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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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*Geneva file
Fact Sheets*

November 13, 1985

FACT SHEET
New U.S. Proposals for Nuclear Arms Reductions

On November 1, at President Reagan's instruction, U.S. negotiators at the Nuclear and Space Arms Talks (NST) in Geneva, presented a new set of proposals for significant, equitable, and verifiable nuclear arms reductions. This followed the presentation by the Soviet Union in late September of a counterproposal which was in response to the concrete reduction offers which the U.S. had put forward at the outset of the negotiations.

President Reagan has stressed that the U.S. has four main objectives in seeking an effective nuclear arms reduction agreement:

- deep cuts;
- no first-strike advantage;
- defensive research, because defense is much safer than offense; and
- no cheating.

This fact sheet summarizes these latest developments in the negotiations.

Soviet Counterproposal

U.S. officials previously described a number of elements in the Soviet counterproposal of late September which would be unacceptable to the U.S. and its Allies, and explained how the effects of that counterproposal would be inequitable and destabilizing.

For example, Soviet definition of strategic delivery vehicles would cover U.S. LRINF missiles and "medium-range" nuclear-capable aircraft in Europe, in Asia, and on all of our aircraft carriers, while about 2000 comparable Soviet nuclear delivery vehicles, as well as 300 Backfire bombers, would not be limited. In addition, the Soviets propose limits on "nuclear charges," defined to include gravity bombs and short-range bomber weapons, which must face unconstrained defenses. Given sizeable and unconstrained Soviet defenses against U.S. retaliatory bomber forces, and the fundamental

differences between bomber and missile forces, as well as other U.S.-Soviet asymmetries, the U.S. cannot accept a direct limit on gravity bombs and SRAMs carried by heavy bombers (as we do for missile warheads).

Nevertheless, the fact that the Soviets have accepted the principle of deep reductions is a welcome development if equitably applied. It underscores the strength of basic U.S. negotiating position, value of united Alliance, and soundness of strategy of pursuing this position in patient and determined manner.

The President is committed to exploring every opportunity to achieve equitable and verifiable reductions in existing nuclear arsenals. Accordingly, President directed that additional U.S. proposals be advanced, building on concrete reductions proposals made earlier by the U.S., and on positive elements of Soviet counterproposal. We thereby seek to establish genuine process of give-and-take.

Strategic Offensive Forces

Over three years ago, in May 1982, we proposed a cut of about one-half in the strategic ballistic missiles (both land- and sea-based) of the U.S. and USSR, and a cut of about one-third in the warheads on such missiles.

-- In response to the Soviet counterproposal, we could accept concept of 50% reduction in strategic offensive forces, but we:

- cannot apply this concept in unequal and destabilizing ways;
- cannot abandon support for Allies; and
- cannot renounce right to conduct SDI research, which is in full conformity with ABM Treaty.

-- Thus the new U.S. proposal builds on the 50% reduction concept in constructive and equitable way.

- Reductions to limit of 4500 on reentry vehicles (RVs) on ICBMs and SLBMs, about 50% below current levels

- Reduction to limit of 3000 on RVs carried by ICBMs, about 50% below the current Soviet level and roughly halfway between our earlier proposal for a limit of 2500 and their proposed limit of 3600

- 50% reduction in highest overall strategic ballistic missile throwweight of either side; in this case, from Soviet level of 11.9 million pounds (U.S. has 4.4 million pounds)

- Contingent upon acceptance of RV and throwweight limits, we would accept equal limit of 1500 on number of long-range ALCMs carried by U.S. and Soviet heavy bombers, about 50% below planned U.S. deployment levels.

-- U.S. cannot agree to one common limit on ballistic missile RVs and ALCMs. It is inequitable to place in a single category ballistic missile warheads, which arrive at their targets in minutes and face few defenses, and bomber weapons, which take hours to arrive on target and also face sizeable defenses.

-- But if Soviets were to accept proposed 4500 RVs limit along with proposed 1500 ALCMs limit, it would result in reduction to a total of 6000 ballistic missile RVs and ALCMs on each side.

-- With respect to strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs), U.S. has proposed:

- reduction in strategic ballistic missiles to limit of 1250-1450, about 40-45% below the current higher Soviet level

- in this context, U.S. could accept further reduction of heavy bomber limits to 350 (compared to our earlier proposal of 400), about 40% below the current U.S. SALT-accountable level.

-- For reasons similar to those stated for RVs and ALCMs, U.S. cannot agree to Soviet proposal to include in a single aggregate strategic ballistic missiles and heavy bombers.

-- However, if agreement reached on range of 1250-1450 for ICBMs and SLBMs, and on heavy bomber limits of 350, would result in reduction to a total of strategic ballistic missiles and heavy bombers of between 1600 and 1800.

-- U.S. proposal also contains following elements:

- ban on all new heavy strategic ballistic missiles and the modernization of existing heavy missiles, due to their destabilizing character

- ban on all mobile ICBMs, because of inherent verification difficulties
- "build-down" as suggested means of implementing agreed reductions

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces

-- Previous U.S. proposals remain on table. U.S. continues to prefer total elimination of entire class of U.S. and Soviet LRINF missiles.

-- We also have made following new proposal as interim step toward this goal:

- U.S. would cap LRINF missile launcher deployments in Europe at the number deployed on December 31, 1985 (140 PII and GLCM) in return for Soviet agreement to reduce SS-20 missile launchers within range of NATO Europe to same number
- There would be freedom to mix between systems deployed as of December 31, 1985, but mix would be subject for discussion. (Could agree on mix giving U.S. approximately equal number at around 420 to 450 LRINF missile warheads in NATO Europe, based on 4 warheads/GLCM launcher, 1 warhead/Pershing II launcher, and 3 warheads/SS-20 launcher)
- Soviets required to reduce SS-20 launchers in Asia (outside range of NATO Europe) by same proportion as reduction of launchers within range of NATO Europe
- End result would be equal global LRINF warhead limits
- Appropriate constraints also applied to SRINF missiles

Defense and Space

-- U.S. is making clear once again that we are committed to SDI research program as permitted by, and in compliance with ABM Treaty.

-- We seek Soviet commitment to explore with us now how cooperative transition could be accomplished, should new defensive technologies prove feasible.

-- Also proposing now that Soviets join us in "open laboratories" arrangement under which both sides would provide information on each other's strategic defense research programs, and provide opportunities for visiting associated research facilities and laboratories.

Verification and Compliance

-- U.S. continues to stress critical importance of agreeing on effective verification means so as to be able to assess with confidence compliance with provisions of all agreements resulting from the negotiations. Verification is more important now than it ever was before, given Soviet conduct related to arms control over the last six years.

-- U.S. continues to stress a need for the Soviets to take necessary steps to correct current instances of non-compliance with existing arms control agreements. Non-compliance is politically corrosive and militarily real.

-- Soviet actions since the signing of SALT II have impeded U.S. verification of Soviet compliance and politically damaged the foundations of strategic arms control. Restoring compliance is a critical step.

-- Soviet Union must alter current practices which obstruct U.S. verification of compliance.

-- One initial step is for Soviets to alter current encryption of telemetry and revert to practices with regard to telemetry in use at time of signing of SALT II. This is militarily important in its own right, but its political significance is even greater.

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TAGS: PAR, CSCE, PREL, CDE

SUBJECT: THE SOVIETS, CDE AND GENEVA

1. JUDGING BY THE ATTITUDE OF SOVIET CDE NEGOTIATOR GRINEVSKY, GORBACHEV WILL DISPLAY HIS "IRON TEETH" ON CDE IN GENEVA. WE HAVE NO REASON TO BE DEFENSIVE. I STILL THINK A BRIEF JOINT STATEMENT ON CDE WORTH TRYING FOR, ASSUMING THAT SOME JOINT STATEMENTS ARE STILL UNDER CONSIDERATION. SUCH A STATEMENT WOULD HELP HOLD THE ALLIANCE TOGETHER ON CDE ISSUES.

2. I MET WITH GRINEVSKY NOVEMBER 12 THE DAY AFTER MY RETURN TO STOCKHOLM. HE HAD SEEN SHEVARDNADZE AFTER HIS RETURN FROM NEW YORK AND BEEN BRIEFED ON THE MOSCOW SHEVARDNADZE-SHULTZ CDE DISCUSSION. HE ACCUSED US OF RENEGING ON THE PRESIDENT'S DUBLIN OFFER, JIM GOODBY'S MOSCOW "COMMITMENTS" AND THE OCTOBER 14 STOCKHOLM AGREEMENT ON THE TRANSITION TO THE EXPLORATORY PHASE IN CDE. THE CORE OF HIS COMPLAINTS WAS THAT THE US AND NATO WERE NOT PRESENTING IDEAS OF THEIR OWN ON NON-USE OF FORCE, AND HE SAID THAT THE EAST WOULD NOT BE FORTHCOMING ON CSBMS UNTIL WE GET MORE SPECIFIC ON NUF.



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3. I SAID THAT I WAS GETTING TIRED OF SPURIOUS ACCUSATIONS OF FOOT-DRAGGING. WE HAD TAKEN THE INITIATIVE IN PROPOSING THE OCTOBER 14 AGREEMENT. WE HAD ASSURED THEM AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS THAT THE PRESIDENT'S DUBLIN OFFER WAS STILL VALID. AND I HAD SOUGHT FROM THE MOMENT OF MY ARRIVAL HERE TO IDENTIFY AREAS WHERE WE COULD MAKE SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS. THE PRESIDENT HAD SEEN ME IN WASHINGTON AND INSTRUCTED THE US DELEGATION TO REDOUBLE ITS EFFORTS TO REACH AGREEMENT. BUT THE SOVIETS WERE SHOWING NO GIVE ON CSBMS AND CONTINUED TO PRESS FOR INCLUSION OF INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES; THIS WAS AN EFFORT TO CHANGE THE MADRID MANDATE AND WE WOULDN'T BUY IT. IF GRINEVSKY WANTED TO ENGAGE IN A PUBLIC POLEMIC ABOUT RESPONSIBILITY FOR LACK OF PROGRESS I WAS READY. BUT I WOULD RATHER CONCENTRATE ON SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS.

4. SINCE THERE WOULD BE NO GENEVA COMMUNIQUE, I SAID I THOUGHT A BRIEF JOINT STATEMENT ON CDE WOULD HELP MOVE THINGS AHEAD HERE. SUCH A STATEMENT MIGHT WELCOME THE MOVE INTO THE EXPLORATORY PHASE AND UNDERLINE BOTH SIDES' COMMITMENT TO AN AGREEMENT MEETING THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE MADRID MANDATE. SINCE A BREAKTHROUGH ON CDE SUBSTANCE IN GENEVA WAS NOT IN THE CARDS, A STATEMENT OF THIS KIND SEEMED THE ONLY WAY THE SUMMIT COULD HELP US HERE. GRINEVSKY SEEMED INTERESTED BUT NON-COMMITAL. (IF THE SOVIETS WANT TO PURSUE THEIR ACCUSATORY STANCE FOR TACTICAL REASONS THEY PROBABLY WON'T AGREE TO A CDE STATEMENT. OUR ALLIES WOULD WELCOME A STATEMENT, AND IT WOULD HELP HOLD THEM WITH US ON SUBSTANCE.)

5. THERE IS NO GREAT PRESSURE HERE TO DRAFT THE NNA PACKAGE MAY EMERGE IN THE NEXT COUPLE OF WEEKS AND LITTLE OF SUBSTANCE WILL HAPPEN HERE UNTIL IT DOES.



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6. THE GOOD NEWS IS THAT THE NATO UNITY HAS FORCED THE SOVIETS TO DROP THEIR ARGUMENT THAT THE CDE OUGHT TO COEXIST WITH THE VIENNA REVIEW CONFERENCE.

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