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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: MATLOCK, JACK: Files

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Date: 1/4/01

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Skinner/F00-008/1

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Paper	Outline for President's September 27 Meeting with Shevardnadze, 3 p.	n.d.	B1
2. Talking Pts	R 2/13/02 F00-008/1 #117 I. Arms Control - General, 10 p.	n.d.	B1
3. Memo	Matlock to Robert McFarlane, re: President's Briefing Material for Meeting with Soviet Minister Eduard Shevardnadze -- Friday, September 27..., 1 p.	n.d.	B1
4. Brfg Memo	McFarlane to [Reagan], re: Meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, 4 p.	n.d.	B1
5. Memo	George Shultz to Reagan, re: Your September 27 Meetin with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, 4 p.	9/21/85	B1
6. Talking Pts	President's Talking Points for Shevardnadze, 7 p.	n.d.	B1
7. Talking Pts	R Contingency Arms Control Talking Points, 8 p.	n.d.	B1
8. Talking Pts	L Specific Regional Issues, 2 p.	n.d.	B1
9. Talking Pts	L Private Meeting with Shevardnadze: Suggested Talking Points, 1 p.	n.d.	B1
10. Bio	D 4/20/06 1 p.	n.d.	B1, B3

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].

B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].

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B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

SMF 7/13/2007

File Folder REAGAN-SHEVARDNADZE MEETING- 9/27/85 (6)

FOIA

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KALINOVSKY

1

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
38469	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO REAGAN RE MEETING WITH SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE <i>R 9/15/2011 F2007-127/1</i>	4	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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MATLOCK

System II

90987 File

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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ACTION

September 22, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM:

Ron RON LEHMAN / *Bill* BILL WRIGHT

SUBJECT:

Arms Control Talking Points for President's
Meeting with Shevardnadze

A copy of Secretary Shultz's draft talking points for his 25 September meeting with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze was received Saturday. In a separate package (System II 90940 add-on), we have prepared a transmittal letter for you to SACG Principals.

Based on the outline provided by Allen Holmes at Friday's SACG (Tab A), and comments provided at that meeting, NSC staff has prepared a draft of the arms control portion for the President's meeting with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze (Tab B). These were worked this weekend without reference to a similar set which may have been submitted directly from Secretary Shultz to the President for his meeting.

Recommendation

That you approve the distribution at Tuesday's SACG of the President's Talking Points at Tab B.

Agree _____

Disagree _____

Concurrence: *Bob* Bob Linhard, *SK* Sven Kraemer, and *Not Avail* Jack Matlock.

Attachments

Tab A Outline for President's Meeting - Holmes
Tab B Draft Presidential Talking Points (NSC Staff)

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Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By *dl* NARA, Date *1/4/01*

~~SECRET~~



United States Department of State

Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs

Washington, D.C. 20520


September 19, 1985

SECRET/NOFORN

Memorandum To: The Senior Arms Control Group

Subject: Outline for President's Meeting
with Shevardnadze

As requested at the SACG meeting September 13, attached is a revised outline for the President's September 27 meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. This draft reflects agency comments received to date. In addition, a CIA recommended section on verification will be circulated separately.


John H. Hawes, Acting

Distribution:

NSC - Mr Robert C. McFarlane
- Col. Robert Linhard
- Mr. Sven Kraemer
OSD - Dr. Fred Ikle
- Mr. Richard Perle
JCS - VADM Arthur Moreau
CIA - Mr. Douglas George
ACDA - Mr. Kenneth Adelman
State - EUR - Amb. Rozanne Ridgway
- S/ARN - Amb. Paul Nitze
- S/ART - Amb. Edward Rowny

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By dlh NARA, Date 1/11/01

SECRET/NOFORN

DECL: OADR

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

Outline for President's
September 27 Meeting With Shevardnadze

Bill
I. Purpose of arms control portion of the meeting should be to reiterate the President's commitment to reaching meaningful arms control agreements, reinforce the importance of compliance with current agreements, and emphasize that we will not accept Soviet preconditions on SDI or INF.

Sven
II. President begins by summarizing US objectives in MBFR, CW, CDE, nuclear testing, and CD. *2*

III. President then makes more extensive remarks on three Geneva NST fora. He expresses disappointment that the Geneva talks are not progressing because of unwillingness of Soviet side to engage in detailed give-and-take at the table:

- Soviet refusal to discuss specifics at Geneva prevents us from evaluating Soviet ideas. Simple reassertion of unacceptable positions can't lead to progress.
- Insisting on preconditions and linkages blocks the search for solutions. It was agreed in January to consider and resolve nuclear and space arms in their interrelationship. This does not mean that progress on offensive arms reductions should be hostage to acceptance of Soviet position on "space-strike" arms.
- Public posturing by playing to media and interest groups is not helpful. Only serious proposals tabled in Geneva -- rather than one-sided calls for moratoria and bans -- will lead to progress.

IV. US seriously concerned about pattern of Soviet violations of arms control agreements such as construction of Krasnoyarsk radar.

Sven

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NLS FOU-0081 #117

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DECL: OADR

BY GAS NARA, DATE 2/13/02

- The United States believes strict compliance with all provisions of negotiated arms control agreements is essential to the integrity and viability of arms control as an instrument to assist in ensuring a secure and stable future world.
- In the interest of ensuring that every opportunity is explored to put the arms reduction process on a firm and lasting foundation, US is prepared to go the extra mile in seeking to build an interim framework of truly mutual restraint.
- We cannot impose upon ourselves a double standard that amounts to unilateral treaty compliance, however. It will require the Soviet Union to take positive steps to resolve our compliance concerns.
- Through joint efforts we have an opportunity to make progress toward concluding agreements involving real reductions in the size of existing nuclear arsenals and toward building a more secure and stable future.

V. US proposals are designed to facilitate progress toward goals we agreed to in January.

- In START, end result must be deep cuts in numbers and destructive power of ballistic missile warheads. We are flexible on means.
- In INF, US favors greatest possible reductions in LRINF missiles - the category of INF weaponry both sides regard as most threatening.
- In Defense and Space, US has proposed discussions on the overall offense-defense relationship, particularly on how both sides could jointly manage a transition to greater reliance on defensive forces, if either side's research should indicate that strategic defense is viable.
- I have directed that the US SDI research program be consistent with all US Treaty obligations, including those contained in the ABM Treaty.

VI. US proposals are equitable and our negotiators have been given great flexibility in meeting Soviet concerns.

- Roy/pis*
- The place to do business on these issues is Geneva, where both sides have able negotiators. If the Soviets have serious proposals, they should be tabled there. Preconditions only impede progress in the negotiations and should be dropped.
 - Comparable Soviet flexibility must be shown if agreements are to be reached. We urge that Soviet negotiators be given a mandate to bargain constructively now in Round III.
 - Any agreement must address key issue of strengthening strategic stability.
 - Might be useful to reconsider confidence building measures as an area where the two sides could reach early agreement.

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SYSTEM II
90959

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEETING WITH SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE

DATE: Friday, September 27, 1985

LOCATION: Oval Office

TIME: 9:00-10:00 a.m. - Prebrief (Oval Office)
10:00-10:05 a.m. - Photo Opportunity
(Oval Office)

10:05-12:00 a.m. - Meeting (Oval Office)

12:15-1:30 p.m. - Luncheon (State Dining
Room)

1:30 p.m. - Departure - C-9

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

I. PURPOSE

In preparation for your Geneva meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev in November.

II. BACKGROUND

Although Shevardnadze will probably unveil a Soviet arms control proposal during your meeting, which will require appropriate reaction, the larger purpose of your meeting will be to give Shevardnadze -- and through him Gorbachev -- a sense of the attitude which you will take into your November meeting. By this, I mean that it will be important to convey both in words and demeanor your firmness in defending American interests, but at the same time your willingness to approach practical problems in a constructive spirit if Gorbachev displays the same attitude.

You should also use the meeting to indicate to Shevardnadze that we will not accept a Geneva meeting which deals exclusively with arms control, important as that topic is for the relationship. The Soviet penchant for using military muscle to extend Soviet influence abroad lies at the root of many of our problems and this point must come through loud and clear. Compliance with past agreements and the need for developing better communications and more confidence in our ability to deal constructively with each other is also crucial to solving problems in the relationship, and must receive appropriate stress.

In order to make sure that you convey clearly a sense of our agenda, I would suggest that, after greeting Shevardnadze, you review the major points on our agenda, before you turn the floor over to him. This should not be regarded as impolite: it is precisely the procedure used by Gorbachev when Mac Baldrige

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NLRR F07-127#38469

BY RW NARA DATE 9/15/11

called on him in May, when Gorbachev treated him to a 60-minute lecture before allowing him to respond. Suggested talking points for your initial presentation are at Tab B. These talking points, taken together, also lay the groundwork for some further initiatives on our part, without, however, tipping our hand regarding the particulars.

After you have made your initial presentation, you might invite his comment, during which he will presumably present the Soviet proposal on nuclear and space weapons. After your discussion of this, I would suggest that you return to some of the specific regional issues which are covered under Tab C. The points on Afghanistan are the most important of these; if time runs short, the others could be mentioned at lunch.

About 12:00, you might suggest that the group adjourn for lunch, asking Shevardnadze to remain with you (with his interpreter) for a brief private chat. At that point you could go over the talking points which comprise a personal message to Gorbachev: your desire to make progress at your November meeting, the need for better communication, and the importance of human rights. We recommend that you do this in private to test whether Gorbachev will respond on the issue if you omit it from the formal record; the point to be made is that progress in this area is essential, but if it will help to keep the topic out of the official transcript, you will cooperate.

Personally, Shevardnadze is more businesslike and more affable than Gromyko. You should not hesitate to go right to the point and to make your views clear. He will probably not be interested in discussing ideological questions and is unlikely to find them persuasive, so that it will probably be best to center the conversation on practical, concrete issues.

III. PARTICIPANTS

9:00 a.m. - 10:00 a.m. -- Pre-Brief: Oval Office

The President
Vice President Bush
Secretary Shultz
Donald T. Regan
Robert C. McFarlane
Ambassador Nitze
Ambassador Ridgway
Ambassador Hartman
Ambassador Matlock

10:00 a.m. - 12:00 -- Meeting: Oval Office

U.S.

The President
Vice President Bush
Secretary Shultz
Donald T. Regan
Robert C. McFarlane
Ambassador Hartman
Ambassador Matlock
Dimitri Zarechnak, Interpreter

Soviet Participants

Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze
Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Korniyenko
Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin
Ambassador and Asst. to the Foreign Minister A.S. Chernyshov
Minister-Counselor O.M. Sokolov
P.R. Palazhchenko (interpreter)

12:15 p.m. - 1:30 p.m. - Luncheon: State Dining Room

U.S.

The President
The Vice President
Secretary Shultz
Secretary Baker
Secretary Weinberger
Donald T. Regan
Robert C. McFarlane
Ambassador Nitze
Ambassador Ridgway
Ambassador Hartman
Ambassador Matlock
PM Director Holmes
Eugenia Arensburger (Interpreter)

Soviet

Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze
Deputy FM Korniyenko
Ambassador Dobrynin
Ambassador and Asst. to the FM A.S. Chernyshov
Minister-Counselor Oleg Sokolov
Minister-Counselor Viktor Isakov
Mr. P.R. Palazhchenko (Interpreter)

IV. PRESS PLAN

Photo opportunity in the Oval Office prior to the meeting, and also perhaps on the Colonnade enroute from the Oval Office.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

9:00 - 10:00 a.m. Pre-Brief - The Oval Office
10:00 - 10:05 a.m. Photo Opportunity (Oval Office)
10:05 - 12:00 noon Meeting - The Oval Office
12:00 - 1:30 p.m. Luncheon - The State Dining Room
1:30 p.m. Departure - C-9

Attachment:

Tab A Memorandum from Secretary of State Shultz
Tab B Talking Points for Initial Presentation
Tab C Contingency Talking Points
Tab D Talking Points for Private Meeting
Tab E Shevardnadze Biography
Tab F Presidential Toast for Lunch
Tab G Notional Press Announcement

Prepared by:
Jack Matlock

cc: Vice President

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

September 21, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: George P. Shultz *GPS*
SUBJECT: Your September 27 Meeting with Soviet
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

This memorandum provides some thoughts on how we can best exploit your meeting with Shevardnadze, along with my separate sessions September 25 and 27, with a view toward your Geneva meeting.

The Soviet Approach

The Soviet game plan is becoming increasingly clear. They are seeking to create the impression that they have left no stone unturned to achieve an arms control breakthrough in Geneva. Dobrynin confirmed to me September 16 that Shevardnadze will present concrete proposals to you next week on the nuclear and space talks. Our guess is that they will be an elaboration of Gorbachev's recent expressions of willingness to accept deep cuts in exchange for constraints on strategic defense beyond the "fundamental research" stage. Shevardnadze will presumably also be pushing previous Soviet initiatives (Gorbachev's July nuclear testing moratorium, the non-militarization of space proposal Shevardnadze will present to the UNGA, perhaps a new twist on the Soviet chemical weapon-free zone in Central Europe concept), while seeking to capitalize on our ASAT test.

Our Objectives

Our task will be three-fold. We will want to:

- Probe to determine the seriousness of any new Soviet proposals;
- Give Shevardnadze as much information as possible and appropriate to set the stage for a productive November meeting and progress at the Geneva talks;
- Lay the basis for further steps in our regional dialogue and on the range of bilateral and human rights issues.

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DECL: OADR

BY *CAJ* NARA, DATE *2/13/02*
FOUO 0081, 12/1

Your Meeting, Friday, September 27

Given the constraints on your time, you might most usefully concentrate on laying the groundwork for an in-depth exchange with Gorbachev on the most pressing issues in the relationship. I recommend that you:

-- Respond to Shevardnadze's proposals with a strong statement of your own commitment to meaningful arms control, explaining to Shevardnadze your views on the need for deep reductions and the potential promise of SDI research. (As Shevardnadze will not be accompanied by his own arms control specialists, he will not expect a detailed reply to his message, which I hope he will preview with me in New York).

-- Outline your plans for a wide-ranging discussion of perceived intentions and motivations. (You might suggest to Shevardnadze that you and Gorbachev be prepared to describe your respective domestic agendas as a means of getting beyond stereotypes to the roots of policy).

-- Express your concerns about Soviet regional policies, focusing on Afghanistan, where we have recently seen some hints of a greater Soviet willingness to consider a negotiated withdrawal.

-- Reemphasize to Shevardnadze the importance you attach to movement on human rights and emigration (perhaps in your tete-a-tete at the conclusion of the meeting).

As with Gromyko last year, lunch could be given over to an elaboration of views on regional issues, providing an opportunity to rehearse points you will later make to Gorbachev on the impact of Soviet international behavior on our perceptions. You could also use the occasion to get some sense from Shevardnadze of current political dynamics in the Kremlin.

My Meetings: Wednesday and Friday afternoon, September 25 and 27

Dobrynin has indicated I may get a first look at Shevardnadze's arms control message during our initial session Wednesday. While I will press him to be as specific as possible, we may not have a complete picture of what Moscow has to offer until your meeting. I will also put some ideas of our own on the table.

-- On the Geneva talks, I will try to engage Shevardnadze in a comprehensive discussion of the offense/defense relationship. This will serve the purpose of smoking out details of his private message and giving him some direct exposure to our thinking on the subject.

-- On nuclear testing, I will stress the importance we attach to verification, reaffirming our willingness to ratify the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaties if the Soviets will cooperate in satisfying our concerns. I will propose that special representatives from both sides explore this possibility this fall.

-- On ASAT, we are not in a position to take the initiative, but I will need to address any proposals Shevardnadze may make.

-- On chemical weapons, we are working interagency a proposal that we exchange lists of CW precursors as a first step toward collaboration in preventing the spread of CW possession and use; and

-- On nuclear nonproliferation, I will confirm our willingness to make a joint statement on cooperation at your Geneva meeting.

As arms control issues will dominate the New York session, regional and bilateral matters will probably slip to my Friday afternoon meeting. I will follow up in greater detail on regional points you make and formally propose that we regularize the expert-level talks we have had over the past year on the Middle East, Afghanistan, Southern Africa and Asia. (We are proposing Central American/Caribbean talks be held in October.)

I will raise human rights and emigration initially in a brief tete-a-tete on the margins of our New York meeting, broaching an idea discussed with Mac Baldrige: that concrete steps by the Soviets to meet our concerns might be met with some liberalization of our non-strategic trade controls. I will return to human rights and emigration in my final session, reinforcing the points you would make in your meeting, and presenting an up-dated list of cases in which we are interested.

There is a good chance that at some point in our meetings Shevardnadze will raise two additional issues: whether there should be a formal communiqué in Geneva and whether there should be follow-up meetings between you and Gorbachev. I will inform him that we remain open as to how the meeting should be documented, and that our final decision will depend on what substantive results can be expected. On follow-up meetings, I will indicate that we are willing in principle, but feel that future meetings should be in capitals. I will reiterate our view that it is the Soviets' turn to come to Washington.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

-4-

Media Arrangements

As with Gromyko last year, I will plan to make two statements in connection with Shevardnadze's visit: the first, a short, informal comment following our New York meeting; the second, a longer review of where we stand following your meeting and lunch. We plan backgrounders by Roz Ridgway, Jack Matlock and Art Hartman after both my exchanges with Shevardnadze to shape public perceptions of the visit and of its implications for the Geneva meeting. You might want to consider a radio address focusing on US - Soviet relations, perhaps the following Saturday. We will also plan to do the usual talk shows after the meetings are over.

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~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

PRESIDENT'S TALKING POINTS FOR SHEVARDNADZE

INTRODUCTION

- In preparing for this meeting, I had a chance to look at how the U.S. and I personally are routinely portrayed in the Soviet press. As you know, the picture is less than flattering.
- I raise this not to make you uncomfortable, but to make a point. This meeting, and the meeting I will have with Mr. Gorbachev in November, are unique opportunities.
- I want you to begin to get a true picture of who Ronald Reagan is, what he stands for, what he wants to accomplish.
- I would like to get the same from you and Mr. Gorbachev.
- I want, in a word, for us to get beyond stereotypes; to talk frankly about our differences; to explore constructively what we can achieve together between now and November 19 -- and after the Geneva meeting as well.
- When I met last year with Mr. Gromyko, I discussed in some detail my view of the world, and of our two countries' place in it. I know you will have read the records of that conversation, so I will not repeat myself.
- I do want to emphasize something I said then, however:
 - I know that our philosophies and political systems are very different and will remain so. But we live in one world and must handle our competition in peace.
 - Neither of us will ever allow the other a military edge. But if we are ever going to clear the air, reduce suspicions, and reduce nuclear arms, there will never be a better time.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

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NLS F00-008/1 #122

BY Chr NARA, DATE 2/13/02

PERCEPTIONS OF SOVIET INTENTIONS

- As I said, I hope to have a wide-ranging and frank conversation with Mr. Gorbachev when we meet in November.
- There will be a number of points I intend to raise with him.
 - I want to explore with him why the Soviet Union should feel threatened by us, when we have never started a war, never will, and indeed sought to use our preponderant strength at the end of World War II for peaceful purposes.
 - I want to explain to him how your military build-up, your self-proclaimed dedication to revolution and our destruction, and your attempts to expand your influence throughout the world at our expense is threatening to us.
 - I hope that this will give you some understanding of why we are rebuilding our own strength and about some of the things I have said about relations between our two countries. I hope that this can clear the air between us and begin the process of reducing suspicions.
- But I hope we can go beyond a discussion of our rivalry and the reasons for it to a better understanding of our motivations.
- One way to do this might be for Mr. Gorbachev and myself to share with one another some sense of our domestic priorities and concerns.
- In our country, we have made great progress in the last several years in getting our economy back on track. We have created millions of new jobs; new technologies we are pioneering are opening up new possibilities throughout the economy; we are seeking ways to redistribute the burden of taxation in our country to improve the quality of life of all Americans. But we also have problems: we need to do more to reduce our budget deficit, for example.
- I know interesting changes are occurring in your country as well. We have watched with interest the steps taken by Mr. Gorbachev since he became General Secretary. We would be interested in hearing from him -- and from you if time permits -- what you hope to accomplish in the months between now and the February Party Congress and in the years ahead.
- I believe that such a discussion could go far toward getting behind the stereotypes which inevitably develop in a relationship such as ours. Do you think Mr. Gorbachev would agree?

REGIONAL ISSUES

- While public attention has often focused on the arms control element of our relationship, regional questions have frequently been the cause of the most serious strains between us.
- Efforts during the seventies to develop understandings on permissible actions in third areas came apart primarily, in our view, because of the Soviet Union's unwillingness to foreswear pursuit of unilateral advantage.
- The result has been that we have had to look to our own strength and to closer cooperation with our Allies and friends to defend our interests. We will continue to pursue such a policy for as long as is necessary -- whether in Central America, the Middle East, southern Africa or elsewhere.
- Nor will we foreswear the right to lend assistance to democratic elements when they appeal to us to resist aggression.
- In addition to teaching us that we have to defend our interests, however, the seventies also taught us the importance of understanding clearly the regional motivations and interests of the other side.
- We have thus sought to expand our dialogue with the Soviet Union on regional issues over the years. This year, as you know, we have had discussions on the Middle East, southern Africa, Afghanistan and Asia. We have proposed talks on Central America and the Caribbean.
- We have found the exchanges useful and worth continuing. And we will have a formal proposal to make on regularizing these types of discussions.
- We must go further, however, in dealing with the problems caused by outside military involvement in regional disputes.
- Frankly, as we see it, the Soviet Union has used its military strength to extend its influence in coercive ways.
- When this happens, we have no choice but to react. And that creates a potentially dangerous situation.
- We need to give greater thought -- creative thought -- to how we can remove the military element from our rivalry.
- I'll welcome your thoughts on this.
- There is a lot we might say about particular issues, but I'll defer that until later, in order to present some thoughts on arms control.

ARMS CONTROL - GENERAL

- Your comments on arms control have been most interesting and without reflecting on the specifics here at the table I will take some time to provide my own views on the situation that we face today.
- Arms control is only one of the important areas which I will be discussing with General Secretary Gorbachev and it is one of the most difficult. Today, as we prepare for that November meeting, we do not know if your government is serious about making progress in arms control. We are prepared to make progress; we are prepared to keep our objectives high. But we are also realistic; there is much work to be done.
- Our two governments have underway a number of formal negotiations including the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva. In addition, the U. S. has proposed that our representatives get together soon on a number of other specific issues. I believe that what is actually achieved at these negotiations and discussions should be the basis for what General Secretary Gorbachev and I can accomplish in this area in November.
- As a first priority, the United States seeks stabilizing and radical reductions in the levels and power of offensive nuclear arms. These are the weapons that most threaten mankind. This goal should be paramount to both of us.
- We must also consider the relationship between offensive and defensive nuclear arms, whether on earth or in space. Your country has long had a massive strategic defense program, including deployment of an ABM system around Moscow. We are also seeing your new radar at Krasnoyarsk and the upgrading of your strategic air defenses.
- We are now conducting a vigorous research effort in the area of strategic defense technologies. I have made no commitment to deploy, but we are morally bound to seeing whether or not strategic defenses can offer a better, safer way of maintaining the peace than is possible by the accumulation of great inventories of offensive nuclear arms.
- I have directed that our strategic defense research be conducted within the bounds of the ABM Treaty.

- Now is the time to take a bold step by agreeing to deep cuts in nuclear forces in a manner which enhances stability and now is the time to establish a serious dialogue on the offense/defense relationship.
- If we are successful then we can look forward to a period of transition to a more stable world, with greatly reduced levels of nuclear arms and an enhanced ability to deter war, perhaps based on an increasing contribution of non-nuclear defenses against nuclear offensive arms.
- This period of transition could lead to the eventual elimination of all nuclear arms, both offensive and defensive. A world free of nuclear arms is an ultimate objective to which we believe the U. S., the Soviet Union and all other nations can agree.
- Mr. Minister, I would like to underscore, in strongest personal terms, my commitment and that of my Administration to the pursuit of arms control agreements that will strengthen peace.
- I believe that to give concrete meaning to the strengthening of peace such agreements must reduce the risks of war by:
 - 1) actually reducing and constraining forces, not just freezing numbers of weapons or offering declaratory statements of intentions;
 - 2) achieving reductions which provide for equal levels in the forces of both sides, not ones which codify imbalances;
 - 3) enhancing stability, not by encouraging those force structures that create instabilities; and,
 - 4) including provisions which ensure effective verification and which encourage compliance.
- Toward this end, our arms control agenda is broad and far reaching. My administration has made an unprecedented series of concrete proposals to reduce the weapons and risks of war and to build a firm peace.
- At this point, it might be useful to raise a new item. We should reconsider confidence building measures as an area where the two sides could reach early agreement.

- In this context, I was interested to hear from Senators Warner and Nunn that General Secretary Gorbachev had indicated to them in September a willingness to look at their concept of risk reduction centers. Although the Senators were presenting their own ideas, there may be some merit in certain aspects of their concept which warrant joint exploration. Similarly, there would appear to be merit in our examining other steps, such as a dialogue at senior levels on our respective defense budgets and plans for reinstituting and expanding military-to-military exchanges, that might help our nations to better understand each other's perspectives on security issues.
- I would like to propose that we ask our experts to meet soon to explore these or other possible approaches that could play a useful role in serving our mutual interests in avoiding accidental war.

BILATERAL ISSUES

- If we are to make real progress in solving the critical problems I have discussed, we are going to have to take some major steps to improve the climate of our bilateral relations.
- We must find a way to live on this planet in peace. Doing that will be much harder if our people don't have more contact and don't have better means to communicate.
- For this reason, I think the bilateral issues we have under negotiation are very important. We have to make sure our negotiators get on with the talks and start producing some results. There has been too much haggling over minor points, and we have to break that pattern.
- But, you know, even though it is important to conclude these matters under discussion, I think it is not nearly as much as we should be doing in this area. The fact is that our societies are dangerously cut off from each other, and we need truly major steps to improve that situation.
- Frankly, I think our bureaucracies have not been imaginative enough in preparing for our meeting in Geneva. I have instructed our people to go back to the drawing boards and to come up with some ideas which are commensurate to the need for better communication and more cooperation.
- I have in mind things like:
 - Giving our students and young people more opportunities to meet and study together;
 - working together in an area like computer education;
 - more contact between our military people;
 - joining efforts to find cures for cancer and other diseases;
 - getting some help from you in improving Russian-language instruction here.
- I have instructed our people to develop some ideas along these lines, and we'll be passing them along in diplomatic channels.
- I hope you will also be thinking of more ambitious ways to expand communication and cooperation between our societies. Tell Mr. Gorbachev that I don't think we should be limited by our cautious bureaucrats. The two of us can lead our countries to some real breakthroughs if we set that as our goal.



~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

CONTINGENCY ARMS CONTROL TALKING POINTS

SECURITY SITUATION

- To aid our discussion of arms control, let me review the military elements of the national security equation. I think this will demonstrate why both sides should favor placing real limits on arms and why now is a good time to start.
- The United States does not seek territorial expansion. The U.S. would not take military action against the Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact unless we or our allies were attacked.
- That said, the United States remains committed to maintaining a strong deterrent against attack by anyone on us or on our allies and vital security interests overseas. The nature of that deterrent is largely determined by the capabilities of our potential adversaries.
- It is difficult for me to understand why the Soviet Union has devoted so much national resource to the massive expansion and modernization of its nuclear and conventional forces, if it has peaceful intentions.
- From that perspective, we worry that at some time the conduct of the Soviet Union or one of its allies could create a risk of war. Indeed, a major crisis could increase incentives to act quickly and decisively with military power. This is an unstable situation and it could become dangerous.
- The U.S. and the Soviet Union must try to address this situation together. I have no doubts that the measures necessary to rectify it will be difficult for both sides. But it is important that we begin now. Arms control can play an important role.

NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

- In some sense the discussions we have had over the years in nuclear non-proliferation could serve as a model for the type of bilateral discussions we would like to see in a number of areas.
- We believe that the usefulness of those consultations should be reflected in a joint statement that could be issued at the November meeting. If you agree then the details of the statement can be worked out in the interim.

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BY Gtv NARA, DATE 2/13/02

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

- At the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, the U.S. has tabled a draft treaty for a comprehensive global ban on chemical weapons. We believe that work on such a treaty must be intensified. We are concerned about the use of such weapons by Soviet and Soviet-allied forces in Afghanistan, Cambodia and Laos, in violation of existing agreements.
- We see a strong requirement for comprehensive verification provisions such as we have proposed to help assure compliance with a future treaty.
- We are also concerned about the proliferation of chemical weapons capability to other nations, especially those in troubled regions. Secretary Shultz has proposed to you that U.S. and Soviet experts meet on this problem early next year.

CDE

- At the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures in Europe, we and our allies have tabled six specific confidence building measures to help reduce the risk of war in Europe. We believe such concrete steps, rather than new declaratory statements about non-use of force, will bring real results.
- As I said in Dublin last year, we are prepared to discuss your non-use-of-force proposal if you are prepared to negotiate the concrete confidence building measures we have proposed. This would be an important step.

MBFR

- In the Vienna negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, the West has made new proposals three times in the past six years (1979, 1982, 1984). Our new proposal in April of last year was designed to help break the long-standing impasse on data and verification issues. We showed important flexibility and are disappointed that the Soviet response of February, 1985 did not show movement at all in our direction.
- Even in this very difficult negotiation, which has gone on for so many years without any agreements, we and our allies are ready if only you are prepared to meet our basic concerns.

NUCLEAR TESTING

- This is an area where I feel our first priority should be to agree on essential verification improvements for the (unratified) Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. I regret that the Soviet Union has been unable to join us in discussions of such improvements.
- As you know, I proposed at the United Nations last Fall that the U.S. and Soviet experts come to each other's test sites to measure the yield of nuclear weapons tests directly. In my recent letter to General Secretary Gorbachev I made this offer unilateral and unconditional.
- I believe that representatives of our two governments should meet soon, possibly even before my November meeting with Secretary Gorbachev to discuss how your experts might come to our nuclear test site and bring equipment necessary to measure the yield of our tests. A positive Soviet response would help build cooperation and confidence in this area.

VERIFICATION

- Indeed, verification and compliance will require our special attention and effort in the future.
- It is important to realize that these are not just technical and legal issues; they have far-reaching political implications and a major effect on our ability to build confidence and reach enduring agreements in the arms control process.
- Arms control accords have to pass severe tests -- in the negotiating process, in the ratification steps, and for the duration of the accords. Verification and compliance will be one of the most critical of the tests, and will play a greater role than in the past.
- I regret to say that over the past several years, we have observed that, while the U.S. has scrupulously observed arms control agreements, an increasing number of questionable Soviet activities that have interfered with and eroded our ability to verify compliance with such agreements.
- Technological developments, as well as Soviet research, development, testing, and deployment programs, have also eroded the arms control verification and compliance framework.

- In addition to their impact on verification, these activities have had a corrosive effect on the confidence that is a necessary ingredient of compliance. These activities must stop if existing arms control accords are to be preserved, and if new arms control arrangements between the U.S. and the USSR are to be created.
- We believe that more intrusive methods are required. This may mean positioning technical devices on the territory of the Soviet Union and the United States. It may also require on site challenge inspections, as in the area of chemical weapons.
- We believe that the U.S. and the USSR will have to explore jointly new methods for enhancing verification of future arms control agreements so that confidence can be restored and security concerns can be satisfied.
- The United States is prepared to work diligently with the Soviet Union to develop such methods as are necessary.

GENEVA - REMOVING OBSTACLES

- Our negotiating teams are meeting in Geneva for the third round of the Nuclear and Space Talks. I have personally been disappointed with the progress to date.
- I want to emphasize to you today that I intend to look at what is achieved in Geneva through the end of this round as the basis for my discussions with the General Secretary and as a gauge for what can be accomplished between our two governments in the area of practical arms control.
- In this regard, I do not believe that propagandistic proposals filled with preconditions show serious intent.
- From the beginning, the U.S. has been committed to a productive negotiating process. We have tabled concrete proposals and I have given our negotiators a high degree of flexibility in meeting your concerns.
- But in order to find points of convergence, on which to build an agreement between the two of us, there must be a concrete counter-proposal on the other side of the table.
- Up to this point we simply have not had the benefit of a proposal from the Soviet Union. It is my hope that between now and the meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev we will have had a chance to find common areas of interest on which we can agree, and turn those areas into tangible form in Geneva.

- Not only has progress in Geneva been impeded by the failure to deal concretely with the substantive elements of the negotiations, there are also certain tactical maneuvers that must be eliminated in the future if we are ever to achieve the kind of agreement that we seek.
- Insisting that resolution is required in one area before proceeding to tackle another is both unrealistic and misguided. This amounts to imposing preconditions and simply blocks the search for solutions.
- It was agreed last January to consider and resolve nuclear and space arms in their interrelationship. We have been working since the beginning, by mutual agreement, in three distinct areas START, INF and Defense and Space. This was done because of the diversity of the subject matter, the established modalities of START and INF and more importantly, to permit us more quickly to find solutions to constraining particular classes of weapons.
- I firmly believe that progress is necessary and achievable in offensive arms reductions on its own merits, and that such progress should not be held hostage to an agreement in other areas. For these reasons we will continue to question your rationale for not dealing substantively with reductions in offensive nuclear forces until your position on what you call "space-strike" arms is accepted.

MAKING PROGRESS IN THE NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS

- The U.S. proposals in the Nuclear and Space Talks are designed to facilitate progress toward the goals which were agreed to in January. As I have stated many times, I have given our negotiators great flexibility to explore potential solutions -- but you have to contribute your own ideas and with them, specific proposals.

START

- In the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks, we want to work with you to restore a sound basis for deterrence and to do so at greatly reduced levels of nuclear forces and in a manner which enhances stability.
- That means we should bring about the deep reductions in offensive nuclear arms that the 1972 ABM Treaty said we both should seek. I know that Mr. Gorbachev has said that the Soviet Union, too, would like deep cuts in nuclear arms. It is time to get down to work and figure out how we are going to achieve them, in a way that enhances stability.

- In START, the end result must be deep cuts in numbers and the destructive power of ballistic missiles and their warheads. We are flexible on the means to obtain our objectives.

INF

- We must also address the problem of INF. In INF, the U.S. favors the greatest possible reductions in Long Range INF missiles -- the category of INF weaponry both sides regard as most threatening.
- We have come a long way in trying to address your concerns. I have said that we would consider not deploying in Europe our full complement of warheads permitted globally.
- I have said that we would be prepared to take appropriate reductions in the Pershing II missiles which your government has so often stressed. We have said we are prepared to consider limitations on aircraft as well, which is also in response to concerns expressed by the Soviet Union.
- Frankly, we have not seen any comparable Soviet effort to address our concerns. As the Soviet Union continues to deploy new SS-20 missiles, you keep saying that there must be no NATO missiles. And I have even proposed that we agree to that, but only if there are no such missiles on your side. What could be better than a stable balance at zero for both of us?

DEFENSE AND SPACE (D&S)

- And we have said that we cannot simply talk about offensive systems. We must talk about defensive systems as well, because they are interrelated.
- This means, however, more than simply discussing the traditional offensive-defensive relationship. We should examine the potential of defensive systems to strengthen stability between us.
- We think there are promising new technologies; so apparently, does the Soviet Union, because you have had a vigorous research program on strategic defense since long before we reinvigorated our own.

- I believe that if there is a better way to assure the peace between us than threatening to destroy each other's societies, the leaders of our countries have not only the opportunity but the responsibility to explore it. We owe this to our children and to future generations.
- In the Defense and Space Talks, the U.S. has proposed discussions on the overall offense-defense relationship, particularly on how both sides could manage a transition to greater reliance on defensive forces, if research should indicate that strategic defense is viable.
- I have directed that the U.S. SDI research program be consistent with all U.S. Treaty obligations, including those contained in the ABM Treaty. At the same time, I must be candid. We are concerned about actions which raise serious questions about Soviet compliance with the ABM Treaty. For example, the construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar directly violates the ABM Treaty. Such erosion of the existing ABM Treaty must be corrected.

SUMMARY

- The proposals of the United States in Geneva are equitable and our negotiators have been given great flexibility to meet Soviet concerns.
- The place to do business on these issues is Geneva, where both sides have able negotiators. We have noted the many public and private hints of a Soviet reductions proposal, but if you have serious proposals, they should be tabled in Geneva. And this should be with specific numbers and without preconditions which only impede progress in the negotiations.
- Comparable Soviet flexibility must be shown if agreements are to be reached. We urge that Soviet negotiators be given a mandate to bargain constructively now in Round III.
- Any proposal must address our concerns over the key issues of strengthening strategic stability and achieving deep reductions.
- I am looking to the Geneva talks in particular to gauge what can be accomplished in arms control for my November meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev.

NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION

- Our Governments have long recognized that despite our differences, we have a shared interest in reducing the risk of armed conflict between us -- especially one involving nuclear weapons -- that might result from accident, miscalculation, or misunderstanding.
- In 1963, our predecessors began the process of seeking to reduce such risks by establishing the Direct Communications Link. This process was advanced by the 1971 Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War, the 1973 Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, and the 1974 Agreement on Measures to Improve the Direct Communications Link.
- Because our two nations bear a special responsibility to avoid a conflict that could be catastrophic for mankind, I ask myself -- as I believe you must -- if we can do more to increase our mutual understanding of each other and to enhance our communications. My meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev and with you and similar meetings between senior officials of our governments, which in themselves symbolize our belief in the value of improving understanding between our nations, afford us an opportunities -- indeed, perhaps historic opportunities -- to consider new approaches to enhance our dialogue, to lend it greater substance, and to ensure its longevity.
- In this context, I was interested to hear from Senators Warner and Nunn that General Secretary Gorbachev had indicated to them in September a willingness to look at their concept of risk reduction centers. Although the Senators were presenting their own ideas, there may be some merit in certain aspects of their concept which warrant joint exploration. Similarly, there would appear to be merit in our examining other steps, such as a dialogue at senior levels on our respective defense budgets and plans for reinstituting and expanding military-to-military exchanges, that might help our nations to better understand each other's perspectives on security issues.
- Again, I would like to propose that we ask our experts to meet soon to explore these or other possible approaches that could play a useful role in serving our mutual interests in avoiding accidental war?

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

SPECIFIC REGIONAL ISSUES

- In my initial presentation, I deferred discussion of specific regional problems, but before the meeting ends, I'd like to mention a few of them:
- Tensions remain high in the Middle East, an area of interest to both of us. Your lack of relations with Israel and support for elements opposing direct discussions between the parties most directly concerned continues to block the most promising avenues of a settlement and calls into question your willingness to play a constructive role in the region. We have a common interest in ensuring that there is no renewal of fighting in the region.
 - I want to make absolutely clear the importance we attach to Central America and the Caribbean. We want stable, democratic societies in the region and we will not permit the forcible alteration of the local balance. Soviet support for the interventionist activities of Cuba and Nicaragua is and will remain a serious problem in our relations and raises the possibility of a serious confrontation.
 - Southern Africa is in the process of cataclysmic change. The situation in South Africa itself is not an East-West issue and it is in neither of our interests that it become one. We can expect Moscow to show the necessary restraint. We remain committed to helping the nations of the region reach a peaceful accommodation of their differences, including the question of Namibia.
 - In Asia, we should be able to do more together to help along a settlement of the Kampuchea question. We regret that Moscow has thus far refused to use its influence in Hanoi to encourage a negotiated solution which could lead to the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea. Both of us should also play a role in lowering tensions on the Korean Peninsula, by encouraging an expansion of the North-South dialogue.
 - We are concerned by the course of events in Poland, which as you know has been a source of controversy between us many times in the past. In our view, stability in Poland can only result from a true policy of national reconciliation and dialogue among the government, the church, and the workers.

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BY CH, NARA, DATE 2/13/02

- The Polish Government seems headed in a different direction. This is something over which you have great influence. We hope you will use your influence to encourage the Polish regime to turn toward reconciliation rather than increased repression.
- Finally, let me raise the question of Afghanistan. There is no other regional issue on which progress could have as dramatic an impact on our overall relations as Afghanistan.
- I am aware of Soviet accusations that we are seeking to "bleed" the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, and that we are opposed to a political settlement.
- I want to reassure you, as I will reassure Mr. Gorbachev personally, that that is not the case.
- We want the war to end. We want the Afghan refugees to be able to return to their country honorably and in peace. We want the Soviet forces in Afghanistan to go home so that the suffering and losses on both sides can end. We believe that only a political settlement can lead to such a result.
- We have had ample opportunities to discuss this issue in the past. Let me add one thing today: If the Soviet Union is prepared seriously to explore means of ending the war on terms which allow the Afghans to exercise their right of self-determination, they would find in us no obstacle. We accept that such a solution must also guarantee the security of your southern border.
- I hope you will convey that message forcefully from me to Mr. Gorbachev.



~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

PRIVATE MEETING WITH SHEVARDNADZE

Suggested Talking Points

- There are a few things I'd like you to pass on to the General Secretary -- informally and off the record.
- First, I'm determined to do all I can to get our relations on a more constructive course.
- The responsibility Mr. Gorbachev and I have to ensure peace in the future is awesome, I take that responsibility seriously and I am sure Mr. Gorbachev does too.
- The best way to work out our problems is through frank discussion. We need to talk about each other less in public and to each other more in private.
- I'm still not satisfied that we are communicating with each other effectively. Somehow I feel we need a more direct and informal means, so that we can discuss issues frankly and explore possible solutions.
- Ask the General Secretary to think about this, and if he has any ideas on how we can exchange ideas more privately, I would welcome them. Of course, any arrangements would have to be fully reciprocal.
- Finally, let me say that I did not mention humanitarian issues in our official session today, since I am aware of your sensitivity regarding discussion in official channels.
- These are, however, very important issues. They must be resolved if we make any substantial progress in other areas.
- You are of course familiar with the specific problems I have in mind, so I don't need to repeat the details. We are not asking for a change in your system or laws; only compliance with political commitments you have made.
- I do want Mr. Gorbachev to understand that progress in this area could make a lot of things possible which would benefit both countries. And, to be frank, our meeting in Geneva cannot be considered successful unless there is progress in solving the various humanitarian issues we have called to your attention.
- So I hope he will do what he can to remove this contentious item from our agenda by solving the underlying problems.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

FOO-008!, #125
C/1 2/13/02

TAB D - TALKING POINTS FOR PRIVATE MEETING TO BE PROVIDED
SEPARATELY

CE

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 10 LISTED ON THE
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OF

PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL TOAST FOR LUNCH

MR. MINISTER, HONORED GUESTS, COLLEAGUES:

A RUSSIAN PROVERB SAYS THAT HE WHO GOES QUIETLY, GOES FARTHEST. DURING OUR OFFICIAL DISCUSSION WE EXCHANGED SOME QUIET WORDS OF AGREEMENT, AND ALSO SOME WORDS WHERE THERE WERE NO AGREEMENTS. BUT ON THE ROAD WE ARE TRAVELLING, WE MUST GO TOGETHER, WHETHER WE AGREE WITH ONE ANOTHER OR NOT. THERE HAVE BEEN MANY CASES IN HISTORY WHERE TWO STATES WHO DID NOT SEE EYE TO EYE ON MANY THINGS HAVE HAD TO DEAL WITH ONE ANOTHER. BUT NEVER BEFORE HAVE TWO NATIONS POSSESSED THE MEANS TO DESTROY ONE ANOTHER AND THE WORLD SO COMPLETELY. THAT SIMPLE FACT IS A SOBERING REMINDER OF THE WORLD IN WHICH WE LIVE AND THE IMPORTANCE OF OUR RELATIONSHIP.

A SPIRIT OF HUMILITY BEFORE THESE AWESOME FACTS OF WAR AND PEACE MUST GUIDE US IN OUR EFFORTS. MR. MINISTER, I KNOW THAT YOUR COUNTRY HAS SUFFERED ENORMOUSLY IN THE GREAT WARS OF THIS CENTURY, AND THAT VIRTUALLY EVERY FAMILY IN THE SOVIET UNION BEARS THE SCARS OF THOSE WARS. THE AMERICAN PEOPLE HAVE ALSO KNOWN THE SUFFERING AND LOSS BROUGHT BY WAR AND REMEMBER OUR WARTIME ALLIANCE WHICH BROUGHT THE DEFEAT OF FASCISM. TODAY OUR MOST IMPORTANT MUTUAL RESPONSIBILITY IS TO STRENGTHEN AND PRESERVE THE PEACE, AND MAKE THE FUTURE FOR BOTH OUR PEOPLES AND THE WORLD MORE STABLE AND SECURE.

1

WE HAVE EXCHANGED VIEWS ON MANY TOPICS, BUT IT IS THIS MOST PROFOUND MESSAGE THAT I HOPE YOU AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV WILL CARRY AWAY FROM OUR MEETINGS. I WILL SPARE NO EFFORT TO MAKE THAT VISION OF A FREE AND SECURE FUTURE A REALITY. WITH YOUR HELP, WE SHOULD NOT FAIL.

MAY I RAISE MY GLASS IN A TOAST TO THE HEALTH OF CHAIRMAN GROMYKO AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV, TO YOUR HEALTH, AND TO THE CAUSE OF PEACE AND FREEDOM.



~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

9/16/85

Notional Press Statement

Today, September 27, 1985 President Reagan met for two and a quarter hours with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in the Oval Office. The Vice President, Secretary of State George Shultz, Chief of Staff Donald Regan, Assistant to the President for National Security Robert McFarlane, Ambassador Hartman, and Mr. Matlock were also present. Attending on the Soviet side were First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Georgy Korniyenko, Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin, Ambassador and Assistant to the Foreign Minister Chernyshov and Minister-Counselor of the Soviet Embassy Sokolov. Following the talks, the President hosted a lunch in honor of Foreign Minister Shevardnadze.

The discussions covered the full range of issues on the U.S.-Soviet agenda. They were held in a serious, frank and constructive atmosphere. Both sides expressed their views, noting areas of agreement and disagreement. They discussed areas where the two countries might be able to make progress in the period leading up to the meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva this November.

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MSA NARA, Date 1/4/01

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Declassify on: OADR



7373

REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS

To: Officer-in-charge
Appointments Center
Room 060, OEOB

Please admit the following appointments on Friday, September 27, 1985
for The President of _____:
(NAME OF PERSON TO BE VISITED) (AGENCY)

Pre-Brief

9:00 am - 10:00 am - Oval Office

The President
Vice President Bush
Secretary Shultz
Mr. Don T. Regan
Mr. McFarlane
Ambassador Nitze
Ambassador Ridgway
Ambassador Hartman
Ambassador Matlock

MEETING LOCATION

Building <u>West Wing</u>	Requested by <u>Jack F. Matlock</u>
Room No. <u>Oval Office</u>	Room No. <u>368</u> Telephone <u>5112</u>
Time of Meeting <u>9:00 a.m.</u>	Date of request <u>9/25/85</u>

Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to five (5) names or less.

APPOINTMENTS CENTER: SIG/OEOB - 395-6046 or WHITE HOUSE - 456-6742

REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS

To: Officer-in-charge
Appointments Center
Room 060, OEOB

Please admit the following appointments on Friday, September 27, 1985

for The President of _____:
(NAME OF PERSON TO BE VISITED) (AGENCY)

2

The President's Meeting with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
10:00 AM - 12:15 - Cabinet Room

US Participants

The President
Vice President Bush
Secretary Shultz
Mr. Don T. Regan
Mr. McFarlane
Ambassador Hartman
Ambassador Matlock

Soviet Participants

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Korniyenko
Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin
Ambassador and Asst to the Foreign Minister A.S. Chernyshov
Minister-Counselor O.M. Sokolov
P.R. Palazhchenko (interpreter)

MEETING LOCATION

Building West Wing Requested by Jack F. Matlock
Room No. Cabinet Room Room No. 368 Telephone 5112
Time of Meeting 10:00 a.m. Date of request 9/25/85

Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to five (5) names or less.

APPOINTMENTS CENTER: SIG/OEOB - 395-6046 or WHITE HOUSE - 456-6742

REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS

To: Officer-in-charge
Appointments Center
Room 060, OEOB

Please admit the following appointments on Friday, September 27, 19 85
for THE PRESIDENT of _____:
(NAME OF PERSON TO BE VISITED) (AGENCY)

3

The President's Luncheon for Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

US Participants

The President
The Vice President
Secretary Shultz
Secretary Baker
Secretary Weinberger
Mr. Don T. Regan
Mr. McFarlane
Ambassador Nitze
Ambassador Ridgway
Ambassador Hartman
Ambassador Matlock
PM Director Holmes
Eugenia Arensbarger, Interpreter and notetaker

Soviet Participants

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
Deputy FM Korniyenko
Ambassador Dobrynin
Ambassador and Asst. to the FM A.S. Chernyshov
Mr. P.R. Palazhchenko (Interpreter)
Minister-Counselor Oleg Sokolov
Minister-Counselor Viktor Isakov

MEETING LOCATION

Building WEST WING Requested by JACK MATLOCK
Room No. West Wing (State Dining Rm) 368 Telephone 5112
Time of Meeting 12:00 Date of request 9/27/85

Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to three (3) names or less.

APPOINTMENTS CENTER: SIG/OEOB - 395-6066 or WHITE HOUSE - 456-6742