in the West the leaders of genuine anti-nuclear movements in the USSR are being incarcerated.
- Leaders of the movement must carry their message person-to-person to the people of the Soviet Union and engage the "man in the street" in discussions.
- Information on the extent of nuclear stockpiles and money spent on armaments must be distributed widely, including in the USSR. Western speakers must be encouraged to tour the USSR and East Europe

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and the Soviet Bloc governments called on to permit this expanded dialogue, much as we permit their publicists to tour this country.

- The President should reiterate his suggestion that the leaders of both countries appear on television and discuss their opposing views of national security issues. Further, he should suggest that American and Soviet officials and academicians appear frequently on television programs in debates and discussions on security issues (Face the Nation/Studio 9).

NOTE: The effectiveness of television as a medium of communications was aptly demonstrated in Charge Jack Matlock's July 4, 1981, address over Soviet TV. Delivered in fluent Russian and containing subtle references to the USSR's intervention in Afghanistan and the volatile situation in Poland, Mr. Matlock's speech was observed throughout the Soviet Union and drew numerous favorable comments from Soviet citizens.

- Finally, the President should place the Soviets squarely on the defensive by calling for the USSR to firmly support its contention that there is a great need to establish greater "Doveriye" (trust) between the two nations. This can only be accomplished, we should stress, if we can have confidence in the intentions of one another. This can be realized only if we lift the lid of secrecy on our respective armaments programs. We must now be prepared to delineate our respective long-term defense programs and share information relating to the strategic concepts that guide the deployment of these systems. Of course, the United States already makes most of this information available. Therefore, the USSR would either have to provide highly useful information or bear the onus of rejecting an initiative designed to get at the root of the strategic competition.
- He should reiterate and give fresh impetus to a series of proposals previously raised in the realm of "Confidence-Building Measures," particularly in his Berlin speech (June, 1982), should stress that conflict is often a result of inadequate confidence and that increased confidence could reduce the intensity and incidence of conflicts.
- Measures previously raised requiring reaffirmation:

- (1) Modernizing the direct communication links between Washington and Moscow; Improving the "Hot Line".
- (2) Creation of a direct military channel of communications in crisis situations
- (3) International agreement on consultations if a nuclear accident occurs
- (4) Advanced notification of test launchings of missiles.
- (5) Advanced notice of major military exercises

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- (6) Broad exchange of data on nuclear forces designed to reduce surprise, miscalculation and uncertainty. We must insist that this is the foundation on which "confidence-building measures" must be undertaken. Without greater access to respective defense modernization programs, budget allocations & decision-making processes, uncertainty and "worst-case" analyses will prevail.

--- Additional measures that might be raised under this rubric:

- (1) Direct military-to-military contacts between high command on both sides. Suggestion has been endorsed in the U.S. Senate, Moscow has hinted receptivity. We should take the initiative on this score. It is unlikely that Soviets could learn a lot more from us than they already know, but it does open the possibility of establishing new channels of access for us.
- (2) Direct "working-level" contacts between key policy planners in the Soviet and American national security decision-making bureaucracies. Again, the Soviet officials have enjoyed unusual access to individuals in the USA, not just government officials, with considerable expertise and knowledge on politico-military matters. We must develop a greater range of contacts ourselves. The Soviets have shown interest in initiating State Department-Ministry of Foreign Affairs discussions at the working level, but we should insist on Central Committee staff access.

NOTE: We should also give greater significance to our channel of communication through our Ambassador in Moscow. We have relied much too heavily on the Dobrynin conduit and need to upgrade the role of our Moscow representative. A first step might be to bring Ambassador Hartman back for consultations, replete with a media-intensive coverage meeting with the President.

A REAGAN-ANDROPOV MEETING: IS IT IN OUR INTEREST?

- Speculation continues to grow regarding the probability of a "summit" meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Andropov. The USSR maintains a low profile on this issue, feigning indifference, but, as Bill Stearman has stressed, they would probably jump at the chance for a Summit Conclave if offered. The pros and cons have been spelled out in other documents, but in brief:

--- DISADVANTAGES:

- Could be perceived as signifying improvements in Soviet-American relations, a "business-as-usual approach" while acceptable changes in Soviet behavior have not been undertaken.
- A Summit could generate unrealistic expectations
- American track record at summits is not impressive; fear is that the Soviets could turn it to great propaganda advantage

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- Confirms USSR's co-equal status as one of the world's two great superpowers

--- ADVANTAGES:

- A High-Level meeting would assist in maintaining Allied support for our security programs and the U.S. approach to East-West relations
 - President would be perceived as genuinely interested in decreasing tension between US and USSR; willing to engage in broad-based, multiple channel dialogue in order to improve relations
 - Every American President since Roosevelt has met with his Soviet counterpart: President would not be seen as opponent of relaxation of tensions.
- The momentum toward a summit or high-level meeting may be impossible to resist without unacceptable political costs. While the arguments against a summit are persuasive to the sophisticated, the more simplistic statements ("What's wrong with talking?") may be more convincing to both American and European public opinion.
- While American performance at past summits has been less than satisfactory, we should not assume that these mistakes would be repeated by President Reagan.
- The record of Williamsburg gathering testifies to the President's powers of persuasion. While he will not convince Andropov to change the course of Soviet national security policies, there is little reason to think that this President will fall prey to previous summit pitfalls.
- Should we perceive the inevitability of a summit or other form of meeting between Reagan and Andropov, we should immediately take steps to:
- (1) Take the high political ground by setting the terms of the summit agenda and let the USSR bear the onus of rejection
 - (2) Unrealistic preconditions for a summit should not be set, lest we be perceived as recalcitrant and guilty of establishing impossible standards. However, we should make it clear at the outset that we expect progress in important areas. As such, the program suggested here for greater cooperation in the area of "strategic philosophy" and "nuclear risk reduction" may offer a useful approach.
 - (3) The preparations for a Reagan-Andropov meeting/summit should be as thorough and complete as were those of the Williamsburg conclave. The results are likely to be equally favorable.

Prepared By:
TYRUS W. COBB

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

NLRR Folc-114/11 #11670

BY KML NARA DATE 4/21/11

June 16, 1983

Jack Matlock

Subject: Summitry

For many reasons--some good and some not so good-- we owe the President a thoughtful treatment of whether, and if so, why and how a Summit meeting should be held.

We have already given him two solid papers which treat the historical record, and emphasizing the damage which can be done to our long term interests by creating a false euphoria in the minds of Americans which makes it difficult to contend with continued misbehavior by the Soviets in the wake of a summit. In short, we have stressed that for a summit to be worthwhile, it must involve the resolution of problems, not atmperics.

What we have not told the President is what should be our agenda (the issues we want to resolve) in the discussions to take place in the months ahead? Should we keep the emphasis on arms control or does that repose an artificial importance to these talks which can not be fulfilled by the results? What other candidate problems should we stress--Central America? Finally, once we have our priorities in mind, what should be our strategy for achieving our goals? How do we use our leverage to get the right concessions from the Russians?

This is a tall order. In addition it is needed rather promptly, next Monday at the latest. Could you tackle this and get back to me with any questions you may have.

Many thanks

Bud

cc: Judge Clark

for Hml Matlock

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SHORT-TERM POLICY OPTIONS

Andropov has already suggested

I. Political Options (in order of priority)

Option

Rationale

A. Invite Andropov to Washington for Summit:

- should be early
- include request for early return visit to Moscow
- offer direct access to American law-makers and American people

-- speech before Congress

-- television address to nation

1. Private dialogues will not win the war of ideas. *will find it difficult to*

2. Andropov ~~can hardly~~ refuse; has already suggested Summit.

3. Should be early; the later a Summit occurs, the more likely it will be perceived as being under pressure of INF deployments.

4. Addresses expectations in Europe that a Summit might be fruitful.

5. Meeting here is better than meeting on fringes of UN.

- UN is not really a visit to US, doesn't carry imperative for return visit.

- Proximity to UN puts more pressure on US for concrete results.

6. Need to get away from idea that Summit should be avoided unless we can achieve concrete results.

- Both leaders are new; need to get acquainted, explore differences of opinion.

- Stress the existence and work of ongoing for^o and that concrete results are to be achieved there.

- Preliminary work should avoid raising expectation of decisions; promote idea that this administration takes a different view of summitry, wants above all to make attempt to understand opposing viewpoints.

7. Offer to allow Andropov to take his story to American public requires reciprocal opportunity for Reagan, thus providing a forum that has proved successful for this President.

extremely

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NLRR E06-114/11 * 11673

BY KML NARA DATE 4/21/11

*Wait to carefully
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SHORT-TERM POLICY OPTIONS

Continued
I. Political Options (*in order of priority*)
Option

Discussion
Rationale

B. Offer to join with Soviets in guaranteeing the neutrality of Afghanistan (or possibly with Soviets and China).

- Subsequent normalization efforts to be under aegis of UN.

1. A US initiative that will be viewed favorably by world.

2. Puts ball in Soviet court: acceptance requires withdrawal, rejection puts the lie to recent Soviet proposals to abandon use of force, etc.

3. Has possibility of reducing one of the major complicating factors in recent US-Soviet/East-West relations.

from
Afghanista ✓

C. Offer to expand the range of US-Soviet bilateral contacts, and support the idea of increased contacts between the NATO and Warsaw Pact Alliances:

- If Soviets are prepared to immediately demonstrate willingness to promote access to broader range of Soviet decision-makers
- (more on this under military options)

1. Again, will be viewed by world as a moderate, reasonable proposal; but, requires Soviets to make moves in an area they have never been willing to liberalize. Puts onus on them.

2. If Soviets accept, can only be to our advantage (as Soviets already enjoy broad access to Americans).

D. Call for Soviets to demonstrate good intentions and adherence to Helsinki Agreements by making some positive overtures in some of the more egregious human rights cases (e.g., Orlov, Sharanskiy)

- Approach here should be public, but low-key and nonpolemical

1. Puts us firmly on the high ground; world opinion is already on our side in these kinds of cases.

2. Approach must be careful: e.g., expresses our concerns, problem of raising confidence levels between us--but avoids giving Soviets grounds for accusation of "meddling in internal affairs".

✓
✓

SHORT-TERM POLICY OPTIONSI. Economic OptionsOptionRationale

1. Announce a declaratory US grain trade policy.

- pledge to negotiate new long term grain agreement with Soviets.
- require minimum level of purchases, but pledge to uphold sanctity of contracts throughout duration of negotiated term
- indicate willingness to sell more than minimums

1. More than anything else, Europeans and Soviets will judge our trade policies based on what we do in grain trade.

2. Agreement is positive sign to Soviets; just as important, is also necessary to protect our markets and protect our farmers.

3. Declaratory policy requires some response from the Soviets.

2. Announce that, pending outcome of trade studies with Allies, we are prepared to broaden the range of trade relations with the Soviets.

- carefully tie in the idea of the necessity for both sides to safeguard trade in strategic areas.
- All contacts, once negotiated and approved, to be honored.

1. This option is primarily intended to placate European Allies. ✓

2. Some will argue that grain trade policy statement and/or statement on trade in other areas will prompt Allies to further normalize/expand trade with Soviets.

- Response should be that Allied reaction to pipeline sanctions proves this will happen anyway.

- As before, our objective is to maintain cohesion of Alliance. ✓

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~Revision completed
1 Aug 83

11674

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

Subject: Summitry

NLRR E06-114/11 #11674

BY KML NARA DATE 4/24/11

I have submitted papers to you earlier pointing out the dangers of summitry in the absence of assurance that substantial progress can be made on issues of primary importance to us, and believe that the considerations set forth in them remain valid. However, public and Congressional pressures are building for a summit meeting, and although the rationale is often fuzzy and the premises mistaken, this is a fact of life with which we must deal.

At this point it is clear that we are well on track in rebuilding our defense strength and in rallying our Allies on the most critical issues. Our economy is showing increasing signs of long-term recovery, and your position of leadership is strong and assured. Andropov, in contrast, is faced with a myriad of problems far more fundamental and intractable than ours. The basics, therefore, are moving unmistakably in our direction and our negotiating strength is stronger than it has been for many years. Our task is to manage the U.S.-Soviet relationship in a manner which will insure that these trends continue over the long term. In other words, we must insure the sustainability of our current policies.

This means, among other things, that we must deal with the summit issue in a manner so that pressures for a summit do not erode our ability to maintain our defense programs or allied unity, particularly on the INF deployment issue. Our goal should be more ambitious than mere damage limitation, however. We should aim to use the summit issue in a manner which enhances our leverage rather than weakening it (which would be the case if we were forced by ill-founded public, Congressional or allied opinion to enter into an inadequately prepared meeting without clear objectives.) I believe that this can be done, provided that we are clear in our own minds about our objectives, avoid raising false public expectations, and pursue a purposeful, well-coordinated negotiating track over the coming months.

U.S. Objectives

Our confrontation with the Soviet Union is and will continue to be a protracted one. Summitry, to the extent we choose to

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indulge in it, should be viewed as just one instrument in a long-term, sustained effort. Although it is possible that a major breakthrough can be achieved within a year in some area of primary interest to us, this is far from certain. There are two basic reasons for this: (1) Despite the favorable trends running in our direction, the Soviet leaders will continue to balk at offering proof that our policy of strength pays off, and are likely to continue for some time to try to undermine our strength and determination rather than making the hard choices required; and (2) Andropov, even with his accession to the titular chief of state role, may not have consolidated his position to the degree that he can force painful decisions on powerful interest groups.

Therefore, if there is a summit within twelve months, our most important objective will be to impress upon Andropov that our will and capacity to confront him successfully is firm and unalterable in the absence of a significant modification of Soviet behavior. This could prepare the ground for more significant Soviet concessions in 1985.

A second objective should be to obtain significant progress (though not necessarily formal agreements) in several of the areas of primary interest to us: human rights, Soviet restraint in third countries, arms reduction and confidence-building measures, and bilateral relations--particularly those aspects which strengthen our capacity to communicate with the Soviet public at large and thus to build pressure for a gradual "opening" of Soviet society.

A third objective should be to demonstrate--both to the more pragmatic elements of the Soviet leadership and to our own public--that we are in fact serious negotiating partners and that we are not making unreasonable demands in order to block settlement of disputes. This will require demonstrable progress on one of the major arms reduction negotiations, given the attitude of both our public and the Soviet leaders.

The Agenda

The agenda for any summit will be effectively shaped by the content of negotiations prior to it. Our negotiations, therefore, should cover, persistently and systematically, those issues on our list, whether they seem amenable to progress or not. It is important to keep hammering at the themes important to us, for if we drop any of them, the Soviets will automatically assume that we are not seriously interested and therefore there is little to be gained from accommodating us. Prospects in the different areas vary, of course, as do the appropriate channels we should use. The following examples are meant to be illustrative rather than comprehensive:

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-- Human Rights: Here the Soviets can make concessions regarding specific persons if they choose, but they are unlikely to make any in overall procedure. In my view, we can aim realistically to obtain the release and emigration of Shcharansky and a number of other political prisoners, at least some improvement in Sakharov's position (e.g. medical treatment in Moscow), and increased Jewish emigration. We are likely to get the most from quiet diplomacy, backed up by publicity generated by private organizations. We should offer nothing in return for these Soviet actions, other than an improved atmosphere.

-- Third Areas: These promise to be among the most intractable issues we must manage. The Soviet aim will be to draw us into a form of geopolitical horse-trading based on an implicit recognition of spheres of influence. We must, of course, totally reject going down this path, since it ultimately would undermine our alliances and weaken the moral basis for our policies. Our leverage on these issues varies with the local situation; it is most powerful when political conditions in the area and the military balance act as a barrier to Soviet penetration and weakest when one or both of these barriers is absent. But while our most effective counter to Soviet adventurism must be defeating it on the spot, we should make it clear that irresponsible Soviet behavior is a major impediment to the whole range of U.S.-Soviet relations. "Linkage" in this general sense is a political fact of life, and we must not let the Soviets forget it.

It is difficult to say at this juncture what we can expect in this area from a summit, but as a minimum I believe we should insist upon credible assurance that there will be no further dramatic Soviet or surrogate military moves to tip the balance in a regional situation. We should, of course, continue to probe Soviet intentions in each individual situation and be prepared to use the implicit leverage of an upcoming summit to push the Soviets toward a solution we favor. Plans for a summit, for example, could be used to increase pressure on the Soviets to reduce sharply arms supplies to Central America.

-- Arms Reduction and CBM's: We should be able to make progress on some of the confidence-building measures we have proposed, but a real breakthrough in any of the three major arms reduction talks seems highly problematic, although possible. If we are to move toward a summit, however, we should use that process to pressure the Soviets to get more forthcoming proposals on the table, and should hold off agreeing to a summit until our positions have narrowed on some of the key issues. Both sides must be able to say after the meeting that some significant progress was achieved in this area. The recent Soviet proposals in START and MBFR may have been motivated in part by a desire to get this process moving.

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-- Bilateral issues: Here, we can reasonably expect some limited progress. If the Soviets agree to a cultural and information exchange agreement which enhances our access to the Soviet public it will be in our interest. Establishment of a consulate in Kiev would provide us with a window on the largest Soviet minority nationality and enhance our ability to exploit the potential nationalities problem. We may be able to achieve some greater access to the Soviet media, though probably not an end to VOA jamming, as well as some minor improvements in the consular and travel areas. While none of these topics are likely to be suitable for extended discussion at a summit, the latter could provide some leverage for favorable results in negotiations preceding the meeting.

Is this Enough?

If the analysis above is accurate, it would seem that we can expect at this point only limited gains from a summit. So limited, in fact, that they might not justify the risk of public euphoria (some is inevitable, even if not encouraged) followed by a let-down and recriminations. For this reason, I believe we should continue to proceed cautiously and deliberately and avoid committing ourselves to a summit until our negotiations provide a clearer picture of how much give there is in Soviet positions. If, however, we are able to bring our positions in either INF or START within hailing distance, a summit would probably be useful.

There are other reasons for proceeding with caution. If heavy-handed Soviet interference should reappear in Poland, it would of course make it difficult for you to meet Andropov. Also, we would want to be sure that the trial of the Pope's would-be assassin in Italy is unlikely to produce persuasive evidence of a "Bulgarian connection," since you will not want to sit down with a man whom the public believes--rightly or wrongly--to have taken out a contract on the Pope.

I believe that the Soviets want a summit, since it enhances their stature--at home and in the rest of the world--to be seen dealing as equals with the President of the United States. It is also useful to Andropov personally in consolidating his power internally to be accepted by you as an equal partner. They will not abandon the store to us for the privilege of a meeting, but they will pay something (in human rights cases and in access to their population) if we negotiate these issues skillfully and avoid making them a public test of strength. But in order to squeeze the maximum out of them, we must position ourselves so that we will not be seen needing a summit more than they.

The Soviets clearly recognize the danger of appearing over eager, and I believe this was behind Gromyko's June 21 statement accusing us of having "no constructive goals" and imply-

ing that we must change our policies to make a summit possible. But their actions over the past few weeks have been more conciliatory than their words. They finally accepted the wording we insisted upon for the CSCE documents in Madrid. They released the Pentacostalists and have promised additional releases. They have made new, more forthcoming proposals in START and MBFR, and have accepted proposals to negotiate an exchanges agreement, new consulates, and several confidence-building measures which they had resisted earlier. And just last week they agreed to a long-term grain agreement on terms more favorable to us than the previous one. While there is a logic to each of these in its own terms, the overall pattern is one designed to show that they are willing to deal seriously.

Impact of INF Deployments

Although Soviet threats of counteraction following INF deployments in December have been vague, they have been expressed repeatedly in public to the point that it will be most difficult for the Soviets to do nothing. We should, therefore, consider the possible impact NATO deployments could have on prospects for a useful summit.

While we cannot judge with certainty exactly what the Soviets will do, it seems that, as a minimum, they would have to exhibit public pique for a few months. This could prevent them from moving ahead on many of the negotiations now in progress until spring. Furthermore, if they should announce additional deployments of their own, they will doubtless insist that they be taken into account in the negotiations, which at best would delay the negotiation process. And if progress is delayed into the spring, another factor will intervene. That is, Soviet reluctance to be seen assisting your reelection. Whether a summit would in fact do so is debatable; the relevant point is that the Soviets believe it will. (You will recall Andropov's comment to Kohl that a summit in 1984 would be difficult, because he did not want to "interfere" in the U.S. elections.) Therefore, if the Soviets agreed to a summit at all in the spring of 1984, they would probably expect payment in some form. Since we obviously will not be willing to make concessions to them merely for the privilege of a meeting, INF deployments may set a chain of events in motion which will make a summit in 1984 impossible.

The Negotiating Schedule

Shultz will probably be meeting Gromyko in Madrid just after Labor Day, and Gromyko will come to New York later in the month for the UN session, which will provide an opportunity for you to meet him, as well as for Shultz to have another meeting. INF negotiations will resume in Geneva September 6,

and START negotiations are scheduled to resume on October 5. By then we should also have in train negotiations on some confidence-building measures and on some other bilateral issues such as an exchanges agreement and new consulates. Therefore, there will be plenty of subjects on the formal negotiating table.

Nevertheless, all this activity will not necessarily bring us nearer a critical breakthrough on one of the major arms reduction agreements, without which a summit is likely to be sterile, and therefore unacceptable both to you and Andropov. We, of course, do not want a summit to center exclusively on arms control issues--the Soviet agenda--but at the same time we must recognize that they are critical elements in our package as well as theirs, and that our ability to obtain progress in other areas of our interest is substantially dependent upon our ability to move ahead with arms reduction.

One of the problems we are now facing is great difficulty in keeping our negotiations with the Soviets confidential. The leaks to the press which are occurring regularly not only discourage the Soviets from dealing with us candidly, but also give elements in our own bureaucracy who oppose specific moves the opportunity to try to preempt your decisions by creating a public stir.

For these reasons I believe that you should consider establishing a private channel to Andropov to discuss the most critical and sensitive issues in the relationship. I believe that such a channel could be useful provided we manage it in a manner so that key cabinet officers in our own government are aware of the messages passed, and that discussion is shifted to formal channels before firm commitments are made. Such a channel would permit us, for example, to probe the Soviet INF position to determine whether an acceptable agreement might in fact be possible before December and to raise other delicate issues such as Cuban activities and human rights questions, which the Soviets have difficulty discussing frankly on the diplomatic record.

Public Handling

Until we have decided whether to proceed to the summit and have nailed down the arrangements with the Soviets privately, we should hold strictly to our current position (that one could be useful in the future if properly prepared), and avoid speculation on whether and when one might be possible.

We should also consider approaching key Senators and Members of Congress privately to encourage them to avoid pressing publicly for a summit, which only erodes our negotiating position in arranging one. (Percy's comments during the Shultz hearing, for example, were distinctly unhelpful.)