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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: MATLOCK, JACK: Files

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File Folder: Meetings with USSR Officials: Shultz-Shevardnadze
Mtg September 27, 1985 Box ~~92129~~ **45**

Date: 12/27/00
Skinner/F00-008/1

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Memo	Rozanne Ridgway to the Secretary, re: Your Breakfast Meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, Friday, October 25, 7:30am, 3 p.	10/22/85	B1
2. Talking Pts	for Shevardnadze Meeting, Introduction, 1 p.	10/22/85	B1
3. Talking Pts	Regional Issues, 3 p.	[10/22/85]	B1
4. Talking Pts	Afghanistan, 1 p.	[10/22/85]	B1
5. Talking Pts	Middle East, 1 p.	[10/22/85]	B1
6. Talking Pts	Iran Iraq, 1 p.	[10/22/85]	B1
7. Talking Pts	East Asia, 1 p.	[10/22/85]	B1
8. Talking Pts	Central America, 1 p.	[10/22/85]	B1
9. Talking Pts	Southern Africa, 1 p.	[10/22/85]	B1
10. Talking Pts	Poland, 1 p.	[10/22/85]	B1
11. Talking Pts	Terrorism, 2 p.	[10/22/85]	B1
12. Talking Pts	Bilateral Issues, 2 p.	[10/22/85]	B1
13. Talking Pts	Concluding Document, 1 p.	[10/22/85]	B1
14. Talking Pts	Human Rights Talking Points for Tete-a-Tete, 1 p.	[10/22/85]	B1
15. Memo	George Shultz to Reagan, re: My 9/27 Meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, 2 p. PART. 2/12/02 F00-008/1 #32 R 5/21/08 f07-127 #38477	9/28/85	B1

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
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- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

File: Schultz
Shaw
MTH 25

Mr. R. C. McFarlane

System II

CONFIDENTIAL

Your Meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

Thursday, October 24

9:30 p.m. Pre-brief: Participants include McFarlane, Ridgway, Nitze, Matlock, Kalb, Palmer, and Parris

Friday, October 25

7:20 a.m. Depart suite to meet Shevardnadze at US Mission entrance

7:30 a.m. Escort Shevardnadze to 12th Floor, US Mission

7:35 a.m. Orange juice served on trays to guests. Photo opportunity.

7:40 a.m. Be seated at the table with interpreters

8:15 a.m. Table cleared. Interpreters move to end of table. Talks begin.

Soviet Participants

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
Deputy FM Komplektov
Ambassador Dobrynin
A. S. Cherneshev
O. Sokolov
S. P. Tarasenko
N. N. Uspenskiy, interpreter

U.S. Participants

Secretary Shultz
Mr. McFarlane
Ambassador Nitze
Ambassador Ridgway
Ambassador Matlock
Mark Palmer
Dimitry Zarechnak, interpreter

9:30 a.m. Meeting concludes. Escort Shevardnadze to USUN lobby where press is staked out. Escort FM Shevardnadze to car.

9:35 a.m. Brief comments to press in USUN lobby.

#1025P:BLP

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DECL:OADR

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By dlr NARA, Date 12/27/00



United States Department of State

Washington, D. C. 20520

~~SECRET/ SENSITIVE~~

OCT 22 1986

BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

TO: The Secretary ^{S/S}

FROM: EUR - Rozanne L. Ridgway *RLR*

SUBJECT: Your Breakfast Meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister
Shevardnadze, Friday, October 25, 7:30 a.m.

I. YOUR OBJECTIVES

1. To emphasize our commitment to an agenda for the Geneva meeting going beyond arms control.

2. To impress upon Shevardnadze the seriousness of the President's UNGA regional conflict resolution initiative and, if possible, lay the groundwork for a joint US - Soviet statement on the subject in Geneva.

3. To clarify our analyses and concerns on a range of regional issues.

4. To express concern about Soviet backsliding on bilateral agreements which we hoped would figure in the Geneva meeting, and to broach the idea of joint steps to combat terrorism.

5. To hand over an example of the type of concluding document we would be prepared to associate ourselves with in Geneva.

6. To reiterate the seriousness of our offer to engage the Soviets in a quiet dialogue which might produce results on human rights and areas of interest to Moscow.

II. SETTING

Since your last meeting with Shevardnadze, the Soviets have maintained their all-out effort to make arms control the focus of the President's November meeting in Geneva. Gorbachev's Paris trip, interviews by high-level Soviet military figures

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NLS F00-008/1, #18

BY *CA*, NARA, DATE *2/12/12*

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such as Marshal Akhromeyev, the "de-activization" of SS-20's in the western USSR in anticipation of the Dutch deployment decision, and a barrage of Soviet media commentary have sought to create the impression that Moscow is serious about achieving concrete progress by November 19, while Washington is dragging its feet. Dobrynin confirmed in his meeting with you Monday that Shevardnadze again wants to talk about "security issues" in New York. He is likely to take his lead from statements Gorbachev will make at the Sofia Warsaw Pact summit meeting October 21 - 23.

While beating their arms control drum, the Soviets have been intransigent on issues we have placed on the agenda. They have put off a response to your proposal that we regularize regional experts discussions. They have assumed uncompromising -- in some cases retrogressive -- positions in negotiations on civil aviation, implementing our North Pacific Air Safety agreement, and exchanges. They have turned down our proposals for discussions on nuclear testing and been non-committal on the President's ideas for an expansion of exchange and cooperative ties. They have turned a deaf ear to your proposal for quiet, serious talks on human rights.

III. PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The Secretary
Mr. McFarlane
Amb. Ridgway
Amb. Nitze
Amb. Matlock
Mr. Palmer
Mr. Zarechnak
(Interpreter)

U.S.S.R.

Foreign Minister SHEVARDNADZE
V. KOMPLEKTOV
A. DOBRYNIN
A. CHERNYSHEV
S. TARASENKO
O. SOKOLOV
N. USPENSKIY
(Interpreter)

IV. PRESS ARRANGEMENTS

There will be a brief photo opportunity (eight photographers from each side) in the dining room at the beginning of breakfast. Following the meeting, we recommend that you make a few remarks to the press in the Plaza driveway after you have escorted Shevardnadze to his limousine. If he follows the pattern you set in New York last month, he will have some remarks of his own.

V. DISCUSSION OF OBJECTIVES

As your guest, Shevardnadze will expect to speak first, and will seek to turn the discussion toward arms control. Given

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the breakfast setting, however, we may be able to turn this to our advantage. You might invite him to start off, allowing him his piece over the eggs, and moving on to our agenda once the table is cleared. As the Soviets have agreed to simultaneous interpretation for this meeting, we should have time to make our points even with spotting him the first word.

The President's initiative of the day before provides a perfect vehicle for focusing the conversation on the regional themes we have told the Soviets we want to discuss. Your talking points provide a comprehensive description of what the initiative is and is not. Specifically, they put down markers that the initiative does not change our current policies in such arenas as Afghanistan or Southern Africa, and that it does not provide a Soviet entree into vital regions like the Middle East and Central America. Rather, it seeks to create a realistic framework for repairing the damage done to our bilateral relations and the international climate by Soviet and Soviet-proxy activities in the past.

Before moving from the President's initiative into a survey of outstanding regional issues, you should reiterate our interest in regularizing regional experts discussions. You might press Shevardnadze as to whether the Soviets have some problem in principle with the idea.

To underscore that our agenda is not limited to arms control, you could wrap up the general session by reviewing progress on the various bilateral issues as we approach the Geneva meeting. You might note our disappointment that Soviet negotiating positions appear to have hardened since you and Shevardnadze last met. Your talking points highlight specific areas where action will be necessary if we are to have agreements by November 19. They also include a proposal for joint steps to combat terrorism in the wake of recent attacks against U.S. and Soviet citizens in the Middle East.

You could conclude the meeting by handing Shevardnadze our sample communique, indicating we would be prepared to subscribe to such a document if the substance were forthcoming (we are seeking NSC clearance). If Shevardnadze hands you their draft document, we recommend that you simply note that we will study it.

As Shevardnadze appeared more receptive to your last approaches on human rights in private, you may wish to take up this question in a short tete-a-tete following the general meeting. You would reiterate the seriousness of our interest in quiet steps which could be taken to satisfy our human rights concerns without compromising Soviet principles, referring to your recent letter on divided spouses to illustrate the kind of actions we have in mind.

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10/22/85, 1500

TALKING POINTS FOR SHEVARDNADZE MEETING

INTRODUCTION

-- WELCOME TO NEW YORK.

-- WE COVERED ARMS CONTROL IN GREAT DETAIL IN OUR LAST MEETING
[NOTE: We may have more to say on arms control depending on
NSPG deliberations.]

-- SINCE WE HAVE ONLY A SHORT TIME TODAY, I PROPOSE THAT WE GO
INTO SOME DEPTH ON REGIONAL ISSUES AND CONCLUDE WITH A QUICK
LOOK AT BILATERAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTIONS.

-- I'D LIKE TO START OFF WITH SOME GENERAL COMMENTS ABOUT THE
PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS TO THE UN YESTERDAY. WE COULD THEN TURN TO
SPECIFIC REGIONS.

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NLS FOO-008/1 #19

BY CAV, NARA, DATE 2/12/02

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FOUO 008/1 #20

BY

CAH

NARA, DATE

2/12/02

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REGIONAL ISSUES

THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE

-- THE PRESIDENT PREVIEWED HIS INITIATIVE OF YESTERDAY IN HIS RECENT LETTER TO GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV. I'D LIKE TO EXPAND A BIT ON WHAT HE SAID IN HIS LETTER AND HIS UNGA SPEECH.

-- AS THE PRESIDENT NOTED WHEN YOU MET WITH HIM IN WASHINGTON, THE REGIONAL EXPERTS' TALKS WE HAVE HELD OVER THE PAST YEAR HAVE BEEN INTERESTING AND USEFUL.

-- WE HAVE PROPOSED REGULARIZING THESE EXCHANGES. WE'RE STILL WAITING FOR YOUR ANSWER.

-- AS I SUGGESTED TO YOU IN SEPTEMBER, HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD BE LOOKING AT WAYS TO EXPAND THE DIALOGUE WE HAVE BEGUN, AND PUT OUR ENERGY TO WORK AT SOLVING PROBLEMS, NOT JUST DISCUSSING THEM.

-- FOR THAT REASON, WE TOOK SPECIAL NOTE OF THE PASSAGE IN YOUR SPEECH LAST MONTH IN NEW YORK WHERE YOU SAID THERE WAS NO "FATED CLASH" OF U.S. AND SOVIET NATIONAL INTERESTS. YOU ALSO SPOKE ABOUT THE SUFFERING CAUSED BY LOCAL CONFLICTS, AND THE NEED FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

-- WE AGREE WITH THESE SENTIMENTS, AND HOPE YOUR REMARKS MEAN THE SOVIET UNION IS READY TO HELP PROMOTE SOLUTIONS TO REGIONAL CONFLICTS.

-- WHAT THE PRESIDENT HAS PROPOSED IS A FRAMEWORK FOR U.S.-SOVIET COOPERATION IN THIS AREA, AN EFFORT TO DESCRIBE PRINCIPLES AND PROCESSES WHICH WE BOTH MIGHT ACT UPON. WE THINK OUR FIRST TARGET OUGHT TO BE THOSE CONFLICTS, AFGHANISTAN, CAMBODIA, NICARAGUA, ANGOLA, AND ETHIOPIA, WHICH DIRECTLY CONTRIBUTED TO THE DETERIORATION OF OUR RELATIONS.

-- THESE ISSUES ARE AT THE CORE OF INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS, AND WERE LARGELY RESPONSIBLE FOR SHATTERING EFFORTS TO IMPROVE U.S. - SOVIET RELATIONS IN THE 1970'S.

-- WE RECOGNIZE THAT TROUBLES IN THESE AREAS OFTEN ARISE OUT OF HISTORIC RIVALRIES AND CAN'T BE VIEWED SOLELY OR EVEN PRIMARILY AS EAST-WEST ISSUES.

-- IT'S CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT INVOLVEMENT OF OUTSIDE POWERS, PARTICULARLY MILITARY INVOLVEMENT, HAS EXACERBATED THESE PROBLEMS, PERPETUATED THEM, AND GIVEN THEM AN EAST-WEST DIMENSION THAT POSES ITS OWN RISKS FOR GLOBAL STABILITY.

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-- YOU ARE AWARE THAT, IN OUR VIEW, THE SOVIET UNION'S RESORT TO DIRECT USE OF FORCE, AS IN AFGHANISTAN, ITS USE OF PROXIES IN OTHER AREAS, AND ITS WILLINGNESS TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF UNSETTLED LOCAL SITUATIONS TO IMPOSE GOVERNMENTS AGAINST THE WILL OF THE PEOPLES INVOLVED HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE DETERIORATION OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

-- AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, THE REGIMES WHICH THE SOVIETS HAVE SUPPORTED ARE REPRESSIVE AND UNPOPULAR, AND HAVE NOT ESTABLISHED THEMSELVES DESPITE OUTSIDE MILITARY INTERVENTION, OFTEN INCLUDING ADVISERS, FOREIGN TROOPS AND MASSIVE MILITARY SUPPLIES. IN FACT THE POLICIES OF THESE SOVIET-STYLE REGIMES HAVE GIVEN RISE TO INDIGENOUS OPPOSITION SEEKING TO LIBERALIZE OR OVERTHROW THEM.

-- WE HAVE NEVER MADE ANY SECRET OF THE FACT THAT OUR SYMPATHIES ARE WITH THOSE WHO FIGHT FOR GENUINE SELF-DETERMINATION.

-- AT THE SAME TIME, WE BELIEVE THAT THESE PROBLEMS REQUIRE POLITICAL NOT MILITARY SOLUTIONS.

-- WE ARE PREPARED TO WORK WITH YOU TO HELP RESOLVE CONFLICTS THROUGH NEGOTIATION AND TO LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT BY BOTH OF OUR COUNTRIES.

-- WHAT WE HAVE IN MIND IS A PEACE PROCESS TO ADDRESS THESE CONFLICTS AT THREE LEVELS. FIRST THERE SHOULD BE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE WARRING PARTIES. NEGOTIATIONS ARE ESSENTIAL TO ACHIEVING AN END TO VIOLENCE, NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN TROOPS.

-- ONCE THESE NEGOTIATIONS MAKE REAL PROGRESS, A SEPARATE SET OF SOVIET-AMERICAN DISCUSSIONS COULD BEGIN. THESE TALKS WOULD NOT BE FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS BUT WOULD SUPPORT THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE WARRING PARTIES.

-- IN SOME CASES, THIS MIGHT MEAN GUARANTEEING ARRANGEMENTS REACHED IN NEGOTIATIONS, BUT IN EVERY CASE THE PRIMARY U.S. - SOVIET ROLE WOULD BE TO SUPPORT REGIONAL EFFORTS TO REDUCE AND ELIMINATE OUTSIDE MILITARY INVOLVEMENT, INCLUDING WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN TROOPS AND LIMITATION OF THE FLOW OF OUTSIDE ARMS.

-- IF THESE FIRST TWO STAGES ARE SUCCESSFUL, IT WOULD MAKE POSSIBLE THE REINTEGRATION OF THESE COUNTRIES INTO THE WORLD ECONOMY. THIS WOULD REQUIRE A MULTILATERAL RECONSTRUCTION AND RECOVERY EFFORT. THE U.S. WOULD BE WILLING TO DO ITS PART IN SUCH AN EFFORT. WE ASSUME THE SOVIET UNION WOULD AS WELL.

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-- AT THE END OF THE DAY, IF THE PROCESS SUCCEEDED, WE MIGHT FIND OURSELVES COOPERATING FOR THE BENEFIT OF AREAS WHICH ARE NOW WRACKED BY WAR, RATHER THAN COMPETING FOR INFLUENCE. THUS, THIS IS NOT A PLAN FOR CONDOMINIUM, BUT RATHER FOR MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT FROM THESE REGIONS.

-- IN SUM THIS INITIATIVE OFFERS A WAY FOR US TO WORK TOGETHER, STEP-BY-STEP, TO ELIMINATE THE CAUSES OF MAJOR TENSIONS IN OUR OWN RELATIONS AND TO END THE VIOLENCE IN A NUMBER OF REGIONS. THOSE ARE WORTHY OBJECTIVES FOR OUR TWO COUNTRIES. WE HOPE YOU'LL GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO OUR PROPOSAL.

-- IF YOU AGREE THAT SUCH A JOINT EFFORT MIGHT BE WORTHWHILE, WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO WORK IN THE WEEKS AHEAD TO DEVELOP LANGUAGE WHICH OUR LEADERS COULD USE IN GENEVA IN AGREEING TO MOVE IN THIS DIRECTION.

-- IN ANY CASE, WE HOPE THAT THE GENERAL SECRETARY WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS OUR IDEA WHEN HE MEETS WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN.

-- I WOULD LIKE TO GIVE YOU AN OPPORTUNITY TO RESPOND NOW. WE MIGHT THEN TURN TO A DISCUSSION OF THE SITUATION IN VARIOUS REGIONS AROUND THE GLOBE.

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AFGHANISTAN

-- THIS IS ONE OF THE BIGGEST OBSTACLES TO AN OVERALL IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS. THE SOVIET OCCUPATION HAS LED MANY PEOPLE IN THE U.S. TO QUESTION THE POSSIBILITY OF A MORE SATISFACTORY U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP.

-- WE HAVE SAID ON MANY OCCASIONS THAT WE RECOGNIZE THE RIGHT OF THE SOVIET UNION TO HAVE A SECURE SOUTHERN BORDER AND THAT THE U.S. DESIRES A NEGOTIATED POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.

-- WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION IS NECESSARY AND FEASIBLE, AND HAVE HEARD A NUMBER OF REPORTS THAT THE SOVIET UNION NOW APPEARS MORE INTERESTED IN SUCH A SOLUTION.

-- IF THAT IS SO, WE WOULD ENCOURAGE TWO THINGS; A DIRECT DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE USSR AND PAKISTAN ON THESE ISSUES: AND A MORE FORTHCOMING SOVIET RESPONSE TO THE CORDOVEZ MISSION.

-- WHAT SEEMS TO BE MISSING AT THE MOMENT IS A SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO PROVIDE A TIMETABLE FOR WITHDRAWAL OF ITS TROOPS. THAT STEP COULD PROVIDE IMPETUS FOR THE CORDOVEZ MISSION AND FACILITATE RAPID PROGRESS TOWARD A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.

-- IF YOU ARE INTERESTED IN A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO RESOLVING THE PROBLEM, YOU'LL FIND US PREPARED TO BE HELPFUL.

-- AS WE HAVE SAID, GIVEN A TIMETABLE FOR SOVIET WITHDRAWAL AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS WHICH PERMIT THE REFUGEES TO RETURN HOME IN SAFETY, WE WOULD BE WILLING TO PROVIDE GUARANTEES OF NON-INTERFERENCE AND TO RESPECT THE SOVIET UNION'S INTEREST IN A SECURE SOUTHERN BORDER.

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NLS FOO-008/1, #21

BY C4J, NARA, DATE 2/12/02 ~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

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MIDDLE EAST

-- THIS REMAINS A CRUCIAL AND VOLATILE AREA OF THE WORLD WHERE OUR RESPECTIVE INTERESTS HAVE BROUGHT US TO THE BRINK OF CONFLICT IN THE PAST. OUR LEADERS WILL WANT TO DISCUSS IT IN GENEVA.

--OUR EXPERIENCE OVER THE PAST FIFTEEN YEARS HAS BEEN THAT AS A PRACTICAL MATTER THE WAY TO MAKE REAL PROGRESS TOWARD PEACE HAS BEEN TO FACILITATE DIRECT TALKS BETWEEN THE PARTIES.

-- THE U.S. STILL BELIEVES THIS IS THE CASE. AS I TOLD FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO LAST MAY, THE U.S. IS COMMITTED TO WORKING WITH THE PARTIES IN THE REGION TO ACHIEVE A JUST AND LASTING SETTLEMENT. THE ONLY REALISTIC PATH TO PEACE IS DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BASED ON UNSC RESOLUTION 242.

-- WE ARE CONTINUING TO WORK TOWARD THAT GOAL. SHOULD JORDAN AND THE PALESTINIANS ENTER INTO DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL, WE BELIEVE THEY SHOULD RECEIVE THE SUPPORT OF ALL STATES SEEKING TO FURTHER ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE.

-- IN OUR VIEW, THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE YOU HAVE PROPOSED HOLDS OUT THE CERTAIN PROSPECT OF FAILURE AND STALEMATE. ONLY DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS OFFER ANY GENUINE CHANCE OF SUCCESS. HOWEVER, WE ARE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE PARTIES' IDEAS CONCERNING A SUPPORTIVE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT FOR THOSE NEGOTIATIONS.

-- SYRIAN ALOOFNESS FROM THE PEACE PROCESS AND THE MILITARY BUILDUP THEY HAVE PURSUED RAISE THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THEY ARE CONSIDERING A MILITARY SOLUTION TO THE ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE.

-- SUCH A COURSE IS DANGEROUS AND CARRIES WITH IT POTENTIALLY CATASTROPHIC CONSEQUENCES. THE OUTCOME OF WAR BETWEEN ISRAEL AND SYRIA WOULD BE PREDICTABLE; ISRAEL WOULD WIN. BUT THE CONSEQUENCES WOULD BE INCALCULABLE, EXCEPT FOR ONE THING: THE TRAGEDY IN THE MIDDLE EAST WOULD CONTINUE.

-- WE HOPE YOU WILL USE YOUR INFLUENCE WITH DAMASCUS TO DISCOURAGE SYRIAN CONSIDERATION OF A MILITARY OPTION.

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BY GS

NARA, DATE

2/12/02

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IRAN-IRAQ

-- THE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL SECRETARY SHOULD INCLUDE THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR IN THEIR DISCUSSION OF REGIONAL ISSUES.

-- BOTH OF US HAVE AGREED IN PAST DISCUSSIONS THAT THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR IS NOT IN OUR INTERESTS AND THAT IRAN IS THE INTRANSIGENT PARTY.

-- THE U.S. SEEKS AN EARLY END TO THE WAR WITH THE SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF BOTH SIDES KEPT INTACT. DO WE UNDERSTAND CORRECTLY THAT THIS IS YOUR GOAL AS WELL?

-- IT REMAINS IMPORTANT THAT BOTH OUR COUNTRIES SUPPORT PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S AND OTHERS' LONGSTANDING EFFORTS TO ARRANGE A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.

-- HOWEVER, DESPITE IRAQ'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST KHARG, IRAN REFUSES TO NEGOTIATE: THE ONLY REAL MEANS TO BRING ABOUT A SETTLEMENT, THEREFORE, IS TO CUT OFF IRAN'S ARMS SUPPLIES.

-- THE U.S. HAS EXERTED ITSELF TO CUT OFF ARMS SUPPLIES FROM THE WEST TO IRAN. ACCORDING TO OUR BEST INFORMATION, NORTH KOREA, VARIOUS EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, AND LIBYA ARE NOW IRAN'S MAJOR SUPPLIERS.

-- THE WAR IS PARTICULARLY REGRETTABLE BECAUSE IT INVOLVES CHEMICAL WARFARE. THIS HAS IMPORTANT IMPLICATIONS FROM BOTH THE REGIONAL AND ARMS CONTROL PERSPECTIVES, AND WE REMAIN READY TO DISCUSS IT WITH YOU.

-- MOREOVER, THE COMMON VIEW OF THE WAR AS A STALEMATE MAY NOT BE ADEQUATE. ARE YOU CONCERNED, AS ARE WE, THAT IF IRAN CAN PURSUE THE WAR INDEFINITELY, IT COULD DEFEAT IRAQ? THIS WOULD GIVE FRESH IMPETUS TO IRAN'S BACKWARD AND DESTABILIZING DOCTRINES IN THE MUSLIM WORLD.

-- IF THE WAR SERIOUSLY TROUBLES THE USSR, YOU SHOULD CONSIDER STEPS TO RESTRICT ARMS FLOWS FROM YOUR FRIENDS TO IRAN.

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FOO-008/1 #23

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BY

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NADA DATE

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EAST ASIA

-- OUR EXPERTS HAVE RECENTLY ENGAGED IN A DETAILED REVIEW OF EAST ASIAN DEVELOPMENTS.

-- THE PROBLEMS OF VIETNAM AND NORTH KOREA ARE CAUSED BY THEIR PRESENT POLICIES, INCLUDING THE ISOLATION THEY HAVE INFLICTED ON THEMSELVES. IF THEY WISH TO PARTICIPATE CONSTRUCTIVELY IN THE DYNAMISM OF THE REGION, THEY NEED TO STOP THREATENING THE REGION'S STABILITY.

-- AS I TOLD YOU IN HELSINKI, THE VIETNAMESE INVASION OF CAMBODIA THREATENS REGIONAL STABILITY. YOU SHOULD USE YOUR CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE WITH HANOI TO URGE THEM TO PURSUE A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT WHICH PRESERVES REMOVES ITS TROOPS FROM CAMBODIA AND LOWERS TENSIONS WITH ASEAN AND CHINA.

-- TENSIONS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA ALSO REPRESENT AN ONGOING THREAT TO STABILITY IN NORTHEAST ASIA. BOTH OF US SHOULD DO WHAT WE CAN TO ENCOURAGE DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH AND REDUCE THE LEVEL OF TENSION.

[NOTE: Public knowledge about North/South contacts is limited to divided families, trade, inter-parliamentary, and sports. On the more closely-held high-level contacts, there was a leak in the Japanese press, but both sides denied it. We should not bring up the high-level contacts with the Soviets as they may not be fully informed.]

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FOO-008/1 #24

BY

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NARA, DATE

2/12/02

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CENTRAL AMERICA

-- WE HAVE BOTH EXPRESSED OUR CONCERNS OVER INCREASED TENSIONS IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.

-- OUR EXPERTS WILL BE ABLE TO DISCUSS THIS IN MORE DEPTH WHEN THEY MEET NEXT WEEK.

-- IT IS WORTH RECALLING THAT PERHAPS THE MOST DANGEROUS CRISIS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES IN THE POSTWAR ERA AROSE IN THIS REGION. THERE IS NO NEED FOR THIS TO HAPPEN AGAIN AS LONG AS YOU DO NOT MISUNDERSTAND THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS REGION TO US.

-- WE REMAIN DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE AMOUNT OF WEAPONS BEING INTRODUCED INTO THE REGION BY THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES. WE HAVE SAID REPEATEDLY THAT THE EMERGENCE OF JET FIGHTER AIRCRAFT OR THE INTRODUCTION OF CUBAN COMBAT UNITS WOULD BE TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE TO THE UNITED STATES.

-- IN GENERAL, THE ARMING OF NICARAGUA WELL BEYOND THE LEVELS OF THE OTHERS IN THE REGION MUST CEASE.

-- CUBA AND NICARAGUA ARE STANDING AGAINST THE TIDE OF GREATER DEMOCRACY IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE. RECOURSE TO VIOLENCE TO UPSET DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENTS WHICH WE REGARD AS VITAL TO THE STABILITY OF THE REGION WILL CONTINUE TO BE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE US. WE EXPECT CUBAN AND NICARAGUAN RESTRAINT IN ACTIVITIES IN THIS PART OF THE HEMISPHERE.

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NLS F00-008/1 #25

BY CJS NARA, DATE 2/12/02

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SOUTHERN AFRICA

-- YOUR SIDE HAS SAID ON MANY OCCASIONS THAT SOUTHERN AFRICA IS NOT AN AREA WHERE EITHER OF US HAVE VITAL INTERESTS.

-- THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN TROOPS AND THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF VIOLENCE ARE MAJOR BARRIERS TO PROGRESS. INSTEAD, WE SHOULD BE SEEKING TO FACILITATE RECONCILIATION AMONG ALL OF THE PEOPLE AND NATIONS IN THE AREA.

-- SOUTH AFRICA HAS ENTERED A TURBULENT PHASE. IT IS LIKELY TO REMAIN IN AN UNSETTLED STATE FOR SOME TIME TO COME. THIS UNDERLINES THE NEED FOR RESTRAINT BY OUTSIDE POWERS.

-- DURING THE 1970'S THE INTERVENTION OF YOUR PROXIES EXACERBATED THE PROBLEMS IN THIS REGION AND ENVENOMED OUR RELATIONS. WE BELIEVE THAT SIMILAR DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CURRENT ENVIRONMENT COULD BE EVEN MORE EXPLOSIVE IN RESULT. DIRECT SOVIET ENGAGEMENT IN THE WAR IN ANGOLA WOULD BE VERY DAMAGING TO OUR POLITICAL RELATIONS.

-- WE REMAIN INTERESTED IN HELPING THE NATIONS OF REGION REACH A PEACEFUL ACCOMMODATION OF THEIR DIFFERENCES, PARTICULARLY ON THE QUESTION OF NAMIBIA.

-- MERE REITERATION OF THE IMPORTANCE OF UNSC RESOLUTION 435 IS NOT ENOUGH. A PRACTICAL WAY MUST BE FOUND TO PROMOTE A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION. DO YOU HAVE AN ALTERNATIVE TO SUGGEST?

-- SOVIET INFLUENCE WITH KEY ACTORS AMONG THE FRONTLINE STATES IS CONSIDERABLE. WE THINK YOU SHOULD USE THAT INFLUENCE TO ENCOURAGE THE CONTINUED SEARCH FOR A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA.

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NLS

FOU-008/1 #26

BY

CH

NARA, DATE

7/12/02

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POLAND

-- WE REMAIN DEEPLY CONCERNED OVER THE NEGATIVE COURSE OF EVENTS IN POLAND. POLITICAL PRISONERS HAVE RISEN IN NUMBER TO AT LEAST 300. MORE REPRESSIVE LEGISLATION HAS BEEN ENACTED.

-- IN ORDER TO HEAL THE WOUNDS IN POLISH SOCIETY AND RESTORE THE ECONOMY, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE GOVERNMENT ENTER INTO A DIALOGUE WITH THE CHURCH AND WORKERS FOR GENUINE RECONCILIATION.

-- AS A CLOSE ALLY AND ECONOMIC PARTNER OF POLAND, YOU CAN CONTRIBUTE TO PEACE AND STABILITY BY URGING THE POLISH GOVERNMENT TO WORK FOR TRUE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION WITH THE CHURCH AND WORKERS.

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NLS F00-008/1 #2-7

BY CH, NARA, DATE 2/12/02

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TERRORISM

-- AT THIS POINT, I WANT TO DIGRESS A BIT AND FOCUS ON THE GENERAL PROBLEM OF TERRORISM AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT.

-- EACH OF US HAS BEEN THE VICTIM OF TERRORISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST IN RECENT WEEKS. AT LEAST ONE AMERICAN HAS DIED; A SOVIET DIPLOMAT WAS MURDERED. EACH OF US HAS HOSTAGES WHO ARE BEING HELD BY TERRORIST GROUPS IN LEBANON.

-- WE MADE A STRONG PUBLIC STATEMENT EXPRESSING OUR OUTRAGE AT THE BEIRUT KIDNAPPING AND THE SUBSEQUENT MURDER. I WANT AGAIN TO EXPRESS MY SYMPATHIES TO YOU FOR THAT TRAGEDY.

-- WE KNOW YOU ARE MAKING A MAJOR EFFORT TO GET YOUR PEOPLE RELEASED. WE WOULD LIKE TO SHARE EXPERIENCES AND INFORMATION:

-- WE BELIEVE YOUR HOSTAGES ARE BEING HELD BY A SMALL LEBANESE SUNNI GROUP VERY CLOSE TO THE GROUP HOLDING OUR PEOPLE. BOTH GROUPS ARE HEAVILY INFLUENCED BY IRAN WHICH HAS NOT MADE A SERIOUS EFFORT TO OBTAIN THEIR RELEASE.

-- SYRIA, WHILE DESIROUS OF RESOLVING THE HOSTAGE PROBLEM, IS CONSTRAINED BY RELATIONS WITH IRAN, AND THE CHAOTIC SITUATION IN LEBANON. IN THE CASE OF THE TWA HOSTAGES, IRAN'S LAST-MINUTE ENDORSEMENT (AT THE URGING OF DAMASCUS) APPEARED TO BE A KEY FACTOR IN THEIR RELEASE.

-- THE QUESTION OF HOSTAGE-TAKING BY TERRORISTS IS ONE WHERE WE CAN AND SHOULD STAND TOGETHER AND LET THIS BE KNOWN. WE HAVE SENSED SOMEWHAT GREATER UNDERSTANDING THAN IN SIMILAR PAST CIRCUMSTANCES IN YOUR INITIAL TREATMENT OF THE ACHILLE LAURO INCIDENT. WHILE SUBSEQUENT SOVIET PRESS TREATMENT OF THE EVENT WAS MORE OPPORTUNISTIC, WE WOULD HOPE TO SEE IN THE FUTURE A MORE COOPERATIVE APPROACH ON YOUR PART.

-- WE HAVE SOME EXPERIENCE IN DISCUSSING CERTAIN TERRORISM PROBLEMS, SUCH AS NUCLEAR TERRORISM, CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AND HOSTAGE-TAKING. THE CONCLUSION LAST SPRING OF THE SCC UNDERSTANDING ON NUCLEAR TERRORISM PROVES THIS POINT.

-- WE THINK THE TIME HAS COME TO START EXPLORING WHETHER FURTHER COOPERATION IS POSSIBLE. IF YOU'RE INTERESTED, WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO HOLD PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS ON CERTAIN TERRORISM ISSUES. SOME OF THE ISSUES ADDRESSED IN THE U.S. RESOLUTION AT THE MILAN UN CONGRESS MIGHT SERVE AS AN OUTLINE.

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BY CAS, NARA, DATE 2/12/02

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-- AS WE WORK IN SEPARATE WAYS TO GET OUR RESPECTIVE HOSTAGES FREED, THE TIME MAY ALSO BE RIGHT FOR COMBINED OR PARALLEL DEMARCHES TO TEHRAN AND DAMASCUS CALLING FOR IRAN TO USE ITS INFLUENCE TO RELEASE ALL OF THE HOSTAGES. WHILE OUR VIEWS ON THE MIDDLE EAST OF COURSE DIFFER, NEITHER YOU NOR WE HAVE AN INTEREST IN SEEING IRAN'S INFLUENCE IN THE LEBANON BECOME STRONGER.

-- WE ALSO BELIEVE THERE WOULD BE UTILITY IN NOTING THE THREAT OF AND POSSIBILITY FOR COOPERATION AGAINST TERRORISM IN A SUMMIT COMMUNIQUE, IF WE HAVE ONE. WOULD YOU AGREE?

[NOTE: It is possible, although in our view unlikely, that Shevardnadze will respond with references to U.S. "state terrorism"; to the 1970 Brazinskas hijacking case, which resulted in the death of a Soviet stewardess; or to anti-Soviet terrorism in the U.S. The points below are for contingency use:]

- NICARAGUA: The Sandinistas advocate and practice the export of revolutionary violence to their neighbors. Their allies should not now complain of indigenous resistance within Nicaragua.
- AFGHANISTAN: The issue is the foreign invader and we admire what the Afghans are doing to rid themselves of it. The solution is a negotiated political settlement and withdrawal of Soviet troops.
- GENERAL: Soviet relations with and assistance to certain groups which have engaged in terrorism are well documented. Rather than simply exchange polemics on terrorism, we would prefer to discuss concrete steps to rid the world of this scourge.
- BRAZINSKAS: We have deep sympathy for the relatives of the Soviet air hostess who was killed. We condemn this act, as we do all acts of terrorism, regardless of the motive. The USG rejected the Brazinskas' appeal for political asylum and has moved for their deportation on the grounds of their illegal entry into the United States. The case is in the hands of the courts in California.
- Anti-Soviet Terrorism in the U.S.: The FBI is continuing to watch closely for possible activity in the U.S. against the USSR.

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NLS F00-0081, #29

BY CH, NARA, DATE 2/12/02

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

BILATERAL ISSUES

-- WHILE WE HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY, IT MIGHT BE USEFUL QUICKLY TO SUMMARIZE WHERE WE STAND ON SOME OF THE BILATERAL ISSUES, AND AGREE ON NEXT STEPS IN THE WEEKS REMAINING BEFORE NOVEMBER 19.

-- OVERALL, WE ARE WORRIED BY BACKSLIDING IN A NUMBER OF AREAS.

-- ON THE EXCHANGES AGREEMENT, THERE ARE TWO MAJOR OUTSTANDING ISSUES.

- o ON EXHIBITS, WE CANNOT ACCEPT LESS THAN WE HAD IN THE PREVIOUS AGREEMENT -- AT LEAST NINE CITIES FOR 28 DAYS EACH OVER THE THREE-YEAR LIFE OF THE AGREEMENT.

- o WE MUST ALSO HAVE IN THE AGREEMENT ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE THAT MUTUALLY AGREED REPRESENTATIVES FROM EACH SIDE CAN HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO APPEAR ON TELEVISION.

-- THESE ARE NOT UNREASONABLE POSITIONS; SURELY A WAY CAN BE FOUND TO ACCOMMODATE THEM.

-- ON AVIATION ISSUES, IT IS GOOD THAT WE HAVE BROUGHT THE NORTHERN PACIFIC AIR SAFETY AGREEMENT INTO EFFECT. WE ARE DISAPPOINTED, HOWEVER, AT THE UNCOMPROMISING SOVIET STAND ON HOW THE AGREEMENT WILL BE IMPLEMENTED.

- o IF THIS AGREEMENT IS TO WORK, THE SOVIET UNION MUST BE READY TO INITIATE ACTION IN EMERGENCIES, ALLOW FOR FREE AND QUICK COMMUNICATION BETWEEN AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL CENTERS, SHARE COSTS, ESTABLISH A RANGE OF COMMUNICATIONS FREQUENCIES, AND AGREE TO USE ENGLISH AS A COMMON LANGUAGE FOR INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION. ARE YOU READY TO DO THIS?

- o IS THE SOVIET UNION PREPARED TO WORK OUT PROCEDURES TO COVER THE SITUATION OF A STRAYED OR LOST AIRCRAFT?

- o IS THE SOVIET UNION WILLING TO DEDICATE THE RESOURCES, INCLUDING MILITARY RESOURCES WHERE NECESSARY, TO THE TASK OF ASSISTING AIRCRAFT IN AN EMERGENCY SITUATION IN THE NORTH PACIFIC AREA?

- o IS THE SOVIET UNION PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE DETAILED PROCEDURES WHICH WOULD ALLOW THE RESPECTIVE AREA CONTROL CENTERS IN Khabarovsk, Tokyo and Anchorage to communicate directly with each other when an aircraft finds itself in an emergency situation?

- o IF THE ANSWERS TO THESE QUESTIONS ARE POSITIVE, AND IF YOU BELIEVE IT WOULD BE PRODUCTIVE, WE ARE PREPARED TO HOST ANOTHER ROUND OF DISCUSSIONS BEFORE THE NOVEMBER MEETING. WE WOULD NEED SUFFICIENT ADVANCE NOTICE TO PERMIT COORDINATION WITH THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT.

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-- WE CANNOT SIGN A CIVIL AVIATION AGREEMENT UNTIL THE QUESTION OF AIR SAFETY IMPLEMENTATION IS RESOLVED.

-- ANY CIVIL AVIATION ACCORD WOULD HAVE TO PROVIDE FOR AN EQUITABLE SHARE OF AIR TRAFFIC FOR THE US CARRIER.

o IN THE LAST ROUND OF TALKS, WE MADE A MAJOR COMPROMISE OFFER ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT YOU WOULD RECIPROCATATE, BUT YOU DID NOT. ARE YOU PREPARED FOR SUCH AN EQUITABLE APPROACH?

-- WE WILL HAVE MARITIME BOUNDARY DISCUSSIONS IN LATE OCTOBER. WE'VE UPGRADED THE LEVEL OF OUR REPRESENTATION AS A SIGN OF OUR SERIOUSNESS AND LOOK FOR A SIMILAR APPROACH FROM YOUR SIDE.

-- WE EXPECT TO SEND A TEAM TO KIEV IN EARLY NOVEMBER TO INSPECT POSSIBLE SITES FOR OUR CONSULATE. I UNDERSTAND YOU MAY SEND A SIMILAR TEAM TO NEW YORK. WE SEEN NO REASON WHY WE SHOULD NOT BE ABLE TO ANNOUNCE AGREEMENT TO ESTABLISH CONSULATES IN THESE CITIES IN GENEVA. DO YOU AGREE?

-- BERLIN AIR CORRIDORS REMAIN A PROBLEM: THE WESTERN POWERS NEED MORE RESERVATION-FREE AREA. WE WILL RESPOND POSITIVELY TO SOVIET FLEXIBILITY IN THE BERLIN TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS.

-- WE HAVE PROPOSED THROUGH OUR NAVAL ATTACHE IN MOSCOW THAT THE ANNUAL REVIEW OF THE INCIDENTS-AT-SEA AGREEMENT BE RESCHEDULED, BUT THERE HAS BEEN NO RESPONSE. WHEN CAN WE EXPECT YOUR ANSWER?

-- WE HAVE AGREED TO LANGUAGE ON COOPERATION ON NON-PROLIFERATION TO BE USED IN GENEVA.

-- WE ARE WAITING TO HEAR FROM YOU ON THE LIST OF THE PRESIDENT'S IDEAS THAT ART HARTMAN GAVE YOU ON EXPANDING EXCHANGE AND COOPERATIVE ACTIVITIES. WE HOPE TO PIN DOWN AGREEMENT ON A NUMBER OF THESE IN TIME FOR GENEVA.

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CONCLUDING DOCUMENT

-- FINALLY, ON THE QUESTION OF HOW WE SHOULD DOCUMENT THE GENEVA MEETING, I CAN TELL YOU WE HAVE GIVEN A LOT OF THOUGHT TO THE VIEWS YOU EXPRESSED TO ME IN NEW YORK AND THE GENERAL SECRETARY OUTLINED IN HIS LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT.

-- AS WE SAID AT THE TIME, OUR WILLINGNESS TO HAVE A FORMAL COMMUNIQUE OR OTHER JOINT DOCUMENT VERY MUCH DEPENDS ON ITS CONTENTS.

-- WE HAVE NO INTEREST IN TYING UP TIME AND RESOURCES IN A PHILOSOPHICAL DEBATE OR IN AN ATTEMPT TO RECONCILE THE IRRECONCILIABLE.

-- IF WE ARE SUCCESSFUL BY NOVEMBER IN SATISFACTORILY DEALING WITH THE ISSUES WE HAVE DISCUSSED TODAY, HOWEVER, WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO HAVE A JOINT DOCUMENT.

-- I WOULD LIKE TO HAND OVER FOR YOU TODAY AN EXAMPLE OF THE KIND OF COMMUNIQUE WE WOULD FIND WORTHWHILE. I REALIZE THAT CERTAIN ELEMENTS OF OUR DRAFT WILL BE SUBJECT TO NEGOTIATION, AND WE HAVE LEFT PLACES FOR THE SOVIET SIDE TO SET FORTH ITS POSITION WHERE WE ARE UNLIKELY TO BE ABLE TO REACH MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE FORMULATIONS.

-- WE HAVE TRIED TO BE AMBITIOUS IN OUTLINING WHAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE FOR US TO AGREE TO. I WANT TO CAUTION YOU, HOWEVER, THAT OUR INCLUSION OF CERTAIN ELEMENTS IN OUR DRAFT SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN BY YOUR NEGOTIATORS AS AN INDICATION THAT WE ARE MORE PREPARED TO REACH AGREEMENTS THAN THEY.

-- IF WE REACH AGREEMENTS, SO MUCH THE BETTER; IF WE DO NOT, WE DO NOT. BUT IF THE SUBSTANCE IS NOT THERE, THAT WILL DIMINISH THE NEED FOR A FINAL DOCUMENT.

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NLS FOU-008/1 #30

BY CHS NARA, DATE 2/2/02

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HUMAN RIGHTS TALKING POINTS FOR TETE-A-TETE

-- I WANTED TO TAKE UP IN PRIVATE THE ISSUE WE DISCUSSED IN OUR NEW YORK PRIVATE MEETING -- HUMAN RIGHTS.

-- WE REGRET THAT YOU HAVE NOT RESPONDED TO MY SUGGESTION THAT WE SET UP A PRIVATE CHANNEL TO DISCUSS HOW BOTH SIDES COULD TAKE STEPS IN AREAS OF INTEREST TO THE OTHER WHICH COULD LEAD TO CONCRETE PROGRESS WITHOUT SACRIFICING PRINCIPLES.

-- THAT OFFER REMAINS OPEN. WE CAN BE FLEXIBLE ON THE MODALITIES. WHAT WE ARE INTERESTED IN -- WHAT THE PRESIDENT IS INTERESTED IN -- IS CONCRETE RESULTS.

-- IN THE MEANTIME, YOU HAVE THE LETTER ART HARTMAN DELIVERED ON A NUMBER OF DUAL NATIONALS AND DIVIDED SPOUSES. THESE ARE PERSONS WHO HAVE SUFFERED GREATLY AS A RESULT OF THEIR INABILITY TO JOIN THEIR LOVED ONES IN OUR COUNTRY. RESOLVING THEIR CASES WOULD BE A CONTRIBUTION TO A SUCCESSFUL MEETING IN GENEVA.

-- AS WE HAVE SAID MORE THAN ONCE, WE WILL NOT FAIL TO NOTICE.

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NLS

FOO-008/1 #31

BY 641, NARA, DATE 2/2/02

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON*File!*
Shultz -
Shevardnadze~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

September 28, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: George P. Shultz *GPS*SUBJECT: My 9/27 Meeting and Dinner With Soviet Foreign
Minister Shevardnadze

In my two-hour plus conversation yesterday afternoon with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, we reviewed your morning meeting, discussed arms control items at some length, and -- most usefully -- went through our list of regional and bilateral items. The atmosphere was good, but Korniyenko again sometimes marred the exchange by making propaganda points or pulling back Shevardnadze when we seemed to be communicating. The informal dinner later that evening gave Obie and me a good opportunity to establish personal contact with the Shevardnadzes without the interference of his staff.

About two-thirds of the time at our afternoon meeting was taken up by arms control items, much of it a standard recitation of Soviet positions by Shevardnadze. He pushed hard on their testing moratorium, and we talked at length, although to no effect, about chemical weapons -- including their use in the Iran-Iraq War. Shevardnadze also floated what purported to be a new approach on INF designed to appear more flexible than the unyielding position given in the letter to you from Gorbachev, although it was equally unacceptable. He referred to my earlier expression of interest in discussing separately any of the items at the Geneva NST if progress can be made that way -- our standard position since January. He then put forward his own "interim proposal" consisting of a freeze on INF deployments and some cuts, followed by discussion of more radical reductions. This proposal will presumably be set out more fully in Geneva.

The most useful part of the discussion was a run-through of our agenda on regional, bilateral, and human rights issues. We agreed our regional discussions had not accomplished much, but nevertheless marked the start of an ability to exchange information on problems in various parts of the world. We can probably agree to regularize them for the future. We agreed to have the Central America/Caribbean talks in Washington in late October. I again raised the question of Afghanistan and the withdrawal of Soviet forces, but he did not appear interested in any real discussion.

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I again offered confidential discussions on human rights issues, noting the obvious connection with trade. Shevardnadze reiterated that they were interested in discussing individual cases, but not broad principles of human rights actions by the Soviet Union. I went quickly through points on finishing up our work on civil aviation, consulates, and exchange negotiations by November, and informed him of our desire to move ahead with the Incidents at Sea talks. We both agreed that any final document from your meeting with Gorbachev should be based on the substance we have achieved, although he repeated the Soviet interest in broad formulations.

In conclusion, we agreed that preparations for your meeting in Geneva had high priority for both governments. Both sides would work hard to make the meeting as productive as possible.

At dinner, Shevardnadze agreed on the importance of you and Gorbachev having some time alone together in Geneva. He described Gorbachev to me as a man who is resourceful, strong, energetic, wants much for his country, and is acutely aware of the Soviet people's desire for peace.

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