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### WITHDRAWAL SHEET **Ronald Reagan Library**

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Date: 1/4/01

21, 1985 Box <del>9212</del>9 4,5

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Memo	Robert McFarlane to Reagan, re: NSDD on Themes and Perceptions for the Gorbachev Meeting, 1 p.	10/23/85	B1

#### **RESTRICTION CODES**

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statue [(b)(3) of the FOIA].

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].

- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of
- the FOIA].

  B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

B-1 National security classified information (b)(1) of the FOIA].

B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the

BECRET

MAYCOCK

No. NSDD 194

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# NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INFORMATION

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EECRET

October 28, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE-THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF THE DIRECTOR OF U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY

SUBJECT:

NSDD on Themes and Perceptions for November Meeting with Gorbachev (8)

The President has approved the attached National Security Decision Directive on his November meeting with Gorbachev in Geneva. The themes and perceptions put forward in the NSDD are meant for public use, and agencies are encouraged to draw from them in discussing our approach to the Geneva sessions. At the same time, the themes and perceptions papers themselves are not meant for public distribution and should be treated as sensitive material. (8)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Robert C. McFarlane

Attachment NSDD-194

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By NARA, Date 140

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION DIRECTIVE NUMBER 194

October 25, 1985

#### MEETING WITH SOVIET LEADER IN GENEVA: THEMES AND PERCEPTIONS (U)

It is important that all agencies have a clear understanding of what I consider key themes that need to be emphasized as we approach my November 19-20 meetings with General Secretary Gorbachev. I will be emphasizing the opportunity that the Geneva meetings provide to address a variety of important issues in a businesslike and constructive manner. For their part, the Soviets are trying to focus public attention almost exclusively on arms control, particularly my strategic defense initiative, while virtually ignoring a host of regional and bilateral issues that separate us. (8)

To help ensure that my message reaches as wide an audience as possible, I urge all government officials who will be discussing the Geneva meetings in public forums to draw from the attached themes and perceptions. (8)

Romad Ragon

Addressing Eb. 12356 5 Jilley NSC (887-1035) 12/20/41

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#### ROAD TO GENEVA AND BEYOND

#### Themes and Perceptions for Public Presentation

Theme:

BUILDING A SAFER WORLD

#### Basic Messages:

-- We want countries to stop trying to expand their influence through armed intervention and subversion.

That is why we are proposing negotiated settlements, withdrawal of outside forces, and international efforts to build economies and meet human needs.

-- We have the mandate and opportunity to reduce the danger of nuclear war by drastic cuts in nuclear arsenals.

That is why we are proposing radical, verifiable and balanced reductions of offensive nuclear weapons and are pursuing research to identify defensive technologies - which threaten no one.

-- We must <u>defend human rights</u> everywhere, since countries which respect human rights are unlikely to unleash war.

That is why we insist that the Helsinki accords and other international commitments be observed.

-- We must establish better communication between our societies, since misunderstandings make the world more dangerous.

That is why we are proposing dramatic increases in people-to-people exchanges, programs to share information, and enhanced cooperation in meeting human needs.

-- The meeting in Ceneva marks a new phase in this process.
Our efforts to reach these ambitious goals will continue.

#### PERCEPTIONS OF THE GENEVA MEETING

#### Working for a Safer Future

The President seeks to build the foundation for peaceful and constructive relations with the Soviet Union. This will require a long-term, sustained effort. It must be based on the principles of fairness, reciprocity and honest fulfillment of all agreements.

#### Soviet Behavior: The Roots of Tension

The use or threat of force by the Soviet Union and its proxies is an underlying cause of Soviet-American and world tension. The President is determined to defend the United States and its Allies. The USSR must cease using arms and force to expand its influence if tensions are to diminish.

#### Leading from Strength

The President's hand is strong: he has reversed the decline in American strength and has a robust economy, a united public and strong alliances behind him. He is able to defend us whatever the Soviets do. But he wants more: he wants to lower arms levels, reduce tensions and create a more cooperative relationship with the USSR.

#### Promoting Democratic Ideals

The President will speak out for democracy, freedom, justice and decency everywhere since these values are the surest foundation of a just and peaceful world in the future. He does not attempt to impose our political or economic system on others, but will insist that the Soviet Union also refrain from attempts to dominate others.

#### Probing Soviet Intentions

We can have a more cooperative relationship with the Soviet Union only if the Soviet leaders also want it. The Geneva meeting will determine whether there has been a change in Soviet policy or only in Soviet style.

#### Realistic but Determined Effort

The President is preparing seriously for the meeting in Geneva. He has no illusions about the profound differences in our philosophies and societies but will go the extra mile for enduring peace and a safer world. He will bring creative and ambitious ideas to the meeting. His efforts will not end when the Geneva meeting is over. He is in this for the long haul.

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#### NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Tab PR-10/23

SECRET

October 18, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SIGNED

FROM:

JACK F. MATLOCK

SUBJECT:

Proposed NSDD on Geneva Themes and Perceptions

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President forwarding a draft NSDD (Tab A) on public themes and perceptions for the November meeting with Gorbachev. The President has already approved the themes and perceptions.

#### RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve M

Disapprove

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Draft NSDD

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By NARA, Date 114 of