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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: MATLOCK, JACK: Files

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File Folder: Reagan-Shevardnadze Mtg - 9/27/85 (4)

Date: 12/28/00

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Skinner/F00-008/1

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Memo	George Shultz to Reagan, re: Your September 27 Meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, 5 p.	9/16/85	B1
	2/12/02 F00-008/1 #79		
2. Talking Pts	President's Talking Points for Shevardnadze, 8 p.	n.d.	B1
3. Paper	Arms Control: Geneva Negotiations, 1 p.	9/16/85	B1
4. Paper	Arms Control: Complicance/Interim Restraint, 1 p.	9/16/85	B1
5. Paper	Arms Control: CDE, 1 p.	9/19/85	B1
6. Paper	Arms Control: Chemical Weapons, 1 p.	9/16/85	B1
7. Paper	Arms Control: Nuclear Non-Proliferation, 2 p.	9/16/85	B1
8. Paper	Arms Control: Nuclear Testing, 1 p.	9/16/85	B1
9. Paper	Arms Control: MBFR, 1 p.	9/16/85	B1
10. Paper	Arms Control: Soviet Declaratory Arms Control Proposals, 1 p.	9/16/85	B1
11. Paper	Arms Control: Soviet UNGA Proposal on Space, 1 p.	9/16/85	B1
12. Paper	Regional Issues: General Points on Regional Dialogue, 1 p.	9/16/85	B1
13. Paper	Regional Issues: Afghanistan, 1 p.	9/16/85	B1
14. Paper	Regional Issues: Middle East/Persian Gulf, 1 p.	9/16/85	B1
15. Paper	Regional Issues: East Asia, 1 p.	9/16/85	B1
16. Paper	Regional Issues: Central America, 1 p.	9/16/85	B1

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].

- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
17. Paper	Regional Issues: Southern Africa, 1 p.	9/16/85	B1
18. Paper	Regional Issues: Europe: US Soviet Issues in Germany, 1 p.	9/16/85	B1
19. Paper	Bilateral Issues: Human Rights, 1 p.	9/16/85	B1
20. Paper	Bilateral Issues: North Pacific Air Safety/Civil Aviation, 1 p.	9/16/85	B1
21. Paper	Bilateral Issues: Economic Relations, 1 p.	9/16/85	B1
22. Paper	Bilateral Issues: Exchange of Consulates - Kiev and New York, 1 p.	9/15/85	B1
23. Paper	Bilateral Issues: General Exchanges Agreement, 1 p.	9/16/85	B1
24. Paper	Bilateral Issues: Maritime Boundary/Soviet Harassment Activity in the Bering Sea, 1 p.	9/16/85	B1
25. Paper	Bilateral Issues: Space Cooperation, 1 p.	9/16/85	B1
26. Paper	Bilateral Issues: Moscow Spy Dust, 1 p.	9/16/85	B1
27. Paper	Bilateral Issues: Visits and Contacts, 1 p.	9/16/85	B1
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29. Bio	2 p. D 6/15/01 F00-008/1 #107	8/20/85	B1, B3

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DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By als NARA, Date 12/26/00

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: George P. Shultz

SUBJECT: Your September 27 Meeting with Soviet
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

This memorandum provides some thoughts on how we can best exploit your meeting with Shevardnadze, along with my separate sessions September 25 and 27, with a view toward your Geneva meeting.

The Soviet Approach

The Soviet game plan is becoming increasingly clear. They are seeking to create the impression that they have left no stone unturned to achieve an arms control breakthrough in Geneva. Dobrynin confirmed to me September 16 that Shevardnadze will present concrete proposals to you next week on the nuclear and space talks. Our guess is that they will be an elaboration of Gorbachev's recent expressions of willingness to accept deep cuts in exchange for constraints on strategic defense beyond the "fundamental research" stage. Shevardnadze will presumably also be pushing previous Soviet initiatives (Gorbachev's July nuclear testing moratorium, the non-militarization of space proposal Shevardnadze will present to the UNGA, perhaps a new twist on the Soviet chemical weapon-free zone in Central Europe concept), while seeking to capitalize on our ASAT test.

Our Objectives

Our task will be three-fold. We will want to:

-- Probe to determine the seriousness of any new Soviet proposals;

-- Give Shevardnadze as much information as possible and appropriate to set the stage for a productive November meeting and progress at the Geneva talks;

-- Lay the basis for further steps in our regional dialogue and on the range of bilateral and human rights issues.

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FOO-008/1, #79

BY

CAJ

NARA, DATE

2/12/02

Your Meeting, Friday, September 27

Given the constraints on your time, you might most usefully concentrate on laying the groundwork for an in-depth exchange with Gorbachev on the most pressing issues in the relationship. I recommend that you:

-- Respond to Shevardnadze's proposals with a strong statement of your own commitment to meaningful arms control, explaining to Shevardnadze your views on the need for deep reductions and the potential promise of SDI research. (As Shevardnadze will not be accompanied by his own arms control specialists, he will not expect a detailed reply to his message, which I hope he will preview with me in New York).

-- Outline your plans for a wide-ranging discussion of perceived intentions and motivations. (You might suggest to Shevardnadze that you and Gorbachev be prepared to describe your respective domestic agendas as a means of getting beyond stereotypes to the roots of policy).

-- Express your concerns about Soviet regional policies, focusing on Afghanistan, where we have recently seen some hints of a greater Soviet willingness to consider a negotiated withdrawal.

-- Reemphasize to Shevardnadze the importance you attach to movement on human rights and emigration (perhaps in your tete-a-tete at the conclusion of the meeting).

As with Gromyko last year, lunch could be given over to an elaboration of views on regional issues, providing an opportunity to rehearse points you will later make to Gorbachev on the impact of Soviet international behavior on our perceptions. You could also use the occasion to get some sense from Shevardnadze of current political dynamics in the Kremlin.

My Meetings: Wednesday and Friday afternoon, September 25 and 27

Dobrynin has indicated I may get a first look at Shevardnadze's arms control message during our initial session Wednesday. While I will press him to be as specific as possible, we may not have a complete picture of what Moscow has to offer until your meeting. I will also put some ideas of our own on the table.

-- On the Geneva talks, I will try to engage Shevardnadze in a comprehensive discussion of the offense/defense relationship. This will serve the purpose of smoking out details of his private message and giving him some direct exposure to our thinking on the subject.

-- On nuclear testing, I will stress the importance we attach to verification, reaffirming our willingness to ratify the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaties if the Soviets will cooperate in satisfying our concerns. I will propose that special representatives from both sides explore this possibility this fall.

-- On ASAT, we are not in a position to take the initiative, but I will need to address any proposals Shevardnadze may make.

-- On chemical weapons, we are working interagency a proposal that we exchange lists of CW precursors as a first step toward collaboration in preventing the spread of CW possession and use; and

-- On nuclear nonproliferation, I will confirm our willingness to make a joint statement on cooperation at your Geneva meeting.

As arms control issues will dominate the New York session, regional and bilateral matters will probably slip to my Friday afternoon meeting. I will follow up in greater detail on regional points you make and formally propose that we regularize the expert-level talks we have had over the past year on the Middle East, Afghanistan, Southern Africa and Asia. (We are proposing Central American/Caribbean talks be held in October.)

I will raise human rights and emigration initially in a brief tete-a-tete on the margins of our New York meeting, broaching an idea discussed with Mac Baldrige: that concrete steps by the Soviets to meet our concerns might be met with some liberalization of our non-strategic trade controls. I will return to human rights and emigration in my final session, reinforcing the points you would make in your meeting, and presenting an up-dated list of cases in which we are interested.

There is a good chance that at some point in our meetings Shevardnadze will raise two additional issues: whether there should be a formal communiqué in Geneva and whether there should be follow-up meetings between you and Gorbachev. I will inform him that we remain open as to how the meeting should be documented, and that our final decision will depend on what substantive results can be expected. On follow-up meetings, I will indicate that we are willing in principle, but feel that future meetings should be in capitals. I will reiterate our view that it is the Soviets' turn to come to Washington.

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Media Arrangements

As with Gromyko last year, I will plan to make two statements in connection with Shevardnadze's visit: the first, a short, informal comment following our New York meeting; the second, a longer review of where we stand following your meeting and lunch. We plan backgrounders by Roz Ridgway, Jack Matlock and Art Hartman after both my exchanges with Shevardnadze to shape public perceptions of the visit and of its implications for the Geneva meeting. You might want to consider a radio address focusing on US - Soviet relations, perhaps the following Saturday. We will also plan to do the usual talk shows after the meetings are over.

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Drafted: EUR/SOV:MRParris (#0324P)
09/16/85, 632-3738

Cleared: EUR:RLRidgway
PM:JHawes

S/ARN: MStafford

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PRESIDENT'S TALKING POINTS FOR SHEVARDNADZE

INTRODUCTION

-- IN PREPARING FOR THIS MEETING I HAD A CHANCE TO LOOK AT HOW THE US AND I PERSONALLY ARE ROUTINELY PORTRAYED IN THE SOVIET PRESS. AS YOU KNOW, THE PICTURE IS LESS THAN FLATTERING.

-- I RAISE THIS NOT TO MAKE YOU UNCOMFORTABLE, BUT TO MAKE A POINT. THIS MEETING, AND THE MEETING I WILL HAVE WITH MR. GORBACHEV IN NOVEMBER, ARE UNIQUE OPPORTUNITIES.

-- I WANT YOU TO BEGIN TO GET A TRUE PICTURE OF WHO RONALD REAGAN IS, WHAT HE STANDS FOR, WHAT HE WANTS TO ACCOMPLISH.

--I WOULD LIKE TO GET THE SAME FROM YOU AND MR. GORBACHEV.

--I WANT, IN A WORD, FOR US TO GET BEYOND STEREOTYPES; TO TALK FRANKLY ABOUT OUR DIFFERENCES; TO EXPLORE CONSTRUCTIVELY WHAT WE CAN ACHIEVE TOGETHER BETWEEN NOW AND NOVEMBER 19 -- AND AFTER THE GENEVA MEETING AS WELL.

-- WHEN I MET LAST YEAR WITH MR. GROMYKO, I DISCUSSED IN SOME DETAIL MY VIEW OF THE WORLD, AND OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES' PLACE IN IT. I KNOW YOU WILL HAVE READ THE RECORDS OF THAT CONVERSATION, SO I WILL NOT REPEAT MYSELF.

-- I DO WANT TO EMPHASIZE SOMETHING I SAID THEN, HOWEVER:

- o I BELIEVE OUR RELATIONSHIP IS AND WILL REMAIN AN ESSENTIALLY COMPETITIVE ONE. BUT WE LIVE IN ONE WORLD AND MUST HANDLE OUR COMPETITION IN PEACE.
- o NEITHER OF US WILL EVER ALLOW THE OTHER A MILITARY EDGE. BUT IF WE ARE EVER GOING TO CLEAR THE AIR, REDUCE SUSPICIONS, AND REDUCE NUCLEAR ARMS, THERE WILL NEVER BE A BETTER TIME.

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DECL: OADR

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F00-0081, #80

BY

CAS

NARA, DATE

2/2/02

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ARMS CONTROL AND SECURITY ISSUES

-- I KNOW YOU AND GEORGE HAD A FULL DISCUSSION OF ARMS CONTROL ISSUES ON WEDNESDAY.

-- I HOPE YOU CAME AWAY FROM THAT DISCUSSION WITH A SENSE OF THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH WE APPROACH THIS CRITICAL AREA.

-- OUR SUGGESTIONS HAVE BEEN CONCRETE AND DESIGNED TO ADDRESS REAL PROBLEMS. AS I HAVE STATED MANY TIMES, I HAVE GIVEN OUR NEGOTIATORS IN GENEVA GREAT FLEXIBILITY TO EXPLORE POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS -- BUT YOU HAVE TO CONTRIBUTE YOUR OWN IDEAS.

-- WHAT WE WANT TO DO IS WORK WITH YOU TO RESTORE AND MAKE MORE EFFECTIVE THE REGIME FOR RELIABLE MUTUAL DETERRENCE WHICH, IN 1972, WAS THOUGHT BY BOTH SIDES TO BE OUR COMMON OBJECTIVE.

-- THAT MEANS WE SHOULD BRING ABOUT THE DEEP REDUCTIONS IN OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR ARMS THAT THE 1972 ABM TREATY SAID WE BOTH WOULD SEEK. I KNOW MR. GORBACHEV HAS SAID THE SOVIET UNION, TOO, WOULD LIKE DEEP CUTS IN NUCLEAR ARMS. IT IS TIME TO GET DOWN TO WORK AND FIGURE OUT HOW WE ARE GOING TO ACHIEVE THEM, IN A WAY THAT ENHANCES STABILITY.

-- IT ALSO MEANS THAT WE SHOULD EXAMINE THE POTENTIAL OF DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS TO STRENGTHEN STABILITY BETWEEN US. WE THINK THERE ARE PROMISING NEW TECHNOLOGIES; SO, APPARENTLY, DOES THE SOVIET UNION, SINCE YOU HAVE A VIGOROUS RESEARCH PROGRAM ON STRATEGIC DEFENSE. I BELIEVE THAT IF THERE IS A BETTER WAY TO ASSURE THE PEACE BETWEEN US THAN THREATENING TO DESTROY EACH OTHER'S SOCIETIES, THE LEADERS OF OUR COUNTRIES HAVE NOT ONLY THE OPPORTUNITY BUT THE RESPONSIBILITY TO EXPLORE IT.

-- BUT I ALSO WANT TO EMPHASIZE TO YOU THAT OUR SDI PROGRAM IS ONLY FOR RESEARCH. I HAVE NOT MADE ANY DEPLOYMENT DECISIONS -- ONLY SOME FUTURE PRESIDENT COULD DO THAT. I HAVE ORDERED THAT ALL SDI RESEARCH COMPLY COMPLETELY WITH THE ABM AND OTHER RELEVANT TREATIES. AND I HAVE TOLD MY NEGOTIATORS IN GENEVA TO EXPLORE WITH THEIR SOVIET COUNTERPARTS THE WHOLE COMPLEX OF ISSUES THAT WOULD ARISE IF IT DOES APPEAR POSSIBLE AND DESIRABLE TO MOVE TO GREATER RELIANCE ON DEFENSE.

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-- FINALLY, IF WE ARE TO MOVE AHEAD, WE HAVE TO RESOLVE PROBLEMS OF COMPLIANCE. YOU HAVE RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT OUR COMPLIANCE WITH CERTAIN AGREEMENTS; WE HAVE EITHER ANSWERED THEM IN DETAIL OR PROPOSED MUTUAL WAYS TO RESOLVE THEM. WE HAVEN'T SEEM THE SAME FORTHCOMINGNESS ON YOUR SIDE. CONTINUING QUESTIONS ABOUT YOUR COMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS ARE VERY DAMAGING IN THEIR OWN RIGHT. THEY ARE DOUBLY SO WHEN WE GET NO SATISFACTION IN CLEARING THEM UP.

-- I ALSO HAVE TO SAY THAT WE HAVE BEEN DISAPPOINTED IN RECENT MONTHS OVER THE HANDLING OF SOVIET IDEAS. WE SEE THEM ADVANCED IN THE NEWSPAPERS BUT NOT THE NEGOTIATIONS. THIS MAKES US WONDER HOW SERIOUS YOU ARE.

-- IF WE ARE TO BE REALISTIC, WE HAVE TO RECOGNIZE THAT LITTLE HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED IN GENEVA. THE TALKS HAVEN'T REALLY GONE BEYOND WHERE THEY ENDED IN 1983. WE DON'T NEED TODAY TO GET INTO THE REASONS FOR THAT: YOU HAVE YOUR ANALYSIS; WE HAVE OURS.

-- BUT WE HAVE ESTABLISHED SOME COMMON GROUND: THAT ANY AGREEMENTS SHOULD BE ON THE BASIS OF EQUALITY; THAT THEY SHOULD ENVISAGE DEEP REDUCTIONS IN WARHEADS; THAT THEY SHOULD ENHANCE STABILITY; THAT THEY SHOULD BE VERIFIABLE; THAT FUNDAMENTAL RESEARCH ON DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ABM TREATY, WILL CONTINUE.

-- THE TIME HAS COME, IT SEEMS TO US, TO BUILD ON THESE GENERAL AREAS OF AGREEMENT TO SOMETHING MORE SPECIFIC -- SOMETHING WHICH WOULD GIVE OUR NEGOTIATORS IN GENEVA THE STIMULUS AND DIRECTION THEY NEED TO ACHIEVE CONCRETE AGREEMENTS.

-- I UNDERSTAND YOU ARE BRINGING SPECIFIC IDEAS ON HOW TO MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD. I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING THEM AND WANT YOU TO EMPHASIZE TO MR. GORBACHEV THAT I WILL STUDY THEM VERY CLOSELY. I HOPE THEY WILL MARK THE OUTSET OF THE KIND OF SERIOUS GIVE-AND-TAKE THAT WILL LEAD TO PROGRESS AT GENEVA. WE MUST NOT LOSE THE OPPORTUNITY BEFORE US.

-- I ALSO HOPE YOU WILL GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO THE PROPOSALS GEORGE HAS MADE ON NUCLEAR TESTING AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

-- WE SEEM TO BE IN GOOD SHAPE ON A NONPROLIFERATION STATEMENT IN GENEVA, AND THERE APPEARS TO BE A BETTER CHANCE OF PROGRESS IN STOCKHOLM. WE ARE ALSO CONSIDERING HOW TO MOVE THE VIENNA MBFR NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD.

-- LET ME JUST EMPHASIZE HERE THAT WE ARE PREPARED FOR AS MUCH PROGRESS IN ANY OF THESE FORUMS AS YOUR SIDE WILL ALLOW. BUT YOU CAN NOT REASONABLY EXPECT THAT WE WILL MAKE ALL THE CONCESSIONS.

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PERCEPTIONS OF SOVIET INTENTIONS

-- AS I SAID, I HOPE TO HAVE A WIDE-RANGING AND FRANK CONVERSATION WITH MR. GORBACHEV WHEN WE MEET IN NOVEMBER.

-- THERE WILL BE A NUMBER OF POINTS I INTEND TO RAISE WITH HIM.

o I WANT TO EXPLORE WITH HIM WHY THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD FEEL THREATENED BY US, WHEN WE HAVE NEVER STARTED A WAR, NEVER WILL, AND INDEED SOUGHT TO USE OUR PREPONDERANT STRENGTH AT THE END OF WORLD WAR II FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES.

o I WANT TO EXPLAIN TO HIM HOW YOUR MILITARY BUILD-UP, YOUR SELF-PROCLAIMED DEDICATION TO REVOLUTION AND OUR DESTRUCTION, AND YOUR ATTEMPTS TO EXPAND YOUR INFLUENCE THROUGHOUT THE WORLD AT OUR EXPENSE IS THREATENING TO US.

o I HOPE THAT THIS WILL GIVE YOU SOME UNDERSTANDING OF WHY WE ARE REBUILDING OUR OWN STRENGTH AND ABOUT SOME OF THE THINGS I HAVE SAID ABOUT RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. I HOPE THAT THIS CAN CLEAR THE AIR BETWEEN US AND BEGIN THE PROCESS OF REDUCING SUSPICIONS.

-- BUT I HOPE WE CAN GO BEYOND A DISCUSSION OF OUR RIVALRY AND THE REASONS FOR IT TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF OUR MOTIVATIONS.

-- ONE WAY TO DO THIS MIGHT BE FOR MR. GORBACHEV AND MYSELF TO SHARE WITH ONE ANOTHER SOME SENSE OF OUR DOMESTIC PRIORITIES AND CONCERNS.

-- IN OUR COUNTRY, WE HAVE MADE GREAT PROGRESS IN THE LAST SEVERAL YEARS IN GETTING OUR ECONOMY BACK ON TRACK. WE HAVE CREATED MILLIONS OF NEW JOBS; NEW TECHNOLOGIES WE ARE PIONEERING ARE OPENING UP NEW POSSIBILITIES THROUGHOUT THE ECONOMY; WE ARE SEEKING WAYS TO REDISTRIBUTE THE BURDEN OF TAXATION IN OUR COUNTRY TO IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF LIFE OF ALL AMERICANS.

-- I KNOW INTERESTING CHANGES ARE OCCURRING IN YOUR COUNTRY AS WELL. WE HAVE WATCHED WITH INTEREST THE STEPS TAKEN BY MR. GORBACHEV SINCE HE BECAME GENERAL SECRETARY. WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN HEARING FROM HIM -- AND FROM YOU IF TIME PERMITS -- WHAT YOU HOPE TO ACCOMPLISH IN THE MONTHS BETWEEN NOW AND THE FEBRUARY PARTY CONGRESS AND IN THE YEARS AHEAD.

-- I BELIEVE THAT SUCH A DISCUSSION COULD GO FAR TOWARD GETTING BEHIND THE STEREOTYPES WHICH INEVITABLY DEVELOP IN A RELATIONSHIP SUCH AS OURS. DO YOU THINK MR. GORBACHEV WOULD AGREE?

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REGIONAL ISSUES

-- WHILE PUBLIC ATTENTION HAS OFTEN FOCUSED ON THE ARMS CONTROL ELEMENT OF OUR RELATIONSHIP, REGIONAL QUESTIONS HAVE FREQUENTLY BEEN THE CAUSE OF THE MOST SERIOUS STRAINS BETWEEN US.

-- WHAT HAS TRADITIONALLY CONCERNED US MOST HAS BEEN YOUR TENDENCY TO USE MILITARY FORCE AS A MEANS OF ADVANCING YOUR INTERESTS, EITHER DIRECTLY OR THROUGH SURROGATES.

-- EFFORTS DURING THE SEVENTIES TO DEVELOP UNDERSTANDINGS ON PERMISSIBLE ACTIONS IN THIRD AREAS CAME APART PRIMARILY, IN OUR VIEW, BECAUSE OF THE SOVIET UNION'S UNWILLINGNESS TO FORESWEAR PURSUIT OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE.

-- THE RESULT HAS BEEN THAT WE HAVE HAD TO LOOK TO OUR OWN STRENGTH AND TO CLOSER COOPERATION WITH OUR ALLIES AND FRIENDS TO DEFEND OUR INTERESTS. WE WILL CONTINUE TO PURSUE SUCH A POLICY FOR AS LONG AS IS NECESSARY -- WHETHER IN CENTRAL AMERICA, THE MIDDLE EAST, SOUTHERN AFRICA OR ELSEWHERE.

-- NOR WILL WE FORESWEAR THE RIGHT TO LEND ASSISTANCE TO DEMOCRATIC ELEMENTS WHEN THEY APPEAL TO US TO RESIST AGGRESSION.

-- IN ADDITION TO TEACHING US THAT WE HAVE TO DEFEND OUR INTERESTS, HOWEVER, THE SEVENTIES ALSO TAUGHT US THE IMPORTANCE OF UNDERSTANDING CLEARLY THE REGIONAL MOTIVATIONS AND INTERESTS OF THE OTHER SIDE.

-- WE HAVE THUS SOUGHT TO EXPAND OUR DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON REGIONAL ISSUES OVER THE YEARS. THIS YEAR, AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE HAD DISCUSSIONS ON THE MIDDLE EAST, SOUTHERN AFRICA, AFGHANISTAN AND ASIA. WE HAVE PROPOSED TALKS ON CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.

-- WE HAVE FOUND THE EXCHANGES USEFUL AND WORTH CONTINUING. AND WE WILL HAVE A FORMAL PROPOSAL TO MAKE ON REGULARIZING THESE TYPES OF DISCUSSIONS.

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-- SUCH DISCUSSIONS, OF COURSE, ARE NOT DESIGNED TO REPLACE EXCHANGES AT THE FOREIGN MINISTER OR HIGHER LEVELS. IF I MAY TOUCH BRIEFLY ON SOME OF THE MORE SALIENT ISSUES:

o TENSIONS REMAIN HIGH IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AN AREA OF INTEREST TO BOTH OF US. YOUR LACK OF RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL AND SUPPORT FOR ELEMENTS OPPOSING DIRECT DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES MOST DIRECTLY CONCERNED CONTINUES TO BLOCK THE MOST PROMISING AVENUES OF A SETTLEMENT AND CALLS INTO QUESTION YOUR WILLINGNESS TO PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN THE REGION. WE HAVE A COMMON INTEREST IN ENSURING THAT THERE IS NO RENEWAL OF FIGHTING IN THE REGION.

o I WANT TO MAKE ABSOLUTELY CLEAR THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN. WE WANT STABLE, DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES IN THE REGION AND WE WILL NOT PERMIT THE FORCIBLE ALTERATION OF THE LOCAL BALANCE. SOVIET SUPPORT FOR THE INTERVENTIONIST ACTIVITIES OF CUBA AND NICARAGUA IS AND WILL REMAIN A SERIOUS PROBLEM IN OUR RELATIONS AND RAISES THE POSSIBILITY OF A SERIOUS CONFRONTATION.

o SOUTHERN AFRICA IS IN THE PROCESS OF CATAclysmic CHANGE. THE SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA ITSELF IS NOT AN EAST-WEST ISSUE AND IT IS IN NEITHER OF OUR INTERESTS THAT IT BECOME ONE. WE EXPECT MOSCOW TO SHOW THE NECESSARY RESTRAINT. WE REMAIN COMMITTED TO HELPING THE NATIONS OF THE REGION REACH A PEACEFUL ACCOMMODATION OF THEIR DIFFERENCES, INCLUDING ON THE QUESTION OF NAMIBIA.

o IN ASIA, WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO DO MORE TOGETHER TO HELP ALONG A SETTLEMENT OF THE KAMPUCHEA QUESTION. WE REGRET THAT MOSCOW HAS THUS FAR REFUSED TO USE ITS INFLUENCE IN HANOI TO ENCOURAGE A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION WHICH COULD LEAD TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF VIETNAMESE FORCES FROM KAMPUCHEA. BOTH OF US SHOULD ALSO PLAY A ROLE IN LOWERING TENSIONS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA, BY ENCOURAGING AN EXPANSION OF THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE.

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-- FINALLY, LET ME RAISE THE QUESTION OF AFGHANISTAN. THERE IS NO OTHER REGIONAL ISSUE ON WHICH PROGRESS COULD HAVE AS DRAMATIC AN IMPACT ON OUR OVERALL RELATIONS AS AFGHANISTAN.

o I AM AWARE OF SOVIET ACCUSATIONS THAT WE ARE SEEKING TO "BLEED" THE SOVIET UNION IN AFGHANISTAN, AND THAT WE ARE OPPOSED TO A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.

o I WANT TO REASSURE YOU, AS I WILL REASSURE MR. GORBACHEV PERSONALLY, THAT THAT IS NOT THE CASE.

o WE WANT THE WAR TO END. WE WANT THE AFGHAN REFUGEES TO BE ABLE TO RETURN TO THEIR COUNTRY HONORABLY AND IN PEACE. WE WANT THE SOVIET FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN TO GO HOME SO THAT THE SUFFERING AND LOSSES ON BOTH SIDES CAN END. WE BELIEVE THAT ONLY A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT CAN LEAD TO SUCH A RESULT.

o WE HAVE HAD AMPLE OPPORTUNITIES TO DISCUSS THIS ISSUE IN THE PAST. LET ME ADD ONE THING TODAY: IF THE SOVIET UNION IS PREPARED SERIOUSLY TO EXPLORE MEANS OF ENDING THE WAR ON TERMS WHICH ALLOW THE AFGHANS TO EXERCISE THEIR RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION, THEY WOULD FIND IN US NO OBSTACLE. WE ACCEPT THAT SUCH A SOLUTION MUST ALSO GUARANTEE THE SECURITY OF YOUR SOUTHERN BORDER.

-- I HOPE YOU WILL CONVEY THAT MESSAGE FORCEFULLY FROM ME TO MR. GORBACHEV.

→ POLAND

-- WE ARE CONCERNED BY THE COURSE OF EVENTS IN POLAND, WHICH AS YOU KNOW HAS BEEN A SOURCE OF CONTROVERSY BETWEEN US MANY TIMES IN THE PAST.

-- IN OUR VIEW, STABILITY IN POLAND CAN ONLY RESULT FROM A TRUE POLICY OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND DIALOGUE AMONG THE GOVERNMENT, THE CHURCH AND THE WORKERS.

-- THE POLISH GOVERNMENT SEEMS HEADED IN A DIFFERENT DIRECTION. THIS IS SOMETHING OVER WHICH YOU HAVE GREAT INFLUENCE.

-- WE HOPE YOU WILL USE YOUR INFLUENCE TO ENCOURAGE THE POLISH REGIME TO TURN TOWARD RECONCILIATION RATHER THAN INCREASED REPRESSION.

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~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 8 -

BILATERAL ISSUES

-- I KNOW THAT YOU AND GEORGE WILL BE DISCUSSING IN DETAIL THE VARIOUS BILATERAL ISSUES ON THE AGENDA.

-- AS IN THE OTHER AREAS I HAVE TOUCHED ON, IT IS OUR HOPE THAT IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO CLEAN UP AS MANY OF THESE AS POSSIBLE UP IN TIME FOR OUR NOVEMBER MEETING.

-- OBVIOUSLY, IF THIS IS GOING TO HAPPEN, BOTH SIDES WILL HAVE TO BE WILLING TO MEET THE OTHER HALF-WAY. WE ARE PREPARED TO DO OUR PART.

-- BUT IF IT PROVES IMPOSSIBLE TO WRAP THESE ISSUES UP BEFORE NOVEMBER 19, WE WILL BE PREPARED TO CONTINUE TO WORK ON THEM AFTER THE MEETING. THE IMPORTANT THING IS TO GET AGREEMENTS WHICH CAN STAND UP TO THE TEST OF TIME AND ARE FIRMLY GROUNDED IN EACH SIDE'S INTERESTS.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND EMIGRATION (for tete-a-tete)

-- I WANTED TO RAISE THIS IN PRIVATE BECAUSE I WANT TO EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE I ATTACH TO MOVEMENT ON THIS ISSUE. I HAVE IN MIND HUMAN RIGHTS CONSIDERATIONS, AN AREA I KNOW YOU DO NOT RECOGNIZE AS PART OF OUR AGENDA. THEY ARE AN ESSENTIAL PART OF OUR RELATIONSHIP, HOWEVER.

-- THERE ARE PRINCIPLES INVOLVED HERE ON BOTH SIDES: YOU VIEW IT AS AN INTERNAL MATTER; AS A NATION OF IMMIGRANTS WE CAN NOT ACCEPT SUCH A VIEW.

-- BUT THERE SHOULD BE WAYS FOR US TO DEAL WITH THESE CONCERNS WITHOUT COMPROMISING OUR PRINCIPLES.

-- I KNOW GEORGE HAS SHARED WITH YOU SOME SPECIFIC IDEAS ON HOW WE MIGHT DO SO. I HOPE THAT YOU WILL CONSIDER THEM CAREFULLY AND THAT WE WILL SEE SOME PROGRESS BEFORE THE NOVEMBER MEETING.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Arms ControlGeneva Negotiations

Round III of the Geneva negotiations began September 19. In the runup to this round the Soviets mounted an intense and skillful propaganda campaign attacking our SDI and ASAT programs and trying to convince western publics that the US lacks the political will for progress in Geneva. In his interview with Time, Gorbachev continued to link progress in Geneva on nuclear force reductions to US willingness to ban "space strike arms." His definition of such a ban, however, distinguished between permitted laboratory research and research which has reached a stage of development that could be verified. This follows earlier indications, including a July letter from Gorbachev to the Union of Concerned Scientists, that the Soviets might be softening their demand for a blanket prohibition on SDI research.

Our negotiators have instructions to probe Soviet views in this area in Round III. They also intend to probe the Soviets on their "model" for a START agreement, which, according to statements by Soviet negotiators in Round II, provides for overall aggregate limits on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and weapons, as well as a percentage limit on the number of weapons that could be deployed on any one leg of the triad.

For our part, Ambassador Tower indicated to his Soviet counterpart near the end of the round that the U.S. might be willing to accept associated limits on ballistic missiles and bombers (the total of which would approximate levels implied by the Soviet Union) if the Soviets would agree on reductions of ballistic missile RVs and destructive capability. We have told the Soviets that we would also envision limits on ALCMs well below the level the Soviets say are implied by our position.

In INF, the Soviet negotiators have taken an especially sterile line, continuing to assert a right to maintain an effective LRINF missile monopoly by including French and British strategic systems and denying the legitimacy of any US INF deployments in Europe.

We wish to draw out Shevardnadze to see if there is new flexibility in either of these areas. In particular, we want to know if the Soviet START "model" will be followed in Round III by a concrete proposal with numbers intended to open up real bargaining on strategic arms. We will also stress the unacceptability of the current Soviet position on INF. We want to emphasize that Soviet ideas floated in public but not embodied in concrete proposals at Geneva look like propaganda and do not lead to progress. We should also stress the need to drop preconditions and address real US concerns.

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DECL: OADR

BY CAS, NARA, DATE 2/12/02

9/16/85

Arms ControlCompliance/Interim Restraint

The February 1 report to Congress on Soviet non-compliance with arms control agreements found that the USSR had violated provisions of several arms control agreements, most notably SALT II, the ABM treaty and agreements governing use of chemical and biological weapons. The evidence surrounding these violations is clear. The evidence surrounding other Soviet actions, however, is ambiguous, and many of the report's additional findings reflect this ambiguity. This ambiguity, combined with new intelligence, may require us to revisit some of the February 1 findings in the next report, which is currently scheduled for early December.

Overall, the Soviets seem to be in accord with most provisions of the treaties, and may be moving to address some of our concerns in areas (such as SNDV limits, concurrent operations and SS-16 deployment) where we had suspected possible violations. However, our principal concerns (e.g. the Krasnoyarsk radar, the SS-X-25 and telemetry encryption) remain unresolved.

The Spring session of the SCC was modestly more productive than normal. We completed two new common understandings with the Soviets that aim at preventing concurrent operations of SAM at the time and place of ABM tests, and at using the Hotline in certain cases of nuclear terrorism. The Soviets have also proposed revising some of the SALT dismantlement or destruction procedures, but we have not yet responded. Although the Soviets did provide some new information on certain issues in the spring session, it was insufficient to allay our concerns. The Fall SCC session begins on October 9, and should end before November 19.

The Soviets responded to our interim restraint decisions with two faces: publicly, they criticized the decision, but privately some members of Soviet arms control delegations have welcomed it as a positive decision. Moreover, several signs of possible Soviet interest in an arms control agreement, including the informal Soviet suggestions of a "model" agreement on strategic offensive arms, have occurred after the interim restraint decision in June.

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NLS FOO-008/1 #82BY CAJ NARA, DATE 2/12/00

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9/16/85

Arms Control

CDE

Since the opening of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security- Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) in January, 1984, we have sought to negotiate measures which would inhibit the use of military force for political intimidation and reduce the risk of surprise attack.

To achieve these goals, the NATO states, led by the United States, have tabled a "package" of six concrete confidence-building measures. Adoption of these measures, which include strong verification provisions, would mark a significant advance over the 1975 Helsinki Final Act through imposition of tougher requirements for notification and observation of military activities in Europe.

The Soviets have sought to focus the conference on their declaratory proposals, the centerpiece of which is a proposed treaty on the non-use of force. Other, unacceptable declaratory proposals include non-first use of nuclear weapons as well as chemical and nuclear weapons free zones.

After 18 months of negotiation, the differences between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries remain formidable. The Soviets, however, have moved some of their more objectionable proposals off center stage with the result that the Stockholm Conference is focusing increasingly on military measures of interest to us. The Soviets may now be ready to consider seriously our offer to discuss a reaffirmation of the principle not to use force in the context of Soviet agreement to concrete confidence building measures.

Following up discussions in Moscow in early September between Ambassador Goodby and his Soviet counterpart, Soviet CDE Ambassador Grinevsky approached Goodby in Stockholm on September 12 to propose a procedural arrangement for proceeding to drafting later this year. We and our Allies will have to test this apparent Soviet willingness to make concessions (dropping their declaratory proposals except non-use of force) as a basis for moving into a more intensive phase of negotiation.

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NARA, DATE

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9/16/85

Arms ControlChemical Weapons

The U.S. has three broad objectives regarding chemical weapons:

--To negotiate a verifiable, worldwide ban on production and stockpiling of chemical weapons;

--Pending negotiation of such a ban, and in light of the Soviet Union's own substantial CW capability, to modernize our own deterrent by production of CW binary weapons;

--And, more recently, to prevent proliferation of CW use and production.

CW use in the Iran-Iraq War and strong evidence of Soviet involvement in CW use in SE Asia and Afghanistan has undermined long-standing international constraints against CW, particularly the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning CW use (but not stockpiles or production). The issue of CW proliferation is complicated by the fact that the industrial technology used to produce CW is readily available (and some U.S. allies are major sellers of this technology).

In April 1984 Vice President Bush tabled at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva a draft CW convention calling for a world-wide ban on CWs with a clear standard of verification, based on mandatory challenge inspections. Progress has been minimal, largely due to Soviet reluctance on the verification question. On the margins of the CD, we have been discussing with the Soviets bilateral arrangements to supplement a CW convention and enhance chances of Soviet compliance; these talks have made some modest progress on destruction of CW stockpiles.

Soviet concern over CW focuses on our development of binaries. Moscow does not appear as serious about as CW proliferation as it is about nuclear proliferation. The Soviets have for a number of years pushed the idea of European regional CW-free zones; we regard these proposals as propaganda designed to appeal to public opinion in the Allied or neutral countries involved.

At the July 31 meeting with Shevardnadze in Helsinki, we suggested experts' discussions on CW issues, with a particular focus on CW use in the Iran-Iraq War. Shevardnadze acknowledged the importance of the the CW issue but did not respond directly to our specific suggestions.

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NARA, DATE

2/2/02

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Arms ControlNuclear Non-Proliferation

The Soviet Union generally has been cooperative on nuclear non-proliferation issues. Like us, the Soviets have a fundamental interest in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons -- above all, from the Soviet perspective, to Germany or to such U.S. friends as Israel. Each side occasionally complains about activities of the other's friends or allies (e.g., the Soviets accuse us of providing proscribed items to Israel or Pakistan, and we complain about Libya and North Korea). For the most part, however, we have avoided public polemics and have made a show of cooperation.

Perhaps in order to burnish their image for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review conference this year, the Soviet Union this spring signed an agreement permitting inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency of two of its civilian nuclear facilities (we long have put our civilian facilities under IAEA NPT safeguards). There has been some speculation that this could signal greater Soviet willingness to accept arms control inspections of military facilities; we have expressed hope that this will prove to be the case, but we also note that Soviet resistance towards verification in ongoing arms control negotiations is not encouraging.

The Soviets have expressed interest in our suggestion that there be a joint U.S.-Soviet statement at the November meeting in Geneva which refers to successful bilateral cooperation on non-proliferation. Ambassador Dick Kennedy provided a draft statement to the Soviets during consultations in April. At Helsinki, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze suggested that US and Soviet representatives should get together after the NPT review conference in Geneva and draft a text for examination by the leadership of the two countries, and that it could be decided later whether the statement would be part of a larger document or issued separately.

Ambassador Kennedy will meet with his Soviet counterpart at meetings of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna shortly before Shevardnadze visits Washington. He will ask them for their comments on the US draft passed to them in April, and suggest to them that details can be worked out at the US/USSR non-proliferation consultations scheduled for mid-October.

A copy of a draft statement is attached.

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- 2 -

[Draft text on non-proliferation given by Ambassador Kennedy to Ambassador Petrovskiy in April 1985].

Draft Joint Statement on the Non-Proliferation Regime
For Issuance at the Summit

President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev reaffirmed the commitment of the United States and the Soviet Union to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). In that regard they noted that the U.S. and the USSR have a common interest in strengthening the non-proliferation regime and working with other countries toward that end.

President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev also reviewed the work of the five sessions of bilateral consultations between the U.S. and the USSR on non-proliferation and noted their high evaluation of the results of these consultations. They note that these talks have been both friendly and productive, and that they have demonstrated the ability of the U.S. and the USSR to achieve positive results in an area of vital importance to global security. In particular, they endorsed the efforts of the U.S. and the USSR to strengthen the IAEA and enhance in every way its ability to discharge its safeguards and technical assistance missions.

They also affirmed that the U.S. and the USSR plan to continue the regular schedule of consultations on the technical and political challenges facing the Non-Proliferation regime.

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9/16/85

Arms ControlNuclear Testing

The US and USSR both unveiled new nuclear testing proposals on the eve of the 40th Anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima. In a letter dated July 27, we extended to Gorbachev a unilateral invitation to send Soviet experts to monitor a U.S. nuclear test at our Nevada test site. This proposal, a refinement of our suggestion at last year's UNGA for reciprocal visits by US and Soviet experts, was designed as a practical step to help resolve our verification concerns regarding the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.

On July 28, Gorbachev privately proposed to us -- and a day later announced -- that the Soviet Union was imposing a unilateral testing moratorium until January 1, 1986, which would be extended if the U.S. joined in. Gorbachev called again for ratification of the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties, as well as resumption of trilateral talks with the British on a Comprehensive Test Ban. Not surprisingly, the Soviets have subsequently made the nuclear testing moratorium proposal a main feature of their current propaganda offensive. Gorbachev has discussed it in letters to our European Allies, and cited it in his Time interview as a far-reaching and bold gesture. They have criticized the US for failing to accept the offer and depicted continuing US tests as an example of the continuing U.S. military buildup.

Both sides pressed their respective proposals publicly and in our bilateral meeting at the CSCE Commemoration in Helsinki in July. The Soviets have thus far not responded to our suggestions that the nuclear testing issue is an area where progress can be achieved at or before November 19.

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NLS F00-008/1 #86

BY CAS

NARA DATE 7/2/02

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9/16/85

Arms Control

MBFR

The Soviet initiative last February essentially put into legally binding form the East's 1983 proposals for initial reductions of 13,000 U.S. and 20,000 Soviet ground troops and a subsequent no-increase commitment by both sides. The Soviet proposal offered little that was new and failed to address the major issues of data and verification. It therefore did not represent a positive response to the West's April 1984 proposal, which offered flexibility on the data issue in exchange for enhanced verification measures. The Soviet proposal, however, technically has put the ball back in our court in the Vienna talks.

This initiative was part of a broader Soviet effort to regain the high ground on the arms control front, including through the Geneva talks and the tabling of a non-use of force treaty in the Stockholm CDE. The lack of flexibility in the Soviet proposal, which largely reworks language on the table since 1983, suggests that move was not intended as a major substantive initiative.

During the last MBFR round, the Soviets continued to hint at possible areas of flexibility, but they refused to elaborate on the details or to discuss substantive issues until the West accepted the proposal in principle. They also continued to press for a Western counter-proposal.

The UK and FRG have now proposed to us a new move at Vienna based on US-Soviet reductions, a no-increase commitment, and strong verification measures in place of prior data agreement. Most allies are looking for a new Western initiative for the fall round, beginning September 26, which would adopt the Soviets' proposed focus on a first-phase agreement. The UK/FRG ideas are being reviewed in interagency channels in Washington.

At Helsinki, Shevardnadze mentioned MBFR as an area for movement before the November 19 meeting, and asked us to reexamine our position.

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NLS F00-0081, #87
BY CW NARA, DATE 2/2/02

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9/16/85

Arms Control

Soviet Declaratory Arms Control Proposals

Soviet propaganda has included a constant and repeated emphasis on several measures that are essentially declaratory in nature. These measures, which Shevardnadze may bring up in your meeting, include:

-- A NATO-Warsaw Pact Non-Aggression (Non-Use-of-Force) Treaty. Shevardnadze may contend that our proposal to add a NUF commitment to an overall CDE agreement which includes concrete CBM's is insufficient. We and our NATO allies see a separate NUF treaty as a purely declaratory measure that would add nothing to the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act; nor would it be consistent with the general principle that the CSCE is not a bloc-to-bloc arrangement.

-- No first use of nuclear weapons, either in the CDE context or as a separate step we might jointly take to build confidence. We refuse to make such a statement, arguing that NATO is a defensive alliance which will not be the first to attack with either conventional or nuclear weapons. We add, however, that NATO will not surrender in advance any of its defense and deterrence potential and because they would not address the threat posed by Soviet forces from outside Europe which could threaten the region.

-- CDE support for nuclear weapons free zones in Northern and Central Europe and the Balkans. Shevardnadze may argue that such zones have the support of nations in the regions concerned and would help reduce tensions and the risk of conflict. We and our NATO allies have opposed nuclear weapons free zones in Europe as destabilizing because of their disruption of collective security arrangements.

-- A basket of miscellaneous issues, which have received less attention from the Soviets than those listed above. They include a Soviet proposal for naval arms control, which we find one-sided and unverifiable; security guarantees for non-nuclear states, which we see as purely declaratory and incapable of bringing about real constraints; and a Warsaw Pact proposal to reduce military budgets, which, in the face of East-bloc secrecy, would be completely unverifiable.

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NLS F00-008/1 #8V

BY CAS, NARA, DATE 2/2/02

9/16/85

Arms ControlSoviet UNGA Proposal on Space

On August 16, the Soviets submitted their annual UNGA disarmament initiative -- a proposal to promote the "peaceful exploration of outer space." The Soviets propose that:

- the UNGA decide to convene an international conference on space before 1987 (a preparatory committee would be created to report to next year's UNGA on the idea);
- the conference consider establishing a world space organization which could "effectively ensure the non-militarization of outer space" and promote peaceful cooperation; and
- the UNGA call on all nations to prevent an arms race in space, in which all nations could renounce the "development (including research), testing and deployment of space strike weapons."

This year's proposal goes beyond Andropov's 1983 ASAT testing moratorium and the Soviet draft space treaty introduced during the past two UNGA sessions. It is clearly designed to gain neutral and non-aligned (NNA) support for their anti-SDI propaganda by enticing them with promises of sharing the benefits of space exploration (e.g. research, space stations). The Soviets hope to play on Third World concerns that SDI and the EUREKA program are designed exclusively for the benefit of the developed industrial countries. It is designed to have broad appeal, and serve as a positive complement to the heavy negative propaganda against SDI and our ASAT test.

We intend to respond to the Soviet proposal by stressing our own strong interest in promoting peaceful cooperation in space from the very outset of the US space program. There are numerous examples of US international space cooperation including: numerous international satellite deployments and experiments being conducted by the space shuttle (including participation by Saudi, French and soon Indian astronauts); LANDSAT photograph sharing and cooperation; as well as hundreds of bilateral and multilateral space agreements under which there is widespread scientific collaboration and research. We also see no need for a new UN organization on space; the UN Outer Space Committee is already charged with promoting peaceful space cooperation and we are on record as supporting the broadening of the Committee's work program.

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BY

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NARA, DATE

2/2/02

Regional IssuesGeneral Points on Regional Dialogue

Following up your proposal at the UNGA in September 1984, we have now held four sets of regional experts' talks with the Soviets: on the Middle East (February 7-8), southern Africa (May 30), Afghanistan (June 18-19), and East Asia (September 12-13). The tone of all four meetings has been businesslike. The exchanges have also been comprehensive, but have yielded little indication of Soviet flexibility, particularly on Afghanistan. In Helsinki, Secretary Shultz and Shevardnadze agreed to hold talks on Central America and the Caribbean. We have proposed they be held in October in Washington.

Despite the fact that nothing dramatic has emerged from these sessions, we continue to believe that such exchanges are a useful mechanism for clarifying our respective views on these issues and to get across to the Soviets the points that we and our friends and allies wish to make. In time, these sessions may allow for a more productive exchange of views. The experience of Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Chester Crocker may be instructive in this regard. He has met with Soviet counterparts four times over the past three years. It was only during his most recent meeting in Paris this May that he was able to engage his interlocutors in real give-and-take on the crucial issues.

We believe that one objective of the November meeting with Gorbachev should be to schedule these sessions on an annual basis to provide a regular opportunity for an in-depth review of developments in key regions. The goal would be to have regional experts talks lay the groundwork for our high-level contacts with the Soviets. Over time, we hope these talks could point the way to possible steps towards progress in resolving concrete problems.

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NLS F00-008/1 #90
BY CA NARA, DATE 2/12/02

Regional IssuesAfghanistan

Almost six years have passed since the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. The Soviets have not succeeded in subjugating the Afghan people and the resistance today is more effective than ever. During the past summer alone Soviet forces have launched three major operations, and have taken a larger role in the fighting. There have been attacks across the Pakistan border. The larger role of Soviet mainforce units has resulted in an increase in Soviet casualties, but no greater control of Afghanistan; results, in fact, have been shortlived, with Soviet withdrawal from the area of the fighting when the combat subsides or after limited tactical gains. The Soviets, frustrated by mujahidin effectiveness, have increasingly brought political pressure to bear on Pakistan.

In June, US and Soviet officials held talks in Washington. Both sides were unyielding and the Soviet presentation was both standard and essentially timeless. We underscored our commitment to Pakistan, but stressed our willingness to be helpful in the effort to reach a negotiated political settlement. At Helsinki, our exchange with Shevardnadze was brief; he had little reaction to our analysis of the problem, other than to note that the tone was more businesslike.

Under the auspices of the UN Secretary General's personal representative, Diego Cordovez, five rounds of indirect talks have been held in Geneva between Pakistan and the Kabul régime. The fourth round in June 1985, appeared to make some progress in drawing up the various documents which would make up a settlement package. At the August round, however, progress was blocked by Moscow's unwillingness to address the question of Soviet troop withdrawal and its insistence on direct talks between the DRA and Pakistan. The next round is scheduled for December.

In August, Pakistani Foreign Minister Yagub Khan passed through Moscow enroute to the Geneva talks and met in Moscow with Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Korniyenko. They touched on the question of a timetable for withdrawal of Soviet forces and the possibility of broadening the Afghan government. Yagub, on the basis of this discussion, believes a review of Soviet policy toward Afghanistan may be underway. It is possible, of course, that a policy debate is going on in Moscow, and that the Korniyenko conversation reflects this, but Soviet actions on the ground appear unaffected. Zia, meanwhile, has made a major policy statement identifying Pakistan more completely than heretofore with Afghan resistance aims and acknowledging Pakistani help (ambiguously) to the resistance.

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DECL: OADR

NLS F00-008/1 #91

BY GJ NADA DATE 2/12/02

9/16/85

Regional IssuesMiddle East/Persian Gulf

Despite frequent protestations about their desire to play a role in the Middle East, Moscow has continued to follow a line of policy that is distinctly unhelpful to any efforts at resolving conflicts in the area.

Reflecting their concern that a successful US brokered peace process will shut them out of the region, the Soviets have stepped up their criticism of the Jordanian/Palestinian agreement. The Soviets publicly support PLO unity, but have made clear they expect Palestinian unity to be based on rejection of the February 11 accord. Moscow, however, has refrained from endorsing the Syrian-sponsored anti-Arafat Palestinian coalition. Differences over the PLO have strained Syrian-Soviet relations, but the connection with Damascus remains the keystone of the Soviet political position in the region.

The publicity which surrounded the meeting between the Soviet and Israeli Ambassadors in Paris has caused both sides to seek a lower profile for their ongoing contacts. The Soviets will probably continue to seek some of the advantages of contacts with Israel without paying a real price in terms of emigration or normalized ties.

The Soviets profess a desire to see an end to the Iran-Iraq War, although they continue to be Iraq's main arms supplier, and East Bloc countries and North Korea provide the bulk of Iranian arms. We believe the Scud missiles used against Baghdad were transferred from Libya to Iran without Soviet permission, and that Moscow has on occasion stopped transactions between Eastern Europe and Iran for major systems, e.g. tanks.

Iran remains intransigently opposed to negotiations, refusing to discuss peace unless the Iraqi regime is replaced. After the heavy losses from Iran's March offensive, which briefly raised signs of internal dissent, Tehran switched to a more defensive strategy of small attacks. At this low level of activity Tehran can continue an indefinite number of years, assuming Iraq does not succeed in closing Kharg Island and substantially cutting off Iran's oil revenues.

The Iranian regime, pressed by its war needs and its diplomatic isolation, moved this spring to improve its ties with Moscow. The USSR's response has been cautious to negative. Iran has not acceded to Soviet demands for a reduction in Iranian opposition to the Soviet presence in Afghanistan.

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NLS FOO-008/1 #92BY CAS NARA, DATE 2/12/02

9/16/85

Regional IssuesEast Asia

Assistant Secretary Paul Wolfowitz led a small team to Moscow on September 12-13 for the latest in a series of regional discussions with the Soviet Foreign Ministry. Deputy Foreign Minister Kapitsa led the Soviet side and the Soviets put forward standard positions, with emphasis on their usual broad empty proposals.

Gorbachev signaled, upon taking office, that one of his high priorities was to improve relations with China. So far, there has been a noticeable improvement in the atmosphere of Sino-Soviet relations. Overall, however, the relationship continues to follow the same pattern which became apparent last year--progress on economic and trade issues but slight improvement in political relations, which remain blocked by differences over Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Soviet troop deployments along the border.

Warmer Soviet-North Korean relations were highlighted during the 40th anniversary of V-J day by a portcall by Soviet naval ships and a visit by First Deputy Prime Minister and Politburo member Geydar Aliyev. The Soviets continue their shipments of MiG 23s--23 so far--and some SA-3 surface-to-air missiles. On the political front, the Soviets continue to endorse North Korea's approach to dialogue with South Korea. North and South are poised to make an historically unprecedented exchange of separated family members/art troupes on Sept. 20-23.

The Soviets have received the Laotian, Vietnamese and Mongolian Foreign Ministers during the past month and a half. In their public statements the Soviets have supported Vietnamese proposals on Cambodia, but have also stressed the need for improved relations with China. Although there are strains in the relationship with Hanoi, the Soviets continue to make the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia possible through economic and military assistance. In return, they have received access to former US facilities at Cam Ranh Bay. Although this strategic gain has cost the Soviets in terms of relations with the ASEAN states, Moscow appears to be willing to pay the price. Some Soviets have informally suggested they would welcome a Cambodian solution and Vietnam's recent proposals on the problem have at least addressed the question of troop withdrawal (although their proposed timetable is unacceptable). So far, there is no reason to believe that the Vietnamese proposal presages any real progress toward a political solution.

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BY G+S, NARA, DATE 2/12/02

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9/16/85

Regional Issues

Central America

We are making progress throughout Central America in our efforts to promote stable, democratic governments secure from challenges from the violent left and right. Our progress has been considerable in El Salvador, Guatemala and elsewhere. We do not intend to allow Moscow and its surrogates or allies to challenge the regional democratic trend. We favor democratic national reconciliation in Nicaragua and will not tolerate Soviet/Cuban use of Nicaragua as a base for regional destabilization.

We believe Moscow will respect a firm U.S. regional policy and will avoid direct, provocative challenges to us so near our shores. We favor opening an experts' dialogue with Moscow on Central America/Caribbean issues to clarify our policy and avoid unnecessary conflict with the USSR as we implement this policy.

We have proposed to the Soviets that we hold a Central America/Caribbean experts meeting in Washington in late October. Washington is appropriate given the venues for other experts' talks and serves our substantive interests in presenting vigorously our position on our own turf.

We will make clear in our preliminary contacts with the Soviets that the talks will include discussion of Cuban as well as Soviet regional activities.

There have been no major new developments concerning jet aircraft for Nicaragua since our letter to then General Secretary Chernenko on December 21. Soviet shipments of military-related equipment have continued, but there have been no new major weapons systems delivered. The recent SNIE on Nicaragua concluded the Soviets may not want to challenge us by supplying MIG-21s.

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BY C44, NARA, DATE 2/12/02

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9/16/85

Regional Issues

Southern Africa

With little direct influence on events in South Africa the Soviets have reacted cautiously to the recent violence. They have of late stepped up their public support for the ANC and their criticism of U.S. links to Pretoria. The Soviet media have depicted U.S. policy as an effort to protect U.S. multinationals and preserve South Africa from national liberation movements.

Moscow has also recently taken steps to strengthen its position in the front-line states. Soviet Foreign Ministry Third African Department Chief Vasev visited Zimbabwe the last week of August, apparently to discuss assistance for the 6-7000 Zimbabwean troops now operating in Mozambique. Mugabe remains wary of the Soviets, but he may be prepared to use Soviet resources to help Machel resist RENAMO.

The Soviets are also trying to present our negotiating efforts in southern Africa as having failed and come to an end. Soviet Foreign Ministry officials have told our Embassy that the lack of South African restraint has destroyed the basis for a negotiated Namibian settlement including Angolan agreement to Cuban troop withdrawal. Lacking any practical alternative to our negotiating approach, Soviet posture has basically been to support Angola's position, demand we pressure South Africa and make baleful predictions.

The Angolans have not changed their position. They have publically suspended their participation in the negotiations and their contacts with us due to recent aggressive South African behavior and the repeal of the Clark Amendment. Privately they have indicated that this does not close the door to a negotiated settlement, and that they will resume their participation in the talks at some point.

U.S. policy remains to move as rapidly as possible toward Namibian independence under UNSCR 435. The Soviets are aware of our view that Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola (CTW) is a practical problem which must be dealt with in a package settlement, and also that the Angolans tabled a proposal last fall which implicitly accepted that view. Assistant Secretary Crocker discussed this and other issues with the Soviets in regional talks in Paris May 30. The meeting produced no breakthroughs, but did provide a comprehensive regional review.

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NLS F00-0081, #95
BY CJS, NARA, DATE 2/14/02

9/16/85

Regional IssuesEurope: US-Soviet Issues in Germany

The third incident involving the USMLM this year took place September 7 in East Germany when a Soviet military truck sideswiped a USMLM vehicle disabled on a narrow road. The MLM was detained nine hours and Soviet soldiers brandished rifles. No one was injured. The US vehicle was near a Soviet communications group, but not in an area formally notified to MLMs as off limits. The Soviets called our MLM chief to explain the situation while it was still in progress. Soviet soldiers assisted in starting the US vehicle. Secretary Shultz protested this incident to Dobrynin.

On July 13, a Soviet truck rammed a USMLM vehicle, injuring the USMLM chief. The Soviet military later apologized for the incident, pointing out that those responsible had been punished. The US had immediately protested the July 13 incident at Assistant Secretary level; in our Helsinki bilateral with the Soviets, we asked for the Nicholson apology in the same spirit.

Despite repeated demands for apology and compensation for Major Nicholson's killing, the Soviets have not moved beyond their grudging public statements of April. Staff level CINC to CINC talks have found some Soviet willingness to prevent use of force against MLMs (new orders, cards, training); a CINC to CINC understanding on reduction of restricted areas may also be possible to achieve.

As result of Allied pressure in the Berlin Air Safety Center (BASC) and high level diplomatic approaches, including the Shultz-Gromyko demarche in Vienna in mid-May, the Soviets have been more cooperative on day-to-day corridor management. They also increased the reservation-free area in mid-May. Reservations in late summer were numerous, but not excessive.

However, we still have an insufficient reservation-free area at the Berlin end of corridors. Following the Soviets' increase of area to 10.5 miles, the Allies lowered their demands to 17 miles (from 20). The situation has remained unchanged since late May.

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BY CAJ NARA, DATE 2/12/02

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9/16/85

Bilateral Issues

Human Rights

Background

The human rights situation in the Soviet Union has, if anything, deteriorated since Gorbachev took power. Monthly emigration figures, despite considerable fluctuation, remain at rock bottom levels. The pressure on Hebrew teachers and other Jewish cultural activists continues, although there have been no arrests reported since late June. Symptomatic of this sustained pressure was the television confession under duress of convicted Moscow Hebrew teacher Dan Shapiro in late July. Arrests of Baptists, Pentecostals and other Christians remain high. Ten Pentecostals out of a community of 170 in Chuguevka have been convicted since January.

Andrey Sakharov and his wife remain isolated, amid unconfirmed reports that they may have been moved from Gor'kiy. Conditions for well-known human rights activists Anatoliy Shcharanskiy, Yuriy Orlov and Iosif Begun have deteriorated. Ukrainian Helsinki monitor Vasyl Stus died of emaciation in a Soviet labor camp in early September. American-Soviet dual national Abe Stolar is still waiting for exit permission for his daughter-in-law. Although three longstanding separated spouse cases have been resolved since the beginning of the year, two new cases have been added to our list.

Judging from recent Gorbachev comments and a July article by KGB head Chebrikov calling for an uncompromisingly hard line on internal dissent, this deterioration would appear to be a result of considered policy. Gorbachev, with the self-confident, vigorous image he has brought to Soviet leadership, seems determined that the USSR will not be put in the position of apologizing for its policies; instead, the Soviets now respond to our criticism of their human rights performance with aggressive attacks on economic and social conditions in the West. Despite this hard line, there is some evidence the Soviets may be willing to act pragmatically on some of our human rights concerns. For example, Soviet officials continue to hint of a willingness to substantially increase Jewish emigration in return for receiving MFN status.

We want to emphasize to Shevardnadze that we consider human rights an integral part of our relationship and an area where the Soviets can do much to improve relations at low cost to themselves. To improve the atmosphere for the summit, we would press for clearing up separated spouse and American citizen cases (about 40 cases), an increase in Jewish emigration and some positive movement on the Sakharov case.

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DECL: OADR

NARA, DATE 2/12/02

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9/16/85

Bilateral Issues

North Pacific Air Safety/Civil Aviation

A top priority for the Soviets in our economic relations has been to restore Aeroflot service to the US. We told the Soviets we are prepared to discuss resumption of bilateral air service once agreement is reached on North Pacific air safety measures (NOPAC) and an equitable balance of economic benefits for U.S. carriers serving the USSR has been negotiated. The Soviets in turn have tied the opening of consulates and, more loosely, an exchanges agreement to Aeroflot's return.

A Memorandum of Understanding on NoPac air safety among Japan, the USSR, and the US was signed in Tokyo on July 29, 1985. It must be brought into force by a trilateral exchange of diplomatic notes, which we and the Japanese had proposed take place in early September in Tokyo. The Soviets have not yet agreed to a date and have proposed an alternate formulation for the proposed language the Japanese suggested for the diplomatic notes. The MOU also requires that technical implementation procedures be worked out which will permit the three sides to communicate with each other. It appears that the three sides will meet in Moscow in October to begin work on these. The date is not set, however.

The principal provision of the MOU provides for a dedicated speech circuit between Khabarovsk and Tokyo. Tokyo will then serve as the contact point between Khabarovsk and Anchorage, to exchange information on unidentified aircraft which appear in Soviet airspace. The effect, of course, is to avoid recurrence of a KAL-007 incident although we do not formally link this issue past events.

We have informed the Soviet Union that we are prepared to begin discussion of bilateral civil aviation matters, including resumption of Aeroflot service to the US (something they very much want) beginning September 16 in Washington. We have told them in very direct terms, however, that we are not prepared to sign any new civil arrangement or to agree to resumed Aeroflot service until the implementation procedures necessary to carry out the NoPac MOU have been worked out.

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DECL: OADR

BY CJS, NARA, DATE 2/2/02

9/16/85

~~Bilateral Issues~~Economic Relations

The revival this year of a government to government dialogue on economic/commercial issues, which has included visits to Moscow by Secretaries Baldrige and Block in May and August, respectively, has modestly improved the prospects for U.S.-Soviet non-strategic trade. At the first meeting of the US-Soviet Joint Commercial Commission since 1978, the Soviets promised Baldrige that bids by US companies would be considered on the same basis as those submitted by firms of other Western countries. The climate for US firms doing business in Moscow has improved somewhat this year and a number of relatively small contracts have been signed. However, the Soviets have not recently concluded any major new contracts with US companies outside of the agricultural sphere.

US exports to the USSR remain much higher than Soviet sales to the US. In 1984 we sold approximately \$3.3 billion to the Soviets while importing \$600 million. We expect 1985 statistics to be roughly similar. Over 80% of our exports to the Soviets now consist of agricultural commodities and we expect them to purchase a record 20 million metric tons (mt.) of grain (mostly corn) during the marketing year ending September 30. During the past year the Soviets were the single largest foreign customer for American grain. Although their purchases are likely to decline somewhat next year, due to a somewhat better harvest, the Soviets will continue to require substantial imports of grain for the foreseeable future and are likely to buy a sizeable share of this requirement from us.

Despite the somewhat improved atmosphere, the outlook for US non-agricultural exports to the USSR is limited by the high value of the dollar, the unavailability of government export financing, and lingering Soviet suspicions that the USG might force commercial contracts to be broken if political relations sour. The Soviets also complain about the size of their trade deficit with us and have hinted that if steps were taken to limit further the sales of Soviet products in the US (i.e. as a result of protectionist pressures or the issue of forced labor) they might retaliate by reducing purchases of our agricultural commodities. They continue to grumble about the absence of MFN and government supported credits, but do not seem to expect any early changes in US policy on these questions.

Despite US export controls on oil and gas equipment and technology and our unwillingness to endorse the development of trade ties in this area, the Soviets remain interested in possible future cooperation with US companies in the energy area. Within the past several months they have had discussions with a number of US energy firms.

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BY QAS NARA, DATE 2/12/02

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9/15/85

Bilateral Issues

Exchange of Consulates - Kiev and New York

We reached agreement in principle in the summer of 1983 to open Consulates in Kiev and New York. We have been ready to move forward on this issue since early 1984, but our efforts have been hamstrung by Soviet linkage to the civil aviation issue. They argue that it makes no sense to have a Consulate in New York unless Aeroflot resumes regular air service to the United States. We, in turn, have linked progress in civil aviation to Northern Pacific Air Safety Measures (NOPAC). We have told the Soviets that we are ready to begin civil aviation discussions as soon as we have formally exchanged notes to activate our agreement on NOPAC (reached in July) and scheduled talks on the technical implementation of this agreement.

We believe it is time to break the stalemate on this issue. An agreement to announce an exchange of consulates would be appropriate during the Geneva meeting. If we are to do so, however, we need to clear up some technical issues. These include looking again at our property in Kiev and agreeing within the USG to an increase of approximately 30 Soviets to staff the New York Consulate.

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9/16/85

Bilateral Issues

General Exchanges Agreement

The US-Soviet General Exchanges Agreement is the basic document which governs cultural, educational, and private people-to-people exchange programs between our two countries. This agreement expired in 1979. Renewal negotiations were stalled over Soviet demands that we return their exchangees who had defected. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan intervened at this stage and we did not return to the talks.

Last June, we submitted the text of a new general exchanges agreement to the Soviets and we have been in negotiations since that time. Most of the basic issues which govern the day-to-day working of the exchange programs have been resolved. There are two important issues remaining to be resolved: thematic exhibits and TV appearances.

Thematic exhibits are at the core of what we want from an agreement since this is at present one of our best instruments for getting into the closed Soviet society. These exhibits, on themes such as American technology, design, and culture, are extraordinarily popular with Soviet citizens and are one exchange over which the Soviets have little control. The Soviets have sought to cut back by half on volume and frequency of exhibits. However, we plan to hold fast to the position that our exhibits, whether there is one or two, be seen in at least 9-12 Soviet cities for 28 showing days each.

We have proposed at least six appearances a year on the other's TV by mutually agreed representatives of each country, including one by the head of state. The Soviets have refused any language that specified a given number of appearances. This will continue to be a tough issue to resolve. The Soviets, as highlighted by Time Magazine's Gorbachev interview, already have virtual on-demand access to our media, while we have little or none to theirs. We are not ready to concede this point, even though we recognize that we may need to reduce the number of appearances to get the Soviets to give us what we want on exhibits.

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BY CS NARA, DATE 2/12/02

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9/16/85

Bilateral Issues

Maritime Boundary/Soviet Harassment Activity
in the Bering Sea

The U.S. regards the line established by the 1867 Convention Ceding Alaska as the U.S.-U.S.S.R maritime boundary. The Soviets agreed in 1977 to use the Line to delimit our 200 nautical mile fisheries zones. (This is now our Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)). We use this Line also as our continental shelf boundary but without similar agreement.

Since 1981 we have met four times to try to reach agreement on a common depiction of the Line as the boundary, most recently in July 1984 in Moscow. In 1981 we learned that there is an approximately 18,500 square nautical mile area in which U.S. and Soviet claims overlap due to use of different mapping practices to draw the Line. (The U.S. uses a great circle; the Soviets, a rhumb line). In 1983 we proposed splitting the difference between our two versions of the Line. The Soviets counterproposed that we agree to split the difference in areas where our 200 nautical miles EEZs overlap, but they seriously complicated and expanded the dispute by making two new claims in areas where our EEZs do not overlap on our side (east) of any depiction of the Line. They strongly asserted that an area on our side of the Line less than 200 nautical miles from the USSR but more than 200 miles from the U.S. ("red zone") is part of the Soviet EEZ and is "non-negotiable", and that an area more than 200 nautical miles from both coasts ("blue zone") lying mostly on our side of the Line should be equally divided. Their proposal called for a moratorium on activities by both sides in the blue zone (the red zone being non-negotiable) pending agreement.

In April 1984, Interior sold oil and gas leases to U.S. companies in the Navarin Basin, east of the Soviet version of the Line. Bids for tracts in the disputed area were put in escrow. Companies have just begun to drill.

In late spring and early summer the Soviets initiated several incidents to assert their claims and demonstrate their ability to disrupt U.S. economic activity. These included the seizure of a fishing boat in disputed waters and the buzzing of drilling rigs which are clearly in the U.S. EEZ. These incidents ceased following our repeated protests and our agreement, in principle, to another round of boundary discussions. We expect these talks will take place in Washington this fall but have not yet proposed a date.

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NLS F00-008/1 #102

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NARA, DATE

2/12/02

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9/16/85

Bilateral Issues

Space Cooperation

The US-Soviet space cooperation agreement, signed in 1972 by President Nixon and Chairman Kosygin, was allowed to lapse in 1982 in response to imposition of martial law in Poland. Since then, limited ad hoc space cooperation with the Soviets has continued in non-sensitive fields, mainly bio-medicine.

In Helsinki in July, Secretary Shultz passed a nonpaper to Shevardnadze proposing the US and the USSR enter into discussions to improve US-Soviet cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space. Specific areas of cooperation we suggested were earth sciences, life sciences, planetary exploration, manned space flight, and astrophysics.

The July 17 tenth anniversary commemoration of the Apollo-Soyuz space link-up provided many spokesmen the occasion to call for renewed US-Soviet space cooperation. Congressman Bill Nelson held Space Subcommittee hearings on this subject in late July and he is planning an October trip to Moscow.

The Soviets have yet to respond to our proposal. A number of Soviet space scientists and leaders have expressed enthusiasm for bilateral cooperation to their US counterparts, but have also indicated projects must await a political decision.

A top Soviet space scientist recently indicated to a US counterpart that bilateral space cooperation will likely have to await the outcome of Geneva discussions. While not directly linking bilateral space cooperation to progress on SDI and ASAT, he hinted that a Soviet response to our proposal would likely come after these issues were discussed at Geneva.

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BY CAV, NARA, DATE 2/12/02

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

9/16/85

Bilateral Issues

Moscow Spy Dust

In mid-August, [REDACTED] stepped-up Soviet use of the chemical tracking agent NPPD in Moscow beginning this spring; sporadic use of NPPD dates back to mid-seventies. NPPD is applied usually to cars or household items of Embassy personnel. It leaves deposits on the person or possessions of people contacted and is used to keep track of US diplomats and possibly Soviet citizens. B1

In standard screening tests NPPD is shown to be a mutagen; mutagens can be, but are not always carcinogens. There is no evidence that Embassy staff have been harmed by exposure. A study team (with representatives from NIH, EPA and the Center for Disease Control) was sent to Moscow to test for the presence of NPPD in residences and vehicles of the American community in Moscow and the Consulate General in Leningrad. The purpose is to determine the extent to which NPPD has been used, who is likely to have been exposed and in what concentrations. The NIH has already begun a number of laboratory tests on possible medical effects of NPPD, including tests on skin absorption (most likely source of penetration). Some results may be available in October; other results will take longer. We briefed our allies but we don't know whether NPPD or other chemicals were used against them.

In demarches in Moscow and Washington, we made it very clear to the Soviets that we regard their use of chemical tracking agents to be completely unacceptable and demanded that it be terminated. The Soviets have rejected the charge as a "fabrication" and claim it could "poison" the atmosphere for U.S.-Soviet relations. We have said we will be monitoring the situation in the USSR carefully to determine whether the Soviets have stopped using these chemicals.

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GS F-00-008/1 #104
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9/16/85

Bilateral Issues

Travel Controls Applied to Soviet Employees of UN Secretariat

The Administration decided in the spring to impose restrictions on Soviet and other (Afghan, Cuban, Libyan, Iranian, and Vietnamese) hostile-country nationals employed in the UN. The Roth amendment was passed in August 1985, mandating similar restrictions. This amendment was the result of concern in Congress and the Executive branch about clandestine activities of these nationals in New York. While unofficial travel must receive prior approval, only advance notification is required for official travel.

The Soviet Embassy DCM made a mild protest last week, essentially accusing the USG of violating its obligations under the UN Headquarters Agreement, and under international law. We replied that these measures are a reasonable step that was necessary to ensure our national security, and do not violate our obligation not to impede the official business of the United Nations. These requirements are not directed in a discriminatory fashion against Soviet nationals alone.

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DECL: OADR

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NLS FOO-008/1 #106

BY CAJ, NARA, DATE 2/10/02

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9/16/85

Bilateral Issues

Visits and Contacts

During the past year there has been a significant upswing in high level contact with the Soviets through increased Congressional exchanges and Cabinet level visits.

Secretary of Commerce Baldrige went to Moscow in May for the first meeting of the US-USSR joint commercial commission since 1978 and also was received by Gorbachev. Agriculture Secretary Block visited Moscow, Kiev and Leningrad in late August and received a Soviet commitment to honor fully wheat purchase obligations under our long-term grains agreement.

Earlier this month, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Samuel Pierce led a team of US housing and construction leaders to the Soviet Union to revitalize the bilateral cooperative Agreement on Housing and explore possibilities for increased trade in construction and housing industry.

In November, EPA Administrator Thomas will take a delegation to the Soviet Union seeking to update the US-Soviet bilateral agreement on Protection of the Environment. Completed projects will be evaluated, and new projects approved. This agreement covers such areas as earthquake prediction, air pollution, and endangered species.

Speaker Tip O'Neill led a Congressional visit to the Soviet Union in March and was received by General Secretary Gorbachev. The O'Neill visit reciprocated the Supreme Soviet visit of Politburo Member Vladimir Shcherbitskiy to Washington earlier that month. This past summer several Congressional delegations led by Senators Bingaman, Simon, and Bradley and House Members De la Garza, Solzarz, Savage, and Mikulski visited the Soviet Union. Earlier this month a large Senate delegation headed by Minority leader Byrd was received in Moscow by Gorbachev. Congressmen Pepper, Udall, Nelson, Markey and McCurdy are planning visits this fall. A second Supreme Soviet delegation led by Lev Tolkunov just concluded meetings in Washington with Speaker O'Neill. O'Neill and Tolkunov agreed in principle to upgrade Congressional exchanges, but O'Neill is likely to move slowly on implementation because of dissatisfaction with Soviet human rights performance.

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2/12/02

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THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 29 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

Pre-Brief for the President's Meeting with Soviet Foreign
Minister Eduard Shevardnadze

Secretary Shultz
Mr. McFarlane
Ambassador Nitze
Ambassador Ridgway
Ambassador Hartman
Ambassador Matlock

The President's Meeting with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
10:00 AM - 12:15 PM

US Participants

Secretary Shultz
Mr. McFarlane
Ambassador Nitze
Ambassador Ridgway
Ambassador Hartman
Ambassador Matlock
Dimitri Zarechnak, Interpreter

Soviet Participants

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Korniyenko
Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin
Special Advisor Sergei Tarasenko (notetaker)
Mr. Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

The President's Luncheon For Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

US Participants

The Vice President
Secretary Shultz
Secretary Baker
Secretary Weinberger
Mr. Regan
Mr. McFarlane
Ambassador Nitze
Ambassador Ridgway
Ambassador Hartman
Ambassador Matlock
PM Director Holmes
Mr. Zarechnak, Interpreter

Soviet Participants

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
Deputy FM Korniyenko
Ambassador Dobrynin
Mr. Tarasenko
Mr. Sukhodrev
Mr. A. S. Chernyshev, Chief of Staff to the Foreign Minister
Minister-Counselor Oleg Sokolov
Minister-Counselor Viktor Isakov
Press Spokesman Vladimir Lomeyko

SECRET/SENSITIVE

9/16/85

Notional Press Statement

Today, September 27, 1985 President Reagan met for two hours with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in the Oval Office. Also present were Secretary of State George Shultz, National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane, Ambassador Nitze, Ambassador Ridgway, Ambassador Hartman and Ambassador Matlock. Attending on the Soviet side were First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Georgiy Korniyenko, Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin and Special Advisor Sergei Tarasenko. Following the talks, the President hosted a lunch in honor of Foreign Minister Shevardnadze.

The discussions covered the full range of items on the U.S.-Soviet agenda. They were held in a serious, frank and constructive atmosphere. Both sides expressed their views, noting areas of agreement and disagreement. They acknowledged areas where the two countries could make progress now and in the meeting between the countries' leaders, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, in Geneva this November.

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines July 21, 2007

REGAN-MCFARLANE BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

- I SCOPE PAPER..... (COBB/PURNELL)
- II GENEVA AGENDA..... (PALMER/MILLER)
- III ACTIVITIES OF THE PRESIDENT AND
KEY POLICY ADVISERS..... (DOANE)
- IV PUBLIC DIPLOMACY..... (KORENGOLD/COBB)
- V ALLIED CONSULTATION PLAN..... (PARRIS)
- VI CONGRESSIONAL PLAN..... (SACHS/DOANE)
- VII PREPARATIONS/TASKINGS..... (PURNELL/MILLER)
- VIII CALENDAR..... (DOANE)


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Jack,

This has been a hell of a week. Primary concern right now is the NSC meeting tomorrow on "Shevardnadze". Below is the agenda/participants notification package that has undergone at least three modifications. The anodyne version you see here represents the lowest common denominator of agreement that could be reached regarding the purpose of the meeting. Also attached is a rough draft of the NSC paper to Bud and the McFarlane-Pres.

The primary problem is that nobody seems to know why we are having this meeting. Hence, numerous revisions of these packages. Originally, Weinberger asked for 20 minutes to discuss SDI; he, Casey and Keyworth had planned to make this the showdown session on arms control in general and SDI in particular. Bud reacted strongly against. Decided at first to make it more of a broad strategic overview session in which the President could talk broad philosophical principles on our policy toward the USSR. Then it was changed to a discussion of the other three issue areas, with no arms control to be discussed. I think that's where we are now, but you need to look at these papers on an urgent basis to determine what you want to be the focus of this meeting.

Then we can prepare Bud's talking points.



Following is the list of participants for Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's Official Working visit on September 27, 1985.

9:00 - 10:00 Oval Office
Pre-Brief for the President's Meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze

via Pan Buch

Secretary Shultz

Mr. McFarlane

Ambassador Nitze

Ambassador Ridgway

Ambassador Hartman

Ambassador Matlock

The President's Meeting with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

10:00 AM - 12:00 - ~~Cabinet Room~~ Oval Office/Cabinet

US Participants

via Pan

Secretary Shultz

Mr. McFarlane

Ambassador Nitze

Ambassador Ridgway

Ambassador Hartman

Ambassador Matlock

Dimitri Zarechnak, Interpreter and notetaker

Soviet Participants

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Korniyenko

Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin

Special Advisor Sergei Tarasenko (notetaker)

Mr. Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

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Mr. McFarlane
Ambassador Nitze
Ambassador Ridgway
Ambassador Hartman
Ambassador Matlock

The President's Meeting with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
10:00 AM - 12:15 - Cabinet Room

US Participants

Secretary Shultz
Mr. McFarlane
Ambassador Nitze
Ambassador Ridgway
Ambassador Hartman
Ambassador Matlock
Dimitri Zarechnak, Interpreter and notetaker

Soviet Participants

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Korniyenko
Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin
Special Advisor Sergei Tarasenko (notetaker)
Mr. Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

The President's Luncheon for Foreign Minister ShevardnadzeUS Participants

The Vice President
Secretary Shultz
Secretary Baker
Secretary Weinberger
Mr. Regan
Mr. McFarlane
Ambassador Nitze
Ambassador Ridgway
Ambassador Hartman
Ambassador Matlock
PM Director Holmes
Mr. Zarechnak, Interpreter and notetaker

Soviet Participants

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
Deputy FM Korniyenko
Ambassador Dobrynin
Mr. Tarasenko (notetaker)
Mr. Sukhodrev
Mr. A.S. Chernyshev, Chief of Staff to the Foreign Minister
Minister-Counselor Oleg Sokolov
Minister-Counselor Viktor Isakov
Press Spokesman Vladimir Lomeyko

54-
24 people
in State House

The President's Luncheon for Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

US Participants

The Vice President
Secretary Shultz
Secretary Baker
Secretary Weinberger
Mr. Regan
Mr. McFarlane
Ambassador Nitze
Ambassador Ridgway
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Mr. A.S. Chernyshev, Chief of Staff to the Foreign Minister
Minister-Counselor Oleg Sokolov
Minister-Counselor Viktor Isakov
Press Spokesman Vladimir Lomeyko

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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ACTION

September 18, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN

FROM: TYRUS W. COBB *WCC*

SUBJECT: Agenda for NSC Meeting on September 20, 1985

Attached at Tab I is a memo from you to pertinent agencies, forwarding an agenda for the NSC meeting on Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's upcoming visit. The meeting is scheduled for Friday, September 20, at 11 a.m., in the Cabinet Room.

Other Jack Matlock, Ron Lehman, Bob *not available* Inghard and Jonathan Miller concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Agenda

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

del 12/26/00

UNCLASSIFIED WITH
CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

MR. DONALD GREGG
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

MR. STEPHEN GALEBACH
Senior Special Assistant
to the Attorney General
Department of Justice

MR. NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. ALTON KEEL
Associate Director for
National Security and
International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MS. SHERRIE COOKSEY
Executive Secretary
Department of Treasury

MR. JOHN H. RIXSE
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COLONEL DAVID R. BROWN
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

BRIGADIER GENERAL GEORGE JOULAN
Executive Assistant to the
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: National Security Council Meeting -- Shevardnadze Visit (2)

There will be a National Security Council meeting in the Cabinet Room on Friday, September 20, at 11 a.m., on the visit of Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. Attached is an agenda for the meeting. (C)

The focus of this meeting will be on bilateral issues, regional concerns, and human rights. Arms control issues will be examined in-depth at a future NSC meeting. (C)

William F. Martin
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
Tab A Agenda

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

Friday, September 20, 1985
11:00 a.m. - 12:00 Noon
Cabinet Room

AGENDA

- I. Introduction.....Robert C. McFarlane
(5 minutes)
- II. Objectives for Geneva Meetings
& perspectives of the
Shevardnadze Meeting Secretary Shultz
(10 minutes) -
- III. Intelligence review on Soviet
expectations..... William P. Casey
(5 minutes)
- IV. Defense perspective..... Secretary Weinberger
(5 minutes)
- V. Discussion.....All Participants
(30 minutes) -
- VI. Conclusion.....Robert C. McFarlane
(5 minutes)

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