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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: MATLOCK, JACK: Files

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File Folder: Reagan-Shevardnadze Mtg - 9/27/85 (7)

Date: 1/4/01

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Skinner/F00-008/1

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. MemCon	The President/Shevardnadze, 15 p.	n.d.	B1
<del>2. Report</del>	<del>re: Shevardnadze Visit, 4 p.</del> <i>R 6/15/01 NLSF00-008/1 #128</i>	<del>10/2/85</del>	<del>B1</del>

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].

B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].

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COORDINATING MEETING -- Tuesday, September 24, 1985 -- 2:15pm  
Room 372

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MEETING WITH SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE  
Friday, September 27, 1985

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I. SCENARIO

Oval Office  
9:00-10:00 - Prebrief  
°List of participants attached  
10:00-10:05 - Photo Op  
°The President & FM Shevardnadze  
Oval Office/Cabinet Room  
10:05-12:00 - Meeting  
°List of participants attached  
Family Dining Room  
12:15-1:30 - Luncheon  
°List of participants attached  
? C-9  
1:30 - Departure  
°The President & FM shake hands

NOTE: No departure statements

II. INTERPRETATION

Oval Office/  
°Cabinet Room equipped for simultaneous interpretation  
°Whispered interpretation at luncheon

III. MILITARY

°Two Marines at West Lobby Door  
°Secretary Shultz and ~~Tim~~ *Bob* Towell to greet

IV. PRESS

V. COORDINATING MEETING PARTICIPANTS

Linda Faulkner	456-7064
Cathy Fenton	456-7064
Bob Ivany	456-2150
Jack Matlock	395-5112
Johnathan Miller	395-3440
Cheri Nolan	456-7140
Linda Mysliwy	632-1276
Claire O'Donnell	456-7052
Lynn Pascoe	632-3738
Bob Pearson	395-3044
John Purnell	395-5112
Karna Small	456-6536
Tim Towell	632-4120
Mary Wengrzynek	395-3440
Kathleen Murphy	632-3738

*Metlock*

7643

(NSC/Elliott)  
September 26, 1985  
11:00 a.m.

*FILE*

*USE IT*

*NOT*

*Received  
17 SEP 29 1985*

PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: LUNCHEON TOAST WITH SOVIET FOREIGN  
MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE  
FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 1985

Mr. Minister, honored guests, colleagues:

A Russian proverb says that he who goes quietly, goes farthest. During our discussion, we exchanged some quiet words of agreement, and also words that marked clearly different views. But whether we agree with one another or not, I believe that on the road we are travelling, we must travel together. We know that many times down through history, two states which did not see eye to eye still found it necessary to deal with one another. The same holds true today. And never before have two nations possessed the means to destroy one another and the entire world. That simple but deeply sobering fact reminds us of the nature of this world we live in, and of the importance of our relationship.

A spirit of humility before these awesome facts of war and peace must guide our efforts. Mr. Minister, I know that your country has suffered enormously in the great wars of this century, and that virtually every family in the Soviet Union bears the scars of those wars.

The American people have also known great suffering from those wars. We remember our wartime alliance which brought the defeat of fascism. The United States has never been, nor will we ever be, an aggressor nation. Today our most important mutual responsibility is to strengthen and preserve the peace, and make the future for both our peoples and the world more stable and secure.

We have exchanged views on many topics, but it is this most profound message that I hope you and General Secretary Gorbachev will carry away from our meetings. I will spare no effort to make that vision of a free and secure future a reality. With your help, we should not fail.

May I raise my glass in a toast to the health of Chairman Gromyko and General Secretary Gorbachev, to your health, and to the cause of peace and freedom -- for the people of our two nations, and for all the people of the world.

~~SECRET~~

PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL TOAST FOR LUNCH

MR. MINISTER, HONORED GUESTS, COLLEAGUES:

A RUSSIAN PROVERB SAYS THAT HE WHO GOES QUIETLY, GOES FARTHEST. DURING OUR OFFICIAL DISCUSSION WE EXCHANGED SOME QUIET WORDS OF AGREEMENT, AND ALSO SOME WORDS WHERE THERE WERE NO AGREEMENTS. BUT ON THE ROAD WE ARE TRAVELLING, WE MUST GO TOGETHER, WHETHER WE AGREE WITH ONE ANOTHER OR NOT. THERE HAVE BEEN MANY CASES IN HISTORY WHERE TWO STATES WHO DID NOT SEE EYE TO EYE ON MANY THINGS HAVE HAD TO DEAL WITH ONE ANOTHER. BUT NEVER BEFORE HAVE TWO NATIONS POSSESSED THE MEANS TO DESTROY ONE ANOTHER AND THE WORLD SO COMPLETELY. THAT SIMPLE FACT IS A SOBERING REMINDER OF THE WORLD IN WHICH WE LIVE AND THE IMPORTANCE OF OUR RELATIONSHIP.

A SPIRIT OF HUMILITY BEFORE THESE AWESOME FACTS OF WAR AND PEACE MUST GUIDE US IN OUR EFFORTS. MR. MINISTER, I KNOW THAT YOUR COUNTRY HAS SUFFERED ENORMOUSLY IN THE GREAT WARS OF THIS CENTURY, AND THAT VIRTUALLY EVERY FAMILY IN THE SOVIET UNION BEARS THE SCARS OF THOSE WARS. THE AMERICAN PEOPLE HAVE ALSO KNOWN THE SUFFERING AND LOSS BROUGHT BY WAR AND REMEMBER OUR WARTIME ALLIANCE WHICH BROUGHT THE DEFEAT OF FASCISM. TODAY OUR MOST IMPORTANT MUTUAL RESPONSIBILITY IS TO STRENGTHEN AND PRESERVE THE PEACE, AND MAKE THE FUTURE FOR BOTH OUR PEOPLES AND THE WORLD MORE STABLE AND SECURE.

WE HAVE EXCHANGED VIEWS ON MANY TOPICS, BUT IT IS THIS MOST PROFOUND MESSAGE THAT I HOPE YOU AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV WILL CARRY AWAY FROM OUR MEETINGS. I WILL SPARE NO EFFORT TO MAKE THAT VISION OF A FREE AND SECURE FUTURE A REALITY. WITH YOUR HELP, WE SHOULD NOT FAIL.

MAY I RAISE MY GLASS IN A TOAST TO THE HEALTH OF CHAIRMAN GROMYKO AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV, TO YOUR HEALTH, AND TO THE CAUSE OF PEACE AND FREEDOM.

PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH SHEVARDNADZE  
SEPTEMBER 27, 1985  
SUGGESTED LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Pre-Brief

9:00 am - 10:00 am - Oval Office

The President  
Vice President Bush  
Secretary Shultz  
Mr. Don T. Regan  
Mr. McFarlane  
Ambassador Nitze  
Ambassador Ridgway  
Ambassador Hartman  
Ambassador Matlock

The President's Meeting with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze  
10:00 AM - 12:15 - Cabinet Room

US Participants

The President  
Vice President Bush  
Secretary Shultz  
Mr. Don T. Regan  
Mr. McFarlane  
Ambassador Hartman  
Ambassador Matlock  
Dimitri Zarechnak, Interpreter

Soviet Participants

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze  
Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Korniyenko  
Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin  
Ambassador and Asst to the Foreign Minister A.S. Chernyshov  
Minister-Counselor O.M. Sokolov  
P.R. Palazhchenko (interpreter)

The President's Luncheon for Foreign Minister ShevardnadzeUS Participants

The President  
The Vice President  
Secretary Shultz  
Secretary Baker  
Secretary Weinberger  
Mr. Don T. Regan  
Mr. McFarlane  
Ambassador Nitze  
Ambassador Ridgway  
Ambassador Hartman  
Ambassador Matlock  
PM Director Holmes  
Mr. Zarechnak, Interpreter and notetaker

Soviet Participants

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze  
Deputy FM Korniyenko  
Ambassador Dobrynin  
Ambassador and Asst. to the FM A.S. Chernyshov  
Mr. P.R. Palazhchenko (Interpreter)  
Minister-Counselor Oleg Sokolov  
Minister-Counselor Viktor Isakov

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SECRET

September 28, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JSM*

SUBJECT: President's Meeting with Shevardnadze:  
Memorandum of Conversation

Attached at Tab I is the memorandum of conversation of the President's meeting with Shevardnadze September 27, 1985.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the Memorandum of Conversation at Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum of Conversation

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By *JLB* NARA, Date *11/10/01*

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Declassify on: OADR

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

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October 1, 1985

- 9/26/85

DRAFT U.S. THEMES ON THE SHEVARDNADZE VISIT & SOVIET COUNTER-PROPOSALGENERAL POINTS ON THE VISIT

- On Friday, September 26, the President and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze met for about two hours with their advisers present.
- They also met privately for about a quarter of an hour.
- The President also hosted a luncheon for the Foreign Minister and his party.
- During the meeting with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, the President provided an overview of his thinking about his upcoming meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev, outlining the US approach to the agenda, which includes human rights, regional issues, bilateral matters, and security and arms control issues.
- The President expressed his desire for a constructive meeting, and stressed our commitment to do everything possible to prepare for it.
- The President reiterated the strong feelings of all Americans on human rights, and the importance of this issue to U.S.-Soviet relations.
- Additionally, he made clear that Soviet actions in various parts of the world have an effect on the prospects for better relations.
- There was also a discussion of bilateral matters, where the ingredients are present for agreement in some areas in the near term.
- Shevardnadze presented a letter to the President from General Secretary Gorbachev, and talked about the Soviet approach to some of the issues, including a Soviet counter-proposal to our initiatives in the Geneva negotiations on nuclear and space arms control.
- The Soviets indicated that they are prepared to discuss 50% reductions in what they call "relevant nuclear arms" linked to a ban on what they call "space strike" arms.
- Shevardnadze indicated that the Soviet counter-proposal will be presented in detail at the Geneva negotiations the week of September 30.
- Since we feel that the best hope of making progress in the arms control area is to discuss these very complex and sensitive issues in private, we are not going to discuss the details of the Soviet counter-proposal.
- As Secretary Shultz said, we welcome the fact that the Soviets are bringing a counter-proposal forward.

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White House Guidelines, August 26, 1997  
By dlr NARA, Date 1/4/01~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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October 1, 1985

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- We will study the Soviet counter-proposal carefully, and will explore it in confidential discussions in Geneva. It is incumbent on the Soviet Union to present or explain the counter-proposal in detail.
- We will see whether the Soviet proposal meets our criteria of ensuring reductions that result in equality, are verifiable, and enhance stability.
- We will need time to determine whether, combined with the proposals the US already has on the table, this could be the basis for progress in reducing nuclear arsenals.
- The series of meetings we have had over the past few days is part of an on-going process of seeking to narrow US-Soviet differences on substantive issues, and to find ways to bridge these differences wherever possible.
- We expect that process to continue over the coming weeks, and hope that good progress can be made between now and the November meeting.
- We are realistic, however, and recognize that these complex issues which affect the basic security of both sides are not likely to be resolved in the short term.

#### POINTS TO MAKE ABOUT THE SOVIET COUNTER-PROPOSAL

- For a number of years, the United States has been trying to persuade the Soviets to begin a process of serious, confidential negotiations on significant reductions in existing nuclear arsenals in Geneva.
- We have had specific proposals on the table in Geneva calling for such reductions since the beginning of these negotiations.
- On September 27, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze gave President Reagan a letter from Mr. Gorbachev and provided the rough outlines of a long awaited counter-proposal.
- [Mr. Shevardnadze indicated that the Soviets are prepared to discuss 50% reductions in what they term "relevant nuclear arms" linked to a ban on what they call "space-strike" weapons.]
- The Soviet counter-proposal and Soviet negotiators in Geneva must provide details on a number of critical questions:
  - o what is to be reduced on both sides;
  - o what the end result is to be;
  - o how such reductions and limits would enhance stability;
  - o how Soviet advantages and U.S. advantages would be affected; and
  - o whether it is verifiable.

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October 1, 1985

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- The President welcomed the letter from Mr. Gorbachev, and indicated to Mr. Shevardnadze that we looked forward to seeing the details of the counter-proposal when it is fleshed out next week in Geneva.
- The time for posturing is over. The time for serious, private negotiations has begun.
- Historically, arms control talks have been most successful when they have been handled in a confidential manner.
- We were encouraged that the Soviet press spokesman on Friday did not get into the specifics of their proposal. We also want to avoid getting into public discussion.
- This is a complex field, and it is vital to the national security interests of both sides. It is important that the talented teams of experts in Geneva be permitted to work seriously without the glare of publicity and propaganda at each stage.
- When we have seen the Soviet counter-proposal in its entirety, and stack it up against our own solid proposals, we will be in a better position fully to judge its merits and demerits, and to define areas of common ground.

#### Historical Perspective

- It is important to keep the Soviet counter-proposal in proper perspective.
- We should not forget that it was the Soviets who walked out of the START and INF negotiations in 1983, which caused an interruption of more than a year in negotiations.
- The U.S. has, in contrast, put on the negotiating table a series of far-reaching arms reduction proposals.
- We are prepared for serious give-and-take without sacrificing our basic objectives.
- The President has given our negotiators unprecedented flexibility.
- The firmness and conviction of our objectives was successful in bringing the Soviets back to the negotiating table.
- And, after a series of Soviet proposals involving unverifiable moratoria and freezes, it has now elicited a Soviet counter-proposal involving an offer to finally discuss reductions.
- What all of this gives evidence of is the correctness of the U.S. (and NATO) strategy thus far. Western unity and firmness eventually brought the Soviets back to the negotiating table.

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- Continued allied support and solidarity will be especially important as we negotiate these issues in Geneva and as we approach the November meeting.

### The U.S. Proposals

- Let me review for you the proposals that we have on the table.
- In START, we have long called for radical reductions.
  - We have proposed to cut strategic ballistic missile warheads down to 5000, and place limits on heavy bombers and the air-launched cruise missiles they carry.
  - We have indicated to the Soviets that we are prepared to take into account differences in our force structure and to negotiate trade-offs.
- In INF, we have called for the complete elimination of all U.S. and Soviet longer-range, land-based INF missiles.
  - If the Soviets are not prepared to go this far immediately, we have proposed, as an interim step, reductions in such LRINF missile warheads to the lowest possible equal global level for the U.S. and the Soviet Union.
- We have also tried to engage the Soviets in a discussion of the full range of defense and space issues, including the offense/defense relationship.
  - We would like these discussions to allow us to move away from a world in which we must depend solely upon the threat of retaliation with offensive nuclear forces for our security, to a world where the overall level of nuclear forces has been reduced (ultimately to zero) and security enhanced through a reliance on deterrence based on the increasing contribution of defensive systems which threaten no one.
- Our arms control proposals in every area of the Geneva negotiations reflect a carefully considered set of criteria, which must be kept in mind in evaluating the Soviet counter-proposal.
  - One criterion is that any agreement must promote strategic stability.
    - This means that after reductions, for as long as we must continue to depend on the threat of retaliation as a deterrent, each side's retaliatory force should be secure enough to survive if the other side strikes first.
    - Obviously, in making reductions, the two sides will have to take into account asymmetries in their respective force structures -- both offensive and defensive.

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-- For example, there are significant differences in the threat posed, on the one hand, by warheads on the large Soviet SS-18 missiles, which can reach American cities or silos in less than thirty minutes without facing any U.S. defenses, and, on the other hand, the threat posed by nuclear bombs on American airplanes that will take many hours to reach Soviet territory and have to penetrate a Soviet air defense shield that includes some 10,000 surface-to-air missiles.

-- For this reason, reductions in land-based ballistic missiles with multiple warheads are more stabilizing than reductions in other systems, systems clearly more suited to a second strike retaliation than to an aggressive first strike.

- A second criterion is that any reductions must result in equal or equivalent levels of forces on both sides.
- A third is that arms control agreements must provide for effective verification of compliance by all parties.
- A fourth is that any arms agreement should not solve problems involving our security by merely transferring them from one region to another (i.e. from Europe to Asia).
- A fifth criteria is that we cannot solve nuclear arms issues in a manner which undercuts our capability to deter conventional aggression.

#### SDI and Arms Control

- The Soviet Union continues to try to hold reductions in offensive nuclear arms hostage to stopping our SDI program.
- In his meeting with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, the President made clear both his commitment to achieving deep reductions in nuclear arms and to continuing our SDI program -- a research program being conducted in full compliance with the ABM Treaty.
- It is important to place the U.S. SDI program into perspective:
  - o an extensive Soviet research program has probed for years into the same basic areas our SDI program is investigating;
  - o the Soviets have taken steps in violation of the ABM Treaty, such as construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar and other questionable activities;
  - o the Soviets have deployed the world's only ABM system around Moscow; and
  - o the Soviets have deployed the world's only operational ASAT system.

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October 1, 1985

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- Thus, in the near term, SDI responds to the massive Soviet effort in strategic defenses which, unlike our own, includes actual deployments, as well as their offensive buildup.
- Our SDI program is a powerful deterrent to a Soviet breakout from the ABM Treaty, a prospect made more worrisome by certain compliance questions such as the Krasnoyarsk Soviet radar which is in violation of the ABM Treaty.
- Our SDI research program also makes clear that we take seriously the enormous and unwarranted Soviet build-up in offensive arms.
- In the long term, SDI may become even more vital.
- SDI provides the hope of moving to a world in which security need not rest solely on the threat of retaliation with offensive nuclear weapons, but a world in which deterrence can be enhanced by the increasing contribution of defensive systems -- systems which threaten no one.

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**USSR-U.S.****Shevardnadze Promotes Positive Image at UN, Washington**

*Soviet reports on Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's meetings with President Reagan and Secretary Shultz together with his inaugural speech at the United Nations seemed intended to project a constructive image of Soviet policy and to portray Washington as recalcitrant on arms issues, especially SDI. The moderate tone of Soviet treatment of the high-level U.S.-Soviet exchanges appears designed to convey Moscow's dedication to creating a positive atmosphere prior to the November summit. Consistent with this effort to present a responsible image, Moscow has thus far kept its latest arms control proposal within diplomatic channels rather than using them to press a propaganda campaign.*

Soviet media accounts of Shevardnadze's 27 September conversation with President Reagan in Washington and his meeting two days earlier with Secretary Shultz in New York reflected Moscow's desire to focus the November summit on arms control issues and to project a positive image of Soviet policy. According to the authoritative TASS account of the meeting on the 27th, Shevardnadze presented the President a message from General Secretary Gorbachev outlining the USSR's "concrete considerations and proposals" for the November summit. TASS noted without elaboration that the Soviet "considerations" dealt primarily with "questions that are the subject of the Geneva talks on nuclear and space arms."

The TASS report on the Shultz-Shevardnadze talks of the 25th followed a similar pattern, noting that the discussions dealt "first of all" with security issues in the context of preparations for the upcoming summit. According to TASS, Shevardnadze underscored the importance of the Soviet Union's peace initiatives and conveyed the "view of the Soviet leadership" that the primary objective of the November summit should be to reach "mutually acceptable decisions" on ending the arms race and preventing the militarization of space.

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Soviet coverage of the two meetings contrasted sharply with Moscow's polemical reporting on similar meetings last year, reflecting both the general upturn in relations since the January 1985 agreement to begin the space and nuclear weapons talks (NST) and Moscow's recent emphasis on the need to create a constructive atmosphere before the November meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev:

- Soviet accounts of Shevardnadze's meetings contained no criticism of U.S. policies. By contrast, in reporting on then-Foreign Minister Gromyko's conversation with President Reagan in September 1984, TASS said Gromyko had told the President that U.S. policy was leading to "a dangerous heightening of international tension" and had "emphasized" that the United States was seeking "military superiority" over the Soviet Union. In a statement to the press following the meeting, Gromyko was quoted by TASS as saying he had not observed any readiness on the part of the Administration to adopt a "realistic stand" on the "acute problems of war and peace." Soviet reports on Gromyko's 26 September 1984 meeting with Secretary Shultz and his January and May 1985 meetings with him in Geneva and Vienna, respectively, all reported direct Soviet criticism of U.S. policies. The TASS account of Shevardnadze's 31 July meeting with Secretary Shultz was less polemical but contained indirect references to standard Soviet complaints against Washington.

- TASS described the exchange between the President and Shevardnadze as "important and mutually beneficial" and reported that Shevardnadze's conversation with Secretary Shultz had been "businesslike, frank, and useful." TASS did not describe the atmosphere of any of the U.S.-Soviet meetings last year. The characterization of the Shevardnadze-Shultz meeting is generally consistent, however, with Soviet descriptions of ministerial-level discussions since the January 1985 meeting between Gromyko and Secretary Shultz in Geneva.<sup>1</sup>

#### **UN Speech**

Shevardnadze's address to the General Assembly set the stage for his subsequent meetings with U.S. leaders and the presentation in Geneva of a new package of Soviet arms control proposals, underscoring the priority Moscow attaches to the U.S.-Soviet summit and to projecting a constructive and flexible image on arms control issues. Shevardnadze asserted that the upcoming summit should focus on the "problem of preventing an arms race in outer space and terminating it

<sup>1</sup> Previous Soviet treatment of foreign minister-level meetings is discussed in the *Trends* of 7 August 1985, pages 1-3; 15 May 1985, pages 1-2; and 9 January 1985, pages 1-2.

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on earth." He said that the Soviet Union wants a "successful outcome" but that it "remains to be seen" if the United States will adopt a similar attitude. Describing the issue of outer space as one "whose solution will to a large extent shape the world of our children, grandchildren, and great grandchildren," he contrasted what he called "sinister 'Star Wars' plans" with "Star Peace"—a Soviet proposal for international cooperation on the peaceful exploration of space.

Shevardnadze attempted to portray the United States as bearing the responsibility both for problems in U.S.-Soviet relations and for the lack of progress in arms control. Declaring that the Soviet Union had not initiated a "single twist in the arms race," he went on to enumerate Soviet peace proposals that he claimed had been rejected by Washington. "The responsibility for the current critical state of international relations," he charged, rests with the United States and "some of its closest allies." Shevardnadze balanced his criticism of the United States, however, by stressing that the Soviet Union views an improvement in bilateral relations as both necessary and possible. In this connection he echoed the assertion made by Gorbachev in April that Soviet-American confrontation is not the product of a "fatal inevitability" and added that the Soviet Union wishes to "build normal, stable relations with the United States."

The tone of Shevardnadze's speech contrasted with the shrill attacks on U.S. policies across the board in Soviet UN addresses of recent years. Soviet bombast reached a crescendo in the wake of the September 1983 KAL incident, when the Soviet speech was delivered by Soviet permanent UN representative Oleg Troyanovskiy. On that occasion Troyanovskiy accused the United States of pursuing "pathological ambitions," developing "barbaric" new weapons, "staging the crudest provocations" (the KAL incident), "spewing out uncivilized invective and insults" against the Soviet Union, and giving support to Third World regimes that are "steeped in blood and infamy." Then-Foreign Minister Gromyko's speech the following year was more subdued but still contained a litany of charges against the United States, including the assertion that the Reagan Administration is guided by a "spirit of imperial ambitions and enmity toward the Soviet Union" in its efforts to achieve "world domination."

In contrast to previous similar Soviet speeches at the United Nations, Shevardnadze avoided direct criticism of the United States in discussing Third World conflict situations. At the same time, he gave little indication that Moscow would alter its own Third World policies in response to U.S. charges

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of Soviet misconduct. He asserted that the Soviet Union is not responsible for "local conflicts," adding that the USSR has "invariably been and will remain on the side of the peoples threatened by imperialism."

**New Arms Proposals** Although Soviet media have reported that Moscow has tabled new proposals at the Geneva arms talks, they have given no details and have not played up the move as a sign of Soviet peaceful intentions. Such circumspection is reminiscent of Soviet media behavior during the SALT talks of the 1970's but contrasts sharply with Moscow's anti-INF propaganda campaign of the early 1980's. During that campaign, Soviet INF proposals were routinely announced authoritatively and given wide coverage by Soviet media. ~~(U/FOUO)~~

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# Analysis Note

1 October 1985  
FB M 85-10046

## Moscow on U.S.-Soviet Relations

24-30 September

Soviet commentaries for foreign and domestic audiences sought to project a positive and constructive image of Soviet policy, particularly in the area of arms control, in contrast to alleged U.S. obstructionism. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's "Star Peace" proposal, made during his speech to the UN General Assembly, became a focal point for the continuing Soviet campaign against SDI. Moscow devoted little public attention to Shevardnadze's meetings with President Reagan and Secretary Shultz and continued to charge that the Administration is not seriously preparing for the Geneva summit in November.

### U.S.-Soviet Relations

Soviet media largely bypassed comment on Shevardnadze's meetings with President Reagan and Secretary Shultz in favor of generalized charges of U.S. obstructionism and pledges of Moscow's commitment to work for improved relations:

- The Soviet Union's peace initiatives, aimed at curbing the arms race, have encountered a broad and positive response all over the world. But official Washington is displaying only what the London Times described as "stubborn intransigence." It would, perhaps, be more accurate to describe all actions and statements by the U.S. Administration as a "well-orchestrated" anti-Soviet campaign. Its purpose is to undermine the influence of the USSR's peace-loving policy on Americans and their allies, and to place outside the framework of talks and dialogue with the USSR in advance those questions which Washington would like to "avoid." (Vladimir Chernyshev, Pravda, 27 September)
- The remarks of representatives of the Washington Administration leave no doubt that so far as they are concerned, the main thing is the continued implementation of the "rearm America" program, not of reaching a consensus with Moscow on the lessening of military confrontation. The Soviet Union fully realizes that it will be very difficult to put international affairs in order, restore stability, and steer Soviet-American relations onto a normal course.

One-shot efforts are not enough. What will be needed here is painstaking, intensive work, the work of more than a day.  
(Vladlen Kuznetsov, Sovetskaya Rossiya, 26 September)

#### Approach to Reagan-Gorbachev Talks

Soviet commentary claimed that the Administration is divided over the Geneva summit and out of touch with grass-roots American feelings. Soviet commentators continued to demand that Washington adopt a constructive approach toward the summit:

- It is hard to judge what kind of struggle is taking place in the White House around the forthcoming summit meeting. Or the extent to which the diehards are gaining the upper hand--absolutely or relatively, whether within the framework of a single round or of the entire match. Or whether the timid voice of the realists will be heeded by the White House chief. It is, however, perfectly clear that the tactic of "gathering trump cards" by means of defiant military-political actions aimed at exerting pressure on the Soviet Union . . . is doomed to failure. (Fedor Burlatskiy, Literaturnaya Gazeta, 25 September)

- In the real American backwoods, in small towns of the farming belt, I had meetings this week with farmers, teachers, and clergymen who passionately want good relations between our countries, because they see in this the key for preserving peace. These people are far from politics, but how much good sense and intuition there is in their opinions and thoughts. How tangibly they feel the burden of military spending upon themselves. How they look forward to the meeting between the leaders of the two countries in Geneva. They are not striving just for peace: they are understanding ever more clearly, despite all prejudice, that the way to their security lies not through military testing and "Star Wars," but through Geneva, through agreements, through negotiations. (Vladimir Dunayev, Moscow domestic radio, 27 September)

- If Washington really wishes to show a realistic approach to the summit meeting, then it is time for those who are responsible for preparing for it to start dealing in a businesslike way with pressing international problems and with questions of bilateral relations with the USSR on the only realistic and possible basis--that of equality and equal security, mutual consideration of each side's national interests, and concern to avert the military threat that hangs over the world. (Yuriy Zhukov, Pravda, 29 September)

### Geneva Arms Talks

Moscow continued to portray Washington as deliberately blocking progress at the Geneva arms reduction talks:

- The U.S. side has done nothing to extract the talks from deadlock. Not a single constructive proposal has issued from it in Geneva. Moreover, it is the United States that is blocking progress on the most topical present-day problems under discussion at the talks by attempting to foist unilateral disarmament onto the Soviet Union . . . . One gets the impression that the Washington Administration continues to believe that its main task is not the quest for mutually acceptable solutions on the three salients of the Geneva talks, but the creation of an even deeper impasse at them. (Izvestiya, 27 September)
- Judging from Western press reports, U.S. political and public circles are with increasing frequency voicing grave misgivings about the prospects for the further development of the strategic limitation process. In view of the stance adopted by the U.S. side at the two previous rounds of the Geneva talks, experts conclude that the process as a whole may even be disrupted through the fault of the United States. (Lt. Col. Yu. Borin, Krasnaya Zvezda, 26 September)

### "Star Wars" vs. "Star Peace"

Soviet media touted Moscow's "Star Peace" proposal on the peaceful uses of space, formally presented by Shevardnadze to the United Nations. Commentators also accused the United States of rejecting the Soviet proposals while adhering instead to the SDI:

- Judging by the answers given by the President's representative to the questions of newsmen who wanted to know Washington's reaction to the Soviet concept of peaceful outer space, the U.S. Administration has a negative attitude to this. Larry Speakes made another attempt to justify America's Strategic Defense Initiative, so-called, although its goal is to turn outer space into an arena of star wars. (Unattributed report, Moscow radio World Service in English, 29 September)
- The mass media abroad are paying great attention to our country's constructive initiatives aimed at halting the arms race on earth and preventing it in space, achieving general disarmament and international detente. . . . How does the United States react to these steps taken by our country? Judging by statements from American leaders, they intend, as

before, to go along the path of escalating arms. The statement by Secretary of State Shultz is evidence of this. He confirmed the U.S. Administration's adherence to the Star Wars program. President Reagan, Shultz announced, will not under any circumstances abandon research work in the context of this program. Everyone understands what research work leads to. It leads to a new and even more dangerous spiral in the arms race--this time in space. (Konstantin Patsyuk, Moscow domestic radio, 30 September)

#### Violations of ABM Treaty

In conjunction with repeated media attacks on SDI, Soviet commentators denied assertions by U.S. officials that the USSR is engaged in an ABM weapons development program and charged that SDI violates the ABM Treaty and raises questions about U.S. sincerity in pursuing arms control negotiations:

- The Soviet Union counters the "Star Wars" program by offering to the world community the concept of "Star Peace." In view of this fact, [White House spokesman Larry] Speakes' claim that research into space weapons is being carried out by both countries is absurd. Moreover, it is a patent lie. The Soviet Union is not developing space strike weapons or antimissile defenses for the territory of the country, but is consistently advocating the absolute prevention of the militarization of space. So we tell Mr. Speakes straight: Include us out! (Vladimir Chernyshev, TASS in English and Russian, 26 September)

- Recently, illustrating their attitude to the international commitments of the United States, representatives of the Pentagon described the Soviet-American ABM Treaty as a "pseudo-agreement on arms control." Now, as a result of mass protests against the "Star Wars" plans in the United States and abroad, Washington is forced to maneuver and from time to time even to don the mask of "a supporter of the 1972 treaty." But, unfortunately, the United States is not taking any measures to do away with the violation of the treaty's provisions in the United States. By continuing the creation of ABM systems and components banned by the treaty and violating other provisions of the 1972 treaty, the Reagan Administration is putting in doubt its own words about the intention to restore the reputation of the United States as a reliable negotiating partner. The American "Star Wars" program and the 1972 treaty are absolutely incompatible and mutually exclusive things. (Vladimir Bogachev, TASS in English, 30 September)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

October 28, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM TO ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK 

SUBJECT: Presidential Note to Shevardnadze

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from Bill Martin to John Hilbold transmitting NSC approval of a draft letter from the President to Shevardnadze thanking him for the gifts he presented during his September visit. We made some minor adjustments to the text, as indicated at Tab A, primarily to reflect the President's recent meeting with Shevardnadze in New York.

Judyt  Mandel concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the attached Martin to Hilbold memorandum forwarding the draft letter to Shevardnadze.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

Tab I	Martin to Hilbold memorandum
Tab A	Approved text for Presidential letter
Tab B	Original draft

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOHN E. HILBOLD

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN

SUBJECT: Letter from the President to Shevardnadze

The NSC has reviewed the draft text of a letter from the President to Shevardnadze thanking him for the gifts he presented during his September visit. We have made some minor suggestions, included in the draft at Tab A, primarily to reflect the President's recent meeting with Shevardnadze in New York.

Attachments

Tab A NSC suggested text for Presidential letter  
Tab B Original draft

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON D.C. 20505

NSC Draft Letter to Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

Dear Mr. Minister:

I truly appreciated the opportunity to meet with you at the White House and in New York to discuss a broad range of issues of mutual concern to our two countries. I look forward to meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev in November and establishing a bilateral dialogue to bring about a more stable future for both of our peoples.

Nancy and I want to thank you and Mrs. Shevardnadze for the handsome gifts you brought for us. We are pleased to have the samovar and matching tray and the lacquered box as remembrances of the exquisite artistry of your fellow countrymen.

With our best wishes to you, Mrs. Shevardnadze, and to your colleagues as we approach our meeting in Geneva,

Sincerely,

October 18, 1985

Dear Mr. Minister:

I truly appreciated meeting with you at the White House on a broad range of issues of mutual concern to our two countries. I look forward to my upcoming conference with General Secretary Gorbachev and establishing a bilateral dialogue to bring about a more stable future for both of our peoples.

Nancy and I want to thank you and Mrs. Shevardnadze for the handsome gifts you brought for us. We are pleased to have the samovar and matching tray and the lacquered box as remembrances of the exquisite artistry of your fellow countrymen.

With our best wishes to you, Mrs. Shevardnadze, and to your colleagues as we approach our meeting in Geneva,

Sincerely,

RR

His Excellency Eduard A. Shevardnadze  
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the  
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics  
Moscow

RR:CMF:JEH:AVH

DISPATCH THRU STATE VIA NSC.

A handwritten signature, likely of the sender, in dark ink, located at the bottom left of the page.

ID # 3011WHITE HOUSE  
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET☐ O - OUTGOING☒ H - INTERNAL☐ I - INCOMINGDate Correspondence  
Received (YY/MM/DD) 1/1Name of Correspondent: Edward A. Shevardnadze☐ MI Mail Report

User Codes: (A) \_\_\_\_\_ (B) \_\_\_\_\_ (C) \_\_\_\_\_

Subject: Thank you for gifts on occasion of his  
visit with the President.

## ROUTE TO:

## ACTION

## DISPOSITION

Office/Agency (Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response	Code	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
<u>GA HILB</u>	ORIGINATOR	<u>Y85/10/18</u>			<u>1/1</u>
<u>WS MART</u>	Referral Note:	<u>C Y85/10/22</u>			<u>1/1</u>
	Referral Note:				<u>1/1</u>
	Referral Note:				<u>1/1</u>
	Referral Note:				<u>1/1</u>
	Referral Note:				<u>1/1</u>

## ACTION CODES:

A - Appropriate Action  
C - Comment/Recommendation  
D - Draft Response  
F - Furnish Fact Sheet  
to be used as EnclosureI - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary  
R - Direct Reply w/Copy  
S - For Signature  
X - Interim Reply

## DISPOSITION CODES:

A - Answered  
B - Non-Special Referral  
C - Completed  
S - Suspended

## FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:

Type of Response = Initials of Signer  
Code = "A"  
Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.

Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOB).

Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.

Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.

WHITE HOUSE GIFT UNIT

ID 8501023 A INITIALS JEH

LOGGED 850930 ARRIVAL 850930 PRESENT 850927  
ARRIVAL FORM P PRESENTED PERSONALLY

DONOR H FOREIGN OFFICIAL  
PREF HIS EXCELLENCY AND MRS.  
NAME EDUARD A. SHEVARDNADZE

TITLE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

CITY MOSCOW  
CNTRY UNI UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

SPOUSE NANULI RAZHDENOVNA

ACKNOWLEDGE BY RR FORM DFT

INTEND B PRESIDENT AND FIRST LADY  
CATEGORY 9999  
MISCELLANEOUS - N.E.C.

DESCRIP A SAMOVAR, 10" WIDE X 14" TALL, AND MATCHING TRAY, 12" X 16", BOTH  
WITH A LACQUERED FLORAL AND FRUIT DESIGN.

FLAG RARE

DISP AF ARCHIVES, FOREIGN

COMMENT ON THE OCCASION OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S WORKING VISIT WITH THE  
PRESIDENT.

TOTVALU RARE GIFTS B

## WHITE HOUSE GIFT UNIT

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PREF HIS EXCELLENCY AND MRS.  
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CITY MOSCOW  
CNTRY UNI UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

SPOUSE NANULI RAZHDENOVNA

ACKNOWLEDGE BY RR FORM DFT

CATEGORY INTEND B PRESIDENT AND FIRST LADY  
0999  
HOUSEHOLD - N.E.C.DESCRIP A LACQUERED BOX, 6 1/2" X 4" X 1 1/2" DEEP, MEDIEVAL SCENE PICTURED  
ON TOP, BLACK SIDES WITH DECORATIVE PAINTED GOLD BORDER AND SOLID  
RED INTERIOR.VALUE 000400  
APPR SIAMESE IMPORTS, MANHASSET, NY.

DISP WH RESIDENCE; FOR OFFICIAL USE/DISPLAY

DESIG AF ARCHIVES, FOREIGN

COMMENT ON THE OCCASION OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S WORKING VISIT WITH THE  
PRESIDENT.

TOTVALU RARE GIFTS B

Week Ending Friday, October 4, 1985

## National Historically Black Colleges Week, 1985

*Proclamation 5370. September 27, 1985*

*By the President of the United States of America*

### **A Proclamation**

The one hundred and two historically black colleges and universities in the United States have contributed substantially to the growth and enrichment of the Nation. These institutions have a rich heritage and tradition of providing high quality academic and professional training, and their graduates have made countless contributions to the progress of our complex technological society.

Historically black colleges and universities bestow forty percent of all degrees earned by black students in the United States. They have awarded degrees to sixty percent of the black physicians, sixty percent of the pharmacists, forty percent of the attorneys, fifty percent of the engineers, seventy-five percent of the military officers, and eighty percent of the members of the judiciary. Throughout the years, these institutions have helped many underprivileged students to develop their full talents through higher education.

Recognizing that the achievements and aspirations of historically black colleges and universities deserve national attention, the Congress of the United States, by Senate Joint Resolution 186, has designated the week of September 23 through September 29, 1985, as "National Historically Black Colleges Week" and authorized and requested the President to issue a proclamation in observance of this event.

Now, Therefore, I, Ronald Reagan, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim the week of September 23 through September 29, 1985, as National Historically Black Colleges Week. I ask all Americans to observe this week with appro-

priate ceremonies and activities to express our respect and appreciation for the outstanding academic and social accomplishments of the Nation's black institutions of higher learning.

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my hand this twenty-seventh day of September, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and eighty-five, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and tenth.

Ronald Reagan

*[Filed with the Office of the Federal Register, 11 a.m., September 30, 1985]*

*Note: The text of the proclamation was released by the Office of the Press Secretary on September 28.*

## Meeting With Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze

*Radio Address to the Nation.  
September 28, 1985*

### **My fellow Americans:**

During the past week we've been working hard to advance the Middle East peace process and to try to improve U.S.-Soviet relations. I met with our good friend President Mubarak of Egypt, and I'll be holding discussions this coming week with another longtime friend of the United States, King Hussein of Jordan. I hope to talk to you more about the Middle East next week. But today let me speak about our efforts to build a more constructive and stable long-term relationship with the Soviet Union.

Both Secretary Shultz and I met with the new Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze this past week. These meetings covered a broad global agenda, including the four major areas of the U.S.-Soviet dialog: human rights, regional and bilateral

issues, and security and arms control matters. They enabled us to discuss at the most senior levels the key issues facing our two nations. I told the Foreign Minister I'm hopeful about my upcoming meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev, and I put forward some new ideas as well as my plans and expectations for that meeting.

The Soviet Foreign Minister indicated that Mr. Gorbachev also is looking forward to these discussions. Furthermore, we agreed to set up a series of senior level discussions between our experts in preparation for the Geneva meeting. Let's be clear, however, that success will not come from one meeting. It must come from a genuine, long-term effort by the leadership of the Soviet Union as well as ourselves. The differences between us are fundamental in political systems, values, and ideology as well as in the way we conduct our relations with other countries.

The United States must and will be forthright and firm in explaining and defending our interests and those of our allies. I went over with Mr. Shevardnadze Soviet actions in various parts of the world which we feel undermine the prospects for a stable peace, and I discussed with him the need for the Soviet Union to work with us seriously to reduce offensive nuclear arms. These weapons exist today, and there's no reason why real reductions cannot begin promptly.

Finally, I emphasized the need for a more productive Soviet response to our efforts in Geneva to begin a U.S.-Soviet dialog now on how to fashion a more stable future for all humanity if the research in strategic defense technologies, which both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. are conducting, bears fruit. Mr. Shevardnadze indicated that the Soviet negotiators will present a counterproposal in Geneva to the initiatives we've taken there. We welcome this. It is important that the counterproposal address our concerns about reductions and stability just as we've sought to address Soviet concerns. And we hope it'll be free of preconditions and other obstacles to progress. We're ready for tough but fair negotiating. You, the people, can distinguish diplomatic progress from mere propaganda designed to influence public opinion in the democracies.

All too often in the past, political and public opinion, and sometimes government policy as well, have taken on extreme views of the U.S.-Soviet relationship. We have witnessed sometimes a near euphoria over a supposed coming together, at other times a feeling that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. may somehow be at the brink of conflict.

By holding to the firm and steady course we set out on 5 years ago, we've shown that there is no longer any reason for such abrupt swings in assessing this relationship. Our differences are indeed profound and it is inevitable that our two countries will have opposing views on many key issues. But we've intensified our bilateral dialog and taken measures, such as the recent upgrading of the crisis hotline, to ensure fast and reliable communications between our leaders at all times.

Above all, I emphasized to the Foreign Minister, and will do so with Mr. Gorbachev, that the overriding responsibility of the leaders of our two countries is to work for peaceful relations between us. So, what we're engaged in is a long-term process to solve problems where they're solvable, bridge differences where they can be bridged, and recognize those areas where there are no realistic solutions, and, where they're lacking, manage our differences in a way that protects Western freedoms and preserves the peace. The United States stands ready to accomplish this.

Much more must be done, but the process is underway, and we will take further steps to show our readiness to do our part. With equal determination by the Soviets, progress can be made. We will judge the results as Soviet actions unfold in each of the four key areas of our relations. And I will be reporting to you further as preparations for the November meeting proceed.

Until next week, thanks for listening, and God bless you.

*Note: The President spoke at 12:06 p.m. from the Oval Office at the White House.*

FORMAT NEEDED (Per NSC)  
(Will plug in times on Thursday after  
Bill finishes tomorrow)  
(incl. Mrs. Reagan's Schedule)

- I. Objectives (1/2 page)
- II. Setting (1/2 page)
- III. Annotated Agenda (4 pages approx.)

16th - Presidential departure from WH/Andrews

Presidential arrival (address brief  
remarks question, length, press  
coverage, theme of remarks)

17th Give all activities (designate  
"tentative" where necessary (e.g.,  
church, walk about, Fleur Dan, briefing  
times)

18th Same, Detail Furgler meeting, possible U  
of G event, briefings, private  
time/dinner (also Mrs.)

19th Start with breakfast; working coffees;  
meeting times, settings, coverage of  
meetings - even arrival/departures;  
working lunches, dinners (include themes  
for toasts). Also include possible  
topics of morning/afternoon meetings.

20th Same as 19th; except for details on  
Swiss reception (including question of  
Reagan remarks, coverage)

21st Departure from Geneva.  
Arrival at Washington (remarks at  
Andrews or White House or a la Nixon - a  
report to Congress).

Mark/Jack:

I will pick up your notes at the ODSM on  
Thursday and have them put on a System II disc  
and then retrieve Schedule from Bill in the  
morning and meld it onto your themes. By  
midday, I will then circulate a draft to Bill,  
you two and Bill Martin. After you comment, I  
will revise and get you a second draft by  
Thursday by 5:00 p.m. so that Bill Martin can  
forward to Bud and David Chew to Don Regan by  
either COB Thursday or OOB on Friday.

McFarlane/Regan is now set for Friday morning.

Thanks