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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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File Folder: Shultz-Shevardnadze Mtg in New York September 25,
1985 (2 of 3) Box ~~92129~~ 45

Date: 12/27/00
Skinner/F00-008/1

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Talking Pts	for Secretary's September 25 and 27 Meetings with Shevardnadze, Introduction, 11 p.	9/25/[85]	B1
2. Talking Pts	Regional Issues, 8 p.	[9/25/85]	B1
3. Talking Pts	Bilateral Issues, 4 p.	[9/25/85]	B1
4. Talking Pts	Human Rights/Emigration, 2 p.	[9/25/85]	B1
5. Talking Pts.	Structure for Followup, 2 p.	[9/25/85]	B1
6. Talking Pts	Geneva and Beyond, 2 p.	[9/25/85]	B1
7. Draft Talking Pts	re: ASAT, 1 p.	n.d.	B1
8. Talking Pts	for McFarlane on Consulates and Human Rights, 2 p. PART 12/12/05 M03-481 #3	n.d.	B1

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].

B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].

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B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

CAS 4/3/2007

File Folder SHULTZ-SHEVARDNADZE MEETING IN NEW YORK
9/25/85 (2)

FOIA

M03-1481

Box Number 45

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date
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8	TALKING	FOR MCFARLANE ON CONSULATES	2	ND
	POINTS	AND HUMAN RIGHTS (#3)		

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

9/25
11am

TALKING POINTS FOR SECRETARY'S

SEPTEMBER 25 AND 27 MEETINGS WITH SHEVARDNADZE

INTRODUCTION

[Note: Shevardnadze is your host in New York and should offer you the floor to begin the meeting].

-- WELCOME TO NEW YORK. UNDERSTAND THAT THIS IS YOUR FIRST VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES. THE PRESIDENT AND MRS. REAGAN, AND MRS. SHULTZ AND I, LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU AND MRS. SHEVARDNADZE IN WASHINGTON AND TO INTRODUCING YOU TO A BIT OF THIS COUNTRY.

-- WE NOTE THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN MAKING A LOT OF PUBLIC STATEMENTS SINCE YOU AND I MET IN HELSINKI. WE HOPE THAT YOUR LEADERSHIP HAS BEEN AT LEAST AS BUSY WORKING ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ISSUES BETWEEN US.

-- FRANKLY, WE HAVE NOT BEEN FAVORABLY IMPRESSED BY THE LACK OF REAL CONTENT AND CONCRETE PROGRESS. WE HOPE YOU HAVE BROUGHT MORE SPECIFIC AND BALANCED POSITIONS TO THE MEETINGS THIS WEEK. ONLY THEN ARE WE GOING TO BE ABLE TO BUILD THE "NORMAL, STABLE" RELATIONSHIP YOU REFERRED TO IN YOUR SPEECH YESTERDAY.

-- AS I THINK YOU WILL SEE, OUR SIDE HAS COME PREPARED TO TALK IN VERY CONCRETE TERMS ABOUT WHAT THE TWO SIDES MIGHT BE ABLE TO ACHIEVE BY THE TIME OUR LEADERS MEET. WE SHOULD USE THIS MEETING AND OUR MEETINGS ON SEPTEMBER 27 TO PIN DOWN AS CLEARLY AS POSSIBLE WHERE WE NEED TO CONCENTRATE OUR EFFORTS BETWEEN NOW AND NOVEMBER 19.

-- BASED ON MY CONVERSATIONS WITH AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN, MY UNDERSTANDING IS THAT WE WILL START OFF THIS SESSION WITH SECURITY ISSUES, THEN MOVE ON TO REGIONAL ISSUES, AND THEN PROCEED TO BILATERAL QUESTIONS. WE ALSO WANT TO BE SURE YOU ARE CLEAR ABOUT OUR HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS.

-- ON SECURITY QUESTIONS, IT WOULD SEEM TO MAKE MOST SENSE TO ADDRESS THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS FIRST. WE COULD THEN DEAL WITH THE STOCKHOLM AND VIENNA TALKS, AND CONCLUDE BY TOUCHING ON NPT, NUCLEAR TESTING, AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

-- WE HAVE ALSO AGREED THAT WE WILL STOP THE MEETING IN TIME TO GIVE THE TWO OF US A CHANCE FOR A PRIVATE CONVERSATION OF, SAY FIFTEEN TO TWENTY MINUTES.

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DECL: OADR

NLS

FOU-008/1 #8

BY

C4

NARA, DATE

2/12/02

GENEVA NST TALKS

-- WHEN YOU AND I MET IN HELSINKI WE AGREED THAT WE SHOULD TRY TO ACHIEVE WHAT YOU CALLED A "MAXIMUM" RESULT WHEN OUR LEADERS MET IN GENEVA. WE AGREED ON THE CENTRALITY TO SUCH A RESULT OF THE ISSUES OUR NEGOTIATORS ARE DISCUSSING IN THE GENEVA BILATERAL ARMS CONTROL TALKS.

-- WE IN THE U.S. HAVE BEEN GIVING A GREAT DEAL OF THOUGHT TO WHAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE BY THE NOVEMBER MEETING.

-- THE U.S. BELIEVES THE WAY TO APPROACH THESE ISSUES IS TO TRY FOR UNDERSTANDINGS ON AREAS OF MUTUAL INTEREST WHICH COULD GUIDE OUR NEGOTIATORS IN THE GENEVA TALKS IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSIONS, AND WHICH MIGHT SERVE AS THE BASIS FOR AN AGREEMENT WHICH MEETS BOTH SIDES' CONCERNS.

-- THIS WOULD REQUIRE, OF COURSE, THAT EXISTING PRECONDITIONS BE DROPPED, AND THAT THE SIDES PROCEED TO ADDRESS BOTH OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE CONSIDERATIONS SIMULTANEOUSLY.

-- I WOULD LIKE TO SHARE WITH YOU TODAY SOME THOUGHTS ON THIS CRITICAL OFFENSIVE-DEFENSIVE RELATIONSHIP. IN DOING SO, I WOULD LIKE TO GO BACK BRIEFLY AND SEE HOW FAR WE HAVE COME AND WHERE WE ARE TODAY.

-- GROMYKO AND I HAD A LENGTHY EXCHANGE ON THE OFFENSE-DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP LAST JANUARY. WE REACHED SOME BASIC CONCLUSIONS WHICH WE THEN CODIFIED IN A PUBLIC STATEMENT. WITH OUR AGREEMENT ON A SET OF OBJECTIVES, THE U.S. AND USSR RESUMED NEGOTIATIONS. I STILL BELIEVE THE JANUARY 8 AGREEMENT POINTS THE WAY TO FUTURE PROGRESS.

-- I STRESSED TO GROMYKO THEN AND WANT TO REEMPHASIZE TO YOU TODAY THAT THE U.S. HAS NO TERRITORIAL AMBITIONS. NEITHER THE U.S. NOR ITS ALLIES HARBORS ANY INTENTION TO ATTACK YOU OR YOUR ALLIES. CONTRARY TO WHAT YOU SAID YESTERDAY IN YOUR SPEECH, WE DO NOT SEEK MILITARY SUPERIORITY.

-- THE U.S. WILL MAINTAIN SUFFICIENT FORCES TO DEFEND ITSELF AND ITS INTERESTS. WE WILL DO SO WITH OR WITHOUT ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS. BUT WE FAR PREFER TO RELY ON LOWER LEVELS OF FORCES, AND THIS CAN ONLY HAPPEN THROUGH BALANCED, EQUITABLE, AND VERIFIABLE ARMS REDUCTIONS.

-- BECAUSE OF THE WAY EACH SIDE'S FORCES HAVE DEVELOPED, AN UNSTABLE SITUATION HAS BEEN CREATED. IF A SERIOUS CRISIS SHOULD ARISE, BOTH SIDES WOULD HAVE INCENTIVES TO ACT QUICKLY AND DECISIVELY WITH THEIR MILITARY POWER. OUR TWO COUNTRIES MUST DEAL WITH THIS PROBLEM.

-- IN THE LATE 1960s AND EARLY 1970s, THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION NEGOTIATED MEASURES THAT WE HOPED WOULD HELP THE SECURITY OF BOTH SIDES. THERE WERE THREE ASSUMPTIONS:

- o WITH DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS SEVERELY LIMITED, THE SIDES COULD PLACE COMPARABLE RESTRAINTS ON OFFENSIVE FORCES, AND CREATE A STABLE BALANCE AT SHARPLY LOWER LEVELS;
- o THE CONSTRAINTS ON BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES WOULD PREVENT BREAK-OUT OR CIRCUMVENTION;
- o BOTH SIDES WOULD ADHERE TO THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF THE AGREEMENTS.

-- THESE PREMISES, HOWEVER, INCREASINGLY HAVE BROKEN DOWN. BOTH SIDES HAVE HIGHER LEVELS OF OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS. YOU HAVE SYSTEMS WHICH ARE CAPABLE OF INFLECTING A DEVASTATING ATTACK ON OUR MISSILE SILOS AND COMMAND AND CONTROL FACILITIES.

-- YOU HAVE ALSO BEEN STEADILY MODERNIZING YOUR PERMITTED ABM SYSTEM AROUND MOSCOW AND DEVELOPING NEW FACILITIES SUCH AS THE KRASNOYARSK RADAR WHICH IS CLEARLY A VIOLATION OF THE 1972 ABM TREATY.

-- THERE HAS BEEN AN EROSION OF INTERNATIONAL STABILITY. YOU SAID YESTERDAY THAT OUR POLICIES WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS. WE CAN'T AGREE. STABILITY WILL CONTINUE TO ERODE UNLESS WE BOTH ACT TO DEVELOP COMMON ASSUMPTIONS ON WHICH TO BASE SPECIFIC AGREEMENTS.

-- THUS, AS I EMPHASIZED TO GROMYKO, OUR TWO COUNTRIES HAVE TWO PRIORITY TASKS IN THE NEAR FUTURE:

- o TO NEGOTIATE DEEP CUTS IN OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR ARMS.
- o TO REVERSE THE EROSION OF THE ABM TREATY.

~~IF WE ARE TO ACHIEVE A MORE STABLE NUCLEAR~~
~~-- I AGREE WITH YOUR STATEMENT YESTERDAY THAT WE SHOULD SEEK A~~ *BALANCE*
~~"LOWERING OF THE EXISTING LEVEL OF STRATEGIC EQUILIBRIUM."~~ *AT A*
~~IF WE ARE TO ACHIEVE THIS GOAL, THE RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND~~ *LOWER*
~~DEPLOYMENT PROGRAMS OF BOTH SIDES MUST BE CONSISTENT WITH THE~~ *LEVEL OF*
~~ABM TREATY.~~ *NUCLEAR*
ARMS,

-- THE PRESIDENT HAS SET AS A MAJOR OBJECTIVE FOR THE COMING DECADE THE DETERMINATION OF WHETHER NEW TECHNOLOGIES WILL MAKE IT FEASIBLE TO MOVE AWAY FROM A SITUATION WHERE OUR ONLY RECOURSE IF ATTACKED IS TO DESTROY THE OTHER'S SOCIETY.

-- THE U.S. BELIEVES THAT YOU SHOULD LOOK HARD AT WHETHER THIS POSSIBILITY IS NOT IN YOUR INTEREST AS WELL AS OUR OWN. INDEED, THE SOVIET UNION HAS HISTORICALLY SHOWN GREATER INTEREST IN STRATEGIC DEFENSE THAN HAS THE U.S.

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-- YOU HAVE CONTINUED AN ACTIVE BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE RESEARCH PROGRAM THROUGHOUT THE SEVENTIES AND EIGHTIES.

-- THE SOVIET VIEW OF RESEARCH UNDER THE ABM TREATY WAS QUITE CLEARLY STATED BY THEN DEFENSE MINISTER GRECHKO IN A SEPTEMBER, 1972 SPEECH TO THE SUPREME SOVIET SESSION WHICH RATIFIED THE ABM TREATY WHEN HE SAID: "THE TREATY DOES NOT PLACE ANY LIMITATIONS ON CARRYING OUT RESEARCH AND EXPERIMENTAL WORK DIRECTED TOWARDS SOLVING THE PROBLEMS OF DEFENSE OF THE COUNTRY AGAINST MISSILE ATTACK."

-- THE U.S. AGREES AND THAT IS WHAT WE ARE DOING TODAY.

-- LET ME ASSURE YOU -- AS I ASSURED GROMYKO -- NO DECISIONS TO DEPLOY OUR SDI PROGRAM HAVE BEEN MADE OR EVEN COULD BE MADE FOR SOME TIME.

-- IN THE LATE 60'S AND EARLY 70'S THE US HOPED THAT BOTH SIDES WOULD BE ABLE TO AGREE ON MEASURES WHICH WOULD BE HELPFUL TO THE SECURITY OF EACH NATION. IT WAS ACCEPTED THAT EACH SIDE SHOULD HAVE ROUGH EQUALITY IN ITS NUCLEAR WEAPONS SYSTEMS, THAT IF DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES WERE TO BE LIMITED THERE SHOULD BE COMPARABLE LIMITATIONS ON DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES, AND THAT LIMITATIONS SHOULD PRECLUDE BREAK-OUT, CIRCUMVENTION OR FAILURE TO ADHERE TO THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF THE LIMITATIONS AGREED UPON.

-- TODAY, ALL THOSE ASSUMPTIONS APPEAR INVALID.

-- YOUR BUILDING PROGRAM -- IN BOTH OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS -- HAS VIOLATED ANY REASONABLE SENSE OF STRATEGIC BALANCE.

-- FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE THE U.S. WISHES TO WORK WITH THE USSR TO RESTORE AND STRENGTHEN THE REGIME FOR STABILITY WHICH IN 1972 WAS THOUGHT BY BOTH SIDES TO BE OUR COMMON OBJECTIVE. WE MUST NEGOTIATE THE FOLLOW-ON EFFECTIVE LIMITATIONS ON OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS CALLED FOR WHEN WE SIGNED THE ABM AGREEMENT, IN ORDER TO REMOVE THE INHERENT INSTABILITY IN THE PRESENT AND PROJECTED ARRAY OF OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS ON BOTH SIDES. AND WE MUST REVERSE THE EROSION OF THE ABM TREATY WHICH HAS TAKEN PLACE.

-- FOR THE LONG RUN WE SHOULD HAVE BOLDER AND MORE RADICAL OBJECTIVES. BOTH SIDES SEEM TO BE AGREED THAT WITH RESPECT TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS A WHOLE, THE OBJECTIVE SHOULD BE TOTAL ELIMINATION. THIS SHOULD BE WORLDWIDE AND AGREED TO BY ALL NATIONS.

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~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

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-- IN FACT, WE WANT TO TALK WITH YOU NOW ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP OF OFFENSE AND DEFENSE, ABOUT THE RISKS AND POSSIBILITIES OF A TRANSITION TO DEFENSE, AND ABOUT ENSURING THAT THE ABM TREATY IS OBSERVED. IN PARTICULAR, AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE CONCERNS ABOUT YOUR NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE TREATY. WE ALSO HAVE SAID REPEATEDLY THAT SHOULD NEW DEFENSIVE TECHNOLOGIES EVENTUALLY PROVE FEASIBLE, THIS WHOLE ISSUE WOULD BE A MATTER OF DISCUSSION AND NEGOTIATION WITH YOU AS REQUIRED BY THE ABM TREATY.

-- INSTEAD OF ENTERING INTO CONCRETE TALKS WITH US, BY AND LARGE, ALL WE HAVE HEARD FROM YOU ARE PROPOSALS FOR MORATORIA AND ABANDONMENT OF OUR SDI RESEARCH PROGRAM, RESEARCH WHICH YOU ARE CONDUCTING AS WELL.

-- WE HAVE HEARD NOTHING SPECIFIC FROM YOU ON OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS. WE HAVE HEARD NOTHING ON YOUR OWN STRATEGIC DEFENSE PROGRAMS. WE HAVE HEARD NOTHING THAT SHOWS YOU HAVE GIVEN ANY SERIOUS THOUGHT TO THE BENEFITS OF, AS WELL AS THE POTENTIAL OBSTACLES TO, GREATER RELIANCE ON DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS.

-- AS I TOLD YOU IN HELSINKI, I THINK IT'S TIME YOU AND I PUT OUR NEGOTIATORS TO WORK. THIS MEANS BOTH DELEGATIONS HAVE TO BE READY TO TALK ABOUT CONCRETE WAYS OF DEALING WITH THE OFFENSE-DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP, AND WITH REDUCTIONS IN OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR ARMS.

-- I UNDERSTAND YOU MAY HAVE SPECIFIC IDEAS FOR THE PRESIDENT. I HOPE THAT IS THE CASE: WE WANT TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE OPPORTUNITY FOR PROGRESS BETWEEN NOW AND NOVEMBER, BUT IT WILL REQUIRE SOME THOUGHT AND IDEAS ON YOUR PART, NOT JUST FROM US.

-- AND AS WE BOTH THINK OVER WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE, IT IS VITAL THAT WE KEEP IN MIND THE FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS: TO PUT US ON THE PATH TOWARDS ELIMINATING NUCLEAR ARMS.

-- IN OUR VIEW, THAT CAN ONLY COME ABOUT BY TAKING A DRAMATIC FIRST STEP IN REDUCING OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR ARMS; AND BY STEPPING BACK AND SEEING WHETHER OUR TWO SIDES CAN CAPITALIZE ON THE TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES OF THE LAST 15 YEARS TO BRING ABOUT A MORE STABLE SITUATION, ONE THAT OFFERS THE POSSIBILITY OF PRESERVING OUR SOCIETIES RATHER THAN THREATENING TO DESTROY THEM.

-- I KNOW THE PRESIDENT IS LOOKING FORWARD TO TALKING TO YOU ABOUT THIS SUBJECT SO I WON'T GO ANY FURTHER.

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ASAT [If Shevardnadze raises our ASAT test]:

-- THE U.S. CANNOT ACCEPT SOVIET COMPLAINTS ABOUT OUR ASAT TEST. YOU HAVE HAD A FULLY-TESTED, OPERATIONAL SYSTEM FOR YEARS, AND YOU HAVE INTEGRATED A TEST OF THIS SYSTEM INTO A STRATEGIC EXERCISE.

-- THE U.S. SYSTEM IS A DETERRENT AGAINST ATTACKS ON OUR SPACE ASSETS OR THOSE OF OUR ALLIES. OUR TESTING IS FULLY CONSISTENT WITH ALL TREATY OBLIGATIONS.

STOCKHOLM CDE TALKS

-- THE STOCKHOLM NEGOTIATIONS ARE ALSO ABOUT STABILITY.

-- WHEN THE ORIGINAL CBMS WERE NEGOTIATED IN THE CSCE FINAL ACT, IT WAS HOPED THEY WOULD HELP DECREASE THE POSSIBILITIES FOR MISCALCULATION AND MISUNDERSTANDINGS THAT COULD PROVOKE OR INTENSIFY A CRISIS.

-- BUT THOSE CBMS HAVEN'T MEASURED UP, AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THEM BY YOUR SIDE HASN'T BEEN ENCOURAGING.

-- YOUR ZAPAD-81 EXERCISE IN 1981 WAS A CLEAR VIOLATION OF THE PRE-NOTIFICATION AND INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS OF THE CBM ON MANEUVER NOTIFICATION -- AND IT TOOK PLACE AT A TIME WHEN THE SOVIET UNION WAS PUTTING GREAT PRESSURE ON POLAND.

-- MORE BROADLY, OUR EXPERIENCE HAS BEEN THAT YOUR NOTIFICATIONS OF MANEUVERS ARE UNINFORMATIVE: YOU SELDOM INVITE WESTERN OBSERVERS; AND EVEN WHEN YOU DO INVITE THEM, THEY ARE DENIED THE ABILITY TO GET A GOOD PICTURE OF THE CONDUCT AND SCOPE OF THE MANEUVER. ALL THIS CONTRASTS SHARPLY WITH THE WEST'S RECORD ON THE HELSINKI CBMS.

-- SO WE AND OUR ALLIES ARE SEEKING A STRONGER REGIME OF MEASURES THAT COULD IN FACT GIVE A BETTER PICTURE OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE. WE ADVANCED STRINGENT CRITERIA FOR THESE NEW CBMS. WE HAVE RECOGNIZED ALL ALONG THAT THEY WOULD IMPOSE A BURDEN ON MILITARY FORCES AND COMMANDERS, BUT WE ARE CONVINCED THE END RESULT WOULD BE BENEFICIAL FOR ALL OF EUROPE.

-- SO FAR, PROGRESS AT STOCKHOLM HAS BEEN SLOW. YOU AND I AGREED AT HELSINKI THAT OUR TWO SIDES SHOULD SPEED UP THIS PROCESS, THAT THIS IS AN AREA WHERE PROGRESS SHOULD BE POSSIBLE.

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-- WHAT WE NEED NOW IS A CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH ON BOTH SIDES AIMED AT RESOLVING THE OUTSTANDING ISSUES. AS THE PRESIDENT HAS SAID, THE U.S. IS PREPARED TO CONSIDER YOUR IDEA ON A STATEMENT REGARDING NON-USE OF FORCE. BUT AT THE SAME TIME, YOU ARE EXPECTED TO ACCEPT THE KIND OF DETAILED CBMS WHICH CAN IN FACT IMPROVE STABILITY IN EUROPE.

-- IF AGREEMENT CAN BE REACHED ON AN APPROACH TO DRAFTING IN STOCKHOLM, THE U.S. WOULD BE READY TO MAKE AN APPROPRIATE STATEMENT WHEN OUR LEADERS MEET IN GENEVA. THIS WOULD HAVE TO HAPPEN BEFORE THE CURRENT ROUND ENDS OCTOBER 18.

-- IN THAT CASE, WE WOULD WANT A GENEVA STATEMENT TO RECORD OUR PROGRESS AT STOCKHOLM.

VIENNA MBFR TALKS [need to adjust depending on current inter-agency discussion of options in preparation for next round of negotiations beginning September 26]

-- THE U.S. CONTINUES TO CONSIDER MBFR AN IMPORTANT PART OF OUR ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS TO ENHANCE SECURITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

-- MBFR AIMS AT MAINTAINING MILITARY STABILITY IN THE AREA WHICH HAS THE GREATEST CONCENTRATION OF MILITARY POWER ON THE GLOBE.

-- SOMEONE ONCE SAID THAT THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS ARE ONE OF THE LONGEST-RUNNING DIPLOMATIC SHOWS IN HISTORY. I RECALL THAT YOU SUGGESTED IT WAS THE ARMS CONTROL STEPCHILD. WE SHOULD ASK OURSELVES, "WHY?"

-- ONE ANSWER, OF COURSE, IS THAT WE HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO AGREE ON THE DATA CONCERNING FORCES IN THE AREA. HERE AGAIN, THE SOVIET APPROACH HAS BEEN UNHELPFUL.

-- THERE ARE ALSO DIFFICULT QUESTIONS ON HOW WE GO ABOUT REDUCING FORCES, AND THEN ASSURING THAT AGREED LEVELS ARE OBSERVED.

-- THE WEST HAS ADVANCED IDEAS THAT WE BELIEVE WOULD SOLVE THESE PROBLEMS. WE ARE STUDYING YOUR LAST PROPOSAL AND CONSULTING WITH OUR ALLIES ON HOW TO PROCEED TOWARD CONSTRUCTIVE DISCUSSIONS.

-- MY GOVERNMENT WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE WAY OPENED FOR PROGRESS IN VIENNA.

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NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

-- OUR DISCUSSIONS OF NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION HAVE OVER THE YEARS BEEN A MODEL FOR THE TYPE OF BILATERAL DISCUSSION WE WOULD LIKE ON A VARIETY OF ISSUES.

-- THE U.S. BELIEVES THE USEFULNESS OF THOSE CONSULTATIONS SHOULD BE REFLECTED IN THE STATEMENT ISSUED AT THE NOVEMBER MEETING. I THINK YOU AGREE.

-- I WOULD OBSERVE THAT THE RECENTLY CONCLUDED REVIEW CONFERENCE WAS ONE OF THE MOST SUCCESSFUL WE HAVE ENGAGED IN TO DATE.

-- AMBASSADORS KENNEDY AND PETROVSKIY HAVE DISCUSSED THE TEXT OF A DRAFT JOINT STATEMENT WHICH OUR TWO LEADERS COULD ISSUE IN GENEVA. WE HAVE GIVEN YOU A TEXT AND NEED A RESPONSE.

-- IT IS OUR HOPE THAT THE TWO AMBASSADORS CAN WORK OUT APPROPRIATE, FINAL LANGUAGE WHEN THEY HOLD THEIR SEMI-ANNUAL BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS IN MID-OCTOBER.

-- BASED ON THEIR PROGRESS, BOTH OF US CAN DECIDE CLOSER TO THE EVENT WHETHER THE STATEMENT SHOULD BE SELF-STANDING OR PART OF A LARGER DOCUMENT.

NUCLEAR TESTING

-- WHERE ARE WE TODAY ON THE ISSUE OF NUCLEAR TESTING?

-- SADLY, WE CONTINUE TO BE CAUGHT IN THE SAME IMPASSE THAT HAS BLOCKED PROGRESS ON THIS IMPORTANT ISSUE FOR YEARS.

-- WE HAVE BOTH RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE OTHER'S COMPLIANCE. WE TAKE YOUR CONCERNS SERIOUSLY AND WANT TO RESOLVE THEM. WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE A SIMILAR ATTITUDE ON YOUR PART.

-- THE U.S. IS NOT PREPARED TO RATIFY THE TTBT AND PNET UNLESS AND UNTIL IMPROVED VERIFICATION PROCEDURES GIVE US CONFIDENCE THAT THE TREATIES ARE BEING OBSERVED. YOU REFUSE TO EVEN DISCUSS VERIFICATION UNTIL WE RATIFY THE AGREEMENTS.

-- IT IS OUR CONVICTION THAT MEANINGFUL PROGRESS CAN BE MADE IN THIS AREA. WE BELIEVE VERIFICATION CAN BE IMPROVED BY EMPLOYING EXISTING TECHNOLOGIES TO INCREASE OUR CONFIDENCE. WE ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT BOTH OUR NATIONS WILL FOR YEARS TO COME HAVE TO RELY HEAVILY ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR DETERRENCE, AND THUS REQUIRE SOME MEANS OF TESTING.

-- LAST JULY OUR TWO LEADERS MADE SUGGESTIONS FOR MOVING THIS ISSUE FORWARD. MR. GORBACHEV ANNOUNCED A NUCLEAR TESTING MORATORIUM, BUT SAID NOTHING ABOUT OUR VERIFICATION CONCERNS.

-- THE PRESIDENT MADE A PRACTICAL PROPOSAL TO BREAK THE CURRENT IMPASSE: ON JULY 27 HE EXTENDED A UNILATERAL INVITATION FOR SOVIET EXPERTS TO VISIT THE U.S. TO MEASURE THE YIELD OF ONE OF OUR TESTS, BRINGING THE EQUIPMENT THEY DEEM NECESSARY FOR SUCH MEASUREMENT. THIS WAS AN ATTEMPT TO SET IN MOTION A PROCESS THAT COULD LEAD TO IMPORTANT VERIFICATION IMPROVEMENTS AND TO INCREASED CONFIDENCE AND COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR TWO NATIONS.

-- I HAVE TO TELL YOU THAT YOUR HANDLING OF THIS ISSUE SEEMED TO US TO REFLECT A GREATER DESIRE TO PURSUE PROPAGANDA THAN TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM.

-- THE U.S. TAKES THIS ISSUE TOO SERIOUSLY TO LEAVE IT IN ITS CURRENT IMPASSE. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THIS IS AN ISSUE WHERE PROGRESS CAN BE MADE.

-- IN ORDER TO EXPLORE THE FEASIBILITY OF MAKING PROGRESS ON THIS OFFER AND THESE VERIFICATION ISSUES, I WOULD LIKE TO PROPOSE A PRIVATE, CONFIDENTIAL MEETING BETWEEN REPRESENTATIVES OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

-- AT SUCH A MEETING OUR REPRESENTATIVES COULD DISCUSS THE PRESIDENT'S OFFER IN GREATER DETAIL AND THE U.S. REPRESENTATIVES COULD PROVIDE INFORMATION HELPFUL TO YOUR GOVERNMENT TO CONSIDER POSITIVELY THE PRESIDENT'S INVITATION TO VISIT THE U.S. TEST SITE.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

-- EVER SINCE WORLD WAR I, WHERE POISON GAS WAS USED EXTENSIVELY BY BOTH SIDES, THERE HAS BEEN A WIDELY RECOGNIZED INTERNATIONAL UNDERSTANDING AGAINST USE OF THESE WEAPONS. THERE HAVE BEEN PERIODIC BREACHES OF THIS COMMON UNDERSTANDING, BUT EVEN IN THE TOTAL WARFARE OF WORLD WAR II, THIS REGIME AGAINST CW USE HELD UP.

-- IN THE LAST FEW YEARS, HOWEVER, THESE CONSTRAINTS HAVE BEEN BREAKING DOWN. I BELIEVE BOTH THE U.S. AND SOVIET UNION HAVE AN INTEREST IN SHORING THEM UP.

-- BOTH THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION FAVOR A CHEMICAL WEAPONS BAN, ALTHOUGH WE DIFFER ON THE MEASURES THAT WOULD BE NEEDED TO ENFORCE SUCH A PROHIBITION. IT SEEMS THAT WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO MAKE A JOINT EFFORT TO PREVENT THE PROBLEM FROM GETTING WORSE, WHILE WE NEGOTIATE TOWARDS ELIMINATING THESE WEAPONS ALTOGETHER.

-- YOU AND I DISCUSSED IN HELSINKI THE ALARMING EXPANSION OF THE USE AND POSSESSION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. THIS IS AN AREA WHERE WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO FIND COMMON GROUND, AS WE HAVE ON NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION.

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-- THE U.S. REMAINS COMMITTED TO SPEEDING UP THE PACE OF CW TALKS IN THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT, BUT RECOGNIZES THAT IMMEDIATE PROGRESS WILL BE DIFFICULT.

-- WHEN WE MET IN HELSINKI, I MADE TWO SUGGESTIONS FOR BEGINNING TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM:

- o THAT SOVIET EXPERTS VISIT THE U.S. TO DISCUSS THE TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF DESTRUCTION;
- o AND THAT WE EXCHANGE INFORMATION ON THE USE OR POTENTIAL USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN THE IRAN - IRAQ WAR.

-- THOSE IDEAS REMAIN ON THE TABLE. I REGRET THERE HAS BEEN NO SOVIET RESPONSE THUS FAR.

-- I HAVE ANOTHER PROPOSAL TO MAKE TODAY. I PROPOSE THAT OUR EXPERTS MEET EARLY NEXT YEAR TO DISCUSS STEPS THAT MIGHT BE TAKEN TO HELP PREVENT THE SPREAD OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

-- THIS WOULD SEEM TO BE A NON-CONTROVERSIAL STEP WHICH WE COULD HAVE IN SHAPE FOR NOVEMBER IF WE START NOW. PERHAPS YOU COULD GIVE US AN INITIAL REACTION BY FRIDAY.

VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE

-- VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE REQUIRE OUR PARTICULAR ATTENTION IN THE FUTURE. THE U.S. BELIEVES STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH ALL PROVISIONS OF NEGOTIATED ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS IS ESSENTIAL TO THE INTEGRITY AND VIABILITY OF ARMS CONTROL AS AN INSTRUMENT TO ASSIST IN ENSURING A SECURE AND STABLE WORLD.

-- IN THE INTEREST OF ENSURING THAT EVERY OPPORTUNITY IS EXPLORED TO PUT THE ARMS REDUCTION PROCESS ON A FIRM AND LASTING FOUNDATION, THE U.S. IS PREPARED TO GO THE EXTRA MILE IN SEEKING TO ESTABLISH A FRAMEWORK OF TRULY MUTUAL RESTRAINT. BUT THIS WILL REQUIRE THE SOVIET UNION TO TAKE POSITIVE STEPS TO RESOLVE OUR CONCERNS.

-- I REGRET TO SAY THAT OVER THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS, WHILE THE U.S. HAS SCRUPULOUSLY OBSERVED ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, AN INCREASING NUMBER OF OBJECTIONABLE SOVIET ACTIVITIES HAVE INTERFERED WITH, AND ERODED, OUR ABILITY TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE.

-- THESE VIOLATIONS AND THE INTERFERENCE WITH VERIFICATION MUST STOP IF EXISTING ARMS CONTROL ACCORDS ARE TO BE PRESERVED, AND IF NEW ARMS CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND USSR ARE TO BE ESTABLISHED.

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REGIONAL ISSUES

GENERAL REMARKS

-- EACH OF OUR COUNTRIES HAS MAJOR INTERESTS AT STAKE IN OTHER AREAS OF THE WORLD. OUR RELATIONS WITH EACH OTHER REGARDING THESE REGIONS WILL ALWAYS BE COMPETITIVE. WE'RE CONFIDENT OF OUR ABILITY TO HANDLE THIS COMPETITION.

-- BOTH OF US HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO KEEP OUR COMPETITION PEACEFUL, FOR THE SAKE OF THE PEOPLE IN THE REGIONS CONCERNED, AND FOR THE SAKE OF PREVENTING TURBULENCE THERE FROM PRODUCING A CRISIS IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

-- SO WE THINK REGIONAL ISSUES ARE SOMETHING THAT DESERVE CLOSE ATTENTION BY THE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL SECRETARY IN NOVEMBER.

-- I THINK THE EXPERTS TALKS WE HAVE HAD ON REGIONAL QUESTIONS SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE YEAR HAVE GIVEN US AT LEAST A MODEST BASIS FOR SUCH A DISCUSSION IN GENEVA.

-- SINCE THE FIRST OF THE YEAR, WE HAVE HAD EXCHANGES ON THE MIDDLE EAST, SOUTHERN AFRICA, AFGHANISTAN, AND EAST ASIA. WE ARE PREPARED FOR AN EXPERTS' EXCHANGE ON CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN AS WELL, THUS COMPLETING THE CYCLE AGREED UPON EARLIER.

-- WHILE OUR MEETINGS SO FAR HAVE PRODUCED NO DRAMATIC RESULTS, WE HAVE FOUND THEM VALUABLE AS A MEANS OF COMMUNICATING POSITIONS, IN CLARIFYING WHERE EACH OTHER'S INTERESTS REALLY LIE AND THEREBY HELPING TO PREVENT MISCALCULATION.

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-- WE BELIEVE THAT MORE EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION APPROACHES ARE REQUIRED. THIS MAY MEAN POSITIONING TECHNICAL DEVICES ON THE TERRITORY OF THE USSR AND U.S.. IT MAY ALSO REQUIRE ON-SITE CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS, AS IN THE AREA OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

-- WE BELIEVE THAT THE U.S. AND USSR WILL HAVE TO REVITALIZE EXISTING VERIFICATION APPROACHES, AND TO EXPLORE NEW ONES. THE UNITED STATES SEEKS STRICT COMPLIANCE AND IS PREPARED TO WORK DILIGENTLY WITH THE USSR TO DEVELOP SUCH APPROACHES SO THAT CONFIDENCE CAN BE RESTORED AND SECURITY CONCERNS SATISFIED.

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AFGHANISTAN

-- OUR DISCUSSIONS OF REGIONAL ISSUES HAVE REVEALED MANY AREAS OF DIFFERENCE, BUT CERTAINLY ONE OF THE BIGGEST OBSTACLES TO AN OVERALL IMPROVEMENT IN OUR RELATIONS REMAINS AFGHANISTAN.

-- AFGHANISTAN REMAINS IMPORTANT TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. THE MEMORY OF THE SOVIET INVASION AND EVIDENCE OF SOVIET TACTICS AIMED AT CIVILIANS IN AFGHANISTAN HAS LED MANY PEOPLE IN THE U.S. TO QUESTION THE POSSIBILITY OF MAKING US-SOVIET RELATIONS MORE PRODUCTIVE.

-- IN PART, THIS IS BECAUSE AMERICANS DO NOT UNDERSTAND WHY THE SOVIET UNION HAS FELT COMPELLED TO ACT WITH SUCH FORCE AND BRUTALITY IN AFGHANISTAN.

-- YOU SPOKE YESTERDAY IN YOUR SPEECH ABOUT HOW "LOCAL WARS" HAVE BEEN KILLING THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE AND HOW WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO SETTLE A SINGLE REGIONAL CONFLICT. WELL, IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THERE IS NO BETTER EXAMPLE OF THIS POINT THAN YOUR CONTINUING OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN.

-- WE HAVE SAID ON MANY OCCASIONS THAT WE RECOGNIZE THE RIGHT OF THE SOVIET UNION TO HAVE A SECURE SOUTHERN BORDER AND THAT THE U.S. DESIRES A NEGOTIATED POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT.

-- FOR OUR PART, WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION IS NECESSARY AND FEASIBLE.

-- I DISCUSSED OUR VIEWS ON THIS WITH YOU AT HELSINKI AND OUTLINED WHAT I BELIEVE IS A PRACTICAL AND CONCRETE WAY TO LOOK AT THE PROBLEM.

-- THE U.S. IS ENCOURAGED BY SIGNS THAT THE TALKS CONDUCTED AT GENEVA BY THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL'S PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE COULD YIELD PROGRESS — / F

-- FOREIGN MINISTER YAQUB KHAN HAS ALSO SPOKEN TO US OF THE CONVERSATION HE HAD ON AFGHANISTAN AT THE MOSCOW AIRPORT IN LATE AUGUST WITH FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KORNIYENKO. THE MINISTER FOUND MR. KORNIYENKO'S REMARKS OF INTEREST AND CAME AWAY WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS "SERIOUS AND KEEN" REGARDING A SETTLEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN.

-- WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN HEARING ADDITIONAL SOVIET THOUGHTS IN THIS VEIN, AND ENCOURAGE REALISTIC, PRACTICAL DISCUSSION OF THIS ISSUE BETWEEN THE USSR AND PAKISTAN.

-- WHAT SEEMS TO BE MISSING AT THIS POINT, HOWEVER, IS SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO PROVIDE A TIMETABLE FOR WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS. THAT STEP COULD PROVIDE IMPETUS FOR THE CORDOVEZ MISSION AND FACILITATE RAPID PROGRESS TOWARD A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.

-- WE ARE INTERESTED IN PURSUING A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO RESOLVING THIS PROBLEM. IF THE SOVIET UNION IS SIMILARLY INTERESTED YOU WILL FIND THAT THE US IS PREPARED TO BE HELPFUL.

-- IN SUM, THERE MUST BE A TIMETABLE FOR SOVIET WITHDRAWAL AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS WHICH PERMIT THE REFUGEES TO RETURN. IF THIS IS FORTHCOMING, WE WOULD BE WILLING TO PROVIDE GUARANTEES OF NON-INTERFERENCE AND TO RESPECT THE SOVIET UNION'S INTEREST IN A SECURE SOUTHERN BORDER.

MIDDLE EAST

-- YOU AND I DID NOT HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THE MIDDLE EAST IN HELSINKI, BUT IT REMAINS A CRUCIAL AND VOLATILE AREA OF THE WORLD WHERE OUR RESPECTIVE INTERESTS HAVE BROUGHT US TO THE BRINK OF CONFLICT IN THE PAST AND WHICH OUR RESPECTIVE LEADERS WILL BE SURE TO DISCUSS IN GENEVA.

--OUR EXPERIENCE OVER THE PAST FIFTEEN YEARS HAS BEEN THAT AS A PRACTICAL MATTER THE WAY TO MAKE REAL PROGRESS TOWARD PEACE HAS BEEN TO FACILITATE DIRECT TALKS BETWEEN THE PARTIES.

-- THE U.S. STILL BELIEVES THIS IS THE CASE. AS I TOLD MR. GROMYKO LAST MAY, THE U.S. IS COMMITTED TO WORKING WITH THE PARTIES IN THE REGION TO ACHIEVE A JUST AND LASTING SETTLEMENT. THE ONLY REALISTIC PATH TO PEACE IS DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BASED ON UNSC RESOLUTION 242.

-- WE ARE CONTINUING TO WORK TOWARD THAT GOAL. SHOULD JORDAN AND THE PALESTINIANS ENTER INTO DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL, WE BELIEVE THEY SHOULD RECEIVE THE SUPPORT OF ALL STATES SEEKING TO FURTHER ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE.

-- THE SOVIET UNION HAS DENOUNCED DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BUT THE ALTERNATIVE YOU HAVE PRESENTED, AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, IN OUR VIEW HOLDS OUT THE CERTAIN PROSPECT OF FAILURE AND STALEMATE.

-- SYRIAN ALOOFNESS FROM THE PEACE PROCESS AND THE MILITARY BUILDUP THEY HAVE PURSUED RAISE THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THEY ARE CONSIDERING A MILITARY SOLUTION TO THE ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE.

-- IN THE US VIEW SUCH A COURSE IS DANGEROUS AND CARRIES WITH IT POTENTIALLY CATASTROPHIC CONSEQUENCES FOR BOTH OF US. THE OUTCOME OF WAR BETWEEN ISRAEL AND SYRIA WOULD BE PREDICTABLE; ISRAEL WOULD WIN. BUT THE CONSEQUENCES WOULD BE INCALCULABLE, EXCEPT FOR ONE THING. THE TRAGEDY IN THE MIDDLE EAST WOULD CONTINUE.

-- WE HOPE YOU WILL USE YOUR INFLUENCE WITH DAMASCUS TO DISCOURAGE SYRIAN CONSIDERATION OF A MILITARY OPTION.

-- ON LEBANON, NOW THAT YOUR PROTEGE SYRIA HAS SUCH A MAJOR ROLE IN THAT COUNTRY, THEY SHOULD CLEAN UP THEIR ACT. IN PARTICULAR, THEY SHOULD STOP FOSTERING TERRORISM.

-- YOUR OTHER MAJOR ALLY IN THE REGION IS EVEN MORE OF AN OUTLAW STATE AND ITS LEADER IS CONSIDERED THROUGHOUT THE WORLD TO BE MENTALLY UNBALANCED. LIBYA MINED THE RED SEA, AND OPENLY BRAGS ABOUT THE FACT THAT IT HAS SENT HIT SQUADS THROUGHOUT AFRICA AND EVEN EUROPE. HOW CAN THE SOVIET UNION SIMULTANEOUSLY CLAIM THAT IT IS FOR PEACE AND PROVIDE THE MILITARY MIGHT AND TRAINING WHICH PERMITS LIBYA TO CARRY ON ITS CAMPAIGN OF VIOLENCE.

IRAN-IRAQ

-- OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS WE HAVE DISCUSSED THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR AND BOTH OF US HAVE AGREED THAT THE WAR IS NOT IN OUR INTERESTS AND THAT IRAN REMAINS THE INTRANSIGENT PARTY.

-- AN EARLY END TO THE WAR, WITH THE SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF BOTH SIDES INTACT, IS THE UNITED STATES' GOAL AND IS IN OUR MUTUAL INTEREST.

-- IT IS IMPORTANT THAT BOTH OUR COUNTRIES SUPPORT PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S AND OTHER'S EFFORTS TO ARRANGE A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.

-- SINCE IRAN CONTINUES TO REFUSE TO NEGOTIATE A GENERAL CEASEFIRE, THE BEST MEANS OF BRINGING ABOUT A PEACE SETTLEMENT IS TO CUT OFF IRAN'S ARMS SUPPLIES.

-- THE U.S. HAS EXERTED ITSELF TO CUT OFF ARMS SUPPLIES FROM THE WEST TO IRAN, BUT THE FLOW OF WEAPONS AND WAR MATERIAL FROM YOUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES CONTINUES.

-- WE HAVE ALSO RAISED WITH YOU THE PROSPECT OF THE USE OF CHEMICAL WARFARE IN THE GULF WAR. IN MY VIEW, THIS ISSUE HAS IMPORTANT IMPLICATIONS FROM BOTH THE REGIONAL AND ARMS CONTROL PERSPECTIVES. WE HAVE OFFERED TO TALK WITH YOU ABOUT THIS PROBLEM AND WHAT MIGHT BE DONE ABOUT IT, BUT WE HAVE RECEIVED NO RESPONSE.

-- I BELIEVE THE USSR COULD DO MORE ON THE GULF WAR. CONCRETE STEPS SUCH AS AN EFFORT TO CUT OFF IRAN'S SUPPLY OF SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES WOULD BE TANGIBLE EVIDENCE THAT YOU ARE PREPARED TO PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE.

EAST ASIA

-- OUR EXPERTS HAVE JUST ENGAGED IN A DETAILED REVIEW OF EAST ASIAN DEVELOPMENTS.

-- IN THE U.S. VIEW, ASIAN ECONOMIC DYNAMISM AND POLITICAL STABILITY ARE ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENTS.

-- THE PRESENT-DAY PROBLEMS OF VIETNAM AND NORTH KOREA ARE CAUSED BY THEIR PRESENT POLICIES, INCLUDING THE ISOLATION THEY HAVE INFLICTED ON THEMSELVES. IF THEY WISH TO PARTICIPATE CONSTRUCTIVELY IN THE DYNAMISM OF THE REGION, THEY NEED TO STOP THREATENING THE REGION'S STABILITY.

-- AS I TOLD YOU IN HELSINKI, WE ARE PARTICULARLY TROUBLED BY THE THREAT TO THIS STABILITY POSED BY THE VIETNAMESE INVASION OF CAMBODIA.

-- WE HOPE YOU WILL USE YOUR CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE WITH HANOI TO URGE THEM TO PURSUE A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT WHICH PRESERVES VIETNAM'S SECURITY INTERESTS, REMOVES ITS TROOPS FROM CAMBODIA, AND LOWERS TENSIONS WITH ASEAN AND CHINA.

-- TENSIONS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA ALSO REPRESENT AN ONGOING THREAT TO STABILITY IN NORTHEAST ASIA. IT IS OUR BELIEF THAT THAT BOTH OF US DO WHAT WE CAN TO ENCOURAGE DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH AND REDUCE THE LEVEL OF TENSION.

[NOTE: Public knowledge about North/South contacts is limited to divided families, trade, inter-parliamentary, and sports. On the more closely-held high-level contacts, there was a leak in the Japanese press, but both sides denied it. We should not bring up the high-level contacts with the Soviets as they may not be fully informed.]

-- THE ENTIRE U.S. ANTICIPATE A SUCCESSFUL OLYMPIAD IN SEOUL AND LOOKS FORWARD TO COMPETING ~~AGAINST~~ YOUR ATHLETES IN 1988.
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CENTRAL AMERICA

-- WE HAVE BOTH EXPRESSED OUR CONCERNS OVER INCREASED TENSIONS IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.

-- OUR EXPERTS WILL BE ABLE TO DISCUSS THIS IN MORE DEPTH WHEN THEY MEET IN OCTOBER.

-- IT IS WORTH RECALLING THAT PERHAPS THE MOST DANGEROUS CRISIS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES IN THE POSTWAR ERA AROSE IN THIS REGION. THERE IS NO NEED FOR THIS TO HAPPEN AGAIN AS LONG AS YOU DO NOT MISUNDERSTAND THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS REGION TO US.

-- WE REMAIN DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE AMOUNT OF WEAPONS BEING INTRODUCED INTO THE REGION BY THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES. WE HAVE SAID REPEATEDLY THAT THE EMERGENCE OF JET FIGHTER AIRCRAFT OR THE INTRODUCTION OF CUBAN COMBAT UNITS WOULD BE TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE TO THE UNITED STATES. IN GENERAL, THE ARMING OF NICARAGUA WELL BEYOND THE LEVELS OF THE OTHERS IN THE REGION MUST CEASE.

-- CUBA AND NICARAGUA ARE STANDING AGAINST THE TIDE OF GREATER DEMOCRACY IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE. RECOURSE TO VIOLENCE TO UPSET DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENTS WHICH WE REGARD AS VITAL TO THE STABILITY OF THE REGION WILL CONTINUE TO BE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE US. WE EXPECT CUBAN AND NICARAGUAN RESTRAINT IN ACTIVITIES IN THIS PART OF THE HEMISPHERE.

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SOUTHERN AFRICA

-- YOUR SIDE HAS SAID ON MANY OCCASIONS THAT SOUTHERN AFRICA IS NOT AN AREA WHERE EITHER OF US HAVE VITAL INTERESTS.

-- THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN TROOPS AND THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF VIOLENCE ARE MAJOR BARRIERS TO PROGRESS. INSTEAD, WE SHOULD BE SEEKING TO FACILITATE RECONCILIATION AMONG ALL OF THE PEOPLE AND NATIONS IN THE AREA.

-- SOUTH AFRICA HAS ENTERED A TURBULENT PHASE IN ITS HISTORY AND IT IS LIKELY TO REMAIN IN AN UNSETTLED STATE FOR SOME TIME TO COME. THIS UNDERLINES THE NEED FOR RESTRAINT BY OUTSIDE POWERS.

-- DURING THE 1970'S THE INTERVENTION OF YOUR PROXIES EXACERBATED THE PROBLEMS IN THIS REGION AND ENVENOMED OUR RELATIONS. WE BELIEVE THAT SIMILAR DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CURRENT ENVIRONMENT COULD BE EVEN MORE EXPLOSIVE IN RESULT.

-- WE REMAIN INTERESTED IN HELPING THE NATIONS OF REGION REACH A PEACEFUL ACCOMMODATION OF THEIR DIFFERENCES, PARTICULARLY ON THE QUESTION OF NAMIBIA.

-- MERE REITERATION OF THE IMPORTANCE OF UNSC RESOLUTION 435 IS NOT ENOUGH. A PRACTICAL WAY MUST BE FOUND TO PROMOTE A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION. DO YOU HAVE AN ALTERNATIVE TO SUGGEST?

-- SOVIET INFLUENCE WITH KEY ACTORS AMONG THE FRONTLINE STATES IS CONSIDERABLE. WE THINK YOU SHOULD USE THAT INFLUENCE TO ENCOURAGE THE CONTINUED SEARCH FOR A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA.

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PROPOSAL FOR REGULARIZATION OF REGIONAL DISCUSSIONS

-- THE U.S. BELIEVES THAT THE TIME HAS COME TO REGULARIZE THE REGIONAL DIALOGUE BEGUN THIS YEAR. WHAT WE HAVE IN MIND IS ANNUAL SESSIONS TO PROVIDE A REGULAR CHANNEL FOR INDEPTH REVIEW OF THE AREAS DISCUSSED THUS FAR. THESE TALKS COULD, OF COURSE, ADDRESS ADDITIONAL AREAS IF THE NEED AROSE IN THE FUTURE.

-- IF THEY ARE TO BE OF MAXIMUM VALUE, HOWEVER, IT WILL BE IMPORTANT THAT OUR RESPECTIVE REPRESENTATIVES BE ABLE TO SPEAK WITH EQUAL AUTHORITY. I REALIZE THAT OUR MINISTRIES ARE NOT ORGANIZED EXACTLY ALIKE, BUT WE HAVE FRANKLY FELT THAT SOME OF YOUR SENIOR PEOPLE WERE SEEKING TO AVOID DISCUSSIONS.

-- ASSUMING THIS PROBLEM CAN BE OVERCOME, WE BELIEVE REGULARIZED SESSIONS OF THE TYPE OUR TWO SIDES HAVE HAD THIS PAST YEAR CAN CONTRIBUTE TO ENSURING THAT COMMUNICATION ON PROBLEMS IS OPEN.

-- WHEN CAN WE EXPECT TO HEAR YOUR RESPONSE TO OUR PROPOSAL?

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BILATERAL ISSUES

CIVIL AVIATION:

[NOTE: On September 23 the Soviets agreed in principle to accept the note format and text proposed by the Japanese to bring the North Pacific Air Safety agreement into force. This should enable us to proceed with the trilateral exchange of notes by the end of this week. Although agreement would still have to be approved by the Japanese Parliament, we expect this can be accomplished by October 1. The Soviets also told us informally September 24 that they are prepared to begin talks on NOPAC implementation immediately, in rough tandem with discussions on new civil aviation arrangements. Our preference would be to start NOPAC technical implementation talks October 8 and civil aviation discussions October 15. It will be difficult for us to begin civil talks earlier due to prior commitments to several other countries.]

-- WE ARE PLEASED THAT WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON MEASURES TO IMPROVE AIR SAFETY IN THE NORTHERN PACIFIC AREA. THIS WILL BENEFIT ALL AIR TRAVELERS IN THE REGION.

-- WE UNDERSTAND THAT THERE IS NOW AGREEMENT ON THE LANGUAGE AND FORMAT OF THE NOTES NEEDED TO BRING THE NOPAC AGREEMENT INTO FORCE. THIS IS GOOD NEWS. WE MUST NOW BEGIN WORK ON IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES WITHOUT DELAY.

-- WE ARE PREPARED TO BEGIN DISCUSSIONS ON TECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION IN MOSCOW ON OCTOBER 8, AND CIVIL AVIATION TALKS IN WASHINGTON ON OCTOBER 15.

WE EXPECT THAT THE PACIFIC AIR SAFETY IMPLEMENTATION TALKS WILL QUICKLY PUT INTO PLACE THE MECHANISMS NECESSARY TO ENSURE THAT THE THREE COUNTRIES INVOLVED COMMUNICATE RAPIDLY TO RESOLVE ANY CIVIL AVIATION PROBLEM IN THE AREA, INCLUDING THE CASE OF A STRAYED OR DEVIATED AIRCRAFT.

-- WITHOUT SATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENTS TO IMPLEMENT THE NOPAC MOU, WE CANNOT AGREE TO RESUME BILATERAL CIVIL AIR SERVICE.

-- WE HOPE THE CIVIL AVIATION TALKS, ONCE BEGUN, WILL MOVE RAPIDLY TO CONCLUSIONS. ANY CIVIL AVIATION ARRANGEMENT MUST, OF COURSE, CONTAIN AN EQUITABLE BALANCE OF ECONOMIC BENEFITS FOR U.S. AIR CARRIERS SERVING THE USSR.

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CONSULATES: [The numbers question is being worked separately. We hope to have NSC agreement by the time of your meeting.]

-- WE AGREED TWO YEARS AGO TO MOVE TOWARD REOPENING OUR CONSULATES IN KIEV AND NEW YORK. THIS SEEMED TO US TO BE A VERY EASY STEP THAT COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED QUICKLY. THEN THE SOVIET SIDE DECIDED TO TIE THIS ISSUE TO THE TOTALLY UNRELATED ONE OF A NEW CIVIL AVIATION AGREEMENT. THIS SEEMED TO BE A SPECIOUS LINKAGE AT THE TIME AND STILL DOES.

-- THE U.S. WILL CONTINUE TO WORK THE AVIATION ISSUES, IN GOOD FAITH, BUT IT IS HIGH TIME WE EITHER RESOLVE THIS QUESTION OR FORGET ABOUT IT.

-- WE SEE NO REASON THAT THE TWO SIDES SHOULD NOT ANNOUNCE IN GENEVA THAT WE HAVE AGREED TO OPEN THE CONSULATES IN KIEV AND NEW YORK. THERE IS, OF COURSE, SOME PRELIMINARY SPADEWORK THAT HAS TO BE DONE. AS I TOLD YOU IN HELSINKI, WE NEED TO SEND A TEAM TO LOOK OVER THE BUILDINGS IN KIEV BEFORE WE CAN AGREE IT MAKES SENSE TO HAVE A PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT.

-- IF THE SOVIET SIDE IS SERIOUS ON THIS ISSUE OF AN EXCHANGE OF CONSULATES, I PROPOSE THAT A US TEAM GO TO KIEV WITHIN TEN DAYS. I WILL THEN ASK AMBASSADOR HARTMAN TO DISCUSS THIS ISSUE WITH YOU AT GREATER LENGTH IN MOSCOW TO WORK OUT THE DETAILS.

EXCHANGES AGREEMENT: [NOTE: In the third point, the number of cities and duration of the shows are more important than whether there are one or two exhibits.]

-- I HOPE YOU AGREE THAT WE SHOULD WRAP UP AN EXCHANGES AGREEMENT OVER THE NEXT MONTH. OUR PEOPLE HAVE BEEN NEGOTIATING OVER A YEAR ON THIS AGREEMENT, BUT SOME MINOR AND SOME MORE SERIOUS ISSUES REMAIN.

-- SURELY, YOUR SIDE CAN HANDLE SUCH ISSUES AS HOUSING FOR OUR EXCHANGEES AND SIMILAR REMAINING PROBLEMS. THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN COMPLETED BY NOW AND IS HARDLY WORTH OUR TIME. THERE ARE ALSO SOME CENTRAL ISSUES THAT WE CAN RESOLVE.

-- AS I TOLD YOU IN HELSINKI, WE MUST HAVE ONE TO TWO EXHIBITS OVER THE THREE-YEAR LIFE OF THE PROGRAM, IN AT LEAST NINE CITIES FOR 28 DAYS EACH, TO MAKE AN AGREEMENT WORTHWHILE TO US. WE SIMPLY HAVE NO GIVE ON THAT POINT.

-- I ALSO TOLD YOU OF OUR STRONG INTEREST IN TELEVISION APPEARANCES IN EACH OTHER'S COUNTRY. DO YOU HAVE ANY SUGGESTIONS ON WHAT WOULD BE A REASONABLE NUMBER OF SUCH RECIPROCAL APPEARANCES?

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-- I HOPE YOU AND AMBASSADOR HARTMAN CAN WORK OUT THE DETAILS IN THE COMING WEEKS. IT WILL TAKE SOME TIME TO DRAFT FINAL DOCUMENTS. WE ALSO NEED TO DISCUSS HOW THEY SHOULD BE SIGNED.

OTHER BILATERAL AGREEMENTS:

-- WE ARE PLEASED THAT THE COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS UNDER OUR OTHER BILATERAL AGREEMENTS ARE MOVING FORWARD. SECRETARIES BLOCK AND PIERCE HAD GOOD DISCUSSIONS IN MOSCOW AND I AM SURE THE ENVIRONMENTAL DISCUSSIONS IN NOVEMBER WILL ALSO BE USEFUL. WE HAVE BEEN THINKING ABOUT OTHER AREAS WHICH WOULD BE GOOD FOR COOPERATION.

-- I MUST SAY, HOWEVER, THAT I AM DISAPPOINTED IN YOUR RESPONSE TO THE PROPOSAL I MADE IN HELSINKI THAT WE NEGOTIATE A NEW SPACE AGREEMENT. THIS WAS AN EASY ISSUE, ONE THAT SCIENTISTS IN BOTH OUR COUNTRIES LIKE, AND THE KIND OF COOPERATION THAT IS IMPORTANT TO THE EFFORT TO BUILD BETTER RELATIONS. OUR OFFER REMAINS ON THE TABLE FOR YOU TO RECONSIDER.

-- IN HELSINKI, WE ALSO MENTIONED THE MARITIME BOUNDARY DISCUSSIONS. WE WILL GET TO YOU SOON WITH A PROPOSED DATE FOR ANOTHER ROUND.

-- THE INCIDENTS-AT-SEA AGREEMENT HAS BEEN A VERY USEFUL AGREEMENT OVER THE YEARS AND HAS HELPED TO REDUCE NAVAL INCIDENTS. WE ARE PREPARED TO GET THIS YEAR'S ANNUAL CONSULTATIONS BACK ON TRACK, UNDER THE NORMAL PATTERN, AND WILL GET BACK TO YOU SOON THROUGH REGULAR CHANNELS REGARDING DATES.

-- IN THE ANNUAL INCIDENTS-AT-SEA REVIEW LAST YEAR, THE SOVIET SIDE RAISED THE IDEA OF RECIPROCAL SHIP VISITS. WE THINK THIS IS AN EXCELLENT IDEA THAT SHOULD BE PURSUED BY OUR DELEGATIONS AT THE UPCOMING ANNUAL REVIEW.

-- SINCE I LAST RAISED THE BERLIN AIR CORRIDORS PROBLEM WITH YOU IN HELSINKI, NO PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE. SINCE YOU INSIST THE PROBLEM IS TECHNICAL, OUR PEOPLE SHOULD BE ABLE TO WORK OUT AN UNDERSTANDING QUICKLY AROUND THE TABLE AT THE WEEKLY BERLIN AIR CONTROLLERS MEETINGS. WE WOULD RESPOND POSITIVELY TO GREATER FLEXIBILITY ON YOUR PART IN THE INTEREST OF REMOVING THIS ISSUE FROM THE AGENDA.

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-- A SECOND ISSUE RELATES TO OUR MILITARY LIAISON MISSIONS IN GERMANY. AN APOLOGY AND COMPENSATION TO THE NICHOLSON FAMILY WOULD HAVE A SIGNIFICANT EFFECT ON THE OUTRAGE IN AMERICA FELT AT THIS TRAGEDY. WE SHOULD MAKE SURE THAT THE MILITARY-TO-MILITARY STAFF TALKS THAT ARE UNDERWAY ARE MORE EFFECTIVE IN PREVENTING FURTHER INCIDENTS. PREVENTABLE INCIDENTS CONTINUE TO ARISE. ARE THESE INCIDENTS BEING CREATED ON PURPOSE? ARE THEY DESIGNED TO HAVE A LARGER MEANING? OR ARE WE TO ASSUME THEY DO NOT STOP DESPITE OUR PROTESTS BECAUSE THE ACTIONS OF THE SOVIET MILITARY ON THE GROUND IS NOT BEING ADEQUATELY CONTROLLED BY MOSCOW?

GRAIN AGREEMENT

[Note: Although the Soviets promised John Block last month during his visit that they would honor their wheat purchase commitment under our Long Term Grain Agreement (LTA), they have still not purchased the additional 1.1 million tons needed to meet the 4 million tons minimum stipulated by the agreement. Although they have until September 30 to make this purchase, recent reports from our Embassy suggest that they may not do so after all. Well placed mid-level Soviet officials told us that a rise in the price of US wheat shortly after the Soviet announcement to purchase have apparently brought about the change of mind. The Soviets bought sizeable quantities of wheat from Canada in early September, perhaps in lieu of the purchases that had been committed to Block. US wheat prices did rise from \$123 per ton in late August to current levels of \$130 per ton. While part of this rise is due to seasonal factors and increases on loan forfeitures, some of it is clearly attributable to the Soviet announcement of intent to purchase, which they made to Block in a room where several representative of the US agricultural press were present]

-- SECRETARY BLOCK WAS TOLD UNEQUIVOCALLY IN THE USSR LAST MONTH THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD HONOR ITS WHEAT PURCHASE COMMITMENTS UNDER OUR LONG-TERM GRAIN AGREEMENT.

-- HOWEVER, TO DATE NO ADDITIONAL WHEAT PURCHASES HAVE BEEN MADE AND OUR GRAIN AGREEMENT YEAR EXPIRES SEPTEMBER 30.

-- WE ARE CONCERNED BY YOUR FAILURE TO HONOR THIS COMMITMENT AND TRUST THAT YOU WILL TAKE THE NECESSARY ACTION PROMPTLY.

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HUMAN RIGHTS/EMIGRATION

-- I WOULD LIKE TO OUTLINE FOR YOU SOME OF OUR VIEWS ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND EMIGRATION. AS A NATION OF IMMIGRANTS RULED BY LAWS, THIS IS A DEEPLY HELD MATTER OF CONCERN COMMON TO ALL AMERICANS. WE BELIEVE IT IS ALSO A MATTER OF FIRST IMPORTANCE FOR THE WORLD AT LARGE. COUNTRIES THAT HAVE TAKEN ON SOLEMN OBLIGATIONS AT THE UNITED NATIONS, HELSINKI, AND ELSEWHERE MUST LIVE UP TO THOSE AGREEMENTS JUST LIKE ANY OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS.

-- THERE IS A PRACTICAL SIDE TO THIS ISSUE. SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES AND THE INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN WERE MAJOR FACTORS IN THE DOWNTURN OF OUR RELATIONSHIP. WE ARE MERELY STATING THE OBVIOUS WHEN WE SAY THAT SOME MOVEMENT ON THESE QUESTIONS WOULD HAVE A SIGNIFICANT EFFECT ON OUR EFFORT TO IMPROVE OUR RELATIONSHIP.

-- STEPS THAT COULD BE TAKEN RANGE FROM RELEASING THE SAKHAROV FROM GORKIY OR ALLOWING SHCHARANSKIY OR ORLOV TO LEAVE THE USSR, TO INCREASED EMIGRATION, TO SUCH SIMPLE STEPS AS CLEANING UP OUR OUTSTANDING DUAL CITIZENSHIP AND DIVIDED SPOUSES CASES.

[For your and/or the President's private discussion with Shevardnadze:

-- I KNOW THE SOVIET SIDE HAS BEEN INTERESTED IN INCREASING TRADE BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES IN CERTAIN CATEGORIES AND YOU HAVE STATED YOUR VIEWS ON HUMAN RIGHTS. WE TOO ARE INTERESTED IN INCREASING NON-STRATEGIC TRADE, BUT THE ISSUE IS HISTORICALLY INTERTWINED WITH EMIGRATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS.

-- PRINCIPLES ARE INVOLVED ON BOTH SIDES. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT MERELY DWELLING ON OUR DIFFERENCES WILL GET US ANYWHERE.

-- IT STILL SHOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR EACH OF US TO DO THINGS IN THESE AREAS RECOGNIZING THAT FOR BOTH SIDES, THE ATMOSPHERE SURROUNDING OUR RELATIONSHIP IS SHAPED AND DEEPLY AFFECTED BY WHAT WE DO IN PRACTICE. WOULD IT NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR US EACH TO MOVE IN THESE AREAS, ONE OF SIGNIFICANCE TO US, ONE OF SIGNIFICANCE TO YOU.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
DECL: OADR

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NLS F00-008/1 #11
BY CAJ NARA, DATE 2/12/02

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-- JUST TO SPECULATE A BIT, PERHAPS YOUR SIDE COULD ALLOW SOME OF THE MORE PROMINENT DETAINED INDIVIDUALS TO GO ABROAD, CLEAR UP THE CASES OF SEPARATED SPOUSES AND AMERICAN CITIZENS THAT CANNOT LEAVE, AND MOVE ON JEWISH EMIGRATION. THIS COULD BE DONE UNILATERALLY, WITHOUT FANFARE OR EFFORTS ON OUR SIDE TO TAKE CREDIT. THIS IS EXACTLY WHAT HAPPENED WITH THE PENTECOSTALISTS IN OUR EMBASSY IN MOSCOW TWO AND A HALF YEARS AGO.

-- ON OUR SIDE, WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO SHOW SOME MORE FLEXIBILITY ON THE QUESTION OF ENERGY DEVELOPMENT.

-- [NOTE: Some energy equipment is already licensable. We also could look at the foreign policy controls imposed in recent years for human rights and regional reasons like Afghanistan, but not, repeat not, at strategic or COCOM controls.]

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STRUCTURE FOR FOLLOWUP

-- I BELIEVE OUR DISCUSSIONS THIS WEEK HAVE BEEN GOOD AND USEFUL ONES. WE NOW NEED TO AGREE ON WHERE WE GO FROM HERE.

-- ON THE GENEVA NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS, WE CAN AGREE THAT OUR DELEGATIONS IN GENEVA WILL DISCUSS THE MATTER IN DETAIL.

-- OUR NEGOTIATORS IN STOCKHOLM ARE WORKING ON ~~DRAFTING PROCEDURES~~ IN CDE. THEY SHOULD CONTINUE THAT PROCESS THERE. OUR DELEGATION IN VIENNA WILL BE EXAMINING WHAT MIGHT BE DONE IN THE MBFR TALKS. *THE ISSUES*

-- AMBASSADOR KENNEDY WILL WORK ON FINAL LANGUAGE ON THE NONPROLIFERATION STATEMENT FOR NOVEMBER WITH MR. PETROVSKIY IN THEIR OCTOBER MEETING.

-- ON TESTING, SHOULD WE CONTINUE TO TALK THROUGH OUR AMBASSADORS, OR IS THERE INTEREST ON YOUR SIDE IN HAVING A DISCUSSION THROUGH SPECIAL ENVOYS?

-- ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS, WHEN CAN WE EXPECT A RESPONSE TO OUR PROPOSAL THAT EXPERTS MEET ON PREVENTING THE SPREAD OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS POSSESSION AND USE ?

-- WE ARE IN TOUCH ON THE CENTRAL AMERICA/CARIBBEAN TALKS, WHICH WE HOPE CAN TAKE PLACE IN LATE OCTOBER. IF WE ARE AGREED THAT WE SHOULD ANNOUNCE IN NOVEMBER A REGULARIZATION OF REGIONAL EXPERTS TALKS, OUR AMBASSADORS IN MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON SHOULD BE EMPOWERED TO WORK OUT APPROPRIATE LANGUAGE.

-- WOULD IT BE USEFUL FOR US TO HAVE FURTHER TALKS ON AFGHANISTAN?

-- LET ME REITERATE OUR HOPE THAT THERE CAN BE TANDEM IMPROVEMENT IN AREAS OF SPECIAL CONCERN TO EACH SIDE. I BELIEVE IT IS IN YOUR OWN INTEREST TO SHOW A DIFFERENT FACE ON THESE MATTERS OF HUMAN RIGHTS/EMIGRATION. ADDITIONALLY, SUCH A NEW POSTURE WOULD HAVE SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. WE SHOULD FIND A WAY TO DISCUSS THIS. YOUR VIEW?

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BY CHS NARA, DATE 2/12/02

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-- ON BILATERAL ISSUES, THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON THE NORTH PACIFIC AIR SAFETY AGREEMENT SHOULD BE EXCHANGED IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. WE LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR RESPONSE TO OUR PROPOSALS THAT IMPLEMENTATION TALKS BEGIN IN MOSCOW OCTOBER 8 AND CIVAIR TALKS START IN WASHINGTON OCTOBER 15.

-- WE SHOULD FINISH UP THE EXCHANGES AGREEMENT IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS. ART HARTMAN HAS MY AUTHORITY TO PUT THE FINAL TOUCHES ON AN AGREEMENT WITH YOUR PEOPLE IN MOSCOW PROVIDING OUR STATED NEEDS ARE MET.

-- NOW THAT WE HAVE DISCUSSED THE CONSULATES, I ASSUME YOU WILL HAVE NO PROBLEM WITH OUR TEAM VISITING KIEV IN THE NEXT TWO WEEKS SO THAT WE CAN DECIDE WHEN AND HOW TO MOVE FORWARD. AS I MENTIONED EARLIER, ART WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH YOU ON THIS.

-- WE WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH YOU IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS ON THE DATES FOR ANOTHER DISCUSSION OF THE MARITIME BOUNDARY ISSUE.

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GENEVA AND BEYOND

-- REAGAN-GORBACHEV TOUR D' HORIZON [needs to be run by President]

- o OUR LEADERS WILL INEVITABLY WANT TO HAVE A FAR-RANGING DISCUSSION IN GENEVA OF THEIR RESPECTIVE WORLD VIEWS AND PERCEPTIONS OF THE OTHER'S MOTIVES AND BEHAVIOR. THIS WILL BE GOOD AND HELPFUL.
- o IN ADDITION TO RUNNING THROUGH THE USUAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL ISSUES, HOWEVER, MIGHT IT NOT BE USEFUL TO BROADEN THE EXCHANGE A BIT?
- o PERHAPS EACH LEADER COULD DESCRIBE HIS OWN INTERNAL OBJECTIVES AND CONCERNS -- WHAT HE IS SEEKING TO ACCOMPLISH IN HIS OWN COUNTRY AND THE PROBLEM HE FACES.
- o THIS COULD GIVE THEM A GLIMPSE BEHIND THE STEREOTYPED IMAGES WHICH INEVITABLY DEVELOP AND ESTABLISH GROUND FOR WHAT WE HOPE WILL BE AN EFFECTIVE WORKING RELATIONSHIP.

-- COMMUNIQUE: [recommend you let Shevardnadze raise]

- o OUR SIDE IS AGNOSTIC AT THIS POINT ON HOW WE SHOULD DOCUMENT THE MEETING. MUCH, OF COURSE, WOULD DEPEND ON HOW MUCH SUBSTANCE WE WOULD HAVE.
- o IF WE COULD LOCK UP EARLY AGREEMENT ON VARIOUS POSSIBILITIES WE HAVE DISCUSSED, AN OMNIBUS DOCUMENT MIGHT BE THE BEST VEHICLE; IF NOT, WE MIGHT CONSIDER A NUMBER OF SEPARATE STATEMENTS ON SPECIFIC ISSUES, E.G., NPT. LET'S SEE HOW WE DO.

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BY CH, NARA, DATE 2/12/82

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-- POST-GENEVA MEETINGS: [recommend you let Shevardnadze raise]

- o AGAIN, WE HAVE NO STRONG VIEWS.
- o IF THE TALKS ARE SUCCESSFUL IN STARTING A PROCESS WHICH COULD LEAD TO CONCRETE RESULTS IN THE YEARS AHEAD, WE WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE INTERESTED IN PRINCIPLE IN FOLLOW-ON MEETINGS.
- o WE BELIEVE THAT SUCH MEETINGS WOULD BEST BE IN CAPITALS.
- o AS WE INDICATED IN SETTING UP THE FORTHCOMING MEETING, THE U.S. BELIEVES IT IS THE SOVIET LEADER'S TURN TO VISIT THE US. WERE HE WILLING TO DO SO, WE COULD PROBABLY AGREE SIMULTANEOUSLY THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD VISIT MOSCOW FOR THE FOLLOWING MEETING.

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RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 7 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.



Matlock

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Your Meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

Wednesday, September 25

- 1:50 pm Depart your suite for Soviet Mission. McFarlane, Nitze, Ridgway, Hartman, Matlock, Palmer, Redman and Parris to accompany.
- 2:00 pm Arrive Soviet Mission. Amb. Dobrynin greets you outside, and escorts you inside. Korniyenko, Sokolov and Tarasenko are waiting in lobby. Together you proceed to small room adjacent to meeting room, where Shevardnadze will greet you. Pool of photographers (each side: 1 official, 8 media reps) in place for photo ops: shaking hands in ante room, sitting on couch in ante room, and sitting at table in meeting room.
- 2:15 pm Photographers are asked to leave. SY agents wait in ante room. Parris and Redman wait in adjacent room. Meeting begins.

Soviet Participants

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
Korniyenko
Dobrynin
Chernyshov
Sokolov
Tarasenko
(Possible add-on)
Uspenskiy - Interpreter

US Participants

Secretary Shultz
McFarlane
Nitze
Hartman
Ridgway
Matlock
Palmer
Zarechnak - Interpreter

- 6:00 pm Meeting concludes. Soviets have told us that there may be a deviation from "standard practice" of Korniyenko escorting you out (ie, Shevardnadze may see you to the door).

The press will be cordoned off to the side outside mission entrance. Redman will escort you over to briefly characterize meeting.

- 6:10 pm Motorcade returns to UN Plaza Hotel.
(approx.)

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DECL: OADR

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Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By dlb NARA, Date 12/27/00

Tickers

SEPT. 25

Shultz

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17AH-ASSEMBLY-SOVIET (SCHEDULED)2

SHULTZ MAY HEAR NEW SOVIET ARMS PROPOSAL
BY WILLIAM SCALLY

UNITED NATIONS, SEPT 25; REUTER - SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER
EDUARD SHEVARDNADZE IN TALKS WITH SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE
SHULTZ TODAY IS EXPECTED TO MAKE A NEW PROPOSAL ON NUCLEAR ARMS
CONTROL.

MOSCON HAS RECENTLY BEEN REPORTED TO BE TALKING ABOUT CUTS IN
NUCLEAR ARSENALS OF UP TO 40 PER CENT. BUT SHEVARDNADZE HAS
MADE CLEAR THE SOVIET UNION IS DETERMINED IN ITS CAMPAIGN TO
KILL PRESIDENT REAGAN'S "STAR WARS" PROGRAM IN ANY ARMS
CONTROL DEAL.

THE FOREIGN MINISTER TOLD THE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY YESTERDAY
THAT THE MISSILE DEFENSE RESEARCH PROGRAM, FORMALLY KNOWN AS
THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE (SDI), WOULD ENABLE AN
AGGRESSOR TO LAUNCH A "DISARMING" FIRST STRIKE WITHOUT FEAR
OF RETALIATION.

REFERRING TO A SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
ON SPACE RESEARCH, NOW BEFORE THE UNITED NATIONS, SHEVARDNADZE
SAID: "TO COUNTER THE SINISTER PLANS OF STAR WARS, THE USSR IS
PUTTING BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY A CONCEPT OF 'STAR
PEACE'".

U.S. OFFICIALS ARE READY TO LISTEN TO SHEVARDNADZE'S PROPOSALS
FOR REDUCING OFFENSIVE WEAPONS AND SAY SOVIET NEGOTIATORS HAVE
SO FAR PUT NOTHING ON THE TABLE AT THE GENEVA ARMS CONTROL
NEGOTIATIONS.

SHEVARDNADZE SAID YESTERDAY WITHOUT ELABORATION THAT THE
SOVIET DELEGATION HAD BROUGHT "SUBSTANTIAL, LARGE-SCALE AND
FAR-REACHING PROPOSALS" -- A STATEMENT THAT WAS WELCOMED BY
SHULTZ'S SPOKESMAN WITH A PLEDGE THAT ANY NEW SOVIET IDEAS
WOULD BE STUDIED CAREFULLY.

more

BUT SHULTZ IN HIS SPEECH TO THE UNITED NATIONS MONDAY DISMISSED THE SOVIET CAMPAIGN AGAINST SDI AS PROPAGANDA AND REAGAN, IN A NEWS CONFERENCE LAST WEEK, MADE CLEAR THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL PRESS AHEAD WITH THE \$25 BILLION RESEARCH PROGRAM.

TODAY'S TALKS AT THE SOVIET U.N. MISSION -- EXPECTED TO LAST ABOUT FOUR HOURS -- AND A MEETING BETWEEN SHEVARDNADZE AND REAGAN IN WASHINGTON FRIDAY WILL CONTINUE PREPARATIONS FOR THE NOVEMBER SUMMIT BETWEEN REAGAN AND SOVIET LEADER MIKHAIL GORBACHEV.

REAGAN HAS SOUGHT TO DAMPEN HIGH EXPECTATIONS OF THE SUMMIT AND U.S. OFFICIALS EXPECT IT TO PRODUCE RELATIVELY MINOR AGREEMENTS.

SHEVARDNADZE SAID YESTERDAY THE SUMMIT SHOULD FOCUS ON REDUCING THE DANGER OF WAR BY PREVENTING A SPACE ARMS RACE, REDUCING NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ENHANCING STRATEGIC STABILITY.2
REUTER 1250

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Talking Points for McFarlane on Consulates and Human Rights

-- Two points need to be cleared up before George talks to Shevardnadze tomorrow. One is the Consulates/numbers issue and the other is the human rights/trade question.

Consulates

--We need to ensure we can raise the Soviet diplomatic ceiling to allow a consulate in New York. Since we intend to assign about 30 Americans to Kiev to make it an all-American staff, we would give the Soviets only thirty in New York, i.e. raising the overall ceiling for the Washington embassy and San Francisco and New York consulates from 320 to 350.

--The problem is that the SIG-I recommendations on Counter-intelligence, recently approved by the President, called for Soviets assigned to their New York consulate to be included under the existing ceiling. This, of course, would mean that we cannot carry through on something which the President also has approved and which we have been pressing the Soviets for two years. The Soviets simply will not play and we do not want them to impose ceilings on our personnel in the USSR because we are increasing at the embassy to replace Soviet employees.

-- The solution, however, is an easy one. We have discussed it with [REDACTED] on your [REDACTED] he agrees but says he needs your clearance. We have in the works plans for a major reduction in the Soviets at their UN mission in New York that would be set in motion sometime after the meeting between the President and Gorbachev in Geneva. Our plans would reduce the Soviet UN mission by 100 people.

E.O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 1.4(d)

-- Thus, even with the new Soviet consulate, there would still be an overall reduction of seventy Soviets in New York. We are also looking at their commercial people there to see if some reduction would be in our interest. This is a good compromise but we need to move on it today so that the Secretary can raise this with Shevardnadze tomorrow.

Human Rights

--The human rights approach in George's talking points would signal our willingness to move on non-strategic trade controls on energy items in exchange for human rights progress also needs a final chop. This is the only way we now have to get movement on one whole area of our agenda. I know Matlock has raised this with you (Bud).

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~DECL: OADR~~

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NLS M03-1481#3

By LOT, KARA, Date 12/12/05

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--The basic outlines of the proposal are that the Soviets would agree to allow some of the major human rights detainees to leave the USSR, would clear up a number of outstanding separated spouses and divided families and would increase the levels of Jewish emigration. We would agree to lift foreign policy controls on the sale of some energy extraction technology and equipment, particularly oil drilling equipment. These were imposed for human rights and Afghanistan reasons. All of this would be done quietly, without fanfare on either side.

--We need an answer on both these items today.

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