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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection:** MATLOCK, JACK: Files

**Archivist:** dlb

**File Folder:** Reagan-Shevardnadze Mtg - 9/27/85 (3)  
Box 921295 Page 1

**Date:** 12/28/00  
Skinner/F00-008/1

| DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                                                                   | DATE               | RESTRICTION   |
|-----------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|---------------|
| 1. Memo               | Tyrus Cobb, Matlock to Robert McFarlane, re: Your Talking Points for Shevardnadze NSC Meeting., 1 p.            | 9/19/85            | B1            |
| 2. Talking Pts        | for Shevardnadze NSC Meeting, 3 p.                                                                              | n.d.               | B1            |
| <del>3. Memo</del>    | <del>Nicholas Platt to McFarlane, re: President's Meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, 2 p.</del> | <del>9/17/85</del> | <del>B1</del> |
| <del>4. Paper</del>   | <del>Arms Control: Geneva Negotiations, 1 p.</del>                                                              | <del>9/16/85</del> | <del>B1</del> |
| <del>5. Paper</del>   | <del>Arms Control: Compliance/Interim Restraint, 1 p.</del>                                                     | <del>9/16/85</del> | <del>B1</del> |
| <del>6. Paper</del>   | <del>Arms Control: CDE, 1 p.</del>                                                                              | <del>9/19/85</del> | <del>B1</del> |
| <del>7. Paper</del>   | <del>Arms Control: Chemical Weapons, 1 p.</del>                                                                 | <del>9/16/85</del> | <del>B1</del> |
| <del>8. Paper</del>   | <del>Arms Control: Nuclear Non-Proliferation, 2 p.</del>                                                        | <del>9/16/85</del> | <del>B1</del> |
| <del>9. Paper</del>   | <del>Arms Control: Nuclear Testing, 1 p.</del>                                                                  | <del>9/16/85</del> | <del>B1</del> |
| <del>10. Paper</del>  | <del>Arms Control: MBFR, 1 p.</del>                                                                             | <del>9/16/85</del> | <del>B1</del> |
| <del>11. Paper</del>  | <del>Arms Control: Soviet Declaratory Arms Control Proposals, 1 p.</del>                                        | <del>9/16/85</del> | <del>B1</del> |
| <del>12. Paper</del>  | <del>Arms Control: Soviet UNGA Proposal on Space, 1 p.</del>                                                    | <del>9/16/85</del> | <del>B1</del> |
| <del>13. Paper</del>  | <del>Regional Issues: General Points on Regional Dialogue, 1 p.</del>                                           | <del>9/16/85</del> | <del>B1</del> |
| <del>14. Paper</del>  | <del>Regional Issues: Afghanistan, 1 p.</del>                                                                   | <del>9/16/85</del> | <del>B1</del> |
| <del>15. Paper</del>  | <del>Regional Issues: Middle East/Persian Gulf, 1 p.</del>                                                      | <del>9/16/85</del> | <del>B1</del> |
| <del>16. Paper</del>  | <del>Regional Issues: East Asia, 1 p.</del>                                                                     | <del>9/16/85</del> | <del>B1</del> |

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
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- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].

- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
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- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection:** MATLOCK, JACK: Files

**Archivist:** dib

**File Folder:** Reagan-Shevardnadze Mtg - 9/27/85 (3)

**Date:** 12/28/00

Box 921295 Page 2

Skinner/F00-008/1

| DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                                                     | DATE               | RESTRICTION   |
|-----------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|---------------|
| <del>17. Paper</del>  | <del>Regional Issues: Central America, 1 p.</del>                                                 | <del>9/16/85</del> | <del>B1</del> |
| <del>18. Paper</del>  | <del>Regional Issues: Southern Africa, 1 p.</del>                                                 | <del>9/16/85</del> | <del>B1</del> |
| <del>19. Paper</del>  | <del>Regional Issues: Europe: US-Soviet Issues in Germany, 1 p.</del>                             | <del>9/16/85</del> | <del>B1</del> |
| <del>20. Paper</del>  | <del>Bilateral Issues: Human Rights, 1 p.</del>                                                   | <del>9/16/85</del> | <del>B1</del> |
| <del>21. Paper</del>  | <del>Bilateral Issues: North Pacific Air Safety/Civil Aviation, 1 p.</del>                        | <del>9/16/85</del> | <del>B1</del> |
| <del>22. Paper</del>  | <del>Bilateral Issues: Economic Relations, 1 p.</del>                                             | <del>9/16/85</del> | <del>B1</del> |
| 23. Paper             | Bilateral Issues: Exchange of Consulates - Kiev and New York, 1 p.                                | 9/15/85            | B1            |
| <del>24. Paper</del>  | <del>Bilateral Issues: General Exchanges Agreement, 1 p.</del>                                    | <del>9/16/85</del> | <del>B1</del> |
| <del>25. Paper</del>  | <del>Bilateral Issues: Maritime Boundary/Soviet Harassment Activity in the Bering Sea, 1 p.</del> | <del>9/16/85</del> | <del>B1</del> |
| <del>26. Paper</del>  | <del>Bilateral Issues: Space Cooperation, 1 p.</del>                                              | <del>9/16/85</del> | <del>B1</del> |
| 27. Paper             | Bilateral Issues: Moscow Spy Dust, 1 p.                                                           | 9/16/85            | B1            |
| <del>28. Paper</del>  | <del>Bilateral Issues: Visits and Contacts, 1 p.</del>                                            | <del>9/16/85</del> | <del>B1</del> |
| <del>29. Paper</del>  | <del>Bilateral Issues: Travel Controls Applied to Soviet Employees of UN Secretariat, 1 p.</del>  | <del>9/16/85</del> | <del>B1</del> |
| 30. Bio               | 1 p.                                                                                              | n.d.               | B1            |

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

Friday, September 20, 1985  
11:00 a.m. - 12:00 Noon  
Cabinet Room

AGENDA

- I. Introduction.....Robert C. McFarlane  
(5 minutes)
- II. Objectives for Geneva Meetings  
and Perspectives of the  
Shevardnadze Meeting.....Secretary Shultz  
(10 minutes)
- III. Intelligence Review on Soviet  
Expectations.....William P. Casey  
(5 minutes)
- IV. Defense Perspective.....Secretary Weinberger  
(5 minutes)
- V. Discussion.....All Participants  
(30 minutes)
- VI. Conclusion.....Robert C. McFarlane  
(5 minutes)

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By dlb NARA, Date 12-78-00

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Ridgeway Kimmitt

Gates

Keel

Cobb

Shultz

Baker

Meese

Casey

President

McFarlane

Vice President Weinberger Wickham Regan

Fuller

Ikle

Moreau

Poindexter

Matlock

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506SECRET

September 20, 1985

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JS*SUBJECT: Briefing Package for the President's Meeting with  
Shevardnadze on September 27, 1985

State has forwarded the attached briefing package for the President's September 27 meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. I have reviewed it and have no problem with it. Although the material is too detailed for the President, you may wish to look through it. Talking points for the meeting will be forwarded separately.

*JS* Sevastianovich, *SK* Kfraemer, *JS* Steiner, *JS* Cobb, *JH* Mandel, *W.A.* Fortier and Lenczowski concur.

Attachment:

Tab A State Memo with Briefing Package

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By *dlb* NARA, Date *12/26/00*SECRET

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 19, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN

FROM:

CAROL CLEVELAND *Carol*

SUBJECT:

Attendees at National Security Council .  
Meeting, September 20, 1985 (U)

The following officials plan to attend the National Security Council Meeting on the visit of Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in the Situation Room on September 20, at 11:00 a.m.  
(c)

The President

The Vice President  
Mr. Craig L. Fuller

State:

Secretary George P. Shultz  
Ms. Rozanne L. Ridgeway (Assistant Secretary for European Affairs)

Treasury:

Secretary James A. Baker, III  
Mr. Robert M. Kimmitt

Defense:

Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger  
Dr. Fred C. Ikle

Justice

Attorney General Edwin Meese III

CIA:

Mr. William J. Casey  
Mr. Robert M. Gates

OMB:

Dr. Alton Keel

JCS:

General John A. Wickham, Jr. (Acting Chairman)  
Admiral Arthur S. Moreau

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By 016 NARA, Date 12/28/00

CONFIDENTIAL

White House:

Mr. Donald T. Regan  
Mr. Robert C. McFarlane  
Admiral John M. Poindexter

NSC:

Amb Jack F. Matlock  
Colonel Tyrus Cobb

Approved \_\_\_\_\_ As Amended \_\_\_\_\_

At Tab A is a proposed seating plan for this meeting.

Approved \_\_\_\_\_ As Amended \_\_\_\_\_

At Tab B is an agenda for the meeting which we plan to put in the folders at the meeting.

Approved \_\_\_\_\_ As Amended \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

|       |   |              |
|-------|---|--------------|
| Tab A | - | Seating Plan |
| Tab B | - | Agenda       |

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National Security Council  
The White House

System # \_\_\_\_\_

Package # \_\_\_\_\_

|                 | SEQUENCE TO | HAS SEEN | DISPOSITION  |
|-----------------|-------------|----------|--------------|
| Bob Pearson     | <u>1</u>    | <u>P</u> | _____        |
| William Martin  | _____       | _____    | _____        |
| John Poindexter | _____       | _____    | _____        |
| Paul Thompson   | _____       | _____    | _____        |
| Wilma Hall      | _____       | _____    | _____        |
| Bud McFarlane   | _____       | _____    | _____        |
| William Martin  | _____       | _____    | _____        |
| NSC Secretariat | <u>2</u>    | _____    | <u>Staff</u> |
| Situation Room  | _____       | _____    | _____        |

|                 |            |            |              |                       |
|-----------------|------------|------------|--------------|-----------------------|
| I = Information | A = Action | R = Retain | D = Dispatch | N = No further Action |
|-----------------|------------|------------|--------------|-----------------------|

cc: VP    Regan    Buchanan    Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

Action: Matlock  
                  Koenig  
Concur: Ladd  
                  ~~Myers~~  
                  Cobb



7374  
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

September 17, 1985

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: President's Meeting with Soviet Foreign  
Minister Shevardnadze

Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze will meet with the President on September 27, after first meeting with Secretary Shultz in New York on September 25. These meetings are an important milestone on the way to the President's meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev on November 19-20 in Geneva.

Our objectives for the September meetings are (1) to make clear our desire to achieve as much substantively before November 19 as the Soviets will allow; (2) to hear any detailed proposals that Shevardnadze may advance; (3) to advance our own proposals, as appropriate, in order to maintain the initiative in the critical period leading up to the November meeting.

The attached package provides various back-up papers, including one-page summaries on major issues in all four areas of our agenda for U.S.-Soviet relations. The recommended list of participants for the President's pre-brief, meeting and luncheon have been forwarded under a separate memo; they are included in this package for your information.

*Bonckinlay*  
for Nicholas Platt  
Executive Secretary

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NLS

F00-008/1 #51

BY CA NARA, DATE 2/12/02

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DECL: OADR



Drafted:EUR/SOV:BBurton/SOV Staff *BB*  
9/16/85 Ext. 20821 (0349P)

Clearance of Entire Package:

EUR:RRidgway *RR*

EUR:JWilkinson *JW*

*W*EUR/SOV:MParris/BLPascoe *BP*

Clearance of Appropriate Papers:

P:WCourtney

PM:JHawes

EUR/SOV:LDSELL/DKursch

EUR/RPM:RCaldwell

EUR/RPM:CDunkerley

EUR/CE:HSimon

PM/SNP:JHolmes

PM/SNP:RDavis

PM/TMP:BTua

S/ARN:MStafford

HA/HR:BConnuck

NEA/PAB:HHagerty

NEA/RA:WChamberlain

NEA:RPeck

S/NP:DStratford

EAP/RA:JLake

EAP:JMonjo

EAP:WSherman

EAP/ANZ:JGlassman

EAP/EP:RDuncan

EAP/IMBS:JWinder

EAP/PHL:JMaisto

EAP/TB:DRobinson

EAP/J:THubbard

AF:FWisner

AF/S:RSmith

ARA/CEN:JHamilton

S/SE:HShlaudeman

SCOPE PAPER AND TALKING POINTS  
TO BE PROVIDED SEPARATELY

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President's Briefing Book

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5. Non-Proliferation
6. Nuclear Testing
7. MBFR
8. Other Arms Control Issues
9. Soviet UNGA Proposal on Space

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2. Afghanistan
3. Middle East
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5. Central America
6. Southern Africa
7. Europe (Berlin, Major Nicholson)

Bilateral Issues

1. Human Rights
2. Pacific Air Safety/Civil Aviation
3. Economic Issues
4. Consulates
5. Exchanges Agreement
6. US-Soviet Maritime Boundary
7. Space Cooperation
8. Spy Dust
9. Visits, Contacts
10. Travel Controls Applied to Soviet Employees of UN Secretariat

Biographic Sketch of Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

Recommended Meeting/Luncheon Participants

Notional Press Statement

DECLASSIFIED  
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997  
By dlb NARA, Date 12/28/00



9/16/85

Arms ControlGeneva Negotiations

Round III of the Geneva negotiations began September 19. In the runup to this round the Soviets mounted an intense and skillful propaganda campaign attacking our SDI and ASAT programs and trying to convince western publics that the US lacks the political will for progress in Geneva. In his interview with Time, Gorbachev continued to link progress in Geneva on nuclear force reductions to US willingness to ban "space strike arms." His definition of such a ban, however, distinguished between permitted laboratory research and research which has reached a stage of development that could be verified. This follows earlier indications, including a July letter from Gorbachev to the Union of Concerned Scientists, that the Soviets might be softening their demand for a blanket prohibition on SDI research.

Our negotiators have instructions to probe Soviet views in this area in Round III. They also intend to probe the Soviets on their "model" for a START agreement, which, according to statements by Soviet negotiators in Round II, provides for overall aggregate limits on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and weapons, as well as a percentage limit on the number of weapons that could be deployed on any one leg of the triad.

For our part, Ambassador Tower indicated to his Soviet counterpart near the end of the round that the U.S. might be willing to accept associated limits on ballistic missiles and bombers (the total of which would approximate levels implied by the Soviet Union) if the Soviets would agree on reductions of ballistic missile RVs and destructive capability. We have told the Soviets that we would also envision limits on ALCMs well below the level the Soviets say are implied by our position.

In INF, the Soviet negotiators have taken an especially sterile line, continuing to assert a right to maintain an effective LRINF missile monopoly by including French and British strategic systems and denying the legitimacy of any US INF deployments in Europe.

We wish to draw out Shevardnadze to see if there is new flexibility in either of these areas. In particular, we want to know if the Soviet START "model" will be followed in Round III by a concrete proposal with numbers intended to open up real bargaining on strategic arms. We will also stress the unacceptability of the current Soviet position on INF. We want to emphasize that Soviet ideas floated in public but not embodied in concrete proposals at Geneva look like propaganda and do not lead to progress. We should also stress the need to drop preconditions and address real US concerns.

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NLS F00-008/1, #52

BY CAJ, NARA, DATE 2/12/82~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

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9/16/85

Arms Control

Compliance/Interim Restraint

The February 1 report to Congress on Soviet non-compliance with arms control agreements found that the USSR had violated provisions of several arms control agreements, most notably SALT II, the ABM treaty and agreements governing use of chemical and biological weapons. The evidence surrounding these violations is clear. The evidence surrounding other Soviet actions, however, is ambiguous, and many of the report's additional findings reflect this ambiguity. This ambiguity, combined with new intelligence, may require us to revisit some of the February 1 findings in the next report, which is currently scheduled for early December.

Overall, the Soviets seem to be in accord with most provisions of the treaties, and may be moving to address some of our concerns in areas (such as SNDV limits, concurrent operations and SS-16 deployment) where we had suspected possible violations. However, our principal concerns (e.g. the Krasnoyarsk radar, the SS-X-25 and telemetry encryption) remain unresolved.

The Spring session of the SCC was modestly more productive than normal. We completed two new common understandings with the Soviets that aim at preventing concurrent operations of SAM at the time and place of ABM tests, and at using the Hotline in certain cases of nuclear terrorism. The Soviets have also proposed revising some of the SALT dismantlement or destruction procedures, but we have not yet responded. Although the Soviets did provide some new information on certain issues in the spring session, it was insufficient to allay our concerns. The Fall SCC session begins on October 9, and should end before November 19.

The Soviets responded to our interim restraint decisions with two faces: publicly, they criticized the decision, but privately some members of Soviet arms control delegations have welcomed it as a positive decision. Moreover, several signs of possible Soviet interest in an arms control agreement, including the informal Soviet suggestions of a "model" agreement on strategic offensive arms, have occurred after the interim restraint decision in June.

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NLS F00-008/1 #53

BY CAS, NARA, DATE 2/2/02

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9/16/85

Arms Control

CDE

Since the opening of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security- Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) in January, 1984, we have sought to negotiate measures which would inhibit the use of military force for political intimidation and reduce the risk of surprise attack.

To achieve these goals, the NATO states, led by the United States, have tabled a "package" of six concrete confidence-building measures. Adoption of these measures, which include strong verification provisions, would mark a significant advance over the 1975 Helsinki Final Act through imposition of tougher requirements for notification and observation of military activities in Europe.

The Soviets have sought to focus the conference on their declaratory proposals, the centerpiece of which is a proposed treaty on the non-use of force. Other, unacceptable declaratory proposals include non-first use of nuclear weapons as well as chemical and nuclear weapons free zones.

After 18 months of negotiation, the differences between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries remain formidable. The Soviets, however, have moved some of their more objectionable proposals off center stage with the result that the Stockholm Conference is focusing increasingly on military measures of interest to us. The Soviets may now be ready to consider seriously our offer to discuss a reaffirmation of the principle not to use force in the context of Soviet agreement to concrete confidence building measures.

Following up discussions in Moscow in early September between Ambassador Goodby and his Soviet counterpart, Soviet CDE Ambassador Grinevsky approached Goodby in Stockholm on September 12 to propose a procedural arrangement for proceeding to drafting later this year. We and our Allies will have to test this apparent Soviet willingness to make concessions (dropping their declaratory proposals except non-use of force) as a basis for moving into a more intensive phase of negotiation.

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BY GS, NARA, DATE 2/12/02



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9/16/85

Arms Control

Chemical Weapons

The U.S. has three broad objectives regarding chemical weapons:

--To negotiate a verifiable, worldwide ban on production and stockpiling of chemical weapons;

--Pending negotiation of such a ban, and in light of the Soviet Union's own substantial CW capability, to modernize our own deterrent by production of CW binary weapons;

--And, more recently, to prevent proliferation of CW use and production.

CW use in the Iran-Iraq War and strong evidence of Soviet involvement in CW use in SE Asia and Afghanistan has undermined long-standing international constraints against CW, particularly the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning CW use (but not stockpiles or production). The issue of CW proliferation is complicated by the fact that the industrial technology used to produce CW is readily available (and some U.S. allies are major sellers of this technology).

In April 1984 Vice President Bush tabled at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva a draft CW convention calling for a world-wide ban on CWs with a clear standard of verification, based on mandatory challenge inspections. Progress has been minimal, largely due to Soviet reluctance on the verification question. On the margins of the CD, we have been discussing with the Soviets bilateral arrangements to supplement a CW convention and enhance chances of Soviet compliance; these talks have made some modest progress on destruction of CW stockpiles.

Soviet concern over CW focuses on our development of binaries. Moscow does not appear as serious about as CW proliferation as it is about nuclear proliferation. The Soviets have for a number of years pushed the idea of European regional CW-free zones; we regard these proposals as propaganda designed to appeal to public opinion in the Allied or neutral countries involved.

At the July 31 meeting with Shevardnadze in Helsinki, we suggested experts' discussions on CW issues, with a particular focus on CW use in the Iran-Iraq War. Shevardnadze acknowledged the importance of the the CW issue but did not respond directly to our specific suggestions.

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DECL: OADR

CW NARA, DATE 2/12/02

9/16/85

Arms ControlNuclear Non-Proliferation

The Soviet Union generally has been cooperative on nuclear non-proliferation issues. Like us, the Soviets have a fundamental interest in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons -- above all, from the Soviet perspective, to Germany or to such U.S. friends as Israel. Each side occasionally complains about activities of the other's friends or allies (e.g., the Soviets accuse us of providing proscribed items to Israel or Pakistan, and we complain about Libya and North Korea). For the most part, however, we have avoided public polemics and have made a show of cooperation.

Perhaps in order to burnish their image for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review conference this year, the Soviet Union this spring signed an agreement permitting inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency of two of its civilian nuclear facilities (we long have put our civilian facilities under IAEA NPT safeguards). There has been some speculation that this could signal greater Soviet willingness to accept arms control inspections of military facilities; we have expressed hope that this will prove to be the case, but we also note that Soviet resistance towards verification in ongoing arms control negotiations is not encouraging.

The Soviets have expressed interest in our suggestion that there be a joint U.S.-Soviet statement at the November meeting in Geneva which refers to successful bilateral cooperation on non-proliferation. Ambassador Dick Kennedy provided a draft statement to the Soviets during consultations in April. At Helsinki, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze suggested that US and Soviet representatives should get together after the NPT review conference in Geneva and draft a text for examination by the leadership of the two countries, and that it could be decided later whether the statement would be part of a larger document or issued separately.

Ambassador Kennedy will meet with his Soviet counterpart at meetings of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna shortly before Shevardnadze visits Washington. He will ask them for their comments on the US draft passed to them in April, and suggest to them that details can be worked out at the US/USSR non-proliferation consultations scheduled for mid-October.

A copy of a draft statement is attached.

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BY CAS, NARA, DATE 7/12/82

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- 2 -

[Draft text on non-proliferation given by Ambassador Kennedy to Ambassador Petrovskiy in April 1985].

Draft Joint Statement on the Non-Proliferation Regime  
For Issuance at the Summit

President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev reaffirmed the commitment of the United States and the Soviet Union to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). In that regard they noted that the U.S. and the USSR have a common interest in strengthening the non-proliferation regime and working with other countries toward that end.

President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev also reviewed the work of the five sessions of bilateral consultations between the U.S. and the USSR on non-proliferation and noted their high evaluation of the results of these consultations. They note that these talks have been both friendly and productive, and that they have demonstrated the ability of the U.S. and the USSR to achieve positive results in an area of vital importance to global security. In particular, they endorsed the efforts of the U.S. and the USSR to strengthen the IAEA and enhance in every way its ability to discharge its safeguards and technical assistance missions.

They also affirmed that the U.S. and the USSR plan to continue the regular schedule of consultations on the technical and political challenges facing the Non-Proliferation regime.

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9/16/85

Arms ControlNuclear Testing

The US and USSR both unveiled new nuclear testing proposals on the eve of the 40th Anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima. In a letter dated July 27, we extended to Gorbachev a unilateral invitation to send Soviet experts to monitor a U.S. nuclear test at our Nevada test site. This proposal, a refinement of our suggestion at last year's UNGA for reciprocal visits by US and Soviet experts, was designed as a practical step to help resolve our verification concerns regarding the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.

On July 28, Gorbachev privately proposed to us -- and a day later announced -- that the Soviet Union was imposing a unilateral testing moratorium until January 1, 1986, which would be extended if the U.S. joined in. Gorbachev called again for ratification of the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties, as well as resumption of trilateral talks with the British on a Comprehensive Test Ban. Not surprisingly, the Soviets have subsequently made the nuclear testing moratorium proposal a main feature of their current propaganda offensive. Gorbachev has discussed it in letters to our European Allies, and cited it in his Time interview as a far-reaching and bold gesture. They have criticized the US for failing to accept the offer and depicted continuing US tests as an example of the continuing U.S. military buildup.

Both sides pressed their respective proposals publicly and in our bilateral meeting at the CSCE Commemoration in Helsinki in July. The Soviets have thus far not responded to our suggestions that the nuclear testing issue is an area where progress can be achieved at or before November 19.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~  
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F00-008/1 #57

BY CAJ NARA, DATE 2/12/02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9/16/85

Arms Control

MBFR

The Soviet initiative last February essentially put into legally binding form the East's 1983 proposals for initial reductions of 13,000 U.S. and 20,000 Soviet ground troops and a subsequent no-increase commitment by both sides. The Soviet proposal offered little that was new and failed to address the major issues of data and verification. It therefore did not represent a positive response to the West's April 1984 proposal, which offered flexibility on the data issue in exchange for enhanced verification measures. The Soviet proposal, however, technically has put the ball back in our court in the Vienna talks.

This initiative was part of a broader Soviet effort to regain the high ground on the arms control front, including through the Geneva talks and the tabling of a non-use of force treaty in the Stockholm CDE. The lack of flexibility in the Soviet proposal, which largely reworks language on the table since 1983, suggests that move was not intended as a major substantive initiative.

During the last MBFR round, the Soviets continued to hint at possible areas of flexibility, but they refused to elaborate on the details or to discuss substantive issues until the West accepted the proposal in principle. They also continued to press for a Western counter-proposal.

The UK and FRG have now proposed to us a new move at Vienna based on US-Soviet reductions, a no-increase commitment, and strong verification measures in place of prior data agreement. Most allies are looking for a new Western initiative for the fall round, beginning September 26, which would adopt the Soviets' proposed focus on a first-phase agreement. The UK/FRG ideas are being reviewed in interagency channels in Washington.

At Helsinki, Shevardnadze mentioned MBFR as an area for movement before the November 19 meeting, and asked us to reexamine our position.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F00-008/1, #58

BY CH, NARA, DATE 2/12/02

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

9/16/85

Arms Control

Soviet Declaratory Arms Control Proposals

Soviet propaganda has included a constant and repeated emphasis on several measures that are essentially declaratory in nature. These measures, which Shevardnadze may bring up in your meeting, include:

-- A NATO-Warsaw Pact Non-Aggression (Non-Use-of-Force) Treaty. Shevardnadze may contend that our proposal to add a NUF commitment to an overall CDE agreement which includes concrete CBM's is insufficient. We and our NATO allies see a separate NUF treaty as a purely declaratory measure that would add nothing to the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act; nor would it be consistent with the general principle that the CSCE is not a bloc-to-bloc arrangement.

-- No first use of nuclear weapons, either in the CDE context or as a separate step we might jointly take to build confidence. We refuse to make such a statement, arguing that NATO is a defensive alliance which will not be the first to attack with either conventional or nuclear weapons. We add, however, that NATO will not surrender in advance any of its defense and deterrence potential and because they would not address the threat posed by Soviet forces from outside Europe which could threaten the region.

-- CDE support for nuclear weapons free zones in Northern and Central Europe and the Balkans. Shevardnadze may argue that such zones have the support of nations in the regions concerned and would help reduce tensions and the risk of conflict. We and our NATO allies have opposed nuclear weapons free zones in Europe as destabilizing because of their disruption of collective security arrangements.

-- A basket of miscellaneous issues, which have received less attention from the Soviets than those listed above. They include a Soviet proposal for naval arms control, which we find one-sided and unverifiable; security guarantees for non-nuclear states, which we see as purely declaratory and incapable of bringing about real constraints; and a Warsaw Pact proposal to reduce military budgets, which, in the face of East-bloc secrecy, would be completely unverifiable.

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NLS F00-008/1 #59

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DECL: OADR

BY GA, NARA, DATE 2/12/02

9/16/85

Arms ControlSoviet UNGA Proposal on Space

On August 16, the Soviets submitted their annual UNGA disarmament initiative -- a proposal to promote the "peaceful exploration of outer space." The Soviets propose that:

- the UNGA decide to convene an international conference on space before 1987 (a preparatory committee would be created to report to next year's UNGA on the idea);
- the conference consider establishing a world space organization which could "effectively ensure the non-militarization of outer space" and promote peaceful cooperation; and
- the UNGA call on all nations to prevent an arms race in space, in which all nations could renounce the "development (including research), testing and deployment of space strike weapons."

This year's proposal goes beyond Andropov's 1983 ASAT testing moratorium and the Soviet draft space treaty introduced during the past two UNGA sessions. It is clearly designed to gain neutral and non-aligned (NNA) support for their anti-SDI propaganda by enticing them with promises of sharing the benefits of space exploration (e.g. research, space stations). The Soviets hope to play on Third World concerns that SDI and the EUREKA program are designed exclusively for the benefit of the developed industrial countries. It is designed to have broad appeal, and serve as a positive complement to the heavy negative propaganda against SDI and our ASAT test.

We intend to respond to the Soviet proposal by stressing our own strong interest in promoting peaceful cooperation in space from the very outset of the US space program. There are numerous examples of US international space cooperation including: numerous international satellite deployments and experiments being conducted by the space shuttle (including participation by Saudi, French and soon Indian astronauts); LANDSAT photograph sharing and cooperation; as well as hundreds of bilateral and multilateral space agreements under which there is widespread scientific collaboration and research. We also see no need for a new UN organization on space; the UN Outer Space Committee is already charged with promoting peaceful space cooperation and we are on record as supporting the broadening of the Committee's work program.

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FOO-0081, #60

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DECL: OADR

BY

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NARA, DATE

2/12/02



~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

9/16/85

Regional Issues

General Points on Regional Dialogue

Following up your proposal at the UNGA in September 1984, we have now held four sets of regional experts' talks with the Soviets: on the Middle East (February 7-8), southern Africa (May 30), Afghanistan (June 18-19), and East Asia (September 12-13). The tone of all four meetings has been businesslike. The exchanges have also been comprehensive, but have yielded little indication of Soviet flexibility, particularly on Afghanistan. In Helsinki, Secretary Shultz and Shevardnadze agreed to hold talks on Central America and the Caribbean. We have proposed they be held in October in Washington.

Despite the fact that nothing dramatic has emerged from these sessions, we continue to believe that such exchanges are a useful mechanism for clarifying our respective views on these issues and to get across to the Soviets the points that we and our friends and allies wish to make. In time, these sessions may allow for a more productive exchange of views. The experience of Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Chester Crocker may be instructive in this regard. He has met with Soviet counterparts four times over the past three years. It was only during his most recent meeting in Paris this May that he was able to engage his interlocutors in real give-and-take on the crucial issues.

We believe that one objective of the November meeting with Gorbachev should be to schedule these sessions on an annual basis to provide a regular opportunity for an in-depth review of developments in key regions. The goal would be to have regional experts talks lay the groundwork for our high-level contacts with the Soviets. Over time, we hope these talks could point the way to possible steps towards progress in resolving concrete problems.

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DECL: OADR

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NLS F00-008/1 #61

BY CH NARA, DATE 7/12/12

9/16/85

Regional IssuesAfghanistan

Almost six years have passed since the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. The Soviets have not succeeded in subjugating the Afghan people and the resistance today is more effective than ever. During the past summer alone Soviet forces have launched three major operations, and have taken a larger role in the fighting. There have been attacks across the Pakistan border. The larger role of Soviet mainforce units has resulted in an increase in Soviet casualties, but no greater control of Afghanistan; results, in fact, have been shortlived, with Soviet withdrawal from the area of the fighting when the combat subsides or after limited tactical gains. The Soviets, frustrated by mujahidin effectiveness, have increasingly brought political pressure to bear on Pakistan.

In June, US and Soviet officials held talks in Washington. Both sides were unyielding and the Soviet presentation was both standard and essentially timeless. We underscored our commitment to Pakistan, but stressed our willingness to be helpful in the effort to reach a negotiated political settlement. At Helsinki, our exchange with Shevardnadze was brief; he had little reaction to our analysis of the problem, other than to note that the tone was more businesslike.

Under the auspices of the UN Secretary General's personal representative, Diego Cordovez, five rounds of indirect talks have been held in Geneva between Pakistan and the Kabul régime. The fourth round in June 1985, appeared to make some progress in drawing up the various documents which would make up a settlement package. At the August round, however, progress was blocked by Moscow's unwillingness to address the question of Soviet troop withdrawal and its insistence on direct talks between the DRA and Pakistan. The next round is scheduled for December.

In August, Pakistani Foreign Minister Yagub Khan passed through Moscow enroute to the Geneva talks and met in Moscow with Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Korniyenko. They touched on the question of a timetable for withdrawal of Soviet forces and the possibility of broadening the Afghan government. Yagub, on the basis of this discussion, believes a review of Soviet policy toward Afghanistan may be underway. It is possible, of course, that a policy debate is going on in Moscow, and that the Korniyenko conversation reflects this, but Soviet actions on the ground appear unaffected. Zia, meanwhile, has made a major policy statement identifying Pakistan more completely than heretofore with Afghan resistance aims and acknowledging Pakistani help (ambiguously) to the resistance.

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FOO-0081, #62

DECL: OADR

BY CH NARA, DATE 2/12/02

9/16/85

Regional IssuesMiddle East/Persian Gulf

Despite frequent protestations about their desire to play a role in the Middle East, Moscow has continued to follow a line of policy that is distinctly unhelpful to any efforts at resolving conflicts in the area.

Reflecting their concern that a successful US brokered peace process will shut them out of the region, the Soviets have stepped up their criticism of the Jordanian/Palestinian agreement. The Soviets publicly support PLO unity, but have made clear they expect Palestinian unity to be based on rejection of the February 11 accord. Moscow, however, has refrained from endorsing the Syrian-sponsored anti-Arafat Palestinian coalition. Differences over the PLO have strained Syrian-Soviet relations, but the connection with Damascus remains the keystone of the Soviet political position in the region.

The publicity which surrounded the meeting between the Soviet and Israeli Ambassadors in Paris has caused both sides to seek a lower profile for their ongoing contacts. The Soviets will probably continue to seek some of the advantages of contacts with Israel without paying a real price in terms of emigration or normalized ties.

The Soviets profess a desire to see an end to the Iran-Iraq War, although they continue to be Iraq's main arms supplier, and East Bloc countries and North Korea provide the bulk of Iranian arms. We believe the Scud missiles used against Baghdad were transferred from Libya to Iran without Soviet permission, and that Moscow has on occasion stopped transactions between Eastern Europe and Iran for major systems, e.g. tanks.

Iran remains intransigently opposed to negotiations, refusing to discuss peace unless the Iraqi regime is replaced. After the heavy losses from Iran's March offensive, which briefly raised signs of internal dissent, Tehran switched to a more defensive strategy of small attacks. At this low level of activity Tehran can continue an indefinite number of years, assuming Iraq does not succeed in closing Kharg Island and substantially cutting off Iran's oil revenues.

The Iranian regime, pressed by its war needs and its diplomatic isolation, moved this spring to improve its ties with Moscow. The USSR's response has been cautious to negative. Iran has not acceded to Soviet demands for a reduction in Iranian opposition to the Soviet presence in Afghanistan.

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DECL: OADR

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NLS F00-008/1, #63

BY CU NARA, DATE 2/12/02



9/16/85

Regional IssuesEast Asia

Assistant Secretary Paul Wolfowitz led a small team to Moscow on September 12-13 for the latest in a series of regional discussions with the Soviet Foreign Ministry. Deputy Foreign Minister Kapitsa led the Soviet side and the Soviets put forward standard positions, with emphasis on their usual broad empty proposals.

Gorbachev signaled, upon taking office, that one of his high priorities was to improve relations with China. So far, there has been a noticeable improvement in the atmosphere of Sino-Soviet relations. Overall, however, the relationship continues to follow the same pattern which became apparent last year--progress on economic and trade issues but slight improvement in political relations, which remain blocked by differences over Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Soviet troop deployments along the border.

Warmer Soviet-North Korean relations were highlighted during the 40th anniversary of V-J day by a portcall by Soviet naval ships and a visit by First Deputy Prime Minister and Politburo member Geydar Aliyev. The Soviets continue their shipments of MiG 23s--23 so far--and some SA-3 surface-to-air missiles. On the political front, the Soviets continue to endorse North Korea's approach to dialogue with South Korea. North and South are poised to make an historically unprecedented exchange of separated family members/art troupes on Sept. 20-23.

The Soviets have received the Laotian, Vietnamese and Mongolian Foreign Ministers during the past month and a half. In their public statements the Soviets have supported Vietnamese proposals on Cambodia, but have also stressed the need for improved relations with China. Although there are strains in the relationship with Hanoi, the Soviets continue to make the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia possible through economic and military assistance. In return, they have received access to former US facilities at Cam Ranh Bay. Although this strategic gain has cost the Soviets in terms of relations with the ASEAN states, Moscow appears to be willing to pay the price. Some Soviets have informally suggested they would welcome a Cambodian solution and Vietnam's recent proposals on the problem have at least addressed the question of troop withdrawal (although their proposed timetable is unacceptable). So far, there is no reason to believe that the Vietnamese proposal presages any real progress toward a political solution.

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DECL: OADR

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FOO-008/1, #6-4

BY CAW NARA, DATE 2/12/02



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9/16/85

Regional Issues

Central America

We are making progress throughout Central America in our efforts to promote stable, democratic governments secure from challenges from the violent left and right. Our progress has been considerable in El Salvador, Guatemala and elsewhere. We do not intend to allow Moscow and its surrogates or allies to challenge the regional democratic trend. We favor democratic national reconciliation in Nicaragua and will not tolerate Soviet/Cuban use of Nicaragua as a base for regional destabilization.

We believe Moscow will respect a firm U.S. regional policy and will avoid direct, provocative challenges to us so near our shores. We favor opening an experts' dialogue with Moscow on Central America/Caribbean issues to clarify our policy and avoid unnecessary conflict with the USSR as we implement this policy.

We have proposed to the Soviets that we hold a Central America/Caribbean experts meeting in Washington in late October. Washington is appropriate given the venues for other experts' talks and serves our substantive interests in presenting vigorously our position on our own turf.

We will make clear in our preliminary contacts with the Soviets that the talks will include discussion of Cuban as well as Soviet regional activities.

There have been no major new developments concerning jet aircraft for Nicaragua since our letter to then General Secretary Chernenko on December 21. Soviet shipments of military-related equipment have continued, but there have been no new major weapons systems delivered. The recent SNIE on Nicaragua concluded the Soviets may not want to challenge us by supplying MIG-21s.

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FOO-008/1 #65

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GW

NARA, DATE

2/12/02

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DECL: OADR

9/16/85

Regional IssuesSouthern Africa

With little direct influence on events in South Africa the Soviets have reacted cautiously to the recent violence. They have of late stepped up their public support for the ANC and their criticism of U.S. links to Pretoria. The Soviet media have depicted U.S. policy as an effort to protect U.S. multinationals and preserve South Africa from national liberation movements.

Moscow has also recently taken steps to strengthen its position in the front-line states. Soviet Foreign Ministry Third African Department Chief Vasev visited Zimbabwe the last week of August, apparently to discuss assistance for the 6-7000 Zimbabwean troops now operating in Mozambique. Mugabe remains wary of the Soviets, but he may be prepared to use Soviet resources to help Machel resist RENAMO.

The Soviets are also trying to present our negotiating efforts in southern Africa as having failed and come to an end. Soviet Foreign Ministry officials have told our Embassy that the lack of South African restraint has destroyed the basis for a negotiated Namibian settlement including Angolan agreement to Cuban troop withdrawal. Lacking any practical alternative to our negotiating approach, Soviet posture has basically been to support Angola's position, demand we pressure South Africa and make baleful predictions.

The Angolans have not changed their position. They have publically suspended their participation in the negotiations and their contacts with us due to recent aggressive South African behavior and the repeal of the Clark Amendment. Privately they have indicated that this does not close the door to a negotiated settlement, and that they will resume their participation in the talks at some point.

U.S. policy remains to move as rapidly as possible toward Namibian independence under UNSCR 435. The Soviets are aware of our view that Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola (CTW) is a practical problem which must be dealt with in a package settlement, and also that the Angolans tabled a proposal last fall which implicitly accepted that view. Assistant Secretary Crocker discussed this and other issues with the Soviets in regional talks in Paris May 30. The meeting produced no breakthroughs, but did provide a comprehensive regional review.

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FOO-008/1, #66

BY

CTV

NARA, DATE

2/12/02

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9/16/85

Regional Issues

Europe: US-Soviet Issues in Germany

The third incident involving the USMLM this year took place September 7 in East Germany when a Soviet military truck sideswiped a USMLM vehicle disabled on a narrow road. The MLM was detained nine hours and Soviet soldiers brandished rifles. No one was injured. The US vehicle was near a Soviet communications group, but not in an area formally notified to MLMs as off limits. The Soviets called our MLM chief to explain the situation while it was still in progress. Soviet soldiers assisted in starting the US vehicle. Secretary Shultz protested this incident to Dobrynin.

On July 13, a Soviet truck rammed a USMLM vehicle, injuring the USMLM chief. The Soviet military later apologized for the incident, pointing out that those responsible had been punished. The US had immediately protested the July 13 incident at Assistant Secretary level; in our Helsinki bilateral with the Soviets, we asked for the Nicholson apology in the same spirit.

Despite repeated demands for apology and compensation for Major Nicholson's killing, the Soviets have not moved beyond their grudging public statements of April. Staff level CINC to CINC talks have found some Soviet willingness to prevent use of force against MLMs (new orders, cards, training); a CINC to CINC understanding on reduction of restricted areas may also be possible to achieve.

As result of Allied pressure in the Berlin Air Safety Center (BASC) and high level diplomatic approaches, including the Shultz-Gromyko demarche in Vienna in mid-May, the Soviets have been more cooperative on day-to-day corridor management. They also increased the reservation-free area in mid-May. Reservations in late summer were numerous, but not excessive.

However, we still have an insufficient reservation-free area at the Berlin end of corridors. Following the Soviets' increase of area to 10.5 miles, the Allies lowered their demands to 17 miles (from 20). The situation has remained unchanged since late May.

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DECL: OADR

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NLS F00-0081, #67

BY CH NARA, DATE 2/12/02



~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

9/16/85

Bilateral Issues

Human Rights

Background

The human rights situation in the Soviet Union has, if anything, deteriorated since Gorbachev took power. Monthly emigration figures, despite considerable fluctuation, remain at rock bottom levels. The pressure on Hebrew teachers and other Jewish cultural activists continues, although there have been no arrests reported since late June. Symptomatic of this sustained pressure was the television confession under duress of convicted Moscow Hebrew teacher Dan Shapiro in late July. Arrests of Baptists, Pentecostals and other Christians remain high. Ten Pentecostals out of a community of 170 in Chuguevka have been convicted since January.

Andrey Sakharov and his wife remain isolated, amid unconfirmed reports that they may have been moved from Gor'kiy. Conditions for well-known human rights activists Anatoliy Shcharanskiy, Yuriy Orlov and Iosif Begun have deteriorated. Ukrainian Helsinki monitor Vasyl Stus died of emaciation in a Soviet labor camp in early September. American-Soviet dual national Abe Stolar is still waiting for exit permission for his daughter-in-law. Although three longstanding separated spouse cases have been resolved since the beginning of the year, two new cases have been added to our list.

Judging from recent Gorbachev comments and a July article by KGB head Chebrikov calling for an uncompromisingly hard line on internal dissent, this deterioration would appear to be a result of considered policy. Gorbachev, with the self-confident, vigorous image he has brought to Soviet leadership, seems determined that the USSR will not be put in the position of apologizing for its policies; instead, the Soviets now respond to our criticism of their human rights performance with aggressive attacks on economic and social conditions in the West. Despite this hard line, there is some evidence the Soviets may be willing to act pragmatically on some of our human rights concerns. For example, Soviet officials continue to hint of a willingness to substantially increase Jewish emigration in return for receiving MFN status.

We want to emphasize to Shevardnadze that we consider human rights an integral part of our relationship and an area where the Soviets can do much to improve relations at low cost to themselves. To improve the atmosphere for the summit, we would press for clearing up separated spouse and American citizen cases (about 40 cases), an increase in Jewish emigration and some positive movement on the Sakharov case.

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NLS F00-00811 #46

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECL: OADR

BY CAS NARA, DATE 2/12/82



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9/16/85

Bilateral Issues

North Pacific Air Safety/Civil Aviation

A top priority for the Soviets in our economic relations has been to restore Aeroflot service to the US. We told the Soviets we are prepared to discuss resumption of bilateral air service once agreement is reached on North Pacific air safety measures (NOPAC) and an equitable balance of economic benefits for U.S. carriers serving the USSR has been negotiated. The Soviets in turn have tied the opening of consulates and, more loosely, an exchanges agreement to Aeroflot's return.

A Memorandum of Understanding on NoPac air safety among Japan, the USSR, and the US was signed in Tokyo on July 29, 1985. It must be brought into force by a trilateral exchange of diplomatic notes, which we and the Japanese had proposed take place in early September in Tokyo. The Soviets have not yet agreed to a date and have proposed an alternate formulation for the proposed language the Japanese suggested for the diplomatic notes. The MOU also requires that technical implementation procedures be worked out which will permit the three sides to communicate with each other. It appears that the three sides will meet in Moscow in October to begin work on these. The date is not set, however.

The principal provision of the MOU provides for a dedicated speech circuit between Khabarovsk and Tokyo. Tokyo will then serve as the contact point between Khabarovsk and Anchorage, to exchange information on unidentified aircraft which appear in Soviet airspace. The effect, of course, is to avoid recurrence of a KAL-007 incident although we do not formally link this issue past events.

We have informed the Soviet Union that we are prepared to begin discussion of bilateral civil aviation matters, including resumption of Aeroflot service to the US (something they very much want) beginning September 16 in Washington. We have told them in very direct terms, however, that we are not prepared to sign any new civil arrangement or to agree to resumed Aeroflot service until the implementation procedures necessary to carry out the NoPac MOU have been worked out.

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NLS #00-008/1, #68

BY CS NARA, DATE 2/12/02

CONFIDENTIAL

9/16/85

Bilateral IssuesEconomic Relations

The revival this year of a government to government dialogue on economic/commercial issues, which has included visits to Moscow by Secretaries Baldrige and Block in May and August, respectively, has modestly improved the prospects for U.S.-Soviet non-strategic trade. At the first meeting of the US-Soviet Joint Commercial Commission since 1978, the Soviets promised Baldrige that bids by US companies would be considered on the same basis as those submitted by firms of other Western countries. The climate for US firms doing business in Moscow has improved somewhat this year and a number of relatively small contracts have been signed. However, the Soviets have not recently concluded any major new contracts with US companies outside of the agricultural sphere.

US exports to the USSR remain much higher than Soviet sales to the US. In 1984 we sold approximately \$3.3 billion to the Soviets while importing \$600 million. We expect 1985 statistics to be roughly similar. Over 80% of our exports to the Soviets now consist of agricultural commodities and we expect them to purchase a record 20 million metric tons (mt.) of grain (mostly corn) during the marketing year ending September 30. During the past year the Soviets were the single largest foreign customer for American grain. Although their purchases are likely to decline somewhat next year, due to a somewhat better harvest, the Soviets will continue to require substantial imports of grain for the foreseeable future and are likely to buy a sizeable share of this requirement from us.

Despite the somewhat improved atmosphere, the outlook for US non-agricultural exports to the USSR is limited by the high value of the dollar, the unavailability of government export financing, and lingering Soviet suspicions that the USG might force commercial contracts to be broken if political relations sour. The Soviets also complain about the size of their trade deficit with us and have hinted that if steps were taken to limit further the sales of Soviet products in the US (i.e. as a result of protectionist pressures or the issue of forced labor) they might retaliate by reducing purchases of our agricultural commodities. They continue to grumble about the absence of MFN and government supported credits, but do not seem to expect any early changes in US policy on these questions.

Despite US export controls on oil and gas equipment and technology and our unwillingness to endorse the development of trade ties in this area, the Soviets remain interested in possible future cooperation with US companies in the energy area. Within the past several months they have had discussions with a number of US energy firms.

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FOO-008/1 #70

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DECL: OADR

BY GR NARA, DATE 2/12/82

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9/15/85

Bilateral Issues

Exchange of Consulates - Kiev and New York

We reached agreement in principle in the summer of 1983 to open Consulates in Kiev and New York. We have been ready to move forward on this issue since early 1984, but our efforts have been hamstrung by Soviet linkage to the civil aviation issue. They argue that it makes no sense to have a Consulate in New York unless Aeroflot resumes regular air service to the United States. We, in turn, have linked progress in civil aviation to Northern Pacific Air Safety Measures (NOPAC). We have told the Soviets that we are ready to begin civil aviation discussions as soon as we have formally exchanged notes to activate our agreement on NOPAC (reached in July) and scheduled talks on the technical implementation of this agreement.

We believe it is time to break the stalemate on this issue. An agreement to announce an exchange of consulates would be appropriate during the Geneva meeting. If we are to do so, however, we need to clear up some technical issues. These include looking again at our property in Kiev and agreeing within the USG to an increase of approximately 30 Soviets to staff the New York Consulate.

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2/12/02



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9/16/85

Bilateral Issues

General Exchanges Agreement

The US-Soviet General Exchanges Agreement is the basic document which governs cultural, educational, and private people-to-people exchange programs between our two countries. This agreement expired in 1979. Renewal negotiations were stalled over Soviet demands that we return their exchangees who had defected. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan intervened at this stage and we did not return to the talks.

Last June, we submitted the text of a new general exchanges agreement to the Soviets and we have been in negotiations since that time. Most of the basic issues which govern the day-to-day working of the exchange programs have been resolved. There are two important issues remaining to be resolved: thematic exhibits and TV appearances.

Thematic exhibits are at the core of what we want from an agreement since this is at present one of our best instruments for getting into the closed Soviet society. These exhibits, on themes such as American technology, design, and culture, are extraordinarily popular with Soviet citizens and are one exchange over which the Soviets have little control. The Soviets have sought to cut back by half on volume and frequency of exhibits. However, we plan to hold fast to the position that our exhibits, whether there is one or two, be seen in at least 9-12 Soviet cities for 28 showing days each.

We have proposed at least six appearances a year on the other's TV by mutually agreed representatives of each country, including one by the head of state. The Soviets have refused any language that specified a given number of appearances. This will continue to be a tough issue to resolve. The Soviets, as highlighted by Time Magazine's Gorbachev interview, already have virtual on-demand access to our media, while we have little or none to theirs. We are not ready to concede this point, even though we recognize that we may need to reduce the number of appearances to get the Soviets to give us what we want on exhibits.

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NLS F00-008/1 #72

BY C+V, NARA, DATE 2/2/02

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9/16/85

Bilateral Issues

Maritime Boundary/Soviet Harassment Activity  
in the Bering Sea

The U.S. regards the line established by the 1867 Convention Ceding Alaska as the U.S.-U.S.S.R maritime boundary. The Soviets agreed in 1977 to use the Line to delimit our 200 nautical mile fisheries zones. (This is now our Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)). We use this Line also as our continental shelf boundary but without similar agreement.

Since 1981 we have met four times to try to reach agreement on a common depiction of the Line as the boundary, most recently in July 1984 in Moscow. In 1981 we learned that there is an approximately 18,500 square nautical mile area in which U.S. and Soviet claims overlap due to use of different mapping practices to draw the Line. (The U.S. uses a great circle; the Soviets, a rhumb line). In 1983 we proposed splitting the difference between our two versions of the Line. The Soviets counterproposed that we agree to split the difference in areas where our 200 nautical miles EEZs overlap, but they seriously complicated and expanded the dispute by making two new claims in areas where our EEZs do not overlap on our side (east) of any depiction of the Line. They strongly asserted that an area on our side of the Line less than 200 nautical miles from the USSR but more than 200 miles from the U.S. ("red zone") is part of the Soviet EEZ and is "non-negotiable", and that an area more than 200 nautical miles from both coasts ("blue zone") lying mostly on our side of the Line should be equally divided. Their proposal called for a moratorium on activities by both sides in the blue zone (the red zone being non-negotiable) pending agreement.

In April 1984, Interior sold oil and gas leases to U.S. companies in the Navarin Basin, east of the Soviet version of the Line. Bids for tracts in the disputed area were put in escrow. Companies have just begun to drill.

In late spring and early summer the Soviets initiated several incidents to assert their claims and demonstrate their ability to disrupt U.S. economic activity. These included the seizure of a fishing boat in disputed waters and the buzzing of drilling rigs which are clearly in the U.S. EEZ. These incidents ceased following our repeated protests and our agreement, in principle, to another round of boundary discussions. We expect these talks will take place in Washington this fall but have not yet proposed a date.

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9/16/85

Bilateral Issues

Space Cooperation

The US-Soviet space cooperation agreement, signed in 1972 by President Nixon and Chairman Kosygin, was allowed to lapse in 1982 in response to imposition of martial law in Poland. Since then, limited ad hoc space cooperation with the Soviets has continued in non-sensitive fields, mainly bio-medicine.

In Helsinki in July, Secretary Shultz passed a nonpaper to Shevardnadze proposing the US and the USSR enter into discussions to improve US-Soviet cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space. Specific areas of cooperation we suggested were earth sciences, life sciences, planetary exploration, manned space flight, and astrophysics.

The July 17 tenth anniversary commemoration of the Apollo-Soyuz space link-up provided many spokesmen the occasion to call for renewed US-Soviet space cooperation. Congressman Bill Nelson held Space Subcommittee hearings on this subject in late July and he is planning an October trip to Moscow.

The Soviets have yet to respond to our proposal. A number of Soviet space scientists and leaders have expressed enthusiasm for bilateral cooperation to their US counterparts, but have also indicated projects must await a political decision.

A top Soviet space scientist recently indicated to a US counterpart that bilateral space cooperation will likely have to await the outcome of Geneva discussions. While not directly linking bilateral space cooperation to progress on SDI and ASAT, he hinted that a Soviet response to our proposal would likely come after these issues were discussed at Geneva.

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9/16/85

Bilateral Issues

Moscow Spy Dust

In mid-August, [REDACTED] stepped-up Soviet use of the chemical tracking agent NPPD in Moscow beginning this spring; sporadic use of NPPD dates back to mid-seventies. NPPD is applied usually to cars or household items of Embassy personnel. It leaves deposits on the person or possessions of people contacted and is used to keep track of US diplomats and possibly Soviet citizens. B1

In standard screening tests NPPD is shown to be a mutagen; mutagens can be, but are not always carcinogens. There is no evidence that Embassy staff have been harmed by exposure. A study team (with representatives from NIH, EPA and the Center for Disease Control) was sent to Moscow to test for the presence of NPPD in residences and vehicles of the American community in Moscow and the Consulate General in Leningrad. The purpose is to determine the extent to which NPPD has been used, who is likely to have been exposed and in what concentrations. The NIH has already begun a number of laboratory tests on possible medical effects of NPPD, including tests on skin absorption (most likely source of penetration). Some results may be available in October; other results will take longer. We briefed our allies but we don't know whether NPPD or other chemicals were used against them.

In demarches in Moscow and Washington, we made it very clear to the Soviets that we regard their use of chemical tracking agents to be completely unacceptable and demanded that it be terminated. The Soviets have rejected the charge as a "fabrication" and claim it could "poison" the atmosphere for U.S.-Soviet relations. We have said we will be monitoring the situation in the USSR carefully to determine whether the Soviets have stopped using these chemicals.

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9/16/85

Bilateral Issues

Visits and Contacts

During the past year there has been a significant upswing in high level contact with the Soviets through increased Congressional exchanges and Cabinet level visits.

Secretary of Commerce Baldrige went to Moscow in May for the first meeting of the US-USSR joint commercial commission since 1978 and also was received by Gorbachev. Agriculture Secretary Block visited Moscow, Kiev and Leningrad in late August and received a Soviet commitment to honor fully wheat purchase obligations under our long-term grains agreement.

Earlier this month, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Samuel Pierce led a team of US housing and construction leaders to the Soviet Union to revitalize the bilateral cooperative Agreement on Housing and explore possibilities for increased trade in construction and housing industry.

In November, EPA Administrator Thomas will take a delegation to the Soviet Union seeking to update the US-Soviet bilateral agreement on Protection of the Environment. Completed projects will be evaluated, and new projects approved. This agreement covers such areas as earthquake prediction, air pollution, and endangered species.

Speaker Tip O'Neill led a Congressional visit to the Soviet Union in March and was received by General Secretary Gorbachev. The O'Neill visit reciprocated the Supreme Soviet visit of Politburo Member Vladimir Shcherbitskiy to Washington earlier that month. This past summer several Congressional delegations led by Senators Bingaman, Simon, and Bradley and House Members De la Garza, Solzarz, Savage, and Mikulski visited the Soviet Union. Earlier this month a large Senate delegation headed by Minority leader Byrd was received in Moscow by Gorbachev. Congressmen Pepper, Udall, Nelson, Markey and McCurdy are planning visits this fall. A second Supreme Soviet delegation led by Lev Tolkunov just concluded meetings in Washington with Speaker O'Neill. O'Neill and Tolkunov agreed in principle to upgrade Congressional exchanges, but O'Neill is likely to move slowly on implementation because of dissatisfaction with Soviet human rights performance.

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9/16/85

Bilateral Issues

Travel Controls Applied to Soviet Employees of UN Secretariat

The Administration decided in the spring to impose restrictions on Soviet and other (Afghan, Cuban, Libyan, Iranian, and Vietnamese) hostile-country nationals employed in the UN. The Roth amendment was passed in August 1985, mandating similar restrictions. This amendment was the result of concern in Congress and the Executive branch about clandestine activities of these nationals in New York. While unofficial travel must receive prior approval, only advance notification is required for official travel.

The Soviet Embassy DCM made a mild protest last week, essentially accusing the USG of violating its obligations under the UN Headquarters Agreement, and under international law. We replied that these measures are a reasonable step that was necessary to ensure our national security, and do not violate our obligation not to impede the official business of the United Nations. These requirements are not directed in a discriminatory fashion against Soviet nationals alone.

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Pre-Brief for the President's Meeting with Soviet Foreign  
Minister Eduard Shevardnadze

Secretary Shultz  
Mr. McFarlane  
Ambassador Nitze  
Ambassador Ridgway  
Ambassador Hartman  
Ambassador Matlock

The President's Meeting with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze  
10:00 AM - 12:15 PM

US Participants

Secretary Shultz  
Mr. McFarlane  
Ambassador Nitze  
Ambassador Ridgway  
Ambassador Hartman  
Ambassador Matlock  
Dimitri Zarechnak, Interpreter

Soviet Participants

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze  
Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Korniyenko  
Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin  
Special Advisor Sergei Tarasenko (notetaker)  
Mr. Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter



The President's Luncheon For Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

US Participants

The Vice President  
Secretary Shultz  
Secretary Baker  
Secretary Weinberger  
Mr. Regan  
Mr. McFarlane  
Ambassador Nitze  
Ambassador Ridgway  
Ambassador Hartman  
Ambassador Matlock  
PM Director Holmes  
Mr. Zarechnak, Interpreter

Soviet Participants

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze  
Deputy FM Korniyenko  
Ambassador Dobrynin  
Mr. Tarasenko  
Mr. Sukhodrev  
Mr. A. S. Chernyshev, Chief of Staff to the Foreign Minister  
Minister-Counselor Oleg Sokolov  
Minister-Counselor Viktor Isakov  
Press Spokesman Vladimir Lomeyko

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9/16/85

Notional Press Statement

Today, September 27, 1985 President Reagan met for two hours with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in the Oval Office. Also present were Secretary of State George Shultz, National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane, Ambassador Nitze, Ambassador Ridgway, Ambassador Hartman and Ambassador Matlock. Attending on the Soviet side were First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Georgiy Korniyenko, Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin and Special Advisor Sergei Tarasenko. Following the talks, the President hosted a lunch in honor of Foreign Minister Shevardnadze.

The discussions covered the full range of items on the U.S.-Soviet agenda. They were held in a serious, frank and constructive atmosphere. Both sides expressed their views, noting areas of agreement and disagreement. They acknowledged areas where the two countries could make progress now and in the meeting between the countries' leaders, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, in Geneva this November.

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Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997  
By dlb NARA, Date 12/28/00