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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. briefing book <i>BACKGROUND</i>	the meetings of President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, December 1987 <i>36p.</i> <i>BROKEN DOWN AS:</i> <i>COVER AND TABLE OF CONTENTS, 3p</i> <i>R 12/9/05 M03-1471 #2</i> <i>ARMS CONTROL PAPERS, 20p</i> <i>PART 12/9/05 M03-1471 #2A</i> <i>HUMAN RIGHTS PAPERS, 13p</i> <i>R 12/9/05 M03-1471 #2B</i>	n.d.	P-1, P-5
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**BACKGROUND BOOK
for
MEETING BETWEEN
PRESIDENT REAGAN
and
GENERAL SECRETARY
GORBACHEV
Washington D.C.**

December 8-10, 1987

DECLASSIFIED

NLS M03-1471#2

BY WJ, NARA, DATE 12/9/05 ~~**SECRET**~~

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THE PRESIDENT'S BACKGROUND BOOK

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. ARMS CONTROL

1. Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
2. INF Treaty Verification
3. START
4. Defense and Space
5. Nuclear Testing
6. Compliance Issues
7. Verification
8. ABM Treaty Interpretation
9. Nuclear Non-Proliferation
10. Chemical Weapons Treaty
11. Chemical Weapons Proliferation
12. Conventional Arms Control in Europe
13. CSCE/Conventional Stability Talks
14. Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) Implementation
15. Comprehensive System of International Peace and Security (CSIS)
16. Soviet Military Practices
17. Gorbachev's Murmansk Speech

II. HUMAN RIGHTS

1. Overview
2. Cases of Special Interest to U.S. Government
3. US-Soviet Human Rights Dialogue
4. Representation List Cases (Separated spouses, divided families, dual nationals)
5. Emigration and Family Visits
6. Political Dissent in the Soviet Union
7. Religion in the Soviet Union
8. Proposed Moscow Human Rights Conference
9. Soviet Human Rights Agenda

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III. REGIONAL ISSUES

1. Regional Dialogue
2. Afghanistan
3. Central America
4. The Caribbean
5. The Soviets and the Iran-Iraq War
6. Middle East Peace Process
7. Southern Africa
8. Terrorism
9. East Asia and the Pacific
10. India-Pakistan Nuclear Issue
11. President's Berlin Initiative
12. Ethiopia

IV. U.S.-SOVIET BILATERAL ISSUES

1. Bilateral Cooperation Checklist
2. Cultural and People-to-People Exchanges
3. U.S.-Soviet Maritime Boundary
4. Embassy Management Issues
5. Kiev Consulate
6. Soviet Disinformation
7. Free Flow of Information

V. U.S.-SOVIET ECONOMIC ISSUES

1. Soviet Economic Performance
2. Soviet International Economic Initiatives
3. U.S.-Soviet Trade
4. Grain Trade
5. Fisheries
6. Textiles

VI. SOVIET DEVELOPMENTS

1. Gorbachev's Leadership
2. Political and Economic Reforms
3. Recent Trends in Soviet Foreign Policy

I. ARMS CONTROL

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10. Chemical Weapons Treaty
11. Chemical Weapons Proliferation
12. Conventional Arms Control in Europe
13. CSCE/Conventional Stability Talks
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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (INF)

I. HISTORIC AGREEMENT

- o INF is first agreement in history actually to reduce, not simply limit build-up of, nuclear weapons.
- o By perseverance, we achieved goal you set in 1981 -- elimination of an entire class of nuclear weapons.
- o Credit to NATO unity and steadfastness; US deployments proceeded despite Soviet threats, 1983 walk-out from talks. (INF basing countries: UK, FRG, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands.)
- o INF has most stringent verification regime in history.

II. WHAT IS BEING ELIMINATED

- o All US and Soviet ground-launched missiles and launchers of intermediate-and shorter-range (from 500-5500 km).
- o For Soviets: SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 intermediate-range missile systems, and SS-12 and SS-23 shorter-range missile systems; those now deployed are capable of carrying over 1500 nuclear warheads.
- o For US: Pershing II ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs); those now deployed are capable of carrying over 400 nuclear warheads. (US has no shorter-range INF deployed.)
- o Both sides are also destroying hundreds more non-deployed missiles and launchers.

III. WHAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED

- o Elimination of Soviet SS-20, a mobile triple-warhead nuclear missile, which presented new threat to Europe.
- o Success for NATO's 1979 "dual track decision" -- deploying US INF in Europe while pursuing negotiations with Soviets to restore INF balance at lowest possible level.
- o Have met the standards you established in 1983:
 - US-Soviet equality;
 - US and Soviet systems only; i.e., no compensation for UK/French systems;
 - Global limits (i.e., no transfer of threat to Asia);
 - No weakening of NATO's conventional capability (i.e., no dual-capable systems included); and
 - Effective verification (see separate paper).

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (INF)
TREATY VERIFICATION

I. VERIFICATION OBJECTIVES

- o Enhance confidence in Treaty;
- o Deter violations by increasing risk of getting caught;
- o Quick detection of violations if they occur.

II. VERIFICATION REGIME CALLS FOR:

- o Locations for treaty-limited items to be specified until they are eliminated.
- o Exchange of comprehensive data on treaty-limited systems;
- o Updates of data throughout reduction period;
- o Specific procedures to verify elimination of treaty-limited systems;
- o Provisions for on-site inspection (OSI);
- o Provisions for verification by National Technical Means (NTM).

III. VERIFICATION PROCESS

- o Provisions have been made for routine exchange of data and to respond to compliance concerns.
- o In 11/87, sides began data exchange -- on missiles, launchers, bases. After Treaty is ratified and enters into force, initial "baseline" on-site inspection will check number of missiles and launchers.
- o There will be on-site inspection of missile/launcher destruction during three-year reduction period.
- o Sides are allowed to conduct short-notice on-site inspections of certain declared sites suspected of illegal activity during three-year reductions and for ten years afterward.

IV. INF VERIFICATION IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

- o US will seek verification measures that build and improve on INF experience for START agreement.
- o Intrusiveness of INF verification regime sets a positive precedent for other regimes.

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STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS (START)

- o Agreed Reykjavik goal is 50% reductions to 6000 ballistic missile warheads and bomber weapons, 1600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (incl. bombers, missiles [though Soviets focus on launchers, while US emphasizes missiles]).
- o Bracketed Joint Draft Treaty Text developed in Geneva. Talks resume January 14, 1988; goal is to finish treaty by spring 1988.

Major Issues:

- o Sublimits: After long resisting the concept, Soviets recently tabled their own version of sublimits. There are significant differences between the two sides.
 - We propose 4800 ballistic missile warheads. Soviet formal proposal implies, but does not state, 4800-5300. Privately Soviets have said they could accept 5000 but only with complete freedom to mix between Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM).
 - Soviets propose 800-900 air-launched cruise missiles; US probably needs more of these stabilizing slow-flyers.
 - US prefers 3000 limit on ICBM warheads; will accept 3300. Soviets propose 3000-3300, but only if US accepts drastic limits on submarine warheads.
 - US wants 1650 limit on heavy and high-warheaded ICBMs. Soviets propose limit of 154 heavy ICBMs with "derived" limit of 1540 warheads on heavy ICBMs only.
 - Soviets propose a one-sided submarine warhead limit of 1800-2000. US wants more -- Soviet proposal would force us to largely restructure our forces and deploy very few submarines.
- o Linkage to Strategic Defenses: Soviets continue to link START with a Defense and Space Agreement limiting SDI. We argue that strategic reductions are good regardless.
- o Throw-weight: Soviets offer only a unilateral statement; we want to codify 50% limit in the Treaty text.
- o Mobile ICBMs: Soviets already have 100 road-mobile ICBMs; 10-warhead rail-mobile system is near deployment. We plan comparable systems. We propose ban on mobile ICBMs on grounds of verification and stability; have put onus on Soviets to show how mobiles could be monitored if allowed.

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- o Sea-launched Cruise Missiles: Soviets want limit of 400 on long-range SLCMs (nuclear/conventional) with none on surface ships. At Reykjavik we agreed to find solution to problem of limiting deployments of nuclear armed SLCMs outside the 1600/6000 limits. Soviet proposal would gut our program, pose unacceptable military risk, not be verifiable.
- o Time frame to complete reductions: We propose 7 years; Soviets prefer 5 years but are willing to consider 7 years.
- o Allowing modernization of heavy ICBMs: Soviets insist such modernization be allowed; we would ban it and impose a flight test ban on existing heavy ICBMs.
- o Range cutoff and armament for ALCMs under a treaty: Soviets seek to use SALT II cutoff range of 600 km and would count all ALCMs as nuclear. We have not arrived at a position; may need significantly higher range and/or exceptions for conventional ALCMs.
- o Inclusion of Backfire: Soviets claim Backfire is a theater weapon which does not belong in a START treaty. We insist Backfire be included in strategic totals.
- o Non-circumvention and Trident II transfer: The Soviets, under the guise of non-circumvention, seek provisions that would ban transfer of the TRIDENT II (D-5) missile to the United Kingdom. We cannot accept such a limitation.
- o Verification: We differ on many important details. We have urged major focus on verification, especially on On-Site Inspection. We also have urged the Soviets to address how mobile ICBMs, if allowed, could be verified.

Soviet Special Concerns:

- o Constraints on SDI are continuing major issue for Soviets.
- o Gorbachev claims mobile ICBMs, the Backfire bomber, limits on Sea Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCMs), and allowing modernization of heavy ICBMs are all "artificial" impediments that must be removed.

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DEFENSE & SPACE

I. Reykjavik

- o Sides agreed not to withdraw from ABM Treaty for 10 years, but disagreed over scope of offensive reductions (US proposed eliminating offensive ballistic missiles, Soviets all nuclear weapons) and over ABM activities during the period (Soviets sought to restrict SDI to lab research).

II. Current Status

- o Our April proposal, including commitment not to withdraw from ABM Treaty through 1994, remains on table.
- o Soviets acknowledge some ABM-related testing can occur in space, but they firmly reject US broad interpretation.
- o October 30 Joint Statement called for developing new instructions to delegations for a separate treaty "on observance of and non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty for an agreed period" as a summit objective.
- o Round VIII ended November 19; next round begins January 14.

III. US Position

- o Commitment through 1994 not to withdraw from ABM Treaty in order to deploy systems other than those permitted by Treaty (contingent on 50% START reductions).
- o Sides would observe ABM Treaty provisions while continuing research, development and testing, which are permitted by the Treaty.
- o Either side will be free to deploy advanced strategic defenses after 1994, unless agreed otherwise.
- o "Predictability package" including data exchange, "open" laboratories, reciprocal observation of tests.

IV. Soviet Position

- o 10-year nonwithdrawal commitment to ABM Treaty and strict observance of ABM Treaty as "signed and ratified" in 1972; and
- o Either agree on list of devices not to be put in space if they exceed certain performance parameters; devices below thresholds could be put in space for any purpose, including ABM-related. "Other" research restricted to labs.
- o Or, "strict observance" incompatible with broad interpretation; unclear whether it equates to narrow interpretation.
- o Material breach of ABM Treaty would release other side from START obligations.

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NUCLEAR TESTING

I. BACKGROUND

- o First round of talks ended November 20. Sides agreed to "familiarization" visits to each other's test sites in January 1988 (President first suggested such visits in September 1984 UNGA speech). Talks resume in February.
- o Next round, sides will try to agree on Joint Verification Experiments that address Soviet concerns re: CORRTEx system.
- o Threat of Congressionally imposed testing limits has receded; could return depending on course of negotiations.

II. US POSITION

- o US requires a stage-by-stage process.
- o First, improved verification; ratification of Threshold Test Ban/Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties (TTBT/PNET).
- o Then, along with a program to reduce and ultimately eliminate nuclear weapons, negotiate further intermediate limitations on, and ultimate cessation of, nuclear testing.
- o Negotiations on strategic arms cuts must be in progress, but not necessarily concluded, for talks on intermediate testing limits to begin; a reductions agreement must be ratified before completing negotiations on intermediate limitations.
- o Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) remains long-term US goal, but only when we no longer depend on nuclear deterrence to ensure international security/stability, and when we have achieved: broad, deep and verifiable arms reductions; substantially improved verification capabilities; expanded confidence-building measures; greater balance in conventional forces.

III. SOVIET POSITION

- o Soviets agreed to reach agreement on effective verification measures for TTBT/PNET to permit ratification, but continue to press for intermediate test limits and near-term CTB.
- o Pushing for early Joint Verification Experiments, completion of TTBT/PNET verification protocols by mid-1988.
- o Gorbachev has pushed test ban since 1985. In June 1987, called for an immediate interim 1-Kiloton threshold and quota of 2-3 tests annually (some support for this in Congress).
- o Soviets observed moratorium from 8/6/85 - 2/26/87. [REDACTED]

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E. O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 1.4(d)

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COMPLIANCE ISSUES

ABM Treaty Review

- o Five-year review of the Treaty must be held between October 1987 - October 1988.
- o Soviets are pressing to set date for review. US has replied that: the review should be held; date and venue should be determined later through diplomatic channels.
- o We believe review should be deferred until both sides can better assess possible outcomes of discussions in Geneva arms control talks and elsewhere.

President's Report to Congress on Soviet Noncompliance

- o 1987 Report currently being prepared.
- o Principal findings of 1986 Report to Congress unchanged from 1985 Report, except SALT issues were only summarized.
- o Most important findings in 1986 Report were:
 - that the large radar under construction in Siberia near Krasnoyarsk is a clear violation of the ABM Treaty's restrictions on such radars;
 - that the Soviets may be preparing an illegal nationwide defense.
- o New issue during 1987 now being considered within USG concerns whether ABM radars have been moved from an authorized location -- an ABM test range -- to an electronics plant at Gomel, an action that may violate the Treaty.
- o US has raised this issue with Soviets in Geneva and has accepted Soviet offer to visit Gomel to collect information on whether Soviet activities there violate the ABM Treaty.
- o Important details of the Gomel visit (e.g., what will be open to inspection, how many US inspectors and for how long) are still to be negotiated.

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VERIFICATION

- o General: Soviets have accepted, in principle, some elements of on-site inspection in most arms control negotiations. They hope to convince Western publics they are more serious about verification than we.
- o START: US tabled draft treaty with extensive verification provisions and details on conversion and destruction; Soviet draft treaty calls for some on-site inspection, but lacks details on many verification issues.

To complete work on verification, US must make decisions on technical issues such as how to count missile warheads and how to determine which types of air-launched cruise missiles will be counted under warhead limits. US has put onus on Soviets to show how mobile ICBMs can be monitored; will insist they be banned unless verification/stability concerns can be met.

- o Defense and Space: Verification barely discussed. Soviets have proposed vague provisions, such as pre-launch inspection of certain payloads, for their list of devices to be banned from space.

In the Conference on Disarmament, Soviets have suggested that international inspectors might monitor payloads before launching, to enforce ban on space weapons.

- o Nuclear Testing: First round of stage-by-stage negotiations on nuclear testing held November 9-20. First agreed stage is to achieve verification improvements required to permit ratification of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. Sides have agreed on exchange of visits by experts to test sites, and have discussed a joint experiment to demonstrate verification methods.
- o Chemical Weapons: Soviets accepted "in principle" challenge inspection without right of refusal; concept of verification of data to be exchanged with US before treaty signature. INF experience suggests tough sledding ahead in addressing details.
- o Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE): Soviets for first time accepted mandatory air and ground inspection of military exercises on Soviet soil. US carried out the first such inspection in August; Soviets inspected NATO exercises in Turkey and the FRG in October.
- o Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR): Soviets did not respond constructively to Western 1985 offer on verification provisions; reiterated view that provisions not commensurate with the scale of reductions.

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ABM TREATY INTERPRETATION

I. Current Status

- o SDI program now complies with narrow interpretation. In 1985 USG concluded broad interpretation was fully justified. President decided as matter of policy not to restructure SDI program at that time, but reserved right to do so in future.
- o In 1987 in-depth legal analyses of negotiating record, ratification proceedings, and subsequent practices confirmed that broad interpretation is fully justified.
- o November 1987 consultations with Congress resulted in agreement to adhere to FY 88 testing program (consistent with narrow interpretation), unless Congress specifically grants funds for tests under broad interpretation. FY 88 funds may, however, be used to plan for such tests.

II. US Position

- o ABM Treaty poses no limitations on ABM-related research, regardless of where such research takes place.
- o For Article II systems and components (i.e., "traditional" physical principles), prohibited development begins with field testing of a prototype of an ABM component.
- o For systems and components based on "other physical principles" (OPP), Agreed Statement D bans deployment regardless of basing mode, but permits development and testing.
- o US decision to deploy strategic defenses would be subject of consultations with Allies and consultations and negotiations, as appropriate, with Soviets, as envisioned under ABM Treaty, or as specified in new treaty.

III. Soviet Position

- o Since NST talks began, Soviets have attempted to limit research and impose tighter restrictions on development and testing beyond those agreed to in the ABM Treaty in 1972.
- o In September they acknowledged for first time that some ABM-related testing in space is permitted; now stress that the sides should "strictly observe" the ABM Treaty "as signed and ratified in 1972."
- o Not clear the Soviets view this as identical to narrow interpretation; list proposal would place restrictions on research. They have emphasized that the "broad" interpretation is incompatible with the ABM Treaty.

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NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

I. Bilateral Consultations

- o Nine rounds of US-Soviet non-proliferation consultations completed. Next round planned for Washington in January. Consultations generally productive and non-confrontational.
- o Soviets have presented us a draft for bilateral agreement to combat nuclear terrorism that addresses the wrong issues.
- o We have proposed more practical ways to cooperate to combat nuclear terrorism.

II. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

- o Both US and USSR are strong supporters of IAEA.
- o Partly for propaganda (and to counter the Chernobyl disaster), Soviets have made their contribution to IAEA early, while US contributions are reduced and late, due to Congressionally-imposed reductions.
- o We expect Soviets to urge prompt and full US payment.
- o We view IAEA as high priority and will continue strong support within appropriations limits.

III. Regional Issues

- o South Africa: At September IAEA General Conference, Pretoria announced willingness to consider adherence to Nonproliferation Treaty and offered discussions with nuclear weapons states. Both we and the Soviets have stated readiness to talk with South Africa.
- o South Asia: We want Soviets to help our efforts to draw India and Pakistan into constructive dialogue on regional non-proliferation solution. Soviets have not pressed India.

IV. Nuclear Safety and Cooperation

- o Soviets have made a proposal for technical cooperation with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on nuclear safety. While not all aspects of it are acceptable, we are giving it serious consideration.
- o US, USSR, European Community and Japan have begun three-year cooperative effort to design advanced fusion reactor. No decision has been made on actual construction.

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CHEMICAL WEAPONS TREATY

I. BACKGROUND

- o 1925 Geneva Protocol bans the use of chemical weapons, but possession and transfer remain unconstrained.
- o In 1984, Vice President Bush tabled US draft treaty at 40 nation Conference on Disarmament in Geneva (CD).
- o At Geneva summit, agreed to accelerate bilateral negotiations with Soviet Union toward global ban.
- o Major obstacle has been Soviet unwillingness to accept stringent verification measures. Soviets now claim to accept US proposals in principle, though their negative reaction to US suspect site provisions in INF calls their commitment into question.
- o To date, the US has not been able to identify measures that would make the draft CW treaty effectively monitorable, or verifiable to protect the security interests of the US and its allies.
- o Have conducted exchange of visits to US, Soviet chemical weapons facility as confidence-building measure and means to promote greater openness.
- o US modernization program proceeding on schedule; final assembly of binary (155 mm. howitzer shells) weapons may begin December 16.

II. US POSITION

- o Pursue effective, verifiable global ban on chemical weapons.
- o Prompt, mandatory challenge inspection with no right of refusal essential for all suspect sites.
- o US continues to have verification concerns regarding undeclared stocks/facilities, novel agents.
- o Continue to study ways to develop effective verification, ensure security of all states within chemical weapons treaty regime.
- o Proliferation of CW-capable states introduces additional concerns about effectiveness of a CD-sponsored convention.
- o US now seeking a way to codify a constrained residual deterrent while gaining confidence that a convention is being complied with.

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III. SOVIET POSITION

- o Have publicly admitted possession; announced production moratorium, work on destruction facility.
- o Now accept most of US draft treaty, including challenge inspection with no right of refusal. Fine print still unknown.
- o Pushing for completion of treaty by mid-1988. Proposed joint summit statement, with commitment to sign ban, as way to give "political impetus" to multilateral negotiations.

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CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW) PROLIFERATION

I. The Problem

- o The number of states possessing chemical weapons has grown dramatically. Approximately 20 states now possess chemical weapons; several more are actively seeking such capability.
- o Chemical weapons are known as the "poor man's nuclear weapon" -- a cheap, effective weapon for Third World states.
- o Proliferation is particularly acute in conflict-torn regions, such as the Middle East and South Asia.
- o Have also seen alarming increase in use of chemical weapons -- in clear violation of 1925 Geneva Protocol.

II. The Solution

- o US has adopted three-part program of concrete measures:
 - Technical measures, such as export controls, to slow proliferation by drying up supply, raising cost;
 - Direct political action with proliferating states and other third parties to discourage acquisition;
 - Support for international investigations of use to prevent illegal use.
- o US has taken steps in all three areas; strongly encouraged other states -- East and West -- to do the same.

III. International Dialogue

- o At Geneva Summit, agreed to initiate dialogue with Soviets on problem of chemical weapons proliferation.
- o Three rounds of bilateral discussions have identified considerable common ground: Soviets accept concept of US three-part approach, have imposed export controls, support investigations of use.
- o However, Soviets remain reluctant to take difficult but necessary political steps, such as protests to client states.
- o US has also engaged friends and Allies: 19-member "Australian Group" has adopted chemical "warning lists," condemned CW use.

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CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL IN EUROPE

I. Background

- o With INF Treaty at hand, Western publics more concerned about Eastern conventional superiority. West needs credible conventional arms control forum; MBFR exhausted.
- o NATO and Warsaw Pact committed to renewed efforts in conventional arms control in Europe from Atlantic to Urals.
- o NATO has proposed two distinct conventional security negotiations: one for continued work on confidence-building measures among all 35 European and North American members of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE); the other to establish more stable balance of force levels between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
- o Former being discussed in Vienna CSCE meeting. Autonomous East/West talks underway in Vienna to agree on a negotiating mandate for the latter.

II. US Views and Objectives

- o Main threat to stability in Europe is substantial Eastern conventional superiority: 30 Soviet ground force divisions deployed in Eastern Europe and many more in Western USSR.
- o We seek: more openness in military activities; verifiable agreement on stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels; exclusion of nuclear weapons and naval forces; elimination of destabilizing disparities and Warsaw Pact capability for surprise or reinforced attack.
- o We continue to press the East in the MBFR talks to respond constructively to NATO's major compromise proposal of December 1985.

III. Soviet Views and Objectives

- o Moscow admits certain East/West military disparities (e.g., tanks), but denies overall conventional superiority.
- o Soviets propose equal NATO/Warsaw Pact reductions of 100,000-150,000 troops within two years, followed by further cuts in ground and tactical air forces to a level 25% below current levels by 1990's.
- o Gorbachev has also called for elimination of asymmetries, where they exist, by cuts to the level of the lower side.
- o Despite NATO's solid opposition, Soviets still want to include nuclear weapons in the conventional talks.

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CSCE/CONVENTIONAL STABILITY TALKS

I. Background

- o Third follow-up meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) opened in Vienna in November 1986, to review implementation of all areas of the Helsinki Final Act -- humanitarian, economic, and security -- and to look for means of improvement.
- o West seeks a balanced outcome from the meeting, with emphasis on significantly improved Eastern implementation of the human rights and fundamental freedoms provisions of the Final Act.
- o On security, West has proposed two negotiations:
 - Among all 35 CSCE states, to build upon the results of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures;
 - Autonomous talks on conventional stability limited to 23-member states of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Discussion of the mandate for these talks is proceeding separately from the CSCE meeting, among the 23 concerned states.
- o Soviets eager to conclude meeting, start stability negotiations; also eager to host CSCE human rights meeting in Moscow, deflect human rights criticism.

II. Current Status

- o NATO had hoped to conclude meeting by end of year, but drafting of a concluding document has been slowed by Eastern stalling, on human rights.
- o Soviets have pressed for a Moscow human rights conference. We will only consider such a meeting if Soviets meet rigorous criteria of openness/access for all participants and demonstrate an improved human rights record. Soviets have criticized our conditions.
- o US prepared to stay in Vienna as long as it takes to achieve a balanced result.

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CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES
AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE (CDE) IMPLEMENTATION

I. Background

- o In September 1986, the 35 participants in the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) adopted a set of military measures that include:
 - Prior notification of military activities (above a threshold of 13,000 troops, or 300 tanks);
 - Exchange of annual forecasts of notifiable activities;
 - Mandatory observation of exercises above 17,000 troops; and
 - On-site inspection as means of verification.

II. Implementation

- o Soviet and Warsaw Pact implementation has generally been encouraging; it has met the letter, but not always the spirit of the Stockholm Accord.
- o Both NATO and Warsaw Pact countries properly forecasted and notified their activities for 1987. The Soviets notified 18 activities for the year.
- o Observers were properly invited to all notified activities above the observation threshold; the USSR, GDR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia have hosted observers on the Eastern side.
 - In general, Soviet observations met only the minimum requirements of the Stockholm Accord. US observers found it very difficult to assess the scope of exercises.
 - By contrast, the US and other NATO Allies provided much more extensive observation programs for exercises in West Germany and the UK.

III. Inspection

- o US conducted the first inspection of a military activity in the USSR in August. The US inspection team was properly received and found the Soviet activity to be in compliance with agreed measures.
- o Subsequently, four other inspections have been conducted, including inspections by the USSR in Turkey and in West Germany. In all cases, inspectors were properly received. No instances of noncompliance have been identified.

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COMPREHENSIVE SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL
PEACE AND SECURITY (CSIS)

I. Gorbachev's Proposal

- o Gorbachev first proposed CSIS at Soviet Party Congress in 1986; elaborated on it this September in major Pravda article.
- o CSIS would establish a "new international security order" covering four areas: military, political, economic, and humanitarian.
- o Concept emphasizes "new thinking" and global interdependence. Repackages long-standing Soviet proposals.
- o Soviets have presented CSIS as way to strengthen and revitalize the UN -- in particular UN role in dealing with regional disputes.
- o Soviets also taking other steps to "strengthen" the UN, such as paying long outstanding dues.
- o CSIS resolution, first approved at the 1986 UNGA by a vote of 102-2 (US was one of the 2 no votes), with 46 abstentions, is again before UNGA First Committee in revised form this year. Soviets vigorously promoting passage.

II. US Position

- o CSIS proposal remains vague and ill-defined; would make UN more susceptible to Soviet influence by:
 - Giving UN General Assembly more substantive, operational role on arms control, terrorism, regional conflicts, etc.
 - Creating new subsidiary UN organs that would duplicate work of existing bodies.
- o Implementation of Soviet resolution could lead to tampering with UN Charter, create duplicative UN organs at great expense, infringe sovereign rights.
- o We oppose the Soviet resolution and affirm the obligations and structure of collective security already embodied in the UN Charter.
- o As always, we are prepared to discuss specific, individual Soviet proposals in the appropriate fora.

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SOVIET MILITARY PRACTICES

- o Over the years, the Soviet military has taken actions that have risked, injured, or killed US and Allied personnel.
- o We have raised our serious concerns with the Soviets on these matters. Soviets occasionally take corrective actions, but generally refuse formal apology/compensation.

Military Liaison Mission (MLM) Incidents

- o On March 24, 1985, LTC Arthur D. Nicholson was shot to death by a Soviet guard in East Germany.
 - Soviets have so far refused apology or compensation; Soviet military representatives indicated in October that issue is now with the Soviet Foreign Ministry.
 - In April, 1986, US and Soviet military reached understanding that "use of force or weapons" against MLM members is "categorically prohibited."
- o On September 17, 1987, a two-man US MLM team was fired on by a group of Soviet soldiers in East Germany. The US military driver was slightly injured.
 - We raised this incident during September ministerial in Washington. Shevardnadze and Ambassador Dubinin admitted fault and offered apologies but claimed US was also to blame (we rejected this contention).
 - At October 26 Potsdam meeting, Soviet military explained steps they are taking to prevent recurrence (including withholding live ammunition from Soviet personnel detaining US MLM tours).

Other Incidents

- o Missile Tests Near Hawaii: In the Fall 1987, Soviets test-fired ICBMs toward Hawaii and apparently illuminated US monitoring aircraft with a laser. We protested.
- o Dangerous Air Practices. Soviet military aircraft have flown in a dangerous manner near US and Allied military aircraft (primarily over the Pacific). Soviet aircraft recently hit a Norwegian P-3 maritime patrol aircraft.
- o KAL Shootdown. On September 1, 1983, the Soviets shot down a Korean airliner, killing the 263 people on board. (In lead-up to Geneva Summit, US, USSR, and Japan concluded agreement on civil air safety in the North Pacific.)

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GORBACHEV'S MURMANSK SPEECH

I. BACKGROUND

- o Gorbachev's October 1 speech calls for military, economic, scientific, economic and maritime cooperation in northern Europe.
 - It says the USSR is ready to "guarantee" a Northern European nuclear weapon free zone (NWFZ) and to "discuss" applying some of these measures to Soviet territory;
 - It proposes NATO/Warsaw Pact consultations on limitations on naval/air forces and activities in the Baltic, Northern, Norwegian and Greenland Seas;
 - It calls for joint exploitation of northern Arctic resources, scientific research of the Arctic, and environmental cooperation;
 - And, it offers to open up Soviet northern sea routes to foreign shipping.
- o European reaction to Gorbachev's speech has been mixed. Peace groups have praised it; neutral governments have cautiously welcomed it; NATO allies have criticized it.

II. US POSITION

- o There is very little new and nothing positive in Gorbachev's Murmansk proposals in the security area.
- o The proposals would complicate NATO efforts to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent, particularly in a post-INF world where we will be more reliant on sea-based nuclear assets.
- o The speech offers some opportunities in non-security areas for cooperation in the Arctic region. We are looking into these.

III. SOVIET POSITION

- o Soviets have so far not pushed Gorbachev's Murmansk proposals very hard, except with Nordic governments, although they did call it formally to US attention.
- o Future trips by high-level Soviets to Nordic capitals will keep the Soviet Arctic initiative percolating in Northern Europe.

I I. HUMAN RIGHTS

II.

HUMAN RIGHTS

1. Overview
2. Cases of Special Interest to U.S. Government
3. US-Soviet Human Rights Dialogue
4. Representation List Cases (Separated spouses, divided families, dual nationals)
5. Emigration and Family Visits
6. Political Dissent in the Soviet Union
7. Religion in the Soviet Union
8. Proposed Moscow Human Rights Conference
9. Soviet Human Rights Agenda

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NLS M03-1471 #2B

By LDI, NARA, Date 12/9/05

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OVERVIEW - SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS

I. GENERAL

- o Some improvement in Soviet human rights picture during the past year. Much more remains to be done, however. We may see back sliding as a result of political struggles in Moscow.
- o In contrast to the past, the Soviets have accepted the topic of human rights as a legitimate part of our bilateral discussions. We have taken advantage of this to conduct regular talks in which we can more thoroughly emphasize our concerns and to identify areas for joint cooperation.
- o We are urging the Soviets to resolve specific cases and to change their laws to make progress more long-lasting.

II. EMIGRATION

- o Since April, Jewish emigration has been at a plateau of 700-900 per month. This is much better than last year, but still far below the average of the 1970's. Emigration of Germans and Armenians is also up significantly.

III. REPRESENTATION LISTS

- o Soviets have made progress in resolving cases of special interest to you, such as Vladimir Feltsman, Ida Nudel, and Vladimir Slepak.
- o Soviets continue to resolve our divided family cases, but several long-term cases, which the Soviets have promised to release, are still unresolved.
- o Soviets have given exit permission in 6 divided spouse cases and 3 blocked marriage cases thus far this year. Nine cases, including four blocked marriages, remain on our list.
- o Soviets have resolved five dual national cases this year. 18 cases remain; resolution of 3 of these cases has been promised.

IV. OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES

- o Since February, over 200 political prisoners released, but not officially rehabilitated. Believed to be from 1,000 to 10,000 more, including hundreds in psychiatric institutions.
- o Over the past two years, the Soviets began permitting limited freedom of expression in some publications and

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demonstrations, but there has been markedly less tolerance in recent weeks. Religious groups and practitioners still persecuted.

- o Soviets have reduced the jamming of VOA and the BBC, but jamming of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and other foreign broadcasters continues.
- o Soviets showing little flexibility on accepting new commitments at the Vienna CSCE Meeting.

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CASES OF SPECIAL INTEREST TO US GOVERNMENT

I. BACKGROUND

- o List of cases of special interest first presented by Secretary Shultz to Shevardnadze in September 1986.
- o You discussed them with Gorbachev in Reykjavik (October 1986) and in Washington with Shevardnadze (September 1987).
- o Many of these cases have been resolved: David Goldfarb, Irina Ratushinskaya, Vytautas Skuodis, Ida Nudel, Vladimir Slepak.
- o Soviets also resolved case of pianist Vladimir Feltsman, in which you have taken a personal interest.

II. SUMMARIES OF CASES REMAINING

- o All remaining divided spouses and blocked marriages have been placed in this special category.
 - Remaining divided spouses: Viktor Faermark, Mariya Jurgutiene, Vladislav Kostin, Pyatras Pakenas, Sergey Petrov.
 - Remaining blocked marriages: Tatyana Alexandrovich, Yevgeniy Grigorishin, Lyubov Kurillo, Viktor Novikov.
- o Iosif Begun was told in September 1987 he could emigrate. But cannot leave without his son. Son cannot go because he and his wife would be stripped of their Soviet citizenship and would therefore not be able to return to the Soviet Union to visit those relatives still left behind.
- o Naum Meiman is refused on "state security" grounds, although his sensitive work was done 30 years ago. His wife Inna was allowed to come to the U.S. for cancer treatment in January, but died here three weeks later.
- o Leyla Gordiyevskaya and her two daughters are the family of a "defector."
- o Abe Stolar was born in Chicago and is a U.S. citizen, as is his son Michael. Stolar family cannot leave because Michael's wife cannot get parental permission.
- o Alexander Lerner has been refused on "state security" grounds since 1971, although he last performed sensitive work in 1965 and a scientific colleague has been allowed to emigrate.

US-SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS DIALOGUE

I. BACKGROUND

- o Soviets previously considered US raising subject of human rights as "interference in internal affairs."
- o At Reykjavik they acknowledged human rights as a valid topic for discussion and agreed to include in regular discussions of bilateral issues.
- o Now accept a range of contacts to discuss laws and procedures, as well as individual human rights cases:
 - Working groups on human rights at Shultz/Shevardnadze level.
 - Yearly "Bilateral Review Commission" talks on bilateral issues and human rights.
 - Quarterly review meetings between Soviet Foreign Ministry and Embassy in Moscow.
- o When human rights raised, Soviets now counterattack on supposed US human rights violations: unemployment; homelessness; alleged persecution of anti-war demonstrators and native American Leonard Peltier; alleged detention of the Bogatyys, a defector couple.

II. FUTURE OF DIALOGUE

- o During recent trip to Moscow by Deputy Secretary Whitehead, Soviets advanced suggestions for increased cooperation on human rights. We have indicated a willingness to explore these areas, many of which we already cover with the Soviets within the bilateral framework.
 - Contacts between parliamentarians, between legal specialists, between writers, and with officials of various agencies concerned with emigration and immigration.
 - Collaboration on alcohol and drug addiction, combatting terrorism, and standards for psychiatric commitment (with our proviso that American Psychiatric Association is the appropriate group to handle US side).
- o We have stressed to Soviets that such dialogue is not an end in itself, but a means to achieve improved performance; process is not a substitute for progress.

REPRESENTATION LIST CASES

I. MARRIAGE CASES: DIVIDED SPOUSES AND BLOCKED MARRIAGES

- o Since August, resolution of two blocked-marriage cases (Tatyana Pinyayeva and Yuriy Kasparyan) and six divided-spouse cases (Matvey Finkel, Svetlana Braun, Elena Kaplan, Galina Goltzman Michelson, Yuriy Balovlenkov, Leonid Sheyba).
- o (Blocked marriage occurs when Soviets prevent wedding, either by not giving American partner a visa or by refusing to perform ceremony.)
- o Two divided spouses also recently refused permission to emigrate (Sergey Petrov and Viktor Faermark).
- o We've called for resolution of remaining 5 divided-spouse cases and 4 blocked-marriage cases by summit.

II. DIVIDED FAMILIES

- o Soviet families applying to join relatives in US who are other than spouses of US citizens.
- o Most families on this list Armenian. Most Soviet Jews still apply for Israel, in the belief this will improve chances to get exit permission.
- o Recent increase in Armenian emigration has kept list from growing. About 100 families now on list.

III. DUAL NATIONALS

- o These are US citizens who are also considered by the Soviets to be Soviet citizens.
- o So far 5 cases resolved in 1987; 18 cases remain.
- o Most were born in the US and brought to the Soviet Union as children, or were born in the Soviet Union to US-citizen parents.
- o Soviets insist that, in order to leave, dual nationals apply to emigrate. Many have difficulty obtaining invitation from a close relative in the US.
- o Best-known case: Abe Stolar family cannot leave because daughter-in-law cannot get her parents' permission.

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EMIGRATION AND FAMILY VISITS

I. JEWISH EMIGRATION

- o Since April, Jewish emigration on a plateau of 700-900 a month. About 7,000 so far this year. Year-end total expected to be between 8,000 and 9,000. (In October Shevardnadze suggested 12-13,000 would be the 1987 total.)
- o Total was 914 for all of 1986.
- o In peak year of 1979, over 50,000 Jews emigrated, an average of over 4,000 per month.
- o Totals held down by Soviet procedures:
 - Arbitrary refusals on grounds that applicant has "knowledge of state secrets."
 - Requirement that even adults have parental permission to emigrate.
 - Requirement that applicants have an invitation from a close relative who lives abroad.

II. ETHNIC GERMAN AND ARMENIAN EMIGRATION

- o These two are the only other groups Soviets allow to emigrate.
- o Monthly levels still increasing, now comparable to peak years in late 70's and early 80's.
- o Most ethnic Germans go to the Federal Republic of Germany, most Armenians to US
- o Soviet German emigration 783 in 1986; about 12,000 so far this year; over 2,000 in October.
- o Soviet Armenian emigration 247 in 1986; so far this year about 5,000 have received exit permission; over 1,300 in October.

III. FAMILY VISITS

- o From April 1 - September 30, Soviets let about 2,500 persons come to US on family visits, compared with about 1,000 in same period last year.
- o Represents only a small percentage of those who would like to come. Many visa requests still denied, even to visit sick or dying relatives.
- o Also slightly easier this year for former Soviet citizens to return on visits to the USSR.

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IV. Soviets in Need of Medical Treatment

- o We frequently ask the Soviets to permit Soviet citizens to travel abroad for medical treatment. Some, [REDACTED] are also refuseniks who have close relatives abroad.

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POLITICAL DISSENT IN THE SOVIET UNION

I. REPRESSION OF DISSENT BUILT INTO SOVIET SYSTEM

- o Gorbachev inherited a highly repressive domestic policy toward political dissenters. Most of the repression remains in force.

II. LIMITED LIBERALIZATION TAKING PLACE

- o Some significant changes have been initiated, albeit within well-defined limits. None challenges the supremacy of the Communist Party or its leadership:
 - Some tolerance of demonstrations and unofficial publications, although recently the attitude has hardened. Demonstrations have been forcibly broken up and the participants subsequently harassed.
 - Release of more than 200 political prisoners. Release has slowed to a trickle, however, and many of those released have been harassed as they attempt to re-enter society. Many had to sign statements of guilt or promises to repudiate their beliefs, and none was rehabilitated.
 - Announced review of Criminal Code that may include repeal or revision of articles that have been used to convict political dissenters. Thus far, no other changes in the legal code have been announced. The Soviets have announced their intention to rescind the use of internal exile in sentencing.

III. US AGENDA

- o Release of all political prisoners, which Western observers suggest number between 1,000 to 10,000. We express particular concern for the prisoners in Perm Camp 36-1 who are subject to especially harsh treatment. Continue to urge the Soviets to account for honorary American citizen Raoul Wallenberg and to release the results of last year's reported review of his case.
- o Repeal of laws that facilitate the suppression of political dissent.
- o Rehabilitation of the released prisoners and an end to harassment.

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I. SOVIET GOAL TO ELIMINATE RELIGION

- o The Soviet Union is an atheist state which ideologically seeks the elimination of religion.
- o The Soviet Constitution guarantees the freedom to practice one's religion, but religious groups are required by law to register with the state and religious instruction is forbidden.
- o Discrimination against religious groups which have not been allowed to register, such as Ukrainian Catholics; also against denominations that consider it against their beliefs to register with the state.
- o Believers subject to discrimination in employment and education; especially harsh sentences for persons convicted under anti-religious articles of Criminal Code.
- o Has been estimated that at least one-third of all known political prisoners are religious activists.

II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

- o In August, Konstantin Kharchev, head of USSR Religious Affairs Council, told Senator Lugar that all Soviet prisoners of faith would be released by November. This hasn't happened.
- o Increased interest in religion and religious activism in light of glasnost, but the government has shown little increased tolerance.
- o Soviets have rejected further commitments at Vienna CSCE Meeting.
- o In 1988, Soviets will mark the Millenium of Christianity in Kievan Rus'. Authorities hope to use occasion to propagandize supposed freedom of religion.

III. US AGENDA

- o Unconditional release of all remaining religious prisoners.
- o Legalization of unregistered churches and increased religious contacts with the West. Contacts should not be restricted to officially sanctioned Soviet religious groups and individuals.

- Legalization of the teaching of religion, including the Hebrew language, as provided for in United Nations agreements. Soviets have signed.
- Unhindered importation and circulation of bibles, prayer books and other religious items.

PROPOSED MOSCOW HUMAN RIGHTS CONFERENCEI. SOVIET PROPOSAL

- o Shevardnadze proposed Moscow conference at Nov. 1986 opening of Vienna CSCE Follow-up Meeting.
- Soviets hope to gain Western endorsement of glasnost, "democratization", and human rights policy by hosting conference.

II. US POSITION

- o Officially haven't said yes or no.
- o US has explicitly said that we cannot consider conference proposal unless the Soviets:
 - Significantly improve human rights performance, i.e.:
 - Release all political and religious prisoners;
 - Resolve last family reunification cases;
 - Unjam foreign radio broadcasts (e.g., Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty);
 - Permit religious (e.g., Hebrew) teaching;
 - Significantly increase Jewish and other emigration;
 - Regularize emigration procedures; and
 - Institutionalize reforms (e.g., repeal "political"/"religious" articles of criminal code).
 - Provide credible guarantees of access and openness to anyone who wishes to participate (e.g., Western activists, Helsinki Monitors, private Soviet citizens, the press -- including VOA, RFE, RL reporters).
- o Shevardnadze told Sec. Shultz in Moscow that US conditions amounted to "political racism."

III. CURRENT STATUS

- o Still waiting for serious Soviet response on human rights performance and access/openness guarantees.
- o In Vienna, Allies currently united behind Western proposal for one post-Vienna CSCE human rights conference in a Western city, but French have proposed (within NATO) modification calling for three meetings--two meetings in West and a (subsidiary) Moscow meeting on human contacts.
- o US skeptical about French idea because French apparently prepared to agree to Moscow meeting in straight exchange (no conditions) for human rights conference in Paris in 1989 which would be centerpiece of French Revolution bicentennial program; Soviets have expressed interest in French proposal.

I. SOVIET ALLEGATIONS OF US HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE

- o As Soviets have accepted the notion of dialogue on human rights, they have raised what they consider U.S. violations of human rights.
- o Frequently raise social and economic problems, such as unemployment, but do not seem serious about seeking resolution.
- o Also raise specific issues, such as war crimes investigations, technology transfer and our human rights activities in the Soviet Union, about which they wish to engage us in detailed consultations.
- o Soviets have publicly accused us of denying them access to KGB defector Anatoliy Bogatyy. Bogatyy and his wife have on several occasions told the Soviets they want to meet with them, but have backed out at the last minute each time.

II. SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR COOPERATION IN HUMAN RIGHTS

- o In a recent discussion with Deputy Secretary Whitehead, Soviets advanced suggestions for increased exchanges and cooperation in the area of human rights.
- o Soviets are seeking cooperation in areas of importance to us, such as:
 - Exchange of information about laws of both countries;
 - Expanding the scope of our discussions about emigration and immigration;
 - Collaborating in fighting terrorism and drug and alcohol addiction;
 - Consulting about the use of psychiatric institutions.
- o As a means of expanding the human rights dialogue, we have indicated willingness to explore these areas, many of which we already cover in bilateral discussions with the Soviets. We have stressed that such dialogue is not an end in itself, but a means to achieve improved performance.

III. SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR MOSCOW HUMANITARIAN CONFERENCE

- o As noted above, Soviets are pressing us to accept their proposal for a CSCE conference on human rights in Moscow.
- o We have said neither yes or no, linking our ultimate decision to improved Soviet performance on human rights and credible guarantees of openness and access.